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authorDaniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>2024-05-04 10:10:26 +0000
committerDaniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>2024-05-04 10:10:26 +0000
commit116e0f61852489520aaad930b8fcbe40834819bf (patch)
treee7cd8828fee4cf285d0b49d2eccc532ac1c064af /arch/x86/boot/compressed/mem_encrypt.S
parentReleasing progress-linux version 6.1.76-1~progress6.99u1. (diff)
downloadlinux-116e0f61852489520aaad930b8fcbe40834819bf.tar.xz
linux-116e0f61852489520aaad930b8fcbe40834819bf.zip
Merging upstream version 6.1.82.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86/boot/compressed/mem_encrypt.S')
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/boot/compressed/mem_encrypt.S152
1 files changed, 139 insertions, 13 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/mem_encrypt.S b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/mem_encrypt.S
index a73e4d783..32f7cc8a8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/mem_encrypt.S
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/mem_encrypt.S
@@ -12,16 +12,13 @@
#include <asm/processor-flags.h>
#include <asm/msr.h>
#include <asm/asm-offsets.h>
+#include <asm/segment.h>
+#include <asm/trapnr.h>
.text
.code32
SYM_FUNC_START(get_sev_encryption_bit)
- xor %eax, %eax
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
push %ebx
- push %ecx
- push %edx
movl $0x80000000, %eax /* CPUID to check the highest leaf */
cpuid
@@ -52,12 +49,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(get_sev_encryption_bit)
xor %eax, %eax
.Lsev_exit:
- pop %edx
- pop %ecx
pop %ebx
-
-#endif /* CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT */
-
RET
SYM_FUNC_END(get_sev_encryption_bit)
@@ -98,7 +90,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(sev_es_req_cpuid)
jmp 1b
SYM_CODE_END(sev_es_req_cpuid)
-SYM_CODE_START(startup32_vc_handler)
+SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(startup32_vc_handler)
pushl %eax
pushl %ebx
pushl %ecx
@@ -184,15 +176,149 @@ SYM_CODE_START(startup32_vc_handler)
jmp .Lfail
SYM_CODE_END(startup32_vc_handler)
+/*
+ * Write an IDT entry into boot32_idt
+ *
+ * Parameters:
+ *
+ * %eax: Handler address
+ * %edx: Vector number
+ * %ecx: IDT address
+ */
+SYM_FUNC_START_LOCAL(startup32_set_idt_entry)
+ /* IDT entry address to %ecx */
+ leal (%ecx, %edx, 8), %ecx
+
+ /* Build IDT entry, lower 4 bytes */
+ movl %eax, %edx
+ andl $0x0000ffff, %edx # Target code segment offset [15:0]
+ orl $(__KERNEL32_CS << 16), %edx # Target code segment selector
+
+ /* Store lower 4 bytes to IDT */
+ movl %edx, (%ecx)
+
+ /* Build IDT entry, upper 4 bytes */
+ movl %eax, %edx
+ andl $0xffff0000, %edx # Target code segment offset [31:16]
+ orl $0x00008e00, %edx # Present, Type 32-bit Interrupt Gate
+
+ /* Store upper 4 bytes to IDT */
+ movl %edx, 4(%ecx)
+
+ RET
+SYM_FUNC_END(startup32_set_idt_entry)
+
+SYM_FUNC_START(startup32_load_idt)
+ push %ebp
+ push %ebx
+
+ call 1f
+1: pop %ebp
+
+ leal (boot32_idt - 1b)(%ebp), %ebx
+
+ /* #VC handler */
+ leal (startup32_vc_handler - 1b)(%ebp), %eax
+ movl $X86_TRAP_VC, %edx
+ movl %ebx, %ecx
+ call startup32_set_idt_entry
+
+ /* Load IDT */
+ leal (boot32_idt_desc - 1b)(%ebp), %ecx
+ movl %ebx, 2(%ecx)
+ lidt (%ecx)
+
+ pop %ebx
+ pop %ebp
+ RET
+SYM_FUNC_END(startup32_load_idt)
+
+/*
+ * Check for the correct C-bit position when the startup_32 boot-path is used.
+ *
+ * The check makes use of the fact that all memory is encrypted when paging is
+ * disabled. The function creates 64 bits of random data using the RDRAND
+ * instruction. RDRAND is mandatory for SEV guests, so always available. If the
+ * hypervisor violates that the kernel will crash right here.
+ *
+ * The 64 bits of random data are stored to a memory location and at the same
+ * time kept in the %eax and %ebx registers. Since encryption is always active
+ * when paging is off the random data will be stored encrypted in main memory.
+ *
+ * Then paging is enabled. When the C-bit position is correct all memory is
+ * still mapped encrypted and comparing the register values with memory will
+ * succeed. An incorrect C-bit position will map all memory unencrypted, so that
+ * the compare will use the encrypted random data and fail.
+ */
+SYM_FUNC_START(startup32_check_sev_cbit)
+ pushl %ebx
+ pushl %ebp
+
+ call 0f
+0: popl %ebp
+
+ /* Check for non-zero sev_status */
+ movl (sev_status - 0b)(%ebp), %eax
+ testl %eax, %eax
+ jz 4f
+
+ /*
+ * Get two 32-bit random values - Don't bail out if RDRAND fails
+ * because it is better to prevent forward progress if no random value
+ * can be gathered.
+ */
+1: rdrand %eax
+ jnc 1b
+2: rdrand %ebx
+ jnc 2b
+
+ /* Store to memory and keep it in the registers */
+ leal (sev_check_data - 0b)(%ebp), %ebp
+ movl %eax, 0(%ebp)
+ movl %ebx, 4(%ebp)
+
+ /* Enable paging to see if encryption is active */
+ movl %cr0, %edx /* Backup %cr0 in %edx */
+ movl $(X86_CR0_PG | X86_CR0_PE), %ecx /* Enable Paging and Protected mode */
+ movl %ecx, %cr0
+
+ cmpl %eax, 0(%ebp)
+ jne 3f
+ cmpl %ebx, 4(%ebp)
+ jne 3f
+
+ movl %edx, %cr0 /* Restore previous %cr0 */
+
+ jmp 4f
+
+3: /* Check failed - hlt the machine */
+ hlt
+ jmp 3b
+
+4:
+ popl %ebp
+ popl %ebx
+ RET
+SYM_FUNC_END(startup32_check_sev_cbit)
+
.code64
#include "../../kernel/sev_verify_cbit.S"
.data
-#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
.balign 8
SYM_DATA(sme_me_mask, .quad 0)
SYM_DATA(sev_status, .quad 0)
SYM_DATA(sev_check_data, .quad 0)
-#endif
+
+SYM_DATA_START_LOCAL(boot32_idt)
+ .rept 32
+ .quad 0
+ .endr
+SYM_DATA_END(boot32_idt)
+
+SYM_DATA_START_LOCAL(boot32_idt_desc)
+ .word . - boot32_idt - 1
+ .long 0
+SYM_DATA_END(boot32_idt_desc)