Adding upstream version 5.6.0.upstream/5.6.0upstream

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

1 files changed, 1235 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/lib/layer/iterate.c b/lib/layer/iterate.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..edc666e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/layer/iterate.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1235 @@
+/*  Copyright (C) CZ.NIC, z.s.p.o. <knot-resolver@labs.nic.cz>
+ *  SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
+ */
+
+/** @file iterate.c
+ *
+ * This builtin module is mainly active in the consume phase.
+ * Primary responsibilities:
+ *  - Classify the packet as auth/nonauth and change its AA flag accordingly.
+ *  - Pick interesting RRs to kr_request::answ_selected and ::auth_selected,
+ *    NEW: and classify their rank, except for validation status.
+ *  - Update kr_query::zone_cut (in case of referral).
+ *  - Interpret CNAMEs.
+ *  - Prepare the followup query - either inline or as another kr_query
+ *    (CNAME jumps create a new "sibling" query).
+ */
+
+#include <sys/time.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+
+#include <contrib/cleanup.h>
+#include <libknot/descriptor.h>
+#include <libknot/rrtype/rdname.h>
+#include <libknot/rrtype/rrsig.h>
+
+#include "lib/layer/iterate.h"
+#include "lib/resolve.h"
+#include "lib/rplan.h"
+#include "lib/defines.h"
+#include "lib/selection.h"
+#include "lib/module.h"
+#include "lib/dnssec/ta.h"
+
+#define VERBOSE_MSG(...) kr_log_q(req->current_query, ITERATOR, __VA_ARGS__)
+#define QVERBOSE_MSG(qry, ...) kr_log_q(qry, ITERATOR, __VA_ARGS__)
+#define WITH_VERBOSE(qry) if (kr_log_is_debug_qry(ITERATOR, (qry)))
+
+/* Iterator often walks through packet section, this is an abstraction. */
+typedef int (*rr_callback_t)(const knot_rrset_t *, unsigned, struct kr_request *);
+
+/** Return minimized QNAME/QTYPE for current zone cut. */
+static const knot_dname_t *minimized_qname(struct kr_query *query, uint16_t *qtype)
+{
+	/* Minimization disabled. */
+	const knot_dname_t *qname = query->sname;
+	if (qname[0] == '\0' || query->flags.NO_MINIMIZE || query->flags.STUB) {
+		return qname;
+	}
+
+	/* Minimize name to contain current zone cut + 1 label. */
+	int cut_labels = knot_dname_labels(query->zone_cut.name, NULL);
+	int qname_labels = knot_dname_labels(qname, NULL);
+	while(qname[0] && qname_labels > cut_labels + 1) {
+		qname = knot_wire_next_label(qname, NULL);
+		qname_labels -= 1;
+	}
+
+	/* Hide QTYPE if minimized. */
+	if (qname != query->sname) {
+		*qtype = KNOT_RRTYPE_NS;
+	}
+
+	return qname;
+}
+
+/** Answer is paired to query. */
+static bool is_paired_to_query(const knot_pkt_t *answer, struct kr_query *query)
+{
+	uint16_t qtype = query->stype;
+	const knot_dname_t *qname = minimized_qname(query, &qtype);
+
+	/* ID should already match, thanks to session_tasklist_del_msgid()
+	 * in worker_submit(), but it won't hurt to check again. */
+	return query->id      == knot_wire_get_id(answer->wire) &&
+	       knot_wire_get_qdcount(answer->wire) == 1 &&
+	       query->sclass  == knot_pkt_qclass(answer) &&
+	       qtype          == knot_pkt_qtype(answer) &&
+	       /* qry->secret had been xor-applied to answer already,
+		* so this also checks for correctness of case randomization */
+	       knot_dname_is_equal(qname, kr_pkt_qname_raw(answer));
+}
+
+/** Relaxed rule for AA, either AA=1 or SOA matching zone cut is required. */
+static bool is_authoritative(const knot_pkt_t *answer, struct kr_query *query)
+{
+	if (knot_wire_get_aa(answer->wire)) {
+		return true;
+	}
+
+	const knot_pktsection_t *ns = knot_pkt_section(answer, KNOT_AUTHORITY);
+	for (unsigned i = 0; i < ns->count; ++i) {
+		const knot_rrset_t *rr = knot_pkt_rr(ns, i);
+		if (rr->type == KNOT_RRTYPE_SOA
+		    && knot_dname_in_bailiwick(rr->owner, query->zone_cut.name) >= 0) {
+			return true;
+		}
+	}
+
+#ifndef STRICT_MODE
+	/* Last resort to work around broken auths, if the zone cut is at the QNAME. */
+	if (knot_dname_is_equal(query->zone_cut.name, knot_pkt_qname(answer))) {
+		return true;
+	}
+#endif
+
+	/* Some authoritative servers are hopelessly broken, allow lame answers in permissive mode. */
+	if (query->flags.PERMISSIVE) {
+		return true;
+	}
+
+	return false;
+}
+
+int kr_response_classify(const knot_pkt_t *pkt)
+{
+	const knot_pktsection_t *an = knot_pkt_section(pkt, KNOT_ANSWER);
+	switch (knot_wire_get_rcode(pkt->wire)) {
+	case KNOT_RCODE_NOERROR:
+		return (an->count == 0) ? PKT_NODATA : PKT_NOERROR;
+	case KNOT_RCODE_NXDOMAIN:
+		return PKT_NXDOMAIN;
+	case KNOT_RCODE_REFUSED:
+		return PKT_REFUSED;
+	default:
+		return PKT_ERROR;
+	}
+}
+
+/** @internal Filter ANY or loopback addresses. */
+static bool is_valid_addr(const uint8_t *addr, size_t len)
+{
+	if (len == sizeof(struct in_addr)) {
+		/* Filter ANY and 127.0.0.0/8 */
+		uint32_t ip_host; /* Memcpy is safe for unaligned case (on non-x86) */
+		memcpy(&ip_host, addr, sizeof(ip_host));
+		ip_host = ntohl(ip_host);
+		if (ip_host == 0 || (ip_host & 0xff000000) == 0x7f000000) {
+			return false;
+		}
+	} else if (len == sizeof(struct in6_addr)) {
+		struct in6_addr ip6_mask;
+		memset(&ip6_mask, 0, sizeof(ip6_mask));
+		/* All except last byte are zeroed, last byte defines ANY/::1 */
+		if (memcmp(addr, ip6_mask.s6_addr, sizeof(ip6_mask.s6_addr) - 1) == 0) {
+			return (addr[len - 1] > 1);
+		}
+	}
+	return true;
+}
+
+/** @internal Update NS address from record \a rr.  Return _FAIL on error. */
+static int update_nsaddr(const knot_rrset_t *rr, struct kr_query *query, int *glue_cnt)
+{
+	if (rr->type == KNOT_RRTYPE_A || rr->type == KNOT_RRTYPE_AAAA) {
+		const knot_rdata_t *rdata = rr->rrs.rdata;
+		const int a_len = rr->type == KNOT_RRTYPE_A
+			? sizeof(struct in_addr) : sizeof(struct in6_addr);
+		if (a_len != rdata->len) {
+			QVERBOSE_MSG(query, "<= ignoring invalid glue, length %d != %d\n",
+					(int)rdata->len, a_len);
+			return KR_STATE_FAIL;
+		}
+		char name_str[KR_DNAME_STR_MAXLEN];
+		char addr_str[INET6_ADDRSTRLEN];
+		WITH_VERBOSE(query) {
+			const int af = (rr->type == KNOT_RRTYPE_A) ? AF_INET : AF_INET6;
+			knot_dname_to_str(name_str, rr->owner, sizeof(name_str));
+			name_str[sizeof(name_str) - 1] = 0;
+			inet_ntop(af, rdata->data, addr_str, sizeof(addr_str));
+		}
+		if (!(query->flags.ALLOW_LOCAL) &&
+			!is_valid_addr(rdata->data, rdata->len)) {
+			QVERBOSE_MSG(query, "<= ignoring invalid glue for "
+				     "'%s': '%s'\n", name_str, addr_str);
+			return KR_STATE_CONSUME; /* Ignore invalid addresses */
+		}
+		int ret = kr_zonecut_add(&query->zone_cut, rr->owner, rdata->data, rdata->len);
+		if (ret != 0) {
+			return KR_STATE_FAIL;
+		}
+
+		++*glue_cnt; /* reduced verbosity */
+		/* QVERBOSE_MSG(query, "<= using glue for "
+			     "'%s': '%s'\n", name_str, addr_str);
+		*/
+	}
+	return KR_STATE_CONSUME;
+}
+
+enum { GLUE_COUNT_THROTTLE = 26 };
+
+/** @internal From \a pkt, fetch glue records for name \a ns, and update the cut etc.
+ *
+ * \param glue_cnt the number of accepted addresses (to be incremented)
+ */
+static void fetch_glue(knot_pkt_t *pkt, const knot_dname_t *ns, bool in_bailiwick,
+			struct kr_request *req, const struct kr_query *qry, int *glue_cnt)
+{
+	ranked_rr_array_t *selected[] = kr_request_selected(req);
+	for (knot_section_t i = KNOT_ANSWER; i <= KNOT_ADDITIONAL; ++i) {
+		const knot_pktsection_t *sec = knot_pkt_section(pkt, i);
+		for (unsigned k = 0; k < sec->count; ++k) {
+			const knot_rrset_t *rr = knot_pkt_rr(sec, k);
+			if (!knot_dname_is_equal(ns, rr->owner)) {
+				continue;
+			}
+			if ((rr->type != KNOT_RRTYPE_A) &&
+			    (rr->type != KNOT_RRTYPE_AAAA)) {
+				continue;
+			}
+
+			uint8_t rank = (in_bailiwick && i == KNOT_ANSWER)
+				? (KR_RANK_INITIAL | KR_RANK_AUTH) : KR_RANK_OMIT;
+			(void) kr_ranked_rrarray_add(selected[i], rr, rank,
+							false, qry->uid, &req->pool);
+
+			if ((rr->type == KNOT_RRTYPE_A) &&
+			    (req->ctx->options.NO_IPV4)) {
+				QVERBOSE_MSG(qry, "<= skipping IPv4 glue due to network settings\n");
+				continue;
+			}
+			if ((rr->type == KNOT_RRTYPE_AAAA) &&
+			    (req->ctx->options.NO_IPV6)) {
+				QVERBOSE_MSG(qry, "<= skipping IPv6 glue due to network settings\n");
+				continue;
+			}
+			(void) update_nsaddr(rr, req->current_query, glue_cnt);
+			/* If we reach limit on total glue addresses,
+			 * we only load the first one per NS name (the one just above). */
+			if (*glue_cnt > GLUE_COUNT_THROTTLE)
+				break;
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+/** Attempt to find glue for given nameserver name (best effort). */
+static bool has_glue(knot_pkt_t *pkt, const knot_dname_t *ns)
+{
+	for (knot_section_t i = KNOT_ANSWER; i <= KNOT_ADDITIONAL; ++i) {
+		const knot_pktsection_t *sec = knot_pkt_section(pkt, i);
+		for (unsigned k = 0; k < sec->count; ++k) {
+			const knot_rrset_t *rr = knot_pkt_rr(sec, k);
+			if (knot_dname_is_equal(ns, rr->owner) &&
+			    (rr->type == KNOT_RRTYPE_A || rr->type == KNOT_RRTYPE_AAAA)) {
+				return true;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	return false;
+}
+
+/** @internal Update the cut with another NS(+glue) record.
+ * @param current_cut is cut name before this packet.
+ * @return _DONE if cut->name changes, _FAIL on error, and _CONSUME otherwise. */
+static int update_cut(knot_pkt_t *pkt, const knot_rrset_t *rr,
+		      struct kr_request *req, const knot_dname_t *current_cut,
+		      int *glue_cnt)
+{
+	struct kr_query *qry = req->current_query;
+	struct kr_zonecut *cut = &qry->zone_cut;
+	int state = KR_STATE_CONSUME;
+
+	/* New authority MUST be at/below the authority of the current cut;
+	 * also qname must be below new authority;
+	 * otherwise it's a possible cache injection attempt. */
+	const bool ok = knot_dname_in_bailiwick(rr->owner, current_cut) >= 0
+		     && knot_dname_in_bailiwick(qry->sname, rr->owner)  >= 0;
+	if (!ok) {
+		VERBOSE_MSG("<= authority: ns outside bailiwick\n");
+		qry->server_selection.error(qry, req->upstream.transport, KR_SELECTION_LAME_DELEGATION);
+#ifdef STRICT_MODE
+		return KR_STATE_FAIL;
+#else
+		/* Workaround: ignore out-of-bailiwick NSs for authoritative answers,
+		 * but fail for referrals. This is important to detect lame answers. */
+		if (knot_pkt_section(pkt, KNOT_ANSWER)->count == 0) {
+			state = KR_STATE_FAIL;
+		}
+		return state;
+#endif
+	}
+
+	/* Update zone cut name */
+	if (!knot_dname_is_equal(rr->owner, cut->name)) {
+		/* Remember parent cut and descend to new (keep keys and TA). */
+		struct kr_zonecut *parent = mm_alloc(&req->pool, sizeof(*parent));
+		if (parent) {
+			memcpy(parent, cut, sizeof(*parent));
+			kr_zonecut_init(cut, rr->owner, &req->pool);
+			cut->key = parent->key;
+			cut->trust_anchor = parent->trust_anchor;
+			cut->parent = parent;
+		} else {
+			kr_zonecut_set(cut, rr->owner);
+		}
+		state = KR_STATE_DONE;
+	}
+
+	/* Fetch glue for each NS */
+	knot_rdata_t *rdata_i = rr->rrs.rdata;
+	for (unsigned i = 0; i < rr->rrs.count;
+			++i, rdata_i = knot_rdataset_next(rdata_i)) {
+		const knot_dname_t *ns_name = knot_ns_name(rdata_i);
+		/* Glue is mandatory for NS below zone */
+		if (knot_dname_in_bailiwick(ns_name, rr->owner) >= 0
+		    && !has_glue(pkt, ns_name)) {
+			const char *msg =
+				"<= authority: missing mandatory glue, skipping NS";
+			WITH_VERBOSE(qry) {
+				auto_free char *ns_str = kr_dname_text(ns_name);
+				VERBOSE_MSG("%s %s\n", msg, ns_str);
+			}
+			continue;
+		}
+		int ret = kr_zonecut_add(cut, ns_name, NULL, 0);
+		kr_assert(!ret);
+
+		/* Choose when to use glue records. */
+		const bool in_bailiwick =
+			knot_dname_in_bailiwick(ns_name, current_cut) >= 0;
+		bool do_fetch;
+		if (qry->flags.PERMISSIVE) {
+			do_fetch = true;
+		} else if (qry->flags.STRICT) {
+			/* Strict mode uses only mandatory glue. */
+			do_fetch = knot_dname_in_bailiwick(ns_name, cut->name) >= 0;
+		} else {
+			/* Normal mode uses in-bailiwick glue. */
+			do_fetch = in_bailiwick;
+		}
+		if (do_fetch) {
+			fetch_glue(pkt, ns_name, in_bailiwick, req, qry, glue_cnt);
+		}
+	}
+
+	return state;
+}
+
+/** Compute rank appropriate for RRs present in the packet.
+ * @param answer whether the RR is from answer or authority section
+ * @param is_nonauth: from referral or forwarding (etc.) */
+static uint8_t get_initial_rank(const knot_rrset_t *rr, const struct kr_query *qry,
+				const bool answer, const bool is_nonauth)
+{
+	/* For RRSIGs, ensure the KR_RANK_AUTH flag corresponds to the signed RR. */
+	uint16_t type = kr_rrset_type_maysig(rr);
+
+	if (qry->flags.CACHED) {
+		return rr->additional ? *(uint8_t *)rr->additional : KR_RANK_OMIT;
+		/* ^^ Current use case for "cached" RRs without rank: hints module. */
+	}
+	if (answer || type == KNOT_RRTYPE_DS
+	    || type == KNOT_RRTYPE_SOA /* needed for aggressive negative caching */
+	    || type == KNOT_RRTYPE_NSEC || type == KNOT_RRTYPE_NSEC3) {
+		/* We almost always want these validated, and it should be possible. */
+		return KR_RANK_INITIAL | KR_RANK_AUTH;
+	}
+	/* Be aggressive: try to validate anything else (almost never extra latency). */
+	return KR_RANK_TRY;
+	/* TODO: this classifier of authoritativity may not be perfect yet. */
+}
+
+static int pick_authority(knot_pkt_t *pkt, struct kr_request *req, bool to_wire)
+{
+	struct kr_query *qry = req->current_query;
+	const knot_pktsection_t *ns = knot_pkt_section(pkt, KNOT_AUTHORITY);
+
+	const knot_dname_t *zonecut_name = qry->zone_cut.name;
+	bool referral = !knot_wire_get_aa(pkt->wire);
+	if (referral) {
+		/* zone cut already updated by process_authority()
+		 * use parent zonecut name */
+		zonecut_name = qry->zone_cut.parent ? qry->zone_cut.parent->name : qry->zone_cut.name;
+		to_wire = false;
+	}
+
+	for (unsigned i = 0; i < ns->count; ++i) {
+		const knot_rrset_t *rr = knot_pkt_rr(ns, i);
+		if (rr->rclass != KNOT_CLASS_IN
+		    || knot_dname_in_bailiwick(rr->owner, zonecut_name) < 0) {
+			continue;
+		}
+		uint8_t rank = get_initial_rank(rr, qry, false,
+						qry->flags.FORWARD || referral);
+		int ret = kr_ranked_rrarray_add(&req->auth_selected, rr,
+						rank, to_wire, qry->uid, &req->pool);
+		if (ret < 0) {
+			return ret;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return kr_ok();
+}
+
+static int process_authority(knot_pkt_t *pkt, struct kr_request *req)
+{
+	struct kr_query *qry = req->current_query;
+	if (kr_fails_assert(!qry->flags.STUB))
+		return KR_STATE_FAIL;
+
+	int result = KR_STATE_CONSUME;
+	if (qry->flags.FORWARD) {
+		return result;
+	}
+
+	const knot_pktsection_t *ns = knot_pkt_section(pkt, KNOT_AUTHORITY);
+	const knot_pktsection_t *an = knot_pkt_section(pkt, KNOT_ANSWER);
+
+#ifdef STRICT_MODE
+	/* AA, terminate resolution chain. */
+	if (knot_wire_get_aa(pkt->wire)) {
+		return KR_STATE_CONSUME;
+	}
+#else
+	/* Work around servers sending back CNAME with different delegation and no AA. */
+	if (an->count > 0 && ns->count > 0) {
+		const knot_rrset_t *rr = knot_pkt_rr(an, 0);
+		if (rr->type == KNOT_RRTYPE_CNAME) {
+			return KR_STATE_CONSUME;
+		}
+		/* Work around for these NSs which are authoritative both for
+		 * parent and child and mixes data from both zones in single answer */
+		if (knot_wire_get_aa(pkt->wire) &&
+		    (rr->type == qry->stype) &&
+		    (knot_dname_is_equal(rr->owner, qry->sname))) {
+			return KR_STATE_CONSUME;
+		}
+	}
+#endif
+	/* Remember current bailiwick for NS processing. */
+	const knot_dname_t *current_zone_cut = qry->zone_cut.name;
+	bool ns_record_exists = false;
+	int glue_cnt = 0;
+	int ns_count = 0;
+	/* Update zone cut information. */
+	for (unsigned i = 0; i < ns->count; ++i) {
+		const knot_rrset_t *rr = knot_pkt_rr(ns, i);
+		if (rr->type == KNOT_RRTYPE_NS) {
+			ns_record_exists = true;
+			int state = update_cut(pkt, rr, req, current_zone_cut, &glue_cnt);
+			switch(state) {
+			case KR_STATE_DONE: result = state; break;
+			case KR_STATE_FAIL: return state; break;
+			default:              /* continue */ break;
+			}
+
+			if (++ns_count >= 13) {
+				VERBOSE_MSG("<= authority: many glue NSs, skipping the rest\n");
+				break;
+			}
+		} else if (rr->type == KNOT_RRTYPE_SOA
+			   && knot_dname_in_bailiwick(rr->owner, qry->zone_cut.name) > 0) {
+			/* SOA below cut in authority indicates different authority,
+			 * but same NS set. */
+			qry->zone_cut.name = knot_dname_copy(rr->owner, &req->pool);
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* Nameserver is authoritative for both parent side and the child side of the
+	 * delegation may respond with an NS record in the answer section, and still update
+	 * the zone cut (this e.g. happens on the `nrl.navy.mil.` zone cut).
+	 * By updating the zone cut, we can continue with QNAME minimization,
+	 * as the current code is only able to minimize one label below a zone cut. */
+	if (!ns_record_exists && knot_wire_get_aa(pkt->wire)) {
+		for (unsigned i = 0; i < an->count; ++i) {
+			const knot_rrset_t *rr = knot_pkt_rr(an, i);
+			if (rr->type == KNOT_RRTYPE_NS
+			    && knot_dname_in_bailiwick(rr->owner, qry->zone_cut.name) > 0
+			    /* "confusing" NS records can happen e.g. on a CNAME chain */
+			    && knot_dname_in_bailiwick(qry->sname, rr->owner) >= 0) {
+				/* NS below cut in authority indicates different authority,
+				 * but same NS set. */
+				qry->zone_cut.name = knot_dname_copy(rr->owner, &req->pool);
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (glue_cnt) {
+		VERBOSE_MSG("<= loaded %d glue addresses\n", glue_cnt);
+	}
+	if (glue_cnt > GLUE_COUNT_THROTTLE) {
+		VERBOSE_MSG("<= (some may have been omitted due to being too many)\n");
+	}
+
+
+	if ((qry->flags.DNSSEC_WANT) && (result == KR_STATE_CONSUME)) {
+		if (knot_wire_get_aa(pkt->wire) == 0 &&
+		    knot_wire_get_ancount(pkt->wire) == 0 &&
+		    ns_record_exists) {
+			/* Unhelpful referral
+			   Prevent from validating as an authoritative answer */
+			result = KR_STATE_DONE;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* CONSUME => Unhelpful referral.
+	 * DONE    => Zone cut updated.  */
+	return result;
+}
+
+static int finalize_answer(knot_pkt_t *pkt, struct kr_request *req)
+{
+	/* Finalize header */
+	knot_pkt_t *answer = kr_request_ensure_answer(req);
+	if (answer) {
+		knot_wire_set_rcode(answer->wire, knot_wire_get_rcode(pkt->wire));
+		req->state = KR_STATE_DONE;
+	}
+	return req->state;
+}
+
+static int unroll_cname(knot_pkt_t *pkt, struct kr_request *req, bool referral, const knot_dname_t **cname_ret)
+{
+	struct kr_query *query = req->current_query;
+	if (kr_fails_assert(!query->flags.STUB))
+		return KR_STATE_FAIL;
+	/* Process answer type */
+	const knot_pktsection_t *an = knot_pkt_section(pkt, KNOT_ANSWER);
+	const knot_dname_t *cname = NULL;
+	const knot_dname_t *pending_cname = query->sname;
+	bool is_final = (query->parent == NULL);
+	bool strict_mode = (query->flags.STRICT);
+
+	query->cname_depth = query->cname_parent ? query->cname_parent->cname_depth : 1;
+
+	do {
+		/* CNAME was found at previous iteration, but records may not follow the correct order.
+		 * Try to find records for pending_cname owner from section start. */
+		cname = pending_cname;
+		size_t cname_answ_selected_i = -1;
+		bool cname_is_occluded = false; /* whether `cname` is in a DNAME's bailiwick */
+		pending_cname = NULL;
+		const int cname_labels = knot_dname_labels(cname, NULL);
+		for (unsigned i = 0; i < an->count; ++i) {
+			const knot_rrset_t *rr = knot_pkt_rr(an, i);
+
+			/* Skip the RR if its owner+type doesn't interest us. */
+			const uint16_t type = kr_rrset_type_maysig(rr);
+			const bool type_OK = rr->type == query->stype || type == query->stype
+						|| type == KNOT_RRTYPE_CNAME;
+			if (rr->rclass != KNOT_CLASS_IN
+			    || knot_dname_in_bailiwick(rr->owner, query->zone_cut.name) < 0) {
+				continue;
+			}
+			const bool all_OK = type_OK && knot_dname_is_equal(rr->owner, cname);
+
+			const bool to_wire = is_final && !referral;
+
+			if (!all_OK && type == KNOT_RRTYPE_DNAME
+					&& knot_dname_in_bailiwick(cname, rr->owner) >= 1) {
+				/* This DNAME (or RRSIGs) cover the current target (`cname`),
+				 * so it is interesting and will occlude its CNAME.
+				 * We rely on CNAME being sent along with DNAME
+				 * (mandatory unless YXDOMAIN). */
+				cname_is_occluded = true;
+				uint8_t rank = get_initial_rank(rr, query, true,
+						query->flags.FORWARD || referral);
+				int ret = kr_ranked_rrarray_add(&req->answ_selected, rr,
+						rank, to_wire, query->uid, &req->pool);
+				if (ret < 0) {
+					return KR_STATE_FAIL;
+				}
+			}
+			if (!all_OK) {
+				continue;
+			}
+
+			if (rr->type == KNOT_RRTYPE_RRSIG) {
+				int rrsig_labels = knot_rrsig_labels(rr->rrs.rdata);
+				if (rrsig_labels > cname_labels) {
+					/* clearly wrong RRSIG, don't pick it.
+					 * don't fail immediately,
+					 * let validator work. */
+					continue;
+				}
+				if (rrsig_labels < cname_labels) {
+					query->flags.DNSSEC_WEXPAND = true;
+				}
+			}
+
+			/* Process records matching current SNAME */
+			if (!is_final) {
+				int cnt_ = 0;
+				int state = update_nsaddr(rr, query->parent, &cnt_);
+				if (state & KR_STATE_FAIL) {
+					return state;
+				}
+			}
+			uint8_t rank = get_initial_rank(rr, query, true,
+					query->flags.FORWARD || referral);
+			int ret = kr_ranked_rrarray_add(&req->answ_selected, rr,
+						rank, to_wire, query->uid, &req->pool);
+			if (ret < 0) {
+				return KR_STATE_FAIL;
+			}
+			cname_answ_selected_i = ret;
+
+			/* Select the next CNAME target, but don't jump immediately.
+			 * There can be records for "old" cname (RRSIGs are interesting);
+			 * more importantly there might be a DNAME for `cname_is_occluded`. */
+			if (query->stype != KNOT_RRTYPE_CNAME && rr->type == KNOT_RRTYPE_CNAME) {
+				pending_cname = knot_cname_name(rr->rrs.rdata);
+				if (!pending_cname) {
+					break;
+				}
+			}
+		}
+		if (!pending_cname) {
+			break;
+		}
+		if (cname_is_occluded) {
+			req->answ_selected.at[cname_answ_selected_i]->dont_cache = true;
+		}
+		if (++(query->cname_depth) > KR_CNAME_CHAIN_LIMIT) {
+			VERBOSE_MSG("<= error: CNAME chain exceeded max length %d\n",
+					/* people count objects from 0, no CNAME = 0 */
+					(int)KR_CNAME_CHAIN_LIMIT - 1);
+			return KR_STATE_FAIL;
+		}
+
+		if (knot_dname_is_equal(cname, pending_cname)) {
+			VERBOSE_MSG("<= error: CNAME chain loop detected\n");
+			return KR_STATE_FAIL;
+		}
+		/* In strict mode, explicitly fetch each CNAME target. */
+		if (strict_mode) {
+			cname = pending_cname;
+			break;
+		}
+		/* Information outside bailiwick is not trusted. */
+		if (knot_dname_in_bailiwick(pending_cname, query->zone_cut.name) < 0) {
+			cname = pending_cname;
+			break;
+		}
+		/* The validator still can't handle multiple zones in one answer,
+		 * so we only follow if a single label is replaced.
+		 * Forwarding appears to be even more sensitive to this.
+		 * TODO: iteration can probably handle the remaining cases,
+		 * but overall it would be better to have a smarter validator
+		 * (and thus save roundtrips).*/
+		const int pending_labels = knot_dname_labels(pending_cname, NULL);
+		if (pending_labels != cname_labels) {
+			cname = pending_cname;
+			break;
+		}
+		if (knot_dname_matched_labels(pending_cname, cname) != cname_labels - 1
+		    || query->flags.FORWARD) {
+			cname = pending_cname;
+			break;
+		}
+	} while (true);
+	*cname_ret = cname;
+	return kr_ok();
+}
+
+static int process_referral_answer(knot_pkt_t *pkt, struct kr_request *req)
+{
+	const knot_dname_t *cname = NULL;
+	int state = unroll_cname(pkt, req, true, &cname);
+	struct kr_query *query = req->current_query;
+	if (state != kr_ok()) {
+		query->server_selection.error(query, req->upstream.transport, KR_SELECTION_BAD_CNAME);
+		return KR_STATE_FAIL;
+	}
+	if (!(query->flags.CACHED)) {
+		/* If not cached (i.e. got from upstream)
+		 * make sure that this is not an authoritative answer
+		 * (even with AA=1) for other layers.
+		 * There can be answers with AA=1,
+		 * empty answer section and NS in authority.
+		 * Clearing of AA prevents them from
+		 * caching in the packet cache.
+		 * If packet already cached, don't touch him. */
+		knot_wire_clear_aa(pkt->wire);
+	}
+	state = pick_authority(pkt, req, false);
+	return state == kr_ok() ? KR_STATE_DONE : KR_STATE_FAIL;
+}
+
+static int process_final(knot_pkt_t *pkt, struct kr_request *req,
+			 const knot_dname_t *cname)
+{
+	const int pkt_class = kr_response_classify(pkt);
+	struct kr_query *query = req->current_query;
+	ranked_rr_array_t *array = &req->answ_selected;
+	for (size_t i = 0; i < array->len; ++i) {
+		const knot_rrset_t *rr = array->at[i]->rr;
+		if (!knot_dname_is_equal(rr->owner, cname)) {
+			continue;
+		}
+		if ((rr->rclass != query->sclass) ||
+		    (rr->type != query->stype)) {
+			continue;
+		}
+		const bool to_wire = ((pkt_class & (PKT_NXDOMAIN|PKT_NODATA)) != 0);
+		const int state = pick_authority(pkt, req, to_wire);
+		if (state != kr_ok()) {
+			return KR_STATE_FAIL;
+		}
+		if (!array->at[i]->to_wire) {
+			const size_t last_idx = array->len - 1;
+			size_t j = i;
+			ranked_rr_array_entry_t *entry = array->at[i];
+			/* Relocate record to the end, after current cname */
+			while (j < last_idx) {
+				array->at[j] = array->at[j + 1];
+				++j;
+			}
+			array->at[last_idx] = entry;
+			entry->to_wire = true;
+		}
+		return finalize_answer(pkt, req);
+	}
+	return kr_ok();
+}
+
+static int process_answer(knot_pkt_t *pkt, struct kr_request *req)
+{
+	struct kr_query *query = req->current_query;
+
+	/* Response for minimized QNAME.  Note that current iterator's minimization
+	 * is only able ask one label below a zone cut.
+	 * NODATA   => may be empty non-terminal, retry (found zone cut)
+	 * NOERROR  => found zone cut, retry, except the case described below
+	 * NXDOMAIN => parent is zone cut, retry as a workaround for bad authoritatives
+	 */
+	const bool is_final = (query->parent == NULL);
+	const int pkt_class = kr_response_classify(pkt);
+	const knot_dname_t * pkt_qname = knot_pkt_qname(pkt);
+	if (!knot_dname_is_equal(pkt_qname, query->sname) &&
+	    (pkt_class & (PKT_NOERROR|PKT_NXDOMAIN|PKT_REFUSED|PKT_NODATA))) {
+		/* Check for parent server that is authoritative for child zone,
+		 * several CCTLDs where the SLD and TLD have the same name servers */
+		const knot_pktsection_t *ans = knot_pkt_section(pkt, KNOT_ANSWER);
+		if ((pkt_class & (PKT_NOERROR)) && ans->count > 0 &&
+		     knot_dname_is_equal(pkt_qname, query->zone_cut.name)) {
+			VERBOSE_MSG("<= continuing with qname minimization\n");
+		} else {
+			/* fall back to disabling minimization */
+			VERBOSE_MSG("<= retrying with non-minimized name\n");
+			query->flags.NO_MINIMIZE = true;
+		}
+		return KR_STATE_CONSUME;
+	}
+
+	/* This answer didn't improve resolution chain, therefore must be authoritative (relaxed to negative). */
+	if (!is_authoritative(pkt, query)) {
+		if (!(query->flags.FORWARD) &&
+		    pkt_class & (PKT_NXDOMAIN|PKT_NODATA)) {
+			query->server_selection.error(query, req->upstream.transport, KR_SELECTION_LAME_DELEGATION);
+			VERBOSE_MSG("<= lame response: non-auth sent negative response\n");
+			return KR_STATE_FAIL;
+		}
+	}
+
+	const knot_dname_t *cname = NULL;
+	/* Process answer type */
+	int state = unroll_cname(pkt, req, false, &cname);
+	if (state != kr_ok()) {
+		query->server_selection.error(query, req->upstream.transport, KR_SELECTION_BAD_CNAME);
+		return state;
+	}
+	/* Make sure that this is an authoritative answer (even with AA=0) for other layers */
+	knot_wire_set_aa(pkt->wire);
+	/* Either way it resolves current query. */
+	query->flags.RESOLVED = true;
+	/* Follow canonical name as next SNAME. */
+	if (!knot_dname_is_equal(cname, query->sname)) {
+		/* Check if target record has been already copied */
+		query->flags.CNAME = true;
+		if (is_final) {
+			state = process_final(pkt, req, cname);
+			if (state != kr_ok()) {
+				return state;
+			}
+		} else if ((query->flags.FORWARD) &&
+			   ((query->stype == KNOT_RRTYPE_DS) ||
+			    (query->stype == KNOT_RRTYPE_NS))) {
+			/* CNAME'ed answer for DS or NS subquery.
+			 * Treat it as proof of zonecut nonexistence. */
+			return KR_STATE_DONE;
+		}
+		VERBOSE_MSG("<= cname chain, following\n");
+		/* Check if the same query was followed in the same CNAME chain. */
+		for (const struct kr_query *q = query->cname_parent; q != NULL;
+				q = q->cname_parent) {
+			if (q->sclass == query->sclass &&
+			    q->stype == query->stype   &&
+			    knot_dname_is_equal(q->sname, cname)) {
+				VERBOSE_MSG("<= cname chain loop\n");
+				query->server_selection.error(query, req->upstream.transport, KR_SELECTION_BAD_CNAME);
+				return KR_STATE_FAIL;
+			}
+		}
+		struct kr_query *next = kr_rplan_push(&req->rplan, query->parent, cname, query->sclass, query->stype);
+		if (!next) {
+			return KR_STATE_FAIL;
+		}
+		next->flags.AWAIT_CUT = true;
+
+		/* Copy transitive flags from original query to CNAME followup. */
+		next->flags.TRACE = query->flags.TRACE;
+		next->flags.ALWAYS_CUT = query->flags.ALWAYS_CUT;
+
+		/* Original query might have turned minimization off, revert. */
+		next->flags.NO_MINIMIZE = req->options.NO_MINIMIZE;
+
+		if (query->flags.FORWARD) {
+			next->forward_flags.CNAME = true;
+		}
+		next->cname_parent = query;
+		/* Want DNSSEC if and only if it's possible to secure
+		 * this name (i.e. iff it is covered by a TA) */
+		if (kr_ta_closest(req->ctx, cname, query->stype)) {
+			next->flags.DNSSEC_WANT = true;
+		} else {
+			next->flags.DNSSEC_WANT = false;
+		}
+		if (!(query->flags.FORWARD) ||
+		    (query->flags.DNSSEC_WEXPAND)) {
+			state = pick_authority(pkt, req, false);
+			if (state != kr_ok()) {
+				return KR_STATE_FAIL;
+			}
+		}
+	} else if (!query->parent) {
+		/* Answer for initial query */
+		const bool to_wire = ((pkt_class & (PKT_NXDOMAIN|PKT_NODATA)) != 0);
+		state = pick_authority(pkt, req, to_wire);
+		if (state != kr_ok()) {
+			return KR_STATE_FAIL;
+		}
+		return finalize_answer(pkt, req);
+	} else {
+		/* Answer for sub-query; DS, IP for NS etc.
+		 * It may contains NSEC \ NSEC3 records for
+		 * data non-existence or wc expansion proving.
+		 * If yes, they must be validated by validator.
+		 * If no, authority section is unuseful.
+		 * dnssec\nsec.c & dnssec\nsec3.c use
+		 * rrsets from incoming packet.
+		 * validator uses answer_selected & auth_selected.
+		 * So, if nsec\nsec3 records are present in authority,
+		 * pick_authority() must be called.
+		 * TODO refactor nsec\nsec3 modules to work with
+		 * answer_selected & auth_selected instead of incoming pkt. */
+		bool auth_is_unuseful = true;
+		const knot_pktsection_t *ns = knot_pkt_section(pkt, KNOT_AUTHORITY);
+		for (unsigned i = 0; i < ns->count; ++i) {
+			const knot_rrset_t *rr = knot_pkt_rr(ns, i);
+			if (rr->type == KNOT_RRTYPE_NSEC ||
+			    rr->type == KNOT_RRTYPE_NSEC3) {
+				auth_is_unuseful = false;
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+		if (!auth_is_unuseful) {
+			state = pick_authority(pkt, req, false);
+			if (state != kr_ok()) {
+				return KR_STATE_FAIL;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	return KR_STATE_DONE;
+}
+
+/** @internal like process_answer() but for the STUB mode. */
+static int process_stub(knot_pkt_t *pkt, struct kr_request *req)
+{
+	struct kr_query *query = req->current_query;
+	if (kr_fails_assert(query->flags.STUB))
+		return KR_STATE_FAIL;
+	/* Pick all answer RRs. */
+	const knot_pktsection_t *an = knot_pkt_section(pkt, KNOT_ANSWER);
+	for (unsigned i = 0; i < an->count; ++i) {
+		const knot_rrset_t *rr = knot_pkt_rr(an, i);
+		int err = kr_ranked_rrarray_add(&req->answ_selected, rr,
+			      KR_RANK_OMIT | KR_RANK_AUTH, true, query->uid, &req->pool);
+		/* KR_RANK_AUTH: we don't have the records directly from
+		 * an authoritative source, but we do trust the server and it's
+		 * supposed to only send us authoritative records. */
+		if (err < 0) {
+			return KR_STATE_FAIL;
+		}
+	}
+
+	knot_wire_set_aa(pkt->wire);
+	query->flags.RESOLVED = true;
+	/* Pick authority RRs. */
+	int pkt_class = kr_response_classify(pkt);
+	const bool to_wire = ((pkt_class & (PKT_NXDOMAIN|PKT_NODATA)) != 0);
+	int err = pick_authority(pkt, req, to_wire);
+	if (err != kr_ok()) {
+		return KR_STATE_FAIL;
+	}
+
+	return finalize_answer(pkt, req);
+}
+
+/* State-less single resolution iteration step, not needed. */
+static int reset(kr_layer_t *ctx)  { return KR_STATE_PRODUCE; }
+
+/* Set resolution context and parameters. */
+static int begin(kr_layer_t *ctx)
+{
+	if (ctx->state & (KR_STATE_DONE|KR_STATE_FAIL)) {
+		return ctx->state;
+	}
+	/*
+	 * RFC7873 5.4 extends the QUERY operation code behaviour in order to
+	 * be able to generate requests for server cookies. Such requests have
+	 * QDCOUNT equal to zero and must contain a cookie option.
+	 * Server cookie queries must be handled by the cookie module/layer
+	 * before this layer.
+	 */
+	const knot_pkt_t *pkt = ctx->req->qsource.packet;
+	if (!pkt || knot_wire_get_qdcount(pkt->wire) == 0) {
+		return KR_STATE_FAIL;
+	}
+
+	struct kr_query *qry = ctx->req->current_query;
+	/* Avoid any other classes, and avoid any meta-types ~~except for ANY~~. */
+	if (qry->sclass != KNOT_CLASS_IN
+	    || (knot_rrtype_is_metatype(qry->stype)
+		    /* && qry->stype != KNOT_RRTYPE_ANY hmm ANY seems broken ATM */)) {
+		knot_pkt_t *ans = kr_request_ensure_answer(ctx->req);
+		if (!ans) return ctx->req->state;
+		knot_wire_set_rcode(ans->wire, KNOT_RCODE_NOTIMPL);
+		return KR_STATE_FAIL;
+	}
+
+	return reset(ctx);
+}
+
+int kr_make_query(struct kr_query *query, knot_pkt_t *pkt)
+{
+	/* Minimize QNAME (if possible). */
+	uint16_t qtype = query->stype;
+	const knot_dname_t *qname = minimized_qname(query, &qtype);
+
+	/* Form a query for the authoritative. */
+	knot_pkt_clear(pkt);
+	int ret = knot_pkt_put_question(pkt, qname, query->sclass, qtype);
+	if (ret != KNOT_EOK) {
+		return ret;
+	}
+
+	/* Query built, expect answer. */
+	query->id = kr_rand_bytes(2);
+	/* We must respect https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7766#section-6.2.1
+	 * -  When sending multiple queries over a TCP connection, clients MUST NOT
+	 *    reuse the DNS Message ID of an in-flight query on that connection.
+	 *
+	 * So, if query is going to be sent over TCP connection
+	 * this id can be changed to avoid duplication with query that already was sent
+	 * but didn't receive answer yet.
+	 */
+	knot_wire_set_id(pkt->wire, query->id);
+	pkt->parsed = pkt->size;
+
+	return kr_ok();
+}
+
+static int prepare_query(kr_layer_t *ctx, knot_pkt_t *pkt)
+{
+	if (kr_fails_assert(pkt && ctx))
+		return KR_STATE_FAIL;
+	struct kr_request *req = ctx->req;
+	struct kr_query *query = req->current_query;
+	if (!query || ctx->state & (KR_STATE_DONE|KR_STATE_FAIL)) {
+		return ctx->state;
+	}
+
+	/* Make query */
+	int ret = kr_make_query(query, pkt);
+	if (ret != 0) {
+		return KR_STATE_FAIL;
+	}
+
+	WITH_VERBOSE(query) {
+		KR_DNAME_GET_STR(name_str, query->sname);
+		KR_RRTYPE_GET_STR(type_str, query->stype);
+		QVERBOSE_MSG(query, "'%s' type '%s' new uid was assigned .%02u, parent uid .%02u\n",
+			    name_str, type_str, req->rplan.next_uid,
+			    query->parent ? query->parent->uid : 0);
+	}
+
+	query->uid = req->rplan.next_uid;
+	req->rplan.next_uid += 1;
+	query->flags.CACHED = false; // in case it got left from earlier (unknown edge case)
+
+	return KR_STATE_CONSUME;
+}
+
+static bool satisfied_by_additional(const struct kr_query *qry)
+{
+	const bool prereq = !qry->flags.STUB && !qry->flags.FORWARD && qry->flags.NONAUTH;
+	if (!prereq)
+		return false;
+	const struct kr_request *req = qry->request;
+	for (ssize_t i = req->add_selected.len - 1; i >= 0; --i) {
+		ranked_rr_array_entry_t *entry = req->add_selected.at[i];
+		if (entry->qry_uid != qry->uid)
+			break;
+		if (entry->rr->type == qry->stype
+		    && knot_dname_is_equal(entry->rr->owner, qry->sname)) {
+			return true;
+		}
+	}
+	return false;
+}
+
+/** Restrict all RRset TTLs to the specified bounds (if matching qry_uid). */
+static void bound_ttls(ranked_rr_array_t *array, uint32_t qry_uid,
+			uint32_t ttl_min, uint32_t ttl_max)
+{
+	for (ssize_t i = 0; i < array->len; ++i) {
+		if (array->at[i]->qry_uid != qry_uid)
+			continue;
+		uint32_t *ttl = &array->at[i]->rr->ttl;
+		if (*ttl < ttl_min) {
+			*ttl = ttl_min;
+		} else if (*ttl > ttl_max) {
+			*ttl = ttl_max;
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+/** Resolve input query or continue resolution with followups.
+ *
+ *  This roughly corresponds to RFC1034, 5.3.3 4a-d.
+ */
+static int resolve(kr_layer_t *ctx, knot_pkt_t *pkt)
+{
+	if (kr_fails_assert(pkt && ctx))
+		return KR_STATE_FAIL;
+	struct kr_request *req = ctx->req;
+	struct kr_query *query = req->current_query;
+	if (!query) {
+		return ctx->state;
+	}
+	query->flags.PKT_IS_SANE = false;
+
+	WITH_VERBOSE(query) {
+		if (query->flags.TRACE) {
+			auto_free char *pkt_text = kr_pkt_text(pkt);
+			VERBOSE_MSG("<= answer received:\n%s\n", pkt_text);
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (query->flags.RESOLVED || query->flags.BADCOOKIE_AGAIN) {
+		return ctx->state;
+	}
+
+	/* Check for packet processing errors first.
+	 * Note - we *MUST* check if it has at least a QUESTION,
+	 * otherwise it would crash on accessing QNAME. */
+	/* TODO: some of these erros are probably unreachable
+	 * thanks to getting caught earlier, in particular in worker_submit() */
+	if (pkt->parsed <= KNOT_WIRE_HEADER_SIZE) {
+		if (pkt->parsed == KNOT_WIRE_HEADER_SIZE && knot_wire_get_rcode(pkt->wire) == KNOT_RCODE_FORMERR) {
+			/* This is a special case where we get valid header with FORMERR and nothing else.
+			 * This happens on some authoritatives which don't support EDNS and don't
+			 * bother copying the SECTION QUESTION. */
+			query->server_selection.error(query, req->upstream.transport, KR_SELECTION_FORMERR);
+			return KR_STATE_FAIL;
+		}
+		VERBOSE_MSG("<= malformed response (parsed %d)\n", (int)pkt->parsed);
+		query->server_selection.error(query, req->upstream.transport, KR_SELECTION_MALFORMED);
+		return KR_STATE_FAIL;
+	} else if (!is_paired_to_query(pkt, query)) {
+		WITH_VERBOSE(query) {
+			const char *ns_str =
+				req->upstream.transport ? kr_straddr(&req->upstream.transport->address.ip) : "(internal)";
+			VERBOSE_MSG("<= ignoring mismatching response from %s\n",
+					ns_str ? ns_str : "(kr_straddr failed)");
+		}
+		query->server_selection.error(query, req->upstream.transport, KR_SELECTION_MISMATCHED);
+		return KR_STATE_FAIL;
+	} else if (knot_wire_get_tc(pkt->wire)) {
+		VERBOSE_MSG("<= truncated response, failover to TCP\n");
+		if (query) {
+			/* Fail if already on TCP. */
+			if (req->upstream.transport->protocol != KR_TRANSPORT_UDP) {
+				VERBOSE_MSG("<= TC=1 with TCP, bailing out\n");
+				query->server_selection.error(query, req->upstream.transport, KR_SELECTION_TRUNCATED);
+				return KR_STATE_FAIL;
+			}
+			query->server_selection.error(query, req->upstream.transport, KR_SELECTION_TRUNCATED);
+		}
+		return KR_STATE_CONSUME;
+	}
+
+	/* If exiting above here, there's no sense to put it into packet cache.
+	 * Having "extra bytes" at the end of DNS message is considered SANE here.
+	 * The most important part is to check for spoofing: is_paired_to_query() */
+	query->flags.PKT_IS_SANE = true;
+
+	const knot_lookup_t *rcode = // just for logging but cheaper than a condition
+		knot_lookup_by_id(knot_rcode_names, knot_wire_get_rcode(pkt->wire));
+
+	// We can't return directly from the switch because we have to give feedback to server selection first
+	int ret = 0;
+	int selection_error = KR_SELECTION_OK;
+
+	/* Check response code. */
+	switch(knot_wire_get_rcode(pkt->wire)) {
+	case KNOT_RCODE_NOERROR:
+	case KNOT_RCODE_NXDOMAIN:
+		break; /* OK */
+	case KNOT_RCODE_YXDOMAIN: /* Basically a successful answer; name just doesn't fit. */
+		if (!kr_request_ensure_answer(req)) {
+			ret = req->state;
+		}
+		knot_wire_set_rcode(req->answer->wire, KNOT_RCODE_YXDOMAIN);
+		break;
+	case KNOT_RCODE_REFUSED:
+		if (query->flags.STUB) {
+			 /* just pass answer through if in stub mode */
+			break;
+		}
+		ret = KR_STATE_FAIL;
+		selection_error = KR_SELECTION_REFUSED;
+		break;
+	case KNOT_RCODE_SERVFAIL:
+		if (query->flags.STUB) {
+			 /* just pass answer through if in stub mode */
+			break;
+		}
+		ret = KR_STATE_FAIL;
+		selection_error = KR_SELECTION_SERVFAIL;
+		break;
+	case KNOT_RCODE_FORMERR:
+		ret = KR_STATE_FAIL;
+		if (knot_pkt_has_edns(pkt)) {
+			selection_error = KR_SELECTION_FORMERR_EDNS;
+		} else {
+			selection_error = KR_SELECTION_FORMERR;
+		}
+		break;
+	case KNOT_RCODE_NOTIMPL:
+		ret = KR_STATE_FAIL;
+		selection_error = KR_SELECTION_NOTIMPL;
+		break;
+	default:
+		ret = KR_STATE_FAIL;
+		selection_error = KR_SELECTION_OTHER_RCODE;
+		break;
+	}
+
+	/* Check for "extra bytes" is deferred, so that RCODE-based failures take priority. */
+	if (ret != KR_STATE_FAIL && pkt->parsed < pkt->size) {
+		VERBOSE_MSG("<= malformed response with %zu extra bytes\n",
+				pkt->size - pkt->parsed);
+		ret = KR_STATE_FAIL;
+		if (selection_error == KR_SELECTION_OK)
+			selection_error = KR_SELECTION_MALFORMED;
+	}
+
+	if (query->server_selection.initialized) {
+		query->server_selection.error(query, req->upstream.transport, selection_error);
+	}
+
+	if (ret) {
+		VERBOSE_MSG("<= rcode: %s\n", rcode ? rcode->name : "??");
+		return ret;
+	}
+
+	int state;
+	/* Forwarding/stub mode is special. */
+	if (query->flags.STUB) {
+		state = process_stub(pkt, req);
+		goto rrarray_finalize;
+	}
+
+	/* Resolve authority to see if it's referral or authoritative. */
+	state = process_authority(pkt, req);
+	switch(state) {
+	case KR_STATE_CONSUME: /* Not referral, process answer. */
+		VERBOSE_MSG("<= rcode: %s\n", rcode ? rcode->name : "??");
+		state = process_answer(pkt, req);
+		break;
+	case KR_STATE_DONE: /* Referral */
+		state = process_referral_answer(pkt,req);
+		if (satisfied_by_additional(query)) { /* This is a little hacky.
+			 * We found sufficient information in ADDITIONAL section
+			 * and it was selected for caching in this CONSUME round.
+			 * To make iterator accept the record in a simple way,
+			 * we trigger another cache *reading* attempt
+			 * for the subsequent PRODUCE round.
+			 */
+			kr_assert(query->flags.NONAUTH);
+			query->flags.CACHE_TRIED = false;
+			VERBOSE_MSG("<= referral response, but cache should stop us short now\n");
+		} else {
+			VERBOSE_MSG("<= referral response, follow\n");
+		}
+		break;
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+
+rrarray_finalize:
+	/* Finish construction of libknot-format RRsets.
+	 * We do this even if dropping the answer, though it's probably useless. */
+	(void)0;
+	const struct kr_cache *cache = &req->ctx->cache;
+	ranked_rr_array_t *selected[] = kr_request_selected(req);
+	for (knot_section_t i = KNOT_ANSWER; i <= KNOT_ADDITIONAL; ++i) {
+		ret = kr_ranked_rrarray_finalize(selected[i], query->uid, &req->pool);
+		if (unlikely(ret))
+			return KR_STATE_FAIL;
+		if (!query->flags.CACHED)
+			bound_ttls(selected[i], query->uid, cache->ttl_min, cache->ttl_max);
+	}
+
+	return state;
+}
+
+/** Module implementation. */
+int iterate_init(struct kr_module *self)
+{
+	static const kr_layer_api_t layer = {
+		.begin = &begin,
+		.reset = &reset,
+		.consume = &resolve,
+		.produce = &prepare_query
+	};
+	self->layer = &layer;
+	return kr_ok();
+}
+
+KR_MODULE_EXPORT(iterate) /* useless for builtin module, but let's be consistent */
+
+#undef VERBOSE_MSG