Adding upstream version 1:9.2p1.upstream/1%9.2p1upstream

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

1 files changed, 715 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/PROTOCOL b/PROTOCOL
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..27804d0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/PROTOCOL
@@ -0,0 +1,715 @@
+This documents OpenSSH's deviations and extensions to the published SSH
+protocol.
+
+Note that OpenSSH's sftp and sftp-server implement revision 3 of the SSH
+filexfer protocol described in:
+
+https://www.openssh.com/txt/draft-ietf-secsh-filexfer-02.txt
+
+Newer versions of the draft will not be supported, though some features
+are individually implemented as extensions described below.
+
+The protocol used by OpenSSH's ssh-agent is described in the file
+PROTOCOL.agent
+
+1. Transport protocol changes
+
+1.1. transport: Protocol 2 MAC algorithm "umac-64@openssh.com"
+
+This is a new transport-layer MAC method using the UMAC algorithm
+(rfc4418). This method is identical to the "umac-64" method documented
+in:
+
+https://www.openssh.com/txt/draft-miller-secsh-umac-01.txt
+
+1.2. transport: Protocol 2 compression algorithm "zlib@openssh.com"
+
+This transport-layer compression method uses the zlib compression
+algorithm (identical to the "zlib" method in rfc4253), but delays the
+start of compression until after authentication has completed. This
+avoids exposing compression code to attacks from unauthenticated users.
+
+The method is documented in:
+
+https://www.openssh.com/txt/draft-miller-secsh-compression-delayed-00.txt
+
+1.3. transport: New public key algorithms "ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com",
+     "ssh-dsa-cert-v01@openssh.com",
+     "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com",
+     "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com" and
+     "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com"
+
+OpenSSH introduces new public key algorithms to support certificate
+authentication for users and host keys. These methods are documented
+in the file PROTOCOL.certkeys
+
+1.4. transport: Elliptic Curve cryptography
+
+OpenSSH supports ECC key exchange and public key authentication as
+specified in RFC5656. Only the ecdsa-sha2-nistp256, ecdsa-sha2-nistp384
+and ecdsa-sha2-nistp521 curves over GF(p) are supported. Elliptic
+curve points encoded using point compression are NOT accepted or
+generated.
+
+1.5 transport: Protocol 2 Encrypt-then-MAC MAC algorithms
+
+OpenSSH supports MAC algorithms, whose names contain "-etm", that
+perform the calculations in a different order to that defined in RFC
+4253. These variants use the so-called "encrypt then MAC" ordering,
+calculating the MAC over the packet ciphertext rather than the
+plaintext. This ordering closes a security flaw in the SSH transport
+protocol, where decryption of unauthenticated ciphertext provided a
+"decryption oracle" that could, in conjunction with cipher flaws, reveal
+session plaintext.
+
+Specifically, the "-etm" MAC algorithms modify the transport protocol
+to calculate the MAC over the packet ciphertext and to send the packet
+length unencrypted. This is necessary for the transport to obtain the
+length of the packet and location of the MAC tag so that it may be
+verified without decrypting unauthenticated data.
+
+As such, the MAC covers:
+
+      mac = MAC(key, sequence_number || packet_length || encrypted_packet)
+
+where "packet_length" is encoded as a uint32 and "encrypted_packet"
+contains:
+
+      byte      padding_length
+      byte[n1]  payload; n1 = packet_length - padding_length - 1
+      byte[n2]  random padding; n2 = padding_length
+
+1.6 transport: AES-GCM
+
+OpenSSH supports the AES-GCM algorithm as specified in RFC 5647.
+Because of problems with the specification of the key exchange
+the behaviour of OpenSSH differs from the RFC as follows:
+
+AES-GCM is only negotiated as the cipher algorithms
+"aes128-gcm@openssh.com" or "aes256-gcm@openssh.com" and never as
+an MAC algorithm. Additionally, if AES-GCM is selected as the cipher
+the exchanged MAC algorithms are ignored and there doesn't have to be
+a matching MAC.
+
+1.7 transport: chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com authenticated encryption
+
+OpenSSH supports authenticated encryption using ChaCha20 and Poly1305
+as described in PROTOCOL.chacha20poly1305.
+
+1.8 transport: curve25519-sha256@libssh.org key exchange algorithm
+
+OpenSSH supports the use of ECDH in Curve25519 for key exchange as
+described at:
+http://git.libssh.org/users/aris/libssh.git/plain/doc/curve25519-sha256@libssh.org.txt?h=curve25519
+
+This is identical to curve25519-sha256 as later published in RFC8731.
+
+2. Connection protocol changes
+
+2.1. connection: Channel write close extension "eow@openssh.com"
+
+The SSH connection protocol (rfc4254) provides the SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF
+message to allow an endpoint to signal its peer that it will send no
+more data over a channel. Unfortunately, there is no symmetric way for
+an endpoint to request that its peer should cease sending data to it
+while still keeping the channel open for the endpoint to send data to
+the peer.
+
+This is desirable, since it saves the transmission of data that would
+otherwise need to be discarded and it allows an endpoint to signal local
+processes of the condition, e.g. by closing the corresponding file
+descriptor.
+
+OpenSSH implements a channel extension message to perform this
+signalling: "eow@openssh.com" (End Of Write). This message is sent by
+an endpoint when the local output of a session channel is closed or
+experiences a write error. The message is formatted as follows:
+
+	byte		SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST
+	uint32		recipient channel
+	string		"eow@openssh.com"
+	boolean		FALSE
+
+On receiving this message, the peer SHOULD cease sending data of
+the channel and MAY signal the process from which the channel data
+originates (e.g. by closing its read file descriptor).
+
+As with the symmetric SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF message, the channel does
+remain open after a "eow@openssh.com" has been sent and more data may
+still be sent in the other direction. This message does not consume
+window space and may be sent even if no window space is available.
+
+NB. due to certain broken SSH implementations aborting upon receipt
+of this message (in contravention of RFC4254 section 5.4), this
+message is only sent to OpenSSH peers (identified by banner).
+Other SSH implementations may be listed to receive this message
+upon request.
+
+2.2. connection: disallow additional sessions extension
+     "no-more-sessions@openssh.com"
+
+Most SSH connections will only ever request a single session, but a
+attacker may abuse a running ssh client to surreptitiously open
+additional sessions under their control. OpenSSH provides a global
+request "no-more-sessions@openssh.com" to mitigate this attack.
+
+When an OpenSSH client expects that it will never open another session
+(i.e. it has been started with connection multiplexing disabled), it
+will send the following global request:
+
+	byte		SSH_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST
+	string		"no-more-sessions@openssh.com"
+	char		want-reply
+
+On receipt of such a message, an OpenSSH server will refuse to open
+future channels of type "session" and instead immediately abort the
+connection.
+
+Note that this is not a general defence against compromised clients
+(that is impossible), but it thwarts a simple attack.
+
+NB. due to certain broken SSH implementations aborting upon receipt
+of this message, the no-more-sessions request is only sent to OpenSSH
+servers (identified by banner). Other SSH implementations may be
+listed to receive this message upon request.
+
+2.3. connection: Tunnel forward extension "tun@openssh.com"
+
+OpenSSH supports layer 2 and layer 3 tunnelling via the "tun@openssh.com"
+channel type. This channel type supports forwarding of network packets
+with datagram boundaries intact between endpoints equipped with
+interfaces like the BSD tun(4) device. Tunnel forwarding channels are
+requested by the client with the following packet:
+
+	byte		SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN
+	string		"tun@openssh.com"
+	uint32		sender channel
+	uint32		initial window size
+	uint32		maximum packet size
+	uint32		tunnel mode
+	uint32		remote unit number
+
+The "tunnel mode" parameter specifies whether the tunnel should forward
+layer 2 frames or layer 3 packets. It may take one of the following values:
+
+	SSH_TUNMODE_POINTOPOINT  1		/* layer 3 packets */
+	SSH_TUNMODE_ETHERNET     2		/* layer 2 frames */
+
+The "tunnel unit number" specifies the remote interface number, or may
+be 0x7fffffff to allow the server to automatically choose an interface. A
+server that is not willing to open a client-specified unit should refuse
+the request with a SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE error. On successful
+open, the server should reply with SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_SUCCESS.
+
+Once established the client and server may exchange packet or frames
+over the tunnel channel by encapsulating them in SSH protocol strings
+and sending them as channel data. This ensures that packet boundaries
+are kept intact. Specifically, packets are transmitted using normal
+SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA packets:
+
+	byte		SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA
+	uint32		recipient channel
+	string		data
+
+The contents of the "data" field for layer 3 packets is:
+
+	uint32			packet length
+	uint32			address family
+	byte[packet length - 4]	packet data
+
+The "address family" field identifies the type of packet in the message.
+It may be one of:
+
+	SSH_TUN_AF_INET		2		/* IPv4 */
+	SSH_TUN_AF_INET6	24		/* IPv6 */
+
+The "packet data" field consists of the IPv4/IPv6 datagram itself
+without any link layer header.
+
+The contents of the "data" field for layer 2 packets is:
+
+	uint32			packet length
+	byte[packet length]	frame
+
+The "frame" field contains an IEEE 802.3 Ethernet frame, including
+header.
+
+2.4. connection: Unix domain socket forwarding
+
+OpenSSH supports local and remote Unix domain socket forwarding
+using the "streamlocal" extension.  Forwarding is initiated as per
+TCP sockets but with a single path instead of a host and port.
+
+Similar to direct-tcpip, direct-streamlocal is sent by the client
+to request that the server make a connection to a Unix domain socket.
+
+	byte		SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN
+	string		"direct-streamlocal@openssh.com"
+	uint32		sender channel
+	uint32		initial window size
+	uint32		maximum packet size
+	string		socket path
+	string		reserved
+	uint32		reserved
+
+Similar to forwarded-tcpip, forwarded-streamlocal is sent by the
+server when the client has previously send the server a streamlocal-forward
+GLOBAL_REQUEST.
+
+	byte		SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN
+	string		"forwarded-streamlocal@openssh.com"
+	uint32		sender channel
+	uint32		initial window size
+	uint32		maximum packet size
+	string		socket path
+	string		reserved for future use
+
+The reserved field is not currently defined and is ignored on the
+remote end.  It is intended to be used in the future to pass
+information about the socket file, such as ownership and mode.
+The client currently sends the empty string for this field.
+
+Similar to tcpip-forward, streamlocal-forward is sent by the client
+to request remote forwarding of a Unix domain socket.
+
+	byte		SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST
+	string		"streamlocal-forward@openssh.com"
+	boolean		TRUE
+	string		socket path
+
+Similar to cancel-tcpip-forward, cancel-streamlocal-forward is sent
+by the client cancel the forwarding of a Unix domain socket.
+
+	byte		SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST
+	string		"cancel-streamlocal-forward@openssh.com"
+	boolean		FALSE
+	string		socket path
+
+2.5. connection: hostkey update and rotation "hostkeys-00@openssh.com"
+and "hostkeys-prove-00@openssh.com"
+
+OpenSSH supports a protocol extension allowing a server to inform
+a client of all its protocol v.2 host keys after user-authentication
+has completed.
+
+	byte		SSH_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST
+	string		"hostkeys-00@openssh.com"
+	char		0 /* want-reply */
+	string[]	hostkeys
+
+Upon receiving this message, a client should check which of the
+supplied host keys are present in known_hosts.
+
+Note that the server may send key types that the client does not
+support. The client should disregard such keys if they are received.
+
+If the client identifies any keys that are not present for the host,
+it should send a "hostkeys-prove@openssh.com" message to request the
+server prove ownership of the private half of the key.
+
+	byte		SSH_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST
+	string		"hostkeys-prove-00@openssh.com"
+	char		1 /* want-reply */
+	string[]	hostkeys
+
+When a server receives this message, it should generate a signature
+using each requested key over the following:
+
+	string		"hostkeys-prove-00@openssh.com"
+	string		session identifier
+	string		hostkey
+
+These signatures should be included in the reply, in the order matching
+the hostkeys in the request:
+
+	byte		SSH_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS
+	string[]	signatures
+
+When the client receives this reply (and not a failure), it should
+validate the signatures and may update its known_hosts file, adding keys
+that it has not seen before and deleting keys for the server host that
+are no longer offered.
+
+These extensions let a client learn key types that it had not previously
+encountered, thereby allowing it to potentially upgrade from weaker
+key algorithms to better ones. It also supports graceful key rotation:
+a server may offer multiple keys of the same type for a period (to
+give clients an opportunity to learn them using this extension) before
+removing the deprecated key from those offered.
+
+2.6. connection: SIGINFO support for "signal" channel request
+
+The SSH channels protocol (RFC4254 section 6.9) supports sending a
+signal to a session attached to a channel. OpenSSH supports one
+extension signal "INFO@openssh.com" that allows sending SIGINFO on
+BSD-derived systems.
+
+3. Authentication protocol changes
+
+3.1. Host-bound public key authentication
+
+This is trivial change to the traditional "publickey" authentication
+method. The authentication request is identical to the original method
+but for the name and one additional field:
+
+	byte		SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST
+	string		username
+	string		"ssh-connection"
+	string		"publickey-hostbound-v00@openssh.com"
+	bool		has_signature
+	string		pkalg
+	string		public key
+	string		server host key
+
+Because the entire SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST message is included in
+the signed data, this ensures that a binding between the destination
+user, the server identity and the session identifier is visible to the
+signer. OpenSSH uses this binding via signed data to implement per-key
+restrictions in ssh-agent.
+
+A server may advertise this method using the SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO
+mechanism (RFC8308), with the following message:
+
+	string		"publickey-hostbound@openssh.com"
+	string		"0" (version)
+
+Clients should prefer host-bound authentication when advertised by
+server.
+
+4. SFTP protocol changes
+
+4.1. sftp: Reversal of arguments to SSH_FXP_SYMLINK
+
+When OpenSSH's sftp-server was implemented, the order of the arguments
+to the SSH_FXP_SYMLINK method was inadvertently reversed. Unfortunately,
+the reversal was not noticed until the server was widely deployed. Since
+fixing this to follow the specification would cause incompatibility, the
+current order was retained. For correct operation, clients should send
+SSH_FXP_SYMLINK as follows:
+
+	uint32		id
+	string		targetpath
+	string		linkpath
+
+4.2. sftp: Server extension announcement in SSH_FXP_VERSION
+
+OpenSSH's sftp-server lists the extensions it supports using the
+standard extension announcement mechanism in the SSH_FXP_VERSION server
+hello packet:
+
+	uint32		3		/* protocol version */
+	string		ext1-name
+	string		ext1-version
+	string		ext2-name
+	string		ext2-version
+	...
+	string		extN-name
+	string		extN-version
+
+Each extension reports its integer version number as an ASCII encoded
+string, e.g. "1". The version will be incremented if the extension is
+ever changed in an incompatible way. The server MAY advertise the same
+extension with multiple versions (though this is unlikely). Clients MUST
+check the version number before attempting to use the extension.
+
+4.3. sftp: Extension request "posix-rename@openssh.com"
+
+This operation provides a rename operation with POSIX semantics, which
+are different to those provided by the standard SSH_FXP_RENAME in
+draft-ietf-secsh-filexfer-02.txt. This request is implemented as a
+SSH_FXP_EXTENDED request with the following format:
+
+	uint32		id
+	string		"posix-rename@openssh.com"
+	string		oldpath
+	string		newpath
+
+On receiving this request the server will perform the POSIX operation
+rename(oldpath, newpath) and will respond with a SSH_FXP_STATUS message.
+This extension is advertised in the SSH_FXP_VERSION hello with version
+"1".
+
+4.4. sftp: Extension requests "statvfs@openssh.com" and
+         "fstatvfs@openssh.com"
+
+These requests correspond to the statvfs and fstatvfs POSIX system
+interfaces. The "statvfs@openssh.com" request operates on an explicit
+pathname, and is formatted as follows:
+
+	uint32		id
+	string		"statvfs@openssh.com"
+	string		path
+
+The "fstatvfs@openssh.com" operates on an open file handle:
+
+	uint32		id
+	string		"fstatvfs@openssh.com"
+	string		handle
+
+These requests return a SSH_FXP_STATUS reply on failure. On success they
+return the following SSH_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY reply:
+
+	uint32		id
+	uint64		f_bsize		/* file system block size */
+	uint64		f_frsize	/* fundamental fs block size */
+	uint64		f_blocks	/* number of blocks (unit f_frsize) */
+	uint64		f_bfree		/* free blocks in file system */
+	uint64		f_bavail	/* free blocks for non-root */
+	uint64		f_files		/* total file inodes */
+	uint64		f_ffree		/* free file inodes */
+	uint64		f_favail	/* free file inodes for to non-root */
+	uint64		f_fsid		/* file system id */
+	uint64		f_flag		/* bit mask of f_flag values */
+	uint64		f_namemax	/* maximum filename length */
+
+The values of the f_flag bitmask are as follows:
+
+	#define SSH_FXE_STATVFS_ST_RDONLY	0x1	/* read-only */
+	#define SSH_FXE_STATVFS_ST_NOSUID	0x2	/* no setuid */
+
+Both the "statvfs@openssh.com" and "fstatvfs@openssh.com" extensions are
+advertised in the SSH_FXP_VERSION hello with version "2".
+
+4.5. sftp: Extension request "hardlink@openssh.com"
+
+This request is for creating a hard link to a regular file. This
+request is implemented as a SSH_FXP_EXTENDED request with the
+following format:
+
+	uint32		id
+	string		"hardlink@openssh.com"
+	string		oldpath
+	string		newpath
+
+On receiving this request the server will perform the operation
+link(oldpath, newpath) and will respond with a SSH_FXP_STATUS message.
+This extension is advertised in the SSH_FXP_VERSION hello with version
+"1".
+
+4.6. sftp: Extension request "fsync@openssh.com"
+
+This request asks the server to call fsync(2) on an open file handle.
+
+	uint32		id
+	string		"fsync@openssh.com"
+	string		handle
+
+On receiving this request, a server will call fsync(handle_fd) and will
+respond with a SSH_FXP_STATUS message.
+
+This extension is advertised in the SSH_FXP_VERSION hello with version
+"1".
+
+4.7. sftp: Extension request "lsetstat@openssh.com"
+
+This request is like the "setstat" command, but sets file attributes on
+symlinks.  It is implemented as a SSH_FXP_EXTENDED request with the
+following format:
+
+	uint32		id
+	string		"lsetstat@openssh.com"
+	string		path
+	ATTRS		attrs
+
+See the "setstat" command for more details.
+
+This extension is advertised in the SSH_FXP_VERSION hello with version
+"1".
+
+4.8. sftp: Extension request "limits@openssh.com"
+
+This request is used to determine various limits the server might impose.
+Clients should not attempt to exceed these limits as the server might sever
+the connection immediately.
+
+	uint32		id
+	string		"limits@openssh.com"
+
+The server will respond with a SSH_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY reply:
+
+	uint32		id
+	uint64		max-packet-length
+	uint64		max-read-length
+	uint64		max-write-length
+	uint64		max-open-handles
+
+The 'max-packet-length' applies to the total number of bytes in a
+single SFTP packet.  Servers SHOULD set this at least to 34000.
+
+The 'max-read-length' is the largest length in a SSH_FXP_READ packet.
+Even if the client requests a larger size, servers will usually respond
+with a shorter SSH_FXP_DATA packet.  Servers SHOULD set this at least to
+32768.
+
+The 'max-write-length' is the largest length in a SSH_FXP_WRITE packet
+the server will accept.  Servers SHOULD set this at least to 32768.
+
+The 'max-open-handles' is the maximum number of active handles that the
+server allows (e.g. handles created by SSH_FXP_OPEN and SSH_FXP_OPENDIR
+packets).  Servers MAY count internal file handles against this limit
+(e.g. system logging or stdout/stderr), so clients SHOULD NOT expect to
+open this many handles in practice.
+
+If the server doesn't enforce a specific limit, then the field may be
+set to 0.  This implies the server relies on the OS to enforce limits
+(e.g. available memory or file handles), and such limits might be
+dynamic.  The client SHOULD take care to not try to exceed reasonable
+limits.
+
+This extension is advertised in the SSH_FXP_VERSION hello with version
+"1".
+
+4.9. sftp: Extension request "expand-path@openssh.com"
+
+This request supports canonicalisation of relative paths and
+those that need tilde-expansion, i.e. "~", "~/..." and "~user/..."
+These paths are expanded using shell-like rules and the resultant
+path is canonicalised similarly to SSH2_FXP_REALPATH.
+
+It is implemented as a SSH_FXP_EXTENDED request with the following
+format:
+
+	uint32		id
+	string		"expand-path@openssh.com"
+	string		path
+
+Its reply is the same format as that of SSH2_FXP_REALPATH.
+
+This extension is advertised in the SSH_FXP_VERSION hello with version
+"1".
+
+4.10. sftp: Extension request "copy-data"
+
+This request asks the server to copy data from one open file handle and
+write it to a different open file handle.  This avoids needing to transfer
+the data across the network twice (a download followed by an upload).
+
+	byte		SSH_FXP_EXTENDED
+	uint32		id
+	string		"copy-data"
+	string		read-from-handle
+	uint64		read-from-offset
+	uint64		read-data-length
+	string		write-to-handle
+	uint64		write-to-offset
+
+The server will copy read-data-length bytes starting from
+read-from-offset from the read-from-handle and write them to
+write-to-handle starting from write-to-offset, and then respond with a
+SSH_FXP_STATUS message.
+
+It's equivalent to issuing a series of SSH_FXP_READ requests on
+read-from-handle and a series of requests of SSH_FXP_WRITE on
+write-to-handle.
+
+If read-from-handle and write-to-handle are the same, the server will
+fail the request and respond with a SSH_FX_INVALID_PARAMETER message.
+
+If read-data-length is 0, then the server will read data from the
+read-from-handle until EOF is reached.
+
+This extension is advertised in the SSH_FXP_VERSION hello with version
+"1".
+
+This request is identical to the "copy-data" request documented in:
+
+https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-secsh-filexfer-extensions-00#section-7
+
+4.11. sftp: Extension request "home-directory"
+
+This request asks the server to expand the specified user's home directory.
+An empty username implies the current user.  This can be used by the client
+to expand ~/ type paths locally.
+
+	byte		SSH_FXP_EXTENDED
+	uint32		id
+	string		"home-directory"
+	string		username
+
+This extension is advertised in the SSH_FXP_VERSION hello with version
+"1".
+
+This provides similar information as the "expand-path@openssh.com" extension.
+
+This request is identical to the "home-directory" request documented in:
+
+https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-secsh-filexfer-extensions-00#section-5
+
+4.12. sftp: Extension request "users-groups-by-id@openssh.com"
+
+This request asks the server to return user and/or group names that
+correspond to one or more IDs (e.g. as returned from a SSH_FXP_STAT
+request). This may be used by the client to provide usernames in
+directory listings.
+
+	byte		SSH_FXP_EXTENDED
+	uint32		id
+	string		"users-groups-by-id@openssh.com"
+	string		uids
+	string		gids
+
+Where "uids" and "gids" consists of one or more integer user or group
+identifiers:
+
+	uint32		id-0
+	...
+
+The server will reply with a SSH_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY:
+
+	byte		SSH_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY
+	string		usernames
+	string		groupnames
+
+Where "username" and "groupnames" consists of names in identical request
+order to "uids" and "gids" respectively:
+
+	string		name-0
+	...
+
+If a name cannot be identified for a given user or group ID, an empty
+string will be returned in its place.
+
+It is acceptable for either "uids" or "gids" to be an empty set, in
+which case the respective "usernames" or "groupnames" list will also
+be empty.
+
+This extension is advertised in the SSH_FXP_VERSION hello with version
+"1".
+
+5. Miscellaneous changes
+
+5.1 Public key format
+
+OpenSSH public keys, as generated by ssh-keygen(1) and appearing in
+authorized_keys files, are formatted as a single line of text consisting
+of the public key algorithm name followed by a base64-encoded key blob.
+The public key blob (before base64 encoding) is the same format used for
+the encoding of public keys sent on the wire: as described in RFC4253
+section 6.6 for RSA and DSA keys, RFC5656 section 3.1 for ECDSA keys
+and the "New public key formats" section of PROTOCOL.certkeys for the
+OpenSSH certificate formats.
+
+5.2 Private key format
+
+OpenSSH private keys, as generated by ssh-keygen(1) use the format
+described in PROTOCOL.key by default. As a legacy option, PEM format
+(RFC7468) private keys are also supported for RSA, DSA and ECDSA keys
+and were the default format before OpenSSH 7.8.
+
+5.3 KRL format
+
+OpenSSH supports a compact format for Key Revocation Lists (KRLs). This
+format is described in the PROTOCOL.krl file.
+
+5.4 Connection multiplexing
+
+OpenSSH's connection multiplexing uses messages as described in
+PROTOCOL.mux over a Unix domain socket for communications between a
+master instance and later clients.
+
+5.5. Agent protocol extensions
+
+OpenSSH extends the usual agent protocol. These changes are documented
+in the PROTOCOL.agent file.
+
+$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL,v 1.48 2022/11/07 01:53:01 dtucker Exp $