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author | Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org> | 2024-04-27 07:24:22 +0000 |
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committer | Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org> | 2024-04-27 07:24:22 +0000 |
commit | 45d6379135504814ab723b57f0eb8be23393a51d (patch) | |
tree | d4f2ec4acca824a8446387a758b0ce4238a4dffa /bin/tests/system/kasp/tests.sh | |
parent | Initial commit. (diff) | |
download | bind9-upstream.tar.xz bind9-upstream.zip |
Adding upstream version 1:9.16.44.upstream/1%9.16.44upstream
Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'bin/tests/system/kasp/tests.sh')
-rw-r--r-- | bin/tests/system/kasp/tests.sh | 4882 |
1 files changed, 4882 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/bin/tests/system/kasp/tests.sh b/bin/tests/system/kasp/tests.sh new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4d3bda7 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/tests/system/kasp/tests.sh @@ -0,0 +1,4882 @@ +#!/bin/sh + +# Copyright (C) Internet Systems Consortium, Inc. ("ISC") +# +# SPDX-License-Identifier: MPL-2.0 +# +# This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public +# License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this +# file, you can obtain one at https://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. +# +# See the COPYRIGHT file distributed with this work for additional +# information regarding copyright ownership. + +# shellcheck source=conf.sh +# shellcheck source=kasp.sh +SYSTEMTESTTOP=.. +. "$SYSTEMTESTTOP/conf.sh" +. "$SYSTEMTESTTOP/kasp.sh" + +start_time="$(TZ=UTC date +%s)" +status=0 +n=0 + +############################################################################### +# Utilities # +############################################################################### + +# Call dig with default options. +dig_with_opts() { + + if [ -n "$TSIG" ]; then + "$DIG" +tcp +noadd +nosea +nostat +nocmd +dnssec -p "$PORT" -y "$TSIG" "$@" + else + "$DIG" +tcp +noadd +nosea +nostat +nocmd +dnssec -p "$PORT" "$@" + fi +} + +# RNDC. +rndccmd() { + "$RNDC" -c "$SYSTEMTESTTOP/common/rndc.conf" -p "$CONTROLPORT" -s "$@" +} + +# Log error and increment failure rate. +log_error() { + echo_i "error: $1" + ret=$((ret+1)) +} + +# Default next key event threshold. May be extended by wait periods. +next_key_event_threshold=100 + +############################################################################### +# Tests # +############################################################################### + +# +# dnssec-keygen +# +set_zone "kasp" +set_policy "kasp" "4" "200" +set_server "keys" "10.53.0.1" + +n=$((n+1)) +echo_i "check that 'dnssec-keygen -k' (configured policy) creates valid files ($n)" +ret=0 +$KEYGEN -K keys -k "$POLICY" -l kasp.conf "$ZONE" > "keygen.out.$POLICY.test$n" 2>/dev/null || ret=1 +lines=$(wc -l < "keygen.out.$POLICY.test$n") +test "$lines" -eq $NUM_KEYS || log_error "wrong number of keys created for policy kasp: $lines" +# Temporarily don't log errors because we are searching multiple files. +disable_logerror + +# Key properties. +set_keyrole "KEY1" "csk" +set_keylifetime "KEY1" "31536000" +set_keyalgorithm "KEY1" "13" "ECDSAP256SHA256" "256" +set_keysigning "KEY1" "yes" +set_zonesigning "KEY1" "yes" + +set_keyrole "KEY2" "ksk" +set_keylifetime "KEY2" "31536000" +set_keyalgorithm "KEY2" "8" "RSASHA256" "2048" +set_keysigning "KEY2" "yes" +set_zonesigning "KEY2" "no" + +set_keyrole "KEY3" "zsk" +set_keylifetime "KEY3" "2592000" +set_keyalgorithm "KEY3" "8" "RSASHA256" "2048" +set_keysigning "KEY3" "no" +set_zonesigning "KEY3" "yes" + +set_keyrole "KEY4" "zsk" +set_keylifetime "KEY4" "16070400" +set_keyalgorithm "KEY4" "8" "RSASHA256" "3072" +set_keysigning "KEY4" "no" +set_zonesigning "KEY4" "yes" + +lines=$(get_keyids "$DIR" "$ZONE" | wc -l) +test "$lines" -eq $NUM_KEYS || log_error "bad number of key ids" + +ids=$(get_keyids "$DIR" "$ZONE") +for id in $ids; do + # There are four key files with the same algorithm. + # Check them until a match is found. + ret=0 && check_key "KEY1" "$id" + test "$ret" -eq 0 && continue + + ret=0 && check_key "KEY2" "$id" + test "$ret" -eq 0 && continue + + ret=0 && check_key "KEY3" "$id" + test "$ret" -eq 0 && continue + + ret=0 && check_key "KEY4" "$id" + + # If ret is still non-zero, non of the files matched. + test "$ret" -eq 0 || echo_i "failed" + status=$((status+ret)) +done +# Turn error logs on again. +enable_logerror + +n=$((n+1)) +echo_i "check that 'dnssec-keygen -k' (default policy) creates valid files ($n)" +ret=0 +set_zone "kasp" +set_policy "default" "1" "3600" +set_server "." "10.53.0.1" +# Key properties. +set_keyrole "KEY1" "csk" +set_keylifetime "KEY1" "0" +set_keyalgorithm "KEY1" "13" "ECDSAP256SHA256" "256" +set_keysigning "KEY1" "yes" +set_zonesigning "KEY1" "yes" + +key_clear "KEY2" +key_clear "KEY3" +key_clear "KEY4" + +$KEYGEN -G -k "$POLICY" "$ZONE" > "keygen.out.$POLICY.test$n" 2>/dev/null || ret=1 +lines=$(wc -l < "keygen.out.$POLICY.test$n") +test "$lines" -eq $NUM_KEYS || log_error "wrong number of keys created for policy default: $lines" +ids=$(get_keyids "$DIR" "$ZONE") +for id in $ids; do + check_key "KEY1" "$id" + test "$ret" -eq 0 && key_save KEY1 + check_keytimes +done +test "$ret" -eq 0 || echo_i "failed" +status=$((status+ret)) + +# +# dnssec-settime +# + +# These test builds upon the latest created key with dnssec-keygen and uses the +# environment variables BASE_FILE, KEY_FILE, PRIVATE_FILE and STATE_FILE. +CMP_FILE="${BASE_FILE}.cmp" +n=$((n+1)) +echo_i "check that 'dnssec-settime' by default does not edit key state file ($n)" +ret=0 +cp "$STATE_FILE" "$CMP_FILE" +$SETTIME -P +3600 "$BASE_FILE" > /dev/null || log_error "settime failed" +grep "; Publish: " "$KEY_FILE" > /dev/null || log_error "mismatch published in $KEY_FILE" +grep "Publish: " "$PRIVATE_FILE" > /dev/null || log_error "mismatch published in $PRIVATE_FILE" +$DIFF "$CMP_FILE" "$STATE_FILE" || log_error "unexpected file change in $STATE_FILE" +test "$ret" -eq 0 || echo_i "failed" +status=$((status+ret)) + +n=$((n+1)) +echo_i "check that 'dnssec-settime -s' also sets publish time metadata and states in key state file ($n)" +ret=0 +cp "$STATE_FILE" "$CMP_FILE" +now=$(date +%Y%m%d%H%M%S) +$SETTIME -s -P "$now" -g "omnipresent" -k "rumoured" "$now" -z "omnipresent" "$now" -r "rumoured" "$now" -d "hidden" "$now" "$BASE_FILE" > /dev/null || log_error "settime failed" +set_keystate "KEY1" "GOAL" "omnipresent" +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DNSKEY" "rumoured" +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_KRRSIG" "rumoured" +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_ZRRSIG" "omnipresent" +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DS" "hidden" +check_key "KEY1" "$id" +test "$ret" -eq 0 && key_save KEY1 +set_keytime "KEY1" "PUBLISHED" "${now}" +check_keytimes +test "$ret" -eq 0 || echo_i "failed" +status=$((status+ret)) + +n=$((n+1)) +echo_i "check that 'dnssec-settime -s' also unsets publish time metadata and states in key state file ($n)" +ret=0 +cp "$STATE_FILE" "$CMP_FILE" +$SETTIME -s -P "none" -g "none" -k "none" "$now" -z "none" "$now" -r "none" "$now" -d "none" "$now" "$BASE_FILE" > /dev/null || log_error "settime failed" +set_keystate "KEY1" "GOAL" "none" +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DNSKEY" "none" +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_KRRSIG" "none" +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_ZRRSIG" "none" +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DS" "none" +check_key "KEY1" "$id" +test "$ret" -eq 0 && key_save KEY1 +set_keytime "KEY1" "PUBLISHED" "none" +check_keytimes +test "$ret" -eq 0 || echo_i "failed" +status=$((status+ret)) + +n=$((n+1)) +echo_i "check that 'dnssec-settime -s' also sets active time metadata and states in key state file (uppercase) ($n)" +ret=0 +cp "$STATE_FILE" "$CMP_FILE" +now=$(date +%Y%m%d%H%M%S) +$SETTIME -s -A "$now" -g "HIDDEN" -k "UNRETENTIVE" "$now" -z "UNRETENTIVE" "$now" -r "OMNIPRESENT" "$now" -d "OMNIPRESENT" "$now" "$BASE_FILE" > /dev/null || log_error "settime failed" +set_keystate "KEY1" "GOAL" "hidden" +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DNSKEY" "unretentive" +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_KRRSIG" "omnipresent" +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_ZRRSIG" "unretentive" +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DS" "omnipresent" +check_key "KEY1" "$id" +test "$ret" -eq 0 && key_save KEY1 +set_keytime "KEY1" "ACTIVE" "${now}" +check_keytimes +test "$ret" -eq 0 || echo_i "failed" +status=$((status+ret)) + +# +# named +# + +# The NSEC record at the apex of the zone and its RRSIG records are +# added as part of the last step in signing a zone. We wait for the +# NSEC records to appear before proceeding with a counter to prevent +# infinite loops if there is an error. +n=$((n+1)) +echo_i "waiting for kasp signing changes to take effect ($n)" + +_wait_for_done_apexnsec() { + while read -r zone + do + dig_with_opts "$zone" @10.53.0.3 nsec > "dig.out.ns3.test$n.$zone" || return 1 + grep "NS SOA" "dig.out.ns3.test$n.$zone" > /dev/null || return 1 + grep "$zone\..*IN.*RRSIG" "dig.out.ns3.test$n.$zone" > /dev/null || return 1 + done < ns3/zones + + while read -r zone + do + dig_with_opts "$zone" @10.53.0.6 nsec > "dig.out.ns6.test$n.$zone" || return 1 + grep "NS SOA" "dig.out.ns6.test$n.$zone" > /dev/null || return 1 + grep "$zone\..*IN.*RRSIG" "dig.out.ns6.test$n.$zone" > /dev/null || return 1 + done < ns6/zones + + return 0 +} +retry_quiet 30 _wait_for_done_apexnsec || ret=1 +test "$ret" -eq 0 || echo_i "failed" +status=$((status+ret)) + +# Test max-zone-ttl rejects zones with too high TTL. +n=$((n+1)) +echo_i "check that max-zone-ttl rejects zones with too high TTL ($n)" +ret=0 +set_zone "max-zone-ttl.kasp" +grep "loading from master file ${ZONE}.db failed: out of range" "ns3/named.run" > /dev/null || ret=1 +test "$ret" -eq 0 || echo_i "failed" +status=$((status+ret)) + +# +# Zone: default.kasp. +# +set_keytimes_csk_policy() { + # The first key is immediately published and activated. + created=$(key_get KEY1 CREATED) + set_keytime "KEY1" "PUBLISHED" "${created}" + set_keytime "KEY1" "ACTIVE" "${created}" + # The DS can be published if the DNSKEY and RRSIG records are + # OMNIPRESENT. This happens after max-zone-ttl (1d) plus + # publish-safety (1h) plus zone-propagation-delay (300s) = + # 86400 + 3600 + 300 = 90300. + set_addkeytime "KEY1" "SYNCPUBLISH" "${created}" 90300 + # Key lifetime is unlimited, so not setting RETIRED and REMOVED. +} + +# Check the zone with default kasp policy has loaded and is signed. +set_zone "default.kasp" +set_policy "default" "1" "3600" +set_server "ns3" "10.53.0.3" +# Key properties. +set_keyrole "KEY1" "csk" +set_keylifetime "KEY1" "0" +set_keyalgorithm "KEY1" "13" "ECDSAP256SHA256" "256" +set_keysigning "KEY1" "yes" +set_zonesigning "KEY1" "yes" +# DNSKEY, RRSIG (ksk), RRSIG (zsk) are published. DS needs to wait. +set_keystate "KEY1" "GOAL" "omnipresent" +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DNSKEY" "rumoured" +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_KRRSIG" "rumoured" +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_ZRRSIG" "rumoured" +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DS" "hidden" + +check_keys +check_dnssecstatus "$SERVER" "$POLICY" "$ZONE" +set_keytimes_csk_policy +check_keytimes +check_apex +check_subdomain +dnssec_verify + +# Trigger a keymgr run. Make sure the key files are not touched if there are +# no modifications to the key metadata. +n=$((n+1)) +echo_i "make sure key files are untouched if metadata does not change ($n)" +ret=0 +basefile=$(key_get KEY1 BASEFILE) +privkey_stat=$(key_get KEY1 PRIVKEY_STAT) +pubkey_stat=$(key_get KEY1 PUBKEY_STAT) +state_stat=$(key_get KEY1 STATE_STAT) + +nextpart $DIR/named.run > /dev/null +rndccmd 10.53.0.3 loadkeys "$ZONE" > /dev/null || log_error "rndc loadkeys zone ${ZONE} failed" +wait_for_log 3 "keymgr: $ZONE done" $DIR/named.run +privkey_stat2=$(key_stat "${basefile}.private") +pubkey_stat2=$(key_stat "${basefile}.key") +state_stat2=$(key_stat "${basefile}.state") +test "$privkey_stat" = "$privkey_stat2" || log_error "wrong private key file stat (expected $privkey_stat got $privkey_stat2)" +test "$pubkey_stat" = "$pubkey_stat2" || log_error "wrong public key file stat (expected $pubkey_stat got $pubkey_stat2)" +test "$state_stat" = "$state_stat2" || log_error "wrong state file stat (expected $state_stat got $state_stat2)" +test "$ret" -eq 0 || echo_i "failed" +status=$((status+ret)) + +n=$((n+1)) +echo_i "again ($n)" +ret=0 + +nextpart $DIR/named.run > /dev/null +rndccmd 10.53.0.3 loadkeys "$ZONE" > /dev/null || log_error "rndc loadkeys zone ${ZONE} failed" +wait_for_log 3 "keymgr: $ZONE done" $DIR/named.run +privkey_stat2=$(key_stat "${basefile}.private") +pubkey_stat2=$(key_stat "${basefile}.key") +state_stat2=$(key_stat "${basefile}.state") +test "$privkey_stat" = "$privkey_stat2" || log_error "wrong private key file stat (expected $privkey_stat got $privkey_stat2)" +test "$pubkey_stat" = "$pubkey_stat2" || log_error "wrong public key file stat (expected $pubkey_stat got $pubkey_stat2)" +test "$state_stat" = "$state_stat2" || log_error "wrong state file stat (expected $state_stat got $state_stat2)" +test "$ret" -eq 0 || echo_i "failed" +status=$((status+ret)) + +# Update zone. +n=$((n+1)) +echo_i "modify unsigned zone file and check that new record is signed for zone ${ZONE} ($n)" +ret=0 +cp "${DIR}/template2.db.in" "${DIR}/${ZONE}.db" +rndccmd 10.53.0.3 reload "$ZONE" > /dev/null || log_error "rndc reload zone ${ZONE} failed" + +update_is_signed() { + ip_a=$1 + ip_d=$2 + + if [ "$ip_a" != "-" ]; then + dig_with_opts "a.${ZONE}" "@${SERVER}" A > "dig.out.$DIR.test$n.a" || return 1 + grep "status: NOERROR" "dig.out.$DIR.test$n.a" > /dev/null || return 1 + grep "a.${ZONE}\..*${DEFAULT_TTL}.*IN.*A.*${ip_a}" "dig.out.$DIR.test$n.a" > /dev/null || return 1 + lines=$(get_keys_which_signed A "dig.out.$DIR.test$n.a" | wc -l) + test "$lines" -eq 1 || return 1 + get_keys_which_signed A "dig.out.$DIR.test$n.a" | grep "^${KEY_ID}$" > /dev/null || return 1 + fi + + if [ "$ip_d" != "-" ]; then + dig_with_opts "d.${ZONE}" "@${SERVER}" A > "dig.out.$DIR.test$n".d || return 1 + grep "status: NOERROR" "dig.out.$DIR.test$n".d > /dev/null || return 1 + grep "d.${ZONE}\..*${DEFAULT_TTL}.*IN.*A.*${ip_d}" "dig.out.$DIR.test$n".d > /dev/null || return 1 + lines=$(get_keys_which_signed A "dig.out.$DIR.test$n".d | wc -l) + test "$lines" -eq 1 || return 1 + get_keys_which_signed A "dig.out.$DIR.test$n".d | grep "^${KEY_ID}$" > /dev/null || return 1 + fi +} + +retry_quiet 10 update_is_signed "10.0.0.11" "10.0.0.44" || ret=1 +test "$ret" -eq 0 || echo_i "failed" +status=$((status+ret)) + +# Move the private key file, a rekey event should not introduce replacement +# keys. +ret=0 +echo_i "test that if private key files are inaccessible this doesn't trigger a rollover ($n)" +basefile=$(key_get KEY1 BASEFILE) +mv "${basefile}.private" "${basefile}.offline" +rndccmd 10.53.0.3 loadkeys "$ZONE" > /dev/null || log_error "rndc loadkeys zone ${ZONE} failed" +wait_for_log 3 "offline, policy default" $DIR/named.run || ret=1 +mv "${basefile}.offline" "${basefile}.private" +test "$ret" -eq 0 || echo_i "failed" +status=$((status+ret)) + +# Nothing has changed. +check_keys +check_dnssecstatus "$SERVER" "$POLICY" "$ZONE" +set_keytimes_csk_policy +check_keytimes +check_apex +check_subdomain +dnssec_verify + +# +# Zone: dynamic.kasp +# +set_zone "dynamic.kasp" +set_dynamic +set_policy "default" "1" "3600" +set_server "ns3" "10.53.0.3" +# Key properties, timings and states same as above. +check_keys +check_dnssecstatus "$SERVER" "$POLICY" "$ZONE" +set_keytimes_csk_policy +check_keytimes +check_apex +check_subdomain +dnssec_verify + +# Update zone with nsupdate. +n=$((n+1)) +echo_i "nsupdate zone and check that new record is signed for zone ${ZONE} ($n)" +ret=0 +( +echo zone ${ZONE} +echo server 10.53.0.3 "$PORT" +echo update del "a.${ZONE}" 300 A 10.0.0.1 +echo update add "a.${ZONE}" 300 A 10.0.0.101 +echo update add "d.${ZONE}" 300 A 10.0.0.4 +echo send +) | $NSUPDATE + +retry_quiet 10 update_is_signed "10.0.0.101" "10.0.0.4" || ret=1 +test "$ret" -eq 0 || echo_i "failed" +status=$((status+ret)) + +# Update zone with nsupdate (reverting the above change). +n=$((n+1)) +echo_i "nsupdate zone and check that new record is signed for zone ${ZONE} ($n)" +ret=0 +( +echo zone ${ZONE} +echo server 10.53.0.3 "$PORT" +echo update add "a.${ZONE}" 300 A 10.0.0.1 +echo update del "a.${ZONE}" 300 A 10.0.0.101 +echo update del "d.${ZONE}" 300 A 10.0.0.4 +echo send +) | $NSUPDATE + +retry_quiet 10 update_is_signed "10.0.0.1" "-" || ret=1 +test "$ret" -eq 0 || echo_i "failed" +status=$((status+ret)) + +# Update zone with freeze/thaw. +n=$((n+1)) +echo_i "modify zone file and check that new record is signed for zone ${ZONE} ($n)" +ret=0 +rndccmd 10.53.0.3 freeze "$ZONE" > /dev/null || log_error "rndc freeze zone ${ZONE} failed" +sleep 1 +echo "d.${ZONE}. 300 A 10.0.0.44" >> "${DIR}/${ZONE}.db" +rndccmd 10.53.0.3 thaw "$ZONE" > /dev/null || log_error "rndc thaw zone ${ZONE} failed" + +retry_quiet 10 update_is_signed "10.0.0.1" "10.0.0.44" || ret=1 +test "$ret" -eq 0 || echo_i "failed" +status=$((status+ret)) + +# +# Zone: dynamic-inline-signing.kasp +# +set_zone "dynamic-inline-signing.kasp" +set_dynamic +set_policy "default" "1" "3600" +set_server "ns3" "10.53.0.3" +# Key properties, timings and states same as above. +check_keys +check_dnssecstatus "$SERVER" "$POLICY" "$ZONE" +set_keytimes_csk_policy +check_keytimes +check_apex +check_subdomain +dnssec_verify + +# Update zone with freeze/thaw. +n=$((n+1)) +echo_i "modify unsigned zone file and check that new record is signed for zone ${ZONE} ($n)" +ret=0 +rndccmd 10.53.0.3 freeze "$ZONE" > /dev/null || log_error "rndc freeze zone ${ZONE} failed" +sleep 1 +cp "${DIR}/template2.db.in" "${DIR}/${ZONE}.db" +rndccmd 10.53.0.3 thaw "$ZONE" > /dev/null || log_error "rndc thaw zone ${ZONE} failed" + +retry_quiet 10 update_is_signed || ret=1 +test "$ret" -eq 0 || echo_i "failed" +status=$((status+ret)) + +# +# Zone: inline-signing.kasp +# +set_zone "inline-signing.kasp" +set_policy "default" "1" "3600" +set_server "ns3" "10.53.0.3" +# Key properties, timings and states same as above. +check_keys +check_dnssecstatus "$SERVER" "$POLICY" "$ZONE" +set_keytimes_csk_policy +check_keytimes +check_apex +check_subdomain +dnssec_verify + +# +# Zone: checkds-ksk.kasp. +# +key_clear "KEY1" +key_clear "KEY2" +key_clear "KEY3" +key_clear "KEY4" + +set_zone "checkds-ksk.kasp" +set_policy "checkds-ksk" "2" "303" +set_server "ns3" "10.53.0.3" +# Key properties. +set_keyrole "KEY1" "ksk" +set_keylifetime "KEY1" "0" +set_keyalgorithm "KEY1" "13" "ECDSAP256SHA256" "256" +set_keysigning "KEY1" "yes" +set_zonesigning "KEY1" "no" + +set_keyrole "KEY2" "zsk" +set_keylifetime "KEY2" "0" +set_keyalgorithm "KEY2" "13" "ECDSAP256SHA256" "256" +set_keysigning "KEY2" "no" +set_zonesigning "KEY2" "yes" +# DNSKEY, RRSIG (ksk), RRSIG (zsk) are published. DS needs to wait. +set_keystate "KEY1" "GOAL" "omnipresent" +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DNSKEY" "rumoured" +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_KRRSIG" "rumoured" +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DS" "hidden" + +set_keystate "KEY2" "GOAL" "omnipresent" +set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_DNSKEY" "rumoured" +set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_ZRRSIG" "rumoured" + +check_keys +check_dnssecstatus "$SERVER" "$POLICY" "$ZONE" +check_apex +check_subdomain +dnssec_verify + +basefile=$(key_get KEY1 BASEFILE) + +_wait_for_metadata() { + _expr=$1 + _file=$2 + grep "$_expr" $_file > /dev/null || return 1 + return 0 +} + +n=$((n+1)) +echo_i "checkds publish correctly sets DSPublish for zone $ZONE ($n)" +now=$(date +%Y%m%d%H%M%S) +rndc_checkds "$SERVER" "$DIR" "-" "$now" "published" "$ZONE" +retry_quiet 3 _wait_for_metadata "DSPublish: $now" "${basefile}.state" || log_error "bad DSPublish in ${basefile}.state" +# DS State should be forced into RUMOURED. +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DS" "rumoured" +check_keys +test "$ret" -eq 0 || echo_i "failed" +status=$((status+ret)) + +n=$((n+1)) +echo_i "checkds withdraw correctly sets DSRemoved for zone $ZONE ($n)" +now=$(date +%Y%m%d%H%M%S) +rndc_checkds "$SERVER" "$DIR" "-" "$now" "withdrawn" "$ZONE" +retry_quiet 3 _wait_for_metadata "DSRemoved: $now" "${basefile}.state" || log_error "bad DSRemoved in ${basefile}.state" +# DS State should be forced into UNRETENTIVE. +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DS" "unretentive" +check_keys +test "$ret" -eq 0 || echo_i "failed" +status=$((status+ret)) + +# +# Zone: checkds-doubleksk.kasp. +# +key_clear "KEY1" +key_clear "KEY2" +key_clear "KEY3" +key_clear "KEY4" + +set_zone "checkds-doubleksk.kasp" +set_policy "checkds-doubleksk" "3" "303" +set_server "ns3" "10.53.0.3" +# Key properties. +set_keyrole "KEY1" "ksk" +set_keylifetime "KEY1" "0" +set_keyalgorithm "KEY1" "13" "ECDSAP256SHA256" "256" +set_keysigning "KEY1" "yes" +set_zonesigning "KEY1" "no" + +set_keyrole "KEY2" "ksk" +set_keylifetime "KEY2" "0" +set_keyalgorithm "KEY2" "13" "ECDSAP256SHA256" "256" +set_keysigning "KEY2" "yes" +set_zonesigning "KEY2" "no" + +set_keyrole "KEY3" "zsk" +set_keylifetime "KEY3" "0" +set_keyalgorithm "KEY3" "13" "ECDSAP256SHA256" "256" +set_keysigning "KEY3" "no" +set_zonesigning "KEY3" "yes" +# DNSKEY, RRSIG (ksk), RRSIG (zsk) are published. DS needs to wait. +set_keystate "KEY1" "GOAL" "omnipresent" +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DNSKEY" "rumoured" +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_KRRSIG" "rumoured" +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DS" "hidden" + +set_keystate "KEY2" "GOAL" "omnipresent" +set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_DNSKEY" "rumoured" +set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_KRRSIG" "rumoured" +set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_DS" "hidden" + +set_keystate "KEY3" "GOAL" "omnipresent" +set_keystate "KEY3" "STATE_DNSKEY" "rumoured" +set_keystate "KEY3" "STATE_ZRRSIG" "rumoured" + +check_keys +check_dnssecstatus "$SERVER" "$POLICY" "$ZONE" +check_apex +check_subdomain +dnssec_verify + +basefile1=$(key_get KEY1 BASEFILE) +basefile2=$(key_get KEY2 BASEFILE) + +n=$((n+1)) +echo_i "checkds published does not set DSPublish for zone $ZONE (multiple KSK) ($n)" +rndc_checkds "$SERVER" "$DIR" "-" "20200102121314" "published" "$ZONE" +grep "DSPublish:" "${basefile1}.state" > /dev/null && log_error "DSPublish incorrectly set in ${basefile1}" +grep "DSPublish:" "${basefile2}.state" > /dev/null && log_error "DSPublish incorrectly set in ${basefile2}" +test "$ret" -eq 0 || echo_i "failed" +status=$((status+ret)) + +n=$((n+1)) +echo_i "checkds withdrawn does not set DSRemoved for zone $ZONE (multiple KSK) ($n)" +rndc_checkds "$SERVER" "$DIR" "-" "20190102121314" "withdrawn" "$ZONE" +grep "DSRemoved:" "${basefile1}.state" > /dev/null && log_error "DSRemoved incorrectly set in ${basefile1}" +grep "DSRemoved:" "${basefile2}.state" > /dev/null && log_error "DSRemoved incorrectly set in ${basefile2}" +test "$ret" -eq 0 || echo_i "failed" +status=$((status+ret)) + +n=$((n+1)) +echo_i "checkds published does not set DSPublish for zone $ZONE (wrong algorithm) ($n)" +rndccmd "$SERVER" dnssec -checkds -key $(key_get KEY1 ID) -alg 8 "published" "$ZONE" > rndc.dnssec.checkds.out.$ZONE.$n +grep "DSPublish:" "${basefile1}.state" > /dev/null && log_error "DSPublish incorrectly set in ${basefile1}" +grep "DSPublish:" "${basefile2}.state" > /dev/null && log_error "DSPublish incorrectly set in ${basefile2}" +test "$ret" -eq 0 || echo_i "failed" +status=$((status+ret)) + +n=$((n+1)) +echo_i "checkds withdrawn does not set DSRemoved for zone $ZONE (wrong algorithm) ($n)" +rndccmd "$SERVER" dnssec -checkds -key $(key_get KEY1 ID) -alg RSASHA256 "withdrawn" "$ZONE" > rndc.dnssec.checkds.out.$ZONE.$n +grep "DSRemoved:" "${basefile1}.state" > /dev/null && log_error "DSRemoved incorrectly set in ${basefile1}" +grep "DSRemoved:" "${basefile2}.state" > /dev/null && log_error "DSRemoved incorrectly set in ${basefile2}" +test "$ret" -eq 0 || echo_i "failed" +status=$((status+ret)) + +n=$((n+1)) +echo_i "checkds published -key correctly sets DSPublish for key $(key_get KEY1 ID) zone $ZONE (multiple KSK) ($n)" +rndc_checkds "$SERVER" "$DIR" KEY1 "20190102121314" "published" "$ZONE" +retry_quiet 3 _wait_for_metadata "DSPublish: 20190102121314" "${basefile1}.state" || log_error "bad DSPublish in ${basefile1}.state" +grep "DSPublish:" "${basefile2}.state" > /dev/null && log_error "DSPublish incorrectly set in ${basefile2}" +test "$ret" -eq 0 || echo_i "failed" +status=$((status+ret)) + +n=$((n+1)) +echo_i "checkds withdrawn -key correctly sets DSRemoved for key $(key_get KEY2 ID) zone $ZONE (multiple KSK) ($n)" +rndc_checkds "$SERVER" "$DIR" KEY2 "20200102121314" "withdrawn" "$ZONE" +grep "DSRemoved:" "${basefile1}.state" > /dev/null && log_error "DSPublish incorrectly set in ${basefile1}" +retry_quiet 3 _wait_for_metadata "DSRemoved: 20200102121314" "${basefile2}.state" || log_error "bad DSRemoved in ${basefile2}.state" +test "$ret" -eq 0 || echo_i "failed" +status=$((status+ret)) + +# +# Zone: checkds-csk.kasp. +# +key_clear "KEY1" +key_clear "KEY2" +key_clear "KEY3" +key_clear "KEY4" + +set_zone "checkds-csk.kasp" +set_policy "checkds-csk" "1" "303" +set_server "ns3" "10.53.0.3" +# Key properties. +set_keyrole "KEY1" "csk" +set_keylifetime "KEY1" "0" +set_keyalgorithm "KEY1" "13" "ECDSAP256SHA256" "256" +set_keysigning "KEY1" "yes" +set_zonesigning "KEY1" "yes" +# DNSKEY, RRSIG (ksk), RRSIG (zsk) are published. DS needs to wait. +set_keystate "KEY1" "GOAL" "omnipresent" +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DNSKEY" "rumoured" +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_KRRSIG" "rumoured" +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_ZRRSIG" "rumoured" +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DS" "hidden" + +check_keys +check_dnssecstatus "$SERVER" "$POLICY" "$ZONE" +check_apex +check_subdomain +dnssec_verify + +basefile=$(key_get KEY1 BASEFILE) + +n=$((n+1)) +echo_i "checkds publish correctly sets DSPublish for zone $ZONE ($n)" +rndc_checkds "$SERVER" "$DIR" "-" "20190102121314" "published" "$ZONE" +retry_quiet 3 _wait_for_metadata "DSPublish: 20190102121314" "${basefile}.state" || log_error "bad DSPublish in ${basefile}.state" +test "$ret" -eq 0 || echo_i "failed" +status=$((status+ret)) + +n=$((n+1)) +echo_i "checkds withdraw correctly sets DSRemoved for zone $ZONE ($n)" +rndc_checkds "$SERVER" "$DIR" "-" "20200102121314" "withdrawn" "$ZONE" +retry_quiet 3 _wait_for_metadata "DSRemoved: 20200102121314" "${basefile}.state" || log_error "bad DSRemoved in ${basefile}.state" +test "$ret" -eq 0 || echo_i "failed" +status=$((status+ret)) + +# Set keytimes for dnssec-policy with various algorithms. +# These all use the same time values. +set_keytimes_algorithm_policy() { + # The first KSK is immediately published and activated. + created=$(key_get KEY1 CREATED) + set_keytime "KEY1" "PUBLISHED" "${created}" + set_keytime "KEY1" "ACTIVE" "${created}" + # Key was pregenerated. + if [ "$1" = "pregenerated" ]; then + keyfile=$(key_get KEY1 BASEFILE) + grep "; Publish:" "${keyfile}.key" > published.test${n}.key1 + published=$(awk '{print $3}' < published.test${n}.key1) + set_keytime "KEY1" "PUBLISHED" "${published}" + set_keytime "KEY1" "ACTIVE" "${published}" + fi + published=$(key_get KEY1 PUBLISHED) + + # The DS can be published if the DNSKEY and RRSIG records are + # OMNIPRESENT. This happens after max-zone-ttl (1d) plus + # publish-safety (1h) plus zone-propagation-delay (300s) = + # 86400 + 3600 + 300 = 90300. + set_addkeytime "KEY1" "SYNCPUBLISH" "${published}" 90300 + # Key lifetime is 10 years, 315360000 seconds. + set_addkeytime "KEY1" "RETIRED" "${published}" 315360000 + # The key is removed after the retire time plus DS TTL (1d), + # parent propagation delay (1h), and retire safety (1h) = + # 86400 + 3600 + 3600 = 93600. + retired=$(key_get KEY1 RETIRED) + set_addkeytime "KEY1" "REMOVED" "${retired}" 93600 + + # The first ZSKs are immediately published and activated. + created=$(key_get KEY2 CREATED) + set_keytime "KEY2" "PUBLISHED" "${created}" + set_keytime "KEY2" "ACTIVE" "${created}" + # Key was pregenerated. + if [ "$1" = "pregenerated" ]; then + keyfile=$(key_get KEY2 BASEFILE) + grep "; Publish:" "${keyfile}.key" > published.test${n}.key2 + published=$(awk '{print $3}' < published.test${n}.key2) + set_keytime "KEY2" "PUBLISHED" "${published}" + set_keytime "KEY2" "ACTIVE" "${published}" + fi + published=$(key_get KEY2 PUBLISHED) + + # Key lifetime for KSK2 is 5 years, 157680000 seconds. + set_addkeytime "KEY2" "RETIRED" "${published}" 157680000 + # The key is removed after the retire time plus max zone ttl (1d), zone + # propagation delay (300s), retire safety (1h), and sign delay + # (signature validity minus refresh, 9d) = + # 86400 + 300 + 3600 + 777600 = 867900. + retired=$(key_get KEY2 RETIRED) + set_addkeytime "KEY2" "REMOVED" "${retired}" 867900 + + # Second ZSK (KEY3). + created=$(key_get KEY3 CREATED) + set_keytime "KEY3" "PUBLISHED" "${created}" + set_keytime "KEY3" "ACTIVE" "${created}" + # Key was pregenerated. + if [ "$1" = "pregenerated" ]; then + keyfile=$(key_get KEY3 BASEFILE) + grep "; Publish:" "${keyfile}.key" > published.test${n}.key3 + published=$(awk '{print $3}' < published.test${n}.key3) + set_keytime "KEY3" "PUBLISHED" "${published}" + set_keytime "KEY3" "ACTIVE" "${published}" + fi + published=$(key_get KEY3 PUBLISHED) + + # Key lifetime for KSK3 is 1 year, 31536000 seconds. + set_addkeytime "KEY3" "RETIRED" "${published}" 31536000 + retired=$(key_get KEY3 RETIRED) + set_addkeytime "KEY3" "REMOVED" "${retired}" 867900 +} + +# +# Zone: rsasha1.kasp. +# +if $SHELL ../testcrypto.sh -q RSASHA1 +then + set_zone "rsasha1.kasp" + set_policy "rsasha1" "3" "1234" + set_server "ns3" "10.53.0.3" + # Key properties. + key_clear "KEY1" + set_keyrole "KEY1" "ksk" + set_keylifetime "KEY1" "315360000" + set_keyalgorithm "KEY1" "5" "RSASHA1" "2048" + set_keysigning "KEY1" "yes" + set_zonesigning "KEY1" "no" + + key_clear "KEY2" + set_keyrole "KEY2" "zsk" + set_keylifetime "KEY2" "157680000" + set_keyalgorithm "KEY2" "5" "RSASHA1" "2048" + set_keysigning "KEY2" "no" + set_zonesigning "KEY2" "yes" + + key_clear "KEY3" + set_keyrole "KEY3" "zsk" + set_keylifetime "KEY3" "31536000" + set_keyalgorithm "KEY3" "5" "RSASHA1" "2000" + set_keysigning "KEY3" "no" + set_zonesigning "KEY3" "yes" + + # KSK: DNSKEY, RRSIG (ksk) published. DS needs to wait. + # ZSK: DNSKEY, RRSIG (zsk) published. + set_keystate "KEY1" "GOAL" "omnipresent" + set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DNSKEY" "rumoured" + set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_KRRSIG" "rumoured" + set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DS" "hidden" + + set_keystate "KEY2" "GOAL" "omnipresent" + set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_DNSKEY" "rumoured" + set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_ZRRSIG" "rumoured" + + set_keystate "KEY3" "GOAL" "omnipresent" + set_keystate "KEY3" "STATE_DNSKEY" "rumoured" + set_keystate "KEY3" "STATE_ZRRSIG" "rumoured" + # Three keys only. + key_clear "KEY4" + + check_keys + check_dnssecstatus "$SERVER" "$POLICY" "$ZONE" + set_keytimes_algorithm_policy + check_keytimes + check_apex + check_subdomain + dnssec_verify +fi + +# +# Zone: unsigned.kasp. +# +set_zone "unsigned.kasp" +set_policy "none" "0" "0" +set_server "ns3" "10.53.0.3" + +key_clear "KEY1" +key_clear "KEY2" +key_clear "KEY3" +key_clear "KEY4" + +check_keys +check_dnssecstatus "$SERVER" "$POLICY" "$ZONE" +check_apex +check_subdomain +# Make sure the zone file is untouched. +n=$((n+1)) +echo_i "Make sure the zonefile for zone ${ZONE} is not edited ($n)" +ret=0 +diff "${DIR}/${ZONE}.db.infile" "${DIR}/${ZONE}.db" || ret=1 +test "$ret" -eq 0 || echo_i "failed" +status=$((status+ret)) + +# +# Zone: insecure.kasp. +# +set_zone "insecure.kasp" +set_policy "insecure" "0" "0" +set_server "ns3" "10.53.0.3" + +key_clear "KEY1" +key_clear "KEY2" +key_clear "KEY3" +key_clear "KEY4" + +check_keys +check_dnssecstatus "$SERVER" "$POLICY" "$ZONE" +check_apex +check_subdomain + +# +# Zone: unlimited.kasp. +# +set_zone "unlimited.kasp" +set_policy "unlimited" "1" "1234" +set_server "ns3" "10.53.0.3" +# Key properties. +set_keyrole "KEY1" "csk" +set_keylifetime "KEY1" "0" +set_keyalgorithm "KEY1" "13" "ECDSAP256SHA256" "256" +set_keysigning "KEY1" "yes" +set_zonesigning "KEY1" "yes" +# DNSKEY, RRSIG (ksk), RRSIG (zsk) are published. DS needs to wait. +set_keystate "KEY1" "GOAL" "omnipresent" +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DNSKEY" "rumoured" +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_KRRSIG" "rumoured" +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_ZRRSIG" "rumoured" +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DS" "hidden" + +check_keys +check_dnssecstatus "$SERVER" "$POLICY" "$ZONE" +set_keytimes_csk_policy +check_keytimes +check_apex +check_subdomain +dnssec_verify + +# +# Zone: inherit.kasp. +# +set_zone "inherit.kasp" +set_policy "rsasha256" "3" "1234" +set_server "ns3" "10.53.0.3" + +# Key properties. +key_clear "KEY1" +set_keyrole "KEY1" "ksk" +set_keylifetime "KEY1" "315360000" +set_keyalgorithm "KEY1" "8" "RSASHA256" "2048" +set_keysigning "KEY1" "yes" +set_zonesigning "KEY1" "no" + +key_clear "KEY2" +set_keyrole "KEY2" "zsk" +set_keylifetime "KEY2" "157680000" +set_keyalgorithm "KEY2" "8" "RSASHA256" "2048" +set_keysigning "KEY2" "no" +set_zonesigning "KEY2" "yes" + +key_clear "KEY3" +set_keyrole "KEY3" "zsk" +set_keylifetime "KEY3" "31536000" +set_keyalgorithm "KEY3" "8" "RSASHA256" "3072" +set_keysigning "KEY3" "no" +set_zonesigning "KEY3" "yes" +# KSK: DNSKEY, RRSIG (ksk) published. DS needs to wait. +# ZSK: DNSKEY, RRSIG (zsk) published. +set_keystate "KEY1" "GOAL" "omnipresent" +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DNSKEY" "rumoured" +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_KRRSIG" "rumoured" +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DS" "hidden" + +set_keystate "KEY2" "GOAL" "omnipresent" +set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_DNSKEY" "rumoured" +set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_ZRRSIG" "rumoured" + +set_keystate "KEY3" "GOAL" "omnipresent" +set_keystate "KEY3" "STATE_DNSKEY" "rumoured" +set_keystate "KEY3" "STATE_ZRRSIG" "rumoured" +# Three keys only. +key_clear "KEY4" + +check_keys +check_dnssecstatus "$SERVER" "$POLICY" "$ZONE" +set_keytimes_algorithm_policy +check_keytimes +check_apex +check_subdomain +dnssec_verify + +# +# Zone: dnssec-keygen.kasp. +# +set_zone "dnssec-keygen.kasp" +set_policy "rsasha256" "3" "1234" +set_server "ns3" "10.53.0.3" +# Key properties, timings and states same as above. + +check_keys +check_dnssecstatus "$SERVER" "$POLICY" "$ZONE" +set_keytimes_algorithm_policy +check_keytimes +check_apex +check_subdomain +dnssec_verify + +# +# Zone: some-keys.kasp. +# +set_zone "some-keys.kasp" +set_policy "rsasha256" "3" "1234" +set_server "ns3" "10.53.0.3" +# Key properties, timings and states same as above. + +check_keys +check_dnssecstatus "$SERVER" "$POLICY" "$ZONE" +set_keytimes_algorithm_policy "pregenerated" +check_keytimes +check_apex +check_subdomain +dnssec_verify + +# +# Zone: pregenerated.kasp. +# +# There are more pregenerated keys than needed, hence the number of keys is +# six, not three. +set_zone "pregenerated.kasp" +set_policy "rsasha256" "6" "1234" +set_server "ns3" "10.53.0.3" +# Key properties, timings and states same as above. + +check_keys +check_dnssecstatus "$SERVER" "$POLICY" "$ZONE" +set_keytimes_algorithm_policy "pregenerated" +check_keytimes +check_apex +check_subdomain +dnssec_verify + +# +# Zone: rumoured.kasp. +# +# There are three keys in rumoured state. +set_zone "rumoured.kasp" +set_policy "rsasha256" "3" "1234" +set_server "ns3" "10.53.0.3" +# Key properties, timings and states same as above. + +check_keys +check_dnssecstatus "$SERVER" "$POLICY" "$ZONE" +set_keytimes_algorithm_policy +# Activation date is a day later. +set_addkeytime "KEY1" "ACTIVE" $(key_get KEY1 ACTIVE) 86400 +set_addkeytime "KEY1" "RETIRED" $(key_get KEY1 RETIRED) 86400 +set_addkeytime "KEY1" "REMOVED" $(key_get KEY1 REMOVED) 86400 +set_addkeytime "KEY2" "ACTIVE" $(key_get KEY2 ACTIVE) 86400 +set_addkeytime "KEY2" "RETIRED" $(key_get KEY2 RETIRED) 86400 +set_addkeytime "KEY2" "REMOVED" $(key_get KEY2 REMOVED) 86400 +set_addkeytime "KEY3" "ACTIVE" $(key_get KEY3 ACTIVE) 86400 +set_addkeytime "KEY3" "RETIRED" $(key_get KEY3 RETIRED) 86400 +set_addkeytime "KEY3" "REMOVED" $(key_get KEY3 REMOVED) 86400 +check_keytimes +check_apex +check_subdomain +dnssec_verify + +# +# Zone: secondary.kasp. +# +set_zone "secondary.kasp" +set_policy "rsasha256" "3" "1234" +set_server "ns3" "10.53.0.3" +# Key properties, timings and states same as above. + +check_keys +check_dnssecstatus "$SERVER" "$POLICY" "$ZONE" +set_keytimes_algorithm_policy +check_keytimes +check_apex +check_subdomain +dnssec_verify + +# Update zone. +n=$((n+1)) +echo_i "check that we correctly sign the zone after IXFR for zone ${ZONE} ($n)" +ret=0 +cp ns2/secondary.kasp.db.in2 ns2/secondary.kasp.db +rndccmd 10.53.0.2 reload "$ZONE" > /dev/null || log_error "rndc reload zone ${ZONE} failed" + +_wait_for_done_subdomains() { + ret=0 + dig_with_opts "a.${ZONE}" "@${SERVER}" A > "dig.out.$DIR.test$n.a" || return 1 + grep "status: NOERROR" "dig.out.$DIR.test$n.a" > /dev/null || return 1 + grep "a.${ZONE}\..*${DEFAULT_TTL}.*IN.*A.*10\.0\.0\.11" "dig.out.$DIR.test$n.a" > /dev/null || return 1 + check_signatures $_qtype "dig.out.$DIR.test$n.a" "ZSK" + if [ $ret -gt 0 ]; then return $ret; fi + + dig_with_opts "d.${ZONE}" "@${SERVER}" A > "dig.out.$DIR.test$n.d" || return 1 + grep "status: NOERROR" "dig.out.$DIR.test$n.d" > /dev/null || return 1 + grep "d.${ZONE}\..*${DEFAULT_TTL}.*IN.*A.*10\.0\.0\.4" "dig.out.$DIR.test$n.d" > /dev/null || return 1 + check_signatures $_qtype "dig.out.$DIR.test$n.d" "ZSK" + return $ret +} +retry_quiet 5 _wait_for_done_subdomains || ret=1 +test "$ret" -eq 0 || echo_i "failed" +status=$((status+ret)) + +# TODO: we might want to test: +# - configuring a zone with too many active keys (should trigger retire). +# - configuring a zone with keys not matching the policy. + +# +# Zone: rsasha1-nsec3.kasp. +# +if $SHELL ../testcrypto.sh -q RSASHA1 +then + set_zone "rsasha1-nsec3.kasp" + set_policy "rsasha1-nsec3" "3" "1234" + set_server "ns3" "10.53.0.3" + # Key properties. + set_keyalgorithm "KEY1" "7" "NSEC3RSASHA1" "2048" + set_keyalgorithm "KEY2" "7" "NSEC3RSASHA1" "2048" + set_keyalgorithm "KEY3" "7" "NSEC3RSASHA1" "2000" + # Key timings and states same as above. + + check_keys + check_dnssecstatus "$SERVER" "$POLICY" "$ZONE" + set_keytimes_algorithm_policy + check_keytimes + check_apex + check_subdomain + dnssec_verify +fi + +# +# Zone: rsasha256.kasp. +# +set_zone "rsasha256.kasp" +set_policy "rsasha256" "3" "1234" +set_server "ns3" "10.53.0.3" +# Key properties. +set_keyalgorithm "KEY1" "8" "RSASHA256" "2048" +set_keyalgorithm "KEY2" "8" "RSASHA256" "2048" +set_keyalgorithm "KEY3" "8" "RSASHA256" "3072" +# Key timings and states same as above. + +check_keys +check_dnssecstatus "$SERVER" "$POLICY" "$ZONE" +set_keytimes_algorithm_policy +check_keytimes +check_apex +check_subdomain +dnssec_verify + +# +# Zone: rsasha512.kasp. +# +set_zone "rsasha512.kasp" +set_policy "rsasha512" "3" "1234" +set_server "ns3" "10.53.0.3" +# Key properties. +set_keyalgorithm "KEY1" "10" "RSASHA512" "2048" +set_keyalgorithm "KEY2" "10" "RSASHA512" "2048" +set_keyalgorithm "KEY3" "10" "RSASHA512" "3072" +# Key timings and states same as above. + +check_keys +check_dnssecstatus "$SERVER" "$POLICY" "$ZONE" +set_keytimes_algorithm_policy +check_keytimes +check_apex +check_subdomain +dnssec_verify + +# +# Zone: ecdsa256.kasp. +# +set_zone "ecdsa256.kasp" +set_policy "ecdsa256" "3" "1234" +set_server "ns3" "10.53.0.3" +# Key properties. +set_keyalgorithm "KEY1" "13" "ECDSAP256SHA256" "256" +set_keyalgorithm "KEY2" "13" "ECDSAP256SHA256" "256" +set_keyalgorithm "KEY3" "13" "ECDSAP256SHA256" "256" +# Key timings and states same as above. + +check_keys +check_dnssecstatus "$SERVER" "$POLICY" "$ZONE" +set_keytimes_algorithm_policy +check_keytimes +check_apex +check_subdomain +dnssec_verify + +# +# Zone: ecdsa512.kasp. +# +set_zone "ecdsa384.kasp" +set_policy "ecdsa384" "3" "1234" +set_server "ns3" "10.53.0.3" +# Key properties. +set_keyalgorithm "KEY1" "14" "ECDSAP384SHA384" "384" +set_keyalgorithm "KEY2" "14" "ECDSAP384SHA384" "384" +set_keyalgorithm "KEY3" "14" "ECDSAP384SHA384" "384" +# Key timings and states same as above. + +check_keys +check_dnssecstatus "$SERVER" "$POLICY" "$ZONE" +set_keytimes_algorithm_policy +check_keytimes +check_apex +check_subdomain +dnssec_verify + +# +# Zone: ed25519.kasp. +# +if [ -f ed25519-supported.file ]; then + set_zone "ed25519.kasp" + set_policy "ed25519" "3" "1234" + set_server "ns3" "10.53.0.3" + # Key properties. + set_keyalgorithm "KEY1" "15" "ED25519" "256" + set_keyalgorithm "KEY2" "15" "ED25519" "256" + set_keyalgorithm "KEY3" "15" "ED25519" "256" + # Key timings and states same as above. + + check_keys + check_dnssecstatus "$SERVER" "$POLICY" "$ZONE" + set_keytimes_algorithm_policy + check_keytimes + check_apex + check_subdomain + dnssec_verify +fi + +# +# Zone: ed448.kasp. +# +if [ -f ed448-supported.file ]; then + set_zone "ed448.kasp" + set_policy "ed448" "3" "1234" + set_server "ns3" "10.53.0.3" + # Key properties. + set_keyalgorithm "KEY1" "16" "ED448" "456" + set_keyalgorithm "KEY2" "16" "ED448" "456" + set_keyalgorithm "KEY3" "16" "ED448" "456" + # Key timings and states same as above. + + check_keys + check_dnssecstatus "$SERVER" "$POLICY" "$ZONE" + set_keytimes_algorithm_policy + check_keytimes + check_apex + check_subdomain + dnssec_verify +fi + +# Set key times for 'autosign' policy. +set_keytimes_autosign_policy() { + # The KSK was published six months ago (with settime). + created=$(key_get KEY1 CREATED) + set_addkeytime "KEY1" "PUBLISHED" "${created}" -15552000 + set_addkeytime "KEY1" "ACTIVE" "${created}" -15552000 + set_addkeytime "KEY1" "SYNCPUBLISH" "${created}" -15552000 + # Key lifetime is 2 years, 63072000 seconds. + active=$(key_get KEY1 ACTIVE) + set_addkeytime "KEY1" "RETIRED" "${active}" 63072000 + # The key is removed after the retire time plus DS TTL (1d), + # parent propagation delay (1h), retire safety (1h) = + # 86400 + 3600 + 3600 = 93600 + retired=$(key_get KEY1 RETIRED) + set_addkeytime "KEY1" "REMOVED" "${retired}" 93600 + + # The ZSK was published six months ago (with settime). + created=$(key_get KEY2 CREATED) + set_addkeytime "KEY2" "PUBLISHED" "${created}" -15552000 + set_addkeytime "KEY2" "ACTIVE" "${created}" -15552000 + # Key lifetime for KSK2 is 1 year, 31536000 seconds. + active=$(key_get KEY2 ACTIVE) + set_addkeytime "KEY2" "RETIRED" "${active}" 31536000 + # The key is removed after the retire time plus: + # TTLsig (RRSIG TTL): 1 day (86400 seconds) + # Dprp (propagation delay): 5 minutes (300 seconds) + # retire-safety: 1 hour (3600 seconds) + # Dsgn (sign delay): 7 days (604800 seconds) + # Iret: 695100 seconds. + retired=$(key_get KEY2 RETIRED) + set_addkeytime "KEY2" "REMOVED" "${retired}" 695100 +} + +# +# Zone: expired-sigs.autosign. +# +set_zone "expired-sigs.autosign" +set_policy "autosign" "2" "300" +set_server "ns3" "10.53.0.3" +# Key properties. +key_clear "KEY1" +set_keyrole "KEY1" "ksk" +set_keylifetime "KEY1" "63072000" +set_keyalgorithm "KEY1" "$DEFAULT_ALGORITHM_NUMBER" "$DEFAULT_ALGORITHM" "$DEFAULT_BITS" +set_keysigning "KEY1" "yes" +set_zonesigning "KEY1" "no" + +key_clear "KEY2" +set_keyrole "KEY2" "zsk" +set_keylifetime "KEY2" "31536000" +set_keyalgorithm "KEY2" "$DEFAULT_ALGORITHM_NUMBER" "$DEFAULT_ALGORITHM" "$DEFAULT_BITS" +set_keysigning "KEY2" "no" +set_zonesigning "KEY2" "yes" + +# Both KSK and ZSK stay OMNIPRESENT. +set_keystate "KEY1" "GOAL" "omnipresent" +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DNSKEY" "omnipresent" +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_KRRSIG" "omnipresent" +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DS" "omnipresent" + +set_keystate "KEY2" "GOAL" "omnipresent" +set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_DNSKEY" "omnipresent" +set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_ZRRSIG" "omnipresent" +# Expect only two keys. +key_clear "KEY3" +key_clear "KEY4" + +check_keys +check_dnssecstatus "$SERVER" "$POLICY" "$ZONE" +set_keytimes_autosign_policy +check_keytimes +check_apex +check_subdomain +dnssec_verify + +# Verify all signatures have been refreshed. +check_rrsig_refresh() { + # Apex. + _qtypes="DNSKEY SOA NS NSEC" + for _qtype in $_qtypes + do + n=$((n+1)) + echo_i "check ${_qtype} rrsig is refreshed correctly for zone ${ZONE} ($n)" + ret=0 + dig_with_opts "$ZONE" "@${SERVER}" "$_qtype" > "dig.out.$DIR.test$n" || log_error "dig ${ZONE} ${_qtype} failed" + grep "status: NOERROR" "dig.out.$DIR.test$n" > /dev/null || log_error "mismatch status in DNS response" + grep "${ZONE}\..*IN.*RRSIG.*${_qtype}.*${ZONE}" "dig.out.$DIR.test$n" > "rrsig.out.$ZONE.$_qtype" || log_error "missing RRSIG (${_qtype}) record in response" + # If this exact RRSIG is also in the zone file it is not refreshed. + _rrsig=$(cat "rrsig.out.$ZONE.$_qtype") + grep "${_rrsig}" "${DIR}/${ZONE}.db" > /dev/null && log_error "RRSIG (${_qtype}) not refreshed in zone ${ZONE}" + test "$ret" -eq 0 || echo_i "failed" + status=$((status+ret)) + done + + # Below apex. + _labels="a b c ns3" + for _label in $_labels; + do + _qtypes="A NSEC" + for _qtype in $_qtypes + do + n=$((n+1)) + echo_i "check ${_label} ${_qtype} rrsig is refreshed correctly for zone ${ZONE} ($n)" + ret=0 + dig_with_opts "${_label}.${ZONE}" "@${SERVER}" "$_qtype" > "dig.out.$DIR.test$n" || log_error "dig ${_label}.${ZONE} ${_qtype} failed" + grep "status: NOERROR" "dig.out.$DIR.test$n" > /dev/null || log_error "mismatch status in DNS response" + grep "${ZONE}\..*IN.*RRSIG.*${_qtype}.*${ZONE}" "dig.out.$DIR.test$n" > "rrsig.out.$ZONE.$_qtype" || log_error "missing RRSIG (${_qtype}) record in response" + _rrsig=$(cat "rrsig.out.$ZONE.$_qtype") + grep "${_rrsig}" "${DIR}/${ZONE}.db" > /dev/null && log_error "RRSIG (${_qtype}) not refreshed in zone ${ZONE}" + test "$ret" -eq 0 || echo_i "failed" + status=$((status+ret)) + done + done +} + +check_rrsig_refresh + +# +# Zone: fresh-sigs.autosign. +# +set_zone "fresh-sigs.autosign" +set_policy "autosign" "2" "300" +set_server "ns3" "10.53.0.3" +# Key properties, timings and states same as above. + +check_keys +check_dnssecstatus "$SERVER" "$POLICY" "$ZONE" +set_keytimes_autosign_policy +check_keytimes +check_apex +check_subdomain +dnssec_verify + +# Verify signature reuse. +check_rrsig_reuse() { + # Apex. + _qtypes="NS NSEC" + for _qtype in $_qtypes + do + n=$((n+1)) + echo_i "check ${_qtype} rrsig is reused correctly for zone ${ZONE} ($n)" + ret=0 + dig_with_opts "$ZONE" "@${SERVER}" "$_qtype" > "dig.out.$DIR.test$n" || log_error "dig ${ZONE} ${_qtype} failed" + grep "status: NOERROR" "dig.out.$DIR.test$n" > /dev/null || log_error "mismatch status in DNS response" + grep "${ZONE}\..*IN.*RRSIG.*${_qtype}.*${ZONE}" "dig.out.$DIR.test$n" > "rrsig.out.$ZONE.$_qtype" || log_error "missing RRSIG (${_qtype}) record in response" + # If this exact RRSIG is also in the signed zone file it is not refreshed. + _rrsig=$(awk '{print $5, $6, $7, $8, $9, $10, $11, $12, $13, $14;}' < "rrsig.out.$ZONE.$_qtype") + $CHECKZONE -f raw -F text -s full -o zone.out.${ZONE}.test$n "${ZONE}" "${DIR}/${ZONE}.db.signed" > /dev/null + grep "${_rrsig}" zone.out.${ZONE}.test$n > /dev/null || log_error "RRSIG (${_qtype}) not reused in zone ${ZONE}" + test "$ret" -eq 0 || echo_i "failed" + status=$((status+ret)) + done + + # Below apex. + _labels="a b c ns3" + for _label in $_labels; + do + _qtypes="A NSEC" + for _qtype in $_qtypes + do + n=$((n+1)) + echo_i "check ${_label} ${_qtype} rrsig is reused correctly for zone ${ZONE} ($n)" + ret=0 + dig_with_opts "${_label}.${ZONE}" "@${SERVER}" "$_qtype" > "dig.out.$DIR.test$n" || log_error "dig ${_label}.${ZONE} ${_qtype} failed" + grep "status: NOERROR" "dig.out.$DIR.test$n" > /dev/null || log_error "mismatch status in DNS response" + grep "${ZONE}\..*IN.*RRSIG.*${_qtype}.*${ZONE}" "dig.out.$DIR.test$n" > "rrsig.out.$ZONE.$_qtype" || log_error "missing RRSIG (${_qtype}) record in response" + # If this exact RRSIG is also in the signed zone file it is not refreshed. + _rrsig=$(awk '{print $5, $6, $7, $8, $9, $10, $11, $12, $13, $14;}' < "rrsig.out.$ZONE.$_qtype") + $CHECKZONE -f raw -F text -s full -o zone.out.${ZONE}.test$n "${ZONE}" "${DIR}/${ZONE}.db.signed" > /dev/null + grep "${_rrsig}" zone.out.${ZONE}.test$n > /dev/null || log_error "RRSIG (${_qtype}) not reused in zone ${ZONE}" + test "$ret" -eq 0 || echo_i "failed" + status=$((status+ret)) + done + done +} + +check_rrsig_reuse + +# +# Zone: unfresh-sigs.autosign. +# +set_zone "unfresh-sigs.autosign" +set_policy "autosign" "2" "300" +set_server "ns3" "10.53.0.3" +# Key properties, timings and states same as above. + +check_keys +check_dnssecstatus "$SERVER" "$POLICY" "$ZONE" +set_keytimes_autosign_policy +check_keytimes +check_apex +check_subdomain +dnssec_verify +check_rrsig_refresh + +# +# Zone: ksk-missing.autosign. +# +set_zone "ksk-missing.autosign" +set_policy "autosign" "2" "300" +set_server "ns3" "10.53.0.3" +# Key properties, timings and states same as above. +# Skip checking the private file, because it is missing. +key_set "KEY1" "PRIVATE" "no" + +check_keys +check_dnssecstatus "$SERVER" "$POLICY" "$ZONE" +check_apex +check_subdomain +dnssec_verify + +# Restore the PRIVATE variable. +key_set "KEY1" "PRIVATE" "yes" + +# +# Zone: zsk-missing.autosign. +# +set_zone "zsk-missing.autosign" +set_policy "autosign" "2" "300" +set_server "ns3" "10.53.0.3" +# Key properties, timings and states same as above. +# Skip checking the private file, because it is missing. +key_set "KEY2" "PRIVATE" "no" + +check_keys +check_dnssecstatus "$SERVER" "$POLICY" "$ZONE" +# For the apex, we expect the SOA to be signed with the KSK because the ZSK is +# offline. Temporary treat KEY1 as a zone signing key too. +set_keyrole "KEY1" "csk" +set_zonesigning "KEY1" "yes" +set_zonesigning "KEY2" "no" +check_apex +set_keyrole "KEY1" "ksk" +set_zonesigning "KEY1" "no" +set_zonesigning "KEY2" "yes" +check_subdomain +dnssec_verify + +# Restore the PRIVATE variable. +key_set "KEY2" "PRIVATE" "yes" + +# +# Zone: zsk-retired.autosign. +# +set_zone "zsk-retired.autosign" +set_policy "autosign" "3" "300" +set_server "ns3" "10.53.0.3" +# The third key is not yet expected to be signing. +set_keyrole "KEY3" "zsk" +set_keylifetime "KEY3" "31536000" +set_keyalgorithm "KEY3" "$DEFAULT_ALGORITHM_NUMBER" "$DEFAULT_ALGORITHM" "$DEFAULT_BITS" +set_keysigning "KEY3" "no" +set_zonesigning "KEY3" "no" +# The ZSK goal is set to HIDDEN but records stay OMNIPRESENT until the new ZSK +# is active. +set_keystate "KEY2" "GOAL" "hidden" +set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_DNSKEY" "omnipresent" +set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_ZRRSIG" "omnipresent" +# A new ZSK should be introduced, so expect a key with goal OMNIPRESENT, +# the DNSKEY introduced (RUMOURED) and the signatures HIDDEN. +set_keystate "KEY3" "GOAL" "omnipresent" +set_keystate "KEY3" "STATE_DNSKEY" "rumoured" +set_keystate "KEY3" "STATE_ZRRSIG" "hidden" + +check_keys +check_dnssecstatus "$SERVER" "$POLICY" "$ZONE" +set_keytimes_autosign_policy + +# The old ZSK is retired. +created=$(key_get KEY2 CREATED) +set_keytime "KEY2" "RETIRED" "${created}" +set_addkeytime "KEY2" "REMOVED" "${created}" 695100 +# The new ZSK is immediately published. +created=$(key_get KEY3 CREATED) +set_keytime "KEY3" "PUBLISHED" "${created}" +# And becomes active after Ipub: +# DNSKEY TTL: 300 seconds +# zone-propagation-delay 5 minutes (300 seconds) +# publish-safety: 1 hour (3600 seconds) +# Ipub: 4200 seconds +published=$(key_get KEY3 PUBLISHED) +set_addkeytime "KEY3" "ACTIVE" "${published}" 4200 +# Lzsk: 1 year (31536000 seconds) +active=$(key_get KEY3 ACTIVE) +set_addkeytime "KEY3" "RETIRED" "${active}" 31536000 +# Iret: 695100 seconds. +retired=$(key_get KEY3 RETIRED) +set_addkeytime "KEY3" "REMOVED" "${retired}" 695100 + +check_keytimes +check_apex +check_subdomain +dnssec_verify +check_rrsig_refresh + +# +# Zone: legacy-keys.kasp. +# +set_zone "legacy-keys.kasp" +# This zone has two active keys and two old keys left in key directory, so +# expect 4 key files. +set_policy "migrate-to-dnssec-policy" "4" "1234" +set_server "ns3" "10.53.0.3" + +# Key properties. +key_clear "KEY1" +set_keyrole "KEY1" "ksk" +set_keylifetime "KEY1" "16070400" +set_keyalgorithm "KEY1" "8" "RSASHA256" "2048" +set_keysigning "KEY1" "yes" +set_zonesigning "KEY1" "no" + +key_clear "KEY2" +set_keyrole "KEY2" "zsk" +set_keylifetime "KEY2" "16070400" +set_keyalgorithm "KEY2" "8" "RSASHA256" "2048" +set_keysigning "KEY2" "no" +set_zonesigning "KEY2" "yes" +# KSK: DNSKEY, RRSIG (ksk) published. DS needs to wait. +# ZSK: DNSKEY, RRSIG (zsk) published. +set_keystate "KEY1" "GOAL" "omnipresent" +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DNSKEY" "rumoured" +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_KRRSIG" "rumoured" +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DS" "hidden" + +set_keystate "KEY2" "GOAL" "omnipresent" +set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_DNSKEY" "rumoured" +set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_ZRRSIG" "rumoured" +# Two keys only. +key_clear "KEY3" +key_clear "KEY4" + +check_keys +check_dnssecstatus "$SERVER" "$POLICY" "$ZONE" + +# Make sure the correct legacy keys were used (and not the removed predecessor +# keys). +n=$((n+1)) +echo_i "check correct keys were used when migrating zone ${ZONE} to dnssec-policy ($n)" +ret=0 +kskfile=$(cat ns3/legacy-keys.kasp.ksk) +basefile=$(key_get KEY1 BASEFILE) +echo_i "filename: $basefile (expect $kskfile)" +test "$DIR/$kskfile" = "$basefile" || ret=1 +zskfile=$(cat ns3/legacy-keys.kasp.zsk) +basefile=$(key_get KEY2 BASEFILE) +echo_i "filename: $basefile (expect $zskfile)" +test "$DIR/$zskfile" = "$basefile" || ret=1 +test "$ret" -eq 0 || echo_i "failed" +status=$((status+ret)) + +# KSK times. +created=$(key_get KEY1 CREATED) +keyfile=$(key_get KEY1 BASEFILE) +grep "; Publish:" "${keyfile}.key" > published.test${n}.key1 +published=$(awk '{print $3}' < published.test${n}.key1) +set_keytime "KEY1" "PUBLISHED" "${published}" +set_keytime "KEY1" "ACTIVE" "${published}" +published=$(key_get KEY1 PUBLISHED) +# The DS can be published if the DNSKEY and RRSIG records are OMNIPRESENT. +# This happens after max-zone-ttl (1d) plus publish-safety (1h) plus +# zone-propagation-delay (300s) = 86400 + 3600 + 300 = 90300. +set_addkeytime "KEY1" "SYNCPUBLISH" "${published}" 90300 +# Key lifetime is 6 months, 315360000 seconds. +set_addkeytime "KEY1" "RETIRED" "${published}" 16070400 +# The key is removed after the retire time plus DS TTL (1d), parent +# propagation delay (1h), and retire safety (1h) = 86400 + 3600 + 3600 = 93600. +retired=$(key_get KEY1 RETIRED) +set_addkeytime "KEY1" "REMOVED" "${retired}" 93600 + +# ZSK times. +created=$(key_get KEY2 CREATED) +keyfile=$(key_get KEY2 BASEFILE) +grep "; Publish:" "${keyfile}.key" > published.test${n}.key2 +published=$(awk '{print $3}' < published.test${n}.key2) +set_keytime "KEY2" "PUBLISHED" "${published}" +set_keytime "KEY2" "ACTIVE" "${published}" +published=$(key_get KEY2 PUBLISHED) +# Key lifetime is 6 months, 315360000 seconds. +set_addkeytime "KEY2" "RETIRED" "${published}" 16070400 +# The key is removed after the retire time plus max zone ttl (1d), zone +# propagation delay (300s), retire safety (1h), and sign delay (signature +# validity minus refresh, 9d) = 86400 + 300 + 3600 + 777600 = 867900. +retired=$(key_get KEY2 RETIRED) +set_addkeytime "KEY2" "REMOVED" "${retired}" 867900 + +check_keytimes +check_apex +check_subdomain +dnssec_verify + +# +# Test dnssec-policy inheritance. +# + +# These zones should be unsigned: +# ns2/unsigned.tld +# ns4/none.inherit.signed +# ns4/none.override.signed +# ns4/inherit.none.signed +# ns4/none.none.signed +# ns5/inherit.inherit.unsigned +# ns5/none.inherit.unsigned +# ns5/none.override.unsigned +# ns5/inherit.none.unsigned +# ns5/none.none.unsigned +key_clear "KEY1" +key_clear "KEY2" +key_clear "KEY3" +key_clear "KEY4" + +set_zone "unsigned.tld" +set_policy "none" "0" "0" +set_server "ns2" "10.53.0.2" +TSIG="" +check_keys +check_dnssecstatus "$SERVER" "$POLICY" "$ZONE" +check_apex +check_subdomain + +set_zone "none.inherit.signed" +set_policy "none" "0" "0" +set_server "ns4" "10.53.0.4" +TSIG="hmac-sha1:sha1:$SHA1" +check_keys +check_dnssecstatus "$SERVER" "$POLICY" "$ZONE" +check_apex +check_subdomain + +set_zone "none.override.signed" +set_policy "none" "0" "0" +set_server "ns4" "10.53.0.4" +TSIG="hmac-sha224:sha224:$SHA224" +check_keys +check_dnssecstatus "$SERVER" "$POLICY" "$ZONE" +check_apex +check_subdomain + +set_zone "inherit.none.signed" +set_policy "none" "0" "0" +set_server "ns4" "10.53.0.4" +TSIG="hmac-sha256:sha256:$SHA256" +check_keys +check_dnssecstatus "$SERVER" "$POLICY" "$ZONE" +check_apex +check_subdomain + +set_zone "none.none.signed" +set_policy "none" "0" "0" +set_server "ns4" "10.53.0.4" +TSIG="hmac-sha256:sha256:$SHA256" +check_keys +check_dnssecstatus "$SERVER" "$POLICY" "$ZONE" +check_apex +check_subdomain + +set_zone "inherit.inherit.unsigned" +set_policy "none" "0" "0" +set_server "ns5" "10.53.0.5" +TSIG="hmac-sha1:sha1:$SHA1" +check_keys +check_dnssecstatus "$SERVER" "$POLICY" "$ZONE" +check_apex +check_subdomain + +set_zone "none.inherit.unsigned" +set_policy "none" "0" "0" +set_server "ns5" "10.53.0.5" +TSIG="hmac-sha1:sha1:$SHA1" +check_keys +check_dnssecstatus "$SERVER" "$POLICY" "$ZONE" +check_apex +check_subdomain + +set_zone "none.override.unsigned" +set_policy "none" "0" "0" +set_server "ns5" "10.53.0.5" +TSIG="hmac-sha224:sha224:$SHA224" +check_keys +check_dnssecstatus "$SERVER" "$POLICY" "$ZONE" +check_apex +check_subdomain + +set_zone "inherit.none.unsigned" +set_policy "none" "0" "0" +set_server "ns5" "10.53.0.5" +TSIG="hmac-sha256:sha256:$SHA256" +check_keys +check_dnssecstatus "$SERVER" "$POLICY" "$ZONE" +check_apex +check_subdomain + +set_zone "none.none.unsigned" +set_policy "none" "0" "0" +set_server "ns5" "10.53.0.5" +TSIG="hmac-sha256:sha256:$SHA256" +check_keys +check_dnssecstatus "$SERVER" "$POLICY" "$ZONE" +check_apex +check_subdomain + +# These zones should be signed with the default policy: +# ns2/signed.tld +# ns4/override.inherit.signed +# ns4/inherit.override.signed +# ns5/override.inherit.signed +# ns5/inherit.override.signed +set_keyrole "KEY1" "csk" +set_keylifetime "KEY1" "0" +set_keyalgorithm "KEY1" "13" "ECDSAP256SHA256" "256" +set_keysigning "KEY1" "yes" +set_zonesigning "KEY1" "yes" + +set_keystate "KEY1" "GOAL" "omnipresent" +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DNSKEY" "rumoured" +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_KRRSIG" "rumoured" +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_ZRRSIG" "rumoured" +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DS" "hidden" + +set_zone "signed.tld" +set_policy "default" "1" "3600" +set_server "ns2" "10.53.0.2" +TSIG="" +check_keys +check_dnssecstatus "$SERVER" "$POLICY" "$ZONE" +set_keytimes_csk_policy +check_keytimes +check_apex +check_subdomain +dnssec_verify + +set_zone "override.inherit.signed" +set_policy "default" "1" "3600" +set_server "ns4" "10.53.0.4" +TSIG="hmac-sha1:sha1:$SHA1" +check_keys +check_dnssecstatus "$SERVER" "$POLICY" "$ZONE" +set_keytimes_csk_policy +check_keytimes +check_apex +check_subdomain +dnssec_verify + +set_zone "inherit.override.signed" +set_policy "default" "1" "3600" +set_server "ns4" "10.53.0.4" +TSIG="hmac-sha224:sha224:$SHA224" +check_keys +check_dnssecstatus "$SERVER" "$POLICY" "$ZONE" +set_keytimes_csk_policy +check_keytimes +check_apex +check_subdomain +dnssec_verify + +set_zone "override.inherit.unsigned" +set_policy "default" "1" "3600" +set_server "ns5" "10.53.0.5" +TSIG="hmac-sha1:sha1:$SHA1" +check_keys +check_dnssecstatus "$SERVER" "$POLICY" "$ZONE" +set_keytimes_csk_policy +check_keytimes +check_apex +check_subdomain +dnssec_verify + +set_zone "inherit.override.unsigned" +set_policy "default" "1" "3600" +set_server "ns5" "10.53.0.5" +TSIG="hmac-sha224:sha224:$SHA224" +check_keys +check_dnssecstatus "$SERVER" "$POLICY" "$ZONE" +set_keytimes_csk_policy +check_keytimes +check_apex +check_subdomain +dnssec_verify + +# These zones should be signed with the test policy: +# ns4/inherit.inherit.signed +# ns4/override.override.signed +# ns4/override.none.signed +# ns5/override.override.unsigned +# ns5/override.none.unsigned +# ns4/example.net (both views) +set_keyrole "KEY1" "csk" +set_keylifetime "KEY1" "0" +set_keyalgorithm "KEY1" "14" "ECDSAP384SHA384" "384" +set_keysigning "KEY1" "yes" +set_zonesigning "KEY1" "yes" + +set_zone "inherit.inherit.signed" +set_policy "test" "1" "3600" +set_server "ns4" "10.53.0.4" +TSIG="hmac-sha1:sha1:$SHA1" +wait_for_nsec +check_keys +check_dnssecstatus "$SERVER" "$POLICY" "$ZONE" +set_keytimes_csk_policy +check_keytimes +check_apex +check_subdomain +dnssec_verify + +set_zone "override.override.signed" +set_policy "test" "1" "3600" +set_server "ns4" "10.53.0.4" +TSIG="hmac-sha224:sha224:$SHA224" +wait_for_nsec +check_keys +check_dnssecstatus "$SERVER" "$POLICY" "$ZONE" +set_keytimes_csk_policy +check_keytimes +check_apex +check_subdomain +dnssec_verify + +set_zone "override.none.signed" +set_policy "test" "1" "3600" +set_server "ns4" "10.53.0.4" +TSIG="hmac-sha256:sha256:$SHA256" +wait_for_nsec +check_keys +check_dnssecstatus "$SERVER" "$POLICY" "$ZONE" +set_keytimes_csk_policy +check_keytimes +check_apex +check_subdomain +dnssec_verify + +set_zone "override.override.unsigned" +set_policy "test" "1" "3600" +set_server "ns5" "10.53.0.5" +TSIG="hmac-sha224:sha224:$SHA224" +wait_for_nsec +check_keys +check_dnssecstatus "$SERVER" "$POLICY" "$ZONE" +set_keytimes_csk_policy +check_keytimes +check_apex +check_subdomain +dnssec_verify + +set_zone "override.none.unsigned" +set_policy "test" "1" "3600" +set_server "ns5" "10.53.0.5" +TSIG="hmac-sha256:sha256:$SHA256" +wait_for_nsec +check_keys +check_dnssecstatus "$SERVER" "$POLICY" "$ZONE" +set_keytimes_csk_policy +check_keytimes +check_apex +check_subdomain +dnssec_verify + +# Test with views. +set_zone "example.net" +set_server "ns4" "10.53.0.4" +TSIG="$DEFAULT_HMAC:keyforview1:$VIEW1" +wait_for_nsec +check_keys +check_dnssecstatus "$SERVER" "$POLICY" "$ZONE" "example1" +set_keytimes_csk_policy +check_keytimes +check_apex +dnssec_verify +# check zonestatus +n=$((n+1)) +echo_i "check $ZONE (view example1) zonestatus ($n)" +ret=0 +check_isdynamic "$SERVER" "$ZONE" "example1" || log_error "zone not dynamic" +check_inlinesigning "$SERVER" "$ZONE" "example1" && log_error "inline-signing enabled, expected disabled" +test "$ret" -eq 0 || echo_i "failed" +status=$((status+ret)) +# check subdomain +n=$((n+1)) +echo_i "check TXT example.net (view example1) rrset is signed correctly ($n)" +ret=0 +dig_with_opts "view.${ZONE}" "@${SERVER}" TXT > "dig.out.$DIR.test$n.txt" || log_error "dig view.${ZONE} TXT failed" +grep "status: NOERROR" "dig.out.$DIR.test$n.txt" > /dev/null || log_error "mismatch status in DNS response" +grep "view.${ZONE}\..*${DEFAULT_TTL}.*IN.*TXT.*view1" "dig.out.$DIR.test$n.txt" > /dev/null || log_error "missing view.${ZONE} TXT record in response" +check_signatures TXT "dig.out.$DIR.test$n.txt" "ZSK" +test "$ret" -eq 0 || echo_i "failed" +status=$((status+ret)) + +TSIG="$DEFAULT_HMAC:keyforview2:$VIEW2" +wait_for_nsec +check_keys +check_dnssecstatus "$SERVER" "$POLICY" "$ZONE" "example2" +check_apex +dnssec_verify +# check zonestatus +n=$((n+1)) +echo_i "check $ZONE (view example2) zonestatus ($n)" +ret=0 +check_isdynamic "$SERVER" "$ZONE" "example2" && log_error "zone dynamic, but not expected" +check_inlinesigning "$SERVER" "$ZONE" "example2" || log_error "inline-signing disabled, expected enabled" +test "$ret" -eq 0 || echo_i "failed" +status=$((status+ret)) +# check subdomain +n=$((n+1)) +echo_i "check TXT example.net (view example2) rrset is signed correctly ($n)" +ret=0 +dig_with_opts "view.${ZONE}" "@${SERVER}" TXT > "dig.out.$DIR.test$n.txt" || log_error "dig view.${ZONE} TXT failed" +grep "status: NOERROR" "dig.out.$DIR.test$n.txt" > /dev/null || log_error "mismatch status in DNS response" +grep "view.${ZONE}\..*${DEFAULT_TTL}.*IN.*TXT.*view2" "dig.out.$DIR.test$n.txt" > /dev/null || log_error "missing view.${ZONE} TXT record in response" +check_signatures TXT "dig.out.$DIR.test$n.txt" "ZSK" +test "$ret" -eq 0 || echo_i "failed" +status=$((status+ret)) + +TSIG="$DEFAULT_HMAC:keyforview3:$VIEW3" +wait_for_nsec +check_keys +check_dnssecstatus "$SERVER" "$POLICY" "$ZONE" "example3" +check_apex +dnssec_verify +# check zonestatus +n=$((n+1)) +echo_i "check $ZONE (view example3) zonestatus ($n)" +ret=0 +check_isdynamic "$SERVER" "$ZONE" "example3" && log_error "zone dynamic, but not expected" +check_inlinesigning "$SERVER" "$ZONE" "example3" || log_error "inline-signing disabled, expected enabled" +test "$ret" -eq 0 || echo_i "failed" +status=$((status+ret)) +# check subdomain +n=$((n+1)) +echo_i "check TXT example.net (view example3) rrset is signed correctly ($n)" +ret=0 +dig_with_opts "view.${ZONE}" "@${SERVER}" TXT > "dig.out.$DIR.test$n.txt" || log_error "dig view.${ZONE} TXT failed" +grep "status: NOERROR" "dig.out.$DIR.test$n.txt" > /dev/null || log_error "mismatch status in DNS response" +grep "view.${ZONE}\..*${DEFAULT_TTL}.*IN.*TXT.*view2" "dig.out.$DIR.test$n.txt" > /dev/null || log_error "missing view.${ZONE} TXT record in response" +check_signatures TXT "dig.out.$DIR.test$n.txt" "ZSK" +test "$ret" -eq 0 || echo_i "failed" +status=$((status+ret)) + +# Clear TSIG. +TSIG="" + +# +# Testing RFC 8901 Multi-Signer Model 2. +# +set_zone "multisigner-model2.kasp" +set_policy "multisigner-model2" "2" "3600" +set_server "ns3" "10.53.0.3" +key_clear "KEY1" +key_clear "KEY2" +key_clear "KEY3" +key_clear "KEY4" + +# Key properties. +set_keyrole "KEY1" "ksk" +set_keylifetime "KEY1" "0" +set_keyalgorithm "KEY1" "$DEFAULT_ALGORITHM_NUMBER" "$DEFAULT_ALGORITHM" "$DEFAULT_BITS" +set_keysigning "KEY1" "yes" +set_zonesigning "KEY1" "no" + +set_keyrole "KEY2" "zsk" +set_keylifetime "KEY2" "0" +set_keyalgorithm "KEY2" "$DEFAULT_ALGORITHM_NUMBER" "$DEFAULT_ALGORITHM" "$DEFAULT_BITS" +set_keysigning "KEY2" "no" +set_zonesigning "KEY2" "yes" + +set_keystate "KEY1" "GOAL" "omnipresent" +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DNSKEY" "rumoured" +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_KRRSIG" "rumoured" +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DS" "hidden" +set_keystate "KEY2" "GOAL" "omnipresent" +set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_DNSKEY" "rumoured" +set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_ZRRSIG" "rumoured" + +check_keys +check_dnssecstatus "$SERVER" "$POLICY" "$ZONE" +check_apex +check_subdomain +dnssec_verify + +# Check that the ZSKs from the other provider are published. +zsks_are_published() { + dig_with_opts +short "$ZONE" "@${SERVER}" DNSKEY > "dig.out.$DIR.test$n" || return 1 + # We should have three ZSKs. + lines=$(grep "256 3 13" dig.out.$DIR.test$n | wc -l) + test "$lines" -eq 3 || return 1 + # And one KSK. + lines=$(grep "257 3 13" dig.out.$DIR.test$n | wc -l) + test "$lines" -eq 1 || return 1 +} + +n=$((n+1)) +echo_i "update zone with ZSK from another provider for zone ${ZONE} ($n)" +ret=0 +( +echo zone ${ZONE} +echo server 10.53.0.3 "$PORT" +echo update add $(cat "${DIR}/${ZONE}.zsk2") +echo send +) | $NSUPDATE +retry_quiet 10 zsks_are_published || ret=1 +test "$ret" -eq 0 || echo_i "failed" +status=$((status+ret)) + +# +# Testing manual rollover. +# +set_zone "manual-rollover.kasp" +set_policy "manual-rollover" "2" "3600" +set_server "ns3" "10.53.0.3" +key_clear "KEY1" +key_clear "KEY2" +key_clear "KEY3" +key_clear "KEY4" +# Key properties. +set_keyrole "KEY1" "ksk" +set_keylifetime "KEY1" "0" +set_keyalgorithm "KEY1" "$DEFAULT_ALGORITHM_NUMBER" "$DEFAULT_ALGORITHM" "$DEFAULT_BITS" +set_keysigning "KEY1" "yes" +set_zonesigning "KEY1" "no" + +set_keyrole "KEY2" "zsk" +set_keylifetime "KEY2" "0" +set_keyalgorithm "KEY2" "$DEFAULT_ALGORITHM_NUMBER" "$DEFAULT_ALGORITHM" "$DEFAULT_BITS" +set_keysigning "KEY2" "no" +set_zonesigning "KEY2" "yes" +# During set up everything was set to OMNIPRESENT. +set_keystate "KEY1" "GOAL" "omnipresent" +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DNSKEY" "omnipresent" +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_KRRSIG" "omnipresent" +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DS" "omnipresent" + +set_keystate "KEY2" "GOAL" "omnipresent" +set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_DNSKEY" "omnipresent" +set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_ZRRSIG" "omnipresent" + +check_keys +check_dnssecstatus "$SERVER" "$POLICY" "$ZONE" + +# The first keys were published and activated a day ago. +created=$(key_get KEY1 CREATED) +set_addkeytime "KEY1" "PUBLISHED" "${created}" -86400 +set_addkeytime "KEY1" "SYNCPUBLISH" "${created}" -86400 +set_addkeytime "KEY1" "ACTIVE" "${created}" -86400 +created=$(key_get KEY2 CREATED) +set_addkeytime "KEY2" "PUBLISHED" "${created}" -86400 +set_addkeytime "KEY2" "ACTIVE" "${created}" -86400 +# Key lifetimes are unlimited, so not setting RETIRED and REMOVED. +check_keytimes +check_apex +check_subdomain +dnssec_verify + +# Schedule KSK rollover in six months (15552000 seconds). +active=$(key_get KEY1 ACTIVE) +set_addkeytime "KEY1" "RETIRED" "${active}" 15552000 +retired=$(key_get KEY1 RETIRED) +rndc_rollover "$SERVER" "$DIR" $(key_get KEY1 ID) "${retired}" "$ZONE" +# Rollover starts in six months, but lifetime is set to six months plus +# prepublication duration = 15552000 + 7500 = 15559500 seconds. +set_keylifetime "KEY1" "15559500" +set_addkeytime "KEY1" "RETIRED" "${active}" 15559500 +retired=$(key_get KEY1 RETIRED) +# Retire interval of this policy is 26h (93600 seconds). +set_addkeytime "KEY1" "REMOVED" "${retired}" 93600 + +check_keys +check_dnssecstatus "$SERVER" "$POLICY" "$ZONE" +check_keytimes +check_apex +check_subdomain +dnssec_verify + +# Schedule KSK rollover now. +set_policy "manual-rollover" "3" "3600" +set_keystate "KEY1" "GOAL" "hidden" +# This key was activated one day ago, so lifetime is set to 1d plus +# prepublication duration (7500 seconds) = 93900 seconds. +set_keylifetime "KEY1" "93900" +created=$(key_get KEY1 CREATED) +set_keytime "KEY1" "RETIRED" "${created}" +rndc_rollover "$SERVER" "$DIR" $(key_get KEY1 ID) "${created}" "$ZONE" +# New key is introduced. +set_keyrole "KEY3" "ksk" +set_keylifetime "KEY3" "0" +set_keyalgorithm "KEY3" "13" "ECDSAP256SHA256" "256" +set_keysigning "KEY3" "yes" +set_zonesigning "KEY3" "no" + +set_keystate "KEY3" "GOAL" "omnipresent" +set_keystate "KEY3" "STATE_DNSKEY" "rumoured" +set_keystate "KEY3" "STATE_KRRSIG" "rumoured" +set_keystate "KEY3" "STATE_DS" "hidden" + +check_keys +check_dnssecstatus "$SERVER" "$POLICY" "$ZONE" +check_apex +check_subdomain +dnssec_verify + +# Schedule ZSK rollover now. +set_policy "manual-rollover" "4" "3600" +set_keystate "KEY2" "GOAL" "hidden" +# This key was activated one day ago, so lifetime is set to 1d plus +# prepublication duration (7500 seconds) = 93900 seconds. +set_keylifetime "KEY2" "93900" +created=$(key_get KEY2 CREATED) +set_keytime "KEY2" "RETIRED" "${created}" +rndc_rollover "$SERVER" "$DIR" $(key_get KEY2 ID) "${created}" "$ZONE" +# New key is introduced. +set_keyrole "KEY4" "zsk" +set_keylifetime "KEY4" "0" +set_keyalgorithm "KEY4" "13" "ECDSAP256SHA256" "256" +set_keysigning "KEY4" "no" +set_zonesigning "KEY4" "no" # not yet, first prepublish DNSKEY. + +set_keystate "KEY4" "GOAL" "omnipresent" +set_keystate "KEY4" "STATE_DNSKEY" "rumoured" +set_keystate "KEY4" "STATE_ZRRSIG" "hidden" + +check_keys +check_dnssecstatus "$SERVER" "$POLICY" "$ZONE" +check_apex +check_subdomain +dnssec_verify + +# Try to schedule a ZSK rollover for an inactive key (should fail). +n=$((n+1)) +echo_i "check that rndc dnssec -rollover fails if key is inactive ($n)" +ret=0 +rndccmd "$SERVER" dnssec -rollover -key $(key_get KEY4 ID) "$ZONE" > rndc.dnssec.rollover.out.$ZONE.$n +grep "key is not actively signing" rndc.dnssec.rollover.out.$ZONE.$n > /dev/null || log_error "bad error message" +test "$ret" -eq 0 || echo_i "failed" +status=$((status+ret)) + +# +# Testing DNSSEC introduction. +# + +# +# Zone: step1.enable-dnssec.autosign. +# +set_zone "step1.enable-dnssec.autosign" +set_policy "enable-dnssec" "1" "300" +set_server "ns3" "10.53.0.3" +# Key properties. +key_clear "KEY1" +set_keyrole "KEY1" "csk" +set_keylifetime "KEY1" "0" +set_keyalgorithm "KEY1" "$DEFAULT_ALGORITHM_NUMBER" "$DEFAULT_ALGORITHM" "$DEFAULT_BITS" +set_keysigning "KEY1" "yes" +set_zonesigning "KEY1" "yes" +# The DNSKEY and signatures are introduced first, the DS remains hidden. +set_keystate "KEY1" "GOAL" "omnipresent" +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DNSKEY" "rumoured" +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_KRRSIG" "rumoured" +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_ZRRSIG" "rumoured" +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DS" "hidden" +# This policy lists only one key (CSK). +key_clear "KEY2" +key_clear "KEY3" +key_clear "KEY4" + +check_keys +check_dnssecstatus "$SERVER" "$POLICY" "$ZONE" + +# Set expected key times: +# - The first key is immediately published and activated. +created=$(key_get KEY1 CREATED) +set_keytime "KEY1" "PUBLISHED" "${created}" +set_keytime "KEY1" "ACTIVE" "${created}" +# - The DS can be published if the DNSKEY and RRSIG records are +# OMNIPRESENT. This happens after max-zone-ttl (12h) plus +# publish-safety (5m) plus zone-propagation-delay (5m) = +# 43200 + 300 + 300 = 43800. +set_addkeytime "KEY1" "SYNCPUBLISH" "${created}" 43800 +# - Key lifetime is unlimited, so not setting RETIRED and REMOVED. + +# Various signing policy checks. +check_keytimes +check_apex +check_subdomain +dnssec_verify + +_check_next_key_event() { + _expect=$1 + + grep "zone ${ZONE}.*: next key event in .* seconds" "${DIR}/named.run" > "keyevent.out.$ZONE.test$n" || return 1 + + # Get the latest next key event. + if [ "${DYNAMIC}" = "yes" ]; then + _time=$(awk '{print $9}' < "keyevent.out.$ZONE.test$n" | tail -1) + else + # inline-signing zone adds "(signed)" + _time=$(awk '{print $10}' < "keyevent.out.$ZONE.test$n" | tail -1) + fi + + # The next key event time must within threshold of the + # expected time. + _expectmin=$((_expect-next_key_event_threshold)) + _expectmax=$((_expect+next_key_event_threshold)) + + test $_expectmin -le "$_time" || return 1 + test $_expectmax -ge "$_time" || return 1 + + return 0 +} + +check_next_key_event() { + n=$((n+1)) + echo_i "check next key event for zone ${ZONE} ($n)" + ret=0 + + retry_quiet 3 _check_next_key_event $1 || log_error "bad next key event time for zone ${ZONE} (expect ${_expect})" + test "$ret" -eq 0 || echo_i "failed" + status=$((status+ret)) + +} + +# Next key event is when the DNSKEY RRset becomes OMNIPRESENT: DNSKEY TTL plus +# publish safety plus the zone propagation delay: 900 seconds. +check_next_key_event 900 + +# +# Zone: step2.enable-dnssec.autosign. +# +set_zone "step2.enable-dnssec.autosign" +set_policy "enable-dnssec" "1" "300" +set_server "ns3" "10.53.0.3" +# The DNSKEY is omnipresent, but the zone signatures not yet. +# Thus, the DS remains hidden. +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DNSKEY" "omnipresent" +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_KRRSIG" "omnipresent" + +# Various signing policy checks. +check_keys +check_dnssecstatus "$SERVER" "$POLICY" "$ZONE" + +# Set expected key times: +# - The key was published and activated 900 seconds ago (with settime). +created=$(key_get KEY1 CREATED) +set_addkeytime "KEY1" "PUBLISHED" "${created}" -900 +set_addkeytime "KEY1" "ACTIVE" "${created}" -900 +set_addkeytime "KEY1" "SYNCPUBLISH" "${created}" 43800 + +# Continue signing policy checks. +check_keytimes +check_apex +check_subdomain +dnssec_verify + +# Next key event is when the zone signatures become OMNIPRESENT: max-zone-ttl +# plus zone propagation delay plus retire safety minus the already elapsed +# 900 seconds: 12h + 300s + 20m - 900 = 44700 - 900 = 43800 seconds +check_next_key_event 43800 + +# +# Zone: step3.enable-dnssec.autosign. +# +set_zone "step3.enable-dnssec.autosign" +set_policy "enable-dnssec" "1" "300" +set_server "ns3" "10.53.0.3" +# All signatures should be omnipresent, so the DS can be submitted. +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_ZRRSIG" "omnipresent" +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DS" "rumoured" + +# Various signing policy checks. +check_keys +check_dnssecstatus "$SERVER" "$POLICY" "$ZONE" + +# Set expected key times: +# - The key was published and activated 44700 seconds ago (with settime). +created=$(key_get KEY1 CREATED) +set_addkeytime "KEY1" "PUBLISHED" "${created}" -44700 +set_addkeytime "KEY1" "ACTIVE" "${created}" -44700 +set_keytime "KEY1" "SYNCPUBLISH" "${created}" + +# Continue signing policy checks. +check_keytimes +check_apex +check_subdomain +dnssec_verify +# Check that CDS publication is logged. +check_cdslog "$DIR" "$ZONE" KEY1 + +# The DS can be introduced. We ignore any parent registration delay, so set +# the DS publish time to now. +rndc_checkds "$SERVER" "$DIR" KEY1 "now" "published" "$ZONE" +# Next key event is when the DS can move to the OMNIPRESENT state. This occurs +# when the parent propagation delay have passed, plus the DS TTL and retire +# safety delay: 1h + 2h + 20m = 3h20m = 12000 seconds +check_next_key_event 12000 + +# +# Zone: step4.enable-dnssec.autosign. +# +set_zone "step4.enable-dnssec.autosign" +set_policy "enable-dnssec" "1" "300" +set_server "ns3" "10.53.0.3" +# The DS is omnipresent. +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DS" "omnipresent" + +# Various signing policy checks. +check_keys +check_dnssecstatus "$SERVER" "$POLICY" "$ZONE" + +# Set expected key times: +# - The key was published and activated 56700 seconds ago (with settime). +created=$(key_get KEY1 CREATED) +set_addkeytime "KEY1" "PUBLISHED" "${created}" -56700 +set_addkeytime "KEY1" "ACTIVE" "${created}" -56700 +set_addkeytime "KEY1" "SYNCPUBLISH" "${created}" -12000 + +# Continue signing policy checks. +check_keytimes +check_apex +check_subdomain +dnssec_verify + +# Next key event is never, the zone dnssec-policy has been established. So we +# fall back to the default loadkeys interval. +check_next_key_event 3600 + +# +# Testing ZSK Pre-Publication rollover. +# + +# Policy parameters. +# Lksk: 2 years (63072000 seconds) +# Lzsk: 30 days (2592000 seconds) +# Iret(KSK): DS TTL (1d) + DprpP (1h) + retire-safety (2d) +# Iret(KSK): 3d1h (262800 seconds) +# Iret(ZSK): RRSIG TTL (1d) + Dprp (1h) + Dsgn (1w) + retire-safety (2d) +# Iret(ZSK): 10d1h (867600 seconds) +Lksk=63072000 +Lzsk=2592000 +IretKSK=262800 +IretZSK=867600 + +# +# Zone: step1.zsk-prepub.autosign. +# +set_zone "step1.zsk-prepub.autosign" +set_policy "zsk-prepub" "2" "3600" +set_server "ns3" "10.53.0.3" + +set_retired_removed() { + _Lkey=$2 + _Iret=$3 + + _active=$(key_get $1 ACTIVE) + set_addkeytime "${1}" "RETIRED" "${_active}" "${_Lkey}" + _retired=$(key_get $1 RETIRED) + set_addkeytime "${1}" "REMOVED" "${_retired}" "${_Iret}" +} + +rollover_predecessor_keytimes() { + _addtime=$1 + + _created=$(key_get KEY1 CREATED) + set_addkeytime "KEY1" "PUBLISHED" "${_created}" "${_addtime}" + set_addkeytime "KEY1" "SYNCPUBLISH" "${_created}" "${_addtime}" + set_addkeytime "KEY1" "ACTIVE" "${_created}" "${_addtime}" + [ "$Lksk" = 0 ] || set_retired_removed "KEY1" "${Lksk}" "${IretKSK}" + + _created=$(key_get KEY2 CREATED) + set_addkeytime "KEY2" "PUBLISHED" "${_created}" "${_addtime}" + set_addkeytime "KEY2" "ACTIVE" "${_created}" "${_addtime}" + [ "$Lzsk" = 0 ] || set_retired_removed "KEY2" "${Lzsk}" "${IretZSK}" +} + +# Key properties. +key_clear "KEY1" +set_keyrole "KEY1" "ksk" +set_keylifetime "KEY1" "${Lksk}" +set_keyalgorithm "KEY1" "$DEFAULT_ALGORITHM_NUMBER" "$DEFAULT_ALGORITHM" "$DEFAULT_BITS" +set_keysigning "KEY1" "yes" +set_zonesigning "KEY1" "no" + +key_clear "KEY2" +set_keyrole "KEY2" "zsk" +set_keylifetime "KEY2" "${Lzsk}" +set_keyalgorithm "KEY2" "$DEFAULT_ALGORITHM_NUMBER" "$DEFAULT_ALGORITHM" "$DEFAULT_BITS" +set_keysigning "KEY2" "no" +set_zonesigning "KEY2" "yes" +# Both KSK (KEY1) and ZSK (KEY2) start in OMNIPRESENT. +set_keystate "KEY1" "GOAL" "omnipresent" +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DNSKEY" "omnipresent" +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_KRRSIG" "omnipresent" +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DS" "omnipresent" + +set_keystate "KEY2" "GOAL" "omnipresent" +set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_DNSKEY" "omnipresent" +set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_ZRRSIG" "omnipresent" +# Initially only two keys. +key_clear "KEY3" +key_clear "KEY4" + +# Various signing policy checks. +check_keys +check_dnssecstatus "$SERVER" "$POLICY" "$ZONE" +# These keys are immediately published and activated. +rollover_predecessor_keytimes 0 +check_keytimes +check_apex +check_subdomain +dnssec_verify + +# Next key event is when the successor ZSK needs to be published. That is +# the ZSK lifetime - prepublication time. The prepublication time is DNSKEY +# TTL plus publish safety plus the zone propagation delay. For the +# zsk-prepub policy that means: 30d - 3600s + 1d + 1h = 2498400 seconds. +check_next_key_event 2498400 + +# +# Zone: step2.zsk-prepub.autosign. +# +set_zone "step2.zsk-prepub.autosign" +set_policy "zsk-prepub" "3" "3600" +set_server "ns3" "10.53.0.3" +# New ZSK (KEY3) is prepublished, but not yet signing. +key_clear "KEY3" +set_keyrole "KEY3" "zsk" +set_keylifetime "KEY3" "${Lzsk}" +set_keyalgorithm "KEY3" "$DEFAULT_ALGORITHM_NUMBER" "$DEFAULT_ALGORITHM" "$DEFAULT_BITS" +set_keysigning "KEY3" "no" +set_zonesigning "KEY3" "no" +# Key states. +set_keystate "KEY2" "GOAL" "hidden" +set_keystate "KEY3" "GOAL" "omnipresent" +set_keystate "KEY3" "STATE_DNSKEY" "rumoured" +set_keystate "KEY3" "STATE_ZRRSIG" "hidden" + +# Various signing policy checks. +check_keys +check_dnssecstatus "$SERVER" "$POLICY" "$ZONE" + +# Set expected key times: +# - The old keys were activated 694 hours ago (2498400 seconds). +rollover_predecessor_keytimes -2498400 +# - The new ZSK is published now. +created=$(key_get KEY3 CREATED) +set_keytime "KEY3" "PUBLISHED" "${created}" +# - The new ZSK becomes active when the DNSKEY is OMNIPRESENT. +# Ipub: TTLkey (1h) + Dprp (1h) + publish-safety (1d) +# Ipub: 26 hour (93600 seconds). +IpubZSK=93600 +set_addkeytime "KEY3" "ACTIVE" "${created}" "${IpubZSK}" +set_retired_removed "KEY3" "${Lzsk}" "${IretZSK}" + +# Continue signing policy checks. +check_keytimes +check_apex +check_subdomain +dnssec_verify + +# Next key event is when the successor ZSK becomes OMNIPRESENT. That is the +# DNSKEY TTL plus the zone propagation delay, plus the publish-safety. For +# the zsk-prepub policy, this means: 3600s + 1h + 1d = 93600 seconds. +check_next_key_event 93600 + +# +# Zone: step3.zsk-prepub.autosign. +# +set_zone "step3.zsk-prepub.autosign" +set_policy "zsk-prepub" "3" "3600" +set_server "ns3" "10.53.0.3" +# ZSK (KEY2) no longer is actively signing, RRSIG state in UNRETENTIVE. +# New ZSK (KEY3) is now actively signing, RRSIG state in RUMOURED. +set_zonesigning "KEY2" "no" +set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_ZRRSIG" "unretentive" +set_zonesigning "KEY3" "yes" +set_keystate "KEY3" "STATE_DNSKEY" "omnipresent" +set_keystate "KEY3" "STATE_ZRRSIG" "rumoured" + +# Various signing policy checks. +check_keys +check_dnssecstatus "$SERVER" "$POLICY" "$ZONE" + +# Set expected key times: +# - The old keys are activated 30 days ago (2592000 seconds). +rollover_predecessor_keytimes -2592000 +# - The new ZSK is published 26 hours ago (93600 seconds). +created=$(key_get KEY3 CREATED) +set_addkeytime "KEY3" "PUBLISHED" "${created}" -93600 +set_keytime "KEY3" "ACTIVE" "${created}" +set_retired_removed "KEY3" "${Lzsk}" "${IretZSK}" + +# Continue signing policy checks. +check_keytimes +check_apex +# Subdomain still has good signatures of ZSK (KEY2). +# Set expected zone signing on for KEY2 and off for KEY3, +# testing whether signatures which are still valid are being reused. +set_zonesigning "KEY2" "yes" +set_zonesigning "KEY3" "no" +check_subdomain +# Restore the expected zone signing properties. +set_zonesigning "KEY2" "no" +set_zonesigning "KEY3" "yes" +dnssec_verify + +# Next key event is when all the RRSIG records have been replaced with +# signatures of the new ZSK, in other words when ZRRSIG becomes OMNIPRESENT. +# That is Dsgn plus the maximum zone TTL plus the zone propagation delay plus +# retire-safety. For the zsk-prepub policy that means: 1w (because 2w validity +# and refresh within a week) + 1d + 1h + 2d = 10d1h = 867600 seconds. +check_next_key_event 867600 + +# +# Zone: step4.zsk-prepub.autosign. +# +set_zone "step4.zsk-prepub.autosign" +set_policy "zsk-prepub" "3" "3600" +set_server "ns3" "10.53.0.3" +# ZSK (KEY2) DNSKEY is no longer needed. +# ZSK (KEY3) is now actively signing, RRSIG state in RUMOURED. +set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_DNSKEY" "unretentive" +set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_ZRRSIG" "hidden" +set_keystate "KEY3" "STATE_ZRRSIG" "omnipresent" + +# Various signing policy checks. +check_keys +check_dnssecstatus "$SERVER" "$POLICY" "$ZONE" + +# Set expected key times: +# - The old keys are activated 961 hours ago (3459600 seconds). +rollover_predecessor_keytimes -3459600 +# - The new ZSK is published 267 hours ago (961200 seconds). +created=$(key_get KEY3 CREATED) +set_addkeytime "KEY3" "PUBLISHED" "${created}" -961200 +published=$(key_get KEY3 PUBLISHED) +set_addkeytime "KEY3" "ACTIVE" "${published}" "${IpubZSK}" +set_retired_removed "KEY3" "${Lzsk}" "${IretZSK}" + +# Continue signing policy checks. +check_keytimes +check_apex +check_subdomain +dnssec_verify + +# Next key event is when the DNSKEY enters the HIDDEN state. This is the +# DNSKEY TTL plus zone propagation delay. For the zsk-prepub policy this is: +# 3600s + 1h = 7200s +check_next_key_event 7200 + +# +# Zone: step5.zsk-prepub.autosign. +# +set_zone "step5.zsk-prepub.autosign" +set_policy "zsk-prepub" "3" "3600" +set_server "ns3" "10.53.0.3" +# ZSK (KEY2) DNSKEY is now completely HIDDEN and removed. +set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_DNSKEY" "hidden" + +# Various signing policy checks. +check_keys +check_dnssecstatus "$SERVER" "$POLICY" "$ZONE" + +# Set expected key times: +# - The old keys are activated 962 hours ago (3463200 seconds). +rollover_predecessor_keytimes -3463200 +# - The new ZSK is published 268 hours ago (964800 seconds). +created=$(key_get KEY3 CREATED) +set_addkeytime "KEY3" "PUBLISHED" "${created}" -964800 +published=$(key_get KEY3 PUBLISHED) +set_addkeytime "KEY3" "ACTIVE" "${published}" "${IpubZSK}" +set_retired_removed "KEY3" "${Lzsk}" "${IretZSK}" + +# Continue signing policy checks. +check_keytimes +check_apex +check_subdomain +dnssec_verify + +# Next key event is when the new successor needs to be published. This is the +# ZSK lifetime minus Iret minus Ipub minus DNSKEY TTL. For the zsk-prepub +# policy this is: 30d - 867600s - 93600s - 3600s = 1627200 seconds. +check_next_key_event 1627200 + +# +# Zone: step6.zsk-prepub.autosign. +# +set_zone "step6.zsk-prepub.autosign" +set_policy "zsk-prepub" "2" "3600" +set_server "ns3" "10.53.0.3" +# ZSK (KEY2) DNSKEY is purged. +key_clear "KEY2" + +# Various signing policy checks. +check_keys +check_dnssecstatus "$SERVER" "$POLICY" "$ZONE" +check_apex +check_subdomain +dnssec_verify + +# +# Testing KSK Double-KSK rollover. +# + +# Policy parameters. +# Lksk: 60 days (16070400 seconds) +# Lzsk: 1 year (31536000 seconds) +# Iret(KSK): DS TTL (1h) + DprpP (1h) + retire-safety (2d) +# Iret(KSK): 50h (180000 seconds) +# Iret(ZSK): RRSIG TTL (1d) + Dprp (1h) + Dsgn (1w) + retire-safety (2d) +# Iret(ZSK): 10d1h (867600 seconds) +Lksk=5184000 +Lzsk=31536000 +IretKSK=180000 +IretZSK=867600 + +# +# Zone: step1.ksk-doubleksk.autosign. +# +set_zone "step1.ksk-doubleksk.autosign" +set_policy "ksk-doubleksk" "2" "7200" +set_server "ns3" "10.53.0.3" +# Key properties. +key_clear "KEY1" +set_keyrole "KEY1" "ksk" +set_keylifetime "KEY1" "${Lksk}" +set_keyalgorithm "KEY1" "$DEFAULT_ALGORITHM_NUMBER" "$DEFAULT_ALGORITHM" "$DEFAULT_BITS" +set_keysigning "KEY1" "yes" +set_zonesigning "KEY1" "no" + +key_clear "KEY2" +set_keyrole "KEY2" "zsk" +set_keylifetime "KEY2" "${Lzsk}" +set_keyalgorithm "KEY2" "$DEFAULT_ALGORITHM_NUMBER" "$DEFAULT_ALGORITHM" "$DEFAULT_BITS" +set_keysigning "KEY2" "no" +set_zonesigning "KEY2" "yes" +# Both KSK (KEY1) and ZSK (KEY2) start in OMNIPRESENT. +set_keystate "KEY1" "GOAL" "omnipresent" +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DNSKEY" "omnipresent" +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_KRRSIG" "omnipresent" +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DS" "omnipresent" + +set_keystate "KEY2" "GOAL" "omnipresent" +set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_DNSKEY" "omnipresent" +set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_ZRRSIG" "omnipresent" +# Initially only two keys. +key_clear "KEY3" +key_clear "KEY4" + +# Various signing policy checks. +check_keys +check_dnssecstatus "$SERVER" "$POLICY" "$ZONE" +# These keys are immediately published and activated. +rollover_predecessor_keytimes 0 +check_keytimes +check_apex +check_subdomain +dnssec_verify + +# Next key event is when the successor KSK needs to be published. That is +# the KSK lifetime - prepublication time. The prepublication time is +# DNSKEY TTL plus publish safety plus the zone propagation delay. +# For the ksk-doubleksk policy that means: 60d - (1d3h) = 5086800 seconds. +check_next_key_event 5086800 + +# +# Zone: step2.ksk-doubleksk.autosign. +# +set_zone "step2.ksk-doubleksk.autosign" +set_policy "ksk-doubleksk" "3" "7200" +set_server "ns3" "10.53.0.3" +# New KSK (KEY3) is prepublished (and signs DNSKEY RRset). +key_clear "KEY3" +set_keyrole "KEY3" "ksk" +set_keylifetime "KEY3" "${Lksk}" +set_keyalgorithm "KEY3" "$DEFAULT_ALGORITHM_NUMBER" "$DEFAULT_ALGORITHM" "$DEFAULT_BITS" +set_keysigning "KEY3" "yes" +set_zonesigning "KEY3" "no" +# Key states. +set_keystate "KEY1" "GOAL" "hidden" +set_keystate "KEY3" "GOAL" "omnipresent" +set_keystate "KEY3" "STATE_DNSKEY" "rumoured" +set_keystate "KEY3" "STATE_KRRSIG" "rumoured" +set_keystate "KEY3" "STATE_DS" "hidden" + +# Various signing policy checks. +check_keys +check_dnssecstatus "$SERVER" "$POLICY" "$ZONE" + +# Set expected key times: +# - The old keys were activated 1413 hours ago (5086800 seconds). +rollover_predecessor_keytimes -5086800 +# - The new KSK is published now. +created=$(key_get KEY3 CREATED) +set_keytime "KEY3" "PUBLISHED" "${created}" +# The new KSK should publish the CDS after the prepublication time. +# TTLkey: 2h +# DprpC: 1h +# publish-safety: 1d +# IpubC: 27h (97200 seconds) +IpubC=97200 +set_addkeytime "KEY3" "SYNCPUBLISH" "${created}" "${IpubC}" +set_addkeytime "KEY3" "ACTIVE" "${created}" "${IpubC}" +set_retired_removed "KEY3" "${Lksk}" "${IretKSK}" + +# Continue signing policy checks. +check_keytimes +check_apex +check_subdomain +dnssec_verify + +# Next key event is when the successor KSK becomes OMNIPRESENT. That is the +# DNSKEY TTL plus the zone propagation delay, plus the publish-safety. For +# the ksk-doubleksk policy, this means: 7200s + 1h + 1d = 97200 seconds. +check_next_key_event 97200 + +# +# Zone: step3.ksk-doubleksk.autosign. +# +set_zone "step3.ksk-doubleksk.autosign" +set_policy "ksk-doubleksk" "3" "7200" +set_server "ns3" "10.53.0.3" + +# The DNSKEY RRset has become omnipresent. +# Check keys before we tell named that we saw the DS has been replaced. +set_keystate "KEY3" "STATE_DNSKEY" "omnipresent" +set_keystate "KEY3" "STATE_KRRSIG" "omnipresent" +# The old DS (KEY1) can be withdrawn and the new DS (KEY3) can be introduced. +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DS" "unretentive" +set_keystate "KEY3" "STATE_DS" "rumoured" + +# Various signing policy checks. +check_keys +check_dnssecstatus "$SERVER" "$POLICY" "$ZONE" +# Check that CDS publication is logged. +check_cdslog "$DIR" "$ZONE" KEY3 + +# Set expected key times: +# - The old keys were activated 60 days ago (5184000 seconds). +rollover_predecessor_keytimes -5184000 +# - The new KSK is published 27 hours ago (97200 seconds). +created=$(key_get KEY3 CREATED) +set_addkeytime "KEY3" "PUBLISHED" "${created}" -97200 +# - The new KSK CDS is published now. +set_keytime "KEY3" "SYNCPUBLISH" "${created}" +syncpub=$(key_get KEY3 SYNCPUBLISH) +set_keytime "KEY3" "ACTIVE" "${syncpub}" +set_retired_removed "KEY3" "${Lksk}" "${IretKSK}" + +# Continue signing policy checks. +check_keytimes +check_apex +check_subdomain +dnssec_verify + +# We ignore any parent registration delay, so set the DS publish time to now. +rndc_checkds "$SERVER" "$DIR" KEY1 "now" "withdrawn" "$ZONE" +rndc_checkds "$SERVER" "$DIR" KEY3 "now" "published" "$ZONE" +# Next key event is when the predecessor DS has been replaced with the +# successor DS and enough time has passed such that the all validators that +# have this DS RRset cached only know about the successor DS. This is the +# the retire interval, which is the parent propagation delay plus the DS TTL +# plus the retire-safety. For the ksk-double-ksk policy this means: +# 1h + 3600s + 2d = 2d2h = 180000 seconds. +check_next_key_event 180000 + +# +# Zone: step4.ksk-doubleksk.autosign. +# +set_zone "step4.ksk-doubleksk.autosign" +set_policy "ksk-doubleksk" "3" "7200" +set_server "ns3" "10.53.0.3" +# KSK (KEY1) DNSKEY can be removed. +set_keysigning "KEY1" "no" +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DNSKEY" "unretentive" +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_KRRSIG" "unretentive" +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DS" "hidden" +# New KSK (KEY3) DS is now OMNIPRESENT. +set_keystate "KEY3" "STATE_DS" "omnipresent" + +# Various signing policy checks. +check_keys +check_dnssecstatus "$SERVER" "$POLICY" "$ZONE" + +# Set expected key times: +# - The old keys were activated 1490 hours ago (5364000 seconds). +rollover_predecessor_keytimes -5364000 +# - The new KSK is published 77 hours ago (277200 seconds). +created=$(key_get KEY3 CREATED) +set_addkeytime "KEY3" "PUBLISHED" "${created}" -277200 +published=$(key_get KEY3 PUBLISHED) +set_addkeytime "KEY3" "SYNCPUBLISH" "${published}" "${IpubC}" +syncpub=$(key_get KEY3 SYNCPUBLISH) +set_keytime "KEY3" "ACTIVE" "${syncpub}" +set_retired_removed "KEY3" "${Lksk}" "${IretKSK}" + +# Continue signing policy checks. +check_keytimes +check_apex +check_subdomain +dnssec_verify + +# Next key event is when the DNSKEY enters the HIDDEN state. This is the +# DNSKEY TTL plus zone propagation delay. For the ksk-doubleksk policy this is: +# 7200s + 1h = 10800s +check_next_key_event 10800 + +# +# Zone: step5.ksk-doubleksk.autosign. +# +set_zone "step5.ksk-doubleksk.autosign" +set_policy "ksk-doubleksk" "3" "7200" +set_server "ns3" "10.53.0.3" +# KSK (KEY1) DNSKEY is now HIDDEN. +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DNSKEY" "hidden" +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_KRRSIG" "hidden" + +# Various signing policy checks. +check_keys +check_dnssecstatus "$SERVER" "$POLICY" "$ZONE" + +# Set expected key times: +# - The old KSK is activated 1492 hours ago (5371200 seconds). +rollover_predecessor_keytimes -5371200 +# - The new KSK is published 79 hours ago (284400 seconds). +created=$(key_get KEY3 CREATED) +set_addkeytime "KEY3" "PUBLISHED" "${created}" -284400 +published=$(key_get KEY3 PUBLISHED) +set_addkeytime "KEY3" "SYNCPUBLISH" "${published}" "${IpubC}" +syncpub=$(key_get KEY3 SYNCPUBLISH) +set_keytime "KEY3" "ACTIVE" "${syncpub}" +set_retired_removed "KEY3" "${Lksk}" "${IretKSK}" + +# Various signing policy checks. +check_keytimes +check_apex +check_subdomain +dnssec_verify + +# Next key event is when the new successor needs to be published. This is the +# KSK lifetime minus Ipub minus Iret minus DNSKEY TTL. For the +# ksk-doubleksk this is: 60d - 1d3h - 1d - 2d2h - 2h = +# 5184000 - 97200 - 180000 - 7200 = 4813200 seconds. +check_next_key_event 4899600 + +# +# Zone: step6.ksk-doubleksk.autosign. +# +set_zone "step6.ksk-doubleksk.autosign" +set_policy "ksk-doubleksk" "2" "7200" +set_server "ns3" "10.53.0.3" +# KSK (KEY1) DNSKEY is purged. +key_clear "KEY1" + +# Various signing policy checks. +check_keys +check_dnssecstatus "$SERVER" "$POLICY" "$ZONE" +check_apex +check_subdomain +dnssec_verify + +# +# Testing CSK key rollover (1). +# + +# Policy parameters. +# Lcsk: 186 days (5184000 seconds) +# Iret(KSK): DS TTL (1h) + DprpP (1h) + retire-safety (2h) +# Iret(KSK): 4h (14400 seconds) +# Iret(ZSK): RRSIG TTL (1d) + Dprp (1h) + Dsgn (25d) + retire-safety (2h) +# Iret(ZSK): 26d3h (2257200 seconds) +Lcsk=16070400 +IretKSK=14400 +IretZSK=2257200 +IretCSK=$IretZSK + +csk_rollover_predecessor_keytimes() { + _addtime=$1 + + _created=$(key_get KEY1 CREATED) + set_addkeytime "KEY1" "PUBLISHED" "${_created}" "${_addtime}" + set_addkeytime "KEY1" "SYNCPUBLISH" "${_created}" "${_addtime}" + set_addkeytime "KEY1" "ACTIVE" "${_created}" "${_addtime}" + [ "$Lcsk" = 0 ] || set_retired_removed "KEY1" "${Lcsk}" "${IretCSK}" +} + +# +# Zone: step1.csk-roll.autosign. +# +set_zone "step1.csk-roll.autosign" +set_policy "csk-roll" "1" "3600" +set_server "ns3" "10.53.0.3" +# Key properties. +key_clear "KEY1" +set_keyrole "KEY1" "csk" +set_keylifetime "KEY1" "${Lcsk}" +set_keyalgorithm "KEY1" "$DEFAULT_ALGORITHM_NUMBER" "$DEFAULT_ALGORITHM" "$DEFAULT_BITS" +set_keysigning "KEY1" "yes" +set_zonesigning "KEY1" "yes" +# The CSK (KEY1) starts in OMNIPRESENT. +set_keystate "KEY1" "GOAL" "omnipresent" +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DNSKEY" "omnipresent" +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_KRRSIG" "omnipresent" +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_ZRRSIG" "omnipresent" +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DS" "omnipresent" +# Initially only one key. +key_clear "KEY2" +key_clear "KEY3" +key_clear "KEY4" + +# Various signing policy checks. +check_keys +check_dnssecstatus "$SERVER" "$POLICY" "$ZONE" +# This key is immediately published and activated. +csk_rollover_predecessor_keytimes 0 +check_keytimes +check_apex +check_subdomain +dnssec_verify + +# Next key event is when the successor CSK needs to be published. +# This is Lcsk - Ipub - Dreg. +# Lcsk: 186d (16070400 seconds) +# Ipub: 3h (10800 seconds) +check_next_key_event 16059600 + +# +# Zone: step2.csk-roll.autosign. +# +set_zone "step2.csk-roll.autosign" +set_policy "csk-roll" "2" "3600" +set_server "ns3" "10.53.0.3" +# New CSK (KEY2) is prepublished (signs DNSKEY RRset, but not yet other RRsets). +key_clear "KEY2" +set_keyrole "KEY2" "csk" +set_keylifetime "KEY2" "16070400" +set_keyalgorithm "KEY2" "$DEFAULT_ALGORITHM_NUMBER" "$DEFAULT_ALGORITHM" "$DEFAULT_BITS" +set_keysigning "KEY2" "yes" +set_zonesigning "KEY2" "no" +# Key states. +set_keystate "KEY1" "GOAL" "hidden" +set_keystate "KEY2" "GOAL" "omnipresent" +set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_DNSKEY" "rumoured" +set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_KRRSIG" "rumoured" +set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_ZRRSIG" "hidden" +set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_DS" "hidden" + +# Various signing policy checks. +check_keys +check_dnssecstatus "$SERVER" "$POLICY" "$ZONE" + +# Set expected key times: +# - This key was activated 4461 hours ago (16059600 seconds). +csk_rollover_predecessor_keytimes -16059600 +# - The new CSK is published now. +created=$(key_get KEY2 CREATED) +set_keytime "KEY2" "PUBLISHED" "${created}" +# - The new CSK should publish the CDS after the prepublication time. +# Ipub: 3 hour (10800 seconds) +Ipub="10800" +set_addkeytime "KEY2" "SYNCPUBLISH" "${created}" "${Ipub}" +set_addkeytime "KEY2" "ACTIVE" "${created}" "${Ipub}" +set_retired_removed "KEY2" "${Lcsk}" "${IretCSK}" + +# Continue signing policy checks. +check_keytimes +check_apex +check_subdomain +dnssec_verify + +# Next key event is when the successor CSK becomes OMNIPRESENT. That is the +# DNSKEY TTL plus the zone propagation delay, plus the publish-safety. For +# the csk-roll policy, this means 3 hours = 10800 seconds. +check_next_key_event 10800 + +# +# Zone: step3.csk-roll.autosign. +# +set_zone "step3.csk-roll.autosign" +set_policy "csk-roll" "2" "3600" +set_server "ns3" "10.53.0.3" +# Swap zone signing role. +set_zonesigning "KEY1" "no" +set_zonesigning "KEY2" "yes" +# CSK (KEY1) will be removed, so moving to UNRETENTIVE. +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_ZRRSIG" "unretentive" +# New CSK (KEY2) DNSKEY is OMNIPRESENT, so moving ZRRSIG to RUMOURED. +set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_DNSKEY" "omnipresent" +set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_KRRSIG" "omnipresent" +set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_ZRRSIG" "rumoured" +# The old DS (KEY1) can be withdrawn and the new DS (KEY2) can be introduced. +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DS" "unretentive" +set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_DS" "rumoured" + +# Various signing policy checks. +check_keys +check_dnssecstatus "$SERVER" "$POLICY" "$ZONE" +# Check that CDS publication is logged. +check_cdslog "$DIR" "$ZONE" KEY2 + +# Set expected key times: +# - This key was activated 186 days ago (16070400 seconds). +csk_rollover_predecessor_keytimes -16070400 +# - The new CSK is published three hours ago, CDS must be published now. +created=$(key_get KEY2 CREATED) +set_addkeytime "KEY2" "PUBLISHED" "${created}" "-${Ipub}" +set_keytime "KEY2" "SYNCPUBLISH" "${created}" +# - Also signatures are being introduced now. +set_keytime "KEY2" "ACTIVE" "${created}" +set_retired_removed "KEY2" "${Lcsk}" "${IretCSK}" + +# Continue signing policy checks. +check_keytimes +check_apex +# Subdomain still has good signatures of old CSK (KEY1). +# Set expected zone signing on for KEY1 and off for KEY2, +# testing whether signatures which are still valid are being reused. +set_zonesigning "KEY1" "yes" +set_zonesigning "KEY2" "no" +check_subdomain +# Restore the expected zone signing properties. +set_zonesigning "KEY1" "no" +set_zonesigning "KEY2" "yes" +dnssec_verify + +# We ignore any parent registration delay, so set the DS publish time to now. +rndc_checkds "$SERVER" "$DIR" KEY1 "now" "withdrawn" "$ZONE" +rndc_checkds "$SERVER" "$DIR" KEY2 "now" "published" "$ZONE" +# Next key event is when the predecessor DS has been replaced with the +# successor DS and enough time has passed such that the all validators that +# have this DS RRset cached only know about the successor DS. This is the +# the retire interval, which is the parent propagation delay plus the DS TTL +# plus the retire-safety. For the csk-roll policy this means: +# 1h + 1h + 2h = 4h = 14400 seconds. +check_next_key_event 14400 + +# +# Zone: step4.csk-roll.autosign. +# +set_zone "step4.csk-roll.autosign" +set_policy "csk-roll" "2" "3600" +set_server "ns3" "10.53.0.3" +# The old CSK (KEY1) is no longer signing the DNSKEY RRset. +set_keysigning "KEY1" "no" +# The old CSK (KEY1) DS is hidden. We still need to keep the DNSKEY public +# but can remove the KRRSIG records. +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_KRRSIG" "unretentive" +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DS" "hidden" +# The new CSK (KEY2) DS is now OMNIPRESENT. +set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_DS" "omnipresent" + +# Various signing policy checks. +check_keys +check_dnssecstatus "$SERVER" "$POLICY" "$ZONE" + +# Set expected key times: +# - This key was activated 4468 hours ago (16084800 seconds). +csk_rollover_predecessor_keytimes -16084800 +# - The new CSK started signing 4h ago (14400 seconds). +created=$(key_get KEY2 CREATED) +set_addkeytime "KEY2" "ACTIVE" "${created}" -14400 +set_addkeytime "KEY2" "SYNCPUBLISH" "${created}" -14400 +syncpub=$(key_get KEY2 SYNCPUBLISH) +set_addkeytime "KEY2" "PUBLISHED" "${syncpub}" "-${Ipub}" +set_retired_removed "KEY2" "${Lcsk}" "${IretCSK}" + +# Continue signing policy checks. +check_keytimes +check_apex +check_subdomain +dnssec_verify + +# Next key event is when the KRRSIG enters the HIDDEN state. This is the +# DNSKEY TTL plus zone propagation delay. For the csk-roll policy this is: +# 1h + 1h = 7200 seconds. +check_next_key_event 7200 + +# +# Zone: step5.csk-roll.autosign. +# +set_zone "step5.csk-roll.autosign" +set_policy "csk-roll" "2" "3600" +set_server "ns3" "10.53.0.3" +# The old CSK (KEY1) KRRSIG records are now all hidden. +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_KRRSIG" "hidden" + +# Various signing policy checks. +check_keys +check_dnssecstatus "$SERVER" "$POLICY" "$ZONE" + +# Set expected key times: +# - This key was activated 4470 hours ago (16092000 seconds). +csk_rollover_predecessor_keytimes -16092000 +# - The new CSK started signing 6h ago (21600 seconds). +created=$(key_get KEY2 CREATED) +set_addkeytime "KEY2" "ACTIVE" "${created}" -21600 +set_addkeytime "KEY2" "SYNCPUBLISH" "${created}" -21600 +syncpub=$(key_get KEY2 SYNCPUBLISH) +set_addkeytime "KEY2" "PUBLISHED" "${syncpub}" "-${Ipub}" +set_retired_removed "KEY2" "${Lcsk}" "${IretCSK}" + +# Continue signing policy checks. +check_keytimes +check_apex +check_subdomain +dnssec_verify + +# Next key event is when the DNSKEY can be removed. This is when all ZRRSIG +# records have been replaced with signatures of the new CSK. We have +# calculated the interval to be 26d3h of which 4h (Iret(KSK)) plus +# 2h (DNSKEY TTL + Dprp) have already passed. So next key event is in +# 26d3h - 4h - 2h = 621h = 2235600 seconds. +check_next_key_event 2235600 + +# +# Zone: step6.csk-roll.autosign. +# +set_zone "step6.csk-roll.autosign" +set_policy "csk-roll" "2" "3600" +set_server "ns3" "10.53.0.3" +# The old CSK (KEY1) ZRRSIG records are now all hidden (so the DNSKEY can +# be removed). +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DNSKEY" "unretentive" +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_ZRRSIG" "hidden" +# The new CSK (KEY2) is now fully OMNIPRESENT. +set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_ZRRSIG" "omnipresent" + +# Various signing policy checks. +check_keys +check_dnssecstatus "$SERVER" "$POLICY" "$ZONE" + +# Set expected key times +# - This key was activated 5091 hours ago (18327600 seconds). +csk_rollover_predecessor_keytimes -18327600 +# - The new CSK is activated 627 hours ago (2257200 seconds). +created=$(key_get KEY2 CREATED) +set_addkeytime "KEY2" "ACTIVE" "${created}" -2257200 +set_addkeytime "KEY2" "SYNCPUBLISH" "${created}" -2257200 +syncpub=$(key_get KEY2 SYNCPUBLISH) +set_addkeytime "KEY2" "PUBLISHED" "${syncpub}" "-${Ipub}" +set_retired_removed "KEY2" "${Lcsk}" "${IretCSK}" + +# Continue signing policy checks. +check_keytimes +check_apex +check_subdomain +dnssec_verify + +# Next key event is when the DNSKEY enters the HIDDEN state. This is the +# DNSKEY TTL plus zone propagation delay. For the csk-roll policy this is: +# 1h + 1h = 7200 seconds. +check_next_key_event 7200 + +# +# Zone: step7.csk-roll.autosign. +# +set_zone "step7.csk-roll.autosign" +set_policy "csk-roll" "2" "3600" +set_server "ns3" "10.53.0.3" +# The old CSK (KEY1) is now completely HIDDEN. +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DNSKEY" "hidden" + +# Various signing policy checks. +check_keys +check_dnssecstatus "$SERVER" "$POLICY" "$ZONE" + +# Set expected key times: +# - This key was activated 5093 hours ago (18334800 seconds). +csk_rollover_predecessor_keytimes -18334800 +# - The new CSK is activated 629 hours ago (2264400 seconds). +created=$(key_get KEY2 CREATED) +set_addkeytime "KEY2" "ACTIVE" "${created}" -2264400 +set_addkeytime "KEY2" "SYNCPUBLISH" "${created}" -2264400 +syncpub=$(key_get KEY2 SYNCPUBLISH) +set_addkeytime "KEY2" "PUBLISHED" "${syncpub}" "-${Ipub}" +set_retired_removed "KEY2" "${Lcsk}" "${IretCSK}" + +# Continue signing policy checks. +check_keytimes +check_apex +check_subdomain +dnssec_verify + +# Next key event is when the new successor needs to be published. +# This is the Lcsk, minus time passed since the key started signing, +# minus the prepublication time. +# Lcsk: 186d (16070400 seconds) +# Time passed: 629h (2264400 seconds) +# Ipub: 3h (10800 seconds) +check_next_key_event 13795200 + +# +# Zone: step8.csk-roll.autosign. +# +set_zone "step8.csk-roll.autosign" +set_policy "csk-roll" "1" "3600" +set_server "ns3" "10.53.0.3" +# The old CSK (KEY1) is purged. +key_clear "KEY1" + +# Various signing policy checks. +check_keys +check_dnssecstatus "$SERVER" "$POLICY" "$ZONE" +check_apex +check_subdomain +dnssec_verify + +# +# Testing CSK key rollover (2). +# + +# Policy parameters. +# Lcsk: 186 days (16070400 seconds) +# Dreg: N/A +# Iret(KSK): DS TTL (1h) + DprpP (1w) + retire-safety (1h) +# Iret(KSK): 170h (61200 seconds) +# Iret(ZSK): RRSIG TTL (1d) + Dprp (1h) + Dsgn (12h) + retire-safety (1h) +# Iret(ZSK): 38h (136800 seconds) +Lcsk=16070400 +IretKSK=612000 +IretZSK=136800 +IretCSK=$IretKSK + +# +# Zone: step1.csk-roll2.autosign. +# +set_zone "step1.csk-roll2.autosign" +set_policy "csk-roll2" "1" "3600" +set_server "ns3" "10.53.0.3" +# Key properties. +key_clear "KEY1" +set_keyrole "KEY1" "csk" +set_keylifetime "KEY1" "16070400" +set_keyalgorithm "KEY1" "$DEFAULT_ALGORITHM_NUMBER" "$DEFAULT_ALGORITHM" "$DEFAULT_BITS" +set_keysigning "KEY1" "yes" +set_zonesigning "KEY1" "yes" +# The CSK (KEY1) starts in OMNIPRESENT. +set_keystate "KEY1" "GOAL" "omnipresent" +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DNSKEY" "omnipresent" +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_KRRSIG" "omnipresent" +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_ZRRSIG" "omnipresent" +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DS" "omnipresent" +# Initially only one key. +key_clear "KEY2" +key_clear "KEY3" +key_clear "KEY4" + +# Various signing policy checks. +check_keys +check_dnssecstatus "$SERVER" "$POLICY" "$ZONE" +# This key is immediately published and activated. +csk_rollover_predecessor_keytimes 0 +check_keytimes +check_apex +check_subdomain +dnssec_verify + +# Next key event is when the successor CSK needs to be published. +# This is Lcsk - Ipub. +# Lcsk: 186d (16070400 seconds) +# Ipub: 3h (10800 seconds) +# Total: 186d3h (16059600 seconds) +check_next_key_event 16059600 + +# +# Zone: step2.csk-roll2.autosign. +# +set_zone "step2.csk-roll2.autosign" +set_policy "csk-roll2" "2" "3600" +set_server "ns3" "10.53.0.3" +# New CSK (KEY2) is prepublished (signs DNSKEY RRset, but not yet other RRsets). +key_clear "KEY2" +set_keyrole "KEY2" "csk" +set_keylifetime "KEY2" "16070400" +set_keyalgorithm "KEY2" "$DEFAULT_ALGORITHM_NUMBER" "$DEFAULT_ALGORITHM" "$DEFAULT_BITS" +set_keysigning "KEY2" "yes" +set_zonesigning "KEY2" "no" +# Key states. +set_keystate "KEY1" "GOAL" "hidden" +set_keystate "KEY2" "GOAL" "omnipresent" +set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_DNSKEY" "rumoured" +set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_KRRSIG" "rumoured" +set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_ZRRSIG" "hidden" +set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_DS" "hidden" + +# Various signing policy checks. +check_keys +check_dnssecstatus "$SERVER" "$POLICY" "$ZONE" + +# Set expected key times: +# - This key was activated 4461 hours ago (16059600 seconds). +csk_rollover_predecessor_keytimes -16059600 +# - The new CSK is published now. +created=$(key_get KEY2 CREATED) +set_keytime "KEY2" "PUBLISHED" "${created}" +# - The new CSK should publish the CDS after the prepublication time. +# - Ipub: 3 hour (10800 seconds) +Ipub="10800" +set_addkeytime "KEY2" "SYNCPUBLISH" "${created}" "${Ipub}" +set_addkeytime "KEY2" "ACTIVE" "${created}" "${Ipub}" +set_retired_removed "KEY2" "${Lcsk}" "${IretCSK}" + +# Continue signing policy checks. +check_apex +check_subdomain +dnssec_verify + +# Next key event is when the successor CSK becomes OMNIPRESENT. That is the +# DNSKEY TTL plus the zone propagation delay, plus the publish-safety. For +# the csk-roll2 policy, this means 3h hours = 10800 seconds. +check_next_key_event 10800 + +# +# Zone: step3.csk-roll2.autosign. +# +set_zone "step3.csk-roll2.autosign" +set_policy "csk-roll2" "2" "3600" +set_server "ns3" "10.53.0.3" +# CSK (KEY1) can be removed, so move to UNRETENTIVE. +set_zonesigning "KEY1" "no" +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_ZRRSIG" "unretentive" +# New CSK (KEY2) DNSKEY is OMNIPRESENT, so move ZRRSIG to RUMOURED state. +set_zonesigning "KEY2" "yes" +set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_DNSKEY" "omnipresent" +set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_KRRSIG" "omnipresent" +set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_ZRRSIG" "rumoured" +# The old DS (KEY1) can be withdrawn and the new DS (KEY2) can be introduced. +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DS" "unretentive" +set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_DS" "rumoured" + +# Various signing policy checks. +check_keys +check_dnssecstatus "$SERVER" "$POLICY" "$ZONE" +# Check that CDS publication is logged. +check_cdslog "$DIR" "$ZONE" KEY2 + +# Set expected key times: +# - This key was activated 186 days ago (16070400 seconds). +csk_rollover_predecessor_keytimes -16070400 +# - The new CSK is published three hours ago, CDS must be published now. +created=$(key_get KEY2 CREATED) +set_addkeytime "KEY2" "PUBLISHED" "${created}" "-${Ipub}" +set_keytime "KEY2" "SYNCPUBLISH" "${created}" +# - Also signatures are being introduced now. +set_keytime "KEY2" "ACTIVE" "${created}" +set_retired_removed "KEY2" "${Lcsk}" "${IretCSK}" + +# Continue signing policy checks. +check_keytimes +check_apex +# Subdomain still has good signatures of old CSK (KEY1). +# Set expected zone signing on for KEY1 and off for KEY2, +# testing whether signatures which are still valid are being reused. +set_zonesigning "KEY1" "yes" +set_zonesigning "KEY2" "no" +check_subdomain +# Restore the expected zone signing properties. +set_zonesigning "KEY1" "no" +set_zonesigning "KEY2" "yes" +dnssec_verify + +# We ignore any parent registration delay, so set the DS publish time to now. +rndc_checkds "$SERVER" "$DIR" KEY1 "now" "withdrawn" "$ZONE" +rndc_checkds "$SERVER" "$DIR" KEY2 "now" "published" "$ZONE" +# Next key event is when the predecessor ZRRSIG records have been replaced +# with that of the successor and enough time has passed such that the all +# validators that have such signed RRsets in cache only know about the +# successor signatures. This is the retire interval: Dsgn plus the +# maximum zone TTL plus the zone propagation delay plus retire-safety. For the +# csk-roll2 policy that means: 12h (because 1d validity and refresh within +# 12 hours) + 1d + 1h + 1h = 38h = 136800 seconds. Prevent intermittent false +# positives on slow platforms by subtracting the number of seconds which +# passed between key creation and invoking 'rndc dnssec -checkds'. +now="$(TZ=UTC date +%s)" +time_passed=$((now-start_time)) +next_time=$((136800-time_passed)) +check_next_key_event $next_time + +# +# Zone: step4.csk-roll2.autosign. +# +set_zone "step4.csk-roll2.autosign" +set_policy "csk-roll2" "2" "3600" +set_server "ns3" "10.53.0.3" +# The old CSK (KEY1) ZRRSIG is now HIDDEN. +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_ZRRSIG" "hidden" +# The new CSK (KEY2) ZRRSIG is now OMNIPRESENT. +set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_ZRRSIG" "omnipresent" + +# Various signing policy checks. +check_keys +check_dnssecstatus "$SERVER" "$POLICY" "$ZONE" + +# Set expected key times: +# - This key was activated 4502 hours ago (16207200 seconds). +csk_rollover_predecessor_keytimes -16207200 +# - The new CSK was published 41 hours (147600 seconds) ago. +created=$(key_get KEY2 CREATED) +set_addkeytime "KEY2" "PUBLISHED" "${created}" -147600 +published=$(key_get KEY2 PUBLISHED) +set_addkeytime "KEY2" "SYNCPUBLISH" "${published}" "${Ipub}" +set_addkeytime "KEY2" "ACTIVE" "${published}" "${Ipub}" +set_retired_removed "KEY2" "${Lcsk}" "${IretCSK}" + +# Continue signing policy checks. +check_keytimes +check_apex +check_subdomain +dnssec_verify + +# Next key event is when the predecessor DS has been replaced with the +# successor DS and enough time has passed such that the all validators that +# have this DS RRset cached only know about the successor DS. This is the +# registration delay plus the retire interval, which is the parent +# propagation delay plus the DS TTL plus the retire-safety. For the +# csk-roll2 policy this means: 1w + 1h + 1h = 170h = 612000 seconds. +# However, 136800 seconds have passed already, so 478800 seconds left. +check_next_key_event 475200 + +# +# Zone: step5.csk-roll2.autosign. +# +set_zone "step5.csk-roll2.autosign" +set_policy "csk-roll2" "2" "3600" +set_server "ns3" "10.53.0.3" +# The old CSK (KEY1) DNSKEY can be removed. +set_keysigning "KEY1" "no" +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DNSKEY" "unretentive" +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_KRRSIG" "unretentive" +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DS" "hidden" +# The new CSK (KEY2) is now fully OMNIPRESENT. +set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_DS" "omnipresent" + +# Various signing policy checks. +check_keys +check_dnssecstatus "$SERVER" "$POLICY" "$ZONE" + +# Set expected key times: +# - This key was activated 4634 hours ago (16682400 seconds). +csk_rollover_predecessor_keytimes -16682400 +# - The new CSK was published 173 hours (622800 seconds) ago. +created=$(key_get KEY2 CREATED) +set_addkeytime "KEY2" "PUBLISHED" "${created}" -622800 +published=$(key_get KEY2 PUBLISHED) +set_addkeytime "KEY2" "SYNCPUBLISH" "${published}" "${Ipub}" +set_addkeytime "KEY2" "ACTIVE" "${published}" "${Ipub}" +set_retired_removed "KEY2" "${Lcsk}" "${IretCSK}" + +# Continue signing policy checks. +check_keytimes +check_apex +check_subdomain +dnssec_verify + +# Next key event is when the DNSKEY enters the HIDDEN state. This is the +# DNSKEY TTL plus zone propagation delay. For the csk-roll policy this is: +# 1h + 1h = 7200 seconds. +check_next_key_event 7200 + +# +# Zone: step6.csk-roll2.autosign. +# +set_zone "step6.csk-roll2.autosign" +set_policy "csk-roll2" "2" "3600" +set_server "ns3" "10.53.0.3" +# The old CSK (KEY1) is now completely HIDDEN. +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DNSKEY" "hidden" +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_KRRSIG" "hidden" + +# Various signing policy checks. +check_keys +check_dnssecstatus "$SERVER" "$POLICY" "$ZONE" + +# Set expected key times: +# - This key was activated 4636 hours ago (16689600 seconds). +csk_rollover_predecessor_keytimes -16689600 +# - The new CSK was published 175 hours (630000 seconds) ago. +created=$(key_get KEY2 CREATED) +set_addkeytime "KEY2" "PUBLISHED" "${created}" -630000 +published=$(key_get KEY2 PUBLISHED) +set_addkeytime "KEY2" "SYNCPUBLISH" "${published}" "${Ipub}" +set_addkeytime "KEY2" "ACTIVE" "${published}" "${Ipub}" +set_retired_removed "KEY2" "${Lcsk}" "${IretCSK}" + +# Continue signing policy checks. +check_keytimes +check_apex +check_subdomain +dnssec_verify + +# Next key event is when the new successor needs to be published. +# This is the Lcsk, minus time passed since the key was published. +# Lcsk: 186d (16070400 seconds) +# Time passed: 175h (630000 seconds) +check_next_key_event 15440400 + +# +# Zone: step7.csk-roll2.autosign. +# +set_zone "step7.csk-roll2.autosign" +set_policy "csk-roll2" "2" "3600" +set_server "ns3" "10.53.0.3" +# The old CSK (KEY1) could have been purged, but purge-keys is disabled. + +# Various signing policy checks. +check_keys +check_dnssecstatus "$SERVER" "$POLICY" "$ZONE" +check_apex +check_subdomain +dnssec_verify + +# +# Test #2375: Scheduled rollovers are happening faster than they can finish +# +set_zone "three-is-a-crowd.kasp" +set_policy "ksk-doubleksk" "3" "7200" +set_server "ns3" "10.53.0.3" +CDNSKEY="no" +# These are the same time values as calculated for ksk-doubleksk. +Lksk=5184000 +Lzsk=31536000 +IretKSK=180000 +IretZSK=867600 +# KSK (KEY1) is outgoing. +key_clear "KEY1" +set_keyrole "KEY1" "ksk" +set_keylifetime "KEY1" "${Lksk}" +set_keyalgorithm "KEY1" "$DEFAULT_ALGORITHM_NUMBER" "$DEFAULT_ALGORITHM" "$DEFAULT_BITS" +set_keysigning "KEY1" "yes" +set_zonesigning "KEY1" "yes" +set_keystate "KEY1" "GOAL" "hidden" +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DNSKEY" "omnipresent" +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_KRRSIG" "omnipresent" +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DS" "unretentive" +# KSK (KEY2) is incoming. +key_clear "KEY2" +set_keyrole "KEY2" "ksk" +set_keylifetime "KEY2" "${Lksk}" +set_keyalgorithm "KEY2" "$DEFAULT_ALGORITHM_NUMBER" "$DEFAULT_ALGORITHM" "$DEFAULT_BITS" +set_keysigning "KEY2" "yes" +set_zonesigning "KEY2" "no" +set_keystate "KEY2" "GOAL" "omnipresent" +set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_DNSKEY" "omnipresent" +set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_KRRSIG" "omnipresent" +set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_DS" "rumoured" +# We will introduce the third KSK shortly. +key_clear "KEY3" +# ZSK (KEY4). +key_clear "KEY4" +set_keyrole "KEY4" "zsk" +set_keylifetime "KEY4" "${Lzsk}" +set_keyalgorithm "KEY4" "$DEFAULT_ALGORITHM_NUMBER" "$DEFAULT_ALGORITHM" "$DEFAULT_BITS" +set_keysigning "KEY4" "no" +set_zonesigning "KEY4" "yes" +set_keystate "KEY4" "GOAL" "omnipresent" +set_keystate "KEY4" "STATE_DNSKEY" "omnipresent" +set_keystate "KEY4" "STATE_ZRRSIG" "omnipresent" +# Run preliminary tests. +check_keys +check_dnssecstatus "$SERVER" "$POLICY" "$ZONE" +check_apex +check_subdomain +dnssec_verify +# Roll over KEY2. +# Set expected key lifetime, which is DNSKEY TTL plus the zone propagation delay, +# plus the publish-safety: 7200s + 1h + 1d = 97200 seconds. +set_keylifetime "KEY2" "97200" +created=$(key_get KEY2 CREATED) +rndc_rollover "$SERVER" "$DIR" $(key_get KEY2 ID) "${created}" "$ZONE" +# Update expected number of keys and key states. +set_keystate "KEY2" "GOAL" "hidden" +set_policy "ksk-doubleksk" "4" "7200" +CDNSKEY="no" +# New KSK (KEY3) is introduced. +set_keyrole "KEY3" "ksk" +set_keylifetime "KEY3" "${Lksk}" +set_keyalgorithm "KEY3" "$DEFAULT_ALGORITHM_NUMBER" "$DEFAULT_ALGORITHM" "$DEFAULT_BITS" +set_keysigning "KEY3" "yes" +set_zonesigning "KEY3" "no" +set_keystate "KEY3" "GOAL" "omnipresent" +set_keystate "KEY3" "STATE_DNSKEY" "rumoured" +set_keystate "KEY3" "STATE_KRRSIG" "rumoured" +set_keystate "KEY3" "STATE_DS" "hidden" +# Run tests again. We now expect four keys (3x KSK, 1x ZSK). +check_keys +check_dnssecstatus "$SERVER" "$POLICY" "$ZONE" +check_apex +check_subdomain +dnssec_verify + +# Test dynamic zones that switch to inline-signing. +set_zone "dynamic2inline.kasp" +set_policy "default" "1" "3600" +set_server "ns6" "10.53.0.6" +# Key properties. +key_clear "KEY1" +set_keyrole "KEY1" "csk" +set_keylifetime "KEY1" "0" +set_keyalgorithm "KEY1" "13" "ECDSAP256SHA256" "256" +set_keysigning "KEY1" "yes" +set_zonesigning "KEY1" "yes" +key_clear "KEY2" +key_clear "KEY3" +key_clear "KEY4" + +# The CSK is rumoured. +set_keystate "KEY1" "GOAL" "omnipresent" +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DNSKEY" "rumoured" +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_KRRSIG" "rumoured" +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_ZRRSIG" "rumoured" +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DS" "hidden" +# Various signing policy checks. +check_keys +check_dnssecstatus "$SERVER" "$POLICY" "$ZONE" +check_apex +check_subdomain +dnssec_verify + +# +# Testing algorithm rollover. +# +Lksk=0 +Lzsk=0 +IretKSK=0 +IretZSK=0 + +# +# Zone: step1.algorithm-roll.kasp +# +set_zone "step1.algorithm-roll.kasp" +set_policy "rsasha256" "2" "3600" +set_server "ns6" "10.53.0.6" +# Key properties. +key_clear "KEY1" +set_keyrole "KEY1" "ksk" +set_keylifetime "KEY1" "0" +set_keyalgorithm "KEY1" "8" "RSASHA256" "2048" +set_keysigning "KEY1" "yes" +set_zonesigning "KEY1" "no" + +key_clear "KEY2" +set_keyrole "KEY2" "zsk" +set_keylifetime "KEY2" "0" +set_keyalgorithm "KEY2" "8" "RSASHA256" "2048" +set_keysigning "KEY2" "no" +set_zonesigning "KEY2" "yes" +key_clear "KEY3" +key_clear "KEY4" + +# The KSK (KEY1) and ZSK (KEY2) start in OMNIPRESENT. +set_keystate "KEY1" "GOAL" "omnipresent" +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DNSKEY" "omnipresent" +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_KRRSIG" "omnipresent" +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DS" "omnipresent" + +set_keystate "KEY2" "GOAL" "omnipresent" +set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_DNSKEY" "omnipresent" +set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_ZRRSIG" "omnipresent" + +# Various signing policy checks. +check_keys +check_dnssecstatus "$SERVER" "$POLICY" "$ZONE" +# These keys are immediately published and activated. +rollover_predecessor_keytimes 0 +check_keytimes +check_apex +check_subdomain +dnssec_verify + +# Next key event is when the successor keys need to be published. +# Since the lifetime of the keys are unlimited, so default to loadkeys +# interval. +check_next_key_event 3600 + +# +# Zone: step1.csk-algorithm-roll.kasp +# +set_zone "step1.csk-algorithm-roll.kasp" +set_policy "csk-algoroll" "1" "3600" +set_server "ns6" "10.53.0.6" +# Key properties. +key_clear "KEY1" +set_keyrole "KEY1" "csk" +set_keylifetime "KEY1" "0" +set_keyalgorithm "KEY1" "8" "RSASHA256" "2048" +set_keysigning "KEY1" "yes" +set_zonesigning "KEY1" "yes" +key_clear "KEY2" +key_clear "KEY3" +key_clear "KEY4" +# The CSK (KEY1) starts in OMNIPRESENT. +set_keystate "KEY1" "GOAL" "omnipresent" +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DNSKEY" "omnipresent" +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_KRRSIG" "omnipresent" +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_ZRRSIG" "omnipresent" +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DS" "omnipresent" + +# Various signing policy checks. +check_keys +check_dnssecstatus "$SERVER" "$POLICY" "$ZONE" +# This key is immediately published and activated. +Lcsk=0 +IretCSK=0 +csk_rollover_predecessor_keytimes 0 +check_keytimes +check_apex +check_subdomain +dnssec_verify + +# Next key event is when the successor keys need to be published. +# Since the lifetime of the keys are unlimited, so default to loadkeys +# interval. +check_next_key_event 3600 + +# +# Testing going insecure. +# + +# +# Zone step1.going-insecure.kasp +# +set_zone "step1.going-insecure.kasp" +set_policy "unsigning" "2" "7200" +set_server "ns6" "10.53.0.6" + +# Policy parameters. +# Lksk: 0 +# Lzsk: 60 days (5184000 seconds) +# Iret(KSK): DS TTL (1d) + DprpP (1h) + retire-safety (1h) +# Iret(KSK): 1d2h (93600 seconds) +# Iret(ZSK): RRSIG TTL (1d) + Dprp (5m) + Dsgn (9d) + retire-safety (1h) +# Iret(ZSK): 10d1h5m (867900 seconds) +Lksk=0 +Lzsk=5184000 +IretKSK=93600 +IretZSK=867900 + +init_migration_insecure() { + key_clear "KEY1" + set_keyrole "KEY1" "ksk" + set_keylifetime "KEY1" "${Lksk}" + set_keyalgorithm "KEY1" "$DEFAULT_ALGORITHM_NUMBER" "$DEFAULT_ALGORITHM" "$DEFAULT_BITS" + set_keysigning "KEY1" "yes" + set_zonesigning "KEY1" "no" + + set_keystate "KEY1" "GOAL" "omnipresent" + set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DNSKEY" "omnipresent" + set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_KRRSIG" "omnipresent" + set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DS" "omnipresent" + + key_clear "KEY2" + set_keyrole "KEY2" "zsk" + set_keylifetime "KEY2" "${Lzsk}" + set_keyalgorithm "KEY2" "$DEFAULT_ALGORITHM_NUMBER" "$DEFAULT_ALGORITHM" "$DEFAULT_BITS" + set_keysigning "KEY2" "no" + set_zonesigning "KEY2" "yes" + + set_keystate "KEY2" "GOAL" "omnipresent" + set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_DNSKEY" "omnipresent" + set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_ZRRSIG" "omnipresent" + + key_clear "KEY3" + key_clear "KEY4" +} +init_migration_insecure + +# Various signing policy checks. +check_keys +check_dnssecstatus "$SERVER" "$POLICY" "$ZONE" + +# We have set the timing metadata to now - 10 days (864000 seconds). +rollover_predecessor_keytimes -864000 +check_keytimes +check_apex +check_subdomain +dnssec_verify + +# +# Zone step1.going-insecure-dynamic.kasp +# + +set_zone "step1.going-insecure-dynamic.kasp" +set_dynamic +set_policy "unsigning" "2" "7200" +set_server "ns6" "10.53.0.6" +init_migration_insecure + +# Various signing policy checks. +check_keys +check_dnssecstatus "$SERVER" "$POLICY" "$ZONE" + +# We have set the timing metadata to now - 10 days (864000 seconds). +rollover_predecessor_keytimes -864000 +check_keytimes +check_apex +check_subdomain +dnssec_verify + +# +# Zone step1.going-straight-to-none.kasp +# +set_zone "step1.going-straight-to-none.kasp" +set_policy "default" "1" "3600" +set_server "ns6" "10.53.0.6" +# Key properties. +set_keyrole "KEY1" "csk" +set_keylifetime "KEY1" "0" +set_keyalgorithm "KEY1" "13" "ECDSAP256SHA256" "256" +set_keysigning "KEY1" "yes" +set_zonesigning "KEY1" "yes" +# DNSKEY, RRSIG (ksk), RRSIG (zsk) are published. DS needs to wait. +set_keystate "KEY1" "GOAL" "omnipresent" +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DNSKEY" "omnipresent" +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_KRRSIG" "omnipresent" +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_ZRRSIG" "omnipresent" +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DS" "omnipresent" +# This policy only has one key. +key_clear "KEY2" +key_clear "KEY3" +key_clear "KEY4" + +check_keys +check_dnssecstatus "$SERVER" "$POLICY" "$ZONE" + +# The first key is immediately published and activated. +created=$(key_get KEY1 CREATED) +set_keytime "KEY1" "PUBLISHED" "${created}" +set_keytime "KEY1" "ACTIVE" "${created}" +set_keytime "KEY1" "SYNCPUBLISH" "${created}" +# Key lifetime is unlimited, so not setting RETIRED and REMOVED. +check_keytimes + +check_apex +check_subdomain +dnssec_verify + +# Reconfig dnssec-policy (triggering algorithm roll and other dnssec-policy +# changes). +echo_i "reconfig dnssec-policy to trigger algorithm rollover" +copy_setports ns6/named2.conf.in ns6/named.conf +rndc_reconfig ns6 10.53.0.6 + +# Calculate time passed to correctly check for next key events. +now="$(TZ=UTC date +%s)" +time_passed=$((now-start_time)) +echo_i "${time_passed} seconds passed between start of tests and reconfig" + +# Wait until we have seen "zone_rekey done:" message for this key. +_wait_for_done_signing() { + _zone=$1 + + _ksk=$(key_get $2 KSK) + _zsk=$(key_get $2 ZSK) + if [ "$_ksk" = "yes" ]; then + _role="KSK" + _expect_type=EXPECT_KRRSIG + elif [ "$_zsk" = "yes" ]; then + _role="ZSK" + _expect_type=EXPECT_ZRRSIG + fi + + if [ "$(key_get ${2} $_expect_type)" = "yes" ] && [ "$(key_get $2 $_role)" = "yes" ]; then + _keyid=$(key_get $2 ID) + _keyalg=$(key_get $2 ALG_STR) + echo_i "wait for zone ${_zone} is done signing with $2 ${_zone}/${_keyalg}/${_keyid}" + grep "zone_rekey done: key ${_keyid}/${_keyalg}" "${DIR}/named.run" > /dev/null || return 1 + fi + + return 0 +} + +wait_for_done_signing() { + n=$((n+1)) + echo_i "wait for zone ${ZONE} is done signing ($n)" + ret=0 + + retry_quiet 30 _wait_for_done_signing ${ZONE} KEY1 || ret=1 + retry_quiet 30 _wait_for_done_signing ${ZONE} KEY2 || ret=1 + retry_quiet 30 _wait_for_done_signing ${ZONE} KEY3 || ret=1 + retry_quiet 30 _wait_for_done_signing ${ZONE} KEY4 || ret=1 + + test "$ret" -eq 0 || echo_i "failed" + status=$((status+ret)) +} + +# Test dynamic zones that switch to inline-signing. +set_zone "dynamic2inline.kasp" +set_policy "default" "1" "3600" +set_server "ns6" "10.53.0.6" +# Key properties. +key_clear "KEY1" +set_keyrole "KEY1" "csk" +set_keylifetime "KEY1" "0" +set_keyalgorithm "KEY1" "13" "ECDSAP256SHA256" "256" +set_keysigning "KEY1" "yes" +set_zonesigning "KEY1" "yes" +key_clear "KEY2" +key_clear "KEY3" +key_clear "KEY4" + +# The CSK is rumoured. +set_keystate "KEY1" "GOAL" "omnipresent" +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DNSKEY" "rumoured" +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_KRRSIG" "rumoured" +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_ZRRSIG" "rumoured" +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DS" "hidden" +# Various signing policy checks. +check_keys +check_dnssecstatus "$SERVER" "$POLICY" "$ZONE" +check_apex +check_subdomain +dnssec_verify + +# +# Testing going insecure. +# + +# +# Zone: step1.going-insecure.kasp +# +set_zone "step1.going-insecure.kasp" +set_policy "insecure" "2" "7200" +set_server "ns6" "10.53.0.6" +# Expect a CDS/CDNSKEY Delete Record. +set_cdsdelete + +# Key goal states should be HIDDEN. +init_migration_insecure +set_keystate "KEY1" "GOAL" "hidden" +set_keystate "KEY2" "GOAL" "hidden" +# The DS may be removed if we are going insecure. +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DS" "unretentive" + +# Various signing policy checks. +check_keys +wait_for_done_signing +check_dnssecstatus "$SERVER" "$POLICY" "$ZONE" +check_apex +check_subdomain +dnssec_verify + +# Tell named that the DS has been removed. +rndc_checkds "$SERVER" "$DIR" "KEY1" "now" "withdrawn" "$ZONE" +wait_for_done_signing +check_dnssecstatus "$SERVER" "$POLICY" "$ZONE" +check_apex +check_subdomain +dnssec_verify + +# Next key event is when the DS becomes HIDDEN. This happens after the +# parent propagation delay, retire safety delay, and DS TTL: +# 1h + 1h + 1d = 26h = 93600 seconds. +check_next_key_event 93600 + +# +# Zone: step2.going-insecure.kasp +# +set_zone "step2.going-insecure.kasp" +set_policy "insecure" "2" "7200" +set_server "ns6" "10.53.0.6" + +# The DS is long enough removed from the zone to be considered HIDDEN. +# This means the DNSKEY and the KSK signatures can be removed. +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DS" "hidden" +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DNSKEY" "unretentive" +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_KRRSIG" "unretentive" +set_keysigning "KEY1" "no" + +set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_DNSKEY" "unretentive" +set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_ZRRSIG" "unretentive" +set_zonesigning "KEY2" "no" + +# Various signing policy checks. +check_keys +check_dnssecstatus "$SERVER" "$POLICY" "$ZONE" +check_apex +check_subdomain + +# Next key event is when the DNSKEY becomes HIDDEN. This happens after the +# propagation delay, plus DNSKEY TTL: +# 5m + 2h = 125m = 7500 seconds. +check_next_key_event 7500 + +# +# Zone: step1.going-insecure-dynamic.kasp +# +set_zone "step1.going-insecure-dynamic.kasp" +set_dynamic +set_policy "insecure" "2" "7200" +set_server "ns6" "10.53.0.6" +# Expect a CDS/CDNSKEY Delete Record. +set_cdsdelete + +# Key goal states should be HIDDEN. +init_migration_insecure +set_keystate "KEY1" "GOAL" "hidden" +set_keystate "KEY2" "GOAL" "hidden" +# The DS may be removed if we are going insecure. +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DS" "unretentive" + +# Various signing policy checks. +check_keys +wait_for_done_signing +check_dnssecstatus "$SERVER" "$POLICY" "$ZONE" +check_apex +check_subdomain +dnssec_verify + +# Tell named that the DS has been removed. +rndc_checkds "$SERVER" "$DIR" "KEY1" "now" "withdrawn" "$ZONE" +wait_for_done_signing +check_dnssecstatus "$SERVER" "$POLICY" "$ZONE" +check_apex +check_subdomain +dnssec_verify + +# Next key event is when the DS becomes HIDDEN. This happens after the +# parent propagation delay, retire safety delay, and DS TTL: +# 1h + 1h + 1d = 26h = 93600 seconds. +check_next_key_event 93600 + +# +# Zone: step2.going-insecure-dynamic.kasp +# +set_zone "step2.going-insecure-dynamic.kasp" +set_dynamic +set_policy "insecure" "2" "7200" +set_server "ns6" "10.53.0.6" + +# The DS is long enough removed from the zone to be considered HIDDEN. +# This means the DNSKEY and the KSK signatures can be removed. +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DS" "hidden" +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DNSKEY" "unretentive" +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_KRRSIG" "unretentive" +set_keysigning "KEY1" "no" + +set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_DNSKEY" "unretentive" +set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_ZRRSIG" "unretentive" +set_zonesigning "KEY2" "no" + +# Various signing policy checks. +check_keys +check_dnssecstatus "$SERVER" "$POLICY" "$ZONE" +check_apex +check_subdomain + +# Next key event is when the DNSKEY becomes HIDDEN. This happens after the +# propagation delay, plus DNSKEY TTL: +# 5m + 2h = 125m = 7500 seconds. +check_next_key_event 7500 + +# +# Zone: step1.going-straight-to-none.kasp +# +set_zone "step1.going-straight-to-none.kasp" +set_policy "none" "1" "3600" +set_server "ns6" "10.53.0.6" + +# The zone will go bogus after signatures expire, but remains validly signed for now. + +# Key properties. +set_keyrole "KEY1" "csk" +set_keylifetime "KEY1" "0" +set_keyalgorithm "KEY1" "13" "ECDSAP256SHA256" "256" +set_keysigning "KEY1" "yes" +set_zonesigning "KEY1" "yes" +# DNSKEY, RRSIG (ksk), RRSIG (zsk) are published. DS needs to wait. +set_keystate "KEY1" "GOAL" "omnipresent" +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DNSKEY" "omnipresent" +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_KRRSIG" "omnipresent" +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_ZRRSIG" "omnipresent" +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DS" "omnipresent" +# This policy only has one key. +key_clear "KEY2" +key_clear "KEY3" +key_clear "KEY4" + +# Various signing policy checks. +check_keys +check_dnssecstatus "$SERVER" "$POLICY" "$ZONE" +dnssec_verify + +# +# Testing KSK/ZSK algorithm rollover. +# + +# Policy parameters. +# Lksk: unlimited +# Lzsk: unlimited +Lksk=0 +Lzsk=0 + +# +# Zone: step1.algorithm-roll.kasp +# +set_zone "step1.algorithm-roll.kasp" +set_policy "ecdsa256" "4" "3600" +set_server "ns6" "10.53.0.6" +# Old RSASHA1 keys. +key_clear "KEY1" +set_keyrole "KEY1" "ksk" +set_keylifetime "KEY1" "0" +set_keyalgorithm "KEY1" "8" "RSASHA256" "2048" +set_keysigning "KEY1" "yes" +set_zonesigning "KEY1" "no" + +key_clear "KEY2" +set_keyrole "KEY2" "zsk" +set_keylifetime "KEY2" "0" +set_keyalgorithm "KEY2" "8" "RSASHA256" "2048" +set_keysigning "KEY2" "no" +set_zonesigning "KEY2" "yes" +# New ECDSAP256SHA256 keys. +key_clear "KEY3" +set_keyrole "KEY3" "ksk" +set_keylifetime "KEY3" "0" +set_keyalgorithm "KEY3" "13" "ECDSAP256SHA256" "256" +set_keysigning "KEY3" "yes" +set_zonesigning "KEY3" "no" + +key_clear "KEY4" +set_keyrole "KEY4" "zsk" +set_keylifetime "KEY4" "0" +set_keyalgorithm "KEY4" "13" "ECDSAP256SHA256" "256" +set_keysigning "KEY4" "no" +set_zonesigning "KEY4" "yes" +# The RSAHSHA1 keys are outroducing. +set_keystate "KEY1" "GOAL" "hidden" +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DNSKEY" "omnipresent" +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_KRRSIG" "omnipresent" +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DS" "omnipresent" +set_keystate "KEY2" "GOAL" "hidden" +set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_DNSKEY" "omnipresent" +set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_ZRRSIG" "omnipresent" +# The ECDSAP256SHA256 keys are introducing. +set_keystate "KEY3" "GOAL" "omnipresent" +set_keystate "KEY3" "STATE_DNSKEY" "rumoured" +set_keystate "KEY3" "STATE_KRRSIG" "rumoured" +set_keystate "KEY3" "STATE_DS" "hidden" +set_keystate "KEY4" "GOAL" "omnipresent" +set_keystate "KEY4" "STATE_DNSKEY" "rumoured" +set_keystate "KEY4" "STATE_ZRRSIG" "rumoured" + +# Various signing policy checks. +check_keys +wait_for_done_signing +check_dnssecstatus "$SERVER" "$POLICY" "$ZONE" + +# Set expected key times: +# - The old keys are published and activated. +rollover_predecessor_keytimes 0 +# - KSK must be retired since it no longer matches the policy. +keyfile=$(key_get KEY1 BASEFILE) +grep "; Inactive:" "${keyfile}.key" > retired.test${n}.ksk +retired=$(awk '{print $3}' < retired.test${n}.ksk) +set_keytime "KEY1" "RETIRED" "${retired}" +# - The key is removed after the retire interval: +# IretKSK = TTLds + DprpP + retire-safety +# TTLds: 2h (7200 seconds) +# DprpP: 1h (3600 seconds) +# retire-safety: 2h (7200 seconds) +# IretKSK: 5h (18000 seconds) +IretKSK=18000 +set_addkeytime "KEY1" "REMOVED" "${retired}" "${IretKSK}" +# - ZSK must be retired since it no longer matches the policy. +keyfile=$(key_get KEY2 BASEFILE) +grep "; Inactive:" "${keyfile}.key" > retired.test${n}.zsk +retired=$(awk '{print $3}' < retired.test${n}.zsk) +set_keytime "KEY2" "RETIRED" "${retired}" +# - The key is removed after the retire interval: +# IretZSK = TTLsig + Dprp + Dsgn + retire-safety +# TTLsig: 6h (21600 seconds) +# Dprp: 1h (3600 seconds) +# Dsgn: 25d (2160000 seconds) +# retire-safety: 2h (7200 seconds) +# IretZSK: 25d9h (2192400 seconds) +IretZSK=2192400 +set_addkeytime "KEY2" "REMOVED" "${retired}" "${IretZSK}" +# - The new KSK is published and activated. +created=$(key_get KEY3 CREATED) +set_keytime "KEY3" "PUBLISHED" "${created}" +set_keytime "KEY3" "ACTIVE" "${created}" +# - It takes TTLsig + Dprp + publish-safety hours to propagate the zone. +# TTLsig: 6h (39600 seconds) +# Dprp: 1h (3600 seconds) +# publish-safety: 1h (3600 seconds) +# Ipub: 8h (28800 seconds) +Ipub=28800 +set_addkeytime "KEY3" "SYNCPUBLISH" "${created}" "${Ipub}" +# - The new ZSK is published and activated. +created=$(key_get KEY4 CREATED) +set_keytime "KEY4" "PUBLISHED" "${created}" +set_keytime "KEY4" "ACTIVE" "${created}" + +# Continue signing policy checks. +check_keytimes +check_apex +check_subdomain +dnssec_verify + +# Next key event is when the ecdsa256 keys have been propagated. +# This is the DNSKEY TTL plus publish safety plus zone propagation delay: +# 3 times an hour: 10800 seconds. +check_next_key_event 10800 + +# +# Zone: step2.algorithm-roll.kasp +# +set_zone "step2.algorithm-roll.kasp" +set_policy "ecdsa256" "4" "3600" +set_server "ns6" "10.53.0.6" +# The RSAHSHA1 keys are outroducing, but need to stay present until the new +# algorithm chain of trust has been established. Thus the properties, timings +# and states of the KEY1 and KEY2 are the same as above. + +# The ECDSAP256SHA256 keys are introducing. The DNSKEY RRset is omnipresent, +# but the zone signatures are not. +set_keystate "KEY3" "STATE_DNSKEY" "omnipresent" +set_keystate "KEY3" "STATE_KRRSIG" "omnipresent" +set_keystate "KEY4" "STATE_DNSKEY" "omnipresent" + +# Various signing policy checks. +check_keys +wait_for_done_signing +check_dnssecstatus "$SERVER" "$POLICY" "$ZONE" + +# Set expected key times: +# - The old keys were activated three hours ago (10800 seconds). +rollover_predecessor_keytimes -10800 +# - KSK must be retired since it no longer matches the policy. +created=$(key_get KEY1 CREATED) +set_keytime "KEY1" "RETIRED" "${created}" +set_addkeytime "KEY1" "REMOVED" "${created}" "${IretKSK}" +# - ZSK must be retired since it no longer matches the policy. +created=$(key_get KEY2 CREATED) +set_keytime "KEY2" "RETIRED" "${created}" +set_addkeytime "KEY2" "REMOVED" "${created}" "${IretZSK}" +# - The new keys are published 3 hours ago. +created=$(key_get KEY3 CREATED) +set_addkeytime "KEY3" "PUBLISHED" "${created}" -10800 +set_addkeytime "KEY3" "ACTIVE" "${created}" -10800 +published=$(key_get KEY3 PUBLISHED) +set_addkeytime "KEY3" "SYNCPUBLISH" "${published}" "${Ipub}" + +created=$(key_get KEY4 CREATED) +set_addkeytime "KEY4" "PUBLISHED" "${created}" -10800 +set_addkeytime "KEY4" "ACTIVE" "${created}" -10800 + +# Continue signing policy checks. +check_keytimes +check_apex +check_subdomain +dnssec_verify + +# Next key event is when all zone signatures are signed with the new +# algorithm. This is the max-zone-ttl plus zone propagation delay +# plus retire safety: 6h + 1h + 2h. But three hours have already passed +# (the time it took to make the DNSKEY omnipresent), so the next event +# should be scheduled in 6 hour: 21600 seconds. Prevent intermittent +# false positives on slow platforms by subtracting the number of seconds +# which passed between key creation and invoking 'rndc reconfig'. +next_time=$((21600-time_passed)) +check_next_key_event $next_time + +# +# Zone: step3.algorithm-roll.kasp +# +set_zone "step3.algorithm-roll.kasp" +set_policy "ecdsa256" "4" "3600" +set_server "ns6" "10.53.0.6" +# The ECDSAP256SHA256 keys are introducing. +set_keystate "KEY4" "STATE_ZRRSIG" "omnipresent" +# The DS can be swapped. +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DS" "unretentive" +set_keystate "KEY3" "STATE_DS" "rumoured" + +# Various signing policy checks. +check_keys +wait_for_done_signing +check_dnssecstatus "$SERVER" "$POLICY" "$ZONE" +# Check that CDS publication is logged. +check_cdslog "$DIR" "$ZONE" KEY3 + +# Set expected key times: +# - The old keys were activated 9 hours ago (32400 seconds). +rollover_predecessor_keytimes -32400 +# - And retired 6 hours ago (21600 seconds). +created=$(key_get KEY1 CREATED) +set_addkeytime "KEY1" "RETIRED" "${created}" -21600 +retired=$(key_get KEY1 RETIRED) +set_addkeytime "KEY1" "REMOVED" "${retired}" "${IretKSK}" + +created=$(key_get KEY2 CREATED) +set_addkeytime "KEY2" "RETIRED" "${created}" -21600 +retired=$(key_get KEY2 RETIRED) +set_addkeytime "KEY2" "REMOVED" "${retired}" "${IretZSK}" +# - The new keys are published 9 hours ago. +created=$(key_get KEY3 CREATED) +set_addkeytime "KEY3" "PUBLISHED" "${created}" -32400 +set_addkeytime "KEY3" "ACTIVE" "${created}" -32400 +published=$(key_get KEY3 PUBLISHED) +set_addkeytime "KEY3" "SYNCPUBLISH" "${published}" ${Ipub} + +created=$(key_get KEY4 CREATED) +set_addkeytime "KEY4" "PUBLISHED" "${created}" -32400 +set_addkeytime "KEY4" "ACTIVE" "${created}" -32400 + +# Continue signing policy checks. +check_keytimes +check_apex +check_subdomain +dnssec_verify + +# Tell named we "saw" the parent swap the DS and see if the next key event is +# scheduled at the correct time. +rndc_checkds "$SERVER" "$DIR" KEY1 "now" "withdrawn" "$ZONE" +rndc_checkds "$SERVER" "$DIR" KEY3 "now" "published" "$ZONE" +# Next key event is when the DS becomes OMNIPRESENT. This happens after the +# parent propagation delay, retire safety delay, and DS TTL: +# 1h + 2h + 2h = 5h = 18000 seconds. +check_next_key_event 18000 + +# +# Zone: step4.algorithm-roll.kasp +# +set_zone "step4.algorithm-roll.kasp" +set_policy "ecdsa256" "4" "3600" +set_server "ns6" "10.53.0.6" +# The old DS is HIDDEN, we can remove the old algorithm DNSKEY/RRSIG records. +set_keysigning "KEY1" "no" +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DNSKEY" "unretentive" +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_KRRSIG" "unretentive" +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DS" "hidden" + +set_zonesigning "KEY2" "no" +set_keystate "KEY2" "GOAL" "hidden" +set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_DNSKEY" "unretentive" +set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_ZRRSIG" "unretentive" +# The ECDSAP256SHA256 DS is now OMNIPRESENT. +set_keystate "KEY3" "STATE_DS" "omnipresent" + +# Various signing policy checks. +check_keys +wait_for_done_signing +check_dnssecstatus "$SERVER" "$POLICY" "$ZONE" + +# Set expected key times: +# - The old keys were activated 38 hours ago (136800 seconds). +rollover_predecessor_keytimes -136800 +# - And retired 35 hours ago (126000 seconds). +created=$(key_get KEY1 CREATED) +set_addkeytime "KEY1" "RETIRED" "${created}" -126000 +retired=$(key_get KEY1 RETIRED) +set_addkeytime "KEY1" "REMOVED" "${retired}" "${IretKSK}" + +created=$(key_get KEY2 CREATED) +set_addkeytime "KEY2" "RETIRED" "${created}" -126000 +retired=$(key_get KEY2 RETIRED) +set_addkeytime "KEY2" "REMOVED" "${retired}" "${IretZSK}" + +# - The new keys are published 38 hours ago. +created=$(key_get KEY3 CREATED) +set_addkeytime "KEY3" "PUBLISHED" "${created}" -136800 +set_addkeytime "KEY3" "ACTIVE" "${created}" -136800 +published=$(key_get KEY3 PUBLISHED) +set_addkeytime "KEY3" "SYNCPUBLISH" "${published}" ${Ipub} + +created=$(key_get KEY4 CREATED) +set_addkeytime "KEY4" "PUBLISHED" "${created}" -136800 +set_addkeytime "KEY4" "ACTIVE" "${created}" -136800 + +# Continue signing policy checks. +check_keytimes +check_apex +check_subdomain +dnssec_verify + +# Next key event is when the old DNSKEY becomes HIDDEN. This happens after the +# DNSKEY TTL plus zone propagation delay (2h). +check_next_key_event 7200 + +# +# Zone: step5.algorithm-roll.kasp +# +set_zone "step5.algorithm-roll.kasp" +set_policy "ecdsa256" "4" "3600" +set_server "ns6" "10.53.0.6" +# The DNSKEY becomes HIDDEN. +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DNSKEY" "hidden" +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_KRRSIG" "hidden" +set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_DNSKEY" "hidden" + +# Various signing policy checks. +check_keys +wait_for_done_signing +check_dnssecstatus "$SERVER" "$POLICY" "$ZONE" + +# Set expected key times: +# - The old keys were activated 40 hours ago (144000 seconds) +rollover_predecessor_keytimes -144000 +# - And retired 37 hours ago (133200 seconds). +created=$(key_get KEY1 CREATED) +set_addkeytime "KEY1" "RETIRED" "${created}" -133200 +retired=$(key_get KEY1 RETIRED) +set_addkeytime "KEY1" "REMOVED" "${retired}" "${IretKSK}" + +created=$(key_get KEY2 CREATED) +set_addkeytime "KEY2" "RETIRED" "${created}" -133200 +retired=$(key_get KEY2 RETIRED) +set_addkeytime "KEY2" "REMOVED" "${retired}" "${IretZSK}" + +# The new keys are published 40 hours ago. +created=$(key_get KEY3 CREATED) +set_addkeytime "KEY3" "PUBLISHED" "${created}" -144000 +set_addkeytime "KEY3" "ACTIVE" "${created}" -144000 +published=$(key_get KEY3 PUBLISHED) +set_addkeytime "KEY3" "SYNCPUBLISH" "${published}" ${Ipub} + +created=$(key_get KEY4 CREATED) +set_addkeytime "KEY4" "PUBLISHED" "${created}" -144000 +set_addkeytime "KEY4" "ACTIVE" "${created}" -144000 + +# Continue signing policy checks. +check_keytimes +check_apex +check_subdomain +dnssec_verify + +# Next key event is when the RSASHA1 signatures become HIDDEN. This happens +# after the max-zone-ttl plus zone propagation delay plus retire safety +# (6h + 1h + 2h) minus the time already passed since the UNRETENTIVE state has +# been reached (2h): 9h - 2h = 7h = 25200 seconds. Prevent intermittent +# false positives on slow platforms by subtracting the number of seconds +# which passed between key creation and invoking 'rndc reconfig'. +next_time=$((25200-time_passed)) +check_next_key_event $next_time + +# +# Zone: step6.algorithm-roll.kasp +# +set_zone "step6.algorithm-roll.kasp" +set_policy "ecdsa256" "4" "3600" +set_server "ns6" "10.53.0.6" +# The old zone signatures (KEY2) should now also be HIDDEN. +set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_ZRRSIG" "hidden" + +# Various signing policy checks. +check_keys +wait_for_done_signing +check_dnssecstatus "$SERVER" "$POLICY" "$ZONE" + +# Set expected key times: +# - The old keys were activated 47 hours ago (169200 seconds) +rollover_predecessor_keytimes -169200 +# - And retired 44 hours ago (158400 seconds). +created=$(key_get KEY1 CREATED) +set_addkeytime "KEY1" "RETIRED" "${created}" -158400 +retired=$(key_get KEY1 RETIRED) +set_addkeytime "KEY1" "REMOVED" "${retired}" "${IretKSK}" + +created=$(key_get KEY2 CREATED) +set_addkeytime "KEY2" "RETIRED" "${created}" -158400 +retired=$(key_get KEY2 RETIRED) +set_addkeytime "KEY2" "REMOVED" "${retired}" "${IretZSK}" + +# The new keys are published 47 hours ago. +created=$(key_get KEY3 CREATED) +set_addkeytime "KEY3" "PUBLISHED" "${created}" -169200 +set_addkeytime "KEY3" "ACTIVE" "${created}" -169200 +published=$(key_get KEY3 PUBLISHED) +set_addkeytime "KEY3" "SYNCPUBLISH" "${published}" ${Ipub} + +created=$(key_get KEY4 CREATED) +set_addkeytime "KEY4" "PUBLISHED" "${created}" -169200 +set_addkeytime "KEY4" "ACTIVE" "${created}" -169200 + +# Continue signing policy checks. +check_keytimes +check_apex +check_subdomain +dnssec_verify + +# Next key event is never since we established the policy and the keys have +# an unlimited lifetime. Fallback to the default loadkeys interval. +check_next_key_event 3600 + +# +# Testing CSK algorithm rollover. +# + +# Policy parameters. +# Lcsk: unlimited +Lcksk=0 + +# +# Zone: step1.csk-algorithm-roll.kasp +# +set_zone "step1.csk-algorithm-roll.kasp" +set_policy "csk-algoroll" "2" "3600" +set_server "ns6" "10.53.0.6" +# Old RSASHA1 key. +key_clear "KEY1" +set_keyrole "KEY1" "csk" +set_keylifetime "KEY1" "0" +set_keyalgorithm "KEY1" "8" "RSASHA256" "2048" +set_keysigning "KEY1" "yes" +set_zonesigning "KEY1" "yes" +# New ECDSAP256SHA256 key. +key_clear "KEY2" +set_keyrole "KEY2" "csk" +set_keylifetime "KEY2" "0" +set_keyalgorithm "KEY2" "$DEFAULT_ALGORITHM_NUMBER" "$DEFAULT_ALGORITHM" "$DEFAULT_BITS" +set_keysigning "KEY2" "yes" +set_zonesigning "KEY2" "yes" +key_clear "KEY3" +key_clear "KEY4" +# The RSAHSHA1 key is outroducing. +set_keystate "KEY1" "GOAL" "hidden" +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DNSKEY" "omnipresent" +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_KRRSIG" "omnipresent" +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_ZRRSIG" "omnipresent" +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DS" "omnipresent" +# The ECDSAP256SHA256 key is introducing. +set_keystate "KEY2" "GOAL" "omnipresent" +set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_DNSKEY" "rumoured" +set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_KRRSIG" "rumoured" +set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_ZRRSIG" "rumoured" +set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_DS" "hidden" + +# Various signing policy checks. +check_keys +wait_for_done_signing +check_dnssecstatus "$SERVER" "$POLICY" "$ZONE" + +# Set expected key times: +# - CSK must be retired since it no longer matches the policy. +csk_rollover_predecessor_keytimes 0 +keyfile=$(key_get KEY1 BASEFILE) +grep "; Inactive:" "${keyfile}.key" > retired.test${n}.ksk +retired=$(awk '{print $3}' < retired.test${n}.ksk) +set_keytime "KEY1" "RETIRED" "${retired}" +# - The key is removed after the retire interval: +# IretZSK = TTLsig + Dprp + Dsgn + retire-safety +# TTLsig: 6h (21600 seconds) +# Dprp: 1h (3600 seconds) +# Dsgn: 25d (2160000 seconds) +# retire-safety: 2h (7200 seconds) +# IretZSK: 25d9h (2192400 seconds) +IretCSK=2192400 +set_addkeytime "KEY1" "REMOVED" "${retired}" "${IretCSK}" +# - The new CSK is published and activated. +created=$(key_get KEY2 CREATED) +set_keytime "KEY2" "PUBLISHED" "${created}" +set_keytime "KEY2" "ACTIVE" "${created}" +# - It takes TTLsig + Dprp + publish-safety hours to propagate the zone. +# TTLsig: 6h (39600 seconds) +# Dprp: 1h (3600 seconds) +# publish-safety: 1h (3600 seconds) +# Ipub: 8h (28800 seconds) +Ipub=28800 +set_addkeytime "KEY2" "SYNCPUBLISH" "${created}" "${Ipub}" + +# Continue signing policy checks. +check_keytimes +check_apex +check_subdomain +dnssec_verify + +# Next key event is when the new key has been propagated. +# This is the DNSKEY TTL plus publish safety plus zone propagation delay: +# 3 times an hour: 10800 seconds. +check_next_key_event 10800 + +# +# Zone: step2.csk-algorithm-roll.kasp +# +set_zone "step2.csk-algorithm-roll.kasp" +set_policy "csk-algoroll" "2" "3600" +set_server "ns6" "10.53.0.6" +# The RSAHSHA1 key is outroducing, but need to stay present until the new +# algorithm chain of trust has been established. Thus the properties, timings +# and states of KEY1 is the same as above. +# +# The ECDSAP256SHA256 keys are introducing. The DNSKEY RRset is omnipresent, +# but the zone signatures are not. +set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_DNSKEY" "omnipresent" +set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_KRRSIG" "omnipresent" + +# Various signing policy checks. +check_keys +wait_for_done_signing +check_dnssecstatus "$SERVER" "$POLICY" "$ZONE" + +# Set expected key times: +# - The old key was activated three hours ago (10800 seconds). +csk_rollover_predecessor_keytimes -10800 +# - CSK must be retired since it no longer matches the policy. +created=$(key_get KEY1 CREATED) +set_keytime "KEY1" "RETIRED" "${created}" +set_addkeytime "KEY1" "REMOVED" "${created}" "${IretCSK}" +# - The new key was published 3 hours ago. +created=$(key_get KEY2 CREATED) +set_addkeytime "KEY2" "PUBLISHED" "${created}" -10800 +set_addkeytime "KEY2" "ACTIVE" "${created}" -10800 +published=$(key_get KEY2 PUBLISHED) +set_addkeytime "KEY2" "SYNCPUBLISH" "${published}" "${Ipub}" + +# Continue signing policy checks. +check_keytimes +check_apex +check_subdomain +dnssec_verify + +# Next key event is when all zone signatures are signed with the new +# algorithm. This is the max-zone-ttl plus zone propagation delay +# plus retire safety: 6h + 1h + 2h. But three hours have already passed +# (the time it took to make the DNSKEY omnipresent), so the next event +# should be scheduled in 6 hour: 21600 seconds. Prevent intermittent +# false positives on slow platforms by subtracting the number of seconds +# which passed between key creation and invoking 'rndc reconfig'. +next_time=$((21600-time_passed)) +check_next_key_event $next_time + +# +# Zone: step3.csk-algorithm-roll.kasp +# +set_zone "step3.csk-algorithm-roll.kasp" +set_policy "csk-algoroll" "2" "3600" +set_server "ns6" "10.53.0.6" +# The RSAHSHA1 key is outroducing, and it is time to swap the DS. +# The ECDSAP256SHA256 key is introducing. The DNSKEY RRset and all signatures +# are now omnipresent, so the DS can be introduced. +set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_ZRRSIG" "omnipresent" +# The old DS (KEY1) can be withdrawn and the new DS (KEY2) can be introduced. +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DS" "unretentive" +set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_DS" "rumoured" + +# Various signing policy checks. +check_keys +wait_for_done_signing +check_dnssecstatus "$SERVER" "$POLICY" "$ZONE" +# Check that CDS publication is logged. +check_cdslog "$DIR" "$ZONE" KEY2 + +# Set expected key times: +# - The old key was activated 9 hours ago (32400 seconds). +csk_rollover_predecessor_keytimes -32400 +# - And was retired 6 hours ago (21600 seconds). +created=$(key_get KEY1 CREATED) +set_addkeytime "KEY1" "RETIRED" "${created}" -21600 +retired=$(key_get KEY1 RETIRED) +set_addkeytime "KEY1" "REMOVED" "${retired}" "${IretCSK}" +# - The new key was published 9 hours ago. +created=$(key_get KEY2 CREATED) +set_addkeytime "KEY2" "PUBLISHED" "${created}" -32400 +set_addkeytime "KEY2" "ACTIVE" "${created}" -32400 +published=$(key_get KEY2 PUBLISHED) +set_addkeytime "KEY2" "SYNCPUBLISH" "${published}" "${Ipub}" + +# Continue signing policy checks. +check_keytimes +check_apex +check_subdomain +dnssec_verify + +# We ignore any parent registration delay, so set the DS publish time to now. +rndc_checkds "$SERVER" "$DIR" KEY1 "now" "withdrawn" "$ZONE" +rndc_checkds "$SERVER" "$DIR" KEY2 "now" "published" "$ZONE" +# Next key event is when the DS becomes OMNIPRESENT. This happens after the +# parent propagation delay, retire safety delay, and DS TTL: +# 1h + 2h + 2h = 5h = 18000 seconds. +check_next_key_event 18000 + +# +# Zone: step4.csk-algorithm-roll.kasp +# +set_zone "step4.csk-algorithm-roll.kasp" +set_policy "csk-algoroll" "2" "3600" +set_server "ns6" "10.53.0.6" +# The old DS is HIDDEN, we can remove the old algorithm DNSKEY/RRSIG records. +set_keysigning "KEY1" "no" +set_zonesigning "KEY1" "no" +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DNSKEY" "unretentive" +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_KRRSIG" "unretentive" +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_ZRRSIG" "unretentive" +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DS" "hidden" +# The ECDSAP256SHA256 DS is now OMNIPRESENT. +set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_DS" "omnipresent" + +# Various signing policy checks. +check_keys +wait_for_done_signing +check_dnssecstatus "$SERVER" "$POLICY" "$ZONE" + +# Set expected key times: +# - The old key was activated 38 hours ago (136800 seconds) +csk_rollover_predecessor_keytimes -136800 +# - And retired 35 hours ago (126000 seconds). +created=$(key_get KEY1 CREATED) +set_addkeytime "KEY1" "RETIRED" "${created}" -126000 +retired=$(key_get KEY1 RETIRED) +set_addkeytime "KEY1" "REMOVED" "${retired}" "${IretCSK}" +# - The new key was published 38 hours ago. +created=$(key_get KEY2 CREATED) +set_addkeytime "KEY2" "PUBLISHED" "${created}" -136800 +set_addkeytime "KEY2" "ACTIVE" "${created}" -136800 +published=$(key_get KEY2 PUBLISHED) +set_addkeytime "KEY2" "SYNCPUBLISH" "${published}" ${Ipub} + +# Continue signing policy checks. +check_keytimes +check_apex +check_subdomain +dnssec_verify + +# Next key event is when the old DNSKEY becomes HIDDEN. This happens after the +# DNSKEY TTL plus zone propagation delay (2h). +check_next_key_event 7200 + +# +# Zone: step5.csk-algorithm-roll.kasp +# +set_zone "step5.csk-algorithm-roll.kasp" +set_policy "csk-algoroll" "2" "3600" +set_server "ns6" "10.53.0.6" +# The DNSKEY becomes HIDDEN. +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DNSKEY" "hidden" +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_KRRSIG" "hidden" + +# Various signing policy checks. +check_keys +wait_for_done_signing +check_dnssecstatus "$SERVER" "$POLICY" "$ZONE" + +# Set expected key times: +# - The old key was activated 40 hours ago (144000 seconds) +csk_rollover_predecessor_keytimes -144000 +# - And retired 37 hours ago (133200 seconds). +created=$(key_get KEY1 CREATED) +set_addkeytime "KEY1" "RETIRED" "${created}" -133200 +retired=$(key_get KEY1 RETIRED) +set_addkeytime "KEY1" "REMOVED" "${retired}" "${IretCSK}" +# - The new key was published 40 hours ago. +created=$(key_get KEY2 CREATED) +set_addkeytime "KEY2" "PUBLISHED" "${created}" -144000 +set_addkeytime "KEY2" "ACTIVE" "${created}" -144000 +published=$(key_get KEY2 PUBLISHED) +set_addkeytime "KEY2" "SYNCPUBLISH" "${published}" ${Ipub} + +# Continue signing policy checks. +check_keytimes +check_apex +check_subdomain +dnssec_verify + +# Next key event is when the RSASHA1 signatures become HIDDEN. This happens +# after the max-zone-ttl plus zone propagation delay plus retire safety +# (6h + 1h + 2h) minus the time already passed since the UNRETENTIVE state has +# been reached (2h): 9h - 2h = 7h = 25200 seconds. Prevent intermittent +# false positives on slow platforms by subtracting the number of seconds +# which passed between key creation and invoking 'rndc reconfig'. +next_time=$((25200-time_passed)) +check_next_key_event $next_time + +# +# Zone: step6.csk-algorithm-roll.kasp +# +set_zone "step6.csk-algorithm-roll.kasp" +set_policy "csk-algoroll" "2" "3600" +set_server "ns6" "10.53.0.6" +# The zone signatures should now also be HIDDEN. +set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_ZRRSIG" "hidden" + +# Various signing policy checks. +check_keys +wait_for_done_signing +check_dnssecstatus "$SERVER" "$POLICY" "$ZONE" + +# Set expected key times: +# - The old keys were activated 47 hours ago (169200 seconds) +csk_rollover_predecessor_keytimes -169200 +# - And retired 44 hours ago (158400 seconds). +created=$(key_get KEY1 CREATED) +set_addkeytime "KEY1" "RETIRED" "${created}" -158400 +retired=$(key_get KEY1 RETIRED) +set_addkeytime "KEY1" "REMOVED" "${retired}" "${IretCSK}" +# - The new key was published 47 hours ago. +created=$(key_get KEY2 CREATED) +set_addkeytime "KEY2" "PUBLISHED" "${created}" -169200 +set_addkeytime "KEY2" "ACTIVE" "${created}" -169200 +published=$(key_get KEY2 PUBLISHED) +set_addkeytime "KEY2" "SYNCPUBLISH" "${published}" ${Ipub} + +# Continue signing policy checks. +check_keytimes +check_apex +check_subdomain +dnssec_verify + +# Next key event is never since we established the policy and the keys have +# an unlimited lifetime. Fallback to the default loadkeys interval. +check_next_key_event 3600 + +_check_soa_ttl() { + dig_with_opts @10.53.0.6 example SOA > dig.out.ns6.test$n.soa2 || return 1 + soa1=$(awk '$4 == "SOA" { print $7 }' dig.out.ns6.test$n.soa1) + soa2=$(awk '$4 == "SOA" { print $7 }' dig.out.ns6.test$n.soa2) + ttl1=$(awk '$4 == "SOA" { print $2 }' dig.out.ns6.test$n.soa1) + ttl2=$(awk '$4 == "SOA" { print $2 }' dig.out.ns6.test$n.soa2) + test ${soa1:-1000} -lt ${soa2:-0} || return 1 + test ${ttl1:-0} -eq $1 || return 1 + test ${ttl2:-0} -eq $2 || return 1 +} + +n=$((n+1)) +echo_i "Check that 'rndc reload' of just the serial updates the signed instance ($n)" +TSIG= +ret=0 +dig_with_opts @10.53.0.6 example SOA > dig.out.ns6.test$n.soa1 || ret=1 +cp ns6/example2.db.in ns6/example.db || ret=1 +nextpart ns6/named.run > /dev/null +rndccmd 10.53.0.6 reload || ret=1 +wait_for_log 3 "all zones loaded" ns6/named.run +# Check that the SOA SERIAL increases and check the TTLs (should be 300 as +# defined in ns6/example2.db.in). +retry_quiet 10 _check_soa_ttl 300 300 || ret=1 +test "$ret" -eq 0 || echo_i "failed" +status=$((status+ret)) + +n=$((n+1)) +echo_i "Check that restart with zone changes and deleted journal works ($n)" +TSIG= +ret=0 +dig_with_opts @10.53.0.6 example SOA > dig.out.ns6.test$n.soa1 || ret=1 +stop_server --use-rndc --port ${CONTROLPORT} ns6 +# TTL of all records change from 300 to 400 +cp ns6/example3.db.in ns6/example.db || ret=1 +rm ns6/example.db.jnl +nextpart ns6/named.run > /dev/null +start_server --noclean --restart --port ${PORT} ns6 +wait_for_log 3 "all zones loaded" ns6/named.run +# Check that the SOA SERIAL increases and check the TTLs (should be changed +# from 300 to 400 as defined in ns6/example3.db.in). +retry_quiet 10 _check_soa_ttl 300 400 || ret=1 +test "$ret" -eq 0 || echo_i "failed" +status=$((status+ret)) + +echo_i "exit status: $status" +[ $status -eq 0 ] || exit 1 |