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-rw-r--r--certs/blacklist.c372
1 files changed, 372 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/certs/blacklist.c b/certs/blacklist.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..41f10601c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/certs/blacklist.c
@@ -0,0 +1,372 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+/* System hash blacklist.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2016 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
+ */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "blacklist: "fmt
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/key.h>
+#include <linux/key-type.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/ctype.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/seq_file.h>
+#include <linux/uidgid.h>
+#include <keys/asymmetric-type.h>
+#include <keys/system_keyring.h>
+#include "blacklist.h"
+
+/*
+ * According to crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c:x509_note_pkey_algo(),
+ * the size of the currently longest supported hash algorithm is 512 bits,
+ * which translates into 128 hex characters.
+ */
+#define MAX_HASH_LEN 128
+
+#define BLACKLIST_KEY_PERM (KEY_POS_SEARCH | KEY_POS_VIEW | \
+ KEY_USR_SEARCH | KEY_USR_VIEW)
+
+static const char tbs_prefix[] = "tbs";
+static const char bin_prefix[] = "bin";
+
+static struct key *blacklist_keyring;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SYSTEM_REVOCATION_LIST
+extern __initconst const u8 revocation_certificate_list[];
+extern __initconst const unsigned long revocation_certificate_list_size;
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * The description must be a type prefix, a colon and then an even number of
+ * hex digits. The hash is kept in the description.
+ */
+static int blacklist_vet_description(const char *desc)
+{
+ int i, prefix_len, tbs_step = 0, bin_step = 0;
+
+ /* The following algorithm only works if prefix lengths match. */
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(tbs_prefix) != sizeof(bin_prefix));
+ prefix_len = sizeof(tbs_prefix) - 1;
+ for (i = 0; *desc; desc++, i++) {
+ if (*desc == ':') {
+ if (tbs_step == prefix_len)
+ goto found_colon;
+ if (bin_step == prefix_len)
+ goto found_colon;
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ if (i >= prefix_len)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ if (*desc == tbs_prefix[i])
+ tbs_step++;
+ if (*desc == bin_prefix[i])
+ bin_step++;
+ }
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+found_colon:
+ desc++;
+ for (i = 0; *desc && i < MAX_HASH_LEN; desc++, i++) {
+ if (!isxdigit(*desc) || isupper(*desc))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ if (*desc)
+ /* The hash is greater than MAX_HASH_LEN. */
+ return -ENOPKG;
+
+ /* Checks for an even number of hexadecimal characters. */
+ if (i == 0 || i & 1)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int blacklist_key_instantiate(struct key *key,
+ struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_AUTH_UPDATE
+ int err;
+#endif
+
+ /* Sets safe default permissions for keys loaded by user space. */
+ key->perm = BLACKLIST_KEY_PERM;
+
+ /*
+ * Skips the authentication step for builtin hashes, they are not
+ * signed but still trusted.
+ */
+ if (key->flags & (1 << KEY_FLAG_BUILTIN))
+ goto out;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_AUTH_UPDATE
+ /*
+ * Verifies the description's PKCS#7 signature against the builtin
+ * trusted keyring.
+ */
+ err = verify_pkcs7_signature(key->description,
+ strlen(key->description), prep->data, prep->datalen,
+ NULL, VERIFYING_UNSPECIFIED_SIGNATURE, NULL, NULL);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+#else
+ /*
+ * It should not be possible to come here because the keyring doesn't
+ * have KEY_USR_WRITE and the only other way to call this function is
+ * for builtin hashes.
+ */
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
+ return -EPERM;
+#endif
+
+out:
+ return generic_key_instantiate(key, prep);
+}
+
+static int blacklist_key_update(struct key *key,
+ struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
+{
+ return -EPERM;
+}
+
+static void blacklist_describe(const struct key *key, struct seq_file *m)
+{
+ seq_puts(m, key->description);
+}
+
+static struct key_type key_type_blacklist = {
+ .name = "blacklist",
+ .vet_description = blacklist_vet_description,
+ .instantiate = blacklist_key_instantiate,
+ .update = blacklist_key_update,
+ .describe = blacklist_describe,
+};
+
+static char *get_raw_hash(const u8 *hash, size_t hash_len,
+ enum blacklist_hash_type hash_type)
+{
+ size_t type_len;
+ const char *type_prefix;
+ char *buffer, *p;
+
+ switch (hash_type) {
+ case BLACKLIST_HASH_X509_TBS:
+ type_len = sizeof(tbs_prefix) - 1;
+ type_prefix = tbs_prefix;
+ break;
+ case BLACKLIST_HASH_BINARY:
+ type_len = sizeof(bin_prefix) - 1;
+ type_prefix = bin_prefix;
+ break;
+ default:
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
+ return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+ }
+ buffer = kmalloc(type_len + 1 + hash_len * 2 + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!buffer)
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+ p = memcpy(buffer, type_prefix, type_len);
+ p += type_len;
+ *p++ = ':';
+ bin2hex(p, hash, hash_len);
+ p += hash_len * 2;
+ *p = '\0';
+ return buffer;
+}
+
+/**
+ * mark_raw_hash_blacklisted - Add a hash to the system blacklist
+ * @hash: The hash as a hex string with a type prefix (eg. "tbs:23aa429783")
+ */
+static int mark_raw_hash_blacklisted(const char *hash)
+{
+ key_ref_t key;
+
+ key = key_create_or_update(make_key_ref(blacklist_keyring, true),
+ "blacklist",
+ hash,
+ NULL,
+ 0,
+ BLACKLIST_KEY_PERM,
+ KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA |
+ KEY_ALLOC_BUILT_IN);
+ if (IS_ERR(key)) {
+ pr_err("Problem blacklisting hash (%ld)\n", PTR_ERR(key));
+ return PTR_ERR(key);
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int mark_hash_blacklisted(const u8 *hash, size_t hash_len,
+ enum blacklist_hash_type hash_type)
+{
+ const char *buffer;
+ int err;
+
+ buffer = get_raw_hash(hash, hash_len, hash_type);
+ if (IS_ERR(buffer))
+ return PTR_ERR(buffer);
+ err = mark_raw_hash_blacklisted(buffer);
+ kfree(buffer);
+ return err;
+}
+
+/**
+ * is_hash_blacklisted - Determine if a hash is blacklisted
+ * @hash: The hash to be checked as a binary blob
+ * @hash_len: The length of the binary hash
+ * @hash_type: Type of hash
+ */
+int is_hash_blacklisted(const u8 *hash, size_t hash_len,
+ enum blacklist_hash_type hash_type)
+{
+ key_ref_t kref;
+ const char *buffer;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ buffer = get_raw_hash(hash, hash_len, hash_type);
+ if (IS_ERR(buffer))
+ return PTR_ERR(buffer);
+ kref = keyring_search(make_key_ref(blacklist_keyring, true),
+ &key_type_blacklist, buffer, false);
+ if (!IS_ERR(kref)) {
+ key_ref_put(kref);
+ ret = -EKEYREJECTED;
+ }
+
+ kfree(buffer);
+ return ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(is_hash_blacklisted);
+
+int is_binary_blacklisted(const u8 *hash, size_t hash_len)
+{
+ if (is_hash_blacklisted(hash, hash_len, BLACKLIST_HASH_BINARY) ==
+ -EKEYREJECTED)
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(is_binary_blacklisted);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SYSTEM_REVOCATION_LIST
+/**
+ * add_key_to_revocation_list - Add a revocation certificate to the blacklist
+ * @data: The data blob containing the certificate
+ * @size: The size of data blob
+ */
+int add_key_to_revocation_list(const char *data, size_t size)
+{
+ key_ref_t key;
+
+ key = key_create_or_update(make_key_ref(blacklist_keyring, true),
+ "asymmetric",
+ NULL,
+ data,
+ size,
+ KEY_POS_VIEW | KEY_POS_READ | KEY_POS_SEARCH
+ | KEY_USR_VIEW,
+ KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA | KEY_ALLOC_BUILT_IN
+ | KEY_ALLOC_BYPASS_RESTRICTION);
+
+ if (IS_ERR(key)) {
+ pr_err("Problem with revocation key (%ld)\n", PTR_ERR(key));
+ return PTR_ERR(key);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * is_key_on_revocation_list - Determine if the key for a PKCS#7 message is revoked
+ * @pkcs7: The PKCS#7 message to check
+ */
+int is_key_on_revocation_list(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = pkcs7_validate_trust(pkcs7, blacklist_keyring);
+
+ if (ret == 0)
+ return -EKEYREJECTED;
+
+ return -ENOKEY;
+}
+#endif
+
+static int restrict_link_for_blacklist(struct key *dest_keyring,
+ const struct key_type *type, const union key_payload *payload,
+ struct key *restrict_key)
+{
+ if (type == &key_type_blacklist)
+ return 0;
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Initialise the blacklist
+ *
+ * The blacklist_init() function is registered as an initcall via
+ * device_initcall(). As a result if the blacklist_init() function fails for
+ * any reason the kernel continues to execute. While cleanly returning -ENODEV
+ * could be acceptable for some non-critical kernel parts, if the blacklist
+ * keyring fails to load it defeats the certificate/key based deny list for
+ * signed modules. If a critical piece of security functionality that users
+ * expect to be present fails to initialize, panic()ing is likely the right
+ * thing to do.
+ */
+static int __init blacklist_init(void)
+{
+ const char *const *bl;
+ struct key_restriction *restriction;
+
+ if (register_key_type(&key_type_blacklist) < 0)
+ panic("Can't allocate system blacklist key type\n");
+
+ restriction = kzalloc(sizeof(*restriction), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!restriction)
+ panic("Can't allocate blacklist keyring restriction\n");
+ restriction->check = restrict_link_for_blacklist;
+
+ blacklist_keyring =
+ keyring_alloc(".blacklist",
+ GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, GLOBAL_ROOT_GID, current_cred(),
+ KEY_POS_VIEW | KEY_POS_READ | KEY_POS_SEARCH |
+ KEY_POS_WRITE |
+ KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ | KEY_USR_SEARCH
+#ifdef CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_AUTH_UPDATE
+ | KEY_USR_WRITE
+#endif
+ , KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA |
+ KEY_ALLOC_SET_KEEP,
+ restriction, NULL);
+ if (IS_ERR(blacklist_keyring))
+ panic("Can't allocate system blacklist keyring\n");
+
+ for (bl = blacklist_hashes; *bl; bl++)
+ if (mark_raw_hash_blacklisted(*bl) < 0)
+ pr_err("- blacklisting failed\n");
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Must be initialised before we try and load the keys into the keyring.
+ */
+device_initcall(blacklist_init);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SYSTEM_REVOCATION_LIST
+/*
+ * Load the compiled-in list of revocation X.509 certificates.
+ */
+static __init int load_revocation_certificate_list(void)
+{
+ if (revocation_certificate_list_size)
+ pr_notice("Loading compiled-in revocation X.509 certificates\n");
+
+ return x509_load_certificate_list(revocation_certificate_list,
+ revocation_certificate_list_size,
+ blacklist_keyring);
+}
+late_initcall(load_revocation_certificate_list);
+#endif