diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/s390/crypto')
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/s390/crypto/Kconfig | 135 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/s390/crypto/Makefile | 21 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/s390/crypto/aes_s390.c | 1061 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/s390/crypto/arch_random.c | 18 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/s390/crypto/chacha-glue.c | 130 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/s390/crypto/chacha-s390.S | 907 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/s390/crypto/chacha-s390.h | 14 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/s390/crypto/crc32-vx.c | 310 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/s390/crypto/crc32be-vx.S | 212 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/s390/crypto/crc32le-vx.S | 273 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/s390/crypto/des_s390.c | 502 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/s390/crypto/ghash_s390.c | 154 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/s390/crypto/paes_s390.c | 804 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/s390/crypto/prng.c | 911 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/s390/crypto/sha.h | 35 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/s390/crypto/sha1_s390.c | 103 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/s390/crypto/sha256_s390.c | 143 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/s390/crypto/sha3_256_s390.c | 146 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/s390/crypto/sha3_512_s390.c | 154 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/s390/crypto/sha512_s390.c | 149 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/s390/crypto/sha_common.c | 124 |
21 files changed, 6306 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/arch/s390/crypto/Kconfig b/arch/s390/crypto/Kconfig new file mode 100644 index 000000000..06ee706b0 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/s390/crypto/Kconfig @@ -0,0 +1,135 @@ +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +menu "Accelerated Cryptographic Algorithms for CPU (s390)" + +config CRYPTO_CRC32_S390 + tristate "CRC32c and CRC32" + depends on S390 + select CRYPTO_HASH + select CRC32 + help + CRC32c and CRC32 CRC algorithms + + Architecture: s390 + + It is available with IBM z13 or later. + +config CRYPTO_SHA512_S390 + tristate "Hash functions: SHA-384 and SHA-512" + depends on S390 + select CRYPTO_HASH + help + SHA-384 and SHA-512 secure hash algorithms (FIPS 180) + + Architecture: s390 + + It is available as of z10. + +config CRYPTO_SHA1_S390 + tristate "Hash functions: SHA-1" + depends on S390 + select CRYPTO_HASH + help + SHA-1 secure hash algorithm (FIPS 180) + + Architecture: s390 + + It is available as of z990. + +config CRYPTO_SHA256_S390 + tristate "Hash functions: SHA-224 and SHA-256" + depends on S390 + select CRYPTO_HASH + help + SHA-224 and SHA-256 secure hash algorithms (FIPS 180) + + Architecture: s390 + + It is available as of z9. + +config CRYPTO_SHA3_256_S390 + tristate "Hash functions: SHA3-224 and SHA3-256" + depends on S390 + select CRYPTO_HASH + help + SHA3-224 and SHA3-256 secure hash algorithms (FIPS 202) + + Architecture: s390 + + It is available as of z14. + +config CRYPTO_SHA3_512_S390 + tristate "Hash functions: SHA3-384 and SHA3-512" + depends on S390 + select CRYPTO_HASH + help + SHA3-384 and SHA3-512 secure hash algorithms (FIPS 202) + + Architecture: s390 + + It is available as of z14. + +config CRYPTO_GHASH_S390 + tristate "Hash functions: GHASH" + depends on S390 + select CRYPTO_HASH + help + GCM GHASH hash function (NIST SP800-38D) + + Architecture: s390 + + It is available as of z196. + +config CRYPTO_AES_S390 + tristate "Ciphers: AES, modes: ECB, CBC, CTR, XTS, GCM" + depends on S390 + select CRYPTO_ALGAPI + select CRYPTO_SKCIPHER + help + Block cipher: AES cipher algorithms (FIPS 197) + AEAD cipher: AES with GCM + Length-preserving ciphers: AES with ECB, CBC, XTS, and CTR modes + + Architecture: s390 + + As of z9 the ECB and CBC modes are hardware accelerated + for 128 bit keys. + + As of z10 the ECB and CBC modes are hardware accelerated + for all AES key sizes. + + As of z196 the CTR mode is hardware accelerated for all AES + key sizes and XTS mode is hardware accelerated for 256 and + 512 bit keys. + +config CRYPTO_DES_S390 + tristate "Ciphers: DES and Triple DES EDE, modes: ECB, CBC, CTR" + depends on S390 + select CRYPTO_ALGAPI + select CRYPTO_SKCIPHER + select CRYPTO_LIB_DES + help + Block ciphers: DES (FIPS 46-2) cipher algorithm + Block ciphers: Triple DES EDE (FIPS 46-3) cipher algorithm + Length-preserving ciphers: DES with ECB, CBC, and CTR modes + Length-preserving ciphers: Triple DES EDED with ECB, CBC, and CTR modes + + Architecture: s390 + + As of z990 the ECB and CBC mode are hardware accelerated. + As of z196 the CTR mode is hardware accelerated. + +config CRYPTO_CHACHA_S390 + tristate "Ciphers: ChaCha20" + depends on S390 + select CRYPTO_SKCIPHER + select CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA_GENERIC + select CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_CHACHA + help + Length-preserving cipher: ChaCha20 stream cipher (RFC 7539) + + Architecture: s390 + + It is available as of z13. + +endmenu diff --git a/arch/s390/crypto/Makefile b/arch/s390/crypto/Makefile new file mode 100644 index 000000000..1b1cc478f --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/s390/crypto/Makefile @@ -0,0 +1,21 @@ +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +# +# Cryptographic API +# + +obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA1_S390) += sha1_s390.o sha_common.o +obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA256_S390) += sha256_s390.o sha_common.o +obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA512_S390) += sha512_s390.o sha_common.o +obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA3_256_S390) += sha3_256_s390.o sha_common.o +obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA3_512_S390) += sha3_512_s390.o sha_common.o +obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_DES_S390) += des_s390.o +obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_AES_S390) += aes_s390.o +obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_PAES_S390) += paes_s390.o +obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_CHACHA_S390) += chacha_s390.o +obj-$(CONFIG_S390_PRNG) += prng.o +obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_GHASH_S390) += ghash_s390.o +obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_CRC32_S390) += crc32-vx_s390.o +obj-y += arch_random.o + +crc32-vx_s390-y := crc32-vx.o crc32le-vx.o crc32be-vx.o +chacha_s390-y := chacha-glue.o chacha-s390.o diff --git a/arch/s390/crypto/aes_s390.c b/arch/s390/crypto/aes_s390.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..7b66e81e5 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/s390/crypto/aes_s390.c @@ -0,0 +1,1061 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ +/* + * Cryptographic API. + * + * s390 implementation of the AES Cipher Algorithm. + * + * s390 Version: + * Copyright IBM Corp. 2005, 2017 + * Author(s): Jan Glauber (jang@de.ibm.com) + * Sebastian Siewior (sebastian@breakpoint.cc> SW-Fallback + * Patrick Steuer <patrick.steuer@de.ibm.com> + * Harald Freudenberger <freude@de.ibm.com> + * + * Derived from "crypto/aes_generic.c" + */ + +#define KMSG_COMPONENT "aes_s390" +#define pr_fmt(fmt) KMSG_COMPONENT ": " fmt + +#include <crypto/aes.h> +#include <crypto/algapi.h> +#include <crypto/ghash.h> +#include <crypto/internal/aead.h> +#include <crypto/internal/cipher.h> +#include <crypto/internal/skcipher.h> +#include <crypto/scatterwalk.h> +#include <linux/err.h> +#include <linux/module.h> +#include <linux/cpufeature.h> +#include <linux/init.h> +#include <linux/mutex.h> +#include <linux/fips.h> +#include <linux/string.h> +#include <crypto/xts.h> +#include <asm/cpacf.h> + +static u8 *ctrblk; +static DEFINE_MUTEX(ctrblk_lock); + +static cpacf_mask_t km_functions, kmc_functions, kmctr_functions, + kma_functions; + +struct s390_aes_ctx { + u8 key[AES_MAX_KEY_SIZE]; + int key_len; + unsigned long fc; + union { + struct crypto_skcipher *skcipher; + struct crypto_cipher *cip; + } fallback; +}; + +struct s390_xts_ctx { + u8 key[32]; + u8 pcc_key[32]; + int key_len; + unsigned long fc; + struct crypto_skcipher *fallback; +}; + +struct gcm_sg_walk { + struct scatter_walk walk; + unsigned int walk_bytes; + u8 *walk_ptr; + unsigned int walk_bytes_remain; + u8 buf[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; + unsigned int buf_bytes; + u8 *ptr; + unsigned int nbytes; +}; + +static int setkey_fallback_cip(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, const u8 *in_key, + unsigned int key_len) +{ + struct s390_aes_ctx *sctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm); + + sctx->fallback.cip->base.crt_flags &= ~CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK; + sctx->fallback.cip->base.crt_flags |= (tfm->crt_flags & + CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK); + + return crypto_cipher_setkey(sctx->fallback.cip, in_key, key_len); +} + +static int aes_set_key(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, const u8 *in_key, + unsigned int key_len) +{ + struct s390_aes_ctx *sctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm); + unsigned long fc; + + /* Pick the correct function code based on the key length */ + fc = (key_len == 16) ? CPACF_KM_AES_128 : + (key_len == 24) ? CPACF_KM_AES_192 : + (key_len == 32) ? CPACF_KM_AES_256 : 0; + + /* Check if the function code is available */ + sctx->fc = (fc && cpacf_test_func(&km_functions, fc)) ? fc : 0; + if (!sctx->fc) + return setkey_fallback_cip(tfm, in_key, key_len); + + sctx->key_len = key_len; + memcpy(sctx->key, in_key, key_len); + return 0; +} + +static void crypto_aes_encrypt(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, u8 *out, const u8 *in) +{ + struct s390_aes_ctx *sctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm); + + if (unlikely(!sctx->fc)) { + crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(sctx->fallback.cip, out, in); + return; + } + cpacf_km(sctx->fc, &sctx->key, out, in, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); +} + +static void crypto_aes_decrypt(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, u8 *out, const u8 *in) +{ + struct s390_aes_ctx *sctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm); + + if (unlikely(!sctx->fc)) { + crypto_cipher_decrypt_one(sctx->fallback.cip, out, in); + return; + } + cpacf_km(sctx->fc | CPACF_DECRYPT, + &sctx->key, out, in, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); +} + +static int fallback_init_cip(struct crypto_tfm *tfm) +{ + const char *name = tfm->__crt_alg->cra_name; + struct s390_aes_ctx *sctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm); + + sctx->fallback.cip = crypto_alloc_cipher(name, 0, + CRYPTO_ALG_NEED_FALLBACK); + + if (IS_ERR(sctx->fallback.cip)) { + pr_err("Allocating AES fallback algorithm %s failed\n", + name); + return PTR_ERR(sctx->fallback.cip); + } + + return 0; +} + +static void fallback_exit_cip(struct crypto_tfm *tfm) +{ + struct s390_aes_ctx *sctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm); + + crypto_free_cipher(sctx->fallback.cip); + sctx->fallback.cip = NULL; +} + +static struct crypto_alg aes_alg = { + .cra_name = "aes", + .cra_driver_name = "aes-s390", + .cra_priority = 300, + .cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_CIPHER | + CRYPTO_ALG_NEED_FALLBACK, + .cra_blocksize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE, + .cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct s390_aes_ctx), + .cra_module = THIS_MODULE, + .cra_init = fallback_init_cip, + .cra_exit = fallback_exit_cip, + .cra_u = { + .cipher = { + .cia_min_keysize = AES_MIN_KEY_SIZE, + .cia_max_keysize = AES_MAX_KEY_SIZE, + .cia_setkey = aes_set_key, + .cia_encrypt = crypto_aes_encrypt, + .cia_decrypt = crypto_aes_decrypt, + } + } +}; + +static int setkey_fallback_skcipher(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key, + unsigned int len) +{ + struct s390_aes_ctx *sctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm); + + crypto_skcipher_clear_flags(sctx->fallback.skcipher, + CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK); + crypto_skcipher_set_flags(sctx->fallback.skcipher, + crypto_skcipher_get_flags(tfm) & + CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK); + return crypto_skcipher_setkey(sctx->fallback.skcipher, key, len); +} + +static int fallback_skcipher_crypt(struct s390_aes_ctx *sctx, + struct skcipher_request *req, + unsigned long modifier) +{ + struct skcipher_request *subreq = skcipher_request_ctx(req); + + *subreq = *req; + skcipher_request_set_tfm(subreq, sctx->fallback.skcipher); + return (modifier & CPACF_DECRYPT) ? + crypto_skcipher_decrypt(subreq) : + crypto_skcipher_encrypt(subreq); +} + +static int ecb_aes_set_key(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *in_key, + unsigned int key_len) +{ + struct s390_aes_ctx *sctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm); + unsigned long fc; + + /* Pick the correct function code based on the key length */ + fc = (key_len == 16) ? CPACF_KM_AES_128 : + (key_len == 24) ? CPACF_KM_AES_192 : + (key_len == 32) ? CPACF_KM_AES_256 : 0; + + /* Check if the function code is available */ + sctx->fc = (fc && cpacf_test_func(&km_functions, fc)) ? fc : 0; + if (!sctx->fc) + return setkey_fallback_skcipher(tfm, in_key, key_len); + + sctx->key_len = key_len; + memcpy(sctx->key, in_key, key_len); + return 0; +} + +static int ecb_aes_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req, unsigned long modifier) +{ + struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req); + struct s390_aes_ctx *sctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm); + struct skcipher_walk walk; + unsigned int nbytes, n; + int ret; + + if (unlikely(!sctx->fc)) + return fallback_skcipher_crypt(sctx, req, modifier); + + ret = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, req, false); + while ((nbytes = walk.nbytes) != 0) { + /* only use complete blocks */ + n = nbytes & ~(AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1); + cpacf_km(sctx->fc | modifier, sctx->key, + walk.dst.virt.addr, walk.src.virt.addr, n); + ret = skcipher_walk_done(&walk, nbytes - n); + } + return ret; +} + +static int ecb_aes_encrypt(struct skcipher_request *req) +{ + return ecb_aes_crypt(req, 0); +} + +static int ecb_aes_decrypt(struct skcipher_request *req) +{ + return ecb_aes_crypt(req, CPACF_DECRYPT); +} + +static int fallback_init_skcipher(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm) +{ + const char *name = crypto_tfm_alg_name(&tfm->base); + struct s390_aes_ctx *sctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm); + + sctx->fallback.skcipher = crypto_alloc_skcipher(name, 0, + CRYPTO_ALG_NEED_FALLBACK | CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC); + + if (IS_ERR(sctx->fallback.skcipher)) { + pr_err("Allocating AES fallback algorithm %s failed\n", + name); + return PTR_ERR(sctx->fallback.skcipher); + } + + crypto_skcipher_set_reqsize(tfm, sizeof(struct skcipher_request) + + crypto_skcipher_reqsize(sctx->fallback.skcipher)); + return 0; +} + +static void fallback_exit_skcipher(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm) +{ + struct s390_aes_ctx *sctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm); + + crypto_free_skcipher(sctx->fallback.skcipher); +} + +static struct skcipher_alg ecb_aes_alg = { + .base.cra_name = "ecb(aes)", + .base.cra_driver_name = "ecb-aes-s390", + .base.cra_priority = 401, /* combo: aes + ecb + 1 */ + .base.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_NEED_FALLBACK, + .base.cra_blocksize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE, + .base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct s390_aes_ctx), + .base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE, + .init = fallback_init_skcipher, + .exit = fallback_exit_skcipher, + .min_keysize = AES_MIN_KEY_SIZE, + .max_keysize = AES_MAX_KEY_SIZE, + .setkey = ecb_aes_set_key, + .encrypt = ecb_aes_encrypt, + .decrypt = ecb_aes_decrypt, +}; + +static int cbc_aes_set_key(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *in_key, + unsigned int key_len) +{ + struct s390_aes_ctx *sctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm); + unsigned long fc; + + /* Pick the correct function code based on the key length */ + fc = (key_len == 16) ? CPACF_KMC_AES_128 : + (key_len == 24) ? CPACF_KMC_AES_192 : + (key_len == 32) ? CPACF_KMC_AES_256 : 0; + + /* Check if the function code is available */ + sctx->fc = (fc && cpacf_test_func(&kmc_functions, fc)) ? fc : 0; + if (!sctx->fc) + return setkey_fallback_skcipher(tfm, in_key, key_len); + + sctx->key_len = key_len; + memcpy(sctx->key, in_key, key_len); + return 0; +} + +static int cbc_aes_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req, unsigned long modifier) +{ + struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req); + struct s390_aes_ctx *sctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm); + struct skcipher_walk walk; + unsigned int nbytes, n; + int ret; + struct { + u8 iv[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; + u8 key[AES_MAX_KEY_SIZE]; + } param; + + if (unlikely(!sctx->fc)) + return fallback_skcipher_crypt(sctx, req, modifier); + + ret = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, req, false); + if (ret) + return ret; + memcpy(param.iv, walk.iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); + memcpy(param.key, sctx->key, sctx->key_len); + while ((nbytes = walk.nbytes) != 0) { + /* only use complete blocks */ + n = nbytes & ~(AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1); + cpacf_kmc(sctx->fc | modifier, ¶m, + walk.dst.virt.addr, walk.src.virt.addr, n); + memcpy(walk.iv, param.iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); + ret = skcipher_walk_done(&walk, nbytes - n); + } + memzero_explicit(¶m, sizeof(param)); + return ret; +} + +static int cbc_aes_encrypt(struct skcipher_request *req) +{ + return cbc_aes_crypt(req, 0); +} + +static int cbc_aes_decrypt(struct skcipher_request *req) +{ + return cbc_aes_crypt(req, CPACF_DECRYPT); +} + +static struct skcipher_alg cbc_aes_alg = { + .base.cra_name = "cbc(aes)", + .base.cra_driver_name = "cbc-aes-s390", + .base.cra_priority = 402, /* ecb-aes-s390 + 1 */ + .base.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_NEED_FALLBACK, + .base.cra_blocksize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE, + .base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct s390_aes_ctx), + .base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE, + .init = fallback_init_skcipher, + .exit = fallback_exit_skcipher, + .min_keysize = AES_MIN_KEY_SIZE, + .max_keysize = AES_MAX_KEY_SIZE, + .ivsize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE, + .setkey = cbc_aes_set_key, + .encrypt = cbc_aes_encrypt, + .decrypt = cbc_aes_decrypt, +}; + +static int xts_fallback_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key, + unsigned int len) +{ + struct s390_xts_ctx *xts_ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm); + + crypto_skcipher_clear_flags(xts_ctx->fallback, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK); + crypto_skcipher_set_flags(xts_ctx->fallback, + crypto_skcipher_get_flags(tfm) & + CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK); + return crypto_skcipher_setkey(xts_ctx->fallback, key, len); +} + +static int xts_aes_set_key(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *in_key, + unsigned int key_len) +{ + struct s390_xts_ctx *xts_ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm); + unsigned long fc; + int err; + + err = xts_fallback_setkey(tfm, in_key, key_len); + if (err) + return err; + + /* In fips mode only 128 bit or 256 bit keys are valid */ + if (fips_enabled && key_len != 32 && key_len != 64) + return -EINVAL; + + /* Pick the correct function code based on the key length */ + fc = (key_len == 32) ? CPACF_KM_XTS_128 : + (key_len == 64) ? CPACF_KM_XTS_256 : 0; + + /* Check if the function code is available */ + xts_ctx->fc = (fc && cpacf_test_func(&km_functions, fc)) ? fc : 0; + if (!xts_ctx->fc) + return 0; + + /* Split the XTS key into the two subkeys */ + key_len = key_len / 2; + xts_ctx->key_len = key_len; + memcpy(xts_ctx->key, in_key, key_len); + memcpy(xts_ctx->pcc_key, in_key + key_len, key_len); + return 0; +} + +static int xts_aes_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req, unsigned long modifier) +{ + struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req); + struct s390_xts_ctx *xts_ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm); + struct skcipher_walk walk; + unsigned int offset, nbytes, n; + int ret; + struct { + u8 key[32]; + u8 tweak[16]; + u8 block[16]; + u8 bit[16]; + u8 xts[16]; + } pcc_param; + struct { + u8 key[32]; + u8 init[16]; + } xts_param; + + if (req->cryptlen < AES_BLOCK_SIZE) + return -EINVAL; + + if (unlikely(!xts_ctx->fc || (req->cryptlen % AES_BLOCK_SIZE) != 0)) { + struct skcipher_request *subreq = skcipher_request_ctx(req); + + *subreq = *req; + skcipher_request_set_tfm(subreq, xts_ctx->fallback); + return (modifier & CPACF_DECRYPT) ? + crypto_skcipher_decrypt(subreq) : + crypto_skcipher_encrypt(subreq); + } + + ret = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, req, false); + if (ret) + return ret; + offset = xts_ctx->key_len & 0x10; + memset(pcc_param.block, 0, sizeof(pcc_param.block)); + memset(pcc_param.bit, 0, sizeof(pcc_param.bit)); + memset(pcc_param.xts, 0, sizeof(pcc_param.xts)); + memcpy(pcc_param.tweak, walk.iv, sizeof(pcc_param.tweak)); + memcpy(pcc_param.key + offset, xts_ctx->pcc_key, xts_ctx->key_len); + cpacf_pcc(xts_ctx->fc, pcc_param.key + offset); + + memcpy(xts_param.key + offset, xts_ctx->key, xts_ctx->key_len); + memcpy(xts_param.init, pcc_param.xts, 16); + + while ((nbytes = walk.nbytes) != 0) { + /* only use complete blocks */ + n = nbytes & ~(AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1); + cpacf_km(xts_ctx->fc | modifier, xts_param.key + offset, + walk.dst.virt.addr, walk.src.virt.addr, n); + ret = skcipher_walk_done(&walk, nbytes - n); + } + memzero_explicit(&pcc_param, sizeof(pcc_param)); + memzero_explicit(&xts_param, sizeof(xts_param)); + return ret; +} + +static int xts_aes_encrypt(struct skcipher_request *req) +{ + return xts_aes_crypt(req, 0); +} + +static int xts_aes_decrypt(struct skcipher_request *req) +{ + return xts_aes_crypt(req, CPACF_DECRYPT); +} + +static int xts_fallback_init(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm) +{ + const char *name = crypto_tfm_alg_name(&tfm->base); + struct s390_xts_ctx *xts_ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm); + + xts_ctx->fallback = crypto_alloc_skcipher(name, 0, + CRYPTO_ALG_NEED_FALLBACK | CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC); + + if (IS_ERR(xts_ctx->fallback)) { + pr_err("Allocating XTS fallback algorithm %s failed\n", + name); + return PTR_ERR(xts_ctx->fallback); + } + crypto_skcipher_set_reqsize(tfm, sizeof(struct skcipher_request) + + crypto_skcipher_reqsize(xts_ctx->fallback)); + return 0; +} + +static void xts_fallback_exit(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm) +{ + struct s390_xts_ctx *xts_ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm); + + crypto_free_skcipher(xts_ctx->fallback); +} + +static struct skcipher_alg xts_aes_alg = { + .base.cra_name = "xts(aes)", + .base.cra_driver_name = "xts-aes-s390", + .base.cra_priority = 402, /* ecb-aes-s390 + 1 */ + .base.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_NEED_FALLBACK, + .base.cra_blocksize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE, + .base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct s390_xts_ctx), + .base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE, + .init = xts_fallback_init, + .exit = xts_fallback_exit, + .min_keysize = 2 * AES_MIN_KEY_SIZE, + .max_keysize = 2 * AES_MAX_KEY_SIZE, + .ivsize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE, + .setkey = xts_aes_set_key, + .encrypt = xts_aes_encrypt, + .decrypt = xts_aes_decrypt, +}; + +static int ctr_aes_set_key(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *in_key, + unsigned int key_len) +{ + struct s390_aes_ctx *sctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm); + unsigned long fc; + + /* Pick the correct function code based on the key length */ + fc = (key_len == 16) ? CPACF_KMCTR_AES_128 : + (key_len == 24) ? CPACF_KMCTR_AES_192 : + (key_len == 32) ? CPACF_KMCTR_AES_256 : 0; + + /* Check if the function code is available */ + sctx->fc = (fc && cpacf_test_func(&kmctr_functions, fc)) ? fc : 0; + if (!sctx->fc) + return setkey_fallback_skcipher(tfm, in_key, key_len); + + sctx->key_len = key_len; + memcpy(sctx->key, in_key, key_len); + return 0; +} + +static unsigned int __ctrblk_init(u8 *ctrptr, u8 *iv, unsigned int nbytes) +{ + unsigned int i, n; + + /* only use complete blocks, max. PAGE_SIZE */ + memcpy(ctrptr, iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); + n = (nbytes > PAGE_SIZE) ? PAGE_SIZE : nbytes & ~(AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1); + for (i = (n / AES_BLOCK_SIZE) - 1; i > 0; i--) { + memcpy(ctrptr + AES_BLOCK_SIZE, ctrptr, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); + crypto_inc(ctrptr + AES_BLOCK_SIZE, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); + ctrptr += AES_BLOCK_SIZE; + } + return n; +} + +static int ctr_aes_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req) +{ + struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req); + struct s390_aes_ctx *sctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm); + u8 buf[AES_BLOCK_SIZE], *ctrptr; + struct skcipher_walk walk; + unsigned int n, nbytes; + int ret, locked; + + if (unlikely(!sctx->fc)) + return fallback_skcipher_crypt(sctx, req, 0); + + locked = mutex_trylock(&ctrblk_lock); + + ret = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, req, false); + while ((nbytes = walk.nbytes) >= AES_BLOCK_SIZE) { + n = AES_BLOCK_SIZE; + + if (nbytes >= 2*AES_BLOCK_SIZE && locked) + n = __ctrblk_init(ctrblk, walk.iv, nbytes); + ctrptr = (n > AES_BLOCK_SIZE) ? ctrblk : walk.iv; + cpacf_kmctr(sctx->fc, sctx->key, walk.dst.virt.addr, + walk.src.virt.addr, n, ctrptr); + if (ctrptr == ctrblk) + memcpy(walk.iv, ctrptr + n - AES_BLOCK_SIZE, + AES_BLOCK_SIZE); + crypto_inc(walk.iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); + ret = skcipher_walk_done(&walk, nbytes - n); + } + if (locked) + mutex_unlock(&ctrblk_lock); + /* + * final block may be < AES_BLOCK_SIZE, copy only nbytes + */ + if (nbytes) { + memset(buf, 0, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); + memcpy(buf, walk.src.virt.addr, nbytes); + cpacf_kmctr(sctx->fc, sctx->key, buf, buf, + AES_BLOCK_SIZE, walk.iv); + memcpy(walk.dst.virt.addr, buf, nbytes); + crypto_inc(walk.iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); + ret = skcipher_walk_done(&walk, 0); + } + + return ret; +} + +static struct skcipher_alg ctr_aes_alg = { + .base.cra_name = "ctr(aes)", + .base.cra_driver_name = "ctr-aes-s390", + .base.cra_priority = 402, /* ecb-aes-s390 + 1 */ + .base.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_NEED_FALLBACK, + .base.cra_blocksize = 1, + .base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct s390_aes_ctx), + .base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE, + .init = fallback_init_skcipher, + .exit = fallback_exit_skcipher, + .min_keysize = AES_MIN_KEY_SIZE, + .max_keysize = AES_MAX_KEY_SIZE, + .ivsize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE, + .setkey = ctr_aes_set_key, + .encrypt = ctr_aes_crypt, + .decrypt = ctr_aes_crypt, + .chunksize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE, +}; + +static int gcm_aes_setkey(struct crypto_aead *tfm, const u8 *key, + unsigned int keylen) +{ + struct s390_aes_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm); + + switch (keylen) { + case AES_KEYSIZE_128: + ctx->fc = CPACF_KMA_GCM_AES_128; + break; + case AES_KEYSIZE_192: + ctx->fc = CPACF_KMA_GCM_AES_192; + break; + case AES_KEYSIZE_256: + ctx->fc = CPACF_KMA_GCM_AES_256; + break; + default: + return -EINVAL; + } + + memcpy(ctx->key, key, keylen); + ctx->key_len = keylen; + return 0; +} + +static int gcm_aes_setauthsize(struct crypto_aead *tfm, unsigned int authsize) +{ + switch (authsize) { + case 4: + case 8: + case 12: + case 13: + case 14: + case 15: + case 16: + break; + default: + return -EINVAL; + } + + return 0; +} + +static void gcm_walk_start(struct gcm_sg_walk *gw, struct scatterlist *sg, + unsigned int len) +{ + memset(gw, 0, sizeof(*gw)); + gw->walk_bytes_remain = len; + scatterwalk_start(&gw->walk, sg); +} + +static inline unsigned int _gcm_sg_clamp_and_map(struct gcm_sg_walk *gw) +{ + struct scatterlist *nextsg; + + gw->walk_bytes = scatterwalk_clamp(&gw->walk, gw->walk_bytes_remain); + while (!gw->walk_bytes) { + nextsg = sg_next(gw->walk.sg); + if (!nextsg) + return 0; + scatterwalk_start(&gw->walk, nextsg); + gw->walk_bytes = scatterwalk_clamp(&gw->walk, + gw->walk_bytes_remain); + } + gw->walk_ptr = scatterwalk_map(&gw->walk); + return gw->walk_bytes; +} + +static inline void _gcm_sg_unmap_and_advance(struct gcm_sg_walk *gw, + unsigned int nbytes) +{ + gw->walk_bytes_remain -= nbytes; + scatterwalk_unmap(gw->walk_ptr); + scatterwalk_advance(&gw->walk, nbytes); + scatterwalk_done(&gw->walk, 0, gw->walk_bytes_remain); + gw->walk_ptr = NULL; +} + +static int gcm_in_walk_go(struct gcm_sg_walk *gw, unsigned int minbytesneeded) +{ + int n; + + if (gw->buf_bytes && gw->buf_bytes >= minbytesneeded) { + gw->ptr = gw->buf; + gw->nbytes = gw->buf_bytes; + goto out; + } + + if (gw->walk_bytes_remain == 0) { + gw->ptr = NULL; + gw->nbytes = 0; + goto out; + } + + if (!_gcm_sg_clamp_and_map(gw)) { + gw->ptr = NULL; + gw->nbytes = 0; + goto out; + } + + if (!gw->buf_bytes && gw->walk_bytes >= minbytesneeded) { + gw->ptr = gw->walk_ptr; + gw->nbytes = gw->walk_bytes; + goto out; + } + + while (1) { + n = min(gw->walk_bytes, AES_BLOCK_SIZE - gw->buf_bytes); + memcpy(gw->buf + gw->buf_bytes, gw->walk_ptr, n); + gw->buf_bytes += n; + _gcm_sg_unmap_and_advance(gw, n); + if (gw->buf_bytes >= minbytesneeded) { + gw->ptr = gw->buf; + gw->nbytes = gw->buf_bytes; + goto out; + } + if (!_gcm_sg_clamp_and_map(gw)) { + gw->ptr = NULL; + gw->nbytes = 0; + goto out; + } + } + +out: + return gw->nbytes; +} + +static int gcm_out_walk_go(struct gcm_sg_walk *gw, unsigned int minbytesneeded) +{ + if (gw->walk_bytes_remain == 0) { + gw->ptr = NULL; + gw->nbytes = 0; + goto out; + } + + if (!_gcm_sg_clamp_and_map(gw)) { + gw->ptr = NULL; + gw->nbytes = 0; + goto out; + } + + if (gw->walk_bytes >= minbytesneeded) { + gw->ptr = gw->walk_ptr; + gw->nbytes = gw->walk_bytes; + goto out; + } + + scatterwalk_unmap(gw->walk_ptr); + gw->walk_ptr = NULL; + + gw->ptr = gw->buf; + gw->nbytes = sizeof(gw->buf); + +out: + return gw->nbytes; +} + +static int gcm_in_walk_done(struct gcm_sg_walk *gw, unsigned int bytesdone) +{ + if (gw->ptr == NULL) + return 0; + + if (gw->ptr == gw->buf) { + int n = gw->buf_bytes - bytesdone; + if (n > 0) { + memmove(gw->buf, gw->buf + bytesdone, n); + gw->buf_bytes = n; + } else + gw->buf_bytes = 0; + } else + _gcm_sg_unmap_and_advance(gw, bytesdone); + + return bytesdone; +} + +static int gcm_out_walk_done(struct gcm_sg_walk *gw, unsigned int bytesdone) +{ + int i, n; + + if (gw->ptr == NULL) + return 0; + + if (gw->ptr == gw->buf) { + for (i = 0; i < bytesdone; i += n) { + if (!_gcm_sg_clamp_and_map(gw)) + return i; + n = min(gw->walk_bytes, bytesdone - i); + memcpy(gw->walk_ptr, gw->buf + i, n); + _gcm_sg_unmap_and_advance(gw, n); + } + } else + _gcm_sg_unmap_and_advance(gw, bytesdone); + + return bytesdone; +} + +static int gcm_aes_crypt(struct aead_request *req, unsigned int flags) +{ + struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req); + struct s390_aes_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm); + unsigned int ivsize = crypto_aead_ivsize(tfm); + unsigned int taglen = crypto_aead_authsize(tfm); + unsigned int aadlen = req->assoclen; + unsigned int pclen = req->cryptlen; + int ret = 0; + + unsigned int n, len, in_bytes, out_bytes, + min_bytes, bytes, aad_bytes, pc_bytes; + struct gcm_sg_walk gw_in, gw_out; + u8 tag[GHASH_DIGEST_SIZE]; + + struct { + u32 _[3]; /* reserved */ + u32 cv; /* Counter Value */ + u8 t[GHASH_DIGEST_SIZE];/* Tag */ + u8 h[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; /* Hash-subkey */ + u64 taadl; /* Total AAD Length */ + u64 tpcl; /* Total Plain-/Cipher-text Length */ + u8 j0[GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE];/* initial counter value */ + u8 k[AES_MAX_KEY_SIZE]; /* Key */ + } param; + + /* + * encrypt + * req->src: aad||plaintext + * req->dst: aad||ciphertext||tag + * decrypt + * req->src: aad||ciphertext||tag + * req->dst: aad||plaintext, return 0 or -EBADMSG + * aad, plaintext and ciphertext may be empty. + */ + if (flags & CPACF_DECRYPT) + pclen -= taglen; + len = aadlen + pclen; + + memset(¶m, 0, sizeof(param)); + param.cv = 1; + param.taadl = aadlen * 8; + param.tpcl = pclen * 8; + memcpy(param.j0, req->iv, ivsize); + *(u32 *)(param.j0 + ivsize) = 1; + memcpy(param.k, ctx->key, ctx->key_len); + + gcm_walk_start(&gw_in, req->src, len); + gcm_walk_start(&gw_out, req->dst, len); + + do { + min_bytes = min_t(unsigned int, + aadlen > 0 ? aadlen : pclen, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); + in_bytes = gcm_in_walk_go(&gw_in, min_bytes); + out_bytes = gcm_out_walk_go(&gw_out, min_bytes); + bytes = min(in_bytes, out_bytes); + + if (aadlen + pclen <= bytes) { + aad_bytes = aadlen; + pc_bytes = pclen; + flags |= CPACF_KMA_LAAD | CPACF_KMA_LPC; + } else { + if (aadlen <= bytes) { + aad_bytes = aadlen; + pc_bytes = (bytes - aadlen) & + ~(AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1); + flags |= CPACF_KMA_LAAD; + } else { + aad_bytes = bytes & ~(AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1); + pc_bytes = 0; + } + } + + if (aad_bytes > 0) + memcpy(gw_out.ptr, gw_in.ptr, aad_bytes); + + cpacf_kma(ctx->fc | flags, ¶m, + gw_out.ptr + aad_bytes, + gw_in.ptr + aad_bytes, pc_bytes, + gw_in.ptr, aad_bytes); + + n = aad_bytes + pc_bytes; + if (gcm_in_walk_done(&gw_in, n) != n) + return -ENOMEM; + if (gcm_out_walk_done(&gw_out, n) != n) + return -ENOMEM; + aadlen -= aad_bytes; + pclen -= pc_bytes; + } while (aadlen + pclen > 0); + + if (flags & CPACF_DECRYPT) { + scatterwalk_map_and_copy(tag, req->src, len, taglen, 0); + if (crypto_memneq(tag, param.t, taglen)) + ret = -EBADMSG; + } else + scatterwalk_map_and_copy(param.t, req->dst, len, taglen, 1); + + memzero_explicit(¶m, sizeof(param)); + return ret; +} + +static int gcm_aes_encrypt(struct aead_request *req) +{ + return gcm_aes_crypt(req, CPACF_ENCRYPT); +} + +static int gcm_aes_decrypt(struct aead_request *req) +{ + return gcm_aes_crypt(req, CPACF_DECRYPT); +} + +static struct aead_alg gcm_aes_aead = { + .setkey = gcm_aes_setkey, + .setauthsize = gcm_aes_setauthsize, + .encrypt = gcm_aes_encrypt, + .decrypt = gcm_aes_decrypt, + + .ivsize = GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE - sizeof(u32), + .maxauthsize = GHASH_DIGEST_SIZE, + .chunksize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE, + + .base = { + .cra_blocksize = 1, + .cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct s390_aes_ctx), + .cra_priority = 900, + .cra_name = "gcm(aes)", + .cra_driver_name = "gcm-aes-s390", + .cra_module = THIS_MODULE, + }, +}; + +static struct crypto_alg *aes_s390_alg; +static struct skcipher_alg *aes_s390_skcipher_algs[4]; +static int aes_s390_skciphers_num; +static struct aead_alg *aes_s390_aead_alg; + +static int aes_s390_register_skcipher(struct skcipher_alg *alg) +{ + int ret; + + ret = crypto_register_skcipher(alg); + if (!ret) + aes_s390_skcipher_algs[aes_s390_skciphers_num++] = alg; + return ret; +} + +static void aes_s390_fini(void) +{ + if (aes_s390_alg) + crypto_unregister_alg(aes_s390_alg); + while (aes_s390_skciphers_num--) + crypto_unregister_skcipher(aes_s390_skcipher_algs[aes_s390_skciphers_num]); + if (ctrblk) + free_page((unsigned long) ctrblk); + + if (aes_s390_aead_alg) + crypto_unregister_aead(aes_s390_aead_alg); +} + +static int __init aes_s390_init(void) +{ + int ret; + + /* Query available functions for KM, KMC, KMCTR and KMA */ + cpacf_query(CPACF_KM, &km_functions); + cpacf_query(CPACF_KMC, &kmc_functions); + cpacf_query(CPACF_KMCTR, &kmctr_functions); + cpacf_query(CPACF_KMA, &kma_functions); + + if (cpacf_test_func(&km_functions, CPACF_KM_AES_128) || + cpacf_test_func(&km_functions, CPACF_KM_AES_192) || + cpacf_test_func(&km_functions, CPACF_KM_AES_256)) { + ret = crypto_register_alg(&aes_alg); + if (ret) + goto out_err; + aes_s390_alg = &aes_alg; + ret = aes_s390_register_skcipher(&ecb_aes_alg); + if (ret) + goto out_err; + } + + if (cpacf_test_func(&kmc_functions, CPACF_KMC_AES_128) || + cpacf_test_func(&kmc_functions, CPACF_KMC_AES_192) || + cpacf_test_func(&kmc_functions, CPACF_KMC_AES_256)) { + ret = aes_s390_register_skcipher(&cbc_aes_alg); + if (ret) + goto out_err; + } + + if (cpacf_test_func(&km_functions, CPACF_KM_XTS_128) || + cpacf_test_func(&km_functions, CPACF_KM_XTS_256)) { + ret = aes_s390_register_skcipher(&xts_aes_alg); + if (ret) + goto out_err; + } + + if (cpacf_test_func(&kmctr_functions, CPACF_KMCTR_AES_128) || + cpacf_test_func(&kmctr_functions, CPACF_KMCTR_AES_192) || + cpacf_test_func(&kmctr_functions, CPACF_KMCTR_AES_256)) { + ctrblk = (u8 *) __get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL); + if (!ctrblk) { + ret = -ENOMEM; + goto out_err; + } + ret = aes_s390_register_skcipher(&ctr_aes_alg); + if (ret) + goto out_err; + } + + if (cpacf_test_func(&kma_functions, CPACF_KMA_GCM_AES_128) || + cpacf_test_func(&kma_functions, CPACF_KMA_GCM_AES_192) || + cpacf_test_func(&kma_functions, CPACF_KMA_GCM_AES_256)) { + ret = crypto_register_aead(&gcm_aes_aead); + if (ret) + goto out_err; + aes_s390_aead_alg = &gcm_aes_aead; + } + + return 0; +out_err: + aes_s390_fini(); + return ret; +} + +module_cpu_feature_match(S390_CPU_FEATURE_MSA, aes_s390_init); +module_exit(aes_s390_fini); + +MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("aes-all"); + +MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Rijndael (AES) Cipher Algorithm"); +MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); +MODULE_IMPORT_NS(CRYPTO_INTERNAL); diff --git a/arch/s390/crypto/arch_random.c b/arch/s390/crypto/arch_random.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..1f2d40993 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/s390/crypto/arch_random.c @@ -0,0 +1,18 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * s390 arch random implementation. + * + * Copyright IBM Corp. 2017, 2020 + * Author(s): Harald Freudenberger + */ + +#include <linux/kernel.h> +#include <linux/atomic.h> +#include <linux/random.h> +#include <linux/static_key.h> +#include <asm/cpacf.h> + +DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(s390_arch_random_available); + +atomic64_t s390_arch_random_counter = ATOMIC64_INIT(0); +EXPORT_SYMBOL(s390_arch_random_counter); diff --git a/arch/s390/crypto/chacha-glue.c b/arch/s390/crypto/chacha-glue.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..5fae187f9 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/s390/crypto/chacha-glue.c @@ -0,0 +1,130 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * s390 ChaCha stream cipher. + * + * Copyright IBM Corp. 2021 + */ + +#define KMSG_COMPONENT "chacha_s390" +#define pr_fmt(fmt) KMSG_COMPONENT ": " fmt + +#include <crypto/internal/chacha.h> +#include <crypto/internal/skcipher.h> +#include <crypto/algapi.h> +#include <linux/cpufeature.h> +#include <linux/kernel.h> +#include <linux/module.h> +#include <linux/sizes.h> +#include <asm/fpu/api.h> +#include "chacha-s390.h" + +static void chacha20_crypt_s390(u32 *state, u8 *dst, const u8 *src, + unsigned int nbytes, const u32 *key, + u32 *counter) +{ + struct kernel_fpu vxstate; + + kernel_fpu_begin(&vxstate, KERNEL_VXR); + chacha20_vx(dst, src, nbytes, key, counter); + kernel_fpu_end(&vxstate, KERNEL_VXR); + + *counter += round_up(nbytes, CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE) / CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE; +} + +static int chacha20_s390(struct skcipher_request *req) +{ + struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req); + struct chacha_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm); + u32 state[CHACHA_STATE_WORDS] __aligned(16); + struct skcipher_walk walk; + unsigned int nbytes; + int rc; + + rc = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, req, false); + chacha_init_generic(state, ctx->key, req->iv); + + while (walk.nbytes > 0) { + nbytes = walk.nbytes; + if (nbytes < walk.total) + nbytes = round_down(nbytes, walk.stride); + + if (nbytes <= CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE) { + chacha_crypt_generic(state, walk.dst.virt.addr, + walk.src.virt.addr, nbytes, + ctx->nrounds); + } else { + chacha20_crypt_s390(state, walk.dst.virt.addr, + walk.src.virt.addr, nbytes, + &state[4], &state[12]); + } + rc = skcipher_walk_done(&walk, walk.nbytes - nbytes); + } + return rc; +} + +void hchacha_block_arch(const u32 *state, u32 *stream, int nrounds) +{ + /* TODO: implement hchacha_block_arch() in assembly */ + hchacha_block_generic(state, stream, nrounds); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(hchacha_block_arch); + +void chacha_init_arch(u32 *state, const u32 *key, const u8 *iv) +{ + chacha_init_generic(state, key, iv); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(chacha_init_arch); + +void chacha_crypt_arch(u32 *state, u8 *dst, const u8 *src, + unsigned int bytes, int nrounds) +{ + /* s390 chacha20 implementation has 20 rounds hard-coded, + * it cannot handle a block of data or less, but otherwise + * it can handle data of arbitrary size + */ + if (bytes <= CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE || nrounds != 20 || !MACHINE_HAS_VX) + chacha_crypt_generic(state, dst, src, bytes, nrounds); + else + chacha20_crypt_s390(state, dst, src, bytes, + &state[4], &state[12]); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(chacha_crypt_arch); + +static struct skcipher_alg chacha_algs[] = { + { + .base.cra_name = "chacha20", + .base.cra_driver_name = "chacha20-s390", + .base.cra_priority = 900, + .base.cra_blocksize = 1, + .base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct chacha_ctx), + .base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE, + + .min_keysize = CHACHA_KEY_SIZE, + .max_keysize = CHACHA_KEY_SIZE, + .ivsize = CHACHA_IV_SIZE, + .chunksize = CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE, + .setkey = chacha20_setkey, + .encrypt = chacha20_s390, + .decrypt = chacha20_s390, + } +}; + +static int __init chacha_mod_init(void) +{ + return IS_REACHABLE(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SKCIPHER) ? + crypto_register_skciphers(chacha_algs, ARRAY_SIZE(chacha_algs)) : 0; +} + +static void __exit chacha_mod_fini(void) +{ + if (IS_REACHABLE(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SKCIPHER)) + crypto_unregister_skciphers(chacha_algs, ARRAY_SIZE(chacha_algs)); +} + +module_cpu_feature_match(S390_CPU_FEATURE_VXRS, chacha_mod_init); +module_exit(chacha_mod_fini); + +MODULE_DESCRIPTION("ChaCha20 stream cipher"); +MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2"); + +MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("chacha20"); diff --git a/arch/s390/crypto/chacha-s390.S b/arch/s390/crypto/chacha-s390.S new file mode 100644 index 000000000..9b0336221 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/s390/crypto/chacha-s390.S @@ -0,0 +1,907 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +/* + * Original implementation written by Andy Polyakov, @dot-asm. + * This is an adaptation of the original code for kernel use. + * + * Copyright (C) 2006-2019 CRYPTOGAMS by <appro@openssl.org>. All Rights Reserved. + */ + +#include <linux/linkage.h> +#include <asm/nospec-insn.h> +#include <asm/vx-insn.h> + +#define SP %r15 +#define FRAME (16 * 8 + 4 * 8) + +.data +.align 32 + +.Lsigma: +.long 0x61707865,0x3320646e,0x79622d32,0x6b206574 # endian-neutral +.long 1,0,0,0 +.long 2,0,0,0 +.long 3,0,0,0 +.long 0x03020100,0x07060504,0x0b0a0908,0x0f0e0d0c # byte swap + +.long 0,1,2,3 +.long 0x61707865,0x61707865,0x61707865,0x61707865 # smashed sigma +.long 0x3320646e,0x3320646e,0x3320646e,0x3320646e +.long 0x79622d32,0x79622d32,0x79622d32,0x79622d32 +.long 0x6b206574,0x6b206574,0x6b206574,0x6b206574 + +.previous + + GEN_BR_THUNK %r14 + +.text + +############################################################################# +# void chacha20_vx_4x(u8 *out, counst u8 *inp, size_t len, +# counst u32 *key, const u32 *counter) + +#define OUT %r2 +#define INP %r3 +#define LEN %r4 +#define KEY %r5 +#define COUNTER %r6 + +#define BEPERM %v31 +#define CTR %v26 + +#define K0 %v16 +#define K1 %v17 +#define K2 %v18 +#define K3 %v19 + +#define XA0 %v0 +#define XA1 %v1 +#define XA2 %v2 +#define XA3 %v3 + +#define XB0 %v4 +#define XB1 %v5 +#define XB2 %v6 +#define XB3 %v7 + +#define XC0 %v8 +#define XC1 %v9 +#define XC2 %v10 +#define XC3 %v11 + +#define XD0 %v12 +#define XD1 %v13 +#define XD2 %v14 +#define XD3 %v15 + +#define XT0 %v27 +#define XT1 %v28 +#define XT2 %v29 +#define XT3 %v30 + +ENTRY(chacha20_vx_4x) + stmg %r6,%r7,6*8(SP) + + larl %r7,.Lsigma + lhi %r0,10 + lhi %r1,0 + + VL K0,0,,%r7 # load sigma + VL K1,0,,KEY # load key + VL K2,16,,KEY + VL K3,0,,COUNTER # load counter + + VL BEPERM,0x40,,%r7 + VL CTR,0x50,,%r7 + + VLM XA0,XA3,0x60,%r7,4 # load [smashed] sigma + + VREPF XB0,K1,0 # smash the key + VREPF XB1,K1,1 + VREPF XB2,K1,2 + VREPF XB3,K1,3 + + VREPF XD0,K3,0 + VREPF XD1,K3,1 + VREPF XD2,K3,2 + VREPF XD3,K3,3 + VAF XD0,XD0,CTR + + VREPF XC0,K2,0 + VREPF XC1,K2,1 + VREPF XC2,K2,2 + VREPF XC3,K2,3 + +.Loop_4x: + VAF XA0,XA0,XB0 + VX XD0,XD0,XA0 + VERLLF XD0,XD0,16 + + VAF XA1,XA1,XB1 + VX XD1,XD1,XA1 + VERLLF XD1,XD1,16 + + VAF XA2,XA2,XB2 + VX XD2,XD2,XA2 + VERLLF XD2,XD2,16 + + VAF XA3,XA3,XB3 + VX XD3,XD3,XA3 + VERLLF XD3,XD3,16 + + VAF XC0,XC0,XD0 + VX XB0,XB0,XC0 + VERLLF XB0,XB0,12 + + VAF XC1,XC1,XD1 + VX XB1,XB1,XC1 + VERLLF XB1,XB1,12 + + VAF XC2,XC2,XD2 + VX XB2,XB2,XC2 + VERLLF XB2,XB2,12 + + VAF XC3,XC3,XD3 + VX XB3,XB3,XC3 + VERLLF XB3,XB3,12 + + VAF XA0,XA0,XB0 + VX XD0,XD0,XA0 + VERLLF XD0,XD0,8 + + VAF XA1,XA1,XB1 + VX XD1,XD1,XA1 + VERLLF XD1,XD1,8 + + VAF XA2,XA2,XB2 + VX XD2,XD2,XA2 + VERLLF XD2,XD2,8 + + VAF XA3,XA3,XB3 + VX XD3,XD3,XA3 + VERLLF XD3,XD3,8 + + VAF XC0,XC0,XD0 + VX XB0,XB0,XC0 + VERLLF XB0,XB0,7 + + VAF XC1,XC1,XD1 + VX XB1,XB1,XC1 + VERLLF XB1,XB1,7 + + VAF XC2,XC2,XD2 + VX XB2,XB2,XC2 + VERLLF XB2,XB2,7 + + VAF XC3,XC3,XD3 + VX XB3,XB3,XC3 + VERLLF XB3,XB3,7 + + VAF XA0,XA0,XB1 + VX XD3,XD3,XA0 + VERLLF XD3,XD3,16 + + VAF XA1,XA1,XB2 + VX XD0,XD0,XA1 + VERLLF XD0,XD0,16 + + VAF XA2,XA2,XB3 + VX XD1,XD1,XA2 + VERLLF XD1,XD1,16 + + VAF XA3,XA3,XB0 + VX XD2,XD2,XA3 + VERLLF XD2,XD2,16 + + VAF XC2,XC2,XD3 + VX XB1,XB1,XC2 + VERLLF XB1,XB1,12 + + VAF XC3,XC3,XD0 + VX XB2,XB2,XC3 + VERLLF XB2,XB2,12 + + VAF XC0,XC0,XD1 + VX XB3,XB3,XC0 + VERLLF XB3,XB3,12 + + VAF XC1,XC1,XD2 + VX XB0,XB0,XC1 + VERLLF XB0,XB0,12 + + VAF XA0,XA0,XB1 + VX XD3,XD3,XA0 + VERLLF XD3,XD3,8 + + VAF XA1,XA1,XB2 + VX XD0,XD0,XA1 + VERLLF XD0,XD0,8 + + VAF XA2,XA2,XB3 + VX XD1,XD1,XA2 + VERLLF XD1,XD1,8 + + VAF XA3,XA3,XB0 + VX XD2,XD2,XA3 + VERLLF XD2,XD2,8 + + VAF XC2,XC2,XD3 + VX XB1,XB1,XC2 + VERLLF XB1,XB1,7 + + VAF XC3,XC3,XD0 + VX XB2,XB2,XC3 + VERLLF XB2,XB2,7 + + VAF XC0,XC0,XD1 + VX XB3,XB3,XC0 + VERLLF XB3,XB3,7 + + VAF XC1,XC1,XD2 + VX XB0,XB0,XC1 + VERLLF XB0,XB0,7 + brct %r0,.Loop_4x + + VAF XD0,XD0,CTR + + VMRHF XT0,XA0,XA1 # transpose data + VMRHF XT1,XA2,XA3 + VMRLF XT2,XA0,XA1 + VMRLF XT3,XA2,XA3 + VPDI XA0,XT0,XT1,0b0000 + VPDI XA1,XT0,XT1,0b0101 + VPDI XA2,XT2,XT3,0b0000 + VPDI XA3,XT2,XT3,0b0101 + + VMRHF XT0,XB0,XB1 + VMRHF XT1,XB2,XB3 + VMRLF XT2,XB0,XB1 + VMRLF XT3,XB2,XB3 + VPDI XB0,XT0,XT1,0b0000 + VPDI XB1,XT0,XT1,0b0101 + VPDI XB2,XT2,XT3,0b0000 + VPDI XB3,XT2,XT3,0b0101 + + VMRHF XT0,XC0,XC1 + VMRHF XT1,XC2,XC3 + VMRLF XT2,XC0,XC1 + VMRLF XT3,XC2,XC3 + VPDI XC0,XT0,XT1,0b0000 + VPDI XC1,XT0,XT1,0b0101 + VPDI XC2,XT2,XT3,0b0000 + VPDI XC3,XT2,XT3,0b0101 + + VMRHF XT0,XD0,XD1 + VMRHF XT1,XD2,XD3 + VMRLF XT2,XD0,XD1 + VMRLF XT3,XD2,XD3 + VPDI XD0,XT0,XT1,0b0000 + VPDI XD1,XT0,XT1,0b0101 + VPDI XD2,XT2,XT3,0b0000 + VPDI XD3,XT2,XT3,0b0101 + + VAF XA0,XA0,K0 + VAF XB0,XB0,K1 + VAF XC0,XC0,K2 + VAF XD0,XD0,K3 + + VPERM XA0,XA0,XA0,BEPERM + VPERM XB0,XB0,XB0,BEPERM + VPERM XC0,XC0,XC0,BEPERM + VPERM XD0,XD0,XD0,BEPERM + + VLM XT0,XT3,0,INP,0 + + VX XT0,XT0,XA0 + VX XT1,XT1,XB0 + VX XT2,XT2,XC0 + VX XT3,XT3,XD0 + + VSTM XT0,XT3,0,OUT,0 + + la INP,0x40(INP) + la OUT,0x40(OUT) + aghi LEN,-0x40 + + VAF XA0,XA1,K0 + VAF XB0,XB1,K1 + VAF XC0,XC1,K2 + VAF XD0,XD1,K3 + + VPERM XA0,XA0,XA0,BEPERM + VPERM XB0,XB0,XB0,BEPERM + VPERM XC0,XC0,XC0,BEPERM + VPERM XD0,XD0,XD0,BEPERM + + clgfi LEN,0x40 + jl .Ltail_4x + + VLM XT0,XT3,0,INP,0 + + VX XT0,XT0,XA0 + VX XT1,XT1,XB0 + VX XT2,XT2,XC0 + VX XT3,XT3,XD0 + + VSTM XT0,XT3,0,OUT,0 + + la INP,0x40(INP) + la OUT,0x40(OUT) + aghi LEN,-0x40 + je .Ldone_4x + + VAF XA0,XA2,K0 + VAF XB0,XB2,K1 + VAF XC0,XC2,K2 + VAF XD0,XD2,K3 + + VPERM XA0,XA0,XA0,BEPERM + VPERM XB0,XB0,XB0,BEPERM + VPERM XC0,XC0,XC0,BEPERM + VPERM XD0,XD0,XD0,BEPERM + + clgfi LEN,0x40 + jl .Ltail_4x + + VLM XT0,XT3,0,INP,0 + + VX XT0,XT0,XA0 + VX XT1,XT1,XB0 + VX XT2,XT2,XC0 + VX XT3,XT3,XD0 + + VSTM XT0,XT3,0,OUT,0 + + la INP,0x40(INP) + la OUT,0x40(OUT) + aghi LEN,-0x40 + je .Ldone_4x + + VAF XA0,XA3,K0 + VAF XB0,XB3,K1 + VAF XC0,XC3,K2 + VAF XD0,XD3,K3 + + VPERM XA0,XA0,XA0,BEPERM + VPERM XB0,XB0,XB0,BEPERM + VPERM XC0,XC0,XC0,BEPERM + VPERM XD0,XD0,XD0,BEPERM + + clgfi LEN,0x40 + jl .Ltail_4x + + VLM XT0,XT3,0,INP,0 + + VX XT0,XT0,XA0 + VX XT1,XT1,XB0 + VX XT2,XT2,XC0 + VX XT3,XT3,XD0 + + VSTM XT0,XT3,0,OUT,0 + +.Ldone_4x: + lmg %r6,%r7,6*8(SP) + BR_EX %r14 + +.Ltail_4x: + VLR XT0,XC0 + VLR XT1,XD0 + + VST XA0,8*8+0x00,,SP + VST XB0,8*8+0x10,,SP + VST XT0,8*8+0x20,,SP + VST XT1,8*8+0x30,,SP + + lghi %r1,0 + +.Loop_tail_4x: + llgc %r5,0(%r1,INP) + llgc %r6,8*8(%r1,SP) + xr %r6,%r5 + stc %r6,0(%r1,OUT) + la %r1,1(%r1) + brct LEN,.Loop_tail_4x + + lmg %r6,%r7,6*8(SP) + BR_EX %r14 +ENDPROC(chacha20_vx_4x) + +#undef OUT +#undef INP +#undef LEN +#undef KEY +#undef COUNTER + +#undef BEPERM + +#undef K0 +#undef K1 +#undef K2 +#undef K3 + + +############################################################################# +# void chacha20_vx(u8 *out, counst u8 *inp, size_t len, +# counst u32 *key, const u32 *counter) + +#define OUT %r2 +#define INP %r3 +#define LEN %r4 +#define KEY %r5 +#define COUNTER %r6 + +#define BEPERM %v31 + +#define K0 %v27 +#define K1 %v24 +#define K2 %v25 +#define K3 %v26 + +#define A0 %v0 +#define B0 %v1 +#define C0 %v2 +#define D0 %v3 + +#define A1 %v4 +#define B1 %v5 +#define C1 %v6 +#define D1 %v7 + +#define A2 %v8 +#define B2 %v9 +#define C2 %v10 +#define D2 %v11 + +#define A3 %v12 +#define B3 %v13 +#define C3 %v14 +#define D3 %v15 + +#define A4 %v16 +#define B4 %v17 +#define C4 %v18 +#define D4 %v19 + +#define A5 %v20 +#define B5 %v21 +#define C5 %v22 +#define D5 %v23 + +#define T0 %v27 +#define T1 %v28 +#define T2 %v29 +#define T3 %v30 + +ENTRY(chacha20_vx) + clgfi LEN,256 + jle chacha20_vx_4x + stmg %r6,%r7,6*8(SP) + + lghi %r1,-FRAME + lgr %r0,SP + la SP,0(%r1,SP) + stg %r0,0(SP) # back-chain + + larl %r7,.Lsigma + lhi %r0,10 + + VLM K1,K2,0,KEY,0 # load key + VL K3,0,,COUNTER # load counter + + VLM K0,BEPERM,0,%r7,4 # load sigma, increments, ... + +.Loop_outer_vx: + VLR A0,K0 + VLR B0,K1 + VLR A1,K0 + VLR B1,K1 + VLR A2,K0 + VLR B2,K1 + VLR A3,K0 + VLR B3,K1 + VLR A4,K0 + VLR B4,K1 + VLR A5,K0 + VLR B5,K1 + + VLR D0,K3 + VAF D1,K3,T1 # K[3]+1 + VAF D2,K3,T2 # K[3]+2 + VAF D3,K3,T3 # K[3]+3 + VAF D4,D2,T2 # K[3]+4 + VAF D5,D2,T3 # K[3]+5 + + VLR C0,K2 + VLR C1,K2 + VLR C2,K2 + VLR C3,K2 + VLR C4,K2 + VLR C5,K2 + + VLR T1,D1 + VLR T2,D2 + VLR T3,D3 + +.Loop_vx: + VAF A0,A0,B0 + VAF A1,A1,B1 + VAF A2,A2,B2 + VAF A3,A3,B3 + VAF A4,A4,B4 + VAF A5,A5,B5 + VX D0,D0,A0 + VX D1,D1,A1 + VX D2,D2,A2 + VX D3,D3,A3 + VX D4,D4,A4 + VX D5,D5,A5 + VERLLF D0,D0,16 + VERLLF D1,D1,16 + VERLLF D2,D2,16 + VERLLF D3,D3,16 + VERLLF D4,D4,16 + VERLLF D5,D5,16 + + VAF C0,C0,D0 + VAF C1,C1,D1 + VAF C2,C2,D2 + VAF C3,C3,D3 + VAF C4,C4,D4 + VAF C5,C5,D5 + VX B0,B0,C0 + VX B1,B1,C1 + VX B2,B2,C2 + VX B3,B3,C3 + VX B4,B4,C4 + VX B5,B5,C5 + VERLLF B0,B0,12 + VERLLF B1,B1,12 + VERLLF B2,B2,12 + VERLLF B3,B3,12 + VERLLF B4,B4,12 + VERLLF B5,B5,12 + + VAF A0,A0,B0 + VAF A1,A1,B1 + VAF A2,A2,B2 + VAF A3,A3,B3 + VAF A4,A4,B4 + VAF A5,A5,B5 + VX D0,D0,A0 + VX D1,D1,A1 + VX D2,D2,A2 + VX D3,D3,A3 + VX D4,D4,A4 + VX D5,D5,A5 + VERLLF D0,D0,8 + VERLLF D1,D1,8 + VERLLF D2,D2,8 + VERLLF D3,D3,8 + VERLLF D4,D4,8 + VERLLF D5,D5,8 + + VAF C0,C0,D0 + VAF C1,C1,D1 + VAF C2,C2,D2 + VAF C3,C3,D3 + VAF C4,C4,D4 + VAF C5,C5,D5 + VX B0,B0,C0 + VX B1,B1,C1 + VX B2,B2,C2 + VX B3,B3,C3 + VX B4,B4,C4 + VX B5,B5,C5 + VERLLF B0,B0,7 + VERLLF B1,B1,7 + VERLLF B2,B2,7 + VERLLF B3,B3,7 + VERLLF B4,B4,7 + VERLLF B5,B5,7 + + VSLDB C0,C0,C0,8 + VSLDB C1,C1,C1,8 + VSLDB C2,C2,C2,8 + VSLDB C3,C3,C3,8 + VSLDB C4,C4,C4,8 + VSLDB C5,C5,C5,8 + VSLDB B0,B0,B0,4 + VSLDB B1,B1,B1,4 + VSLDB B2,B2,B2,4 + VSLDB B3,B3,B3,4 + VSLDB B4,B4,B4,4 + VSLDB B5,B5,B5,4 + VSLDB D0,D0,D0,12 + VSLDB D1,D1,D1,12 + VSLDB D2,D2,D2,12 + VSLDB D3,D3,D3,12 + VSLDB D4,D4,D4,12 + VSLDB D5,D5,D5,12 + + VAF A0,A0,B0 + VAF A1,A1,B1 + VAF A2,A2,B2 + VAF A3,A3,B3 + VAF A4,A4,B4 + VAF A5,A5,B5 + VX D0,D0,A0 + VX D1,D1,A1 + VX D2,D2,A2 + VX D3,D3,A3 + VX D4,D4,A4 + VX D5,D5,A5 + VERLLF D0,D0,16 + VERLLF D1,D1,16 + VERLLF D2,D2,16 + VERLLF D3,D3,16 + VERLLF D4,D4,16 + VERLLF D5,D5,16 + + VAF C0,C0,D0 + VAF C1,C1,D1 + VAF C2,C2,D2 + VAF C3,C3,D3 + VAF C4,C4,D4 + VAF C5,C5,D5 + VX B0,B0,C0 + VX B1,B1,C1 + VX B2,B2,C2 + VX B3,B3,C3 + VX B4,B4,C4 + VX B5,B5,C5 + VERLLF B0,B0,12 + VERLLF B1,B1,12 + VERLLF B2,B2,12 + VERLLF B3,B3,12 + VERLLF B4,B4,12 + VERLLF B5,B5,12 + + VAF A0,A0,B0 + VAF A1,A1,B1 + VAF A2,A2,B2 + VAF A3,A3,B3 + VAF A4,A4,B4 + VAF A5,A5,B5 + VX D0,D0,A0 + VX D1,D1,A1 + VX D2,D2,A2 + VX D3,D3,A3 + VX D4,D4,A4 + VX D5,D5,A5 + VERLLF D0,D0,8 + VERLLF D1,D1,8 + VERLLF D2,D2,8 + VERLLF D3,D3,8 + VERLLF D4,D4,8 + VERLLF D5,D5,8 + + VAF C0,C0,D0 + VAF C1,C1,D1 + VAF C2,C2,D2 + VAF C3,C3,D3 + VAF C4,C4,D4 + VAF C5,C5,D5 + VX B0,B0,C0 + VX B1,B1,C1 + VX B2,B2,C2 + VX B3,B3,C3 + VX B4,B4,C4 + VX B5,B5,C5 + VERLLF B0,B0,7 + VERLLF B1,B1,7 + VERLLF B2,B2,7 + VERLLF B3,B3,7 + VERLLF B4,B4,7 + VERLLF B5,B5,7 + + VSLDB C0,C0,C0,8 + VSLDB C1,C1,C1,8 + VSLDB C2,C2,C2,8 + VSLDB C3,C3,C3,8 + VSLDB C4,C4,C4,8 + VSLDB C5,C5,C5,8 + VSLDB B0,B0,B0,12 + VSLDB B1,B1,B1,12 + VSLDB B2,B2,B2,12 + VSLDB B3,B3,B3,12 + VSLDB B4,B4,B4,12 + VSLDB B5,B5,B5,12 + VSLDB D0,D0,D0,4 + VSLDB D1,D1,D1,4 + VSLDB D2,D2,D2,4 + VSLDB D3,D3,D3,4 + VSLDB D4,D4,D4,4 + VSLDB D5,D5,D5,4 + brct %r0,.Loop_vx + + VAF A0,A0,K0 + VAF B0,B0,K1 + VAF C0,C0,K2 + VAF D0,D0,K3 + VAF A1,A1,K0 + VAF D1,D1,T1 # +K[3]+1 + + VPERM A0,A0,A0,BEPERM + VPERM B0,B0,B0,BEPERM + VPERM C0,C0,C0,BEPERM + VPERM D0,D0,D0,BEPERM + + clgfi LEN,0x40 + jl .Ltail_vx + + VAF D2,D2,T2 # +K[3]+2 + VAF D3,D3,T3 # +K[3]+3 + VLM T0,T3,0,INP,0 + + VX A0,A0,T0 + VX B0,B0,T1 + VX C0,C0,T2 + VX D0,D0,T3 + + VLM K0,T3,0,%r7,4 # re-load sigma and increments + + VSTM A0,D0,0,OUT,0 + + la INP,0x40(INP) + la OUT,0x40(OUT) + aghi LEN,-0x40 + je .Ldone_vx + + VAF B1,B1,K1 + VAF C1,C1,K2 + + VPERM A0,A1,A1,BEPERM + VPERM B0,B1,B1,BEPERM + VPERM C0,C1,C1,BEPERM + VPERM D0,D1,D1,BEPERM + + clgfi LEN,0x40 + jl .Ltail_vx + + VLM A1,D1,0,INP,0 + + VX A0,A0,A1 + VX B0,B0,B1 + VX C0,C0,C1 + VX D0,D0,D1 + + VSTM A0,D0,0,OUT,0 + + la INP,0x40(INP) + la OUT,0x40(OUT) + aghi LEN,-0x40 + je .Ldone_vx + + VAF A2,A2,K0 + VAF B2,B2,K1 + VAF C2,C2,K2 + + VPERM A0,A2,A2,BEPERM + VPERM B0,B2,B2,BEPERM + VPERM C0,C2,C2,BEPERM + VPERM D0,D2,D2,BEPERM + + clgfi LEN,0x40 + jl .Ltail_vx + + VLM A1,D1,0,INP,0 + + VX A0,A0,A1 + VX B0,B0,B1 + VX C0,C0,C1 + VX D0,D0,D1 + + VSTM A0,D0,0,OUT,0 + + la INP,0x40(INP) + la OUT,0x40(OUT) + aghi LEN,-0x40 + je .Ldone_vx + + VAF A3,A3,K0 + VAF B3,B3,K1 + VAF C3,C3,K2 + VAF D2,K3,T3 # K[3]+3 + + VPERM A0,A3,A3,BEPERM + VPERM B0,B3,B3,BEPERM + VPERM C0,C3,C3,BEPERM + VPERM D0,D3,D3,BEPERM + + clgfi LEN,0x40 + jl .Ltail_vx + + VAF D3,D2,T1 # K[3]+4 + VLM A1,D1,0,INP,0 + + VX A0,A0,A1 + VX B0,B0,B1 + VX C0,C0,C1 + VX D0,D0,D1 + + VSTM A0,D0,0,OUT,0 + + la INP,0x40(INP) + la OUT,0x40(OUT) + aghi LEN,-0x40 + je .Ldone_vx + + VAF A4,A4,K0 + VAF B4,B4,K1 + VAF C4,C4,K2 + VAF D4,D4,D3 # +K[3]+4 + VAF D3,D3,T1 # K[3]+5 + VAF K3,D2,T3 # K[3]+=6 + + VPERM A0,A4,A4,BEPERM + VPERM B0,B4,B4,BEPERM + VPERM C0,C4,C4,BEPERM + VPERM D0,D4,D4,BEPERM + + clgfi LEN,0x40 + jl .Ltail_vx + + VLM A1,D1,0,INP,0 + + VX A0,A0,A1 + VX B0,B0,B1 + VX C0,C0,C1 + VX D0,D0,D1 + + VSTM A0,D0,0,OUT,0 + + la INP,0x40(INP) + la OUT,0x40(OUT) + aghi LEN,-0x40 + je .Ldone_vx + + VAF A5,A5,K0 + VAF B5,B5,K1 + VAF C5,C5,K2 + VAF D5,D5,D3 # +K[3]+5 + + VPERM A0,A5,A5,BEPERM + VPERM B0,B5,B5,BEPERM + VPERM C0,C5,C5,BEPERM + VPERM D0,D5,D5,BEPERM + + clgfi LEN,0x40 + jl .Ltail_vx + + VLM A1,D1,0,INP,0 + + VX A0,A0,A1 + VX B0,B0,B1 + VX C0,C0,C1 + VX D0,D0,D1 + + VSTM A0,D0,0,OUT,0 + + la INP,0x40(INP) + la OUT,0x40(OUT) + lhi %r0,10 + aghi LEN,-0x40 + jne .Loop_outer_vx + +.Ldone_vx: + lmg %r6,%r7,FRAME+6*8(SP) + la SP,FRAME(SP) + BR_EX %r14 + +.Ltail_vx: + VSTM A0,D0,8*8,SP,3 + lghi %r1,0 + +.Loop_tail_vx: + llgc %r5,0(%r1,INP) + llgc %r6,8*8(%r1,SP) + xr %r6,%r5 + stc %r6,0(%r1,OUT) + la %r1,1(%r1) + brct LEN,.Loop_tail_vx + + lmg %r6,%r7,FRAME+6*8(SP) + la SP,FRAME(SP) + BR_EX %r14 +ENDPROC(chacha20_vx) + +.previous diff --git a/arch/s390/crypto/chacha-s390.h b/arch/s390/crypto/chacha-s390.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..733744ce3 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/s390/crypto/chacha-s390.h @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +/* + * s390 ChaCha stream cipher. + * + * Copyright IBM Corp. 2021 + */ + +#ifndef _CHACHA_S390_H +#define _CHACHA_S390_H + +void chacha20_vx(u8 *out, const u8 *inp, size_t len, const u32 *key, + const u32 *counter); + +#endif /* _CHACHA_S390_H */ diff --git a/arch/s390/crypto/crc32-vx.c b/arch/s390/crypto/crc32-vx.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..017143e9c --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/s390/crypto/crc32-vx.c @@ -0,0 +1,310 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Crypto-API module for CRC-32 algorithms implemented with the + * z/Architecture Vector Extension Facility. + * + * Copyright IBM Corp. 2015 + * Author(s): Hendrik Brueckner <brueckner@linux.vnet.ibm.com> + */ +#define KMSG_COMPONENT "crc32-vx" +#define pr_fmt(fmt) KMSG_COMPONENT ": " fmt + +#include <linux/module.h> +#include <linux/cpufeature.h> +#include <linux/crc32.h> +#include <crypto/internal/hash.h> +#include <asm/fpu/api.h> + + +#define CRC32_BLOCK_SIZE 1 +#define CRC32_DIGEST_SIZE 4 + +#define VX_MIN_LEN 64 +#define VX_ALIGNMENT 16L +#define VX_ALIGN_MASK (VX_ALIGNMENT - 1) + +struct crc_ctx { + u32 key; +}; + +struct crc_desc_ctx { + u32 crc; +}; + +/* Prototypes for functions in assembly files */ +u32 crc32_le_vgfm_16(u32 crc, unsigned char const *buf, size_t size); +u32 crc32_be_vgfm_16(u32 crc, unsigned char const *buf, size_t size); +u32 crc32c_le_vgfm_16(u32 crc, unsigned char const *buf, size_t size); + +/* + * DEFINE_CRC32_VX() - Define a CRC-32 function using the vector extension + * + * Creates a function to perform a particular CRC-32 computation. Depending + * on the message buffer, the hardware-accelerated or software implementation + * is used. Note that the message buffer is aligned to improve fetch + * operations of VECTOR LOAD MULTIPLE instructions. + * + */ +#define DEFINE_CRC32_VX(___fname, ___crc32_vx, ___crc32_sw) \ + static u32 __pure ___fname(u32 crc, \ + unsigned char const *data, size_t datalen) \ + { \ + struct kernel_fpu vxstate; \ + unsigned long prealign, aligned, remaining; \ + \ + if (datalen < VX_MIN_LEN + VX_ALIGN_MASK) \ + return ___crc32_sw(crc, data, datalen); \ + \ + if ((unsigned long)data & VX_ALIGN_MASK) { \ + prealign = VX_ALIGNMENT - \ + ((unsigned long)data & VX_ALIGN_MASK); \ + datalen -= prealign; \ + crc = ___crc32_sw(crc, data, prealign); \ + data = (void *)((unsigned long)data + prealign); \ + } \ + \ + aligned = datalen & ~VX_ALIGN_MASK; \ + remaining = datalen & VX_ALIGN_MASK; \ + \ + kernel_fpu_begin(&vxstate, KERNEL_VXR_LOW); \ + crc = ___crc32_vx(crc, data, aligned); \ + kernel_fpu_end(&vxstate, KERNEL_VXR_LOW); \ + \ + if (remaining) \ + crc = ___crc32_sw(crc, data + aligned, remaining); \ + \ + return crc; \ + } + +DEFINE_CRC32_VX(crc32_le_vx, crc32_le_vgfm_16, crc32_le) +DEFINE_CRC32_VX(crc32_be_vx, crc32_be_vgfm_16, crc32_be) +DEFINE_CRC32_VX(crc32c_le_vx, crc32c_le_vgfm_16, __crc32c_le) + + +static int crc32_vx_cra_init_zero(struct crypto_tfm *tfm) +{ + struct crc_ctx *mctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm); + + mctx->key = 0; + return 0; +} + +static int crc32_vx_cra_init_invert(struct crypto_tfm *tfm) +{ + struct crc_ctx *mctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm); + + mctx->key = ~0; + return 0; +} + +static int crc32_vx_init(struct shash_desc *desc) +{ + struct crc_ctx *mctx = crypto_shash_ctx(desc->tfm); + struct crc_desc_ctx *ctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc); + + ctx->crc = mctx->key; + return 0; +} + +static int crc32_vx_setkey(struct crypto_shash *tfm, const u8 *newkey, + unsigned int newkeylen) +{ + struct crc_ctx *mctx = crypto_shash_ctx(tfm); + + if (newkeylen != sizeof(mctx->key)) + return -EINVAL; + mctx->key = le32_to_cpu(*(__le32 *)newkey); + return 0; +} + +static int crc32be_vx_setkey(struct crypto_shash *tfm, const u8 *newkey, + unsigned int newkeylen) +{ + struct crc_ctx *mctx = crypto_shash_ctx(tfm); + + if (newkeylen != sizeof(mctx->key)) + return -EINVAL; + mctx->key = be32_to_cpu(*(__be32 *)newkey); + return 0; +} + +static int crc32le_vx_final(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *out) +{ + struct crc_desc_ctx *ctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc); + + *(__le32 *)out = cpu_to_le32p(&ctx->crc); + return 0; +} + +static int crc32be_vx_final(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *out) +{ + struct crc_desc_ctx *ctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc); + + *(__be32 *)out = cpu_to_be32p(&ctx->crc); + return 0; +} + +static int crc32c_vx_final(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *out) +{ + struct crc_desc_ctx *ctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc); + + /* + * Perform a final XOR with 0xFFFFFFFF to be in sync + * with the generic crc32c shash implementation. + */ + *(__le32 *)out = ~cpu_to_le32p(&ctx->crc); + return 0; +} + +static int __crc32le_vx_finup(u32 *crc, const u8 *data, unsigned int len, + u8 *out) +{ + *(__le32 *)out = cpu_to_le32(crc32_le_vx(*crc, data, len)); + return 0; +} + +static int __crc32be_vx_finup(u32 *crc, const u8 *data, unsigned int len, + u8 *out) +{ + *(__be32 *)out = cpu_to_be32(crc32_be_vx(*crc, data, len)); + return 0; +} + +static int __crc32c_vx_finup(u32 *crc, const u8 *data, unsigned int len, + u8 *out) +{ + /* + * Perform a final XOR with 0xFFFFFFFF to be in sync + * with the generic crc32c shash implementation. + */ + *(__le32 *)out = ~cpu_to_le32(crc32c_le_vx(*crc, data, len)); + return 0; +} + + +#define CRC32_VX_FINUP(alg, func) \ + static int alg ## _vx_finup(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data, \ + unsigned int datalen, u8 *out) \ + { \ + return __ ## alg ## _vx_finup(shash_desc_ctx(desc), \ + data, datalen, out); \ + } + +CRC32_VX_FINUP(crc32le, crc32_le_vx) +CRC32_VX_FINUP(crc32be, crc32_be_vx) +CRC32_VX_FINUP(crc32c, crc32c_le_vx) + +#define CRC32_VX_DIGEST(alg, func) \ + static int alg ## _vx_digest(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data, \ + unsigned int len, u8 *out) \ + { \ + return __ ## alg ## _vx_finup(crypto_shash_ctx(desc->tfm), \ + data, len, out); \ + } + +CRC32_VX_DIGEST(crc32le, crc32_le_vx) +CRC32_VX_DIGEST(crc32be, crc32_be_vx) +CRC32_VX_DIGEST(crc32c, crc32c_le_vx) + +#define CRC32_VX_UPDATE(alg, func) \ + static int alg ## _vx_update(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data, \ + unsigned int datalen) \ + { \ + struct crc_desc_ctx *ctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc); \ + ctx->crc = func(ctx->crc, data, datalen); \ + return 0; \ + } + +CRC32_VX_UPDATE(crc32le, crc32_le_vx) +CRC32_VX_UPDATE(crc32be, crc32_be_vx) +CRC32_VX_UPDATE(crc32c, crc32c_le_vx) + + +static struct shash_alg crc32_vx_algs[] = { + /* CRC-32 LE */ + { + .init = crc32_vx_init, + .setkey = crc32_vx_setkey, + .update = crc32le_vx_update, + .final = crc32le_vx_final, + .finup = crc32le_vx_finup, + .digest = crc32le_vx_digest, + .descsize = sizeof(struct crc_desc_ctx), + .digestsize = CRC32_DIGEST_SIZE, + .base = { + .cra_name = "crc32", + .cra_driver_name = "crc32-vx", + .cra_priority = 200, + .cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_OPTIONAL_KEY, + .cra_blocksize = CRC32_BLOCK_SIZE, + .cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct crc_ctx), + .cra_module = THIS_MODULE, + .cra_init = crc32_vx_cra_init_zero, + }, + }, + /* CRC-32 BE */ + { + .init = crc32_vx_init, + .setkey = crc32be_vx_setkey, + .update = crc32be_vx_update, + .final = crc32be_vx_final, + .finup = crc32be_vx_finup, + .digest = crc32be_vx_digest, + .descsize = sizeof(struct crc_desc_ctx), + .digestsize = CRC32_DIGEST_SIZE, + .base = { + .cra_name = "crc32be", + .cra_driver_name = "crc32be-vx", + .cra_priority = 200, + .cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_OPTIONAL_KEY, + .cra_blocksize = CRC32_BLOCK_SIZE, + .cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct crc_ctx), + .cra_module = THIS_MODULE, + .cra_init = crc32_vx_cra_init_zero, + }, + }, + /* CRC-32C LE */ + { + .init = crc32_vx_init, + .setkey = crc32_vx_setkey, + .update = crc32c_vx_update, + .final = crc32c_vx_final, + .finup = crc32c_vx_finup, + .digest = crc32c_vx_digest, + .descsize = sizeof(struct crc_desc_ctx), + .digestsize = CRC32_DIGEST_SIZE, + .base = { + .cra_name = "crc32c", + .cra_driver_name = "crc32c-vx", + .cra_priority = 200, + .cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_OPTIONAL_KEY, + .cra_blocksize = CRC32_BLOCK_SIZE, + .cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct crc_ctx), + .cra_module = THIS_MODULE, + .cra_init = crc32_vx_cra_init_invert, + }, + }, +}; + + +static int __init crc_vx_mod_init(void) +{ + return crypto_register_shashes(crc32_vx_algs, + ARRAY_SIZE(crc32_vx_algs)); +} + +static void __exit crc_vx_mod_exit(void) +{ + crypto_unregister_shashes(crc32_vx_algs, ARRAY_SIZE(crc32_vx_algs)); +} + +module_cpu_feature_match(S390_CPU_FEATURE_VXRS, crc_vx_mod_init); +module_exit(crc_vx_mod_exit); + +MODULE_AUTHOR("Hendrik Brueckner <brueckner@linux.vnet.ibm.com>"); +MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); + +MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("crc32"); +MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("crc32-vx"); +MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("crc32c"); +MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("crc32c-vx"); diff --git a/arch/s390/crypto/crc32be-vx.S b/arch/s390/crypto/crc32be-vx.S new file mode 100644 index 000000000..6b3d1009c --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/s390/crypto/crc32be-vx.S @@ -0,0 +1,212 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +/* + * Hardware-accelerated CRC-32 variants for Linux on z Systems + * + * Use the z/Architecture Vector Extension Facility to accelerate the + * computing of CRC-32 checksums. + * + * This CRC-32 implementation algorithm processes the most-significant + * bit first (BE). + * + * Copyright IBM Corp. 2015 + * Author(s): Hendrik Brueckner <brueckner@linux.vnet.ibm.com> + */ + +#include <linux/linkage.h> +#include <asm/nospec-insn.h> +#include <asm/vx-insn.h> + +/* Vector register range containing CRC-32 constants */ +#define CONST_R1R2 %v9 +#define CONST_R3R4 %v10 +#define CONST_R5 %v11 +#define CONST_R6 %v12 +#define CONST_RU_POLY %v13 +#define CONST_CRC_POLY %v14 + +.data +.align 8 + +/* + * The CRC-32 constant block contains reduction constants to fold and + * process particular chunks of the input data stream in parallel. + * + * For the CRC-32 variants, the constants are precomputed according to + * these definitions: + * + * R1 = x4*128+64 mod P(x) + * R2 = x4*128 mod P(x) + * R3 = x128+64 mod P(x) + * R4 = x128 mod P(x) + * R5 = x96 mod P(x) + * R6 = x64 mod P(x) + * + * Barret reduction constant, u, is defined as floor(x**64 / P(x)). + * + * where P(x) is the polynomial in the normal domain and the P'(x) is the + * polynomial in the reversed (bitreflected) domain. + * + * Note that the constant definitions below are extended in order to compute + * intermediate results with a single VECTOR GALOIS FIELD MULTIPLY instruction. + * The righmost doubleword can be 0 to prevent contribution to the result or + * can be multiplied by 1 to perform an XOR without the need for a separate + * VECTOR EXCLUSIVE OR instruction. + * + * CRC-32 (IEEE 802.3 Ethernet, ...) polynomials: + * + * P(x) = 0x04C11DB7 + * P'(x) = 0xEDB88320 + */ + +.Lconstants_CRC_32_BE: + .quad 0x08833794c, 0x0e6228b11 # R1, R2 + .quad 0x0c5b9cd4c, 0x0e8a45605 # R3, R4 + .quad 0x0f200aa66, 1 << 32 # R5, x32 + .quad 0x0490d678d, 1 # R6, 1 + .quad 0x104d101df, 0 # u + .quad 0x104C11DB7, 0 # P(x) + +.previous + + GEN_BR_THUNK %r14 + +.text +/* + * The CRC-32 function(s) use these calling conventions: + * + * Parameters: + * + * %r2: Initial CRC value, typically ~0; and final CRC (return) value. + * %r3: Input buffer pointer, performance might be improved if the + * buffer is on a doubleword boundary. + * %r4: Length of the buffer, must be 64 bytes or greater. + * + * Register usage: + * + * %r5: CRC-32 constant pool base pointer. + * V0: Initial CRC value and intermediate constants and results. + * V1..V4: Data for CRC computation. + * V5..V8: Next data chunks that are fetched from the input buffer. + * + * V9..V14: CRC-32 constants. + */ +ENTRY(crc32_be_vgfm_16) + /* Load CRC-32 constants */ + larl %r5,.Lconstants_CRC_32_BE + VLM CONST_R1R2,CONST_CRC_POLY,0,%r5 + + /* Load the initial CRC value into the leftmost word of V0. */ + VZERO %v0 + VLVGF %v0,%r2,0 + + /* Load a 64-byte data chunk and XOR with CRC */ + VLM %v1,%v4,0,%r3 /* 64-bytes into V1..V4 */ + VX %v1,%v0,%v1 /* V1 ^= CRC */ + aghi %r3,64 /* BUF = BUF + 64 */ + aghi %r4,-64 /* LEN = LEN - 64 */ + + /* Check remaining buffer size and jump to proper folding method */ + cghi %r4,64 + jl .Lless_than_64bytes + +.Lfold_64bytes_loop: + /* Load the next 64-byte data chunk into V5 to V8 */ + VLM %v5,%v8,0,%r3 + + /* + * Perform a GF(2) multiplication of the doublewords in V1 with + * the reduction constants in V0. The intermediate result is + * then folded (accumulated) with the next data chunk in V5 and + * stored in V1. Repeat this step for the register contents + * in V2, V3, and V4 respectively. + */ + VGFMAG %v1,CONST_R1R2,%v1,%v5 + VGFMAG %v2,CONST_R1R2,%v2,%v6 + VGFMAG %v3,CONST_R1R2,%v3,%v7 + VGFMAG %v4,CONST_R1R2,%v4,%v8 + + /* Adjust buffer pointer and length for next loop */ + aghi %r3,64 /* BUF = BUF + 64 */ + aghi %r4,-64 /* LEN = LEN - 64 */ + + cghi %r4,64 + jnl .Lfold_64bytes_loop + +.Lless_than_64bytes: + /* Fold V1 to V4 into a single 128-bit value in V1 */ + VGFMAG %v1,CONST_R3R4,%v1,%v2 + VGFMAG %v1,CONST_R3R4,%v1,%v3 + VGFMAG %v1,CONST_R3R4,%v1,%v4 + + /* Check whether to continue with 64-bit folding */ + cghi %r4,16 + jl .Lfinal_fold + +.Lfold_16bytes_loop: + + VL %v2,0,,%r3 /* Load next data chunk */ + VGFMAG %v1,CONST_R3R4,%v1,%v2 /* Fold next data chunk */ + + /* Adjust buffer pointer and size for folding next data chunk */ + aghi %r3,16 + aghi %r4,-16 + + /* Process remaining data chunks */ + cghi %r4,16 + jnl .Lfold_16bytes_loop + +.Lfinal_fold: + /* + * The R5 constant is used to fold a 128-bit value into an 96-bit value + * that is XORed with the next 96-bit input data chunk. To use a single + * VGFMG instruction, multiply the rightmost 64-bit with x^32 (1<<32) to + * form an intermediate 96-bit value (with appended zeros) which is then + * XORed with the intermediate reduction result. + */ + VGFMG %v1,CONST_R5,%v1 + + /* + * Further reduce the remaining 96-bit value to a 64-bit value using a + * single VGFMG, the rightmost doubleword is multiplied with 0x1. The + * intermediate result is then XORed with the product of the leftmost + * doubleword with R6. The result is a 64-bit value and is subject to + * the Barret reduction. + */ + VGFMG %v1,CONST_R6,%v1 + + /* + * The input values to the Barret reduction are the degree-63 polynomial + * in V1 (R(x)), degree-32 generator polynomial, and the reduction + * constant u. The Barret reduction result is the CRC value of R(x) mod + * P(x). + * + * The Barret reduction algorithm is defined as: + * + * 1. T1(x) = floor( R(x) / x^32 ) GF2MUL u + * 2. T2(x) = floor( T1(x) / x^32 ) GF2MUL P(x) + * 3. C(x) = R(x) XOR T2(x) mod x^32 + * + * Note: To compensate the division by x^32, use the vector unpack + * instruction to move the leftmost word into the leftmost doubleword + * of the vector register. The rightmost doubleword is multiplied + * with zero to not contribute to the intermediate results. + */ + + /* T1(x) = floor( R(x) / x^32 ) GF2MUL u */ + VUPLLF %v2,%v1 + VGFMG %v2,CONST_RU_POLY,%v2 + + /* + * Compute the GF(2) product of the CRC polynomial in VO with T1(x) in + * V2 and XOR the intermediate result, T2(x), with the value in V1. + * The final result is in the rightmost word of V2. + */ + VUPLLF %v2,%v2 + VGFMAG %v2,CONST_CRC_POLY,%v2,%v1 + +.Ldone: + VLGVF %r2,%v2,3 + BR_EX %r14 +ENDPROC(crc32_be_vgfm_16) + +.previous diff --git a/arch/s390/crypto/crc32le-vx.S b/arch/s390/crypto/crc32le-vx.S new file mode 100644 index 000000000..71caf0f4e --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/s390/crypto/crc32le-vx.S @@ -0,0 +1,273 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +/* + * Hardware-accelerated CRC-32 variants for Linux on z Systems + * + * Use the z/Architecture Vector Extension Facility to accelerate the + * computing of bitreflected CRC-32 checksums for IEEE 802.3 Ethernet + * and Castagnoli. + * + * This CRC-32 implementation algorithm is bitreflected and processes + * the least-significant bit first (Little-Endian). + * + * Copyright IBM Corp. 2015 + * Author(s): Hendrik Brueckner <brueckner@linux.vnet.ibm.com> + */ + +#include <linux/linkage.h> +#include <asm/nospec-insn.h> +#include <asm/vx-insn.h> + +/* Vector register range containing CRC-32 constants */ +#define CONST_PERM_LE2BE %v9 +#define CONST_R2R1 %v10 +#define CONST_R4R3 %v11 +#define CONST_R5 %v12 +#define CONST_RU_POLY %v13 +#define CONST_CRC_POLY %v14 + +.data +.align 8 + +/* + * The CRC-32 constant block contains reduction constants to fold and + * process particular chunks of the input data stream in parallel. + * + * For the CRC-32 variants, the constants are precomputed according to + * these definitions: + * + * R1 = [(x4*128+32 mod P'(x) << 32)]' << 1 + * R2 = [(x4*128-32 mod P'(x) << 32)]' << 1 + * R3 = [(x128+32 mod P'(x) << 32)]' << 1 + * R4 = [(x128-32 mod P'(x) << 32)]' << 1 + * R5 = [(x64 mod P'(x) << 32)]' << 1 + * R6 = [(x32 mod P'(x) << 32)]' << 1 + * + * The bitreflected Barret reduction constant, u', is defined as + * the bit reversal of floor(x**64 / P(x)). + * + * where P(x) is the polynomial in the normal domain and the P'(x) is the + * polynomial in the reversed (bitreflected) domain. + * + * CRC-32 (IEEE 802.3 Ethernet, ...) polynomials: + * + * P(x) = 0x04C11DB7 + * P'(x) = 0xEDB88320 + * + * CRC-32C (Castagnoli) polynomials: + * + * P(x) = 0x1EDC6F41 + * P'(x) = 0x82F63B78 + */ + +.Lconstants_CRC_32_LE: + .octa 0x0F0E0D0C0B0A09080706050403020100 # BE->LE mask + .quad 0x1c6e41596, 0x154442bd4 # R2, R1 + .quad 0x0ccaa009e, 0x1751997d0 # R4, R3 + .octa 0x163cd6124 # R5 + .octa 0x1F7011641 # u' + .octa 0x1DB710641 # P'(x) << 1 + +.Lconstants_CRC_32C_LE: + .octa 0x0F0E0D0C0B0A09080706050403020100 # BE->LE mask + .quad 0x09e4addf8, 0x740eef02 # R2, R1 + .quad 0x14cd00bd6, 0xf20c0dfe # R4, R3 + .octa 0x0dd45aab8 # R5 + .octa 0x0dea713f1 # u' + .octa 0x105ec76f0 # P'(x) << 1 + +.previous + + GEN_BR_THUNK %r14 + +.text + +/* + * The CRC-32 functions use these calling conventions: + * + * Parameters: + * + * %r2: Initial CRC value, typically ~0; and final CRC (return) value. + * %r3: Input buffer pointer, performance might be improved if the + * buffer is on a doubleword boundary. + * %r4: Length of the buffer, must be 64 bytes or greater. + * + * Register usage: + * + * %r5: CRC-32 constant pool base pointer. + * V0: Initial CRC value and intermediate constants and results. + * V1..V4: Data for CRC computation. + * V5..V8: Next data chunks that are fetched from the input buffer. + * V9: Constant for BE->LE conversion and shift operations + * + * V10..V14: CRC-32 constants. + */ + +ENTRY(crc32_le_vgfm_16) + larl %r5,.Lconstants_CRC_32_LE + j crc32_le_vgfm_generic +ENDPROC(crc32_le_vgfm_16) + +ENTRY(crc32c_le_vgfm_16) + larl %r5,.Lconstants_CRC_32C_LE + j crc32_le_vgfm_generic +ENDPROC(crc32c_le_vgfm_16) + +ENTRY(crc32_le_vgfm_generic) + /* Load CRC-32 constants */ + VLM CONST_PERM_LE2BE,CONST_CRC_POLY,0,%r5 + + /* + * Load the initial CRC value. + * + * The CRC value is loaded into the rightmost word of the + * vector register and is later XORed with the LSB portion + * of the loaded input data. + */ + VZERO %v0 /* Clear V0 */ + VLVGF %v0,%r2,3 /* Load CRC into rightmost word */ + + /* Load a 64-byte data chunk and XOR with CRC */ + VLM %v1,%v4,0,%r3 /* 64-bytes into V1..V4 */ + VPERM %v1,%v1,%v1,CONST_PERM_LE2BE + VPERM %v2,%v2,%v2,CONST_PERM_LE2BE + VPERM %v3,%v3,%v3,CONST_PERM_LE2BE + VPERM %v4,%v4,%v4,CONST_PERM_LE2BE + + VX %v1,%v0,%v1 /* V1 ^= CRC */ + aghi %r3,64 /* BUF = BUF + 64 */ + aghi %r4,-64 /* LEN = LEN - 64 */ + + cghi %r4,64 + jl .Lless_than_64bytes + +.Lfold_64bytes_loop: + /* Load the next 64-byte data chunk into V5 to V8 */ + VLM %v5,%v8,0,%r3 + VPERM %v5,%v5,%v5,CONST_PERM_LE2BE + VPERM %v6,%v6,%v6,CONST_PERM_LE2BE + VPERM %v7,%v7,%v7,CONST_PERM_LE2BE + VPERM %v8,%v8,%v8,CONST_PERM_LE2BE + + /* + * Perform a GF(2) multiplication of the doublewords in V1 with + * the R1 and R2 reduction constants in V0. The intermediate result + * is then folded (accumulated) with the next data chunk in V5 and + * stored in V1. Repeat this step for the register contents + * in V2, V3, and V4 respectively. + */ + VGFMAG %v1,CONST_R2R1,%v1,%v5 + VGFMAG %v2,CONST_R2R1,%v2,%v6 + VGFMAG %v3,CONST_R2R1,%v3,%v7 + VGFMAG %v4,CONST_R2R1,%v4,%v8 + + aghi %r3,64 /* BUF = BUF + 64 */ + aghi %r4,-64 /* LEN = LEN - 64 */ + + cghi %r4,64 + jnl .Lfold_64bytes_loop + +.Lless_than_64bytes: + /* + * Fold V1 to V4 into a single 128-bit value in V1. Multiply V1 with R3 + * and R4 and accumulating the next 128-bit chunk until a single 128-bit + * value remains. + */ + VGFMAG %v1,CONST_R4R3,%v1,%v2 + VGFMAG %v1,CONST_R4R3,%v1,%v3 + VGFMAG %v1,CONST_R4R3,%v1,%v4 + + cghi %r4,16 + jl .Lfinal_fold + +.Lfold_16bytes_loop: + + VL %v2,0,,%r3 /* Load next data chunk */ + VPERM %v2,%v2,%v2,CONST_PERM_LE2BE + VGFMAG %v1,CONST_R4R3,%v1,%v2 /* Fold next data chunk */ + + aghi %r3,16 + aghi %r4,-16 + + cghi %r4,16 + jnl .Lfold_16bytes_loop + +.Lfinal_fold: + /* + * Set up a vector register for byte shifts. The shift value must + * be loaded in bits 1-4 in byte element 7 of a vector register. + * Shift by 8 bytes: 0x40 + * Shift by 4 bytes: 0x20 + */ + VLEIB %v9,0x40,7 + + /* + * Prepare V0 for the next GF(2) multiplication: shift V0 by 8 bytes + * to move R4 into the rightmost doubleword and set the leftmost + * doubleword to 0x1. + */ + VSRLB %v0,CONST_R4R3,%v9 + VLEIG %v0,1,0 + + /* + * Compute GF(2) product of V1 and V0. The rightmost doubleword + * of V1 is multiplied with R4. The leftmost doubleword of V1 is + * multiplied by 0x1 and is then XORed with rightmost product. + * Implicitly, the intermediate leftmost product becomes padded + */ + VGFMG %v1,%v0,%v1 + + /* + * Now do the final 32-bit fold by multiplying the rightmost word + * in V1 with R5 and XOR the result with the remaining bits in V1. + * + * To achieve this by a single VGFMAG, right shift V1 by a word + * and store the result in V2 which is then accumulated. Use the + * vector unpack instruction to load the rightmost half of the + * doubleword into the rightmost doubleword element of V1; the other + * half is loaded in the leftmost doubleword. + * The vector register with CONST_R5 contains the R5 constant in the + * rightmost doubleword and the leftmost doubleword is zero to ignore + * the leftmost product of V1. + */ + VLEIB %v9,0x20,7 /* Shift by words */ + VSRLB %v2,%v1,%v9 /* Store remaining bits in V2 */ + VUPLLF %v1,%v1 /* Split rightmost doubleword */ + VGFMAG %v1,CONST_R5,%v1,%v2 /* V1 = (V1 * R5) XOR V2 */ + + /* + * Apply a Barret reduction to compute the final 32-bit CRC value. + * + * The input values to the Barret reduction are the degree-63 polynomial + * in V1 (R(x)), degree-32 generator polynomial, and the reduction + * constant u. The Barret reduction result is the CRC value of R(x) mod + * P(x). + * + * The Barret reduction algorithm is defined as: + * + * 1. T1(x) = floor( R(x) / x^32 ) GF2MUL u + * 2. T2(x) = floor( T1(x) / x^32 ) GF2MUL P(x) + * 3. C(x) = R(x) XOR T2(x) mod x^32 + * + * Note: The leftmost doubleword of vector register containing + * CONST_RU_POLY is zero and, thus, the intermediate GF(2) product + * is zero and does not contribute to the final result. + */ + + /* T1(x) = floor( R(x) / x^32 ) GF2MUL u */ + VUPLLF %v2,%v1 + VGFMG %v2,CONST_RU_POLY,%v2 + + /* + * Compute the GF(2) product of the CRC polynomial with T1(x) in + * V2 and XOR the intermediate result, T2(x), with the value in V1. + * The final result is stored in word element 2 of V2. + */ + VUPLLF %v2,%v2 + VGFMAG %v2,CONST_CRC_POLY,%v2,%v1 + +.Ldone: + VLGVF %r2,%v2,2 + BR_EX %r14 +ENDPROC(crc32_le_vgfm_generic) + +.previous diff --git a/arch/s390/crypto/des_s390.c b/arch/s390/crypto/des_s390.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..8e75b83a5 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/s390/crypto/des_s390.c @@ -0,0 +1,502 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ +/* + * Cryptographic API. + * + * s390 implementation of the DES Cipher Algorithm. + * + * Copyright IBM Corp. 2003, 2011 + * Author(s): Thomas Spatzier + * Jan Glauber (jan.glauber@de.ibm.com) + */ + +#include <linux/init.h> +#include <linux/module.h> +#include <linux/cpufeature.h> +#include <linux/crypto.h> +#include <linux/fips.h> +#include <linux/mutex.h> +#include <crypto/algapi.h> +#include <crypto/internal/des.h> +#include <crypto/internal/skcipher.h> +#include <asm/cpacf.h> + +#define DES3_KEY_SIZE (3 * DES_KEY_SIZE) + +static u8 *ctrblk; +static DEFINE_MUTEX(ctrblk_lock); + +static cpacf_mask_t km_functions, kmc_functions, kmctr_functions; + +struct s390_des_ctx { + u8 iv[DES_BLOCK_SIZE]; + u8 key[DES3_KEY_SIZE]; +}; + +static int des_setkey(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, const u8 *key, + unsigned int key_len) +{ + struct s390_des_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm); + int err; + + err = crypto_des_verify_key(tfm, key); + if (err) + return err; + + memcpy(ctx->key, key, key_len); + return 0; +} + +static int des_setkey_skcipher(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key, + unsigned int key_len) +{ + return des_setkey(crypto_skcipher_tfm(tfm), key, key_len); +} + +static void s390_des_encrypt(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, u8 *out, const u8 *in) +{ + struct s390_des_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm); + + cpacf_km(CPACF_KM_DEA, ctx->key, out, in, DES_BLOCK_SIZE); +} + +static void s390_des_decrypt(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, u8 *out, const u8 *in) +{ + struct s390_des_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm); + + cpacf_km(CPACF_KM_DEA | CPACF_DECRYPT, + ctx->key, out, in, DES_BLOCK_SIZE); +} + +static struct crypto_alg des_alg = { + .cra_name = "des", + .cra_driver_name = "des-s390", + .cra_priority = 300, + .cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_CIPHER, + .cra_blocksize = DES_BLOCK_SIZE, + .cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct s390_des_ctx), + .cra_module = THIS_MODULE, + .cra_u = { + .cipher = { + .cia_min_keysize = DES_KEY_SIZE, + .cia_max_keysize = DES_KEY_SIZE, + .cia_setkey = des_setkey, + .cia_encrypt = s390_des_encrypt, + .cia_decrypt = s390_des_decrypt, + } + } +}; + +static int ecb_desall_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req, unsigned long fc) +{ + struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req); + struct s390_des_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm); + struct skcipher_walk walk; + unsigned int nbytes, n; + int ret; + + ret = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, req, false); + while ((nbytes = walk.nbytes) != 0) { + /* only use complete blocks */ + n = nbytes & ~(DES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1); + cpacf_km(fc, ctx->key, walk.dst.virt.addr, + walk.src.virt.addr, n); + ret = skcipher_walk_done(&walk, nbytes - n); + } + return ret; +} + +static int cbc_desall_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req, unsigned long fc) +{ + struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req); + struct s390_des_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm); + struct skcipher_walk walk; + unsigned int nbytes, n; + int ret; + struct { + u8 iv[DES_BLOCK_SIZE]; + u8 key[DES3_KEY_SIZE]; + } param; + + ret = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, req, false); + if (ret) + return ret; + memcpy(param.iv, walk.iv, DES_BLOCK_SIZE); + memcpy(param.key, ctx->key, DES3_KEY_SIZE); + while ((nbytes = walk.nbytes) != 0) { + /* only use complete blocks */ + n = nbytes & ~(DES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1); + cpacf_kmc(fc, ¶m, walk.dst.virt.addr, + walk.src.virt.addr, n); + memcpy(walk.iv, param.iv, DES_BLOCK_SIZE); + ret = skcipher_walk_done(&walk, nbytes - n); + } + return ret; +} + +static int ecb_des_encrypt(struct skcipher_request *req) +{ + return ecb_desall_crypt(req, CPACF_KM_DEA); +} + +static int ecb_des_decrypt(struct skcipher_request *req) +{ + return ecb_desall_crypt(req, CPACF_KM_DEA | CPACF_DECRYPT); +} + +static struct skcipher_alg ecb_des_alg = { + .base.cra_name = "ecb(des)", + .base.cra_driver_name = "ecb-des-s390", + .base.cra_priority = 400, /* combo: des + ecb */ + .base.cra_blocksize = DES_BLOCK_SIZE, + .base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct s390_des_ctx), + .base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE, + .min_keysize = DES_KEY_SIZE, + .max_keysize = DES_KEY_SIZE, + .setkey = des_setkey_skcipher, + .encrypt = ecb_des_encrypt, + .decrypt = ecb_des_decrypt, +}; + +static int cbc_des_encrypt(struct skcipher_request *req) +{ + return cbc_desall_crypt(req, CPACF_KMC_DEA); +} + +static int cbc_des_decrypt(struct skcipher_request *req) +{ + return cbc_desall_crypt(req, CPACF_KMC_DEA | CPACF_DECRYPT); +} + +static struct skcipher_alg cbc_des_alg = { + .base.cra_name = "cbc(des)", + .base.cra_driver_name = "cbc-des-s390", + .base.cra_priority = 400, /* combo: des + cbc */ + .base.cra_blocksize = DES_BLOCK_SIZE, + .base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct s390_des_ctx), + .base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE, + .min_keysize = DES_KEY_SIZE, + .max_keysize = DES_KEY_SIZE, + .ivsize = DES_BLOCK_SIZE, + .setkey = des_setkey_skcipher, + .encrypt = cbc_des_encrypt, + .decrypt = cbc_des_decrypt, +}; + +/* + * RFC2451: + * + * For DES-EDE3, there is no known need to reject weak or + * complementation keys. Any weakness is obviated by the use of + * multiple keys. + * + * However, if the first two or last two independent 64-bit keys are + * equal (k1 == k2 or k2 == k3), then the DES3 operation is simply the + * same as DES. Implementers MUST reject keys that exhibit this + * property. + * + * In fips mode additionally check for all 3 keys are unique. + * + */ +static int des3_setkey(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, const u8 *key, + unsigned int key_len) +{ + struct s390_des_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm); + int err; + + err = crypto_des3_ede_verify_key(tfm, key); + if (err) + return err; + + memcpy(ctx->key, key, key_len); + return 0; +} + +static int des3_setkey_skcipher(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key, + unsigned int key_len) +{ + return des3_setkey(crypto_skcipher_tfm(tfm), key, key_len); +} + +static void des3_encrypt(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, u8 *dst, const u8 *src) +{ + struct s390_des_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm); + + cpacf_km(CPACF_KM_TDEA_192, ctx->key, dst, src, DES_BLOCK_SIZE); +} + +static void des3_decrypt(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, u8 *dst, const u8 *src) +{ + struct s390_des_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm); + + cpacf_km(CPACF_KM_TDEA_192 | CPACF_DECRYPT, + ctx->key, dst, src, DES_BLOCK_SIZE); +} + +static struct crypto_alg des3_alg = { + .cra_name = "des3_ede", + .cra_driver_name = "des3_ede-s390", + .cra_priority = 300, + .cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_CIPHER, + .cra_blocksize = DES_BLOCK_SIZE, + .cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct s390_des_ctx), + .cra_module = THIS_MODULE, + .cra_u = { + .cipher = { + .cia_min_keysize = DES3_KEY_SIZE, + .cia_max_keysize = DES3_KEY_SIZE, + .cia_setkey = des3_setkey, + .cia_encrypt = des3_encrypt, + .cia_decrypt = des3_decrypt, + } + } +}; + +static int ecb_des3_encrypt(struct skcipher_request *req) +{ + return ecb_desall_crypt(req, CPACF_KM_TDEA_192); +} + +static int ecb_des3_decrypt(struct skcipher_request *req) +{ + return ecb_desall_crypt(req, CPACF_KM_TDEA_192 | CPACF_DECRYPT); +} + +static struct skcipher_alg ecb_des3_alg = { + .base.cra_name = "ecb(des3_ede)", + .base.cra_driver_name = "ecb-des3_ede-s390", + .base.cra_priority = 400, /* combo: des3 + ecb */ + .base.cra_blocksize = DES_BLOCK_SIZE, + .base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct s390_des_ctx), + .base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE, + .min_keysize = DES3_KEY_SIZE, + .max_keysize = DES3_KEY_SIZE, + .setkey = des3_setkey_skcipher, + .encrypt = ecb_des3_encrypt, + .decrypt = ecb_des3_decrypt, +}; + +static int cbc_des3_encrypt(struct skcipher_request *req) +{ + return cbc_desall_crypt(req, CPACF_KMC_TDEA_192); +} + +static int cbc_des3_decrypt(struct skcipher_request *req) +{ + return cbc_desall_crypt(req, CPACF_KMC_TDEA_192 | CPACF_DECRYPT); +} + +static struct skcipher_alg cbc_des3_alg = { + .base.cra_name = "cbc(des3_ede)", + .base.cra_driver_name = "cbc-des3_ede-s390", + .base.cra_priority = 400, /* combo: des3 + cbc */ + .base.cra_blocksize = DES_BLOCK_SIZE, + .base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct s390_des_ctx), + .base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE, + .min_keysize = DES3_KEY_SIZE, + .max_keysize = DES3_KEY_SIZE, + .ivsize = DES_BLOCK_SIZE, + .setkey = des3_setkey_skcipher, + .encrypt = cbc_des3_encrypt, + .decrypt = cbc_des3_decrypt, +}; + +static unsigned int __ctrblk_init(u8 *ctrptr, u8 *iv, unsigned int nbytes) +{ + unsigned int i, n; + + /* align to block size, max. PAGE_SIZE */ + n = (nbytes > PAGE_SIZE) ? PAGE_SIZE : nbytes & ~(DES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1); + memcpy(ctrptr, iv, DES_BLOCK_SIZE); + for (i = (n / DES_BLOCK_SIZE) - 1; i > 0; i--) { + memcpy(ctrptr + DES_BLOCK_SIZE, ctrptr, DES_BLOCK_SIZE); + crypto_inc(ctrptr + DES_BLOCK_SIZE, DES_BLOCK_SIZE); + ctrptr += DES_BLOCK_SIZE; + } + return n; +} + +static int ctr_desall_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req, unsigned long fc) +{ + struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req); + struct s390_des_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm); + u8 buf[DES_BLOCK_SIZE], *ctrptr; + struct skcipher_walk walk; + unsigned int n, nbytes; + int ret, locked; + + locked = mutex_trylock(&ctrblk_lock); + + ret = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, req, false); + while ((nbytes = walk.nbytes) >= DES_BLOCK_SIZE) { + n = DES_BLOCK_SIZE; + if (nbytes >= 2*DES_BLOCK_SIZE && locked) + n = __ctrblk_init(ctrblk, walk.iv, nbytes); + ctrptr = (n > DES_BLOCK_SIZE) ? ctrblk : walk.iv; + cpacf_kmctr(fc, ctx->key, walk.dst.virt.addr, + walk.src.virt.addr, n, ctrptr); + if (ctrptr == ctrblk) + memcpy(walk.iv, ctrptr + n - DES_BLOCK_SIZE, + DES_BLOCK_SIZE); + crypto_inc(walk.iv, DES_BLOCK_SIZE); + ret = skcipher_walk_done(&walk, nbytes - n); + } + if (locked) + mutex_unlock(&ctrblk_lock); + /* final block may be < DES_BLOCK_SIZE, copy only nbytes */ + if (nbytes) { + cpacf_kmctr(fc, ctx->key, buf, walk.src.virt.addr, + DES_BLOCK_SIZE, walk.iv); + memcpy(walk.dst.virt.addr, buf, nbytes); + crypto_inc(walk.iv, DES_BLOCK_SIZE); + ret = skcipher_walk_done(&walk, 0); + } + return ret; +} + +static int ctr_des_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req) +{ + return ctr_desall_crypt(req, CPACF_KMCTR_DEA); +} + +static struct skcipher_alg ctr_des_alg = { + .base.cra_name = "ctr(des)", + .base.cra_driver_name = "ctr-des-s390", + .base.cra_priority = 400, /* combo: des + ctr */ + .base.cra_blocksize = 1, + .base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct s390_des_ctx), + .base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE, + .min_keysize = DES_KEY_SIZE, + .max_keysize = DES_KEY_SIZE, + .ivsize = DES_BLOCK_SIZE, + .setkey = des_setkey_skcipher, + .encrypt = ctr_des_crypt, + .decrypt = ctr_des_crypt, + .chunksize = DES_BLOCK_SIZE, +}; + +static int ctr_des3_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req) +{ + return ctr_desall_crypt(req, CPACF_KMCTR_TDEA_192); +} + +static struct skcipher_alg ctr_des3_alg = { + .base.cra_name = "ctr(des3_ede)", + .base.cra_driver_name = "ctr-des3_ede-s390", + .base.cra_priority = 400, /* combo: des3 + ede */ + .base.cra_blocksize = 1, + .base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct s390_des_ctx), + .base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE, + .min_keysize = DES3_KEY_SIZE, + .max_keysize = DES3_KEY_SIZE, + .ivsize = DES_BLOCK_SIZE, + .setkey = des3_setkey_skcipher, + .encrypt = ctr_des3_crypt, + .decrypt = ctr_des3_crypt, + .chunksize = DES_BLOCK_SIZE, +}; + +static struct crypto_alg *des_s390_algs_ptr[2]; +static int des_s390_algs_num; +static struct skcipher_alg *des_s390_skciphers_ptr[6]; +static int des_s390_skciphers_num; + +static int des_s390_register_alg(struct crypto_alg *alg) +{ + int ret; + + ret = crypto_register_alg(alg); + if (!ret) + des_s390_algs_ptr[des_s390_algs_num++] = alg; + return ret; +} + +static int des_s390_register_skcipher(struct skcipher_alg *alg) +{ + int ret; + + ret = crypto_register_skcipher(alg); + if (!ret) + des_s390_skciphers_ptr[des_s390_skciphers_num++] = alg; + return ret; +} + +static void des_s390_exit(void) +{ + while (des_s390_algs_num--) + crypto_unregister_alg(des_s390_algs_ptr[des_s390_algs_num]); + while (des_s390_skciphers_num--) + crypto_unregister_skcipher(des_s390_skciphers_ptr[des_s390_skciphers_num]); + if (ctrblk) + free_page((unsigned long) ctrblk); +} + +static int __init des_s390_init(void) +{ + int ret; + + /* Query available functions for KM, KMC and KMCTR */ + cpacf_query(CPACF_KM, &km_functions); + cpacf_query(CPACF_KMC, &kmc_functions); + cpacf_query(CPACF_KMCTR, &kmctr_functions); + + if (cpacf_test_func(&km_functions, CPACF_KM_DEA)) { + ret = des_s390_register_alg(&des_alg); + if (ret) + goto out_err; + ret = des_s390_register_skcipher(&ecb_des_alg); + if (ret) + goto out_err; + } + if (cpacf_test_func(&kmc_functions, CPACF_KMC_DEA)) { + ret = des_s390_register_skcipher(&cbc_des_alg); + if (ret) + goto out_err; + } + if (cpacf_test_func(&km_functions, CPACF_KM_TDEA_192)) { + ret = des_s390_register_alg(&des3_alg); + if (ret) + goto out_err; + ret = des_s390_register_skcipher(&ecb_des3_alg); + if (ret) + goto out_err; + } + if (cpacf_test_func(&kmc_functions, CPACF_KMC_TDEA_192)) { + ret = des_s390_register_skcipher(&cbc_des3_alg); + if (ret) + goto out_err; + } + + if (cpacf_test_func(&kmctr_functions, CPACF_KMCTR_DEA) || + cpacf_test_func(&kmctr_functions, CPACF_KMCTR_TDEA_192)) { + ctrblk = (u8 *) __get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL); + if (!ctrblk) { + ret = -ENOMEM; + goto out_err; + } + } + + if (cpacf_test_func(&kmctr_functions, CPACF_KMCTR_DEA)) { + ret = des_s390_register_skcipher(&ctr_des_alg); + if (ret) + goto out_err; + } + if (cpacf_test_func(&kmctr_functions, CPACF_KMCTR_TDEA_192)) { + ret = des_s390_register_skcipher(&ctr_des3_alg); + if (ret) + goto out_err; + } + + return 0; +out_err: + des_s390_exit(); + return ret; +} + +module_cpu_feature_match(S390_CPU_FEATURE_MSA, des_s390_init); +module_exit(des_s390_exit); + +MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("des"); +MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("des3_ede"); + +MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); +MODULE_DESCRIPTION("DES & Triple DES EDE Cipher Algorithms"); diff --git a/arch/s390/crypto/ghash_s390.c b/arch/s390/crypto/ghash_s390.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..0800a2a57 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/s390/crypto/ghash_s390.c @@ -0,0 +1,154 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Cryptographic API. + * + * s390 implementation of the GHASH algorithm for GCM (Galois/Counter Mode). + * + * Copyright IBM Corp. 2011 + * Author(s): Gerald Schaefer <gerald.schaefer@de.ibm.com> + */ + +#include <crypto/internal/hash.h> +#include <linux/module.h> +#include <linux/cpufeature.h> +#include <asm/cpacf.h> + +#define GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE 16 +#define GHASH_DIGEST_SIZE 16 + +struct ghash_ctx { + u8 key[GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE]; +}; + +struct ghash_desc_ctx { + u8 icv[GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE]; + u8 key[GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE]; + u8 buffer[GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE]; + u32 bytes; +}; + +static int ghash_init(struct shash_desc *desc) +{ + struct ghash_desc_ctx *dctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc); + struct ghash_ctx *ctx = crypto_shash_ctx(desc->tfm); + + memset(dctx, 0, sizeof(*dctx)); + memcpy(dctx->key, ctx->key, GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE); + + return 0; +} + +static int ghash_setkey(struct crypto_shash *tfm, + const u8 *key, unsigned int keylen) +{ + struct ghash_ctx *ctx = crypto_shash_ctx(tfm); + + if (keylen != GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE) + return -EINVAL; + + memcpy(ctx->key, key, GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE); + + return 0; +} + +static int ghash_update(struct shash_desc *desc, + const u8 *src, unsigned int srclen) +{ + struct ghash_desc_ctx *dctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc); + unsigned int n; + u8 *buf = dctx->buffer; + + if (dctx->bytes) { + u8 *pos = buf + (GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE - dctx->bytes); + + n = min(srclen, dctx->bytes); + dctx->bytes -= n; + srclen -= n; + + memcpy(pos, src, n); + src += n; + + if (!dctx->bytes) { + cpacf_kimd(CPACF_KIMD_GHASH, dctx, buf, + GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE); + } + } + + n = srclen & ~(GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE - 1); + if (n) { + cpacf_kimd(CPACF_KIMD_GHASH, dctx, src, n); + src += n; + srclen -= n; + } + + if (srclen) { + dctx->bytes = GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE - srclen; + memcpy(buf, src, srclen); + } + + return 0; +} + +static int ghash_flush(struct ghash_desc_ctx *dctx) +{ + u8 *buf = dctx->buffer; + + if (dctx->bytes) { + u8 *pos = buf + (GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE - dctx->bytes); + + memset(pos, 0, dctx->bytes); + cpacf_kimd(CPACF_KIMD_GHASH, dctx, buf, GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE); + dctx->bytes = 0; + } + + return 0; +} + +static int ghash_final(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *dst) +{ + struct ghash_desc_ctx *dctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc); + int ret; + + ret = ghash_flush(dctx); + if (!ret) + memcpy(dst, dctx->icv, GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE); + return ret; +} + +static struct shash_alg ghash_alg = { + .digestsize = GHASH_DIGEST_SIZE, + .init = ghash_init, + .update = ghash_update, + .final = ghash_final, + .setkey = ghash_setkey, + .descsize = sizeof(struct ghash_desc_ctx), + .base = { + .cra_name = "ghash", + .cra_driver_name = "ghash-s390", + .cra_priority = 300, + .cra_blocksize = GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE, + .cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct ghash_ctx), + .cra_module = THIS_MODULE, + }, +}; + +static int __init ghash_mod_init(void) +{ + if (!cpacf_query_func(CPACF_KIMD, CPACF_KIMD_GHASH)) + return -ENODEV; + + return crypto_register_shash(&ghash_alg); +} + +static void __exit ghash_mod_exit(void) +{ + crypto_unregister_shash(&ghash_alg); +} + +module_cpu_feature_match(S390_CPU_FEATURE_MSA, ghash_mod_init); +module_exit(ghash_mod_exit); + +MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("ghash"); + +MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); +MODULE_DESCRIPTION("GHASH hash function, s390 implementation"); diff --git a/arch/s390/crypto/paes_s390.c b/arch/s390/crypto/paes_s390.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..d84d87349 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/s390/crypto/paes_s390.c @@ -0,0 +1,804 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Cryptographic API. + * + * s390 implementation of the AES Cipher Algorithm with protected keys. + * + * s390 Version: + * Copyright IBM Corp. 2017,2020 + * Author(s): Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> + * Harald Freudenberger <freude@de.ibm.com> + */ + +#define KMSG_COMPONENT "paes_s390" +#define pr_fmt(fmt) KMSG_COMPONENT ": " fmt + +#include <crypto/aes.h> +#include <crypto/algapi.h> +#include <linux/bug.h> +#include <linux/err.h> +#include <linux/module.h> +#include <linux/cpufeature.h> +#include <linux/init.h> +#include <linux/mutex.h> +#include <linux/spinlock.h> +#include <linux/delay.h> +#include <crypto/internal/skcipher.h> +#include <crypto/xts.h> +#include <asm/cpacf.h> +#include <asm/pkey.h> + +/* + * Key blobs smaller/bigger than these defines are rejected + * by the common code even before the individual setkey function + * is called. As paes can handle different kinds of key blobs + * and padding is also possible, the limits need to be generous. + */ +#define PAES_MIN_KEYSIZE 16 +#define PAES_MAX_KEYSIZE MAXEP11AESKEYBLOBSIZE + +static u8 *ctrblk; +static DEFINE_MUTEX(ctrblk_lock); + +static cpacf_mask_t km_functions, kmc_functions, kmctr_functions; + +struct key_blob { + /* + * Small keys will be stored in the keybuf. Larger keys are + * stored in extra allocated memory. In both cases does + * key point to the memory where the key is stored. + * The code distinguishes by checking keylen against + * sizeof(keybuf). See the two following helper functions. + */ + u8 *key; + u8 keybuf[128]; + unsigned int keylen; +}; + +static inline int _key_to_kb(struct key_blob *kb, + const u8 *key, + unsigned int keylen) +{ + struct clearkey_header { + u8 type; + u8 res0[3]; + u8 version; + u8 res1[3]; + u32 keytype; + u32 len; + } __packed * h; + + switch (keylen) { + case 16: + case 24: + case 32: + /* clear key value, prepare pkey clear key token in keybuf */ + memset(kb->keybuf, 0, sizeof(kb->keybuf)); + h = (struct clearkey_header *) kb->keybuf; + h->version = 0x02; /* TOKVER_CLEAR_KEY */ + h->keytype = (keylen - 8) >> 3; + h->len = keylen; + memcpy(kb->keybuf + sizeof(*h), key, keylen); + kb->keylen = sizeof(*h) + keylen; + kb->key = kb->keybuf; + break; + default: + /* other key material, let pkey handle this */ + if (keylen <= sizeof(kb->keybuf)) + kb->key = kb->keybuf; + else { + kb->key = kmalloc(keylen, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!kb->key) + return -ENOMEM; + } + memcpy(kb->key, key, keylen); + kb->keylen = keylen; + break; + } + + return 0; +} + +static inline void _free_kb_keybuf(struct key_blob *kb) +{ + if (kb->key && kb->key != kb->keybuf + && kb->keylen > sizeof(kb->keybuf)) { + kfree(kb->key); + kb->key = NULL; + } +} + +struct s390_paes_ctx { + struct key_blob kb; + struct pkey_protkey pk; + spinlock_t pk_lock; + unsigned long fc; +}; + +struct s390_pxts_ctx { + struct key_blob kb[2]; + struct pkey_protkey pk[2]; + spinlock_t pk_lock; + unsigned long fc; +}; + +static inline int __paes_keyblob2pkey(struct key_blob *kb, + struct pkey_protkey *pk) +{ + int i, ret; + + /* try three times in case of failure */ + for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) { + if (i > 0 && ret == -EAGAIN && in_task()) + if (msleep_interruptible(1000)) + return -EINTR; + ret = pkey_keyblob2pkey(kb->key, kb->keylen, pk); + if (ret == 0) + break; + } + + return ret; +} + +static inline int __paes_convert_key(struct s390_paes_ctx *ctx) +{ + int ret; + struct pkey_protkey pkey; + + ret = __paes_keyblob2pkey(&ctx->kb, &pkey); + if (ret) + return ret; + + spin_lock_bh(&ctx->pk_lock); + memcpy(&ctx->pk, &pkey, sizeof(pkey)); + spin_unlock_bh(&ctx->pk_lock); + + return 0; +} + +static int ecb_paes_init(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm) +{ + struct s390_paes_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm); + + ctx->kb.key = NULL; + spin_lock_init(&ctx->pk_lock); + + return 0; +} + +static void ecb_paes_exit(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm) +{ + struct s390_paes_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm); + + _free_kb_keybuf(&ctx->kb); +} + +static inline int __ecb_paes_set_key(struct s390_paes_ctx *ctx) +{ + int rc; + unsigned long fc; + + rc = __paes_convert_key(ctx); + if (rc) + return rc; + + /* Pick the correct function code based on the protected key type */ + fc = (ctx->pk.type == PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_128) ? CPACF_KM_PAES_128 : + (ctx->pk.type == PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_192) ? CPACF_KM_PAES_192 : + (ctx->pk.type == PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_256) ? CPACF_KM_PAES_256 : 0; + + /* Check if the function code is available */ + ctx->fc = (fc && cpacf_test_func(&km_functions, fc)) ? fc : 0; + + return ctx->fc ? 0 : -EINVAL; +} + +static int ecb_paes_set_key(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *in_key, + unsigned int key_len) +{ + int rc; + struct s390_paes_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm); + + _free_kb_keybuf(&ctx->kb); + rc = _key_to_kb(&ctx->kb, in_key, key_len); + if (rc) + return rc; + + return __ecb_paes_set_key(ctx); +} + +static int ecb_paes_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req, unsigned long modifier) +{ + struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req); + struct s390_paes_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm); + struct skcipher_walk walk; + unsigned int nbytes, n, k; + int ret; + struct { + u8 key[MAXPROTKEYSIZE]; + } param; + + ret = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, req, false); + if (ret) + return ret; + + spin_lock_bh(&ctx->pk_lock); + memcpy(param.key, ctx->pk.protkey, MAXPROTKEYSIZE); + spin_unlock_bh(&ctx->pk_lock); + + while ((nbytes = walk.nbytes) != 0) { + /* only use complete blocks */ + n = nbytes & ~(AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1); + k = cpacf_km(ctx->fc | modifier, ¶m, + walk.dst.virt.addr, walk.src.virt.addr, n); + if (k) + ret = skcipher_walk_done(&walk, nbytes - k); + if (k < n) { + if (__paes_convert_key(ctx)) + return skcipher_walk_done(&walk, -EIO); + spin_lock_bh(&ctx->pk_lock); + memcpy(param.key, ctx->pk.protkey, MAXPROTKEYSIZE); + spin_unlock_bh(&ctx->pk_lock); + } + } + return ret; +} + +static int ecb_paes_encrypt(struct skcipher_request *req) +{ + return ecb_paes_crypt(req, 0); +} + +static int ecb_paes_decrypt(struct skcipher_request *req) +{ + return ecb_paes_crypt(req, CPACF_DECRYPT); +} + +static struct skcipher_alg ecb_paes_alg = { + .base.cra_name = "ecb(paes)", + .base.cra_driver_name = "ecb-paes-s390", + .base.cra_priority = 401, /* combo: aes + ecb + 1 */ + .base.cra_blocksize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE, + .base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct s390_paes_ctx), + .base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE, + .base.cra_list = LIST_HEAD_INIT(ecb_paes_alg.base.cra_list), + .init = ecb_paes_init, + .exit = ecb_paes_exit, + .min_keysize = PAES_MIN_KEYSIZE, + .max_keysize = PAES_MAX_KEYSIZE, + .setkey = ecb_paes_set_key, + .encrypt = ecb_paes_encrypt, + .decrypt = ecb_paes_decrypt, +}; + +static int cbc_paes_init(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm) +{ + struct s390_paes_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm); + + ctx->kb.key = NULL; + spin_lock_init(&ctx->pk_lock); + + return 0; +} + +static void cbc_paes_exit(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm) +{ + struct s390_paes_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm); + + _free_kb_keybuf(&ctx->kb); +} + +static inline int __cbc_paes_set_key(struct s390_paes_ctx *ctx) +{ + int rc; + unsigned long fc; + + rc = __paes_convert_key(ctx); + if (rc) + return rc; + + /* Pick the correct function code based on the protected key type */ + fc = (ctx->pk.type == PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_128) ? CPACF_KMC_PAES_128 : + (ctx->pk.type == PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_192) ? CPACF_KMC_PAES_192 : + (ctx->pk.type == PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_256) ? CPACF_KMC_PAES_256 : 0; + + /* Check if the function code is available */ + ctx->fc = (fc && cpacf_test_func(&kmc_functions, fc)) ? fc : 0; + + return ctx->fc ? 0 : -EINVAL; +} + +static int cbc_paes_set_key(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *in_key, + unsigned int key_len) +{ + int rc; + struct s390_paes_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm); + + _free_kb_keybuf(&ctx->kb); + rc = _key_to_kb(&ctx->kb, in_key, key_len); + if (rc) + return rc; + + return __cbc_paes_set_key(ctx); +} + +static int cbc_paes_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req, unsigned long modifier) +{ + struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req); + struct s390_paes_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm); + struct skcipher_walk walk; + unsigned int nbytes, n, k; + int ret; + struct { + u8 iv[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; + u8 key[MAXPROTKEYSIZE]; + } param; + + ret = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, req, false); + if (ret) + return ret; + + memcpy(param.iv, walk.iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); + spin_lock_bh(&ctx->pk_lock); + memcpy(param.key, ctx->pk.protkey, MAXPROTKEYSIZE); + spin_unlock_bh(&ctx->pk_lock); + + while ((nbytes = walk.nbytes) != 0) { + /* only use complete blocks */ + n = nbytes & ~(AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1); + k = cpacf_kmc(ctx->fc | modifier, ¶m, + walk.dst.virt.addr, walk.src.virt.addr, n); + if (k) { + memcpy(walk.iv, param.iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); + ret = skcipher_walk_done(&walk, nbytes - k); + } + if (k < n) { + if (__paes_convert_key(ctx)) + return skcipher_walk_done(&walk, -EIO); + spin_lock_bh(&ctx->pk_lock); + memcpy(param.key, ctx->pk.protkey, MAXPROTKEYSIZE); + spin_unlock_bh(&ctx->pk_lock); + } + } + return ret; +} + +static int cbc_paes_encrypt(struct skcipher_request *req) +{ + return cbc_paes_crypt(req, 0); +} + +static int cbc_paes_decrypt(struct skcipher_request *req) +{ + return cbc_paes_crypt(req, CPACF_DECRYPT); +} + +static struct skcipher_alg cbc_paes_alg = { + .base.cra_name = "cbc(paes)", + .base.cra_driver_name = "cbc-paes-s390", + .base.cra_priority = 402, /* ecb-paes-s390 + 1 */ + .base.cra_blocksize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE, + .base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct s390_paes_ctx), + .base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE, + .base.cra_list = LIST_HEAD_INIT(cbc_paes_alg.base.cra_list), + .init = cbc_paes_init, + .exit = cbc_paes_exit, + .min_keysize = PAES_MIN_KEYSIZE, + .max_keysize = PAES_MAX_KEYSIZE, + .ivsize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE, + .setkey = cbc_paes_set_key, + .encrypt = cbc_paes_encrypt, + .decrypt = cbc_paes_decrypt, +}; + +static int xts_paes_init(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm) +{ + struct s390_pxts_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm); + + ctx->kb[0].key = NULL; + ctx->kb[1].key = NULL; + spin_lock_init(&ctx->pk_lock); + + return 0; +} + +static void xts_paes_exit(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm) +{ + struct s390_pxts_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm); + + _free_kb_keybuf(&ctx->kb[0]); + _free_kb_keybuf(&ctx->kb[1]); +} + +static inline int __xts_paes_convert_key(struct s390_pxts_ctx *ctx) +{ + struct pkey_protkey pkey0, pkey1; + + if (__paes_keyblob2pkey(&ctx->kb[0], &pkey0) || + __paes_keyblob2pkey(&ctx->kb[1], &pkey1)) + return -EINVAL; + + spin_lock_bh(&ctx->pk_lock); + memcpy(&ctx->pk[0], &pkey0, sizeof(pkey0)); + memcpy(&ctx->pk[1], &pkey1, sizeof(pkey1)); + spin_unlock_bh(&ctx->pk_lock); + + return 0; +} + +static inline int __xts_paes_set_key(struct s390_pxts_ctx *ctx) +{ + unsigned long fc; + + if (__xts_paes_convert_key(ctx)) + return -EINVAL; + + if (ctx->pk[0].type != ctx->pk[1].type) + return -EINVAL; + + /* Pick the correct function code based on the protected key type */ + fc = (ctx->pk[0].type == PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_128) ? CPACF_KM_PXTS_128 : + (ctx->pk[0].type == PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_256) ? + CPACF_KM_PXTS_256 : 0; + + /* Check if the function code is available */ + ctx->fc = (fc && cpacf_test_func(&km_functions, fc)) ? fc : 0; + + return ctx->fc ? 0 : -EINVAL; +} + +static int xts_paes_set_key(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *in_key, + unsigned int xts_key_len) +{ + int rc; + struct s390_pxts_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm); + u8 ckey[2 * AES_MAX_KEY_SIZE]; + unsigned int ckey_len, key_len; + + if (xts_key_len % 2) + return -EINVAL; + + key_len = xts_key_len / 2; + + _free_kb_keybuf(&ctx->kb[0]); + _free_kb_keybuf(&ctx->kb[1]); + rc = _key_to_kb(&ctx->kb[0], in_key, key_len); + if (rc) + return rc; + rc = _key_to_kb(&ctx->kb[1], in_key + key_len, key_len); + if (rc) + return rc; + + rc = __xts_paes_set_key(ctx); + if (rc) + return rc; + + /* + * xts_check_key verifies the key length is not odd and makes + * sure that the two keys are not the same. This can be done + * on the two protected keys as well + */ + ckey_len = (ctx->pk[0].type == PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_128) ? + AES_KEYSIZE_128 : AES_KEYSIZE_256; + memcpy(ckey, ctx->pk[0].protkey, ckey_len); + memcpy(ckey + ckey_len, ctx->pk[1].protkey, ckey_len); + return xts_verify_key(tfm, ckey, 2*ckey_len); +} + +static int xts_paes_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req, unsigned long modifier) +{ + struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req); + struct s390_pxts_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm); + struct skcipher_walk walk; + unsigned int keylen, offset, nbytes, n, k; + int ret; + struct { + u8 key[MAXPROTKEYSIZE]; /* key + verification pattern */ + u8 tweak[16]; + u8 block[16]; + u8 bit[16]; + u8 xts[16]; + } pcc_param; + struct { + u8 key[MAXPROTKEYSIZE]; /* key + verification pattern */ + u8 init[16]; + } xts_param; + + ret = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, req, false); + if (ret) + return ret; + + keylen = (ctx->pk[0].type == PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_128) ? 48 : 64; + offset = (ctx->pk[0].type == PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_128) ? 16 : 0; + + memset(&pcc_param, 0, sizeof(pcc_param)); + memcpy(pcc_param.tweak, walk.iv, sizeof(pcc_param.tweak)); + spin_lock_bh(&ctx->pk_lock); + memcpy(pcc_param.key + offset, ctx->pk[1].protkey, keylen); + memcpy(xts_param.key + offset, ctx->pk[0].protkey, keylen); + spin_unlock_bh(&ctx->pk_lock); + cpacf_pcc(ctx->fc, pcc_param.key + offset); + memcpy(xts_param.init, pcc_param.xts, 16); + + while ((nbytes = walk.nbytes) != 0) { + /* only use complete blocks */ + n = nbytes & ~(AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1); + k = cpacf_km(ctx->fc | modifier, xts_param.key + offset, + walk.dst.virt.addr, walk.src.virt.addr, n); + if (k) + ret = skcipher_walk_done(&walk, nbytes - k); + if (k < n) { + if (__xts_paes_convert_key(ctx)) + return skcipher_walk_done(&walk, -EIO); + spin_lock_bh(&ctx->pk_lock); + memcpy(xts_param.key + offset, + ctx->pk[0].protkey, keylen); + spin_unlock_bh(&ctx->pk_lock); + } + } + + return ret; +} + +static int xts_paes_encrypt(struct skcipher_request *req) +{ + return xts_paes_crypt(req, 0); +} + +static int xts_paes_decrypt(struct skcipher_request *req) +{ + return xts_paes_crypt(req, CPACF_DECRYPT); +} + +static struct skcipher_alg xts_paes_alg = { + .base.cra_name = "xts(paes)", + .base.cra_driver_name = "xts-paes-s390", + .base.cra_priority = 402, /* ecb-paes-s390 + 1 */ + .base.cra_blocksize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE, + .base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct s390_pxts_ctx), + .base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE, + .base.cra_list = LIST_HEAD_INIT(xts_paes_alg.base.cra_list), + .init = xts_paes_init, + .exit = xts_paes_exit, + .min_keysize = 2 * PAES_MIN_KEYSIZE, + .max_keysize = 2 * PAES_MAX_KEYSIZE, + .ivsize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE, + .setkey = xts_paes_set_key, + .encrypt = xts_paes_encrypt, + .decrypt = xts_paes_decrypt, +}; + +static int ctr_paes_init(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm) +{ + struct s390_paes_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm); + + ctx->kb.key = NULL; + spin_lock_init(&ctx->pk_lock); + + return 0; +} + +static void ctr_paes_exit(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm) +{ + struct s390_paes_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm); + + _free_kb_keybuf(&ctx->kb); +} + +static inline int __ctr_paes_set_key(struct s390_paes_ctx *ctx) +{ + int rc; + unsigned long fc; + + rc = __paes_convert_key(ctx); + if (rc) + return rc; + + /* Pick the correct function code based on the protected key type */ + fc = (ctx->pk.type == PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_128) ? CPACF_KMCTR_PAES_128 : + (ctx->pk.type == PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_192) ? CPACF_KMCTR_PAES_192 : + (ctx->pk.type == PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_256) ? + CPACF_KMCTR_PAES_256 : 0; + + /* Check if the function code is available */ + ctx->fc = (fc && cpacf_test_func(&kmctr_functions, fc)) ? fc : 0; + + return ctx->fc ? 0 : -EINVAL; +} + +static int ctr_paes_set_key(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *in_key, + unsigned int key_len) +{ + int rc; + struct s390_paes_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm); + + _free_kb_keybuf(&ctx->kb); + rc = _key_to_kb(&ctx->kb, in_key, key_len); + if (rc) + return rc; + + return __ctr_paes_set_key(ctx); +} + +static unsigned int __ctrblk_init(u8 *ctrptr, u8 *iv, unsigned int nbytes) +{ + unsigned int i, n; + + /* only use complete blocks, max. PAGE_SIZE */ + memcpy(ctrptr, iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); + n = (nbytes > PAGE_SIZE) ? PAGE_SIZE : nbytes & ~(AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1); + for (i = (n / AES_BLOCK_SIZE) - 1; i > 0; i--) { + memcpy(ctrptr + AES_BLOCK_SIZE, ctrptr, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); + crypto_inc(ctrptr + AES_BLOCK_SIZE, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); + ctrptr += AES_BLOCK_SIZE; + } + return n; +} + +static int ctr_paes_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req) +{ + struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req); + struct s390_paes_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm); + u8 buf[AES_BLOCK_SIZE], *ctrptr; + struct skcipher_walk walk; + unsigned int nbytes, n, k; + int ret, locked; + struct { + u8 key[MAXPROTKEYSIZE]; + } param; + + ret = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, req, false); + if (ret) + return ret; + + spin_lock_bh(&ctx->pk_lock); + memcpy(param.key, ctx->pk.protkey, MAXPROTKEYSIZE); + spin_unlock_bh(&ctx->pk_lock); + + locked = mutex_trylock(&ctrblk_lock); + + while ((nbytes = walk.nbytes) >= AES_BLOCK_SIZE) { + n = AES_BLOCK_SIZE; + if (nbytes >= 2*AES_BLOCK_SIZE && locked) + n = __ctrblk_init(ctrblk, walk.iv, nbytes); + ctrptr = (n > AES_BLOCK_SIZE) ? ctrblk : walk.iv; + k = cpacf_kmctr(ctx->fc, ¶m, walk.dst.virt.addr, + walk.src.virt.addr, n, ctrptr); + if (k) { + if (ctrptr == ctrblk) + memcpy(walk.iv, ctrptr + k - AES_BLOCK_SIZE, + AES_BLOCK_SIZE); + crypto_inc(walk.iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); + ret = skcipher_walk_done(&walk, nbytes - k); + } + if (k < n) { + if (__paes_convert_key(ctx)) { + if (locked) + mutex_unlock(&ctrblk_lock); + return skcipher_walk_done(&walk, -EIO); + } + spin_lock_bh(&ctx->pk_lock); + memcpy(param.key, ctx->pk.protkey, MAXPROTKEYSIZE); + spin_unlock_bh(&ctx->pk_lock); + } + } + if (locked) + mutex_unlock(&ctrblk_lock); + /* + * final block may be < AES_BLOCK_SIZE, copy only nbytes + */ + if (nbytes) { + memset(buf, 0, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); + memcpy(buf, walk.src.virt.addr, nbytes); + while (1) { + if (cpacf_kmctr(ctx->fc, ¶m, buf, + buf, AES_BLOCK_SIZE, + walk.iv) == AES_BLOCK_SIZE) + break; + if (__paes_convert_key(ctx)) + return skcipher_walk_done(&walk, -EIO); + spin_lock_bh(&ctx->pk_lock); + memcpy(param.key, ctx->pk.protkey, MAXPROTKEYSIZE); + spin_unlock_bh(&ctx->pk_lock); + } + memcpy(walk.dst.virt.addr, buf, nbytes); + crypto_inc(walk.iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); + ret = skcipher_walk_done(&walk, nbytes); + } + + return ret; +} + +static struct skcipher_alg ctr_paes_alg = { + .base.cra_name = "ctr(paes)", + .base.cra_driver_name = "ctr-paes-s390", + .base.cra_priority = 402, /* ecb-paes-s390 + 1 */ + .base.cra_blocksize = 1, + .base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct s390_paes_ctx), + .base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE, + .base.cra_list = LIST_HEAD_INIT(ctr_paes_alg.base.cra_list), + .init = ctr_paes_init, + .exit = ctr_paes_exit, + .min_keysize = PAES_MIN_KEYSIZE, + .max_keysize = PAES_MAX_KEYSIZE, + .ivsize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE, + .setkey = ctr_paes_set_key, + .encrypt = ctr_paes_crypt, + .decrypt = ctr_paes_crypt, + .chunksize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE, +}; + +static inline void __crypto_unregister_skcipher(struct skcipher_alg *alg) +{ + if (!list_empty(&alg->base.cra_list)) + crypto_unregister_skcipher(alg); +} + +static void paes_s390_fini(void) +{ + __crypto_unregister_skcipher(&ctr_paes_alg); + __crypto_unregister_skcipher(&xts_paes_alg); + __crypto_unregister_skcipher(&cbc_paes_alg); + __crypto_unregister_skcipher(&ecb_paes_alg); + if (ctrblk) + free_page((unsigned long) ctrblk); +} + +static int __init paes_s390_init(void) +{ + int ret; + + /* Query available functions for KM, KMC and KMCTR */ + cpacf_query(CPACF_KM, &km_functions); + cpacf_query(CPACF_KMC, &kmc_functions); + cpacf_query(CPACF_KMCTR, &kmctr_functions); + + if (cpacf_test_func(&km_functions, CPACF_KM_PAES_128) || + cpacf_test_func(&km_functions, CPACF_KM_PAES_192) || + cpacf_test_func(&km_functions, CPACF_KM_PAES_256)) { + ret = crypto_register_skcipher(&ecb_paes_alg); + if (ret) + goto out_err; + } + + if (cpacf_test_func(&kmc_functions, CPACF_KMC_PAES_128) || + cpacf_test_func(&kmc_functions, CPACF_KMC_PAES_192) || + cpacf_test_func(&kmc_functions, CPACF_KMC_PAES_256)) { + ret = crypto_register_skcipher(&cbc_paes_alg); + if (ret) + goto out_err; + } + + if (cpacf_test_func(&km_functions, CPACF_KM_PXTS_128) || + cpacf_test_func(&km_functions, CPACF_KM_PXTS_256)) { + ret = crypto_register_skcipher(&xts_paes_alg); + if (ret) + goto out_err; + } + + if (cpacf_test_func(&kmctr_functions, CPACF_KMCTR_PAES_128) || + cpacf_test_func(&kmctr_functions, CPACF_KMCTR_PAES_192) || + cpacf_test_func(&kmctr_functions, CPACF_KMCTR_PAES_256)) { + ctrblk = (u8 *) __get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL); + if (!ctrblk) { + ret = -ENOMEM; + goto out_err; + } + ret = crypto_register_skcipher(&ctr_paes_alg); + if (ret) + goto out_err; + } + + return 0; +out_err: + paes_s390_fini(); + return ret; +} + +module_init(paes_s390_init); +module_exit(paes_s390_fini); + +MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("paes"); + +MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Rijndael (AES) Cipher Algorithm with protected keys"); +MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); diff --git a/arch/s390/crypto/prng.c b/arch/s390/crypto/prng.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..a077087bc --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/s390/crypto/prng.c @@ -0,0 +1,911 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Copyright IBM Corp. 2006, 2015 + * Author(s): Jan Glauber <jan.glauber@de.ibm.com> + * Harald Freudenberger <freude@de.ibm.com> + * Driver for the s390 pseudo random number generator + */ + +#define KMSG_COMPONENT "prng" +#define pr_fmt(fmt) KMSG_COMPONENT ": " fmt + +#include <linux/fs.h> +#include <linux/fips.h> +#include <linux/init.h> +#include <linux/kernel.h> +#include <linux/device.h> +#include <linux/miscdevice.h> +#include <linux/module.h> +#include <linux/moduleparam.h> +#include <linux/mutex.h> +#include <linux/cpufeature.h> +#include <linux/random.h> +#include <linux/slab.h> +#include <linux/sched/signal.h> + +#include <asm/debug.h> +#include <linux/uaccess.h> +#include <asm/timex.h> +#include <asm/cpacf.h> + +MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); +MODULE_AUTHOR("IBM Corporation"); +MODULE_DESCRIPTION("s390 PRNG interface"); + + +#define PRNG_MODE_AUTO 0 +#define PRNG_MODE_TDES 1 +#define PRNG_MODE_SHA512 2 + +static unsigned int prng_mode = PRNG_MODE_AUTO; +module_param_named(mode, prng_mode, int, 0); +MODULE_PARM_DESC(prng_mode, "PRNG mode: 0 - auto, 1 - TDES, 2 - SHA512"); + + +#define PRNG_CHUNKSIZE_TDES_MIN 8 +#define PRNG_CHUNKSIZE_TDES_MAX (64*1024) +#define PRNG_CHUNKSIZE_SHA512_MIN 64 +#define PRNG_CHUNKSIZE_SHA512_MAX (64*1024) + +static unsigned int prng_chunk_size = 256; +module_param_named(chunksize, prng_chunk_size, int, 0); +MODULE_PARM_DESC(prng_chunk_size, "PRNG read chunk size in bytes"); + + +#define PRNG_RESEED_LIMIT_TDES 4096 +#define PRNG_RESEED_LIMIT_TDES_LOWER 4096 +#define PRNG_RESEED_LIMIT_SHA512 100000 +#define PRNG_RESEED_LIMIT_SHA512_LOWER 10000 + +static unsigned int prng_reseed_limit; +module_param_named(reseed_limit, prng_reseed_limit, int, 0); +MODULE_PARM_DESC(prng_reseed_limit, "PRNG reseed limit"); + +static bool trng_available; + +/* + * Any one who considers arithmetical methods of producing random digits is, + * of course, in a state of sin. -- John von Neumann + */ + +static int prng_errorflag; + +#define PRNG_GEN_ENTROPY_FAILED 1 +#define PRNG_SELFTEST_FAILED 2 +#define PRNG_INSTANTIATE_FAILED 3 +#define PRNG_SEED_FAILED 4 +#define PRNG_RESEED_FAILED 5 +#define PRNG_GEN_FAILED 6 + +struct prng_ws_s { + u8 parm_block[32]; + u32 reseed_counter; + u64 byte_counter; +}; + +struct prno_ws_s { + u32 res; + u32 reseed_counter; + u64 stream_bytes; + u8 V[112]; + u8 C[112]; +}; + +struct prng_data_s { + struct mutex mutex; + union { + struct prng_ws_s prngws; + struct prno_ws_s prnows; + }; + u8 *buf; + u32 rest; + u8 *prev; +}; + +static struct prng_data_s *prng_data; + +/* initial parameter block for tdes mode, copied from libica */ +static const u8 initial_parm_block[32] __initconst = { + 0x0F, 0x2B, 0x8E, 0x63, 0x8C, 0x8E, 0xD2, 0x52, + 0x64, 0xB7, 0xA0, 0x7B, 0x75, 0x28, 0xB8, 0xF4, + 0x75, 0x5F, 0xD2, 0xA6, 0x8D, 0x97, 0x11, 0xFF, + 0x49, 0xD8, 0x23, 0xF3, 0x7E, 0x21, 0xEC, 0xA0 }; + + +/*** helper functions ***/ + +/* + * generate_entropy: + * This function fills a given buffer with random bytes. The entropy within + * the random bytes given back is assumed to have at least 50% - meaning + * a 64 bytes buffer has at least 64 * 8 / 2 = 256 bits of entropy. + * Within the function the entropy generation is done in junks of 64 bytes. + * So the caller should also ask for buffer fill in multiples of 64 bytes. + * The generation of the entropy is based on the assumption that every stckf() + * invocation produces 0.5 bits of entropy. To accumulate 256 bits of entropy + * at least 512 stckf() values are needed. The entropy relevant part of the + * stckf value is bit 51 (counting starts at the left with bit nr 0) so + * here we use the lower 4 bytes and exor the values into 2k of bufferspace. + * To be on the save side, if there is ever a problem with stckf() the + * other half of the page buffer is filled with bytes from urandom via + * get_random_bytes(), so this function consumes 2k of urandom for each + * requested 64 bytes output data. Finally the buffer page is condensed into + * a 64 byte value by hashing with a SHA512 hash. + */ +static int generate_entropy(u8 *ebuf, size_t nbytes) +{ + int n, ret = 0; + u8 *pg, pblock[80] = { + /* 8 x 64 bit init values */ + 0x6A, 0x09, 0xE6, 0x67, 0xF3, 0xBC, 0xC9, 0x08, + 0xBB, 0x67, 0xAE, 0x85, 0x84, 0xCA, 0xA7, 0x3B, + 0x3C, 0x6E, 0xF3, 0x72, 0xFE, 0x94, 0xF8, 0x2B, + 0xA5, 0x4F, 0xF5, 0x3A, 0x5F, 0x1D, 0x36, 0xF1, + 0x51, 0x0E, 0x52, 0x7F, 0xAD, 0xE6, 0x82, 0xD1, + 0x9B, 0x05, 0x68, 0x8C, 0x2B, 0x3E, 0x6C, 0x1F, + 0x1F, 0x83, 0xD9, 0xAB, 0xFB, 0x41, 0xBD, 0x6B, + 0x5B, 0xE0, 0xCD, 0x19, 0x13, 0x7E, 0x21, 0x79, + /* 128 bit counter total message bit length */ + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, 0x00 }; + + /* allocate one page stckf buffer */ + pg = (u8 *) __get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL); + if (!pg) { + prng_errorflag = PRNG_GEN_ENTROPY_FAILED; + return -ENOMEM; + } + + /* fill the ebuf in chunks of 64 byte each */ + while (nbytes) { + /* fill lower 2k with urandom bytes */ + get_random_bytes(pg, PAGE_SIZE / 2); + /* exor upper 2k with 512 stckf values, offset 4 bytes each */ + for (n = 0; n < 512; n++) { + int offset = (PAGE_SIZE / 2) + (n * 4) - 4; + u64 *p = (u64 *)(pg + offset); + *p ^= get_tod_clock_fast(); + } + /* hash over the filled page */ + cpacf_klmd(CPACF_KLMD_SHA_512, pblock, pg, PAGE_SIZE); + n = (nbytes < 64) ? nbytes : 64; + memcpy(ebuf, pblock, n); + ret += n; + ebuf += n; + nbytes -= n; + } + + memzero_explicit(pblock, sizeof(pblock)); + memzero_explicit(pg, PAGE_SIZE); + free_page((unsigned long)pg); + return ret; +} + + +/*** tdes functions ***/ + +static void prng_tdes_add_entropy(void) +{ + __u64 entropy[4]; + unsigned int i; + + for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) { + cpacf_kmc(CPACF_KMC_PRNG, prng_data->prngws.parm_block, + (char *) entropy, (char *) entropy, + sizeof(entropy)); + memcpy(prng_data->prngws.parm_block, entropy, sizeof(entropy)); + } +} + + +static void prng_tdes_seed(int nbytes) +{ + char buf[16]; + int i = 0; + + BUG_ON(nbytes > sizeof(buf)); + + get_random_bytes(buf, nbytes); + + /* Add the entropy */ + while (nbytes >= 8) { + *((__u64 *)prng_data->prngws.parm_block) ^= *((__u64 *)(buf+i)); + prng_tdes_add_entropy(); + i += 8; + nbytes -= 8; + } + prng_tdes_add_entropy(); + prng_data->prngws.reseed_counter = 0; +} + + +static int __init prng_tdes_instantiate(void) +{ + int datalen; + + pr_debug("prng runs in TDES mode with " + "chunksize=%d and reseed_limit=%u\n", + prng_chunk_size, prng_reseed_limit); + + /* memory allocation, prng_data struct init, mutex init */ + datalen = sizeof(struct prng_data_s) + prng_chunk_size; + prng_data = kzalloc(datalen, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!prng_data) { + prng_errorflag = PRNG_INSTANTIATE_FAILED; + return -ENOMEM; + } + mutex_init(&prng_data->mutex); + prng_data->buf = ((u8 *)prng_data) + sizeof(struct prng_data_s); + memcpy(prng_data->prngws.parm_block, initial_parm_block, 32); + + /* initialize the PRNG, add 128 bits of entropy */ + prng_tdes_seed(16); + + return 0; +} + + +static void prng_tdes_deinstantiate(void) +{ + pr_debug("The prng module stopped " + "after running in triple DES mode\n"); + kfree_sensitive(prng_data); +} + + +/*** sha512 functions ***/ + +static int __init prng_sha512_selftest(void) +{ + /* NIST DRBG testvector for Hash Drbg, Sha-512, Count #0 */ + static const u8 seed[] __initconst = { + 0x6b, 0x50, 0xa7, 0xd8, 0xf8, 0xa5, 0x5d, 0x7a, + 0x3d, 0xf8, 0xbb, 0x40, 0xbc, 0xc3, 0xb7, 0x22, + 0xd8, 0x70, 0x8d, 0xe6, 0x7f, 0xda, 0x01, 0x0b, + 0x03, 0xc4, 0xc8, 0x4d, 0x72, 0x09, 0x6f, 0x8c, + 0x3e, 0xc6, 0x49, 0xcc, 0x62, 0x56, 0xd9, 0xfa, + 0x31, 0xdb, 0x7a, 0x29, 0x04, 0xaa, 0xf0, 0x25 }; + static const u8 V0[] __initconst = { + 0x00, 0xad, 0xe3, 0x6f, 0x9a, 0x01, 0xc7, 0x76, + 0x61, 0x34, 0x35, 0xf5, 0x4e, 0x24, 0x74, 0x22, + 0x21, 0x9a, 0x29, 0x89, 0xc7, 0x93, 0x2e, 0x60, + 0x1e, 0xe8, 0x14, 0x24, 0x8d, 0xd5, 0x03, 0xf1, + 0x65, 0x5d, 0x08, 0x22, 0x72, 0xd5, 0xad, 0x95, + 0xe1, 0x23, 0x1e, 0x8a, 0xa7, 0x13, 0xd9, 0x2b, + 0x5e, 0xbc, 0xbb, 0x80, 0xab, 0x8d, 0xe5, 0x79, + 0xab, 0x5b, 0x47, 0x4e, 0xdd, 0xee, 0x6b, 0x03, + 0x8f, 0x0f, 0x5c, 0x5e, 0xa9, 0x1a, 0x83, 0xdd, + 0xd3, 0x88, 0xb2, 0x75, 0x4b, 0xce, 0x83, 0x36, + 0x57, 0x4b, 0xf1, 0x5c, 0xca, 0x7e, 0x09, 0xc0, + 0xd3, 0x89, 0xc6, 0xe0, 0xda, 0xc4, 0x81, 0x7e, + 0x5b, 0xf9, 0xe1, 0x01, 0xc1, 0x92, 0x05, 0xea, + 0xf5, 0x2f, 0xc6, 0xc6, 0xc7, 0x8f, 0xbc, 0xf4 }; + static const u8 C0[] __initconst = { + 0x00, 0xf4, 0xa3, 0xe5, 0xa0, 0x72, 0x63, 0x95, + 0xc6, 0x4f, 0x48, 0xd0, 0x8b, 0x5b, 0x5f, 0x8e, + 0x6b, 0x96, 0x1f, 0x16, 0xed, 0xbc, 0x66, 0x94, + 0x45, 0x31, 0xd7, 0x47, 0x73, 0x22, 0xa5, 0x86, + 0xce, 0xc0, 0x4c, 0xac, 0x63, 0xb8, 0x39, 0x50, + 0xbf, 0xe6, 0x59, 0x6c, 0x38, 0x58, 0x99, 0x1f, + 0x27, 0xa7, 0x9d, 0x71, 0x2a, 0xb3, 0x7b, 0xf9, + 0xfb, 0x17, 0x86, 0xaa, 0x99, 0x81, 0xaa, 0x43, + 0xe4, 0x37, 0xd3, 0x1e, 0x6e, 0xe5, 0xe6, 0xee, + 0xc2, 0xed, 0x95, 0x4f, 0x53, 0x0e, 0x46, 0x8a, + 0xcc, 0x45, 0xa5, 0xdb, 0x69, 0x0d, 0x81, 0xc9, + 0x32, 0x92, 0xbc, 0x8f, 0x33, 0xe6, 0xf6, 0x09, + 0x7c, 0x8e, 0x05, 0x19, 0x0d, 0xf1, 0xb6, 0xcc, + 0xf3, 0x02, 0x21, 0x90, 0x25, 0xec, 0xed, 0x0e }; + static const u8 random[] __initconst = { + 0x95, 0xb7, 0xf1, 0x7e, 0x98, 0x02, 0xd3, 0x57, + 0x73, 0x92, 0xc6, 0xa9, 0xc0, 0x80, 0x83, 0xb6, + 0x7d, 0xd1, 0x29, 0x22, 0x65, 0xb5, 0xf4, 0x2d, + 0x23, 0x7f, 0x1c, 0x55, 0xbb, 0x9b, 0x10, 0xbf, + 0xcf, 0xd8, 0x2c, 0x77, 0xa3, 0x78, 0xb8, 0x26, + 0x6a, 0x00, 0x99, 0x14, 0x3b, 0x3c, 0x2d, 0x64, + 0x61, 0x1e, 0xee, 0xb6, 0x9a, 0xcd, 0xc0, 0x55, + 0x95, 0x7c, 0x13, 0x9e, 0x8b, 0x19, 0x0c, 0x7a, + 0x06, 0x95, 0x5f, 0x2c, 0x79, 0x7c, 0x27, 0x78, + 0xde, 0x94, 0x03, 0x96, 0xa5, 0x01, 0xf4, 0x0e, + 0x91, 0x39, 0x6a, 0xcf, 0x8d, 0x7e, 0x45, 0xeb, + 0xdb, 0xb5, 0x3b, 0xbf, 0x8c, 0x97, 0x52, 0x30, + 0xd2, 0xf0, 0xff, 0x91, 0x06, 0xc7, 0x61, 0x19, + 0xae, 0x49, 0x8e, 0x7f, 0xbc, 0x03, 0xd9, 0x0f, + 0x8e, 0x4c, 0x51, 0x62, 0x7a, 0xed, 0x5c, 0x8d, + 0x42, 0x63, 0xd5, 0xd2, 0xb9, 0x78, 0x87, 0x3a, + 0x0d, 0xe5, 0x96, 0xee, 0x6d, 0xc7, 0xf7, 0xc2, + 0x9e, 0x37, 0xee, 0xe8, 0xb3, 0x4c, 0x90, 0xdd, + 0x1c, 0xf6, 0xa9, 0xdd, 0xb2, 0x2b, 0x4c, 0xbd, + 0x08, 0x6b, 0x14, 0xb3, 0x5d, 0xe9, 0x3d, 0xa2, + 0xd5, 0xcb, 0x18, 0x06, 0x69, 0x8c, 0xbd, 0x7b, + 0xbb, 0x67, 0xbf, 0xe3, 0xd3, 0x1f, 0xd2, 0xd1, + 0xdb, 0xd2, 0xa1, 0xe0, 0x58, 0xa3, 0xeb, 0x99, + 0xd7, 0xe5, 0x1f, 0x1a, 0x93, 0x8e, 0xed, 0x5e, + 0x1c, 0x1d, 0xe2, 0x3a, 0x6b, 0x43, 0x45, 0xd3, + 0x19, 0x14, 0x09, 0xf9, 0x2f, 0x39, 0xb3, 0x67, + 0x0d, 0x8d, 0xbf, 0xb6, 0x35, 0xd8, 0xe6, 0xa3, + 0x69, 0x32, 0xd8, 0x10, 0x33, 0xd1, 0x44, 0x8d, + 0x63, 0xb4, 0x03, 0xdd, 0xf8, 0x8e, 0x12, 0x1b, + 0x6e, 0x81, 0x9a, 0xc3, 0x81, 0x22, 0x6c, 0x13, + 0x21, 0xe4, 0xb0, 0x86, 0x44, 0xf6, 0x72, 0x7c, + 0x36, 0x8c, 0x5a, 0x9f, 0x7a, 0x4b, 0x3e, 0xe2 }; + + u8 buf[sizeof(random)]; + struct prno_ws_s ws; + + memset(&ws, 0, sizeof(ws)); + + /* initial seed */ + cpacf_prno(CPACF_PRNO_SHA512_DRNG_SEED, + &ws, NULL, 0, seed, sizeof(seed)); + + /* check working states V and C */ + if (memcmp(ws.V, V0, sizeof(V0)) != 0 + || memcmp(ws.C, C0, sizeof(C0)) != 0) { + pr_err("The prng self test state test " + "for the SHA-512 mode failed\n"); + prng_errorflag = PRNG_SELFTEST_FAILED; + return -EIO; + } + + /* generate random bytes */ + cpacf_prno(CPACF_PRNO_SHA512_DRNG_GEN, + &ws, buf, sizeof(buf), NULL, 0); + cpacf_prno(CPACF_PRNO_SHA512_DRNG_GEN, + &ws, buf, sizeof(buf), NULL, 0); + + /* check against expected data */ + if (memcmp(buf, random, sizeof(random)) != 0) { + pr_err("The prng self test data test " + "for the SHA-512 mode failed\n"); + prng_errorflag = PRNG_SELFTEST_FAILED; + return -EIO; + } + + return 0; +} + + +static int __init prng_sha512_instantiate(void) +{ + int ret, datalen, seedlen; + u8 seed[128 + 16]; + + pr_debug("prng runs in SHA-512 mode " + "with chunksize=%d and reseed_limit=%u\n", + prng_chunk_size, prng_reseed_limit); + + /* memory allocation, prng_data struct init, mutex init */ + datalen = sizeof(struct prng_data_s) + prng_chunk_size; + if (fips_enabled) + datalen += prng_chunk_size; + prng_data = kzalloc(datalen, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!prng_data) { + prng_errorflag = PRNG_INSTANTIATE_FAILED; + return -ENOMEM; + } + mutex_init(&prng_data->mutex); + prng_data->buf = ((u8 *)prng_data) + sizeof(struct prng_data_s); + + /* selftest */ + ret = prng_sha512_selftest(); + if (ret) + goto outfree; + + /* generate initial seed, we need at least 256 + 128 bits entropy. */ + if (trng_available) { + /* + * Trng available, so use it. The trng works in chunks of + * 32 bytes and produces 100% entropy. So we pull 64 bytes + * which gives us 512 bits entropy. + */ + seedlen = 2 * 32; + cpacf_trng(NULL, 0, seed, seedlen); + } else { + /* + * No trng available, so use the generate_entropy() function. + * This function works in 64 byte junks and produces + * 50% entropy. So we pull 2*64 bytes which gives us 512 bits + * of entropy. + */ + seedlen = 2 * 64; + ret = generate_entropy(seed, seedlen); + if (ret != seedlen) + goto outfree; + } + + /* append the seed by 16 bytes of unique nonce */ + store_tod_clock_ext((union tod_clock *)(seed + seedlen)); + seedlen += 16; + + /* now initial seed of the prno drng */ + cpacf_prno(CPACF_PRNO_SHA512_DRNG_SEED, + &prng_data->prnows, NULL, 0, seed, seedlen); + memzero_explicit(seed, sizeof(seed)); + + /* if fips mode is enabled, generate a first block of random + bytes for the FIPS 140-2 Conditional Self Test */ + if (fips_enabled) { + prng_data->prev = prng_data->buf + prng_chunk_size; + cpacf_prno(CPACF_PRNO_SHA512_DRNG_GEN, + &prng_data->prnows, + prng_data->prev, prng_chunk_size, NULL, 0); + } + + return 0; + +outfree: + kfree(prng_data); + return ret; +} + + +static void prng_sha512_deinstantiate(void) +{ + pr_debug("The prng module stopped after running in SHA-512 mode\n"); + kfree_sensitive(prng_data); +} + + +static int prng_sha512_reseed(void) +{ + int ret, seedlen; + u8 seed[64]; + + /* We need at least 256 bits of fresh entropy for reseeding */ + if (trng_available) { + /* trng produces 256 bits entropy in 32 bytes */ + seedlen = 32; + cpacf_trng(NULL, 0, seed, seedlen); + } else { + /* generate_entropy() produces 256 bits entropy in 64 bytes */ + seedlen = 64; + ret = generate_entropy(seed, seedlen); + if (ret != sizeof(seed)) + return ret; + } + + /* do a reseed of the prno drng with this bytestring */ + cpacf_prno(CPACF_PRNO_SHA512_DRNG_SEED, + &prng_data->prnows, NULL, 0, seed, seedlen); + memzero_explicit(seed, sizeof(seed)); + + return 0; +} + + +static int prng_sha512_generate(u8 *buf, size_t nbytes) +{ + int ret; + + /* reseed needed ? */ + if (prng_data->prnows.reseed_counter > prng_reseed_limit) { + ret = prng_sha512_reseed(); + if (ret) + return ret; + } + + /* PRNO generate */ + cpacf_prno(CPACF_PRNO_SHA512_DRNG_GEN, + &prng_data->prnows, buf, nbytes, NULL, 0); + + /* FIPS 140-2 Conditional Self Test */ + if (fips_enabled) { + if (!memcmp(prng_data->prev, buf, nbytes)) { + prng_errorflag = PRNG_GEN_FAILED; + return -EILSEQ; + } + memcpy(prng_data->prev, buf, nbytes); + } + + return nbytes; +} + + +/*** file io functions ***/ + +static int prng_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) +{ + return nonseekable_open(inode, file); +} + + +static ssize_t prng_tdes_read(struct file *file, char __user *ubuf, + size_t nbytes, loff_t *ppos) +{ + int chunk, n, ret = 0; + + /* lock prng_data struct */ + if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&prng_data->mutex)) + return -ERESTARTSYS; + + while (nbytes) { + if (need_resched()) { + if (signal_pending(current)) { + if (ret == 0) + ret = -ERESTARTSYS; + break; + } + /* give mutex free before calling schedule() */ + mutex_unlock(&prng_data->mutex); + schedule(); + /* occupy mutex again */ + if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&prng_data->mutex)) { + if (ret == 0) + ret = -ERESTARTSYS; + return ret; + } + } + + /* + * we lose some random bytes if an attacker issues + * reads < 8 bytes, but we don't care + */ + chunk = min_t(int, nbytes, prng_chunk_size); + + /* PRNG only likes multiples of 8 bytes */ + n = (chunk + 7) & -8; + + if (prng_data->prngws.reseed_counter > prng_reseed_limit) + prng_tdes_seed(8); + + /* if the CPU supports PRNG stckf is present too */ + *((unsigned long long *)prng_data->buf) = get_tod_clock_fast(); + + /* + * Beside the STCKF the input for the TDES-EDE is the output + * of the last operation. We differ here from X9.17 since we + * only store one timestamp into the buffer. Padding the whole + * buffer with timestamps does not improve security, since + * successive stckf have nearly constant offsets. + * If an attacker knows the first timestamp it would be + * trivial to guess the additional values. One timestamp + * is therefore enough and still guarantees unique input values. + * + * Note: you can still get strict X9.17 conformity by setting + * prng_chunk_size to 8 bytes. + */ + cpacf_kmc(CPACF_KMC_PRNG, prng_data->prngws.parm_block, + prng_data->buf, prng_data->buf, n); + + prng_data->prngws.byte_counter += n; + prng_data->prngws.reseed_counter += n; + + if (copy_to_user(ubuf, prng_data->buf, chunk)) { + ret = -EFAULT; + break; + } + + nbytes -= chunk; + ret += chunk; + ubuf += chunk; + } + + /* unlock prng_data struct */ + mutex_unlock(&prng_data->mutex); + + return ret; +} + + +static ssize_t prng_sha512_read(struct file *file, char __user *ubuf, + size_t nbytes, loff_t *ppos) +{ + int n, ret = 0; + u8 *p; + + /* if errorflag is set do nothing and return 'broken pipe' */ + if (prng_errorflag) + return -EPIPE; + + /* lock prng_data struct */ + if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&prng_data->mutex)) + return -ERESTARTSYS; + + while (nbytes) { + if (need_resched()) { + if (signal_pending(current)) { + if (ret == 0) + ret = -ERESTARTSYS; + break; + } + /* give mutex free before calling schedule() */ + mutex_unlock(&prng_data->mutex); + schedule(); + /* occopy mutex again */ + if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&prng_data->mutex)) { + if (ret == 0) + ret = -ERESTARTSYS; + return ret; + } + } + if (prng_data->rest) { + /* push left over random bytes from the previous read */ + p = prng_data->buf + prng_chunk_size - prng_data->rest; + n = (nbytes < prng_data->rest) ? + nbytes : prng_data->rest; + prng_data->rest -= n; + } else { + /* generate one chunk of random bytes into read buf */ + p = prng_data->buf; + n = prng_sha512_generate(p, prng_chunk_size); + if (n < 0) { + ret = n; + break; + } + if (nbytes < prng_chunk_size) { + n = nbytes; + prng_data->rest = prng_chunk_size - n; + } else { + n = prng_chunk_size; + prng_data->rest = 0; + } + } + if (copy_to_user(ubuf, p, n)) { + ret = -EFAULT; + break; + } + memzero_explicit(p, n); + ubuf += n; + nbytes -= n; + ret += n; + } + + /* unlock prng_data struct */ + mutex_unlock(&prng_data->mutex); + + return ret; +} + + +/*** sysfs stuff ***/ + +static const struct file_operations prng_sha512_fops = { + .owner = THIS_MODULE, + .open = &prng_open, + .release = NULL, + .read = &prng_sha512_read, + .llseek = noop_llseek, +}; +static const struct file_operations prng_tdes_fops = { + .owner = THIS_MODULE, + .open = &prng_open, + .release = NULL, + .read = &prng_tdes_read, + .llseek = noop_llseek, +}; + +/* chunksize attribute (ro) */ +static ssize_t prng_chunksize_show(struct device *dev, + struct device_attribute *attr, + char *buf) +{ + return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%u\n", prng_chunk_size); +} +static DEVICE_ATTR(chunksize, 0444, prng_chunksize_show, NULL); + +/* counter attribute (ro) */ +static ssize_t prng_counter_show(struct device *dev, + struct device_attribute *attr, + char *buf) +{ + u64 counter; + + if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&prng_data->mutex)) + return -ERESTARTSYS; + if (prng_mode == PRNG_MODE_SHA512) + counter = prng_data->prnows.stream_bytes; + else + counter = prng_data->prngws.byte_counter; + mutex_unlock(&prng_data->mutex); + + return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%llu\n", counter); +} +static DEVICE_ATTR(byte_counter, 0444, prng_counter_show, NULL); + +/* errorflag attribute (ro) */ +static ssize_t prng_errorflag_show(struct device *dev, + struct device_attribute *attr, + char *buf) +{ + return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", prng_errorflag); +} +static DEVICE_ATTR(errorflag, 0444, prng_errorflag_show, NULL); + +/* mode attribute (ro) */ +static ssize_t prng_mode_show(struct device *dev, + struct device_attribute *attr, + char *buf) +{ + if (prng_mode == PRNG_MODE_TDES) + return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "TDES\n"); + else + return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "SHA512\n"); +} +static DEVICE_ATTR(mode, 0444, prng_mode_show, NULL); + +/* reseed attribute (w) */ +static ssize_t prng_reseed_store(struct device *dev, + struct device_attribute *attr, + const char *buf, size_t count) +{ + if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&prng_data->mutex)) + return -ERESTARTSYS; + prng_sha512_reseed(); + mutex_unlock(&prng_data->mutex); + + return count; +} +static DEVICE_ATTR(reseed, 0200, NULL, prng_reseed_store); + +/* reseed limit attribute (rw) */ +static ssize_t prng_reseed_limit_show(struct device *dev, + struct device_attribute *attr, + char *buf) +{ + return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%u\n", prng_reseed_limit); +} +static ssize_t prng_reseed_limit_store(struct device *dev, + struct device_attribute *attr, + const char *buf, size_t count) +{ + unsigned limit; + + if (sscanf(buf, "%u\n", &limit) != 1) + return -EINVAL; + + if (prng_mode == PRNG_MODE_SHA512) { + if (limit < PRNG_RESEED_LIMIT_SHA512_LOWER) + return -EINVAL; + } else { + if (limit < PRNG_RESEED_LIMIT_TDES_LOWER) + return -EINVAL; + } + + prng_reseed_limit = limit; + + return count; +} +static DEVICE_ATTR(reseed_limit, 0644, + prng_reseed_limit_show, prng_reseed_limit_store); + +/* strength attribute (ro) */ +static ssize_t prng_strength_show(struct device *dev, + struct device_attribute *attr, + char *buf) +{ + return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "256\n"); +} +static DEVICE_ATTR(strength, 0444, prng_strength_show, NULL); + +static struct attribute *prng_sha512_dev_attrs[] = { + &dev_attr_errorflag.attr, + &dev_attr_chunksize.attr, + &dev_attr_byte_counter.attr, + &dev_attr_mode.attr, + &dev_attr_reseed.attr, + &dev_attr_reseed_limit.attr, + &dev_attr_strength.attr, + NULL +}; +ATTRIBUTE_GROUPS(prng_sha512_dev); + +static struct attribute *prng_tdes_dev_attrs[] = { + &dev_attr_chunksize.attr, + &dev_attr_byte_counter.attr, + &dev_attr_mode.attr, + NULL +}; +ATTRIBUTE_GROUPS(prng_tdes_dev); + +static struct miscdevice prng_sha512_dev = { + .name = "prandom", + .minor = MISC_DYNAMIC_MINOR, + .mode = 0644, + .fops = &prng_sha512_fops, + .groups = prng_sha512_dev_groups, +}; + +static struct miscdevice prng_tdes_dev = { + .name = "prandom", + .minor = MISC_DYNAMIC_MINOR, + .mode = 0644, + .fops = &prng_tdes_fops, + .groups = prng_tdes_dev_groups, +}; + + +/*** module init and exit ***/ + +static int __init prng_init(void) +{ + int ret; + + /* check if the CPU has a PRNG */ + if (!cpacf_query_func(CPACF_KMC, CPACF_KMC_PRNG)) + return -ENODEV; + + /* check if TRNG subfunction is available */ + if (cpacf_query_func(CPACF_PRNO, CPACF_PRNO_TRNG)) + trng_available = true; + + /* choose prng mode */ + if (prng_mode != PRNG_MODE_TDES) { + /* check for MSA5 support for PRNO operations */ + if (!cpacf_query_func(CPACF_PRNO, CPACF_PRNO_SHA512_DRNG_GEN)) { + if (prng_mode == PRNG_MODE_SHA512) { + pr_err("The prng module cannot " + "start in SHA-512 mode\n"); + return -ENODEV; + } + prng_mode = PRNG_MODE_TDES; + } else + prng_mode = PRNG_MODE_SHA512; + } + + if (prng_mode == PRNG_MODE_SHA512) { + + /* SHA512 mode */ + + if (prng_chunk_size < PRNG_CHUNKSIZE_SHA512_MIN + || prng_chunk_size > PRNG_CHUNKSIZE_SHA512_MAX) + return -EINVAL; + prng_chunk_size = (prng_chunk_size + 0x3f) & ~0x3f; + + if (prng_reseed_limit == 0) + prng_reseed_limit = PRNG_RESEED_LIMIT_SHA512; + else if (prng_reseed_limit < PRNG_RESEED_LIMIT_SHA512_LOWER) + return -EINVAL; + + ret = prng_sha512_instantiate(); + if (ret) + goto out; + + ret = misc_register(&prng_sha512_dev); + if (ret) { + prng_sha512_deinstantiate(); + goto out; + } + + } else { + + /* TDES mode */ + + if (prng_chunk_size < PRNG_CHUNKSIZE_TDES_MIN + || prng_chunk_size > PRNG_CHUNKSIZE_TDES_MAX) + return -EINVAL; + prng_chunk_size = (prng_chunk_size + 0x07) & ~0x07; + + if (prng_reseed_limit == 0) + prng_reseed_limit = PRNG_RESEED_LIMIT_TDES; + else if (prng_reseed_limit < PRNG_RESEED_LIMIT_TDES_LOWER) + return -EINVAL; + + ret = prng_tdes_instantiate(); + if (ret) + goto out; + + ret = misc_register(&prng_tdes_dev); + if (ret) { + prng_tdes_deinstantiate(); + goto out; + } + } + +out: + return ret; +} + + +static void __exit prng_exit(void) +{ + if (prng_mode == PRNG_MODE_SHA512) { + misc_deregister(&prng_sha512_dev); + prng_sha512_deinstantiate(); + } else { + misc_deregister(&prng_tdes_dev); + prng_tdes_deinstantiate(); + } +} + +module_cpu_feature_match(S390_CPU_FEATURE_MSA, prng_init); +module_exit(prng_exit); diff --git a/arch/s390/crypto/sha.h b/arch/s390/crypto/sha.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..65ea12fc8 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/s390/crypto/sha.h @@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ */ +/* + * Cryptographic API. + * + * s390 generic implementation of the SHA Secure Hash Algorithms. + * + * Copyright IBM Corp. 2007 + * Author(s): Jan Glauber (jang@de.ibm.com) + */ +#ifndef _CRYPTO_ARCH_S390_SHA_H +#define _CRYPTO_ARCH_S390_SHA_H + +#include <linux/crypto.h> +#include <crypto/sha1.h> +#include <crypto/sha2.h> +#include <crypto/sha3.h> + +/* must be big enough for the largest SHA variant */ +#define SHA3_STATE_SIZE 200 +#define CPACF_MAX_PARMBLOCK_SIZE SHA3_STATE_SIZE +#define SHA_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE SHA3_224_BLOCK_SIZE + +struct s390_sha_ctx { + u64 count; /* message length in bytes */ + u32 state[CPACF_MAX_PARMBLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(u32)]; + u8 buf[SHA_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE]; + int func; /* KIMD function to use */ +}; + +struct shash_desc; + +int s390_sha_update(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data, unsigned int len); +int s390_sha_final(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *out); + +#endif diff --git a/arch/s390/crypto/sha1_s390.c b/arch/s390/crypto/sha1_s390.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..bc3a22704 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/s390/crypto/sha1_s390.c @@ -0,0 +1,103 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ +/* + * Cryptographic API. + * + * s390 implementation of the SHA1 Secure Hash Algorithm. + * + * Derived from cryptoapi implementation, adapted for in-place + * scatterlist interface. Originally based on the public domain + * implementation written by Steve Reid. + * + * s390 Version: + * Copyright IBM Corp. 2003, 2007 + * Author(s): Thomas Spatzier + * Jan Glauber (jan.glauber@de.ibm.com) + * + * Derived from "crypto/sha1_generic.c" + * Copyright (c) Alan Smithee. + * Copyright (c) Andrew McDonald <andrew@mcdonald.org.uk> + * Copyright (c) Jean-Francois Dive <jef@linuxbe.org> + */ +#include <crypto/internal/hash.h> +#include <linux/init.h> +#include <linux/module.h> +#include <linux/cpufeature.h> +#include <crypto/sha1.h> +#include <asm/cpacf.h> + +#include "sha.h" + +static int s390_sha1_init(struct shash_desc *desc) +{ + struct s390_sha_ctx *sctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc); + + sctx->state[0] = SHA1_H0; + sctx->state[1] = SHA1_H1; + sctx->state[2] = SHA1_H2; + sctx->state[3] = SHA1_H3; + sctx->state[4] = SHA1_H4; + sctx->count = 0; + sctx->func = CPACF_KIMD_SHA_1; + + return 0; +} + +static int s390_sha1_export(struct shash_desc *desc, void *out) +{ + struct s390_sha_ctx *sctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc); + struct sha1_state *octx = out; + + octx->count = sctx->count; + memcpy(octx->state, sctx->state, sizeof(octx->state)); + memcpy(octx->buffer, sctx->buf, sizeof(octx->buffer)); + return 0; +} + +static int s390_sha1_import(struct shash_desc *desc, const void *in) +{ + struct s390_sha_ctx *sctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc); + const struct sha1_state *ictx = in; + + sctx->count = ictx->count; + memcpy(sctx->state, ictx->state, sizeof(ictx->state)); + memcpy(sctx->buf, ictx->buffer, sizeof(ictx->buffer)); + sctx->func = CPACF_KIMD_SHA_1; + return 0; +} + +static struct shash_alg alg = { + .digestsize = SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, + .init = s390_sha1_init, + .update = s390_sha_update, + .final = s390_sha_final, + .export = s390_sha1_export, + .import = s390_sha1_import, + .descsize = sizeof(struct s390_sha_ctx), + .statesize = sizeof(struct sha1_state), + .base = { + .cra_name = "sha1", + .cra_driver_name= "sha1-s390", + .cra_priority = 300, + .cra_blocksize = SHA1_BLOCK_SIZE, + .cra_module = THIS_MODULE, + } +}; + +static int __init sha1_s390_init(void) +{ + if (!cpacf_query_func(CPACF_KIMD, CPACF_KIMD_SHA_1)) + return -ENODEV; + return crypto_register_shash(&alg); +} + +static void __exit sha1_s390_fini(void) +{ + crypto_unregister_shash(&alg); +} + +module_cpu_feature_match(S390_CPU_FEATURE_MSA, sha1_s390_init); +module_exit(sha1_s390_fini); + +MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("sha1"); +MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); +MODULE_DESCRIPTION("SHA1 Secure Hash Algorithm"); diff --git a/arch/s390/crypto/sha256_s390.c b/arch/s390/crypto/sha256_s390.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..6f1ccdf93 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/s390/crypto/sha256_s390.c @@ -0,0 +1,143 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ +/* + * Cryptographic API. + * + * s390 implementation of the SHA256 and SHA224 Secure Hash Algorithm. + * + * s390 Version: + * Copyright IBM Corp. 2005, 2011 + * Author(s): Jan Glauber (jang@de.ibm.com) + */ +#include <crypto/internal/hash.h> +#include <linux/init.h> +#include <linux/module.h> +#include <linux/cpufeature.h> +#include <crypto/sha2.h> +#include <asm/cpacf.h> + +#include "sha.h" + +static int s390_sha256_init(struct shash_desc *desc) +{ + struct s390_sha_ctx *sctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc); + + sctx->state[0] = SHA256_H0; + sctx->state[1] = SHA256_H1; + sctx->state[2] = SHA256_H2; + sctx->state[3] = SHA256_H3; + sctx->state[4] = SHA256_H4; + sctx->state[5] = SHA256_H5; + sctx->state[6] = SHA256_H6; + sctx->state[7] = SHA256_H7; + sctx->count = 0; + sctx->func = CPACF_KIMD_SHA_256; + + return 0; +} + +static int sha256_export(struct shash_desc *desc, void *out) +{ + struct s390_sha_ctx *sctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc); + struct sha256_state *octx = out; + + octx->count = sctx->count; + memcpy(octx->state, sctx->state, sizeof(octx->state)); + memcpy(octx->buf, sctx->buf, sizeof(octx->buf)); + return 0; +} + +static int sha256_import(struct shash_desc *desc, const void *in) +{ + struct s390_sha_ctx *sctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc); + const struct sha256_state *ictx = in; + + sctx->count = ictx->count; + memcpy(sctx->state, ictx->state, sizeof(ictx->state)); + memcpy(sctx->buf, ictx->buf, sizeof(ictx->buf)); + sctx->func = CPACF_KIMD_SHA_256; + return 0; +} + +static struct shash_alg sha256_alg = { + .digestsize = SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE, + .init = s390_sha256_init, + .update = s390_sha_update, + .final = s390_sha_final, + .export = sha256_export, + .import = sha256_import, + .descsize = sizeof(struct s390_sha_ctx), + .statesize = sizeof(struct sha256_state), + .base = { + .cra_name = "sha256", + .cra_driver_name= "sha256-s390", + .cra_priority = 300, + .cra_blocksize = SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE, + .cra_module = THIS_MODULE, + } +}; + +static int s390_sha224_init(struct shash_desc *desc) +{ + struct s390_sha_ctx *sctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc); + + sctx->state[0] = SHA224_H0; + sctx->state[1] = SHA224_H1; + sctx->state[2] = SHA224_H2; + sctx->state[3] = SHA224_H3; + sctx->state[4] = SHA224_H4; + sctx->state[5] = SHA224_H5; + sctx->state[6] = SHA224_H6; + sctx->state[7] = SHA224_H7; + sctx->count = 0; + sctx->func = CPACF_KIMD_SHA_256; + + return 0; +} + +static struct shash_alg sha224_alg = { + .digestsize = SHA224_DIGEST_SIZE, + .init = s390_sha224_init, + .update = s390_sha_update, + .final = s390_sha_final, + .export = sha256_export, + .import = sha256_import, + .descsize = sizeof(struct s390_sha_ctx), + .statesize = sizeof(struct sha256_state), + .base = { + .cra_name = "sha224", + .cra_driver_name= "sha224-s390", + .cra_priority = 300, + .cra_blocksize = SHA224_BLOCK_SIZE, + .cra_module = THIS_MODULE, + } +}; + +static int __init sha256_s390_init(void) +{ + int ret; + + if (!cpacf_query_func(CPACF_KIMD, CPACF_KIMD_SHA_256)) + return -ENODEV; + ret = crypto_register_shash(&sha256_alg); + if (ret < 0) + goto out; + ret = crypto_register_shash(&sha224_alg); + if (ret < 0) + crypto_unregister_shash(&sha256_alg); +out: + return ret; +} + +static void __exit sha256_s390_fini(void) +{ + crypto_unregister_shash(&sha224_alg); + crypto_unregister_shash(&sha256_alg); +} + +module_cpu_feature_match(S390_CPU_FEATURE_MSA, sha256_s390_init); +module_exit(sha256_s390_fini); + +MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("sha256"); +MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("sha224"); +MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); +MODULE_DESCRIPTION("SHA256 and SHA224 Secure Hash Algorithm"); diff --git a/arch/s390/crypto/sha3_256_s390.c b/arch/s390/crypto/sha3_256_s390.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e1350e033 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/s390/crypto/sha3_256_s390.c @@ -0,0 +1,146 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ +/* + * Cryptographic API. + * + * s390 implementation of the SHA256 and SHA224 Secure Hash Algorithm. + * + * s390 Version: + * Copyright IBM Corp. 2019 + * Author(s): Joerg Schmidbauer (jschmidb@de.ibm.com) + */ +#include <crypto/internal/hash.h> +#include <linux/init.h> +#include <linux/module.h> +#include <linux/cpufeature.h> +#include <crypto/sha3.h> +#include <asm/cpacf.h> + +#include "sha.h" + +static int sha3_256_init(struct shash_desc *desc) +{ + struct s390_sha_ctx *sctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc); + + memset(sctx->state, 0, sizeof(sctx->state)); + sctx->count = 0; + sctx->func = CPACF_KIMD_SHA3_256; + + return 0; +} + +static int sha3_256_export(struct shash_desc *desc, void *out) +{ + struct s390_sha_ctx *sctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc); + struct sha3_state *octx = out; + + octx->rsiz = sctx->count; + memcpy(octx->st, sctx->state, sizeof(octx->st)); + memcpy(octx->buf, sctx->buf, sizeof(octx->buf)); + + return 0; +} + +static int sha3_256_import(struct shash_desc *desc, const void *in) +{ + struct s390_sha_ctx *sctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc); + const struct sha3_state *ictx = in; + + sctx->count = ictx->rsiz; + memcpy(sctx->state, ictx->st, sizeof(ictx->st)); + memcpy(sctx->buf, ictx->buf, sizeof(ictx->buf)); + sctx->func = CPACF_KIMD_SHA3_256; + + return 0; +} + +static int sha3_224_import(struct shash_desc *desc, const void *in) +{ + struct s390_sha_ctx *sctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc); + const struct sha3_state *ictx = in; + + sctx->count = ictx->rsiz; + memcpy(sctx->state, ictx->st, sizeof(ictx->st)); + memcpy(sctx->buf, ictx->buf, sizeof(ictx->buf)); + sctx->func = CPACF_KIMD_SHA3_224; + + return 0; +} + +static struct shash_alg sha3_256_alg = { + .digestsize = SHA3_256_DIGEST_SIZE, /* = 32 */ + .init = sha3_256_init, + .update = s390_sha_update, + .final = s390_sha_final, + .export = sha3_256_export, + .import = sha3_256_import, + .descsize = sizeof(struct s390_sha_ctx), + .statesize = sizeof(struct sha3_state), + .base = { + .cra_name = "sha3-256", + .cra_driver_name = "sha3-256-s390", + .cra_priority = 300, + .cra_blocksize = SHA3_256_BLOCK_SIZE, + .cra_module = THIS_MODULE, + } +}; + +static int sha3_224_init(struct shash_desc *desc) +{ + struct s390_sha_ctx *sctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc); + + memset(sctx->state, 0, sizeof(sctx->state)); + sctx->count = 0; + sctx->func = CPACF_KIMD_SHA3_224; + + return 0; +} + +static struct shash_alg sha3_224_alg = { + .digestsize = SHA3_224_DIGEST_SIZE, + .init = sha3_224_init, + .update = s390_sha_update, + .final = s390_sha_final, + .export = sha3_256_export, /* same as for 256 */ + .import = sha3_224_import, /* function code different! */ + .descsize = sizeof(struct s390_sha_ctx), + .statesize = sizeof(struct sha3_state), + .base = { + .cra_name = "sha3-224", + .cra_driver_name = "sha3-224-s390", + .cra_priority = 300, + .cra_blocksize = SHA3_224_BLOCK_SIZE, + .cra_module = THIS_MODULE, + } +}; + +static int __init sha3_256_s390_init(void) +{ + int ret; + + if (!cpacf_query_func(CPACF_KIMD, CPACF_KIMD_SHA3_256)) + return -ENODEV; + + ret = crypto_register_shash(&sha3_256_alg); + if (ret < 0) + goto out; + + ret = crypto_register_shash(&sha3_224_alg); + if (ret < 0) + crypto_unregister_shash(&sha3_256_alg); +out: + return ret; +} + +static void __exit sha3_256_s390_fini(void) +{ + crypto_unregister_shash(&sha3_224_alg); + crypto_unregister_shash(&sha3_256_alg); +} + +module_cpu_feature_match(S390_CPU_FEATURE_MSA, sha3_256_s390_init); +module_exit(sha3_256_s390_fini); + +MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("sha3-256"); +MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("sha3-224"); +MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); +MODULE_DESCRIPTION("SHA3-256 and SHA3-224 Secure Hash Algorithm"); diff --git a/arch/s390/crypto/sha3_512_s390.c b/arch/s390/crypto/sha3_512_s390.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..06c142ed9 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/s390/crypto/sha3_512_s390.c @@ -0,0 +1,154 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ +/* + * Cryptographic API. + * + * s390 implementation of the SHA512 and SHA384 Secure Hash Algorithm. + * + * Copyright IBM Corp. 2019 + * Author(s): Joerg Schmidbauer (jschmidb@de.ibm.com) + */ +#include <crypto/internal/hash.h> +#include <linux/init.h> +#include <linux/module.h> +#include <linux/cpufeature.h> +#include <crypto/sha3.h> +#include <asm/cpacf.h> + +#include "sha.h" + +static int sha3_512_init(struct shash_desc *desc) +{ + struct s390_sha_ctx *sctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc); + + memset(sctx->state, 0, sizeof(sctx->state)); + sctx->count = 0; + sctx->func = CPACF_KIMD_SHA3_512; + + return 0; +} + +static int sha3_512_export(struct shash_desc *desc, void *out) +{ + struct s390_sha_ctx *sctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc); + struct sha3_state *octx = out; + + octx->rsiz = sctx->count; + octx->rsizw = sctx->count >> 32; + + memcpy(octx->st, sctx->state, sizeof(octx->st)); + memcpy(octx->buf, sctx->buf, sizeof(octx->buf)); + + return 0; +} + +static int sha3_512_import(struct shash_desc *desc, const void *in) +{ + struct s390_sha_ctx *sctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc); + const struct sha3_state *ictx = in; + + if (unlikely(ictx->rsizw)) + return -ERANGE; + sctx->count = ictx->rsiz; + + memcpy(sctx->state, ictx->st, sizeof(ictx->st)); + memcpy(sctx->buf, ictx->buf, sizeof(ictx->buf)); + sctx->func = CPACF_KIMD_SHA3_512; + + return 0; +} + +static int sha3_384_import(struct shash_desc *desc, const void *in) +{ + struct s390_sha_ctx *sctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc); + const struct sha3_state *ictx = in; + + if (unlikely(ictx->rsizw)) + return -ERANGE; + sctx->count = ictx->rsiz; + + memcpy(sctx->state, ictx->st, sizeof(ictx->st)); + memcpy(sctx->buf, ictx->buf, sizeof(ictx->buf)); + sctx->func = CPACF_KIMD_SHA3_384; + + return 0; +} + +static struct shash_alg sha3_512_alg = { + .digestsize = SHA3_512_DIGEST_SIZE, + .init = sha3_512_init, + .update = s390_sha_update, + .final = s390_sha_final, + .export = sha3_512_export, + .import = sha3_512_import, + .descsize = sizeof(struct s390_sha_ctx), + .statesize = sizeof(struct sha3_state), + .base = { + .cra_name = "sha3-512", + .cra_driver_name = "sha3-512-s390", + .cra_priority = 300, + .cra_blocksize = SHA3_512_BLOCK_SIZE, + .cra_module = THIS_MODULE, + } +}; + +MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("sha3-512"); + +static int sha3_384_init(struct shash_desc *desc) +{ + struct s390_sha_ctx *sctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc); + + memset(sctx->state, 0, sizeof(sctx->state)); + sctx->count = 0; + sctx->func = CPACF_KIMD_SHA3_384; + + return 0; +} + +static struct shash_alg sha3_384_alg = { + .digestsize = SHA3_384_DIGEST_SIZE, + .init = sha3_384_init, + .update = s390_sha_update, + .final = s390_sha_final, + .export = sha3_512_export, /* same as for 512 */ + .import = sha3_384_import, /* function code different! */ + .descsize = sizeof(struct s390_sha_ctx), + .statesize = sizeof(struct sha3_state), + .base = { + .cra_name = "sha3-384", + .cra_driver_name = "sha3-384-s390", + .cra_priority = 300, + .cra_blocksize = SHA3_384_BLOCK_SIZE, + .cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct s390_sha_ctx), + .cra_module = THIS_MODULE, + } +}; + +MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("sha3-384"); + +static int __init init(void) +{ + int ret; + + if (!cpacf_query_func(CPACF_KIMD, CPACF_KIMD_SHA3_512)) + return -ENODEV; + ret = crypto_register_shash(&sha3_512_alg); + if (ret < 0) + goto out; + ret = crypto_register_shash(&sha3_384_alg); + if (ret < 0) + crypto_unregister_shash(&sha3_512_alg); +out: + return ret; +} + +static void __exit fini(void) +{ + crypto_unregister_shash(&sha3_512_alg); + crypto_unregister_shash(&sha3_384_alg); +} + +module_cpu_feature_match(S390_CPU_FEATURE_MSA, init); +module_exit(fini); + +MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); +MODULE_DESCRIPTION("SHA3-512 and SHA3-384 Secure Hash Algorithm"); diff --git a/arch/s390/crypto/sha512_s390.c b/arch/s390/crypto/sha512_s390.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..04f11c407 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/s390/crypto/sha512_s390.c @@ -0,0 +1,149 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ +/* + * Cryptographic API. + * + * s390 implementation of the SHA512 and SHA38 Secure Hash Algorithm. + * + * Copyright IBM Corp. 2007 + * Author(s): Jan Glauber (jang@de.ibm.com) + */ +#include <crypto/internal/hash.h> +#include <crypto/sha2.h> +#include <linux/errno.h> +#include <linux/init.h> +#include <linux/kernel.h> +#include <linux/module.h> +#include <linux/cpufeature.h> +#include <asm/cpacf.h> + +#include "sha.h" + +static int sha512_init(struct shash_desc *desc) +{ + struct s390_sha_ctx *ctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc); + + *(__u64 *)&ctx->state[0] = SHA512_H0; + *(__u64 *)&ctx->state[2] = SHA512_H1; + *(__u64 *)&ctx->state[4] = SHA512_H2; + *(__u64 *)&ctx->state[6] = SHA512_H3; + *(__u64 *)&ctx->state[8] = SHA512_H4; + *(__u64 *)&ctx->state[10] = SHA512_H5; + *(__u64 *)&ctx->state[12] = SHA512_H6; + *(__u64 *)&ctx->state[14] = SHA512_H7; + ctx->count = 0; + ctx->func = CPACF_KIMD_SHA_512; + + return 0; +} + +static int sha512_export(struct shash_desc *desc, void *out) +{ + struct s390_sha_ctx *sctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc); + struct sha512_state *octx = out; + + octx->count[0] = sctx->count; + octx->count[1] = 0; + memcpy(octx->state, sctx->state, sizeof(octx->state)); + memcpy(octx->buf, sctx->buf, sizeof(octx->buf)); + return 0; +} + +static int sha512_import(struct shash_desc *desc, const void *in) +{ + struct s390_sha_ctx *sctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc); + const struct sha512_state *ictx = in; + + if (unlikely(ictx->count[1])) + return -ERANGE; + sctx->count = ictx->count[0]; + + memcpy(sctx->state, ictx->state, sizeof(ictx->state)); + memcpy(sctx->buf, ictx->buf, sizeof(ictx->buf)); + sctx->func = CPACF_KIMD_SHA_512; + return 0; +} + +static struct shash_alg sha512_alg = { + .digestsize = SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE, + .init = sha512_init, + .update = s390_sha_update, + .final = s390_sha_final, + .export = sha512_export, + .import = sha512_import, + .descsize = sizeof(struct s390_sha_ctx), + .statesize = sizeof(struct sha512_state), + .base = { + .cra_name = "sha512", + .cra_driver_name= "sha512-s390", + .cra_priority = 300, + .cra_blocksize = SHA512_BLOCK_SIZE, + .cra_module = THIS_MODULE, + } +}; + +MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("sha512"); + +static int sha384_init(struct shash_desc *desc) +{ + struct s390_sha_ctx *ctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc); + + *(__u64 *)&ctx->state[0] = SHA384_H0; + *(__u64 *)&ctx->state[2] = SHA384_H1; + *(__u64 *)&ctx->state[4] = SHA384_H2; + *(__u64 *)&ctx->state[6] = SHA384_H3; + *(__u64 *)&ctx->state[8] = SHA384_H4; + *(__u64 *)&ctx->state[10] = SHA384_H5; + *(__u64 *)&ctx->state[12] = SHA384_H6; + *(__u64 *)&ctx->state[14] = SHA384_H7; + ctx->count = 0; + ctx->func = CPACF_KIMD_SHA_512; + + return 0; +} + +static struct shash_alg sha384_alg = { + .digestsize = SHA384_DIGEST_SIZE, + .init = sha384_init, + .update = s390_sha_update, + .final = s390_sha_final, + .export = sha512_export, + .import = sha512_import, + .descsize = sizeof(struct s390_sha_ctx), + .statesize = sizeof(struct sha512_state), + .base = { + .cra_name = "sha384", + .cra_driver_name= "sha384-s390", + .cra_priority = 300, + .cra_blocksize = SHA384_BLOCK_SIZE, + .cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct s390_sha_ctx), + .cra_module = THIS_MODULE, + } +}; + +MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("sha384"); + +static int __init init(void) +{ + int ret; + + if (!cpacf_query_func(CPACF_KIMD, CPACF_KIMD_SHA_512)) + return -ENODEV; + if ((ret = crypto_register_shash(&sha512_alg)) < 0) + goto out; + if ((ret = crypto_register_shash(&sha384_alg)) < 0) + crypto_unregister_shash(&sha512_alg); +out: + return ret; +} + +static void __exit fini(void) +{ + crypto_unregister_shash(&sha512_alg); + crypto_unregister_shash(&sha384_alg); +} + +module_cpu_feature_match(S390_CPU_FEATURE_MSA, init); +module_exit(fini); + +MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); +MODULE_DESCRIPTION("SHA512 and SHA-384 Secure Hash Algorithm"); diff --git a/arch/s390/crypto/sha_common.c b/arch/s390/crypto/sha_common.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..686fe7aa1 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/s390/crypto/sha_common.c @@ -0,0 +1,124 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ +/* + * Cryptographic API. + * + * s390 generic implementation of the SHA Secure Hash Algorithms. + * + * Copyright IBM Corp. 2007 + * Author(s): Jan Glauber (jang@de.ibm.com) + */ + +#include <crypto/internal/hash.h> +#include <linux/module.h> +#include <asm/cpacf.h> +#include "sha.h" + +int s390_sha_update(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data, unsigned int len) +{ + struct s390_sha_ctx *ctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc); + unsigned int bsize = crypto_shash_blocksize(desc->tfm); + unsigned int index, n; + + /* how much is already in the buffer? */ + index = ctx->count % bsize; + ctx->count += len; + + if ((index + len) < bsize) + goto store; + + /* process one stored block */ + if (index) { + memcpy(ctx->buf + index, data, bsize - index); + cpacf_kimd(ctx->func, ctx->state, ctx->buf, bsize); + data += bsize - index; + len -= bsize - index; + index = 0; + } + + /* process as many blocks as possible */ + if (len >= bsize) { + n = (len / bsize) * bsize; + cpacf_kimd(ctx->func, ctx->state, data, n); + data += n; + len -= n; + } +store: + if (len) + memcpy(ctx->buf + index , data, len); + + return 0; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(s390_sha_update); + +static int s390_crypto_shash_parmsize(int func) +{ + switch (func) { + case CPACF_KLMD_SHA_1: + return 20; + case CPACF_KLMD_SHA_256: + return 32; + case CPACF_KLMD_SHA_512: + return 64; + case CPACF_KLMD_SHA3_224: + case CPACF_KLMD_SHA3_256: + case CPACF_KLMD_SHA3_384: + case CPACF_KLMD_SHA3_512: + return 200; + default: + return -EINVAL; + } +} + +int s390_sha_final(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *out) +{ + struct s390_sha_ctx *ctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc); + unsigned int bsize = crypto_shash_blocksize(desc->tfm); + u64 bits; + unsigned int n; + int mbl_offset; + + n = ctx->count % bsize; + bits = ctx->count * 8; + mbl_offset = s390_crypto_shash_parmsize(ctx->func); + if (mbl_offset < 0) + return -EINVAL; + + mbl_offset = mbl_offset / sizeof(u32); + + /* set total msg bit length (mbl) in CPACF parmblock */ + switch (ctx->func) { + case CPACF_KLMD_SHA_1: + case CPACF_KLMD_SHA_256: + memcpy(ctx->state + mbl_offset, &bits, sizeof(bits)); + break; + case CPACF_KLMD_SHA_512: + /* + * the SHA512 parmblock has a 128-bit mbl field, clear + * high-order u64 field, copy bits to low-order u64 field + */ + memset(ctx->state + mbl_offset, 0x00, sizeof(bits)); + mbl_offset += sizeof(u64) / sizeof(u32); + memcpy(ctx->state + mbl_offset, &bits, sizeof(bits)); + break; + case CPACF_KLMD_SHA3_224: + case CPACF_KLMD_SHA3_256: + case CPACF_KLMD_SHA3_384: + case CPACF_KLMD_SHA3_512: + break; + default: + return -EINVAL; + } + + cpacf_klmd(ctx->func, ctx->state, ctx->buf, n); + + /* copy digest to out */ + memcpy(out, ctx->state, crypto_shash_digestsize(desc->tfm)); + /* wipe context */ + memset(ctx, 0, sizeof *ctx); + + return 0; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(s390_sha_final); + +MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); +MODULE_DESCRIPTION("s390 SHA cipher common functions"); |