Adding debian version 6.1.76-1.debian/6.1.76-1

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

3 files changed, 179 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/debian/patches/features/all/db-mok-keyring/0003-MODSIGN-checking-the-blacklisted-hash-before-loading-a-kernel-module.patch b/debian/patches/features/all/db-mok-keyring/0003-MODSIGN-checking-the-blacklisted-hash-before-loading-a-kernel-module.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f2278ce63
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/features/all/db-mok-keyring/0003-MODSIGN-checking-the-blacklisted-hash-before-loading-a-kernel-module.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,130 @@
+From: "Lee, Chun-Yi" <joeyli.kernel@gmail.com>
+Date: Tue, 13 Mar 2018 18:38:02 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH 3/4] MODSIGN: checking the blacklisted hash before loading a
+ kernel module
+Origin: https://lore.kernel.org/patchwork/patch/933175/
+
+This patch adds the logic for checking the kernel module's hash
+base on blacklist. The hash must be generated by sha256 and enrolled
+to dbx/mokx.
+
+For example:
+	sha256sum sample.ko
+	mokutil --mokx --import-hash $HASH_RESULT
+
+Whether the signature on ko file is stripped or not, the hash can be
+compared by kernel.
+
+Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
+Cc: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
+Cc: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
+Signed-off-by: "Lee, Chun-Yi" <jlee@suse.com>
+[Rebased by Luca Boccassi]
+[bwh: Forward-ported to 5.19:
+ - The type parameter to is_hash_blacklisted() is now an enumeration
+   rather than a string
+ - Adjust filename, context]
+---
+ kernel/module/signing.c | 59 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
+ 1 file changed, 57 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/kernel/module/signing.c
++++ b/kernel/module/signing.c
+@@ -13,6 +13,8 @@
+ #include <linux/verification.h>
+ #include <linux/security.h>
+ #include <crypto/public_key.h>
++#include <crypto/hash.h>
++#include <keys/system_keyring.h>
+ #include <uapi/linux/module.h>
+ #include "internal.h"
+ 
+@@ -37,13 +39,60 @@
+ 	sig_enforce = true;
+ }
+ 
++static int mod_is_hash_blacklisted(const void *mod, size_t verifylen)
++{
++	struct crypto_shash *tfm;
++	struct shash_desc *desc;
++	size_t digest_size, desc_size;
++	u8 *digest;
++	int ret;
++
++	tfm = crypto_alloc_shash("sha256", 0, 0);
++	if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
++		ret = PTR_ERR(tfm);
++		goto error_return;
++	}
++
++	desc_size = crypto_shash_descsize(tfm) + sizeof(*desc);
++	digest_size = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm);
++	digest = kzalloc(digest_size + desc_size, GFP_KERNEL);
++	if (!digest) {
++		pr_err("digest memory buffer allocate fail\n");
++		ret = -ENOMEM;
++		goto error_digest;
++	}
++	desc = (void *)digest + digest_size;
++	desc->tfm = tfm;
++	ret = crypto_shash_init(desc);
++	if (ret < 0)
++		goto error_shash;
++
++	ret = crypto_shash_finup(desc, mod, verifylen, digest);
++	if (ret < 0)
++		goto error_shash;
++
++	pr_debug("%ld digest: %*phN\n", verifylen, (int) digest_size, digest);
++
++	ret = is_hash_blacklisted(digest, digest_size, BLACKLIST_HASH_BINARY);
++	if (ret == -EKEYREJECTED)
++		pr_err("Module hash %*phN is blacklisted\n",
++		       (int) digest_size, digest);
++
++error_shash:
++	kfree(digest);
++error_digest:
++	crypto_free_shash(tfm);
++error_return:
++	return ret;
++}
++
+ /*
+  * Verify the signature on a module.
+  */
+ int mod_verify_sig(const void *mod, struct load_info *info)
+ {
+ 	struct module_signature ms;
+-	size_t sig_len, modlen = info->len;
++	size_t sig_len, modlen = info->len, wholelen;
+ 	int ret;
+ 
+ 	pr_devel("==>%s(,%zu)\n", __func__, modlen);
+@@ -51,6 +100,7 @@
+ 	if (modlen <= sizeof(ms))
+ 		return -EBADMSG;
+ 
++	wholelen = modlen + sizeof(MODULE_SIG_STRING) - 1;
+ 	memcpy(&ms, mod + (modlen - sizeof(ms)), sizeof(ms));
+ 
+ 	ret = mod_check_sig(&ms, modlen, "module");
+@@ -61,10 +111,17 @@
+ 	modlen -= sig_len + sizeof(ms);
+ 	info->len = modlen;
+ 
+-	return verify_pkcs7_signature(mod, modlen, mod + modlen, sig_len,
++	ret = verify_pkcs7_signature(mod, modlen, mod + modlen, sig_len,
+ 				      VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING,
+ 				      VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE,
+ 				      NULL, NULL);
++	pr_devel("verify_pkcs7_signature() = %d\n", ret);
++
++	/* checking hash of module is in blacklist */
++	if (!ret)
++		ret = mod_is_hash_blacklisted(mod, wholelen);
++
++	return ret;
+ }
+ 
+ int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, int flags)
diff --git a/debian/patches/features/all/db-mok-keyring/KEYS-Make-use-of-platform-keyring-for-module-signature.patch b/debian/patches/features/all/db-mok-keyring/KEYS-Make-use-of-platform-keyring-for-module-signature.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..e46aefe4d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/features/all/db-mok-keyring/KEYS-Make-use-of-platform-keyring-for-module-signature.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+From: Robert Holmes <robeholmes@gmail.com>
+Date: Tue, 23 Apr 2019 07:39:29 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] KEYS: Make use of platform keyring for module signature
+ verify
+Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/935945
+Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/1030200
+Origin: https://src.fedoraproject.org/rpms/kernel/raw/master/f/KEYS-Make-use-of-platform-keyring-for-module-signature.patch
+Forwarded: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-modules/qvgp2il2co4iyxkzxvcs4p2bpyilqsbfgcprtpfrsajwae2etc@3z2s2o52i3xg/t/#u
+
+This allows a cert in DB to be used to sign modules,
+in addition to certs in the MoK and built-in keyrings.
+
+Signed-off-by: Robert Holmes <robeholmes@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: Jeremy Cline <jcline@redhat.com>
+[bwh: Forward-ported to 5.19: adjust filename]
+[наб: reinstate for 6.1, re-write description]
+---
+--- a/kernel/module/signing.c
++++ b/kernel/module/signing.c
+@@ -116,6 +116,13 @@ int mod_verify_sig(const void *mod, stru
+ 				      VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE,
+ 				      NULL, NULL);
+ 	pr_devel("verify_pkcs7_signature() = %d\n", ret);
++	if (ret == -ENOKEY && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING)) {
++		ret = verify_pkcs7_signature(mod, modlen, mod + modlen, sig_len,
++					      VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING,
++					      VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE,
++					      NULL, NULL);
++		pr_devel("verify_pkcs7_signature() = %d\n", ret);
++	}
+ 
+ 	/* checking hash of module is in blacklist */
+ 	if (!ret)
diff --git a/debian/patches/features/all/db-mok-keyring/trust-machine-keyring-by-default.patch b/debian/patches/features/all/db-mok-keyring/trust-machine-keyring-by-default.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..7c32a018f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/features/all/db-mok-keyring/trust-machine-keyring-by-default.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+Author: Luca Boccassi <bluca@debian.org>
+Description: trust machine keyring (MoK) by default
+ Debian always trusted keys in MoK by default. Upstream made it conditional on
+ a new EFI variable being set. To keep backward compatibility skip this check.
+--- a/security/integrity/platform_certs/machine_keyring.c
++++ b/security/integrity/platform_certs/machine_keyring.c
+@@ -69,8 +69,7 @@
+ 	if (!initialized) {
+ 		initialized = true;
+ 
+-		if (uefi_check_trust_mok_keys())
+-			trust_mok = true;
++		trust_mok = true;
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	return trust_mok;