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authorDaniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>2024-05-05 17:47:29 +0000
committerDaniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>2024-05-05 17:47:29 +0000
commit4f5791ebd03eaec1c7da0865a383175b05102712 (patch)
tree8ce7b00f7a76baa386372422adebbe64510812d4 /third_party/heimdal/lib/gssapi/ntlm/crypto.c
parentInitial commit. (diff)
downloadsamba-4f5791ebd03eaec1c7da0865a383175b05102712.tar.xz
samba-4f5791ebd03eaec1c7da0865a383175b05102712.zip
Adding upstream version 2:4.17.12+dfsg.upstream/2%4.17.12+dfsgupstream
Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'third_party/heimdal/lib/gssapi/ntlm/crypto.c')
-rw-r--r--third_party/heimdal/lib/gssapi/ntlm/crypto.c636
1 files changed, 636 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/third_party/heimdal/lib/gssapi/ntlm/crypto.c b/third_party/heimdal/lib/gssapi/ntlm/crypto.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..efa71d9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/heimdal/lib/gssapi/ntlm/crypto.c
@@ -0,0 +1,636 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2006-2016 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan
+ * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden).
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors
+ * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ * without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "ntlm.h"
+struct hx509_certs_data;
+struct krb5_pk_identity;
+struct krb5_pk_cert;
+struct ContentInfo;
+struct AlgorithmIdentifier;
+struct _krb5_krb_auth_data;
+struct krb5_dh_moduli;
+struct _krb5_key_data;
+struct _krb5_encryption_type;
+struct _krb5_key_type;
+#include "krb5_locl.h"
+
+/*
+ *
+ */
+
+static void
+encode_le_uint32(uint32_t n, unsigned char *p)
+{
+ p[0] = (n >> 0) & 0xFF;
+ p[1] = (n >> 8) & 0xFF;
+ p[2] = (n >> 16) & 0xFF;
+ p[3] = (n >> 24) & 0xFF;
+}
+
+
+static void
+decode_le_uint32(const void *ptr, uint32_t *n)
+{
+ const unsigned char *p = ptr;
+ *n = (p[0] << 0) | (p[1] << 8) | (p[2] << 16) | (p[3] << 24);
+}
+
+/*
+ *
+ */
+
+const char a2i_signmagic[] =
+ "session key to server-to-client signing key magic constant";
+const char a2i_sealmagic[] =
+ "session key to server-to-client sealing key magic constant";
+const char i2a_signmagic[] =
+ "session key to client-to-server signing key magic constant";
+const char i2a_sealmagic[] =
+ "session key to client-to-server sealing key magic constant";
+
+
+void
+_gss_ntlm_set_key(struct ntlmv2_key *key, int acceptor, int sealsign,
+ unsigned char *data, size_t len)
+{
+ unsigned char out[16];
+ EVP_MD_CTX *ctx;
+ const char *signmagic;
+ const char *sealmagic;
+
+ if (acceptor) {
+ signmagic = a2i_signmagic;
+ sealmagic = a2i_sealmagic;
+ } else {
+ signmagic = i2a_signmagic;
+ sealmagic = i2a_sealmagic;
+ }
+
+ key->seq = 0;
+
+ ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
+ EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, data, len);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, signmagic, strlen(signmagic) + 1);
+ EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, key->signkey, NULL);
+
+ EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, data, len);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, sealmagic, strlen(sealmagic) + 1);
+ EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, out, NULL);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(ctx);
+
+ RC4_set_key(&key->sealkey, 16, out);
+ if (sealsign)
+ key->signsealkey = &key->sealkey;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Set (or reset) keys
+ */
+
+void
+_gss_ntlm_set_keys(ntlm_ctx ctx)
+{
+ int acceptor;
+
+ if (ctx->sessionkey.length == 0)
+ return;
+
+ acceptor = !(ctx->status & STATUS_CLIENT);
+
+ ctx->status |= STATUS_SESSIONKEY;
+
+ if (ctx->flags & NTLM_NEG_NTLM2_SESSION) {
+ _gss_ntlm_set_key(&ctx->u.v2.send, acceptor,
+ (ctx->flags & NTLM_NEG_KEYEX),
+ ctx->sessionkey.data,
+ ctx->sessionkey.length);
+ _gss_ntlm_set_key(&ctx->u.v2.recv, !acceptor,
+ (ctx->flags & NTLM_NEG_KEYEX),
+ ctx->sessionkey.data,
+ ctx->sessionkey.length);
+ } else {
+ ctx->u.v1.crypto_send.seq = 0;
+ RC4_set_key(&ctx->u.v1.crypto_send.key,
+ ctx->sessionkey.length,
+ ctx->sessionkey.data);
+ ctx->u.v1.crypto_recv.seq = 0;
+ RC4_set_key(&ctx->u.v1.crypto_recv.key,
+ ctx->sessionkey.length,
+ ctx->sessionkey.data);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ *
+ */
+
+static OM_uint32
+v1_sign_message(gss_buffer_t in,
+ RC4_KEY *signkey,
+ uint32_t seq,
+ unsigned char out[16])
+{
+ unsigned char sigature[12];
+ uint32_t crc;
+
+ _krb5_crc_init_table();
+ crc = _krb5_crc_update(in->value, in->length, 0);
+
+ encode_le_uint32(0, &sigature[0]);
+ encode_le_uint32(crc, &sigature[4]);
+ encode_le_uint32(seq, &sigature[8]);
+
+ encode_le_uint32(1, out); /* version */
+ RC4(signkey, sizeof(sigature), sigature, out + 4);
+
+ if (RAND_bytes(out + 4, 4) != 1)
+ return GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
+static OM_uint32
+v2_sign_message(gss_buffer_t in,
+ unsigned char signkey[16],
+ RC4_KEY *sealkey,
+ uint32_t seq,
+ unsigned char out[16])
+{
+ unsigned char hmac[16];
+ unsigned int hmaclen;
+ HMAC_CTX c;
+
+ HMAC_CTX_init(&c);
+ if (HMAC_Init_ex(&c, signkey, 16, EVP_md5(), NULL) == 0) {
+ HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&c);
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+ }
+
+ encode_le_uint32(seq, hmac);
+ HMAC_Update(&c, hmac, 4);
+ HMAC_Update(&c, in->value, in->length);
+ HMAC_Final(&c, hmac, &hmaclen);
+ HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&c);
+
+ encode_le_uint32(1, &out[0]);
+ if (sealkey)
+ RC4(sealkey, 8, hmac, &out[4]);
+ else
+ memcpy(&out[4], hmac, 8);
+
+ memset(&out[12], 0, 4);
+
+ return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+}
+
+static OM_uint32
+v2_verify_message(gss_buffer_t in,
+ unsigned char signkey[16],
+ RC4_KEY *sealkey,
+ uint32_t seq,
+ const unsigned char checksum[16])
+{
+ OM_uint32 ret;
+ unsigned char out[16];
+
+ ret = v2_sign_message(in, signkey, sealkey, seq, out);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ if (memcmp(checksum, out, 16) != 0)
+ return GSS_S_BAD_MIC;
+
+ return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+}
+
+static OM_uint32
+v2_seal_message(const gss_buffer_t in,
+ unsigned char signkey[16],
+ uint32_t seq,
+ RC4_KEY *sealkey,
+ gss_buffer_t out)
+{
+ unsigned char *p;
+ OM_uint32 ret;
+
+ if (in->length + 16 < in->length)
+ return EINVAL;
+
+ p = malloc(in->length + 16);
+ if (p == NULL)
+ return ENOMEM;
+
+ RC4(sealkey, in->length, in->value, p);
+
+ ret = v2_sign_message(in, signkey, sealkey, seq, &p[in->length]);
+ if (ret) {
+ free(p);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ out->value = p;
+ out->length = in->length + 16;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static OM_uint32
+v2_unseal_message(gss_buffer_t in,
+ unsigned char signkey[16],
+ uint32_t seq,
+ RC4_KEY *sealkey,
+ gss_buffer_t out)
+{
+ OM_uint32 ret;
+
+ if (in->length < 16)
+ return GSS_S_BAD_MIC;
+
+ out->length = in->length - 16;
+ out->value = malloc(out->length);
+ if (out->value == NULL)
+ return GSS_S_BAD_MIC;
+
+ RC4(sealkey, out->length, in->value, out->value);
+
+ ret = v2_verify_message(out, signkey, sealkey, seq,
+ ((const unsigned char *)in->value) + out->length);
+ if (ret) {
+ OM_uint32 junk;
+ gss_release_buffer(&junk, out);
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ *
+ */
+
+#define CTX_FLAGS_ISSET(_ctx,_flags) \
+ (((_ctx)->flags & (_flags)) == (_flags))
+
+/*
+ *
+ */
+
+OM_uint32 GSSAPI_CALLCONV
+_gss_ntlm_get_mic
+ (OM_uint32 * minor_status,
+ gss_const_ctx_id_t context_handle,
+ gss_qop_t qop_req,
+ const gss_buffer_t message_buffer,
+ gss_buffer_t message_token
+ )
+{
+ ntlm_ctx ctx = (ntlm_ctx)context_handle;
+ OM_uint32 junk;
+
+ *minor_status = 0;
+
+ message_token->value = malloc(16);
+ message_token->length = 16;
+ if (message_token->value == NULL) {
+ *minor_status = ENOMEM;
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+ }
+
+ if (CTX_FLAGS_ISSET(ctx, NTLM_NEG_SIGN|NTLM_NEG_NTLM2_SESSION)) {
+ OM_uint32 ret;
+
+ if ((ctx->status & STATUS_SESSIONKEY) == 0) {
+ gss_release_buffer(&junk, message_token);
+ return GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE;
+ }
+
+ ret = v2_sign_message(message_buffer,
+ ctx->u.v2.send.signkey,
+ ctx->u.v2.send.signsealkey,
+ ctx->u.v2.send.seq++,
+ message_token->value);
+ if (ret)
+ gss_release_buffer(&junk, message_token);
+ return ret;
+
+ } else if (CTX_FLAGS_ISSET(ctx, NTLM_NEG_SIGN)) {
+ OM_uint32 ret;
+
+ if ((ctx->status & STATUS_SESSIONKEY) == 0) {
+ gss_release_buffer(&junk, message_token);
+ return GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE;
+ }
+
+ ret = v1_sign_message(message_buffer,
+ &ctx->u.v1.crypto_send.key,
+ ctx->u.v1.crypto_send.seq++,
+ message_token->value);
+ if (ret)
+ gss_release_buffer(&junk, message_token);
+ return ret;
+
+ } else if (CTX_FLAGS_ISSET(ctx, NTLM_NEG_ALWAYS_SIGN)) {
+ unsigned char *sigature;
+
+ sigature = message_token->value;
+
+ encode_le_uint32(1, &sigature[0]); /* version */
+ encode_le_uint32(0, &sigature[4]);
+ encode_le_uint32(0, &sigature[8]);
+ encode_le_uint32(0, &sigature[12]);
+
+ return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+ }
+ gss_release_buffer(&junk, message_token);
+
+ return GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE;
+}
+
+/*
+ *
+ */
+
+OM_uint32 GSSAPI_CALLCONV
+_gss_ntlm_verify_mic
+ (OM_uint32 * minor_status,
+ gss_const_ctx_id_t context_handle,
+ const gss_buffer_t message_buffer,
+ const gss_buffer_t token_buffer,
+ gss_qop_t * qop_state
+ )
+{
+ ntlm_ctx ctx = (ntlm_ctx)context_handle;
+
+ if (qop_state != NULL)
+ *qop_state = GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT;
+ *minor_status = 0;
+
+ if (token_buffer->length != 16)
+ return GSS_S_BAD_MIC;
+
+ if (CTX_FLAGS_ISSET(ctx, NTLM_NEG_SIGN|NTLM_NEG_NTLM2_SESSION)) {
+ OM_uint32 ret;
+
+ if ((ctx->status & STATUS_SESSIONKEY) == 0)
+ return GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE;
+
+ ret = v2_verify_message(message_buffer,
+ ctx->u.v2.recv.signkey,
+ ctx->u.v2.recv.signsealkey,
+ ctx->u.v2.recv.seq++,
+ token_buffer->value);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+ } else if (CTX_FLAGS_ISSET(ctx, NTLM_NEG_SIGN)) {
+
+ unsigned char sigature[12];
+ uint32_t crc, num;
+
+ if ((ctx->status & STATUS_SESSIONKEY) == 0)
+ return GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE;
+
+ decode_le_uint32(token_buffer->value, &num);
+ if (num != 1)
+ return GSS_S_BAD_MIC;
+
+ RC4(&ctx->u.v1.crypto_recv.key, sizeof(sigature),
+ ((unsigned char *)token_buffer->value) + 4, sigature);
+
+ _krb5_crc_init_table();
+ crc = _krb5_crc_update(message_buffer->value,
+ message_buffer->length, 0);
+ /* skip first 4 bytes in the encrypted checksum */
+ decode_le_uint32(&sigature[4], &num);
+ if (num != crc)
+ return GSS_S_BAD_MIC;
+ decode_le_uint32(&sigature[8], &num);
+ if (ctx->u.v1.crypto_recv.seq != num)
+ return GSS_S_BAD_MIC;
+ ctx->u.v1.crypto_recv.seq++;
+
+ return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+ } else if (ctx->flags & NTLM_NEG_ALWAYS_SIGN) {
+ uint32_t num;
+ unsigned char *p;
+
+ p = (unsigned char*)(token_buffer->value);
+
+ decode_le_uint32(&p[0], &num); /* version */
+ if (num != 1) return GSS_S_BAD_MIC;
+ decode_le_uint32(&p[4], &num);
+ if (num != 0) return GSS_S_BAD_MIC;
+ decode_le_uint32(&p[8], &num);
+ if (num != 0) return GSS_S_BAD_MIC;
+ decode_le_uint32(&p[12], &num);
+ if (num != 0) return GSS_S_BAD_MIC;
+
+ return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+ }
+
+ return GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE;
+}
+
+/*
+ *
+ */
+
+OM_uint32 GSSAPI_CALLCONV
+_gss_ntlm_wrap_size_limit (
+ OM_uint32 * minor_status,
+ gss_const_ctx_id_t context_handle,
+ int conf_req_flag,
+ gss_qop_t qop_req,
+ OM_uint32 req_output_size,
+ OM_uint32 * max_input_size
+ )
+{
+ ntlm_ctx ctx = (ntlm_ctx)context_handle;
+
+ *minor_status = 0;
+
+ if(ctx->flags & NTLM_NEG_SEAL) {
+
+ if (req_output_size < 16)
+ *max_input_size = 0;
+ else
+ *max_input_size = req_output_size - 16;
+
+ return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+ }
+
+ return GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE;
+}
+
+/*
+ *
+ */
+
+OM_uint32 GSSAPI_CALLCONV
+_gss_ntlm_wrap
+(OM_uint32 * minor_status,
+ gss_const_ctx_id_t context_handle,
+ int conf_req_flag,
+ gss_qop_t qop_req,
+ const gss_buffer_t input_message_buffer,
+ int * conf_state,
+ gss_buffer_t output_message_buffer
+ )
+{
+ ntlm_ctx ctx = (ntlm_ctx)context_handle;
+ OM_uint32 ret;
+
+ *minor_status = 0;
+ if (conf_state)
+ *conf_state = 0;
+ if (output_message_buffer == GSS_C_NO_BUFFER)
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+
+
+ if (CTX_FLAGS_ISSET(ctx, NTLM_NEG_SEAL|NTLM_NEG_NTLM2_SESSION)) {
+
+ return v2_seal_message(input_message_buffer,
+ ctx->u.v2.send.signkey,
+ ctx->u.v2.send.seq++,
+ &ctx->u.v2.send.sealkey,
+ output_message_buffer);
+
+ } else if (CTX_FLAGS_ISSET(ctx, NTLM_NEG_SEAL)) {
+ gss_buffer_desc trailer;
+ OM_uint32 junk;
+
+ output_message_buffer->length = input_message_buffer->length + 16;
+ output_message_buffer->value = malloc(output_message_buffer->length);
+ if (output_message_buffer->value == NULL) {
+ output_message_buffer->length = 0;
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+ }
+
+
+ RC4(&ctx->u.v1.crypto_send.key, input_message_buffer->length,
+ input_message_buffer->value, output_message_buffer->value);
+
+ ret = _gss_ntlm_get_mic(minor_status, context_handle,
+ 0, input_message_buffer,
+ &trailer);
+ if (ret) {
+ gss_release_buffer(&junk, output_message_buffer);
+ return ret;
+ }
+ if (trailer.length != 16) {
+ gss_release_buffer(&junk, output_message_buffer);
+ gss_release_buffer(&junk, &trailer);
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+ }
+ memcpy(((unsigned char *)output_message_buffer->value) +
+ input_message_buffer->length,
+ trailer.value, trailer.length);
+ gss_release_buffer(&junk, &trailer);
+
+ return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+ }
+
+ return GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE;
+}
+
+/*
+ *
+ */
+
+OM_uint32 GSSAPI_CALLCONV
+_gss_ntlm_unwrap
+ (OM_uint32 * minor_status,
+ gss_const_ctx_id_t context_handle,
+ const gss_buffer_t input_message_buffer,
+ gss_buffer_t output_message_buffer,
+ int * conf_state,
+ gss_qop_t * qop_state
+ )
+{
+ ntlm_ctx ctx = (ntlm_ctx)context_handle;
+ OM_uint32 ret;
+
+ *minor_status = 0;
+ output_message_buffer->value = NULL;
+ output_message_buffer->length = 0;
+
+ if (conf_state)
+ *conf_state = 0;
+ if (qop_state)
+ *qop_state = 0;
+
+ if (CTX_FLAGS_ISSET(ctx, NTLM_NEG_SEAL|NTLM_NEG_NTLM2_SESSION)) {
+
+ return v2_unseal_message(input_message_buffer,
+ ctx->u.v2.recv.signkey,
+ ctx->u.v2.recv.seq++,
+ &ctx->u.v2.recv.sealkey,
+ output_message_buffer);
+
+ } else if (CTX_FLAGS_ISSET(ctx, NTLM_NEG_SEAL)) {
+
+ gss_buffer_desc trailer;
+ OM_uint32 junk;
+
+ if (input_message_buffer->length < 16)
+ return GSS_S_BAD_MIC;
+
+ output_message_buffer->length = input_message_buffer->length - 16;
+ output_message_buffer->value = malloc(output_message_buffer->length);
+ if (output_message_buffer->value == NULL) {
+ output_message_buffer->length = 0;
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+ }
+
+ RC4(&ctx->u.v1.crypto_recv.key, output_message_buffer->length,
+ input_message_buffer->value, output_message_buffer->value);
+
+ trailer.value = ((unsigned char *)input_message_buffer->value) +
+ output_message_buffer->length;
+ trailer.length = 16;
+
+ ret = _gss_ntlm_verify_mic(minor_status, context_handle,
+ output_message_buffer,
+ &trailer, NULL);
+ if (ret) {
+ gss_release_buffer(&junk, output_message_buffer);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+ }
+
+ return GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE;
+}