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author | Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org> | 2024-04-28 07:33:12 +0000 |
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committer | Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org> | 2024-04-28 07:33:12 +0000 |
commit | 36082a2fe36ecd800d784ae44c14f1f18c66a7e9 (patch) | |
tree | 6c68e0c0097987aff85a01dabddd34b862309a7c /lib/cert-session.c | |
parent | Initial commit. (diff) | |
download | gnutls28-36082a2fe36ecd800d784ae44c14f1f18c66a7e9.tar.xz gnutls28-36082a2fe36ecd800d784ae44c14f1f18c66a7e9.zip |
Adding upstream version 3.7.9.upstream/3.7.9upstream
Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'lib/cert-session.c')
-rw-r--r-- | lib/cert-session.c | 919 |
1 files changed, 919 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/lib/cert-session.c b/lib/cert-session.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9b03600 --- /dev/null +++ b/lib/cert-session.c @@ -0,0 +1,919 @@ +/* + * Copyright (C) 2001-2015 Free Software Foundation, Inc. + * Copyright (C) 2015 Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos + * + * Author: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos + * + * This file is part of GnuTLS. + * + * The GnuTLS is free software; you can redistribute it and/or + * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License + * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2.1 of + * the License, or (at your option) any later version. + * + * This library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but + * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU + * Lesser General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public License + * along with this program. If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/> + * + */ + +/* This file contains certificate authentication functions to be exported in the + * API which did not fit elsewhere. + */ + +#include "gnutls_int.h" +#include <auth/srp_kx.h> +#include <auth/anon.h> +#include <auth/cert.h> +#include <auth/psk.h> +#include "errors.h" +#include <auth.h> +#include <state.h> +#include <datum.h> +#include <algorithms.h> +#include <gnutls/ocsp.h> +#include "x509.h" +#include "hello_ext.h" +#include "x509/ocsp.h" + +/** + * gnutls_certificate_get_ours: + * @session: is a gnutls session + * + * Gets the certificate as sent to the peer in the last handshake. + * The certificate is in raw (DER) format. No certificate + * list is being returned. Only the first certificate. + * + * This function returns the certificate that was sent in the current + * handshake. In subsequent resumed sessions this function will return + * %NULL. That differs from gnutls_certificate_get_peers() which always + * returns the peer's certificate used in the original session. + * + * Returns: a pointer to a #gnutls_datum_t containing our + * certificate, or %NULL in case of an error or if no certificate + * was used. + **/ +const gnutls_datum_t *gnutls_certificate_get_ours(gnutls_session_t session) +{ + gnutls_certificate_credentials_t cred; + + CHECK_AUTH_TYPE(GNUTLS_CRD_CERTIFICATE, NULL); + + cred = (gnutls_certificate_credentials_t) + _gnutls_get_cred(session, GNUTLS_CRD_CERTIFICATE); + if (cred == NULL) { + gnutls_assert(); + return NULL; + } + + if (session->internals.selected_cert_list == NULL) + return NULL; + + return &session->internals.selected_cert_list[0].cert; +} + +/** + * gnutls_certificate_get_peers: + * @session: is a gnutls session + * @list_size: is the length of the certificate list (may be %NULL) + * + * Get the peer's raw certificate (chain) as sent by the peer. These + * certificates are in raw format (DER encoded for X.509). In case of + * a X.509 then a certificate list may be present. The list + * is provided as sent by the server; the server must send as first + * certificate in the list its own certificate, following the + * issuer's certificate, then the issuer's issuer etc. However, there + * are servers which violate this principle and thus on certain + * occasions this may be an unsorted list. + * + * In resumed sessions, this function will return the peer's certificate + * list as used in the first/original session. + * + * Returns: a pointer to a #gnutls_datum_t containing the peer's + * certificates, or %NULL in case of an error or if no certificate + * was used. + **/ +const gnutls_datum_t *gnutls_certificate_get_peers(gnutls_session_t + session, + unsigned int *list_size) +{ + cert_auth_info_t info; + + CHECK_AUTH_TYPE(GNUTLS_CRD_CERTIFICATE, NULL); + + info = _gnutls_get_auth_info(session, GNUTLS_CRD_CERTIFICATE); + if (info == NULL) + return NULL; + + if (list_size) + *list_size = info->ncerts; + return info->raw_certificate_list; +} + +/** + * gnutls_certificate_client_get_request_status: + * @session: is a gnutls session + * + * Get whether client certificate was requested on the last + * handshake or not. + * + * Returns: 0 if the peer (server) did not request client + * authentication or 1 otherwise. + **/ +unsigned +gnutls_certificate_client_get_request_status(gnutls_session_t session) +{ + return (session->internals.hsk_flags & HSK_CRT_ASKED)?1:0; +} + +/** + * gnutls_certificate_set_params_function: + * @res: is a gnutls_certificate_credentials_t type + * @func: is the function to be called + * + * This function will set a callback in order for the server to get + * the Diffie-Hellman or RSA parameters for certificate + * authentication. The callback should return %GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS (0) on success. + * + * Deprecated: This function is unnecessary and discouraged on GnuTLS 3.6.0 + * or later. Since 3.6.0, DH parameters are negotiated + * following RFC7919. + * + **/ +void +gnutls_certificate_set_params_function(gnutls_certificate_credentials_t + res, gnutls_params_function * func) +{ + res->params_func = func; +} + +/** + * gnutls_certificate_set_flags: + * @res: is a gnutls_certificate_credentials_t type + * @flags: are the flags of #gnutls_certificate_flags type + * + * This function will set flags to tweak the operation of + * the credentials structure. See the #gnutls_certificate_flags enumerations + * for more information on the available flags. + * + * Since: 3.4.7 + **/ +void +gnutls_certificate_set_flags(gnutls_certificate_credentials_t res, + unsigned int flags) +{ + res->flags = flags; +} + +/** + * gnutls_certificate_set_verify_flags: + * @res: is a gnutls_certificate_credentials_t type + * @flags: are the flags + * + * This function will set the flags to be used for verification + * of certificates and override any defaults. The provided flags must be an OR of the + * #gnutls_certificate_verify_flags enumerations. + * + **/ +void +gnutls_certificate_set_verify_flags(gnutls_certificate_credentials_t + res, unsigned int flags) +{ + res->verify_flags = flags; +} + +/** + * gnutls_certificate_get_verify_flags: + * @res: is a gnutls_certificate_credentials_t type + * + * Returns the verification flags set with + * gnutls_certificate_set_verify_flags(). + * + * Returns: The certificate verification flags used by @res. + * + * Since: 3.4.0 + */ +unsigned int +gnutls_certificate_get_verify_flags(gnutls_certificate_credentials_t res) +{ + return res->verify_flags; +} + +/** + * gnutls_certificate_set_verify_limits: + * @res: is a gnutls_certificate_credentials type + * @max_bits: is the number of bits of an acceptable certificate (default 8200) + * @max_depth: is maximum depth of the verification of a certificate chain (default 5) + * + * This function will set some upper limits for the default + * verification function, gnutls_certificate_verify_peers2(), to avoid + * denial of service attacks. You can set them to zero to disable + * limits. + **/ +void +gnutls_certificate_set_verify_limits(gnutls_certificate_credentials_t res, + unsigned int max_bits, + unsigned int max_depth) +{ + res->verify_depth = max_depth; + res->verify_bits = max_bits; +} + +#ifdef ENABLE_OCSP +static int +_gnutls_ocsp_verify_mandatory_stapling(gnutls_session_t session, + gnutls_x509_crt_t cert, + unsigned int * ocsp_status); + +/* If the certificate is revoked status will be GNUTLS_CERT_REVOKED. + * + * Returns: + * Zero on success, a negative error code otherwise. + */ +static int +check_ocsp_response(gnutls_session_t session, gnutls_x509_crt_t cert, + gnutls_x509_trust_list_t tl, + unsigned verify_flags, + gnutls_x509_crt_t *cand_issuers, unsigned cand_issuers_size, + gnutls_datum_t * data, unsigned int *ostatus) +{ + gnutls_ocsp_resp_t resp; + int ret; + unsigned int status, cert_status; + time_t rtime, vtime, ntime, now; + int check_failed = 0; + + now = gnutls_time(0); + + ret = gnutls_ocsp_resp_init(&resp); + if (ret < 0) + return gnutls_assert_val(ret); + + ret = gnutls_ocsp_resp_import(resp, data); + if (ret < 0) { + _gnutls_audit_log(session, + "There was an error parsing the OCSP response: %s.\n", + gnutls_strerror(ret)); + ret = gnutls_assert_val(0); + check_failed = 1; + *ostatus |= GNUTLS_CERT_INVALID; + *ostatus |= GNUTLS_CERT_INVALID_OCSP_STATUS; + goto cleanup; + } + + if (gnutls_ocsp_resp_get_status(resp) != GNUTLS_OCSP_RESP_SUCCESSFUL) { + ret = _gnutls_ocsp_verify_mandatory_stapling(session, cert, ostatus); + if (ret < 0) { + gnutls_assert(); + goto cleanup; + } + if (*ostatus & GNUTLS_CERT_MISSING_OCSP_STATUS) { + _gnutls_audit_log(session, + "Missing basic OCSP response while required: %s.\n", + gnutls_strerror(ret)); + check_failed = 1; + } + ret = gnutls_assert_val(0); + goto cleanup; + } + + ret = gnutls_ocsp_resp_check_crt(resp, 0, cert); + if (ret < 0) { + ret = gnutls_assert_val(0); + _gnutls_audit_log(session, + "Got OCSP response with an unrelated certificate.\n"); + check_failed = 1; + *ostatus |= GNUTLS_CERT_INVALID; + *ostatus |= GNUTLS_CERT_INVALID_OCSP_STATUS; + goto cleanup; + } + + /* Attempt to verify against our trusted list */ + ret = gnutls_ocsp_resp_verify(resp, tl, &status, verify_flags); + if ((ret < 0 || status != 0) && cand_issuers_size > 0) { + /* Attempt to verify against the certificate list provided by the server */ + + ret = gnutls_ocsp_resp_verify_direct(resp, cand_issuers[0], &status, verify_flags); + /* if verification fails attempt to find whether any of the other + * bundled CAs is an issuer of the OCSP response */ + if ((ret < 0 || status != 0) && cand_issuers_size > 1) { + int ret2; + unsigned status2, i; + + for (i=1;i<cand_issuers_size;i++) { + ret2 = gnutls_ocsp_resp_verify_direct(resp, cand_issuers[i], &status2, verify_flags); + if (ret2 >= 0 && status2 == 0) { + status = status2; + ret = ret2; + break; + } + } + } + } + + if (ret < 0) { + ret = gnutls_assert_val(0); + gnutls_assert(); + check_failed = 1; + *ostatus |= GNUTLS_CERT_INVALID; + *ostatus |= GNUTLS_CERT_INVALID_OCSP_STATUS; + goto cleanup; + } + + /* do not consider revocation data if response was not verified */ + if (status != 0) { + char buf[MAX_OCSP_MSG_SIZE]; + + _gnutls_debug_log("OCSP rejection reason: %s\n", + _gnutls_ocsp_verify_status_to_str(status, buf)); + + ret = gnutls_assert_val(0); + check_failed = 1; + *ostatus |= GNUTLS_CERT_INVALID; + *ostatus |= GNUTLS_CERT_INVALID_OCSP_STATUS; + goto cleanup; + } + + ret = gnutls_ocsp_resp_get_single(resp, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, + &cert_status, &vtime, &ntime, + &rtime, NULL); + if (ret < 0) { + _gnutls_audit_log(session, + "There was an error parsing the OCSP response: %s.\n", + gnutls_strerror(ret)); + ret = gnutls_assert_val(0); + check_failed = 1; + *ostatus |= GNUTLS_CERT_INVALID; + *ostatus |= GNUTLS_CERT_INVALID_OCSP_STATUS; + goto cleanup; + } + + if (cert_status == GNUTLS_OCSP_CERT_REVOKED) { + _gnutls_audit_log(session, + "The certificate was revoked via OCSP\n"); + check_failed = 1; + *ostatus |= GNUTLS_CERT_INVALID; + *ostatus |= GNUTLS_CERT_REVOKED; + ret = gnutls_assert_val(0); + goto cleanup; + } + + /* Report but do not fail on the following errors. That is + * because including the OCSP response in the handshake shouldn't + * cause more problems that not including it. + */ + if (ntime == -1) { + if (now - vtime > MAX_OCSP_VALIDITY_SECS) { + _gnutls_audit_log(session, + "The OCSP response is old\n"); + check_failed = 1; + *ostatus |= GNUTLS_CERT_INVALID; + *ostatus |= GNUTLS_CERT_REVOCATION_DATA_SUPERSEDED; + goto cleanup; + } + } else { + /* there is a newer OCSP answer, don't trust this one */ + if (ntime < now) { + _gnutls_audit_log(session, + "There is a newer OCSP response but was not provided by the server\n"); + check_failed = 1; + *ostatus |= GNUTLS_CERT_INVALID; + *ostatus |= GNUTLS_CERT_REVOCATION_DATA_SUPERSEDED; + goto cleanup; + } + } + + ret = 0; + cleanup: + if (check_failed == 0) + session->internals.ocsp_check_ok = 1; + + gnutls_ocsp_resp_deinit(resp); + + return ret; +} + +static int +_gnutls_ocsp_verify_mandatory_stapling(gnutls_session_t session, + gnutls_x509_crt_t cert, + unsigned int * ocsp_status) +{ + gnutls_x509_tlsfeatures_t tlsfeatures; + int i, ret; + unsigned feature; + + /* RFC 7633: If cert has TLS feature GNUTLS_EXTENSION_STATUS_REQUEST, stapling is mandatory. + * + * At this point, we know that we did not get the certificate status. + * + * To proceed, first check whether we have requested the certificate status + */ + if (!(session->internals.hsk_flags & HSK_OCSP_REQUESTED)) + return 0; + + ret = gnutls_x509_tlsfeatures_init(&tlsfeatures); + if (ret < 0) { + gnutls_assert(); + return ret; + } + + /* We have requested the status, now check whether the certificate mandates a response */ + if (gnutls_x509_crt_get_tlsfeatures(cert, tlsfeatures, 0, NULL) == 0) { + for (i = 0;; ++i) { + ret = gnutls_x509_tlsfeatures_get(tlsfeatures, i, &feature); + if (ret == GNUTLS_E_REQUESTED_DATA_NOT_AVAILABLE) { + break; + } + + if (ret < 0) { + gnutls_assert(); + goto cleanup; + } + + if (feature == 5 /* TLS ID for status request */) { + /* We sent a status request, the certificate mandates a reply, but we did not get any. */ + *ocsp_status |= GNUTLS_CERT_INVALID; + *ocsp_status |= GNUTLS_CERT_MISSING_OCSP_STATUS; + break; + } + } + } + + ret = 0; + cleanup: + gnutls_x509_tlsfeatures_deinit(tlsfeatures); + return ret; +} +#endif + +#define CLEAR_CERTS for(x=0;x<peer_certificate_list_size;x++) { \ + if (peer_certificate_list[x]) \ + gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(peer_certificate_list[x]); \ + } \ + gnutls_free( peer_certificate_list) + +/*- + * _gnutls_x509_cert_verify_peers - return the peer's certificate status + * @session: is a gnutls session + * + * This function will try to verify the peer's certificate and return its status (TRUSTED, REVOKED etc.). + * The return value (status) should be one of the gnutls_certificate_status_t enumerated elements. + * However you must also check the peer's name in order to check if the verified certificate belongs to the + * actual peer. Returns a negative error code in case of an error, or GNUTLS_E_NO_CERTIFICATE_FOUND if no certificate was sent. + -*/ +int +_gnutls_x509_cert_verify_peers(gnutls_session_t session, + gnutls_typed_vdata_st * data, + unsigned int elements, + unsigned int *status) +{ + cert_auth_info_t info; + gnutls_certificate_credentials_t cred; + gnutls_x509_crt_t *peer_certificate_list; + gnutls_datum_t resp; + int peer_certificate_list_size, i, x, ret; + gnutls_x509_crt_t *cand_issuers; + unsigned cand_issuers_size; + unsigned int ocsp_status = 0; + unsigned int verify_flags; + + /* No OCSP check so far */ + session->internals.ocsp_check_ok = 0; + + CHECK_AUTH_TYPE(GNUTLS_CRD_CERTIFICATE, GNUTLS_E_INVALID_REQUEST); + + info = _gnutls_get_auth_info(session, GNUTLS_CRD_CERTIFICATE); + if (info == NULL) { + gnutls_assert(); + return GNUTLS_E_INVALID_REQUEST; + } + + cred = (gnutls_certificate_credentials_t) + _gnutls_get_cred(session, GNUTLS_CRD_CERTIFICATE); + if (cred == NULL) { + gnutls_assert(); + return GNUTLS_E_INSUFFICIENT_CREDENTIALS; + } + + if (info->raw_certificate_list == NULL || info->ncerts == 0) + return GNUTLS_E_NO_CERTIFICATE_FOUND; + + if (info->ncerts > cred->verify_depth && cred->verify_depth > 0) { + gnutls_assert(); + return GNUTLS_E_CONSTRAINT_ERROR; + } + + verify_flags = + cred->verify_flags | session->internals.additional_verify_flags; + /* generate a list of gnutls_certs based on the auth info + * raw certs. + */ + peer_certificate_list_size = info->ncerts; + peer_certificate_list = + gnutls_calloc(peer_certificate_list_size, + sizeof(gnutls_x509_crt_t)); + if (peer_certificate_list == NULL) { + gnutls_assert(); + return GNUTLS_E_MEMORY_ERROR; + } + + for (i = 0; i < peer_certificate_list_size; i++) { + ret = gnutls_x509_crt_init(&peer_certificate_list[i]); + if (ret < 0) { + gnutls_assert(); + CLEAR_CERTS; + return ret; + } + + ret = + gnutls_x509_crt_import(peer_certificate_list[i], + &info->raw_certificate_list[i], + GNUTLS_X509_FMT_DER); + if (ret < 0) { + gnutls_assert(); + CLEAR_CERTS; + return ret; + } + } + + /* Use the OCSP extension if any */ +#ifdef ENABLE_OCSP + if (verify_flags & GNUTLS_VERIFY_DISABLE_CRL_CHECKS) + goto skip_ocsp; + + for (i=0;i<peer_certificate_list_size;i++) { + ret = gnutls_ocsp_status_request_get2(session, i, &resp); + if (ret < 0) { + ret = _gnutls_ocsp_verify_mandatory_stapling(session, peer_certificate_list[i], &ocsp_status); + if (ret < 0) { + gnutls_assert(); + CLEAR_CERTS; + return ret; + } + + continue; + } + + cand_issuers = NULL; + cand_issuers_size = 0; + if (peer_certificate_list_size > i+1) { + cand_issuers = &peer_certificate_list[i+1]; + cand_issuers_size = peer_certificate_list_size-i-1; + } + + ret = + check_ocsp_response(session, + peer_certificate_list[i], + cred->tlist, + verify_flags, cand_issuers, + cand_issuers_size, + &resp, &ocsp_status); + + if (ret < 0) { + CLEAR_CERTS; + return gnutls_assert_val(ret); + } + } +#endif + + skip_ocsp: + /* Verify certificate + */ + if (session->internals.cert_output_callback != NULL) { + _gnutls_debug_log("Print full certificate path validation to trust root.\n"); + ret = + gnutls_x509_trust_list_verify_crt2(cred->tlist, + peer_certificate_list, + peer_certificate_list_size, + data, elements, + verify_flags, status, + session->internals.cert_output_callback); + } else { + ret = + gnutls_x509_trust_list_verify_crt2(cred->tlist, + peer_certificate_list, + peer_certificate_list_size, + data, elements, + verify_flags, status, NULL); + } + + if (ret < 0) { + gnutls_assert(); + CLEAR_CERTS; + return ret; + } + + CLEAR_CERTS; + + *status |= ocsp_status; + + return 0; +} + +/** + * gnutls_certificate_verify_peers2: + * @session: is a gnutls session + * @status: is the output of the verification + * + * This function will verify the peer's certificate and store + * the status in the @status variable as a bitwise OR of gnutls_certificate_status_t + * values or zero if the certificate is trusted. Note that value in @status + * is set only when the return value of this function is success (i.e, failure + * to trust a certificate does not imply a negative return value). + * The default verification flags used by this function can be overridden + * using gnutls_certificate_set_verify_flags(). + * + * This function will take into account the stapled OCSP responses sent by the server, + * as well as the following X.509 certificate extensions: Name Constraints, + * Key Usage, and Basic Constraints (pathlen). + * + * Note that you must also check the peer's name in order to check if + * the verified certificate belongs to the actual peer, see gnutls_x509_crt_check_hostname(), + * or use gnutls_certificate_verify_peers3(). + * + * To avoid denial of service attacks some + * default upper limits regarding the certificate key size and chain + * size are set. To override them use gnutls_certificate_set_verify_limits(). + * + * Note that when using raw public-keys verification will not work because there is + * no corresponding certificate body belonging to the raw key that can be verified. In that + * case this function will return %GNUTLS_E_INVALID_REQUEST. + * + * Returns: %GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS (0) when the validation is performed, or a negative error code otherwise. + * A successful error code means that the @status parameter must be checked to obtain the validation status. + **/ +int +gnutls_certificate_verify_peers2(gnutls_session_t session, + unsigned int *status) +{ + return gnutls_certificate_verify_peers(session, NULL, 0, status); +} + +/** + * gnutls_certificate_verify_peers3: + * @session: is a gnutls session + * @hostname: is the expected name of the peer; may be %NULL + * @status: is the output of the verification + * + * This function will verify the peer's certificate and store the + * the status in the @status variable as a bitwise OR of gnutls_certificate_status_t + * values or zero if the certificate is trusted. Note that value in @status + * is set only when the return value of this function is success (i.e, failure + * to trust a certificate does not imply a negative return value). + * The default verification flags used by this function can be overridden + * using gnutls_certificate_set_verify_flags(). See the documentation + * of gnutls_certificate_verify_peers2() for details in the verification process. + * + * This function will take into account the stapled OCSP responses sent by the server, + * as well as the following X.509 certificate extensions: Name Constraints, + * Key Usage, and Basic Constraints (pathlen). + * + * If the @hostname provided is non-NULL then this function will compare + * the hostname in the certificate against it. The comparison will follow + * the RFC6125 recommendations. If names do not match the + * %GNUTLS_CERT_UNEXPECTED_OWNER status flag will be set. + * + * In order to verify the purpose of the end-certificate (by checking the extended + * key usage), use gnutls_certificate_verify_peers(). + * + * To avoid denial of service attacks some + * default upper limits regarding the certificate key size and chain + * size are set. To override them use gnutls_certificate_set_verify_limits(). + * + * Note that when using raw public-keys verification will not work because there is + * no corresponding certificate body belonging to the raw key that can be verified. In that + * case this function will return %GNUTLS_E_INVALID_REQUEST. + * + * Returns: %GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS (0) when the validation is performed, or a negative error code otherwise. + * A successful error code means that the @status parameter must be checked to obtain the validation status. + * + * Since: 3.1.4 + **/ +int +gnutls_certificate_verify_peers3(gnutls_session_t session, + const char *hostname, + unsigned int *status) +{ +gnutls_typed_vdata_st data; + + data.type = GNUTLS_DT_DNS_HOSTNAME; + data.size = 0; + data.data = (void*)hostname; + + return gnutls_certificate_verify_peers(session, &data, 1, status); +} + +/** + * gnutls_certificate_verify_peers: + * @session: is a gnutls session + * @data: an array of typed data + * @elements: the number of data elements + * @status: is the output of the verification + * + * This function will verify the peer's certificate and store the + * the status in the @status variable as a bitwise OR of gnutls_certificate_status_t + * values or zero if the certificate is trusted. Note that value in @status + * is set only when the return value of this function is success (i.e, failure + * to trust a certificate does not imply a negative return value). + * The default verification flags used by this function can be overridden + * using gnutls_certificate_set_verify_flags(). See the documentation + * of gnutls_certificate_verify_peers2() for details in the verification process. + * + * This function will take into account the stapled OCSP responses sent by the server, + * as well as the following X.509 certificate extensions: Name Constraints, + * Key Usage, and Basic Constraints (pathlen). + * + * The acceptable @data types are %GNUTLS_DT_DNS_HOSTNAME, %GNUTLS_DT_RFC822NAME and %GNUTLS_DT_KEY_PURPOSE_OID. + * The former two accept as data a null-terminated hostname or email address, and the latter a null-terminated + * object identifier (e.g., %GNUTLS_KP_TLS_WWW_SERVER). + * + * If a DNS hostname is provided then this function will compare + * the hostname in the certificate against the given. If names do not match the + * %GNUTLS_CERT_UNEXPECTED_OWNER status flag will be set. + * If a key purpose OID is provided and the end-certificate contains the extended key + * usage PKIX extension, it will be required to be have the provided key purpose + * or be marked for any purpose, otherwise verification status will have the + * %GNUTLS_CERT_SIGNER_CONSTRAINTS_FAILURE flag set. + * + * To avoid denial of service attacks some + * default upper limits regarding the certificate key size and chain + * size are set. To override them use gnutls_certificate_set_verify_limits(). + * + * Note that when using raw public-keys verification will not work because there is + * no corresponding certificate body belonging to the raw key that can be verified. In that + * case this function will return %GNUTLS_E_INVALID_REQUEST. + * + * Returns: %GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS (0) when the validation is performed, or a negative error code otherwise. + * A successful error code means that the @status parameter must be checked to obtain the validation status. + * + * Since: 3.3.0 + **/ +int +gnutls_certificate_verify_peers(gnutls_session_t session, + gnutls_typed_vdata_st * data, + unsigned int elements, + unsigned int *status) +{ + cert_auth_info_t info; + + CHECK_AUTH_TYPE(GNUTLS_CRD_CERTIFICATE, GNUTLS_E_INVALID_REQUEST); + + info = _gnutls_get_auth_info(session, GNUTLS_CRD_CERTIFICATE); + if (info == NULL) { + return GNUTLS_E_NO_CERTIFICATE_FOUND; + } + + if (info->raw_certificate_list == NULL || info->ncerts == 0) + return GNUTLS_E_NO_CERTIFICATE_FOUND; + + + switch (get_certificate_type(session, GNUTLS_CTYPE_PEERS)) { + case GNUTLS_CRT_X509: + return _gnutls_x509_cert_verify_peers(session, data, elements, + status); + default: + return GNUTLS_E_INVALID_REQUEST; + } +} + +/*- + * _gnutls_x509_extract_certificate_activation_time - return the peer's certificate activation time + * @cert: should contain an X.509 DER encoded certificate + * + * This function will return the certificate's activation time in UNIX time + * (ie seconds since 00:00:00 UTC January 1, 1970). + * + * Returns a (time_t) -1 in case of an error. + * + -*/ +static time_t +_gnutls_x509_get_raw_crt_activation_time(const gnutls_datum_t * cert) +{ + gnutls_x509_crt_t xcert; + time_t result; + + result = gnutls_x509_crt_init(&xcert); + if (result < 0) + return (time_t) - 1; + + result = gnutls_x509_crt_import(xcert, cert, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_DER); + if (result < 0) { + gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(xcert); + return (time_t) - 1; + } + + result = gnutls_x509_crt_get_activation_time(xcert); + + gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(xcert); + + return result; +} + +/*- + * gnutls_x509_extract_certificate_expiration_time: + * @cert: should contain an X.509 DER encoded certificate + * + * This function will return the certificate's expiration time in UNIX + * time (ie seconds since 00:00:00 UTC January 1, 1970). Returns a + * + * (time_t) -1 in case of an error. + * + -*/ +static time_t +_gnutls_x509_get_raw_crt_expiration_time(const gnutls_datum_t * cert) +{ + gnutls_x509_crt_t xcert; + time_t result; + + result = gnutls_x509_crt_init(&xcert); + if (result < 0) + return (time_t) - 1; + + result = gnutls_x509_crt_import(xcert, cert, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_DER); + if (result < 0) { + gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(xcert); + return (time_t) - 1; + } + + result = gnutls_x509_crt_get_expiration_time(xcert); + + gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(xcert); + + return result; +} + +/** + * gnutls_certificate_expiration_time_peers: + * @session: is a gnutls session + * + * This function will return the peer's certificate expiration time. + * + * Returns: (time_t)-1 on error. + * + * Deprecated: gnutls_certificate_verify_peers2() now verifies expiration times. + **/ +time_t gnutls_certificate_expiration_time_peers(gnutls_session_t session) +{ + cert_auth_info_t info; + + CHECK_AUTH_TYPE(GNUTLS_CRD_CERTIFICATE, GNUTLS_E_INVALID_REQUEST); + + info = _gnutls_get_auth_info(session, GNUTLS_CRD_CERTIFICATE); + if (info == NULL) { + return (time_t) - 1; + } + + if (info->raw_certificate_list == NULL || info->ncerts == 0) { + gnutls_assert(); + return (time_t) - 1; + } + + switch (get_certificate_type(session, GNUTLS_CTYPE_PEERS)) { + case GNUTLS_CRT_X509: + return + _gnutls_x509_get_raw_crt_expiration_time(&info-> + raw_certificate_list[0]); + default: + return (time_t) - 1; + } +} + +/** + * gnutls_certificate_activation_time_peers: + * @session: is a gnutls session + * + * This function will return the peer's certificate activation time. + * + * Returns: (time_t)-1 on error. + * + * Deprecated: gnutls_certificate_verify_peers2() now verifies activation times. + **/ +time_t gnutls_certificate_activation_time_peers(gnutls_session_t session) +{ + cert_auth_info_t info; + + CHECK_AUTH_TYPE(GNUTLS_CRD_CERTIFICATE, GNUTLS_E_INVALID_REQUEST); + + info = _gnutls_get_auth_info(session, GNUTLS_CRD_CERTIFICATE); + if (info == NULL) { + return (time_t) - 1; + } + + if (info->raw_certificate_list == NULL || info->ncerts == 0) { + gnutls_assert(); + return (time_t) - 1; + } + + switch (get_certificate_type(session, GNUTLS_CTYPE_PEERS)) { + case GNUTLS_CRT_X509: + return + _gnutls_x509_get_raw_crt_activation_time(&info-> + raw_certificate_list[0]); + default: + return (time_t) - 1; + } +} |