Adding upstream version 15.5.upstream/15.5

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

1 files changed, 1645 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/src/backend/commands/user.c b/src/backend/commands/user.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cba8e19
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/backend/commands/user.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1645 @@
+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * user.c
+ *	  Commands for manipulating roles (formerly called users).
+ *
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2022, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
+ *
+ * src/backend/commands/user.c
+ *
+ *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+#include "postgres.h"
+
+#include "access/genam.h"
+#include "access/htup_details.h"
+#include "access/table.h"
+#include "access/xact.h"
+#include "catalog/binary_upgrade.h"
+#include "catalog/catalog.h"
+#include "catalog/dependency.h"
+#include "catalog/indexing.h"
+#include "catalog/objectaccess.h"
+#include "catalog/pg_auth_members.h"
+#include "catalog/pg_authid.h"
+#include "catalog/pg_database.h"
+#include "catalog/pg_db_role_setting.h"
+#include "commands/comment.h"
+#include "commands/dbcommands.h"
+#include "commands/defrem.h"
+#include "commands/seclabel.h"
+#include "commands/user.h"
+#include "libpq/crypt.h"
+#include "miscadmin.h"
+#include "storage/lmgr.h"
+#include "utils/acl.h"
+#include "utils/builtins.h"
+#include "utils/fmgroids.h"
+#include "utils/syscache.h"
+#include "utils/timestamp.h"
+
+/* Potentially set by pg_upgrade_support functions */
+Oid			binary_upgrade_next_pg_authid_oid = InvalidOid;
+
+
+/* GUC parameter */
+int			Password_encryption = PASSWORD_TYPE_SCRAM_SHA_256;
+
+/* Hook to check passwords in CreateRole() and AlterRole() */
+check_password_hook_type check_password_hook = NULL;
+
+static void AddRoleMems(const char *rolename, Oid roleid,
+						List *memberSpecs, List *memberIds,
+						Oid grantorId, bool admin_opt);
+static void DelRoleMems(const char *rolename, Oid roleid,
+						List *memberSpecs, List *memberIds,
+						bool admin_opt);
+
+
+/* Check if current user has createrole privileges */
+static bool
+have_createrole_privilege(void)
+{
+	return has_createrole_privilege(GetUserId());
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * CREATE ROLE
+ */
+Oid
+CreateRole(ParseState *pstate, CreateRoleStmt *stmt)
+{
+	Relation	pg_authid_rel;
+	TupleDesc	pg_authid_dsc;
+	HeapTuple	tuple;
+	Datum		new_record[Natts_pg_authid];
+	bool		new_record_nulls[Natts_pg_authid];
+	Oid			roleid;
+	ListCell   *item;
+	ListCell   *option;
+	char	   *password = NULL;	/* user password */
+	bool		issuper = false;	/* Make the user a superuser? */
+	bool		inherit = true; /* Auto inherit privileges? */
+	bool		createrole = false; /* Can this user create roles? */
+	bool		createdb = false;	/* Can the user create databases? */
+	bool		canlogin = false;	/* Can this user login? */
+	bool		isreplication = false;	/* Is this a replication role? */
+	bool		bypassrls = false;	/* Is this a row security enabled role? */
+	int			connlimit = -1; /* maximum connections allowed */
+	List	   *addroleto = NIL;	/* roles to make this a member of */
+	List	   *rolemembers = NIL;	/* roles to be members of this role */
+	List	   *adminmembers = NIL; /* roles to be admins of this role */
+	char	   *validUntil = NULL;	/* time the login is valid until */
+	Datum		validUntil_datum;	/* same, as timestamptz Datum */
+	bool		validUntil_null;
+	DefElem    *dpassword = NULL;
+	DefElem    *dissuper = NULL;
+	DefElem    *dinherit = NULL;
+	DefElem    *dcreaterole = NULL;
+	DefElem    *dcreatedb = NULL;
+	DefElem    *dcanlogin = NULL;
+	DefElem    *disreplication = NULL;
+	DefElem    *dconnlimit = NULL;
+	DefElem    *daddroleto = NULL;
+	DefElem    *drolemembers = NULL;
+	DefElem    *dadminmembers = NULL;
+	DefElem    *dvalidUntil = NULL;
+	DefElem    *dbypassRLS = NULL;
+
+	/* The defaults can vary depending on the original statement type */
+	switch (stmt->stmt_type)
+	{
+		case ROLESTMT_ROLE:
+			break;
+		case ROLESTMT_USER:
+			canlogin = true;
+			/* may eventually want inherit to default to false here */
+			break;
+		case ROLESTMT_GROUP:
+			break;
+	}
+
+	/* Extract options from the statement node tree */
+	foreach(option, stmt->options)
+	{
+		DefElem    *defel = (DefElem *) lfirst(option);
+
+		if (strcmp(defel->defname, "password") == 0)
+		{
+			if (dpassword)
+				errorConflictingDefElem(defel, pstate);
+			dpassword = defel;
+		}
+		else if (strcmp(defel->defname, "sysid") == 0)
+		{
+			ereport(NOTICE,
+					(errmsg("SYSID can no longer be specified")));
+		}
+		else if (strcmp(defel->defname, "superuser") == 0)
+		{
+			if (dissuper)
+				errorConflictingDefElem(defel, pstate);
+			dissuper = defel;
+		}
+		else if (strcmp(defel->defname, "inherit") == 0)
+		{
+			if (dinherit)
+				errorConflictingDefElem(defel, pstate);
+			dinherit = defel;
+		}
+		else if (strcmp(defel->defname, "createrole") == 0)
+		{
+			if (dcreaterole)
+				errorConflictingDefElem(defel, pstate);
+			dcreaterole = defel;
+		}
+		else if (strcmp(defel->defname, "createdb") == 0)
+		{
+			if (dcreatedb)
+				errorConflictingDefElem(defel, pstate);
+			dcreatedb = defel;
+		}
+		else if (strcmp(defel->defname, "canlogin") == 0)
+		{
+			if (dcanlogin)
+				errorConflictingDefElem(defel, pstate);
+			dcanlogin = defel;
+		}
+		else if (strcmp(defel->defname, "isreplication") == 0)
+		{
+			if (disreplication)
+				errorConflictingDefElem(defel, pstate);
+			disreplication = defel;
+		}
+		else if (strcmp(defel->defname, "connectionlimit") == 0)
+		{
+			if (dconnlimit)
+				errorConflictingDefElem(defel, pstate);
+			dconnlimit = defel;
+		}
+		else if (strcmp(defel->defname, "addroleto") == 0)
+		{
+			if (daddroleto)
+				errorConflictingDefElem(defel, pstate);
+			daddroleto = defel;
+		}
+		else if (strcmp(defel->defname, "rolemembers") == 0)
+		{
+			if (drolemembers)
+				errorConflictingDefElem(defel, pstate);
+			drolemembers = defel;
+		}
+		else if (strcmp(defel->defname, "adminmembers") == 0)
+		{
+			if (dadminmembers)
+				errorConflictingDefElem(defel, pstate);
+			dadminmembers = defel;
+		}
+		else if (strcmp(defel->defname, "validUntil") == 0)
+		{
+			if (dvalidUntil)
+				errorConflictingDefElem(defel, pstate);
+			dvalidUntil = defel;
+		}
+		else if (strcmp(defel->defname, "bypassrls") == 0)
+		{
+			if (dbypassRLS)
+				errorConflictingDefElem(defel, pstate);
+			dbypassRLS = defel;
+		}
+		else
+			elog(ERROR, "option \"%s\" not recognized",
+				 defel->defname);
+	}
+
+	if (dpassword && dpassword->arg)
+		password = strVal(dpassword->arg);
+	if (dissuper)
+		issuper = boolVal(dissuper->arg);
+	if (dinherit)
+		inherit = boolVal(dinherit->arg);
+	if (dcreaterole)
+		createrole = boolVal(dcreaterole->arg);
+	if (dcreatedb)
+		createdb = boolVal(dcreatedb->arg);
+	if (dcanlogin)
+		canlogin = boolVal(dcanlogin->arg);
+	if (disreplication)
+		isreplication = boolVal(disreplication->arg);
+	if (dconnlimit)
+	{
+		connlimit = intVal(dconnlimit->arg);
+		if (connlimit < -1)
+			ereport(ERROR,
+					(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_PARAMETER_VALUE),
+					 errmsg("invalid connection limit: %d", connlimit)));
+	}
+	if (daddroleto)
+		addroleto = (List *) daddroleto->arg;
+	if (drolemembers)
+		rolemembers = (List *) drolemembers->arg;
+	if (dadminmembers)
+		adminmembers = (List *) dadminmembers->arg;
+	if (dvalidUntil)
+		validUntil = strVal(dvalidUntil->arg);
+	if (dbypassRLS)
+		bypassrls = boolVal(dbypassRLS->arg);
+
+	/* Check some permissions first */
+	if (issuper)
+	{
+		if (!superuser())
+			ereport(ERROR,
+					(errcode(ERRCODE_INSUFFICIENT_PRIVILEGE),
+					 errmsg("must be superuser to create superusers")));
+	}
+	else if (isreplication)
+	{
+		if (!superuser())
+			ereport(ERROR,
+					(errcode(ERRCODE_INSUFFICIENT_PRIVILEGE),
+					 errmsg("must be superuser to create replication users")));
+	}
+	else if (bypassrls)
+	{
+		if (!superuser())
+			ereport(ERROR,
+					(errcode(ERRCODE_INSUFFICIENT_PRIVILEGE),
+					 errmsg("must be superuser to create bypassrls users")));
+	}
+	else
+	{
+		if (!have_createrole_privilege())
+			ereport(ERROR,
+					(errcode(ERRCODE_INSUFFICIENT_PRIVILEGE),
+					 errmsg("permission denied to create role")));
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Check that the user is not trying to create a role in the reserved
+	 * "pg_" namespace.
+	 */
+	if (IsReservedName(stmt->role))
+		ereport(ERROR,
+				(errcode(ERRCODE_RESERVED_NAME),
+				 errmsg("role name \"%s\" is reserved",
+						stmt->role),
+				 errdetail("Role names starting with \"pg_\" are reserved.")));
+
+	/*
+	 * If built with appropriate switch, whine when regression-testing
+	 * conventions for role names are violated.
+	 */
+#ifdef ENFORCE_REGRESSION_TEST_NAME_RESTRICTIONS
+	if (strncmp(stmt->role, "regress_", 8) != 0)
+		elog(WARNING, "roles created by regression test cases should have names starting with \"regress_\"");
+#endif
+
+	/*
+	 * Check the pg_authid relation to be certain the role doesn't already
+	 * exist.
+	 */
+	pg_authid_rel = table_open(AuthIdRelationId, RowExclusiveLock);
+	pg_authid_dsc = RelationGetDescr(pg_authid_rel);
+
+	if (OidIsValid(get_role_oid(stmt->role, true)))
+		ereport(ERROR,
+				(errcode(ERRCODE_DUPLICATE_OBJECT),
+				 errmsg("role \"%s\" already exists",
+						stmt->role)));
+
+	/* Convert validuntil to internal form */
+	if (validUntil)
+	{
+		validUntil_datum = DirectFunctionCall3(timestamptz_in,
+											   CStringGetDatum(validUntil),
+											   ObjectIdGetDatum(InvalidOid),
+											   Int32GetDatum(-1));
+		validUntil_null = false;
+	}
+	else
+	{
+		validUntil_datum = (Datum) 0;
+		validUntil_null = true;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Call the password checking hook if there is one defined
+	 */
+	if (check_password_hook && password)
+		(*check_password_hook) (stmt->role,
+								password,
+								get_password_type(password),
+								validUntil_datum,
+								validUntil_null);
+
+	/*
+	 * Build a tuple to insert
+	 */
+	MemSet(new_record, 0, sizeof(new_record));
+	MemSet(new_record_nulls, false, sizeof(new_record_nulls));
+
+	new_record[Anum_pg_authid_rolname - 1] =
+		DirectFunctionCall1(namein, CStringGetDatum(stmt->role));
+
+	new_record[Anum_pg_authid_rolsuper - 1] = BoolGetDatum(issuper);
+	new_record[Anum_pg_authid_rolinherit - 1] = BoolGetDatum(inherit);
+	new_record[Anum_pg_authid_rolcreaterole - 1] = BoolGetDatum(createrole);
+	new_record[Anum_pg_authid_rolcreatedb - 1] = BoolGetDatum(createdb);
+	new_record[Anum_pg_authid_rolcanlogin - 1] = BoolGetDatum(canlogin);
+	new_record[Anum_pg_authid_rolreplication - 1] = BoolGetDatum(isreplication);
+	new_record[Anum_pg_authid_rolconnlimit - 1] = Int32GetDatum(connlimit);
+
+	if (password)
+	{
+		char	   *shadow_pass;
+		const char *logdetail = NULL;
+
+		/*
+		 * Don't allow an empty password. Libpq treats an empty password the
+		 * same as no password at all, and won't even try to authenticate. But
+		 * other clients might, so allowing it would be confusing. By clearing
+		 * the password when an empty string is specified, the account is
+		 * consistently locked for all clients.
+		 *
+		 * Note that this only covers passwords stored in the database itself.
+		 * There are also checks in the authentication code, to forbid an
+		 * empty password from being used with authentication methods that
+		 * fetch the password from an external system, like LDAP or PAM.
+		 */
+		if (password[0] == '\0' ||
+			plain_crypt_verify(stmt->role, password, "", &logdetail) == STATUS_OK)
+		{
+			ereport(NOTICE,
+					(errmsg("empty string is not a valid password, clearing password")));
+			new_record_nulls[Anum_pg_authid_rolpassword - 1] = true;
+		}
+		else
+		{
+			/* Encrypt the password to the requested format. */
+			shadow_pass = encrypt_password(Password_encryption, stmt->role,
+										   password);
+			new_record[Anum_pg_authid_rolpassword - 1] =
+				CStringGetTextDatum(shadow_pass);
+		}
+	}
+	else
+		new_record_nulls[Anum_pg_authid_rolpassword - 1] = true;
+
+	new_record[Anum_pg_authid_rolvaliduntil - 1] = validUntil_datum;
+	new_record_nulls[Anum_pg_authid_rolvaliduntil - 1] = validUntil_null;
+
+	new_record[Anum_pg_authid_rolbypassrls - 1] = BoolGetDatum(bypassrls);
+
+	/*
+	 * pg_largeobject_metadata contains pg_authid.oid's, so we use the
+	 * binary-upgrade override.
+	 */
+	if (IsBinaryUpgrade)
+	{
+		if (!OidIsValid(binary_upgrade_next_pg_authid_oid))
+			ereport(ERROR,
+					(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_PARAMETER_VALUE),
+					 errmsg("pg_authid OID value not set when in binary upgrade mode")));
+
+		roleid = binary_upgrade_next_pg_authid_oid;
+		binary_upgrade_next_pg_authid_oid = InvalidOid;
+	}
+	else
+	{
+		roleid = GetNewOidWithIndex(pg_authid_rel, AuthIdOidIndexId,
+									Anum_pg_authid_oid);
+	}
+
+	new_record[Anum_pg_authid_oid - 1] = ObjectIdGetDatum(roleid);
+
+	tuple = heap_form_tuple(pg_authid_dsc, new_record, new_record_nulls);
+
+	/*
+	 * Insert new record in the pg_authid table
+	 */
+	CatalogTupleInsert(pg_authid_rel, tuple);
+
+	/*
+	 * Advance command counter so we can see new record; else tests in
+	 * AddRoleMems may fail.
+	 */
+	if (addroleto || adminmembers || rolemembers)
+		CommandCounterIncrement();
+
+	/*
+	 * Add the new role to the specified existing roles.
+	 */
+	if (addroleto)
+	{
+		RoleSpec   *thisrole = makeNode(RoleSpec);
+		List	   *thisrole_list = list_make1(thisrole);
+		List	   *thisrole_oidlist = list_make1_oid(roleid);
+
+		thisrole->roletype = ROLESPEC_CSTRING;
+		thisrole->rolename = stmt->role;
+		thisrole->location = -1;
+
+		foreach(item, addroleto)
+		{
+			RoleSpec   *oldrole = lfirst(item);
+			HeapTuple	oldroletup = get_rolespec_tuple(oldrole);
+			Form_pg_authid oldroleform = (Form_pg_authid) GETSTRUCT(oldroletup);
+			Oid			oldroleid = oldroleform->oid;
+			char	   *oldrolename = NameStr(oldroleform->rolname);
+
+			AddRoleMems(oldrolename, oldroleid,
+						thisrole_list,
+						thisrole_oidlist,
+						GetUserId(), false);
+
+			ReleaseSysCache(oldroletup);
+		}
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Add the specified members to this new role. adminmembers get the admin
+	 * option, rolemembers don't.
+	 */
+	AddRoleMems(stmt->role, roleid,
+				adminmembers, roleSpecsToIds(adminmembers),
+				GetUserId(), true);
+	AddRoleMems(stmt->role, roleid,
+				rolemembers, roleSpecsToIds(rolemembers),
+				GetUserId(), false);
+
+	/* Post creation hook for new role */
+	InvokeObjectPostCreateHook(AuthIdRelationId, roleid, 0);
+
+	/*
+	 * Close pg_authid, but keep lock till commit.
+	 */
+	table_close(pg_authid_rel, NoLock);
+
+	return roleid;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * ALTER ROLE
+ *
+ * Note: the rolemembers option accepted here is intended to support the
+ * backwards-compatible ALTER GROUP syntax.  Although it will work to say
+ * "ALTER ROLE role ROLE rolenames", we don't document it.
+ */
+Oid
+AlterRole(ParseState *pstate, AlterRoleStmt *stmt)
+{
+	Datum		new_record[Natts_pg_authid];
+	bool		new_record_nulls[Natts_pg_authid];
+	bool		new_record_repl[Natts_pg_authid];
+	Relation	pg_authid_rel;
+	TupleDesc	pg_authid_dsc;
+	HeapTuple	tuple,
+				new_tuple;
+	Form_pg_authid authform;
+	ListCell   *option;
+	char	   *rolename;
+	char	   *password = NULL;	/* user password */
+	int			connlimit = -1; /* maximum connections allowed */
+	char	   *validUntil = NULL;	/* time the login is valid until */
+	Datum		validUntil_datum;	/* same, as timestamptz Datum */
+	bool		validUntil_null;
+	DefElem    *dpassword = NULL;
+	DefElem    *dissuper = NULL;
+	DefElem    *dinherit = NULL;
+	DefElem    *dcreaterole = NULL;
+	DefElem    *dcreatedb = NULL;
+	DefElem    *dcanlogin = NULL;
+	DefElem    *disreplication = NULL;
+	DefElem    *dconnlimit = NULL;
+	DefElem    *drolemembers = NULL;
+	DefElem    *dvalidUntil = NULL;
+	DefElem    *dbypassRLS = NULL;
+	Oid			roleid;
+
+	check_rolespec_name(stmt->role,
+						_("Cannot alter reserved roles."));
+
+	/* Extract options from the statement node tree */
+	foreach(option, stmt->options)
+	{
+		DefElem    *defel = (DefElem *) lfirst(option);
+
+		if (strcmp(defel->defname, "password") == 0)
+		{
+			if (dpassword)
+				errorConflictingDefElem(defel, pstate);
+			dpassword = defel;
+		}
+		else if (strcmp(defel->defname, "superuser") == 0)
+		{
+			if (dissuper)
+				errorConflictingDefElem(defel, pstate);
+			dissuper = defel;
+		}
+		else if (strcmp(defel->defname, "inherit") == 0)
+		{
+			if (dinherit)
+				errorConflictingDefElem(defel, pstate);
+			dinherit = defel;
+		}
+		else if (strcmp(defel->defname, "createrole") == 0)
+		{
+			if (dcreaterole)
+				errorConflictingDefElem(defel, pstate);
+			dcreaterole = defel;
+		}
+		else if (strcmp(defel->defname, "createdb") == 0)
+		{
+			if (dcreatedb)
+				errorConflictingDefElem(defel, pstate);
+			dcreatedb = defel;
+		}
+		else if (strcmp(defel->defname, "canlogin") == 0)
+		{
+			if (dcanlogin)
+				errorConflictingDefElem(defel, pstate);
+			dcanlogin = defel;
+		}
+		else if (strcmp(defel->defname, "isreplication") == 0)
+		{
+			if (disreplication)
+				errorConflictingDefElem(defel, pstate);
+			disreplication = defel;
+		}
+		else if (strcmp(defel->defname, "connectionlimit") == 0)
+		{
+			if (dconnlimit)
+				errorConflictingDefElem(defel, pstate);
+			dconnlimit = defel;
+		}
+		else if (strcmp(defel->defname, "rolemembers") == 0 &&
+				 stmt->action != 0)
+		{
+			if (drolemembers)
+				errorConflictingDefElem(defel, pstate);
+			drolemembers = defel;
+		}
+		else if (strcmp(defel->defname, "validUntil") == 0)
+		{
+			if (dvalidUntil)
+				errorConflictingDefElem(defel, pstate);
+			dvalidUntil = defel;
+		}
+		else if (strcmp(defel->defname, "bypassrls") == 0)
+		{
+			if (dbypassRLS)
+				errorConflictingDefElem(defel, pstate);
+			dbypassRLS = defel;
+		}
+		else
+			elog(ERROR, "option \"%s\" not recognized",
+				 defel->defname);
+	}
+
+	if (dpassword && dpassword->arg)
+		password = strVal(dpassword->arg);
+	if (dconnlimit)
+	{
+		connlimit = intVal(dconnlimit->arg);
+		if (connlimit < -1)
+			ereport(ERROR,
+					(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_PARAMETER_VALUE),
+					 errmsg("invalid connection limit: %d", connlimit)));
+	}
+	if (dvalidUntil)
+		validUntil = strVal(dvalidUntil->arg);
+
+	/*
+	 * Scan the pg_authid relation to be certain the user exists.
+	 */
+	pg_authid_rel = table_open(AuthIdRelationId, RowExclusiveLock);
+	pg_authid_dsc = RelationGetDescr(pg_authid_rel);
+
+	tuple = get_rolespec_tuple(stmt->role);
+	authform = (Form_pg_authid) GETSTRUCT(tuple);
+	rolename = pstrdup(NameStr(authform->rolname));
+	roleid = authform->oid;
+
+	/*
+	 * To mess with a superuser or replication role in any way you gotta be
+	 * superuser.  We also insist on superuser to change the BYPASSRLS
+	 * property.  Otherwise, if you don't have createrole, you're only allowed
+	 * to change your own password.
+	 */
+	if (authform->rolsuper || dissuper)
+	{
+		if (!superuser())
+			ereport(ERROR,
+					(errcode(ERRCODE_INSUFFICIENT_PRIVILEGE),
+					 errmsg("must be superuser to alter superuser roles or change superuser attribute")));
+	}
+	else if (authform->rolreplication || disreplication)
+	{
+		if (!superuser())
+			ereport(ERROR,
+					(errcode(ERRCODE_INSUFFICIENT_PRIVILEGE),
+					 errmsg("must be superuser to alter replication roles or change replication attribute")));
+	}
+	else if (dbypassRLS)
+	{
+		if (!superuser())
+			ereport(ERROR,
+					(errcode(ERRCODE_INSUFFICIENT_PRIVILEGE),
+					 errmsg("must be superuser to change bypassrls attribute")));
+	}
+	else if (!have_createrole_privilege())
+	{
+		/* check the rest */
+		if (dinherit || dcreaterole || dcreatedb || dcanlogin || dconnlimit ||
+			drolemembers || dvalidUntil || !dpassword || roleid != GetUserId())
+			ereport(ERROR,
+					(errcode(ERRCODE_INSUFFICIENT_PRIVILEGE),
+					 errmsg("permission denied")));
+	}
+
+	/* Convert validuntil to internal form */
+	if (dvalidUntil)
+	{
+		validUntil_datum = DirectFunctionCall3(timestamptz_in,
+											   CStringGetDatum(validUntil),
+											   ObjectIdGetDatum(InvalidOid),
+											   Int32GetDatum(-1));
+		validUntil_null = false;
+	}
+	else
+	{
+		/* fetch existing setting in case hook needs it */
+		validUntil_datum = SysCacheGetAttr(AUTHNAME, tuple,
+										   Anum_pg_authid_rolvaliduntil,
+										   &validUntil_null);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Call the password checking hook if there is one defined
+	 */
+	if (check_password_hook && password)
+		(*check_password_hook) (rolename,
+								password,
+								get_password_type(password),
+								validUntil_datum,
+								validUntil_null);
+
+	/*
+	 * Build an updated tuple, perusing the information just obtained
+	 */
+	MemSet(new_record, 0, sizeof(new_record));
+	MemSet(new_record_nulls, false, sizeof(new_record_nulls));
+	MemSet(new_record_repl, false, sizeof(new_record_repl));
+
+	/*
+	 * issuper/createrole/etc
+	 */
+	if (dissuper)
+	{
+		new_record[Anum_pg_authid_rolsuper - 1] = BoolGetDatum(boolVal(dissuper->arg));
+		new_record_repl[Anum_pg_authid_rolsuper - 1] = true;
+	}
+
+	if (dinherit)
+	{
+		new_record[Anum_pg_authid_rolinherit - 1] = BoolGetDatum(boolVal(dinherit->arg));
+		new_record_repl[Anum_pg_authid_rolinherit - 1] = true;
+	}
+
+	if (dcreaterole)
+	{
+		new_record[Anum_pg_authid_rolcreaterole - 1] = BoolGetDatum(boolVal(dcreaterole->arg));
+		new_record_repl[Anum_pg_authid_rolcreaterole - 1] = true;
+	}
+
+	if (dcreatedb)
+	{
+		new_record[Anum_pg_authid_rolcreatedb - 1] = BoolGetDatum(boolVal(dcreatedb->arg));
+		new_record_repl[Anum_pg_authid_rolcreatedb - 1] = true;
+	}
+
+	if (dcanlogin)
+	{
+		new_record[Anum_pg_authid_rolcanlogin - 1] = BoolGetDatum(boolVal(dcanlogin->arg));
+		new_record_repl[Anum_pg_authid_rolcanlogin - 1] = true;
+	}
+
+	if (disreplication)
+	{
+		new_record[Anum_pg_authid_rolreplication - 1] = BoolGetDatum(boolVal(disreplication->arg));
+		new_record_repl[Anum_pg_authid_rolreplication - 1] = true;
+	}
+
+	if (dconnlimit)
+	{
+		new_record[Anum_pg_authid_rolconnlimit - 1] = Int32GetDatum(connlimit);
+		new_record_repl[Anum_pg_authid_rolconnlimit - 1] = true;
+	}
+
+	/* password */
+	if (password)
+	{
+		char	   *shadow_pass;
+		const char *logdetail = NULL;
+
+		/* Like in CREATE USER, don't allow an empty password. */
+		if (password[0] == '\0' ||
+			plain_crypt_verify(rolename, password, "", &logdetail) == STATUS_OK)
+		{
+			ereport(NOTICE,
+					(errmsg("empty string is not a valid password, clearing password")));
+			new_record_nulls[Anum_pg_authid_rolpassword - 1] = true;
+		}
+		else
+		{
+			/* Encrypt the password to the requested format. */
+			shadow_pass = encrypt_password(Password_encryption, rolename,
+										   password);
+			new_record[Anum_pg_authid_rolpassword - 1] =
+				CStringGetTextDatum(shadow_pass);
+		}
+		new_record_repl[Anum_pg_authid_rolpassword - 1] = true;
+	}
+
+	/* unset password */
+	if (dpassword && dpassword->arg == NULL)
+	{
+		new_record_repl[Anum_pg_authid_rolpassword - 1] = true;
+		new_record_nulls[Anum_pg_authid_rolpassword - 1] = true;
+	}
+
+	/* valid until */
+	new_record[Anum_pg_authid_rolvaliduntil - 1] = validUntil_datum;
+	new_record_nulls[Anum_pg_authid_rolvaliduntil - 1] = validUntil_null;
+	new_record_repl[Anum_pg_authid_rolvaliduntil - 1] = true;
+
+	if (dbypassRLS)
+	{
+		new_record[Anum_pg_authid_rolbypassrls - 1] = BoolGetDatum(boolVal(dbypassRLS->arg));
+		new_record_repl[Anum_pg_authid_rolbypassrls - 1] = true;
+	}
+
+	new_tuple = heap_modify_tuple(tuple, pg_authid_dsc, new_record,
+								  new_record_nulls, new_record_repl);
+	CatalogTupleUpdate(pg_authid_rel, &tuple->t_self, new_tuple);
+
+	InvokeObjectPostAlterHook(AuthIdRelationId, roleid, 0);
+
+	ReleaseSysCache(tuple);
+	heap_freetuple(new_tuple);
+
+	/*
+	 * Advance command counter so we can see new record; else tests in
+	 * AddRoleMems may fail.
+	 */
+	if (drolemembers)
+	{
+		List	   *rolemembers = (List *) drolemembers->arg;
+
+		CommandCounterIncrement();
+
+		if (stmt->action == +1) /* add members to role */
+			AddRoleMems(rolename, roleid,
+						rolemembers, roleSpecsToIds(rolemembers),
+						GetUserId(), false);
+		else if (stmt->action == -1)	/* drop members from role */
+			DelRoleMems(rolename, roleid,
+						rolemembers, roleSpecsToIds(rolemembers),
+						false);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Close pg_authid, but keep lock till commit.
+	 */
+	table_close(pg_authid_rel, NoLock);
+
+	return roleid;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * ALTER ROLE ... SET
+ */
+Oid
+AlterRoleSet(AlterRoleSetStmt *stmt)
+{
+	HeapTuple	roletuple;
+	Form_pg_authid roleform;
+	Oid			databaseid = InvalidOid;
+	Oid			roleid = InvalidOid;
+
+	if (stmt->role)
+	{
+		check_rolespec_name(stmt->role,
+							_("Cannot alter reserved roles."));
+
+		roletuple = get_rolespec_tuple(stmt->role);
+		roleform = (Form_pg_authid) GETSTRUCT(roletuple);
+		roleid = roleform->oid;
+
+		/*
+		 * Obtain a lock on the role and make sure it didn't go away in the
+		 * meantime.
+		 */
+		shdepLockAndCheckObject(AuthIdRelationId, roleid);
+
+		/*
+		 * To mess with a superuser you gotta be superuser; else you need
+		 * createrole, or just want to change your own settings
+		 */
+		if (roleform->rolsuper)
+		{
+			if (!superuser())
+				ereport(ERROR,
+						(errcode(ERRCODE_INSUFFICIENT_PRIVILEGE),
+						 errmsg("must be superuser to alter superusers")));
+		}
+		else
+		{
+			if (!have_createrole_privilege() && roleid != GetUserId())
+				ereport(ERROR,
+						(errcode(ERRCODE_INSUFFICIENT_PRIVILEGE),
+						 errmsg("permission denied")));
+		}
+
+		ReleaseSysCache(roletuple);
+	}
+
+	/* look up and lock the database, if specified */
+	if (stmt->database != NULL)
+	{
+		databaseid = get_database_oid(stmt->database, false);
+		shdepLockAndCheckObject(DatabaseRelationId, databaseid);
+
+		if (!stmt->role)
+		{
+			/*
+			 * If no role is specified, then this is effectively the same as
+			 * ALTER DATABASE ... SET, so use the same permission check.
+			 */
+			if (!pg_database_ownercheck(databaseid, GetUserId()))
+				aclcheck_error(ACLCHECK_NOT_OWNER, OBJECT_DATABASE,
+							   stmt->database);
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (!stmt->role && !stmt->database)
+	{
+		/* Must be superuser to alter settings globally. */
+		if (!superuser())
+			ereport(ERROR,
+					(errcode(ERRCODE_INSUFFICIENT_PRIVILEGE),
+					 errmsg("must be superuser to alter settings globally")));
+	}
+
+	AlterSetting(databaseid, roleid, stmt->setstmt);
+
+	return roleid;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * DROP ROLE
+ */
+void
+DropRole(DropRoleStmt *stmt)
+{
+	Relation	pg_authid_rel,
+				pg_auth_members_rel;
+	ListCell   *item;
+
+	if (!have_createrole_privilege())
+		ereport(ERROR,
+				(errcode(ERRCODE_INSUFFICIENT_PRIVILEGE),
+				 errmsg("permission denied to drop role")));
+
+	/*
+	 * Scan the pg_authid relation to find the Oid of the role(s) to be
+	 * deleted.
+	 */
+	pg_authid_rel = table_open(AuthIdRelationId, RowExclusiveLock);
+	pg_auth_members_rel = table_open(AuthMemRelationId, RowExclusiveLock);
+
+	foreach(item, stmt->roles)
+	{
+		RoleSpec   *rolspec = lfirst(item);
+		char	   *role;
+		HeapTuple	tuple,
+					tmp_tuple;
+		Form_pg_authid roleform;
+		ScanKeyData scankey;
+		char	   *detail;
+		char	   *detail_log;
+		SysScanDesc sscan;
+		Oid			roleid;
+
+		if (rolspec->roletype != ROLESPEC_CSTRING)
+			ereport(ERROR,
+					(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_PARAMETER_VALUE),
+					 errmsg("cannot use special role specifier in DROP ROLE")));
+		role = rolspec->rolename;
+
+		tuple = SearchSysCache1(AUTHNAME, PointerGetDatum(role));
+		if (!HeapTupleIsValid(tuple))
+		{
+			if (!stmt->missing_ok)
+			{
+				ereport(ERROR,
+						(errcode(ERRCODE_UNDEFINED_OBJECT),
+						 errmsg("role \"%s\" does not exist", role)));
+			}
+			else
+			{
+				ereport(NOTICE,
+						(errmsg("role \"%s\" does not exist, skipping",
+								role)));
+			}
+
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		roleform = (Form_pg_authid) GETSTRUCT(tuple);
+		roleid = roleform->oid;
+
+		if (roleid == GetUserId())
+			ereport(ERROR,
+					(errcode(ERRCODE_OBJECT_IN_USE),
+					 errmsg("current user cannot be dropped")));
+		if (roleid == GetOuterUserId())
+			ereport(ERROR,
+					(errcode(ERRCODE_OBJECT_IN_USE),
+					 errmsg("current user cannot be dropped")));
+		if (roleid == GetSessionUserId())
+			ereport(ERROR,
+					(errcode(ERRCODE_OBJECT_IN_USE),
+					 errmsg("session user cannot be dropped")));
+
+		/*
+		 * For safety's sake, we allow createrole holders to drop ordinary
+		 * roles but not superuser roles.  This is mainly to avoid the
+		 * scenario where you accidentally drop the last superuser.
+		 */
+		if (roleform->rolsuper && !superuser())
+			ereport(ERROR,
+					(errcode(ERRCODE_INSUFFICIENT_PRIVILEGE),
+					 errmsg("must be superuser to drop superusers")));
+
+		/* DROP hook for the role being removed */
+		InvokeObjectDropHook(AuthIdRelationId, roleid, 0);
+
+		/*
+		 * Lock the role, so nobody can add dependencies to her while we drop
+		 * her.  We keep the lock until the end of transaction.
+		 */
+		LockSharedObject(AuthIdRelationId, roleid, 0, AccessExclusiveLock);
+
+		/* Check for pg_shdepend entries depending on this role */
+		if (checkSharedDependencies(AuthIdRelationId, roleid,
+									&detail, &detail_log))
+			ereport(ERROR,
+					(errcode(ERRCODE_DEPENDENT_OBJECTS_STILL_EXIST),
+					 errmsg("role \"%s\" cannot be dropped because some objects depend on it",
+							role),
+					 errdetail_internal("%s", detail),
+					 errdetail_log("%s", detail_log)));
+
+		/*
+		 * Remove the role from the pg_authid table
+		 */
+		CatalogTupleDelete(pg_authid_rel, &tuple->t_self);
+
+		ReleaseSysCache(tuple);
+
+		/*
+		 * Remove role from the pg_auth_members table.  We have to remove all
+		 * tuples that show it as either a role or a member.
+		 *
+		 * XXX what about grantor entries?	Maybe we should do one heap scan.
+		 */
+		ScanKeyInit(&scankey,
+					Anum_pg_auth_members_roleid,
+					BTEqualStrategyNumber, F_OIDEQ,
+					ObjectIdGetDatum(roleid));
+
+		sscan = systable_beginscan(pg_auth_members_rel, AuthMemRoleMemIndexId,
+								   true, NULL, 1, &scankey);
+
+		while (HeapTupleIsValid(tmp_tuple = systable_getnext(sscan)))
+		{
+			CatalogTupleDelete(pg_auth_members_rel, &tmp_tuple->t_self);
+		}
+
+		systable_endscan(sscan);
+
+		ScanKeyInit(&scankey,
+					Anum_pg_auth_members_member,
+					BTEqualStrategyNumber, F_OIDEQ,
+					ObjectIdGetDatum(roleid));
+
+		sscan = systable_beginscan(pg_auth_members_rel, AuthMemMemRoleIndexId,
+								   true, NULL, 1, &scankey);
+
+		while (HeapTupleIsValid(tmp_tuple = systable_getnext(sscan)))
+		{
+			CatalogTupleDelete(pg_auth_members_rel, &tmp_tuple->t_self);
+		}
+
+		systable_endscan(sscan);
+
+		/*
+		 * Remove any comments or security labels on this role.
+		 */
+		DeleteSharedComments(roleid, AuthIdRelationId);
+		DeleteSharedSecurityLabel(roleid, AuthIdRelationId);
+
+		/*
+		 * Remove settings for this role.
+		 */
+		DropSetting(InvalidOid, roleid);
+
+		/*
+		 * Advance command counter so that later iterations of this loop will
+		 * see the changes already made.  This is essential if, for example,
+		 * we are trying to drop both a role and one of its direct members ---
+		 * we'll get an error if we try to delete the linking pg_auth_members
+		 * tuple twice.  (We do not need a CCI between the two delete loops
+		 * above, because it's not allowed for a role to directly contain
+		 * itself.)
+		 */
+		CommandCounterIncrement();
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Now we can clean up; but keep locks until commit.
+	 */
+	table_close(pg_auth_members_rel, NoLock);
+	table_close(pg_authid_rel, NoLock);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Rename role
+ */
+ObjectAddress
+RenameRole(const char *oldname, const char *newname)
+{
+	HeapTuple	oldtuple,
+				newtuple;
+	TupleDesc	dsc;
+	Relation	rel;
+	Datum		datum;
+	bool		isnull;
+	Datum		repl_val[Natts_pg_authid];
+	bool		repl_null[Natts_pg_authid];
+	bool		repl_repl[Natts_pg_authid];
+	int			i;
+	Oid			roleid;
+	ObjectAddress address;
+	Form_pg_authid authform;
+
+	rel = table_open(AuthIdRelationId, RowExclusiveLock);
+	dsc = RelationGetDescr(rel);
+
+	oldtuple = SearchSysCache1(AUTHNAME, CStringGetDatum(oldname));
+	if (!HeapTupleIsValid(oldtuple))
+		ereport(ERROR,
+				(errcode(ERRCODE_UNDEFINED_OBJECT),
+				 errmsg("role \"%s\" does not exist", oldname)));
+
+	/*
+	 * XXX Client applications probably store the session user somewhere, so
+	 * renaming it could cause confusion.  On the other hand, there may not be
+	 * an actual problem besides a little confusion, so think about this and
+	 * decide.  Same for SET ROLE ... we don't restrict renaming the current
+	 * effective userid, though.
+	 */
+
+	authform = (Form_pg_authid) GETSTRUCT(oldtuple);
+	roleid = authform->oid;
+
+	if (roleid == GetSessionUserId())
+		ereport(ERROR,
+				(errcode(ERRCODE_FEATURE_NOT_SUPPORTED),
+				 errmsg("session user cannot be renamed")));
+	if (roleid == GetOuterUserId())
+		ereport(ERROR,
+				(errcode(ERRCODE_FEATURE_NOT_SUPPORTED),
+				 errmsg("current user cannot be renamed")));
+
+	/*
+	 * Check that the user is not trying to rename a system role and not
+	 * trying to rename a role into the reserved "pg_" namespace.
+	 */
+	if (IsReservedName(NameStr(authform->rolname)))
+		ereport(ERROR,
+				(errcode(ERRCODE_RESERVED_NAME),
+				 errmsg("role name \"%s\" is reserved",
+						NameStr(authform->rolname)),
+				 errdetail("Role names starting with \"pg_\" are reserved.")));
+
+	if (IsReservedName(newname))
+		ereport(ERROR,
+				(errcode(ERRCODE_RESERVED_NAME),
+				 errmsg("role name \"%s\" is reserved",
+						newname),
+				 errdetail("Role names starting with \"pg_\" are reserved.")));
+
+	/*
+	 * If built with appropriate switch, whine when regression-testing
+	 * conventions for role names are violated.
+	 */
+#ifdef ENFORCE_REGRESSION_TEST_NAME_RESTRICTIONS
+	if (strncmp(newname, "regress_", 8) != 0)
+		elog(WARNING, "roles created by regression test cases should have names starting with \"regress_\"");
+#endif
+
+	/* make sure the new name doesn't exist */
+	if (SearchSysCacheExists1(AUTHNAME, CStringGetDatum(newname)))
+		ereport(ERROR,
+				(errcode(ERRCODE_DUPLICATE_OBJECT),
+				 errmsg("role \"%s\" already exists", newname)));
+
+	/*
+	 * createrole is enough privilege unless you want to mess with a superuser
+	 */
+	if (((Form_pg_authid) GETSTRUCT(oldtuple))->rolsuper)
+	{
+		if (!superuser())
+			ereport(ERROR,
+					(errcode(ERRCODE_INSUFFICIENT_PRIVILEGE),
+					 errmsg("must be superuser to rename superusers")));
+	}
+	else
+	{
+		if (!have_createrole_privilege())
+			ereport(ERROR,
+					(errcode(ERRCODE_INSUFFICIENT_PRIVILEGE),
+					 errmsg("permission denied to rename role")));
+	}
+
+	/* OK, construct the modified tuple */
+	for (i = 0; i < Natts_pg_authid; i++)
+		repl_repl[i] = false;
+
+	repl_repl[Anum_pg_authid_rolname - 1] = true;
+	repl_val[Anum_pg_authid_rolname - 1] = DirectFunctionCall1(namein,
+															   CStringGetDatum(newname));
+	repl_null[Anum_pg_authid_rolname - 1] = false;
+
+	datum = heap_getattr(oldtuple, Anum_pg_authid_rolpassword, dsc, &isnull);
+
+	if (!isnull && get_password_type(TextDatumGetCString(datum)) == PASSWORD_TYPE_MD5)
+	{
+		/* MD5 uses the username as salt, so just clear it on a rename */
+		repl_repl[Anum_pg_authid_rolpassword - 1] = true;
+		repl_null[Anum_pg_authid_rolpassword - 1] = true;
+
+		ereport(NOTICE,
+				(errmsg("MD5 password cleared because of role rename")));
+	}
+
+	newtuple = heap_modify_tuple(oldtuple, dsc, repl_val, repl_null, repl_repl);
+	CatalogTupleUpdate(rel, &oldtuple->t_self, newtuple);
+
+	InvokeObjectPostAlterHook(AuthIdRelationId, roleid, 0);
+
+	ObjectAddressSet(address, AuthIdRelationId, roleid);
+
+	ReleaseSysCache(oldtuple);
+
+	/*
+	 * Close pg_authid, but keep lock till commit.
+	 */
+	table_close(rel, NoLock);
+
+	return address;
+}
+
+/*
+ * GrantRoleStmt
+ *
+ * Grant/Revoke roles to/from roles
+ */
+void
+GrantRole(GrantRoleStmt *stmt)
+{
+	Relation	pg_authid_rel;
+	Oid			grantor;
+	List	   *grantee_ids;
+	ListCell   *item;
+
+	if (stmt->grantor)
+		grantor = get_rolespec_oid(stmt->grantor, false);
+	else
+		grantor = GetUserId();
+
+	grantee_ids = roleSpecsToIds(stmt->grantee_roles);
+
+	/* AccessShareLock is enough since we aren't modifying pg_authid */
+	pg_authid_rel = table_open(AuthIdRelationId, AccessShareLock);
+
+	/*
+	 * Step through all of the granted roles and add/remove entries for the
+	 * grantees, or, if admin_opt is set, then just add/remove the admin
+	 * option.
+	 *
+	 * Note: Permissions checking is done by AddRoleMems/DelRoleMems
+	 */
+	foreach(item, stmt->granted_roles)
+	{
+		AccessPriv *priv = (AccessPriv *) lfirst(item);
+		char	   *rolename = priv->priv_name;
+		Oid			roleid;
+
+		/* Must reject priv(columns) and ALL PRIVILEGES(columns) */
+		if (rolename == NULL || priv->cols != NIL)
+			ereport(ERROR,
+					(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_GRANT_OPERATION),
+					 errmsg("column names cannot be included in GRANT/REVOKE ROLE")));
+
+		roleid = get_role_oid(rolename, false);
+		if (stmt->is_grant)
+			AddRoleMems(rolename, roleid,
+						stmt->grantee_roles, grantee_ids,
+						grantor, stmt->admin_opt);
+		else
+			DelRoleMems(rolename, roleid,
+						stmt->grantee_roles, grantee_ids,
+						stmt->admin_opt);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Close pg_authid, but keep lock till commit.
+	 */
+	table_close(pg_authid_rel, NoLock);
+}
+
+/*
+ * DropOwnedObjects
+ *
+ * Drop the objects owned by a given list of roles.
+ */
+void
+DropOwnedObjects(DropOwnedStmt *stmt)
+{
+	List	   *role_ids = roleSpecsToIds(stmt->roles);
+	ListCell   *cell;
+
+	/* Check privileges */
+	foreach(cell, role_ids)
+	{
+		Oid			roleid = lfirst_oid(cell);
+
+		if (!has_privs_of_role(GetUserId(), roleid))
+			ereport(ERROR,
+					(errcode(ERRCODE_INSUFFICIENT_PRIVILEGE),
+					 errmsg("permission denied to drop objects")));
+	}
+
+	/* Ok, do it */
+	shdepDropOwned(role_ids, stmt->behavior);
+}
+
+/*
+ * ReassignOwnedObjects
+ *
+ * Give the objects owned by a given list of roles away to another user.
+ */
+void
+ReassignOwnedObjects(ReassignOwnedStmt *stmt)
+{
+	List	   *role_ids = roleSpecsToIds(stmt->roles);
+	ListCell   *cell;
+	Oid			newrole;
+
+	/* Check privileges */
+	foreach(cell, role_ids)
+	{
+		Oid			roleid = lfirst_oid(cell);
+
+		if (!has_privs_of_role(GetUserId(), roleid))
+			ereport(ERROR,
+					(errcode(ERRCODE_INSUFFICIENT_PRIVILEGE),
+					 errmsg("permission denied to reassign objects")));
+	}
+
+	/* Must have privileges on the receiving side too */
+	newrole = get_rolespec_oid(stmt->newrole, false);
+
+	if (!has_privs_of_role(GetUserId(), newrole))
+		ereport(ERROR,
+				(errcode(ERRCODE_INSUFFICIENT_PRIVILEGE),
+				 errmsg("permission denied to reassign objects")));
+
+	/* Ok, do it */
+	shdepReassignOwned(role_ids, newrole);
+}
+
+/*
+ * roleSpecsToIds
+ *
+ * Given a list of RoleSpecs, generate a list of role OIDs in the same order.
+ *
+ * ROLESPEC_PUBLIC is not allowed.
+ */
+List *
+roleSpecsToIds(List *memberNames)
+{
+	List	   *result = NIL;
+	ListCell   *l;
+
+	foreach(l, memberNames)
+	{
+		RoleSpec   *rolespec = lfirst_node(RoleSpec, l);
+		Oid			roleid;
+
+		roleid = get_rolespec_oid(rolespec, false);
+		result = lappend_oid(result, roleid);
+	}
+	return result;
+}
+
+/*
+ * AddRoleMems -- Add given members to the specified role
+ *
+ * rolename: name of role to add to (used only for error messages)
+ * roleid: OID of role to add to
+ * memberSpecs: list of RoleSpec of roles to add (used only for error messages)
+ * memberIds: OIDs of roles to add
+ * grantorId: who is granting the membership
+ * admin_opt: granting admin option?
+ */
+static void
+AddRoleMems(const char *rolename, Oid roleid,
+			List *memberSpecs, List *memberIds,
+			Oid grantorId, bool admin_opt)
+{
+	Relation	pg_authmem_rel;
+	TupleDesc	pg_authmem_dsc;
+	ListCell   *specitem;
+	ListCell   *iditem;
+
+	Assert(list_length(memberSpecs) == list_length(memberIds));
+
+	/* Skip permission check if nothing to do */
+	if (!memberIds)
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * Check permissions: must have createrole or admin option on the role to
+	 * be changed.  To mess with a superuser role, you gotta be superuser.
+	 */
+	if (superuser_arg(roleid))
+	{
+		if (!superuser())
+			ereport(ERROR,
+					(errcode(ERRCODE_INSUFFICIENT_PRIVILEGE),
+					 errmsg("must be superuser to alter superusers")));
+	}
+	else
+	{
+		if (!have_createrole_privilege() &&
+			!is_admin_of_role(grantorId, roleid))
+			ereport(ERROR,
+					(errcode(ERRCODE_INSUFFICIENT_PRIVILEGE),
+					 errmsg("must have admin option on role \"%s\"",
+							rolename)));
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * The charter of pg_database_owner is to have exactly one, implicit,
+	 * situation-dependent member.  There's no technical need for this
+	 * restriction.  (One could lift it and take the further step of making
+	 * pg_database_ownercheck() equivalent to has_privs_of_role(roleid,
+	 * ROLE_PG_DATABASE_OWNER), in which case explicit, situation-independent
+	 * members could act as the owner of any database.)
+	 */
+	if (roleid == ROLE_PG_DATABASE_OWNER)
+		ereport(ERROR,
+				errmsg("role \"%s\" cannot have explicit members", rolename));
+
+	/*
+	 * The role membership grantor of record has little significance at
+	 * present.  Nonetheless, inasmuch as users might look to it for a crude
+	 * audit trail, let only superusers impute the grant to a third party.
+	 */
+	if (grantorId != GetUserId() && !superuser())
+		ereport(ERROR,
+				(errcode(ERRCODE_INSUFFICIENT_PRIVILEGE),
+				 errmsg("must be superuser to set grantor")));
+
+	pg_authmem_rel = table_open(AuthMemRelationId, RowExclusiveLock);
+	pg_authmem_dsc = RelationGetDescr(pg_authmem_rel);
+
+	forboth(specitem, memberSpecs, iditem, memberIds)
+	{
+		RoleSpec   *memberRole = lfirst_node(RoleSpec, specitem);
+		Oid			memberid = lfirst_oid(iditem);
+		HeapTuple	authmem_tuple;
+		HeapTuple	tuple;
+		Datum		new_record[Natts_pg_auth_members];
+		bool		new_record_nulls[Natts_pg_auth_members];
+		bool		new_record_repl[Natts_pg_auth_members];
+
+		/*
+		 * pg_database_owner is never a role member.  Lifting this restriction
+		 * would require a policy decision about membership loops.  One could
+		 * prevent loops, which would include making "ALTER DATABASE x OWNER
+		 * TO proposed_datdba" fail if is_member_of_role(pg_database_owner,
+		 * proposed_datdba).  Hence, gaining a membership could reduce what a
+		 * role could do.  Alternately, one could allow these memberships to
+		 * complete loops.  A role could then have actual WITH ADMIN OPTION on
+		 * itself, prompting a decision about is_admin_of_role() treatment of
+		 * the case.
+		 *
+		 * Lifting this restriction also has policy implications for ownership
+		 * of shared objects (databases and tablespaces).  We allow such
+		 * ownership, but we might find cause to ban it in the future.
+		 * Designing such a ban would more troublesome if the design had to
+		 * address pg_database_owner being a member of role FOO that owns a
+		 * shared object.  (The effect of such ownership is that any owner of
+		 * another database can act as the owner of affected shared objects.)
+		 */
+		if (memberid == ROLE_PG_DATABASE_OWNER)
+			ereport(ERROR,
+					errmsg("role \"%s\" cannot be a member of any role",
+						   get_rolespec_name(memberRole)));
+
+		/*
+		 * Refuse creation of membership loops, including the trivial case
+		 * where a role is made a member of itself.  We do this by checking to
+		 * see if the target role is already a member of the proposed member
+		 * role.  We have to ignore possible superuserness, however, else we
+		 * could never grant membership in a superuser-privileged role.
+		 */
+		if (is_member_of_role_nosuper(roleid, memberid))
+			ereport(ERROR,
+					(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_GRANT_OPERATION),
+					 errmsg("role \"%s\" is a member of role \"%s\"",
+							rolename, get_rolespec_name(memberRole))));
+
+		/*
+		 * Check if entry for this role/member already exists; if so, give
+		 * warning unless we are adding admin option.
+		 */
+		authmem_tuple = SearchSysCache2(AUTHMEMROLEMEM,
+										ObjectIdGetDatum(roleid),
+										ObjectIdGetDatum(memberid));
+		if (HeapTupleIsValid(authmem_tuple) &&
+			(!admin_opt ||
+			 ((Form_pg_auth_members) GETSTRUCT(authmem_tuple))->admin_option))
+		{
+			ereport(NOTICE,
+					(errmsg("role \"%s\" is already a member of role \"%s\"",
+							get_rolespec_name(memberRole), rolename)));
+			ReleaseSysCache(authmem_tuple);
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		/* Build a tuple to insert or update */
+		MemSet(new_record, 0, sizeof(new_record));
+		MemSet(new_record_nulls, false, sizeof(new_record_nulls));
+		MemSet(new_record_repl, false, sizeof(new_record_repl));
+
+		new_record[Anum_pg_auth_members_roleid - 1] = ObjectIdGetDatum(roleid);
+		new_record[Anum_pg_auth_members_member - 1] = ObjectIdGetDatum(memberid);
+		new_record[Anum_pg_auth_members_grantor - 1] = ObjectIdGetDatum(grantorId);
+		new_record[Anum_pg_auth_members_admin_option - 1] = BoolGetDatum(admin_opt);
+
+		if (HeapTupleIsValid(authmem_tuple))
+		{
+			new_record_repl[Anum_pg_auth_members_grantor - 1] = true;
+			new_record_repl[Anum_pg_auth_members_admin_option - 1] = true;
+			tuple = heap_modify_tuple(authmem_tuple, pg_authmem_dsc,
+									  new_record,
+									  new_record_nulls, new_record_repl);
+			CatalogTupleUpdate(pg_authmem_rel, &tuple->t_self, tuple);
+			ReleaseSysCache(authmem_tuple);
+		}
+		else
+		{
+			tuple = heap_form_tuple(pg_authmem_dsc,
+									new_record, new_record_nulls);
+			CatalogTupleInsert(pg_authmem_rel, tuple);
+		}
+
+		/* CCI after each change, in case there are duplicates in list */
+		CommandCounterIncrement();
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Close pg_authmem, but keep lock till commit.
+	 */
+	table_close(pg_authmem_rel, NoLock);
+}
+
+/*
+ * DelRoleMems -- Remove given members from the specified role
+ *
+ * rolename: name of role to del from (used only for error messages)
+ * roleid: OID of role to del from
+ * memberSpecs: list of RoleSpec of roles to del (used only for error messages)
+ * memberIds: OIDs of roles to del
+ * admin_opt: remove admin option only?
+ */
+static void
+DelRoleMems(const char *rolename, Oid roleid,
+			List *memberSpecs, List *memberIds,
+			bool admin_opt)
+{
+	Relation	pg_authmem_rel;
+	TupleDesc	pg_authmem_dsc;
+	ListCell   *specitem;
+	ListCell   *iditem;
+
+	Assert(list_length(memberSpecs) == list_length(memberIds));
+
+	/* Skip permission check if nothing to do */
+	if (!memberIds)
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * Check permissions: must have createrole or admin option on the role to
+	 * be changed.  To mess with a superuser role, you gotta be superuser.
+	 */
+	if (superuser_arg(roleid))
+	{
+		if (!superuser())
+			ereport(ERROR,
+					(errcode(ERRCODE_INSUFFICIENT_PRIVILEGE),
+					 errmsg("must be superuser to alter superusers")));
+	}
+	else
+	{
+		if (!have_createrole_privilege() &&
+			!is_admin_of_role(GetUserId(), roleid))
+			ereport(ERROR,
+					(errcode(ERRCODE_INSUFFICIENT_PRIVILEGE),
+					 errmsg("must have admin option on role \"%s\"",
+							rolename)));
+	}
+
+	pg_authmem_rel = table_open(AuthMemRelationId, RowExclusiveLock);
+	pg_authmem_dsc = RelationGetDescr(pg_authmem_rel);
+
+	forboth(specitem, memberSpecs, iditem, memberIds)
+	{
+		RoleSpec   *memberRole = lfirst(specitem);
+		Oid			memberid = lfirst_oid(iditem);
+		HeapTuple	authmem_tuple;
+
+		/*
+		 * Find entry for this role/member
+		 */
+		authmem_tuple = SearchSysCache2(AUTHMEMROLEMEM,
+										ObjectIdGetDatum(roleid),
+										ObjectIdGetDatum(memberid));
+		if (!HeapTupleIsValid(authmem_tuple))
+		{
+			ereport(WARNING,
+					(errmsg("role \"%s\" is not a member of role \"%s\"",
+							get_rolespec_name(memberRole), rolename)));
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		if (!admin_opt)
+		{
+			/* Remove the entry altogether */
+			CatalogTupleDelete(pg_authmem_rel, &authmem_tuple->t_self);
+		}
+		else
+		{
+			/* Just turn off the admin option */
+			HeapTuple	tuple;
+			Datum		new_record[Natts_pg_auth_members];
+			bool		new_record_nulls[Natts_pg_auth_members];
+			bool		new_record_repl[Natts_pg_auth_members];
+
+			/* Build a tuple to update with */
+			MemSet(new_record, 0, sizeof(new_record));
+			MemSet(new_record_nulls, false, sizeof(new_record_nulls));
+			MemSet(new_record_repl, false, sizeof(new_record_repl));
+
+			new_record[Anum_pg_auth_members_admin_option - 1] = BoolGetDatum(false);
+			new_record_repl[Anum_pg_auth_members_admin_option - 1] = true;
+
+			tuple = heap_modify_tuple(authmem_tuple, pg_authmem_dsc,
+									  new_record,
+									  new_record_nulls, new_record_repl);
+			CatalogTupleUpdate(pg_authmem_rel, &tuple->t_self, tuple);
+		}
+
+		ReleaseSysCache(authmem_tuple);
+
+		/* CCI after each change, in case there are duplicates in list */
+		CommandCounterIncrement();
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Close pg_authmem, but keep lock till commit.
+	 */
+	table_close(pg_authmem_rel, NoLock);
+}