Adding upstream version 14.2.21.upstream/14.2.21upstream

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

1 files changed, 86 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/doc/ceph-volume/lvm/encryption.rst b/doc/ceph-volume/lvm/encryption.rst
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+.. _ceph-volume-lvm-encryption:
+
+Encryption
+==========
+
+Logical volumes can be encrypted using ``dmcrypt`` by specifying the
+``--dmcrypt`` flag when creating OSDs. Encryption can be done in different ways,
+specially with LVM. ``ceph-volume`` is somewhat opinionated with the way it
+sets up encryption with logical volumes so that the process is consistent and
+robust.
+
+In this case, ``ceph-volume lvm`` follows these constraints:
+
+* only LUKS (version 1) is used
+* Logical Volumes are encrypted, while their underlying PVs (physical volumes)
+  aren't
+* Non-LVM devices like partitions are also encrypted with the same OSD key
+
+
+LUKS
+----
+There are currently two versions of LUKS, 1 and 2. Version 2 is a bit easier
+to implement but not widely available in all distros Ceph supports. LUKS 1 is
+not going to be deprecated in favor of LUKS 2, so in order to have as wide
+support as possible, ``ceph-volume`` uses LUKS version 1.
+
+.. note:: Version 1 of LUKS is just referenced as "LUKS" whereas version 2 is
+          referred to as LUKS2
+
+
+LUKS on LVM
+-----------
+Encryption is done on top of existing logical volumes (unlike encrypting the
+physical device). Any single logical volume can be encrypted while other
+volumes can remain unencrypted. This method also allows for flexible logical
+volume setups, since encryption will happen once the LV is created.
+
+
+Workflow
+--------
+When setting up the OSD, a secret key will be created, that will be passed
+along to the monitor in JSON format as ``stdin`` to prevent the key from being
+captured in the logs.
+
+The JSON payload looks something like::
+
+        {
+            "cephx_secret": CEPHX_SECRET,
+            "dmcrypt_key": DMCRYPT_KEY,
+            "cephx_lockbox_secret": LOCKBOX_SECRET,
+        }
+
+The naming convention for the keys is **strict**, and they are named like that
+for the hardcoded (legacy) names ceph-disk used.
+
+* ``cephx_secret`` : The cephx key used to authenticate
+* ``dmcrypt_key`` : The secret (or private) key to unlock encrypted devices
+* ``cephx_lockbox_secret`` : The authentication key used to retrieve the
+  ``dmcrypt_key``. It is named *lockbox* because ceph-disk used to have an
+  unencrypted partition named after it, used to store public keys and other
+  OSD metadata.
+
+The naming convention is strict because Monitors supported the naming
+convention by ceph-disk, which used these key names. In order to keep
+compatibility and prevent ceph-disk from breaking, ceph-volume will use the same
+naming convention *although they don't make sense for the new encryption
+workflow*.
+
+After the common steps of setting up the OSD during the prepare stage, either
+with :term:`filestore` or :term:`bluestore`, the logical volume is left ready
+to be activated, regardless of the state of the device (encrypted or decrypted).
+
+At activation time, the logical volume will get decrypted and the OSD started
+once the process completes correctly.
+
+Summary of the encryption workflow for creating a new OSD:
+
+#. OSD is created, both lockbox and dmcrypt keys are created, and sent along
+   with JSON to the monitors, indicating an encrypted OSD.
+
+#. All complementary devices (like journal, db, or wal) get created and
+   encrypted with the same OSD key. Key is stored in the LVM metadata of the
+   OSD
+
+#. Activation continues by ensuring devices are mounted, retrieving the dmcrypt
+   secret key from the monitors and decrypting before the OSD gets started.