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authorDaniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>2024-04-28 07:33:12 +0000
committerDaniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>2024-04-28 07:33:12 +0000
commit36082a2fe36ecd800d784ae44c14f1f18c66a7e9 (patch)
tree6c68e0c0097987aff85a01dabddd34b862309a7c /lib/cert-session.c
parentInitial commit. (diff)
downloadgnutls28-36082a2fe36ecd800d784ae44c14f1f18c66a7e9.tar.xz
gnutls28-36082a2fe36ecd800d784ae44c14f1f18c66a7e9.zip
Adding upstream version 3.7.9.upstream/3.7.9upstream
Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'lib/cert-session.c')
-rw-r--r--lib/cert-session.c919
1 files changed, 919 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/lib/cert-session.c b/lib/cert-session.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9b03600
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/cert-session.c
@@ -0,0 +1,919 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2001-2015 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ * Copyright (C) 2015 Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
+ *
+ * Author: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
+ *
+ * This file is part of GnuTLS.
+ *
+ * The GnuTLS is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2.1 of
+ * the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
+ * Lesser General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public License
+ * along with this program. If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>
+ *
+ */
+
+/* This file contains certificate authentication functions to be exported in the
+ * API which did not fit elsewhere.
+ */
+
+#include "gnutls_int.h"
+#include <auth/srp_kx.h>
+#include <auth/anon.h>
+#include <auth/cert.h>
+#include <auth/psk.h>
+#include "errors.h"
+#include <auth.h>
+#include <state.h>
+#include <datum.h>
+#include <algorithms.h>
+#include <gnutls/ocsp.h>
+#include "x509.h"
+#include "hello_ext.h"
+#include "x509/ocsp.h"
+
+/**
+ * gnutls_certificate_get_ours:
+ * @session: is a gnutls session
+ *
+ * Gets the certificate as sent to the peer in the last handshake.
+ * The certificate is in raw (DER) format. No certificate
+ * list is being returned. Only the first certificate.
+ *
+ * This function returns the certificate that was sent in the current
+ * handshake. In subsequent resumed sessions this function will return
+ * %NULL. That differs from gnutls_certificate_get_peers() which always
+ * returns the peer's certificate used in the original session.
+ *
+ * Returns: a pointer to a #gnutls_datum_t containing our
+ * certificate, or %NULL in case of an error or if no certificate
+ * was used.
+ **/
+const gnutls_datum_t *gnutls_certificate_get_ours(gnutls_session_t session)
+{
+ gnutls_certificate_credentials_t cred;
+
+ CHECK_AUTH_TYPE(GNUTLS_CRD_CERTIFICATE, NULL);
+
+ cred = (gnutls_certificate_credentials_t)
+ _gnutls_get_cred(session, GNUTLS_CRD_CERTIFICATE);
+ if (cred == NULL) {
+ gnutls_assert();
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (session->internals.selected_cert_list == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ return &session->internals.selected_cert_list[0].cert;
+}
+
+/**
+ * gnutls_certificate_get_peers:
+ * @session: is a gnutls session
+ * @list_size: is the length of the certificate list (may be %NULL)
+ *
+ * Get the peer's raw certificate (chain) as sent by the peer. These
+ * certificates are in raw format (DER encoded for X.509). In case of
+ * a X.509 then a certificate list may be present. The list
+ * is provided as sent by the server; the server must send as first
+ * certificate in the list its own certificate, following the
+ * issuer's certificate, then the issuer's issuer etc. However, there
+ * are servers which violate this principle and thus on certain
+ * occasions this may be an unsorted list.
+ *
+ * In resumed sessions, this function will return the peer's certificate
+ * list as used in the first/original session.
+ *
+ * Returns: a pointer to a #gnutls_datum_t containing the peer's
+ * certificates, or %NULL in case of an error or if no certificate
+ * was used.
+ **/
+const gnutls_datum_t *gnutls_certificate_get_peers(gnutls_session_t
+ session,
+ unsigned int *list_size)
+{
+ cert_auth_info_t info;
+
+ CHECK_AUTH_TYPE(GNUTLS_CRD_CERTIFICATE, NULL);
+
+ info = _gnutls_get_auth_info(session, GNUTLS_CRD_CERTIFICATE);
+ if (info == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (list_size)
+ *list_size = info->ncerts;
+ return info->raw_certificate_list;
+}
+
+/**
+ * gnutls_certificate_client_get_request_status:
+ * @session: is a gnutls session
+ *
+ * Get whether client certificate was requested on the last
+ * handshake or not.
+ *
+ * Returns: 0 if the peer (server) did not request client
+ * authentication or 1 otherwise.
+ **/
+unsigned
+gnutls_certificate_client_get_request_status(gnutls_session_t session)
+{
+ return (session->internals.hsk_flags & HSK_CRT_ASKED)?1:0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * gnutls_certificate_set_params_function:
+ * @res: is a gnutls_certificate_credentials_t type
+ * @func: is the function to be called
+ *
+ * This function will set a callback in order for the server to get
+ * the Diffie-Hellman or RSA parameters for certificate
+ * authentication. The callback should return %GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS (0) on success.
+ *
+ * Deprecated: This function is unnecessary and discouraged on GnuTLS 3.6.0
+ * or later. Since 3.6.0, DH parameters are negotiated
+ * following RFC7919.
+ *
+ **/
+void
+gnutls_certificate_set_params_function(gnutls_certificate_credentials_t
+ res, gnutls_params_function * func)
+{
+ res->params_func = func;
+}
+
+/**
+ * gnutls_certificate_set_flags:
+ * @res: is a gnutls_certificate_credentials_t type
+ * @flags: are the flags of #gnutls_certificate_flags type
+ *
+ * This function will set flags to tweak the operation of
+ * the credentials structure. See the #gnutls_certificate_flags enumerations
+ * for more information on the available flags.
+ *
+ * Since: 3.4.7
+ **/
+void
+gnutls_certificate_set_flags(gnutls_certificate_credentials_t res,
+ unsigned int flags)
+{
+ res->flags = flags;
+}
+
+/**
+ * gnutls_certificate_set_verify_flags:
+ * @res: is a gnutls_certificate_credentials_t type
+ * @flags: are the flags
+ *
+ * This function will set the flags to be used for verification
+ * of certificates and override any defaults. The provided flags must be an OR of the
+ * #gnutls_certificate_verify_flags enumerations.
+ *
+ **/
+void
+gnutls_certificate_set_verify_flags(gnutls_certificate_credentials_t
+ res, unsigned int flags)
+{
+ res->verify_flags = flags;
+}
+
+/**
+ * gnutls_certificate_get_verify_flags:
+ * @res: is a gnutls_certificate_credentials_t type
+ *
+ * Returns the verification flags set with
+ * gnutls_certificate_set_verify_flags().
+ *
+ * Returns: The certificate verification flags used by @res.
+ *
+ * Since: 3.4.0
+ */
+unsigned int
+gnutls_certificate_get_verify_flags(gnutls_certificate_credentials_t res)
+{
+ return res->verify_flags;
+}
+
+/**
+ * gnutls_certificate_set_verify_limits:
+ * @res: is a gnutls_certificate_credentials type
+ * @max_bits: is the number of bits of an acceptable certificate (default 8200)
+ * @max_depth: is maximum depth of the verification of a certificate chain (default 5)
+ *
+ * This function will set some upper limits for the default
+ * verification function, gnutls_certificate_verify_peers2(), to avoid
+ * denial of service attacks. You can set them to zero to disable
+ * limits.
+ **/
+void
+gnutls_certificate_set_verify_limits(gnutls_certificate_credentials_t res,
+ unsigned int max_bits,
+ unsigned int max_depth)
+{
+ res->verify_depth = max_depth;
+ res->verify_bits = max_bits;
+}
+
+#ifdef ENABLE_OCSP
+static int
+_gnutls_ocsp_verify_mandatory_stapling(gnutls_session_t session,
+ gnutls_x509_crt_t cert,
+ unsigned int * ocsp_status);
+
+/* If the certificate is revoked status will be GNUTLS_CERT_REVOKED.
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ * Zero on success, a negative error code otherwise.
+ */
+static int
+check_ocsp_response(gnutls_session_t session, gnutls_x509_crt_t cert,
+ gnutls_x509_trust_list_t tl,
+ unsigned verify_flags,
+ gnutls_x509_crt_t *cand_issuers, unsigned cand_issuers_size,
+ gnutls_datum_t * data, unsigned int *ostatus)
+{
+ gnutls_ocsp_resp_t resp;
+ int ret;
+ unsigned int status, cert_status;
+ time_t rtime, vtime, ntime, now;
+ int check_failed = 0;
+
+ now = gnutls_time(0);
+
+ ret = gnutls_ocsp_resp_init(&resp);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return gnutls_assert_val(ret);
+
+ ret = gnutls_ocsp_resp_import(resp, data);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ _gnutls_audit_log(session,
+ "There was an error parsing the OCSP response: %s.\n",
+ gnutls_strerror(ret));
+ ret = gnutls_assert_val(0);
+ check_failed = 1;
+ *ostatus |= GNUTLS_CERT_INVALID;
+ *ostatus |= GNUTLS_CERT_INVALID_OCSP_STATUS;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if (gnutls_ocsp_resp_get_status(resp) != GNUTLS_OCSP_RESP_SUCCESSFUL) {
+ ret = _gnutls_ocsp_verify_mandatory_stapling(session, cert, ostatus);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ gnutls_assert();
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ if (*ostatus & GNUTLS_CERT_MISSING_OCSP_STATUS) {
+ _gnutls_audit_log(session,
+ "Missing basic OCSP response while required: %s.\n",
+ gnutls_strerror(ret));
+ check_failed = 1;
+ }
+ ret = gnutls_assert_val(0);
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ ret = gnutls_ocsp_resp_check_crt(resp, 0, cert);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ ret = gnutls_assert_val(0);
+ _gnutls_audit_log(session,
+ "Got OCSP response with an unrelated certificate.\n");
+ check_failed = 1;
+ *ostatus |= GNUTLS_CERT_INVALID;
+ *ostatus |= GNUTLS_CERT_INVALID_OCSP_STATUS;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ /* Attempt to verify against our trusted list */
+ ret = gnutls_ocsp_resp_verify(resp, tl, &status, verify_flags);
+ if ((ret < 0 || status != 0) && cand_issuers_size > 0) {
+ /* Attempt to verify against the certificate list provided by the server */
+
+ ret = gnutls_ocsp_resp_verify_direct(resp, cand_issuers[0], &status, verify_flags);
+ /* if verification fails attempt to find whether any of the other
+ * bundled CAs is an issuer of the OCSP response */
+ if ((ret < 0 || status != 0) && cand_issuers_size > 1) {
+ int ret2;
+ unsigned status2, i;
+
+ for (i=1;i<cand_issuers_size;i++) {
+ ret2 = gnutls_ocsp_resp_verify_direct(resp, cand_issuers[i], &status2, verify_flags);
+ if (ret2 >= 0 && status2 == 0) {
+ status = status2;
+ ret = ret2;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ ret = gnutls_assert_val(0);
+ gnutls_assert();
+ check_failed = 1;
+ *ostatus |= GNUTLS_CERT_INVALID;
+ *ostatus |= GNUTLS_CERT_INVALID_OCSP_STATUS;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ /* do not consider revocation data if response was not verified */
+ if (status != 0) {
+ char buf[MAX_OCSP_MSG_SIZE];
+
+ _gnutls_debug_log("OCSP rejection reason: %s\n",
+ _gnutls_ocsp_verify_status_to_str(status, buf));
+
+ ret = gnutls_assert_val(0);
+ check_failed = 1;
+ *ostatus |= GNUTLS_CERT_INVALID;
+ *ostatus |= GNUTLS_CERT_INVALID_OCSP_STATUS;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ ret = gnutls_ocsp_resp_get_single(resp, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
+ &cert_status, &vtime, &ntime,
+ &rtime, NULL);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ _gnutls_audit_log(session,
+ "There was an error parsing the OCSP response: %s.\n",
+ gnutls_strerror(ret));
+ ret = gnutls_assert_val(0);
+ check_failed = 1;
+ *ostatus |= GNUTLS_CERT_INVALID;
+ *ostatus |= GNUTLS_CERT_INVALID_OCSP_STATUS;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if (cert_status == GNUTLS_OCSP_CERT_REVOKED) {
+ _gnutls_audit_log(session,
+ "The certificate was revoked via OCSP\n");
+ check_failed = 1;
+ *ostatus |= GNUTLS_CERT_INVALID;
+ *ostatus |= GNUTLS_CERT_REVOKED;
+ ret = gnutls_assert_val(0);
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ /* Report but do not fail on the following errors. That is
+ * because including the OCSP response in the handshake shouldn't
+ * cause more problems that not including it.
+ */
+ if (ntime == -1) {
+ if (now - vtime > MAX_OCSP_VALIDITY_SECS) {
+ _gnutls_audit_log(session,
+ "The OCSP response is old\n");
+ check_failed = 1;
+ *ostatus |= GNUTLS_CERT_INVALID;
+ *ostatus |= GNUTLS_CERT_REVOCATION_DATA_SUPERSEDED;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ } else {
+ /* there is a newer OCSP answer, don't trust this one */
+ if (ntime < now) {
+ _gnutls_audit_log(session,
+ "There is a newer OCSP response but was not provided by the server\n");
+ check_failed = 1;
+ *ostatus |= GNUTLS_CERT_INVALID;
+ *ostatus |= GNUTLS_CERT_REVOCATION_DATA_SUPERSEDED;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ }
+
+ ret = 0;
+ cleanup:
+ if (check_failed == 0)
+ session->internals.ocsp_check_ok = 1;
+
+ gnutls_ocsp_resp_deinit(resp);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int
+_gnutls_ocsp_verify_mandatory_stapling(gnutls_session_t session,
+ gnutls_x509_crt_t cert,
+ unsigned int * ocsp_status)
+{
+ gnutls_x509_tlsfeatures_t tlsfeatures;
+ int i, ret;
+ unsigned feature;
+
+ /* RFC 7633: If cert has TLS feature GNUTLS_EXTENSION_STATUS_REQUEST, stapling is mandatory.
+ *
+ * At this point, we know that we did not get the certificate status.
+ *
+ * To proceed, first check whether we have requested the certificate status
+ */
+ if (!(session->internals.hsk_flags & HSK_OCSP_REQUESTED))
+ return 0;
+
+ ret = gnutls_x509_tlsfeatures_init(&tlsfeatures);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ gnutls_assert();
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ /* We have requested the status, now check whether the certificate mandates a response */
+ if (gnutls_x509_crt_get_tlsfeatures(cert, tlsfeatures, 0, NULL) == 0) {
+ for (i = 0;; ++i) {
+ ret = gnutls_x509_tlsfeatures_get(tlsfeatures, i, &feature);
+ if (ret == GNUTLS_E_REQUESTED_DATA_NOT_AVAILABLE) {
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ gnutls_assert();
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if (feature == 5 /* TLS ID for status request */) {
+ /* We sent a status request, the certificate mandates a reply, but we did not get any. */
+ *ocsp_status |= GNUTLS_CERT_INVALID;
+ *ocsp_status |= GNUTLS_CERT_MISSING_OCSP_STATUS;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ ret = 0;
+ cleanup:
+ gnutls_x509_tlsfeatures_deinit(tlsfeatures);
+ return ret;
+}
+#endif
+
+#define CLEAR_CERTS for(x=0;x<peer_certificate_list_size;x++) { \
+ if (peer_certificate_list[x]) \
+ gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(peer_certificate_list[x]); \
+ } \
+ gnutls_free( peer_certificate_list)
+
+/*-
+ * _gnutls_x509_cert_verify_peers - return the peer's certificate status
+ * @session: is a gnutls session
+ *
+ * This function will try to verify the peer's certificate and return its status (TRUSTED, REVOKED etc.).
+ * The return value (status) should be one of the gnutls_certificate_status_t enumerated elements.
+ * However you must also check the peer's name in order to check if the verified certificate belongs to the
+ * actual peer. Returns a negative error code in case of an error, or GNUTLS_E_NO_CERTIFICATE_FOUND if no certificate was sent.
+ -*/
+int
+_gnutls_x509_cert_verify_peers(gnutls_session_t session,
+ gnutls_typed_vdata_st * data,
+ unsigned int elements,
+ unsigned int *status)
+{
+ cert_auth_info_t info;
+ gnutls_certificate_credentials_t cred;
+ gnutls_x509_crt_t *peer_certificate_list;
+ gnutls_datum_t resp;
+ int peer_certificate_list_size, i, x, ret;
+ gnutls_x509_crt_t *cand_issuers;
+ unsigned cand_issuers_size;
+ unsigned int ocsp_status = 0;
+ unsigned int verify_flags;
+
+ /* No OCSP check so far */
+ session->internals.ocsp_check_ok = 0;
+
+ CHECK_AUTH_TYPE(GNUTLS_CRD_CERTIFICATE, GNUTLS_E_INVALID_REQUEST);
+
+ info = _gnutls_get_auth_info(session, GNUTLS_CRD_CERTIFICATE);
+ if (info == NULL) {
+ gnutls_assert();
+ return GNUTLS_E_INVALID_REQUEST;
+ }
+
+ cred = (gnutls_certificate_credentials_t)
+ _gnutls_get_cred(session, GNUTLS_CRD_CERTIFICATE);
+ if (cred == NULL) {
+ gnutls_assert();
+ return GNUTLS_E_INSUFFICIENT_CREDENTIALS;
+ }
+
+ if (info->raw_certificate_list == NULL || info->ncerts == 0)
+ return GNUTLS_E_NO_CERTIFICATE_FOUND;
+
+ if (info->ncerts > cred->verify_depth && cred->verify_depth > 0) {
+ gnutls_assert();
+ return GNUTLS_E_CONSTRAINT_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ verify_flags =
+ cred->verify_flags | session->internals.additional_verify_flags;
+ /* generate a list of gnutls_certs based on the auth info
+ * raw certs.
+ */
+ peer_certificate_list_size = info->ncerts;
+ peer_certificate_list =
+ gnutls_calloc(peer_certificate_list_size,
+ sizeof(gnutls_x509_crt_t));
+ if (peer_certificate_list == NULL) {
+ gnutls_assert();
+ return GNUTLS_E_MEMORY_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < peer_certificate_list_size; i++) {
+ ret = gnutls_x509_crt_init(&peer_certificate_list[i]);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ gnutls_assert();
+ CLEAR_CERTS;
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ ret =
+ gnutls_x509_crt_import(peer_certificate_list[i],
+ &info->raw_certificate_list[i],
+ GNUTLS_X509_FMT_DER);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ gnutls_assert();
+ CLEAR_CERTS;
+ return ret;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Use the OCSP extension if any */
+#ifdef ENABLE_OCSP
+ if (verify_flags & GNUTLS_VERIFY_DISABLE_CRL_CHECKS)
+ goto skip_ocsp;
+
+ for (i=0;i<peer_certificate_list_size;i++) {
+ ret = gnutls_ocsp_status_request_get2(session, i, &resp);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ ret = _gnutls_ocsp_verify_mandatory_stapling(session, peer_certificate_list[i], &ocsp_status);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ gnutls_assert();
+ CLEAR_CERTS;
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ cand_issuers = NULL;
+ cand_issuers_size = 0;
+ if (peer_certificate_list_size > i+1) {
+ cand_issuers = &peer_certificate_list[i+1];
+ cand_issuers_size = peer_certificate_list_size-i-1;
+ }
+
+ ret =
+ check_ocsp_response(session,
+ peer_certificate_list[i],
+ cred->tlist,
+ verify_flags, cand_issuers,
+ cand_issuers_size,
+ &resp, &ocsp_status);
+
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ CLEAR_CERTS;
+ return gnutls_assert_val(ret);
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
+ skip_ocsp:
+ /* Verify certificate
+ */
+ if (session->internals.cert_output_callback != NULL) {
+ _gnutls_debug_log("Print full certificate path validation to trust root.\n");
+ ret =
+ gnutls_x509_trust_list_verify_crt2(cred->tlist,
+ peer_certificate_list,
+ peer_certificate_list_size,
+ data, elements,
+ verify_flags, status,
+ session->internals.cert_output_callback);
+ } else {
+ ret =
+ gnutls_x509_trust_list_verify_crt2(cred->tlist,
+ peer_certificate_list,
+ peer_certificate_list_size,
+ data, elements,
+ verify_flags, status, NULL);
+ }
+
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ gnutls_assert();
+ CLEAR_CERTS;
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ CLEAR_CERTS;
+
+ *status |= ocsp_status;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * gnutls_certificate_verify_peers2:
+ * @session: is a gnutls session
+ * @status: is the output of the verification
+ *
+ * This function will verify the peer's certificate and store
+ * the status in the @status variable as a bitwise OR of gnutls_certificate_status_t
+ * values or zero if the certificate is trusted. Note that value in @status
+ * is set only when the return value of this function is success (i.e, failure
+ * to trust a certificate does not imply a negative return value).
+ * The default verification flags used by this function can be overridden
+ * using gnutls_certificate_set_verify_flags().
+ *
+ * This function will take into account the stapled OCSP responses sent by the server,
+ * as well as the following X.509 certificate extensions: Name Constraints,
+ * Key Usage, and Basic Constraints (pathlen).
+ *
+ * Note that you must also check the peer's name in order to check if
+ * the verified certificate belongs to the actual peer, see gnutls_x509_crt_check_hostname(),
+ * or use gnutls_certificate_verify_peers3().
+ *
+ * To avoid denial of service attacks some
+ * default upper limits regarding the certificate key size and chain
+ * size are set. To override them use gnutls_certificate_set_verify_limits().
+ *
+ * Note that when using raw public-keys verification will not work because there is
+ * no corresponding certificate body belonging to the raw key that can be verified. In that
+ * case this function will return %GNUTLS_E_INVALID_REQUEST.
+ *
+ * Returns: %GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS (0) when the validation is performed, or a negative error code otherwise.
+ * A successful error code means that the @status parameter must be checked to obtain the validation status.
+ **/
+int
+gnutls_certificate_verify_peers2(gnutls_session_t session,
+ unsigned int *status)
+{
+ return gnutls_certificate_verify_peers(session, NULL, 0, status);
+}
+
+/**
+ * gnutls_certificate_verify_peers3:
+ * @session: is a gnutls session
+ * @hostname: is the expected name of the peer; may be %NULL
+ * @status: is the output of the verification
+ *
+ * This function will verify the peer's certificate and store the
+ * the status in the @status variable as a bitwise OR of gnutls_certificate_status_t
+ * values or zero if the certificate is trusted. Note that value in @status
+ * is set only when the return value of this function is success (i.e, failure
+ * to trust a certificate does not imply a negative return value).
+ * The default verification flags used by this function can be overridden
+ * using gnutls_certificate_set_verify_flags(). See the documentation
+ * of gnutls_certificate_verify_peers2() for details in the verification process.
+ *
+ * This function will take into account the stapled OCSP responses sent by the server,
+ * as well as the following X.509 certificate extensions: Name Constraints,
+ * Key Usage, and Basic Constraints (pathlen).
+ *
+ * If the @hostname provided is non-NULL then this function will compare
+ * the hostname in the certificate against it. The comparison will follow
+ * the RFC6125 recommendations. If names do not match the
+ * %GNUTLS_CERT_UNEXPECTED_OWNER status flag will be set.
+ *
+ * In order to verify the purpose of the end-certificate (by checking the extended
+ * key usage), use gnutls_certificate_verify_peers().
+ *
+ * To avoid denial of service attacks some
+ * default upper limits regarding the certificate key size and chain
+ * size are set. To override them use gnutls_certificate_set_verify_limits().
+ *
+ * Note that when using raw public-keys verification will not work because there is
+ * no corresponding certificate body belonging to the raw key that can be verified. In that
+ * case this function will return %GNUTLS_E_INVALID_REQUEST.
+ *
+ * Returns: %GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS (0) when the validation is performed, or a negative error code otherwise.
+ * A successful error code means that the @status parameter must be checked to obtain the validation status.
+ *
+ * Since: 3.1.4
+ **/
+int
+gnutls_certificate_verify_peers3(gnutls_session_t session,
+ const char *hostname,
+ unsigned int *status)
+{
+gnutls_typed_vdata_st data;
+
+ data.type = GNUTLS_DT_DNS_HOSTNAME;
+ data.size = 0;
+ data.data = (void*)hostname;
+
+ return gnutls_certificate_verify_peers(session, &data, 1, status);
+}
+
+/**
+ * gnutls_certificate_verify_peers:
+ * @session: is a gnutls session
+ * @data: an array of typed data
+ * @elements: the number of data elements
+ * @status: is the output of the verification
+ *
+ * This function will verify the peer's certificate and store the
+ * the status in the @status variable as a bitwise OR of gnutls_certificate_status_t
+ * values or zero if the certificate is trusted. Note that value in @status
+ * is set only when the return value of this function is success (i.e, failure
+ * to trust a certificate does not imply a negative return value).
+ * The default verification flags used by this function can be overridden
+ * using gnutls_certificate_set_verify_flags(). See the documentation
+ * of gnutls_certificate_verify_peers2() for details in the verification process.
+ *
+ * This function will take into account the stapled OCSP responses sent by the server,
+ * as well as the following X.509 certificate extensions: Name Constraints,
+ * Key Usage, and Basic Constraints (pathlen).
+ *
+ * The acceptable @data types are %GNUTLS_DT_DNS_HOSTNAME, %GNUTLS_DT_RFC822NAME and %GNUTLS_DT_KEY_PURPOSE_OID.
+ * The former two accept as data a null-terminated hostname or email address, and the latter a null-terminated
+ * object identifier (e.g., %GNUTLS_KP_TLS_WWW_SERVER).
+ *
+ * If a DNS hostname is provided then this function will compare
+ * the hostname in the certificate against the given. If names do not match the
+ * %GNUTLS_CERT_UNEXPECTED_OWNER status flag will be set.
+ * If a key purpose OID is provided and the end-certificate contains the extended key
+ * usage PKIX extension, it will be required to be have the provided key purpose
+ * or be marked for any purpose, otherwise verification status will have the
+ * %GNUTLS_CERT_SIGNER_CONSTRAINTS_FAILURE flag set.
+ *
+ * To avoid denial of service attacks some
+ * default upper limits regarding the certificate key size and chain
+ * size are set. To override them use gnutls_certificate_set_verify_limits().
+ *
+ * Note that when using raw public-keys verification will not work because there is
+ * no corresponding certificate body belonging to the raw key that can be verified. In that
+ * case this function will return %GNUTLS_E_INVALID_REQUEST.
+ *
+ * Returns: %GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS (0) when the validation is performed, or a negative error code otherwise.
+ * A successful error code means that the @status parameter must be checked to obtain the validation status.
+ *
+ * Since: 3.3.0
+ **/
+int
+gnutls_certificate_verify_peers(gnutls_session_t session,
+ gnutls_typed_vdata_st * data,
+ unsigned int elements,
+ unsigned int *status)
+{
+ cert_auth_info_t info;
+
+ CHECK_AUTH_TYPE(GNUTLS_CRD_CERTIFICATE, GNUTLS_E_INVALID_REQUEST);
+
+ info = _gnutls_get_auth_info(session, GNUTLS_CRD_CERTIFICATE);
+ if (info == NULL) {
+ return GNUTLS_E_NO_CERTIFICATE_FOUND;
+ }
+
+ if (info->raw_certificate_list == NULL || info->ncerts == 0)
+ return GNUTLS_E_NO_CERTIFICATE_FOUND;
+
+
+ switch (get_certificate_type(session, GNUTLS_CTYPE_PEERS)) {
+ case GNUTLS_CRT_X509:
+ return _gnutls_x509_cert_verify_peers(session, data, elements,
+ status);
+ default:
+ return GNUTLS_E_INVALID_REQUEST;
+ }
+}
+
+/*-
+ * _gnutls_x509_extract_certificate_activation_time - return the peer's certificate activation time
+ * @cert: should contain an X.509 DER encoded certificate
+ *
+ * This function will return the certificate's activation time in UNIX time
+ * (ie seconds since 00:00:00 UTC January 1, 1970).
+ *
+ * Returns a (time_t) -1 in case of an error.
+ *
+ -*/
+static time_t
+_gnutls_x509_get_raw_crt_activation_time(const gnutls_datum_t * cert)
+{
+ gnutls_x509_crt_t xcert;
+ time_t result;
+
+ result = gnutls_x509_crt_init(&xcert);
+ if (result < 0)
+ return (time_t) - 1;
+
+ result = gnutls_x509_crt_import(xcert, cert, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_DER);
+ if (result < 0) {
+ gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(xcert);
+ return (time_t) - 1;
+ }
+
+ result = gnutls_x509_crt_get_activation_time(xcert);
+
+ gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(xcert);
+
+ return result;
+}
+
+/*-
+ * gnutls_x509_extract_certificate_expiration_time:
+ * @cert: should contain an X.509 DER encoded certificate
+ *
+ * This function will return the certificate's expiration time in UNIX
+ * time (ie seconds since 00:00:00 UTC January 1, 1970). Returns a
+ *
+ * (time_t) -1 in case of an error.
+ *
+ -*/
+static time_t
+_gnutls_x509_get_raw_crt_expiration_time(const gnutls_datum_t * cert)
+{
+ gnutls_x509_crt_t xcert;
+ time_t result;
+
+ result = gnutls_x509_crt_init(&xcert);
+ if (result < 0)
+ return (time_t) - 1;
+
+ result = gnutls_x509_crt_import(xcert, cert, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_DER);
+ if (result < 0) {
+ gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(xcert);
+ return (time_t) - 1;
+ }
+
+ result = gnutls_x509_crt_get_expiration_time(xcert);
+
+ gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(xcert);
+
+ return result;
+}
+
+/**
+ * gnutls_certificate_expiration_time_peers:
+ * @session: is a gnutls session
+ *
+ * This function will return the peer's certificate expiration time.
+ *
+ * Returns: (time_t)-1 on error.
+ *
+ * Deprecated: gnutls_certificate_verify_peers2() now verifies expiration times.
+ **/
+time_t gnutls_certificate_expiration_time_peers(gnutls_session_t session)
+{
+ cert_auth_info_t info;
+
+ CHECK_AUTH_TYPE(GNUTLS_CRD_CERTIFICATE, GNUTLS_E_INVALID_REQUEST);
+
+ info = _gnutls_get_auth_info(session, GNUTLS_CRD_CERTIFICATE);
+ if (info == NULL) {
+ return (time_t) - 1;
+ }
+
+ if (info->raw_certificate_list == NULL || info->ncerts == 0) {
+ gnutls_assert();
+ return (time_t) - 1;
+ }
+
+ switch (get_certificate_type(session, GNUTLS_CTYPE_PEERS)) {
+ case GNUTLS_CRT_X509:
+ return
+ _gnutls_x509_get_raw_crt_expiration_time(&info->
+ raw_certificate_list[0]);
+ default:
+ return (time_t) - 1;
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ * gnutls_certificate_activation_time_peers:
+ * @session: is a gnutls session
+ *
+ * This function will return the peer's certificate activation time.
+ *
+ * Returns: (time_t)-1 on error.
+ *
+ * Deprecated: gnutls_certificate_verify_peers2() now verifies activation times.
+ **/
+time_t gnutls_certificate_activation_time_peers(gnutls_session_t session)
+{
+ cert_auth_info_t info;
+
+ CHECK_AUTH_TYPE(GNUTLS_CRD_CERTIFICATE, GNUTLS_E_INVALID_REQUEST);
+
+ info = _gnutls_get_auth_info(session, GNUTLS_CRD_CERTIFICATE);
+ if (info == NULL) {
+ return (time_t) - 1;
+ }
+
+ if (info->raw_certificate_list == NULL || info->ncerts == 0) {
+ gnutls_assert();
+ return (time_t) - 1;
+ }
+
+ switch (get_certificate_type(session, GNUTLS_CTYPE_PEERS)) {
+ case GNUTLS_CRT_X509:
+ return
+ _gnutls_x509_get_raw_crt_activation_time(&info->
+ raw_certificate_list[0]);
+ default:
+ return (time_t) - 1;
+ }
+}