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/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
*
* auth-sasl.c
* Routines to handle authentication via SASL
*
* Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2022, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
* Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
*
*
* IDENTIFICATION
* src/backend/libpq/auth-sasl.c
*
*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
*/
#include "postgres.h"
#include "libpq/auth.h"
#include "libpq/libpq.h"
#include "libpq/pqformat.h"
#include "libpq/sasl.h"
/*
* Maximum accepted size of SASL messages.
*
* The messages that the server or libpq generate are much smaller than this,
* but have some headroom.
*/
#define PG_MAX_SASL_MESSAGE_LENGTH 1024
/*
* Perform a SASL exchange with a libpq client, using a specific mechanism
* implementation.
*
* shadow_pass is an optional pointer to the stored secret of the role
* authenticated, from pg_authid.rolpassword. For mechanisms that use
* shadowed passwords, a NULL pointer here means that an entry could not
* be found for the role (or the user does not exist), and the mechanism
* should fail the authentication exchange.
*
* Mechanisms must take care not to reveal to the client that a user entry
* does not exist; ideally, the external failure mode is identical to that
* of an incorrect password. Mechanisms may instead use the logdetail
* output parameter to internally differentiate between failure cases and
* assist debugging by the server admin.
*
* A mechanism is not required to utilize a shadow entry, or even a password
* system at all; for these cases, shadow_pass may be ignored and the caller
* should just pass NULL.
*/
int
CheckSASLAuth(const pg_be_sasl_mech *mech, Port *port, char *shadow_pass,
const char **logdetail)
{
StringInfoData sasl_mechs;
int mtype;
StringInfoData buf;
void *opaq = NULL;
char *output = NULL;
int outputlen = 0;
const char *input;
int inputlen;
int result;
bool initial;
/*
* Send the SASL authentication request to user. It includes the list of
* authentication mechanisms that are supported.
*/
initStringInfo(&sasl_mechs);
mech->get_mechanisms(port, &sasl_mechs);
/* Put another '\0' to mark that list is finished. */
appendStringInfoChar(&sasl_mechs, '\0');
sendAuthRequest(port, AUTH_REQ_SASL, sasl_mechs.data, sasl_mechs.len);
pfree(sasl_mechs.data);
/*
* Loop through SASL message exchange. This exchange can consist of
* multiple messages sent in both directions. First message is always
* from the client. All messages from client to server are password
* packets (type 'p').
*/
initial = true;
do
{
pq_startmsgread();
mtype = pq_getbyte();
if (mtype != 'p')
{
/* Only log error if client didn't disconnect. */
if (mtype != EOF)
{
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
errmsg("expected SASL response, got message type %d",
mtype)));
}
else
return STATUS_EOF;
}
/* Get the actual SASL message */
initStringInfo(&buf);
if (pq_getmessage(&buf, PG_MAX_SASL_MESSAGE_LENGTH))
{
/* EOF - pq_getmessage already logged error */
pfree(buf.data);
return STATUS_ERROR;
}
elog(DEBUG4, "processing received SASL response of length %d", buf.len);
/*
* The first SASLInitialResponse message is different from the others.
* It indicates which SASL mechanism the client selected, and contains
* an optional Initial Client Response payload. The subsequent
* SASLResponse messages contain just the SASL payload.
*/
if (initial)
{
const char *selected_mech;
selected_mech = pq_getmsgrawstring(&buf);
/*
* Initialize the status tracker for message exchanges.
*
* If the user doesn't exist, or doesn't have a valid password, or
* it's expired, we still go through the motions of SASL
* authentication, but tell the authentication method that the
* authentication is "doomed". That is, it's going to fail, no
* matter what.
*
* This is because we don't want to reveal to an attacker what
* usernames are valid, nor which users have a valid password.
*/
opaq = mech->init(port, selected_mech, shadow_pass);
inputlen = pq_getmsgint(&buf, 4);
if (inputlen == -1)
input = NULL;
else
input = pq_getmsgbytes(&buf, inputlen);
initial = false;
}
else
{
inputlen = buf.len;
input = pq_getmsgbytes(&buf, buf.len);
}
pq_getmsgend(&buf);
/*
* The StringInfo guarantees that there's a \0 byte after the
* response.
*/
Assert(input == NULL || input[inputlen] == '\0');
/*
* Hand the incoming message to the mechanism implementation.
*/
result = mech->exchange(opaq, input, inputlen,
&output, &outputlen,
logdetail);
/* input buffer no longer used */
pfree(buf.data);
if (output)
{
/*
* PG_SASL_EXCHANGE_FAILURE with some output is forbidden by SASL.
* Make sure here that the mechanism used got that right.
*/
if (result == PG_SASL_EXCHANGE_FAILURE)
elog(ERROR, "output message found after SASL exchange failure");
/*
* Negotiation generated data to be sent to the client.
*/
elog(DEBUG4, "sending SASL challenge of length %d", outputlen);
if (result == PG_SASL_EXCHANGE_SUCCESS)
sendAuthRequest(port, AUTH_REQ_SASL_FIN, output, outputlen);
else
sendAuthRequest(port, AUTH_REQ_SASL_CONT, output, outputlen);
pfree(output);
}
} while (result == PG_SASL_EXCHANGE_CONTINUE);
/* Oops, Something bad happened */
if (result != PG_SASL_EXCHANGE_SUCCESS)
{
return STATUS_ERROR;
}
return STATUS_OK;
}
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