Adding upstream version 86.0.1.upstream/86.0.1upstream

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

1 files changed, 441 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/security/manager/ssl/ContentSignatureVerifier.cpp b/security/manager/ssl/ContentSignatureVerifier.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..fa076bdff9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/manager/ssl/ContentSignatureVerifier.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,441 @@
+/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
+/* vim: set ts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
+/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+
+#include "ContentSignatureVerifier.h"
+
+#include "BRNameMatchingPolicy.h"
+#include "CryptoTask.h"
+#include "CSTrustDomain.h"
+#include "ScopedNSSTypes.h"
+#include "SharedCertVerifier.h"
+#include "cryptohi.h"
+#include "keyhi.h"
+#include "mozilla/Base64.h"
+#include "mozilla/dom/Promise.h"
+#include "nsCOMPtr.h"
+#include "nsPromiseFlatString.h"
+#include "nsSecurityHeaderParser.h"
+#include "nsWhitespaceTokenizer.h"
+#include "mozpkix/pkix.h"
+#include "mozpkix/pkixtypes.h"
+#include "mozpkix/pkixutil.h"
+#include "secerr.h"
+#include "ssl.h"
+
+NS_IMPL_ISUPPORTS(ContentSignatureVerifier, nsIContentSignatureVerifier)
+
+using namespace mozilla;
+using namespace mozilla::pkix;
+using namespace mozilla::psm;
+using dom::Promise;
+
+static LazyLogModule gCSVerifierPRLog("ContentSignatureVerifier");
+#define CSVerifier_LOG(args) MOZ_LOG(gCSVerifierPRLog, LogLevel::Debug, args)
+
+// Content-Signature prefix
+const unsigned char kPREFIX[] = {'C', 'o', 'n', 't', 'e', 'n', 't',
+                                 '-', 'S', 'i', 'g', 'n', 'a', 't',
+                                 'u', 'r', 'e', ':', 0};
+
+class VerifyContentSignatureTask : public CryptoTask {
+ public:
+  VerifyContentSignatureTask(const nsACString& aData,
+                             const nsACString& aCSHeader,
+                             const nsACString& aCertChain,
+                             const nsACString& aHostname,
+                             RefPtr<Promise>& aPromise)
+      : mData(aData),
+        mCSHeader(aCSHeader),
+        mCertChain(aCertChain),
+        mHostname(aHostname),
+        mSignatureVerified(false),
+        mPromise(new nsMainThreadPtrHolder<Promise>(
+            "VerifyContentSignatureTask::mPromise", aPromise)) {}
+
+ private:
+  virtual nsresult CalculateResult() override;
+  virtual void CallCallback(nsresult rv) override;
+
+  nsCString mData;
+  nsCString mCSHeader;
+  nsCString mCertChain;
+  nsCString mHostname;
+  bool mSignatureVerified;
+  nsMainThreadPtrHandle<Promise> mPromise;
+};
+
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+ContentSignatureVerifier::AsyncVerifyContentSignature(
+    const nsACString& aData, const nsACString& aCSHeader,
+    const nsACString& aCertChain, const nsACString& aHostname, JSContext* aCx,
+    Promise** aPromise) {
+  NS_ENSURE_ARG_POINTER(aCx);
+
+  nsIGlobalObject* globalObject = xpc::CurrentNativeGlobal(aCx);
+  if (NS_WARN_IF(!globalObject)) {
+    return NS_ERROR_UNEXPECTED;
+  }
+
+  ErrorResult result;
+  RefPtr<Promise> promise = Promise::Create(globalObject, result);
+  if (NS_WARN_IF(result.Failed())) {
+    return result.StealNSResult();
+  }
+
+  RefPtr<VerifyContentSignatureTask> task(new VerifyContentSignatureTask(
+      aData, aCSHeader, aCertChain, aHostname, promise));
+  nsresult rv = task->Dispatch();
+  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+    return rv;
+  }
+
+  promise.forget(aPromise);
+  return NS_OK;
+}
+
+static nsresult VerifyContentSignatureInternal(
+    const nsACString& aData, const nsACString& aCSHeader,
+    const nsACString& aCertChain, const nsACString& aHostname,
+    /* out */
+    mozilla::Telemetry::LABELS_CONTENT_SIGNATURE_VERIFICATION_ERRORS&
+        aErrorLabel,
+    /* out */ nsACString& aCertFingerprint, /* out */ uint32_t& aErrorValue);
+static nsresult ParseContentSignatureHeader(
+    const nsACString& aContentSignatureHeader,
+    /* out */ nsCString& aSignature);
+
+nsresult VerifyContentSignatureTask::CalculateResult() {
+  // 3 is the default, non-specific, "something failed" error.
+  Telemetry::LABELS_CONTENT_SIGNATURE_VERIFICATION_ERRORS errorLabel =
+      Telemetry::LABELS_CONTENT_SIGNATURE_VERIFICATION_ERRORS::err3;
+  nsAutoCString certFingerprint;
+  uint32_t errorValue = 3;
+  nsresult rv =
+      VerifyContentSignatureInternal(mData, mCSHeader, mCertChain, mHostname,
+                                     errorLabel, certFingerprint, errorValue);
+  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+    CSVerifier_LOG(("CSVerifier: Signature verification failed"));
+    if (certFingerprint.Length() > 0) {
+      Telemetry::AccumulateCategoricalKeyed(certFingerprint, errorLabel);
+    }
+    Accumulate(Telemetry::CONTENT_SIGNATURE_VERIFICATION_STATUS, errorValue);
+    if (rv == NS_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE) {
+      return NS_OK;
+    }
+    return rv;
+  }
+
+  mSignatureVerified = true;
+  Accumulate(Telemetry::CONTENT_SIGNATURE_VERIFICATION_STATUS, 0);
+
+  return NS_OK;
+}
+
+void VerifyContentSignatureTask::CallCallback(nsresult rv) {
+  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+    mPromise->MaybeReject(rv);
+  } else {
+    mPromise->MaybeResolve(mSignatureVerified);
+  }
+}
+
+bool IsNewLine(char16_t c) { return c == '\n' || c == '\r'; }
+
+nsresult ReadChainIntoCertList(const nsACString& aCertChain,
+                               nsTArray<nsTArray<uint8_t>>& aCertList) {
+  bool inBlock = false;
+  bool certFound = false;
+
+  const nsCString header = "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----"_ns;
+  const nsCString footer = "-----END CERTIFICATE-----"_ns;
+
+  nsCWhitespaceTokenizerTemplate<IsNewLine> tokenizer(aCertChain);
+
+  nsAutoCString blockData;
+  while (tokenizer.hasMoreTokens()) {
+    nsDependentCSubstring token = tokenizer.nextToken();
+    if (token.IsEmpty()) {
+      continue;
+    }
+    if (inBlock) {
+      if (token.Equals(footer)) {
+        inBlock = false;
+        certFound = true;
+        // base64 decode data, make certs, append to chain
+        nsAutoCString derString;
+        nsresult rv = Base64Decode(blockData, derString);
+        if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+          CSVerifier_LOG(("CSVerifier: decoding the signature failed"));
+          return rv;
+        }
+        nsTArray<uint8_t> derBytes(derString.Data(), derString.Length());
+        aCertList.AppendElement(std::move(derBytes));
+      } else {
+        blockData.Append(token);
+      }
+    } else if (token.Equals(header)) {
+      inBlock = true;
+      blockData = "";
+    }
+  }
+  if (inBlock || !certFound) {
+    // the PEM data did not end; bad data.
+    CSVerifier_LOG(("CSVerifier: supplied chain contains bad data"));
+    return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
+  }
+  return NS_OK;
+}
+
+// Given data to verify, a content signature header value, a string representing
+// a list of PEM-encoded certificates, and a hostname to validate the
+// certificates against, this function attempts to validate the certificate
+// chain, extract the signature from the header, and verify the data using the
+// key in the end-entity certificate from the chain. Returns NS_OK if everything
+// is satisfactory and a failing nsresult otherwise. The output parameters are
+// filled with telemetry data to report in the case of failures.
+static nsresult VerifyContentSignatureInternal(
+    const nsACString& aData, const nsACString& aCSHeader,
+    const nsACString& aCertChain, const nsACString& aHostname,
+    /* out */
+    Telemetry::LABELS_CONTENT_SIGNATURE_VERIFICATION_ERRORS& aErrorLabel,
+    /* out */ nsACString& aCertFingerprint,
+    /* out */ uint32_t& aErrorValue) {
+  nsTArray<nsTArray<uint8_t>> certList;
+  nsresult rv = ReadChainIntoCertList(aCertChain, certList);
+  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+    return rv;
+  }
+  if (certList.Length() < 1) {
+    return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
+  }
+  // The 0th element should be the end-entity that issued the content
+  // signature.
+  nsTArray<uint8_t>& certBytes(certList.ElementAt(0));
+  Input certInput;
+  mozilla::pkix::Result result =
+      certInput.Init(certBytes.Elements(), certBytes.Length());
+  if (result != Success) {
+    return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
+  }
+
+  // Get EE certificate fingerprint for telemetry.
+  unsigned char fingerprint[SHA256_LENGTH] = {0};
+  SECStatus srv =
+      PK11_HashBuf(SEC_OID_SHA256, fingerprint, certInput.UnsafeGetData(),
+                   certInput.GetLength());
+  if (srv != SECSuccess) {
+    return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
+  }
+  SECItem fingerprintItem = {siBuffer, fingerprint, SHA256_LENGTH};
+  UniquePORTString tmpFingerprintString(
+      CERT_Hexify(&fingerprintItem, false /* don't use colon delimiters */));
+  if (!tmpFingerprintString) {
+    return NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
+  }
+  aCertFingerprint.Assign(tmpFingerprintString.get());
+
+  // Check the signerCert chain is good
+  CSTrustDomain trustDomain(certList);
+  result = BuildCertChain(
+      trustDomain, certInput, Now(), EndEntityOrCA::MustBeEndEntity,
+      KeyUsage::noParticularKeyUsageRequired, KeyPurposeId::id_kp_codeSigning,
+      CertPolicyId::anyPolicy, nullptr /*stapledOCSPResponse*/);
+  if (result != Success) {
+    // if there was a library error, return an appropriate error
+    if (IsFatalError(result)) {
+      return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
+    }
+    // otherwise, assume the signature was invalid
+    if (result == mozilla::pkix::Result::ERROR_EXPIRED_CERTIFICATE) {
+      aErrorLabel =
+          Telemetry::LABELS_CONTENT_SIGNATURE_VERIFICATION_ERRORS::err4;
+      aErrorValue = 4;
+    } else if (result ==
+               mozilla::pkix::Result::ERROR_NOT_YET_VALID_CERTIFICATE) {
+      aErrorLabel =
+          Telemetry::LABELS_CONTENT_SIGNATURE_VERIFICATION_ERRORS::err5;
+      aErrorValue = 5;
+    } else {
+      // Building cert chain failed for some other reason.
+      aErrorLabel =
+          Telemetry::LABELS_CONTENT_SIGNATURE_VERIFICATION_ERRORS::err6;
+      aErrorValue = 6;
+    }
+    CSVerifier_LOG(("CSVerifier: The supplied chain is bad (%s)",
+                    MapResultToName(result)));
+    return NS_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE;
+  }
+
+  // Check the SAN
+  Input hostnameInput;
+
+  result = hostnameInput.Init(
+      BitwiseCast<const uint8_t*, const char*>(aHostname.BeginReading()),
+      aHostname.Length());
+  if (result != Success) {
+    return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
+  }
+
+  BRNameMatchingPolicy nameMatchingPolicy(BRNameMatchingPolicy::Mode::Enforce);
+  result = CheckCertHostname(certInput, hostnameInput, nameMatchingPolicy);
+  if (result != Success) {
+    // EE cert isnot valid for the given host name.
+    aErrorLabel = Telemetry::LABELS_CONTENT_SIGNATURE_VERIFICATION_ERRORS::err7;
+    aErrorValue = 7;
+    return NS_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE;
+  }
+
+  pkix::BackCert backCert(certInput, EndEntityOrCA::MustBeEndEntity, nullptr);
+  result = backCert.Init();
+  // This should never fail, because we've already built a verified certificate
+  // chain with this certificate.
+  if (result != Success) {
+    aErrorLabel = Telemetry::LABELS_CONTENT_SIGNATURE_VERIFICATION_ERRORS::err8;
+    aErrorValue = 8;
+    CSVerifier_LOG(("CSVerifier: couldn't decode certificate to get spki"));
+    return NS_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE;
+  }
+  Input spkiInput = backCert.GetSubjectPublicKeyInfo();
+  SECItem spkiItem = {siBuffer, const_cast<uint8_t*>(spkiInput.UnsafeGetData()),
+                      spkiInput.GetLength()};
+  UniqueCERTSubjectPublicKeyInfo spki(
+      SECKEY_DecodeDERSubjectPublicKeyInfo(&spkiItem));
+  if (!spki) {
+    aErrorLabel = Telemetry::LABELS_CONTENT_SIGNATURE_VERIFICATION_ERRORS::err8;
+    aErrorValue = 8;
+    CSVerifier_LOG(("CSVerifier: couldn't decode spki"));
+    return NS_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE;
+  }
+  mozilla::UniqueSECKEYPublicKey key(SECKEY_ExtractPublicKey(spki.get()));
+  if (!key) {
+    aErrorLabel = Telemetry::LABELS_CONTENT_SIGNATURE_VERIFICATION_ERRORS::err8;
+    aErrorValue = 8;
+    CSVerifier_LOG(("CSVerifier: unable to extract a key"));
+    return NS_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE;
+  }
+
+  nsAutoCString signature;
+  rv = ParseContentSignatureHeader(aCSHeader, signature);
+  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+    return rv;
+  }
+
+  // Base 64 decode the signature
+  nsAutoCString rawSignature;
+  rv = Base64Decode(signature, rawSignature);
+  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+    CSVerifier_LOG(("CSVerifier: decoding the signature failed"));
+    return rv;
+  }
+
+  // get signature object
+  ScopedAutoSECItem signatureItem;
+  SECItem rawSignatureItem = {
+      siBuffer,
+      BitwiseCast<unsigned char*, const char*>(rawSignature.get()),
+      rawSignature.Length(),
+  };
+  // We have a raw ecdsa signature r||s so we have to DER-encode it first
+  // Note that we have to check rawSignatureItem->len % 2 here as
+  // DSAU_EncodeDerSigWithLen asserts this
+  if (rawSignatureItem.len == 0 || rawSignatureItem.len % 2 != 0) {
+    CSVerifier_LOG(("CSVerifier: signature length is bad"));
+    return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
+  }
+  if (DSAU_EncodeDerSigWithLen(&signatureItem, &rawSignatureItem,
+                               rawSignatureItem.len) != SECSuccess) {
+    CSVerifier_LOG(("CSVerifier: encoding the signature failed"));
+    return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
+  }
+
+  // this is the only OID we support for now
+  SECOidTag oid = SEC_OID_ANSIX962_ECDSA_SHA384_SIGNATURE;
+  mozilla::UniqueVFYContext cx(
+      VFY_CreateContext(key.get(), &signatureItem, oid, nullptr));
+  if (!cx) {
+    // Creating context failed.
+    aErrorLabel = Telemetry::LABELS_CONTENT_SIGNATURE_VERIFICATION_ERRORS::err9;
+    aErrorValue = 9;
+    return NS_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE;
+  }
+
+  if (VFY_Begin(cx.get()) != SECSuccess) {
+    // Creating context failed.
+    aErrorLabel = Telemetry::LABELS_CONTENT_SIGNATURE_VERIFICATION_ERRORS::err9;
+    aErrorValue = 9;
+    return NS_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE;
+  }
+  if (VFY_Update(cx.get(), kPREFIX, sizeof(kPREFIX)) != SECSuccess) {
+    aErrorLabel = Telemetry::LABELS_CONTENT_SIGNATURE_VERIFICATION_ERRORS::err1;
+    aErrorValue = 1;
+    return NS_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE;
+  }
+  if (VFY_Update(cx.get(),
+                 reinterpret_cast<const unsigned char*>(aData.BeginReading()),
+                 aData.Length()) != SECSuccess) {
+    aErrorLabel = Telemetry::LABELS_CONTENT_SIGNATURE_VERIFICATION_ERRORS::err1;
+    aErrorValue = 1;
+    return NS_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE;
+  }
+  if (VFY_End(cx.get()) != SECSuccess) {
+    aErrorLabel = Telemetry::LABELS_CONTENT_SIGNATURE_VERIFICATION_ERRORS::err1;
+    aErrorValue = 1;
+    return NS_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE;
+  }
+
+  return NS_OK;
+}
+
+static nsresult ParseContentSignatureHeader(
+    const nsACString& aContentSignatureHeader,
+    /* out */ nsCString& aSignature) {
+  // We only support p384 ecdsa.
+  constexpr auto signature_var = "p384ecdsa"_ns;
+
+  aSignature.Truncate();
+
+  const nsCString& flatHeader = PromiseFlatCString(aContentSignatureHeader);
+  nsSecurityHeaderParser parser(flatHeader);
+  nsresult rv = parser.Parse();
+  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+    CSVerifier_LOG(("CSVerifier: could not parse ContentSignature header"));
+    return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
+  }
+  LinkedList<nsSecurityHeaderDirective>* directives = parser.GetDirectives();
+
+  for (nsSecurityHeaderDirective* directive = directives->getFirst();
+       directive != nullptr; directive = directive->getNext()) {
+    CSVerifier_LOG(
+        ("CSVerifier: found directive '%s'", directive->mName.get()));
+    if (directive->mName.Length() == signature_var.Length() &&
+        directive->mName.EqualsIgnoreCase(signature_var.get(),
+                                          signature_var.Length())) {
+      if (!aSignature.IsEmpty()) {
+        CSVerifier_LOG(("CSVerifier: found two ContentSignatures"));
+        return NS_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE;
+      }
+
+      CSVerifier_LOG(("CSVerifier: found a ContentSignature directive"));
+      aSignature.Assign(directive->mValue);
+    }
+  }
+
+  // we have to ensure that we found a signature at this point
+  if (aSignature.IsEmpty()) {
+    CSVerifier_LOG(
+        ("CSVerifier: got a Content-Signature header but didn't find a "
+         "signature."));
+    return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
+  }
+
+  // Bug 769521: We have to change b64 url to regular encoding as long as we
+  // don't have a b64 url decoder. This should change soon, but in the meantime
+  // we have to live with this.
+  aSignature.ReplaceChar('-', '+');
+  aSignature.ReplaceChar('_', '/');
+
+  return NS_OK;
+}