1 files changed, 265 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/src/crypto/aes/gcm_ppc64x.go b/src/crypto/aes/gcm_ppc64x.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..44b2705
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/crypto/aes/gcm_ppc64x.go
@@ -0,0 +1,265 @@
+// Copyright 2019 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+//go:build ppc64le || ppc64
+
+package aes
+
+import (
+	"crypto/cipher"
+	"crypto/subtle"
+	"encoding/binary"
+	"errors"
+	"runtime"
+)
+
+// This file implements GCM using an optimized GHASH function.
+
+//go:noescape
+func gcmInit(productTable *[256]byte, h []byte)
+
+//go:noescape
+func gcmHash(output []byte, productTable *[256]byte, inp []byte, len int)
+
+//go:noescape
+func gcmMul(output []byte, productTable *[256]byte)
+
+const (
+	gcmCounterSize       = 16
+	gcmBlockSize         = 16
+	gcmTagSize           = 16
+	gcmStandardNonceSize = 12
+)
+
+var errOpen = errors.New("cipher: message authentication failed")
+
+// Assert that aesCipherGCM implements the gcmAble interface.
+var _ gcmAble = (*aesCipherAsm)(nil)
+
+type gcmAsm struct {
+	cipher *aesCipherAsm
+	// ks is the key schedule, the length of which depends on the size of
+	// the AES key.
+	ks []uint32
+	// productTable contains pre-computed multiples of the binary-field
+	// element used in GHASH.
+	productTable [256]byte
+	// nonceSize contains the expected size of the nonce, in bytes.
+	nonceSize int
+	// tagSize contains the size of the tag, in bytes.
+	tagSize int
+}
+
+// NewGCM returns the AES cipher wrapped in Galois Counter Mode. This is only
+// called by crypto/cipher.NewGCM via the gcmAble interface.
+func (c *aesCipherAsm) NewGCM(nonceSize, tagSize int) (cipher.AEAD, error) {
+	var h1, h2 uint64
+	g := &gcmAsm{cipher: c, ks: c.enc, nonceSize: nonceSize, tagSize: tagSize}
+
+	hle := make([]byte, gcmBlockSize)
+
+	c.Encrypt(hle, hle)
+
+	// Reverse the bytes in each 8 byte chunk
+	// Load little endian, store big endian
+	if runtime.GOARCH == "ppc64le" {
+		h1 = binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(hle[:8])
+		h2 = binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(hle[8:])
+	} else {
+		h1 = binary.BigEndian.Uint64(hle[:8])
+		h2 = binary.BigEndian.Uint64(hle[8:])
+	}
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(hle[:8], h1)
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(hle[8:], h2)
+	gcmInit(&g.productTable, hle)
+
+	return g, nil
+}
+
+func (g *gcmAsm) NonceSize() int {
+	return g.nonceSize
+}
+
+func (g *gcmAsm) Overhead() int {
+	return g.tagSize
+}
+
+func sliceForAppend(in []byte, n int) (head, tail []byte) {
+	if total := len(in) + n; cap(in) >= total {
+		head = in[:total]
+	} else {
+		head = make([]byte, total)
+		copy(head, in)
+	}
+	tail = head[len(in):]
+	return
+}
+
+// deriveCounter computes the initial GCM counter state from the given nonce.
+func (g *gcmAsm) deriveCounter(counter *[gcmBlockSize]byte, nonce []byte) {
+	if len(nonce) == gcmStandardNonceSize {
+		copy(counter[:], nonce)
+		counter[gcmBlockSize-1] = 1
+	} else {
+		var hash [16]byte
+		g.paddedGHASH(&hash, nonce)
+		lens := gcmLengths(0, uint64(len(nonce))*8)
+		g.paddedGHASH(&hash, lens[:])
+		copy(counter[:], hash[:])
+	}
+}
+
+// counterCrypt encrypts in using AES in counter mode and places the result
+// into out. counter is the initial count value and will be updated with the next
+// count value. The length of out must be greater than or equal to the length
+// of in.
+func (g *gcmAsm) counterCrypt(out, in []byte, counter *[gcmBlockSize]byte) {
+	var mask [gcmBlockSize]byte
+
+	for len(in) >= gcmBlockSize {
+		// Hint to avoid bounds check
+		_, _ = in[15], out[15]
+		g.cipher.Encrypt(mask[:], counter[:])
+		gcmInc32(counter)
+
+		// XOR 16 bytes each loop iteration in 8 byte chunks
+		in0 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(in[0:])
+		in1 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(in[8:])
+		m0 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(mask[:8])
+		m1 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(mask[8:])
+		binary.LittleEndian.PutUint64(out[:8], in0^m0)
+		binary.LittleEndian.PutUint64(out[8:], in1^m1)
+		out = out[16:]
+		in = in[16:]
+	}
+
+	if len(in) > 0 {
+		g.cipher.Encrypt(mask[:], counter[:])
+		gcmInc32(counter)
+		// XOR leftover bytes
+		for i, inb := range in {
+			out[i] = inb ^ mask[i]
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// increments the rightmost 32-bits of the count value by 1.
+func gcmInc32(counterBlock *[16]byte) {
+	c := counterBlock[len(counterBlock)-4:]
+	x := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(c) + 1
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(c, x)
+}
+
+// paddedGHASH pads data with zeroes until its length is a multiple of
+// 16-bytes. It then calculates a new value for hash using the ghash
+// algorithm.
+func (g *gcmAsm) paddedGHASH(hash *[16]byte, data []byte) {
+	if siz := len(data) - (len(data) % gcmBlockSize); siz > 0 {
+		gcmHash(hash[:], &g.productTable, data[:], siz)
+		data = data[siz:]
+	}
+	if len(data) > 0 {
+		var s [16]byte
+		copy(s[:], data)
+		gcmHash(hash[:], &g.productTable, s[:], len(s))
+	}
+}
+
+// auth calculates GHASH(ciphertext, additionalData), masks the result with
+// tagMask and writes the result to out.
+func (g *gcmAsm) auth(out, ciphertext, aad []byte, tagMask *[gcmTagSize]byte) {
+	var hash [16]byte
+	g.paddedGHASH(&hash, aad)
+	g.paddedGHASH(&hash, ciphertext)
+	lens := gcmLengths(uint64(len(aad))*8, uint64(len(ciphertext))*8)
+	g.paddedGHASH(&hash, lens[:])
+
+	copy(out, hash[:])
+	for i := range out {
+		out[i] ^= tagMask[i]
+	}
+}
+
+// Seal encrypts and authenticates plaintext. See the cipher.AEAD interface for
+// details.
+func (g *gcmAsm) Seal(dst, nonce, plaintext, data []byte) []byte {
+	if len(nonce) != g.nonceSize {
+		panic("cipher: incorrect nonce length given to GCM")
+	}
+	if uint64(len(plaintext)) > ((1<<32)-2)*BlockSize {
+		panic("cipher: message too large for GCM")
+	}
+
+	ret, out := sliceForAppend(dst, len(plaintext)+g.tagSize)
+
+	var counter, tagMask [gcmBlockSize]byte
+	g.deriveCounter(&counter, nonce)
+
+	g.cipher.Encrypt(tagMask[:], counter[:])
+	gcmInc32(&counter)
+
+	g.counterCrypt(out, plaintext, &counter)
+	g.auth(out[len(plaintext):], out[:len(plaintext)], data, &tagMask)
+
+	return ret
+}
+
+// Open authenticates and decrypts ciphertext. See the cipher.AEAD interface
+// for details.
+func (g *gcmAsm) Open(dst, nonce, ciphertext, data []byte) ([]byte, error) {
+	if len(nonce) != g.nonceSize {
+		panic("cipher: incorrect nonce length given to GCM")
+	}
+	if len(ciphertext) < g.tagSize {
+		return nil, errOpen
+	}
+	if uint64(len(ciphertext)) > ((1<<32)-2)*uint64(BlockSize)+uint64(g.tagSize) {
+		return nil, errOpen
+	}
+
+	tag := ciphertext[len(ciphertext)-g.tagSize:]
+	ciphertext = ciphertext[:len(ciphertext)-g.tagSize]
+
+	var counter, tagMask [gcmBlockSize]byte
+	g.deriveCounter(&counter, nonce)
+
+	g.cipher.Encrypt(tagMask[:], counter[:])
+	gcmInc32(&counter)
+
+	var expectedTag [gcmTagSize]byte
+	g.auth(expectedTag[:], ciphertext, data, &tagMask)
+
+	ret, out := sliceForAppend(dst, len(ciphertext))
+
+	if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(expectedTag[:g.tagSize], tag) != 1 {
+		for i := range out {
+			out[i] = 0
+		}
+		return nil, errOpen
+	}
+
+	g.counterCrypt(out, ciphertext, &counter)
+	return ret, nil
+}
+
+func gcmLengths(len0, len1 uint64) [16]byte {
+	return [16]byte{
+		byte(len0 >> 56),
+		byte(len0 >> 48),
+		byte(len0 >> 40),
+		byte(len0 >> 32),
+		byte(len0 >> 24),
+		byte(len0 >> 16),
+		byte(len0 >> 8),
+		byte(len0),
+		byte(len1 >> 56),
+		byte(len1 >> 48),
+		byte(len1 >> 40),
+		byte(len1 >> 32),
+		byte(len1 >> 24),
+		byte(len1 >> 16),
+		byte(len1 >> 8),
+		byte(len1),
+	}
+}