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author | Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org> | 2024-05-05 17:47:29 +0000 |
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committer | Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org> | 2024-05-05 17:47:29 +0000 |
commit | 4f5791ebd03eaec1c7da0865a383175b05102712 (patch) | |
tree | 8ce7b00f7a76baa386372422adebbe64510812d4 /source3/rpc_server/rpc_handles.c | |
parent | Initial commit. (diff) | |
download | samba-upstream.tar.xz samba-upstream.zip |
Adding upstream version 2:4.17.12+dfsg.upstream/2%4.17.12+dfsgupstream
Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'source3/rpc_server/rpc_handles.c')
-rw-r--r-- | source3/rpc_server/rpc_handles.c | 233 |
1 files changed, 233 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/source3/rpc_server/rpc_handles.c b/source3/rpc_server/rpc_handles.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..60ee11d --- /dev/null +++ b/source3/rpc_server/rpc_handles.c @@ -0,0 +1,233 @@ +/* + * Unix SMB/CIFS implementation. + * RPC Pipe client / server routines + * Copyright (C) Andrew Tridgell 1992-1997, + * Copyright (C) Luke Kenneth Casson Leighton 1996-1997, + * Copyright (C) Jeremy Allison 2001. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by + * the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or + * (at your option) any later version. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program; if not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. + */ + +#include "includes.h" +#include "system/passwd.h" /* uid_wrapper */ +#include "../librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_lsa.h" +#include "../librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_samr.h" +#include "auth.h" +#include "rpc_server/rpc_pipes.h" +#include "../libcli/security/security.h" +#include "lib/tsocket/tsocket.h" +#include "librpc/ndr/ndr_table.h" +#include "librpc/rpc/dcesrv_core.h" + +#undef DBGC_CLASS +#define DBGC_CLASS DBGC_RPC_SRV + +static size_t num_handles = 0; + +bool check_open_pipes(void) +{ + if (num_handles > 0) { + return true; + } + + return false; +} + +size_t num_pipe_handles(void) +{ + return num_handles; +} + +/**************************************************************************** + find first available policy slot. creates a policy handle for you. + + If "data_ptr" is given, this must be a talloc'ed object, create_policy_hnd + talloc_moves this into the handle. If the policy_hnd is closed, + data_ptr is TALLOC_FREE()'ed +****************************************************************************/ + +struct hnd_cnt { + bool _dummy; +}; + +static int hnd_cnt_destructor(struct hnd_cnt *cnt) +{ + num_handles--; + return 0; +} + +bool create_policy_hnd(struct pipes_struct *p, + struct policy_handle *hnd, + uint8_t handle_type, + void *data_ptr) +{ + struct dcesrv_handle *rpc_hnd = NULL; + struct hnd_cnt *cnt = NULL; + + rpc_hnd = dcesrv_handle_create(p->dce_call, handle_type); + if (rpc_hnd == NULL) { + return false; + } + + cnt = talloc_zero(rpc_hnd, struct hnd_cnt); + if (cnt == NULL) { + TALLOC_FREE(rpc_hnd); + return false; + } + talloc_set_destructor(cnt, hnd_cnt_destructor); + + if (data_ptr != NULL) { + rpc_hnd->data = talloc_move(rpc_hnd, &data_ptr); + } + + *hnd = rpc_hnd->wire_handle; + + num_handles++; + + return true; +} + +/**************************************************************************** + find policy by handle - internal version. +****************************************************************************/ + +static struct dcesrv_handle *find_policy_by_hnd_internal( + struct pipes_struct *p, + const struct policy_handle *hnd, + uint8_t handle_type, + void **data_p) +{ + struct dcesrv_handle *h = NULL; + + if (data_p) { + *data_p = NULL; + } + + /* + * Do not pass an empty policy_handle to dcesrv_handle_lookup() or + * it will create a new empty handle + */ + if (ndr_policy_handle_empty(hnd)) { + p->fault_state = DCERPC_FAULT_CONTEXT_MISMATCH; + return NULL; + } + + /* + * Do not pass handle_type to avoid setting the fault_state in the + * pipes_struct if the handle type does not match + */ + h = dcesrv_handle_lookup(p->dce_call, hnd, DCESRV_HANDLE_ANY); + if (h == NULL) { + p->fault_state = DCERPC_FAULT_CONTEXT_MISMATCH; + return NULL; + } + + if (handle_type != DCESRV_HANDLE_ANY && + h->wire_handle.handle_type != handle_type) { + /* Just return NULL, do not set a fault + * state in pipes_struct */ + return NULL; + } + + if (data_p) { + *data_p = h->data; + } + + return h; +} + +/**************************************************************************** + find policy by handle +****************************************************************************/ + +void *_find_policy_by_hnd(struct pipes_struct *p, + const struct policy_handle *hnd, + uint8_t handle_type, + NTSTATUS *pstatus) +{ + struct dcesrv_handle *rpc_hnd = NULL; + void *data = NULL; + + rpc_hnd = find_policy_by_hnd_internal(p, hnd, handle_type, &data); + if (rpc_hnd == NULL) { + *pstatus = NT_STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE; + return NULL; + } + + *pstatus = NT_STATUS_OK; + return data; +} + +/**************************************************************************** + Close a policy. +****************************************************************************/ + +bool close_policy_hnd(struct pipes_struct *p, + struct policy_handle *hnd) +{ + struct dcesrv_handle *rpc_hnd = NULL; + + rpc_hnd = find_policy_by_hnd_internal(p, hnd, DCESRV_HANDLE_ANY, NULL); + if (rpc_hnd == NULL) { + DEBUG(3, ("Error closing policy (policy not found)\n")); + return false; + } + + TALLOC_FREE(rpc_hnd); + + return true; +} + +/******************************************************************* +Shall we allow access to this rpc? Currently this function +implements the 'restrict anonymous' setting by denying access to +anonymous users if the restrict anonymous level is > 0. Further work +will be checking a security descriptor to determine whether a user +token has enough access to access the pipe. +********************************************************************/ + +bool pipe_access_check(struct pipes_struct *p) +{ + /* Don't let anonymous users access this RPC if restrict + anonymous > 0 */ + + if (lp_restrict_anonymous() > 0) { + + struct dcesrv_call_state *dce_call = p->dce_call; + struct dcesrv_auth *auth_state = dce_call->auth_state; + enum dcerpc_AuthType auth_type = DCERPC_AUTH_TYPE_NONE; + struct auth_session_info *session_info = NULL; + enum security_user_level user_level; + + if (!auth_state->auth_finished) { + return false; + } + + dcesrv_call_auth_info(dce_call, &auth_type, NULL); + + /* schannel, so we must be ok */ + if (auth_type == DCERPC_AUTH_TYPE_SCHANNEL) { + return True; + } + + session_info = dcesrv_call_session_info(dce_call); + user_level = security_session_user_level(session_info, NULL); + + if (user_level < SECURITY_USER) { + return False; + } + } + + return True; +} |