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author | Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org> | 2024-05-05 17:47:29 +0000 |
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committer | Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org> | 2024-05-05 17:47:29 +0000 |
commit | 4f5791ebd03eaec1c7da0865a383175b05102712 (patch) | |
tree | 8ce7b00f7a76baa386372422adebbe64510812d4 /third_party/heimdal/lib/gssapi/ntlm/crypto.c | |
parent | Initial commit. (diff) | |
download | samba-4f5791ebd03eaec1c7da0865a383175b05102712.tar.xz samba-4f5791ebd03eaec1c7da0865a383175b05102712.zip |
Adding upstream version 2:4.17.12+dfsg.upstream/2%4.17.12+dfsgupstream
Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'third_party/heimdal/lib/gssapi/ntlm/crypto.c')
-rw-r--r-- | third_party/heimdal/lib/gssapi/ntlm/crypto.c | 636 |
1 files changed, 636 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/third_party/heimdal/lib/gssapi/ntlm/crypto.c b/third_party/heimdal/lib/gssapi/ntlm/crypto.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..efa71d9 --- /dev/null +++ b/third_party/heimdal/lib/gssapi/ntlm/crypto.c @@ -0,0 +1,636 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2006-2016 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "ntlm.h" +struct hx509_certs_data; +struct krb5_pk_identity; +struct krb5_pk_cert; +struct ContentInfo; +struct AlgorithmIdentifier; +struct _krb5_krb_auth_data; +struct krb5_dh_moduli; +struct _krb5_key_data; +struct _krb5_encryption_type; +struct _krb5_key_type; +#include "krb5_locl.h" + +/* + * + */ + +static void +encode_le_uint32(uint32_t n, unsigned char *p) +{ + p[0] = (n >> 0) & 0xFF; + p[1] = (n >> 8) & 0xFF; + p[2] = (n >> 16) & 0xFF; + p[3] = (n >> 24) & 0xFF; +} + + +static void +decode_le_uint32(const void *ptr, uint32_t *n) +{ + const unsigned char *p = ptr; + *n = (p[0] << 0) | (p[1] << 8) | (p[2] << 16) | (p[3] << 24); +} + +/* + * + */ + +const char a2i_signmagic[] = + "session key to server-to-client signing key magic constant"; +const char a2i_sealmagic[] = + "session key to server-to-client sealing key magic constant"; +const char i2a_signmagic[] = + "session key to client-to-server signing key magic constant"; +const char i2a_sealmagic[] = + "session key to client-to-server sealing key magic constant"; + + +void +_gss_ntlm_set_key(struct ntlmv2_key *key, int acceptor, int sealsign, + unsigned char *data, size_t len) +{ + unsigned char out[16]; + EVP_MD_CTX *ctx; + const char *signmagic; + const char *sealmagic; + + if (acceptor) { + signmagic = a2i_signmagic; + sealmagic = a2i_sealmagic; + } else { + signmagic = i2a_signmagic; + sealmagic = i2a_sealmagic; + } + + key->seq = 0; + + ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create(); + EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL); + EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, data, len); + EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, signmagic, strlen(signmagic) + 1); + EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, key->signkey, NULL); + + EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL); + EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, data, len); + EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, sealmagic, strlen(sealmagic) + 1); + EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, out, NULL); + EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(ctx); + + RC4_set_key(&key->sealkey, 16, out); + if (sealsign) + key->signsealkey = &key->sealkey; +} + +/* + * Set (or reset) keys + */ + +void +_gss_ntlm_set_keys(ntlm_ctx ctx) +{ + int acceptor; + + if (ctx->sessionkey.length == 0) + return; + + acceptor = !(ctx->status & STATUS_CLIENT); + + ctx->status |= STATUS_SESSIONKEY; + + if (ctx->flags & NTLM_NEG_NTLM2_SESSION) { + _gss_ntlm_set_key(&ctx->u.v2.send, acceptor, + (ctx->flags & NTLM_NEG_KEYEX), + ctx->sessionkey.data, + ctx->sessionkey.length); + _gss_ntlm_set_key(&ctx->u.v2.recv, !acceptor, + (ctx->flags & NTLM_NEG_KEYEX), + ctx->sessionkey.data, + ctx->sessionkey.length); + } else { + ctx->u.v1.crypto_send.seq = 0; + RC4_set_key(&ctx->u.v1.crypto_send.key, + ctx->sessionkey.length, + ctx->sessionkey.data); + ctx->u.v1.crypto_recv.seq = 0; + RC4_set_key(&ctx->u.v1.crypto_recv.key, + ctx->sessionkey.length, + ctx->sessionkey.data); + } +} + +/* + * + */ + +static OM_uint32 +v1_sign_message(gss_buffer_t in, + RC4_KEY *signkey, + uint32_t seq, + unsigned char out[16]) +{ + unsigned char sigature[12]; + uint32_t crc; + + _krb5_crc_init_table(); + crc = _krb5_crc_update(in->value, in->length, 0); + + encode_le_uint32(0, &sigature[0]); + encode_le_uint32(crc, &sigature[4]); + encode_le_uint32(seq, &sigature[8]); + + encode_le_uint32(1, out); /* version */ + RC4(signkey, sizeof(sigature), sigature, out + 4); + + if (RAND_bytes(out + 4, 4) != 1) + return GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE; + + return 0; +} + + +static OM_uint32 +v2_sign_message(gss_buffer_t in, + unsigned char signkey[16], + RC4_KEY *sealkey, + uint32_t seq, + unsigned char out[16]) +{ + unsigned char hmac[16]; + unsigned int hmaclen; + HMAC_CTX c; + + HMAC_CTX_init(&c); + if (HMAC_Init_ex(&c, signkey, 16, EVP_md5(), NULL) == 0) { + HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&c); + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + } + + encode_le_uint32(seq, hmac); + HMAC_Update(&c, hmac, 4); + HMAC_Update(&c, in->value, in->length); + HMAC_Final(&c, hmac, &hmaclen); + HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&c); + + encode_le_uint32(1, &out[0]); + if (sealkey) + RC4(sealkey, 8, hmac, &out[4]); + else + memcpy(&out[4], hmac, 8); + + memset(&out[12], 0, 4); + + return GSS_S_COMPLETE; +} + +static OM_uint32 +v2_verify_message(gss_buffer_t in, + unsigned char signkey[16], + RC4_KEY *sealkey, + uint32_t seq, + const unsigned char checksum[16]) +{ + OM_uint32 ret; + unsigned char out[16]; + + ret = v2_sign_message(in, signkey, sealkey, seq, out); + if (ret) + return ret; + + if (memcmp(checksum, out, 16) != 0) + return GSS_S_BAD_MIC; + + return GSS_S_COMPLETE; +} + +static OM_uint32 +v2_seal_message(const gss_buffer_t in, + unsigned char signkey[16], + uint32_t seq, + RC4_KEY *sealkey, + gss_buffer_t out) +{ + unsigned char *p; + OM_uint32 ret; + + if (in->length + 16 < in->length) + return EINVAL; + + p = malloc(in->length + 16); + if (p == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + + RC4(sealkey, in->length, in->value, p); + + ret = v2_sign_message(in, signkey, sealkey, seq, &p[in->length]); + if (ret) { + free(p); + return ret; + } + + out->value = p; + out->length = in->length + 16; + + return 0; +} + +static OM_uint32 +v2_unseal_message(gss_buffer_t in, + unsigned char signkey[16], + uint32_t seq, + RC4_KEY *sealkey, + gss_buffer_t out) +{ + OM_uint32 ret; + + if (in->length < 16) + return GSS_S_BAD_MIC; + + out->length = in->length - 16; + out->value = malloc(out->length); + if (out->value == NULL) + return GSS_S_BAD_MIC; + + RC4(sealkey, out->length, in->value, out->value); + + ret = v2_verify_message(out, signkey, sealkey, seq, + ((const unsigned char *)in->value) + out->length); + if (ret) { + OM_uint32 junk; + gss_release_buffer(&junk, out); + } + return ret; +} + +/* + * + */ + +#define CTX_FLAGS_ISSET(_ctx,_flags) \ + (((_ctx)->flags & (_flags)) == (_flags)) + +/* + * + */ + +OM_uint32 GSSAPI_CALLCONV +_gss_ntlm_get_mic + (OM_uint32 * minor_status, + gss_const_ctx_id_t context_handle, + gss_qop_t qop_req, + const gss_buffer_t message_buffer, + gss_buffer_t message_token + ) +{ + ntlm_ctx ctx = (ntlm_ctx)context_handle; + OM_uint32 junk; + + *minor_status = 0; + + message_token->value = malloc(16); + message_token->length = 16; + if (message_token->value == NULL) { + *minor_status = ENOMEM; + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + } + + if (CTX_FLAGS_ISSET(ctx, NTLM_NEG_SIGN|NTLM_NEG_NTLM2_SESSION)) { + OM_uint32 ret; + + if ((ctx->status & STATUS_SESSIONKEY) == 0) { + gss_release_buffer(&junk, message_token); + return GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE; + } + + ret = v2_sign_message(message_buffer, + ctx->u.v2.send.signkey, + ctx->u.v2.send.signsealkey, + ctx->u.v2.send.seq++, + message_token->value); + if (ret) + gss_release_buffer(&junk, message_token); + return ret; + + } else if (CTX_FLAGS_ISSET(ctx, NTLM_NEG_SIGN)) { + OM_uint32 ret; + + if ((ctx->status & STATUS_SESSIONKEY) == 0) { + gss_release_buffer(&junk, message_token); + return GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE; + } + + ret = v1_sign_message(message_buffer, + &ctx->u.v1.crypto_send.key, + ctx->u.v1.crypto_send.seq++, + message_token->value); + if (ret) + gss_release_buffer(&junk, message_token); + return ret; + + } else if (CTX_FLAGS_ISSET(ctx, NTLM_NEG_ALWAYS_SIGN)) { + unsigned char *sigature; + + sigature = message_token->value; + + encode_le_uint32(1, &sigature[0]); /* version */ + encode_le_uint32(0, &sigature[4]); + encode_le_uint32(0, &sigature[8]); + encode_le_uint32(0, &sigature[12]); + + return GSS_S_COMPLETE; + } + gss_release_buffer(&junk, message_token); + + return GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE; +} + +/* + * + */ + +OM_uint32 GSSAPI_CALLCONV +_gss_ntlm_verify_mic + (OM_uint32 * minor_status, + gss_const_ctx_id_t context_handle, + const gss_buffer_t message_buffer, + const gss_buffer_t token_buffer, + gss_qop_t * qop_state + ) +{ + ntlm_ctx ctx = (ntlm_ctx)context_handle; + + if (qop_state != NULL) + *qop_state = GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT; + *minor_status = 0; + + if (token_buffer->length != 16) + return GSS_S_BAD_MIC; + + if (CTX_FLAGS_ISSET(ctx, NTLM_NEG_SIGN|NTLM_NEG_NTLM2_SESSION)) { + OM_uint32 ret; + + if ((ctx->status & STATUS_SESSIONKEY) == 0) + return GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE; + + ret = v2_verify_message(message_buffer, + ctx->u.v2.recv.signkey, + ctx->u.v2.recv.signsealkey, + ctx->u.v2.recv.seq++, + token_buffer->value); + if (ret) + return ret; + + return GSS_S_COMPLETE; + } else if (CTX_FLAGS_ISSET(ctx, NTLM_NEG_SIGN)) { + + unsigned char sigature[12]; + uint32_t crc, num; + + if ((ctx->status & STATUS_SESSIONKEY) == 0) + return GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE; + + decode_le_uint32(token_buffer->value, &num); + if (num != 1) + return GSS_S_BAD_MIC; + + RC4(&ctx->u.v1.crypto_recv.key, sizeof(sigature), + ((unsigned char *)token_buffer->value) + 4, sigature); + + _krb5_crc_init_table(); + crc = _krb5_crc_update(message_buffer->value, + message_buffer->length, 0); + /* skip first 4 bytes in the encrypted checksum */ + decode_le_uint32(&sigature[4], &num); + if (num != crc) + return GSS_S_BAD_MIC; + decode_le_uint32(&sigature[8], &num); + if (ctx->u.v1.crypto_recv.seq != num) + return GSS_S_BAD_MIC; + ctx->u.v1.crypto_recv.seq++; + + return GSS_S_COMPLETE; + } else if (ctx->flags & NTLM_NEG_ALWAYS_SIGN) { + uint32_t num; + unsigned char *p; + + p = (unsigned char*)(token_buffer->value); + + decode_le_uint32(&p[0], &num); /* version */ + if (num != 1) return GSS_S_BAD_MIC; + decode_le_uint32(&p[4], &num); + if (num != 0) return GSS_S_BAD_MIC; + decode_le_uint32(&p[8], &num); + if (num != 0) return GSS_S_BAD_MIC; + decode_le_uint32(&p[12], &num); + if (num != 0) return GSS_S_BAD_MIC; + + return GSS_S_COMPLETE; + } + + return GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE; +} + +/* + * + */ + +OM_uint32 GSSAPI_CALLCONV +_gss_ntlm_wrap_size_limit ( + OM_uint32 * minor_status, + gss_const_ctx_id_t context_handle, + int conf_req_flag, + gss_qop_t qop_req, + OM_uint32 req_output_size, + OM_uint32 * max_input_size + ) +{ + ntlm_ctx ctx = (ntlm_ctx)context_handle; + + *minor_status = 0; + + if(ctx->flags & NTLM_NEG_SEAL) { + + if (req_output_size < 16) + *max_input_size = 0; + else + *max_input_size = req_output_size - 16; + + return GSS_S_COMPLETE; + } + + return GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE; +} + +/* + * + */ + +OM_uint32 GSSAPI_CALLCONV +_gss_ntlm_wrap +(OM_uint32 * minor_status, + gss_const_ctx_id_t context_handle, + int conf_req_flag, + gss_qop_t qop_req, + const gss_buffer_t input_message_buffer, + int * conf_state, + gss_buffer_t output_message_buffer + ) +{ + ntlm_ctx ctx = (ntlm_ctx)context_handle; + OM_uint32 ret; + + *minor_status = 0; + if (conf_state) + *conf_state = 0; + if (output_message_buffer == GSS_C_NO_BUFFER) + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + + + if (CTX_FLAGS_ISSET(ctx, NTLM_NEG_SEAL|NTLM_NEG_NTLM2_SESSION)) { + + return v2_seal_message(input_message_buffer, + ctx->u.v2.send.signkey, + ctx->u.v2.send.seq++, + &ctx->u.v2.send.sealkey, + output_message_buffer); + + } else if (CTX_FLAGS_ISSET(ctx, NTLM_NEG_SEAL)) { + gss_buffer_desc trailer; + OM_uint32 junk; + + output_message_buffer->length = input_message_buffer->length + 16; + output_message_buffer->value = malloc(output_message_buffer->length); + if (output_message_buffer->value == NULL) { + output_message_buffer->length = 0; + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + } + + + RC4(&ctx->u.v1.crypto_send.key, input_message_buffer->length, + input_message_buffer->value, output_message_buffer->value); + + ret = _gss_ntlm_get_mic(minor_status, context_handle, + 0, input_message_buffer, + &trailer); + if (ret) { + gss_release_buffer(&junk, output_message_buffer); + return ret; + } + if (trailer.length != 16) { + gss_release_buffer(&junk, output_message_buffer); + gss_release_buffer(&junk, &trailer); + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + } + memcpy(((unsigned char *)output_message_buffer->value) + + input_message_buffer->length, + trailer.value, trailer.length); + gss_release_buffer(&junk, &trailer); + + return GSS_S_COMPLETE; + } + + return GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE; +} + +/* + * + */ + +OM_uint32 GSSAPI_CALLCONV +_gss_ntlm_unwrap + (OM_uint32 * minor_status, + gss_const_ctx_id_t context_handle, + const gss_buffer_t input_message_buffer, + gss_buffer_t output_message_buffer, + int * conf_state, + gss_qop_t * qop_state + ) +{ + ntlm_ctx ctx = (ntlm_ctx)context_handle; + OM_uint32 ret; + + *minor_status = 0; + output_message_buffer->value = NULL; + output_message_buffer->length = 0; + + if (conf_state) + *conf_state = 0; + if (qop_state) + *qop_state = 0; + + if (CTX_FLAGS_ISSET(ctx, NTLM_NEG_SEAL|NTLM_NEG_NTLM2_SESSION)) { + + return v2_unseal_message(input_message_buffer, + ctx->u.v2.recv.signkey, + ctx->u.v2.recv.seq++, + &ctx->u.v2.recv.sealkey, + output_message_buffer); + + } else if (CTX_FLAGS_ISSET(ctx, NTLM_NEG_SEAL)) { + + gss_buffer_desc trailer; + OM_uint32 junk; + + if (input_message_buffer->length < 16) + return GSS_S_BAD_MIC; + + output_message_buffer->length = input_message_buffer->length - 16; + output_message_buffer->value = malloc(output_message_buffer->length); + if (output_message_buffer->value == NULL) { + output_message_buffer->length = 0; + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + } + + RC4(&ctx->u.v1.crypto_recv.key, output_message_buffer->length, + input_message_buffer->value, output_message_buffer->value); + + trailer.value = ((unsigned char *)input_message_buffer->value) + + output_message_buffer->length; + trailer.length = 16; + + ret = _gss_ntlm_verify_mic(minor_status, context_handle, + output_message_buffer, + &trailer, NULL); + if (ret) { + gss_release_buffer(&junk, output_message_buffer); + return ret; + } + + return GSS_S_COMPLETE; + } + + return GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE; +} |