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author | Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org> | 2024-04-28 14:29:10 +0000 |
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committer | Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org> | 2024-04-28 14:29:10 +0000 |
commit | 2aa4a82499d4becd2284cdb482213d541b8804dd (patch) | |
tree | b80bf8bf13c3766139fbacc530efd0dd9d54394c /third_party/rust/ahash/README.md | |
parent | Initial commit. (diff) | |
download | firefox-upstream.tar.xz firefox-upstream.zip |
Adding upstream version 86.0.1.upstream/86.0.1upstream
Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>
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diff --git a/third_party/rust/ahash/README.md b/third_party/rust/ahash/README.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..b1bf029d21 --- /dev/null +++ b/third_party/rust/ahash/README.md @@ -0,0 +1,245 @@ +# aHash + +AHash is a high speed keyed hashing algorithm intended for use in in-memory hashmaps. It provides a high quality +64bit hash. AHash is designed for performance and is not cryptographically secure. + +## Goals + +AHash is the fastest DOS resistant hash for use in HashMaps available in the Rust language. +Failing in any of these criteria will be treated as a bug. + +## Design + +AHash is a keyed hash, so two instances initialized with different keys will produce completely different hashes, and the +resulting hashes cannot be predicted without knowing the keys. [This prevents DOS attacks where an attacker sends a large +number of items whose hashes collide that get used as keys in a hashmap.](https://github.com/tkaitchuck/aHash/wiki/How-aHash-is-resists-DOS-attacks) + +AHash takes advantage of specialized hardware instructions whenever possible including the [hardware AES instruction](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AES_instruction_set) +on X86 processors when it is available. If it is not available it falls back on a somewhat slower (but still DOS resistant) +[algorithm based on multiplication](https://github.com/tkaitchuck/aHash/wiki/AHash-fallback-algorithm). + +As such aHash does not have a fixed standard for its output. This is not a problem for Hashmaps, and allows aHash to achieve high performance and improve over time. + +## Non-Goals + +Because different computers or computers on versions of the code will observe different outputs Hash is not recommended +for use other than in-memory maps. Specifically aHash does not intend to be: + +* Used as a MACs or other application requiring a cryptographically secure hash +* Used for distributed applications or ones requiring persisting hashed values + +## Hash quality + +**Both aHash's aes variant and the fallback pass the full [SMHasher test suite](https://github.com/rurban/smhasher)** (the output of the tests is checked into the smhasher subdirectory.) + +At **over 50GB/s** aHash is the fastest algorithm to pass the full test suite by more than a factor of 2. Even the fallback algorithm is in the top 5 in terms of throughput. + +## Speed + +When it is available aHash uses AES rounds using the AES-NI instruction. AES-NI is very fast (on an intel i7-6700 it +is as fast as a 64 bit multiplication.) and handles 16 bytes of input at a time, while being a very strong permutation. + +This is obviously much faster than most standard approaches to hashing, and does a better job of scrambling data than most non-secure hashes. + +On an intel i7-6700 compiled on nightly Rust with flags `-C opt-level=3 -C target-cpu=native -C codegen-units=1`: + +| Input | SipHash 1-3 time | FnvHash time|FxHash time| aHash time| aHash Fallback* | +|----------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|---------------| +| u8 | 9.3271 ns | 0.808 ns | **0.594 ns** | 0.7704 ns | 0.7664 ns | +| u16 | 9.5139 ns | 0.803 ns | **0.594 ns** | 0.7653 ns | 0.7704 ns | +| u32 | 9.1196 ns | 1.4424 ns | **0.594 ns** | 0.7637 ns | 0.7712 ns | +| u64 | 10.854 ns | 3.0484 ns | **0.628 ns** | 0.7788 ns | 0.7888 ns | +| u128 | 12.465 ns | 7.0728 ns | 0.799 ns | **0.6174 ns** | 0.6250 ns | +| 1 byte string | 11.745 ns | 2.4743 ns | 2.4000 ns | **1.4921 ns** | 1.5861 ns | +| 3 byte string | 12.066 ns | 3.5221 ns | 2.9253 ns | **1.4745 ns** | 1.8518 ns | +| 4 byte string | 11.634 ns | 4.0770 ns | 1.8818 ns | **1.5206 ns** | 1.8924 ns | +| 7 byte string | 14.762 ns | 5.9780 ns | 3.2282 ns | **1.5207 ns** | 1.8933 ns | +| 8 byte string | 13.442 ns | 4.0535 ns | 2.9422 ns | **1.6262 ns** | 1.8929 ns | +| 15 byte string | 16.880 ns | 8.3434 ns | 4.6070 ns | **1.6265 ns** | 1.7965 ns | +| 16 byte string | 15.155 ns | 7.5796 ns | 3.2619 ns | **1.6262 ns** | 1.8011 ns | +| 24 byte string | 16.521 ns | 12.492 ns | 3.5424 ns | **1.6266 ns** | 2.8311 ns | +| 68 byte string | 24.598 ns | 50.715 ns | 5.8312 ns | **4.8282 ns** | 5.4824 ns | +| 132 byte string| 39.224 ns | 119.96 ns | 11.777 ns | **6.5087 ns** | 9.1459 ns | +|1024 byte string| 254.00 ns | 1087.3 ns | 156.41 ns | **25.402 ns** | 54.566 ns | + +* Fallback refers to the algorithm aHash would use if AES instructions are unavailable. +For reference a hash that does nothing (not even reads the input data takes) **0.520 ns**. So that represents the fastest +possible time. + +As you can see above aHash like `FxHash` provides a large speedup over `SipHash-1-3` which is already nearly twice as fast as `SipHash-2-4`. + +Rust's HashMap by default uses `SipHash-1-3` because faster hash functions such as `FxHash` are predictable and vulnerable to denial of +service attacks. While `aHash` has both very strong scrambling and very high performance. + +AHash performs well when dealing with large inputs because aHash reads 8 or 16 bytes at a time. (depending on availability of AES-NI) + +Because of this, and its optimized logic, `aHash` is able to outperform `FxHash` with strings. +It also provides especially good performance dealing with unaligned input. +(Notice the big performance gaps between 3 vs 4, 7 vs 8 and 15 vs 16 in `FxHash` above) + +For more a more representative performance comparison which includes the overhead of using a HashMap, see [HashBrown's benchmarks](https://github.com/rust-lang/hashbrown#performance) +as HashBrown now uses aHash as its hasher by default. + +## Security + +AHash is designed to [prevent an adversary that does not know the key from being able to create hash collisions or partial collisions.](https://github.com/tkaitchuck/aHash/wiki/How-aHash-is-resists-DOS-attacks) + +This achieved by ensuring that: + +* aHash is designed to [resist differential crypto analysis](https://github.com/tkaitchuck/aHash/wiki/How-aHash-is-resists-DOS-attacks#differential-analysis). Meaning it should not be possible to devise a scheme to "cancel" out a modification of the internal state from a block of input via some corresponding change in a subsequent block of input. + * This is achieved by not performing any "premixing" - This reversible mixing gave previous hashes such as murmurhash confidence in their quality, but could be undone by a deliberate attack. + * Before it is used each chunk of input is "masked" such as by xoring it with an unpredictable value. +* aHash obeys the '[strict avalanche criterion](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Avalanche_effect#Strict_avalanche_criterion)': +Each bit of input has the potential to flip every bit of the output. +* Similarly, each bit in the key can affect every bit in the output. +* Input bits never affect just one, or a very few, bits in intermediate state. This is specifically designed to prevent the sort of +[differential attacks launched by the sipHash authors](https://emboss.github.io/blog/2012/12/14/breaking-murmur-hash-flooding-dos-reloaded/) which cancel previous inputs. +* The `finish` call at the end of the hash is designed to not expose individual bits of the internal state. + * For example in the main algorithm 256bits of state and 256bits of keys are reduced to 64 total bits using 3 rounds of AES encryption. +Reversing this is more than non-trivial. Most of the information is by definition gone, and any given bit of the internal state is fully diffused across the output. +* In both aHash and its fallback the internal state is divided into two halves which are updated by two unrelated techniques using the same input. - This means that if there is a way to attack one of them it likely won't be able to attack both of them at the same time. +* It is deliberately difficult to 'chain' collisions. + * To attack Previous attacks on hash functions have relied on the ability + +More details are available on [the wiki](https://github.com/tkaitchuck/aHash/wiki/How-aHash-is-resists-DOS-attacks). + +### aHash is not cryptographically secure + +AHash should not be used for situations where cryptographic security is needed. +It is not intended for this and will likely fail to hold up for several reasons. + +1. aHash relies on random keys which are assumed to not be observable by an attacker. For a cryptographic hash all inputs can be seen and controlled by the attacker. +2. aHash has not yet gone through peer review. +3. Because aHash uses reduced rounds of AES as opposed to the standard of 10. Things like the SQUARE attack apply to part of the internal state. +(These are mitigated by other means to prevent producing collections, but would be a problem in other contexts). +4. Like any cypher based hash, it will show certain statistical deviations from truly random output when comparing a (VERY) large number of hashes. +(By definition cyphers have fewer collisions than truly random data.) + +There are several efforts to build a secure hash function that uses AES-NI for acceleration, but aHash is not one of them. + +## Accelerated CPUs + +Hardware AES instructions are built into Intel processors built after 2010 and AMD processors after 2012. +It is also available on [many other CPUs](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AES_instruction_set) should in eventually +be able to get aHash to work. However, only X86 and X86-64 are the only supported architectures at the moment, as currently +they are the only architectures for which Rust provides an intrinsic. + +aHash also uses `sse2` and `sse3` instructions. X86 processors that have `aesni` also have these instruction sets. + +## Why not use a cryptographic hash in a hashmap. + +Cryptographic hashes are designed to make is nearly impossible to find two items that collide when the attacker has full control +over the input. This has several implications: + +* They are very difficult to construct, and have to go to a lot of effort to ensure that collisions are not possible. +* They have no notion of a 'key'. Rather, they are fully deterministic and provide exactly one hash for a given input. + +For a HashMap the requirements are different. + +* Speed is very important, especially for short inputs. Often the key for a HashMap is a single `u32` or similar, and to be effective +the bucket that it should be hashed to needs to be computed in just a few CPU cycles. +* A hashmap does not need to provide a hard and fast guarantee that no two inputs will ever collide. Hence, hashCodes are not 256bits +but are just 64 or 32 bits in length. Often the first thing done with the hashcode is to truncate it further to compute which among a few buckets should be used for a key. + * Here collisions are expected, and a cheap to deal with provided there is no systematic way to generated huge numbers of values that all +go to the same bucket. + * This also means that unlike a cryptographic hash partial collisions matter. It doesn't do a hashmap any good to produce a unique 256bit hash if +the lower 12 bits are all the same. This means that even a provably irreversible hash would not offer protection from a DOS attack in a hashmap +because an attacker can easily just brute force the bottom N bits. + +From a cryptography point of view, a hashmap needs something closer to a block cypher. +Where the input can be quickly mixed in a way that cannot be reversed without knowing a key. + +# Why use aHash over X + +## SipHash + +For a hashmap: Because aHash nearly **10x** faster. + +SipHash is however useful in other contexts, such as for a HMAC, where aHash would be completely inappropriate. + +*SipHash-2-4* is designed to provide DOS attack resistance, and has no presently known attacks +against this claim that doesn't involve learning bits of the key. + +SipHash is also available in the "1-3" variant which is about twice as fast as the standard version. +The SipHash authors don't recommend using this variation when DOS attacks are a concern, but there are still no known +practical DOS attacks against the algorithm. Rust has opted for the "1-3" version as the default in `std::collections::HashMap`, +because the speed trade off of "2-4" was not worth it. + +As you can see in the table above, aHash is **much** faster than even *SipHash-1-3*, but it also provides DOS resistance, +and any attack against the accelerated form would likely involve a weakness in AES. + +## FxHash + +In terms of performance, aHash is faster than the FXhash for strings and byte arrays but not primitives. +So it might seem like using Fxhash for hashmaps when the key is a primitive is a good idea. This is *not* the case. + +When FX hash is operating on a 4 or 8 byte input such as a u32 or a u64, it reduces to multiplying the input by a fixed +constant. This is a bad hashing algorithm because it means that lower bits can never be influenced by any higher bit. In +the context of a hashmap where the low order bits are used to determine which bucket to put an item in, this isn't +any better than the identity function. Any keys that happen to end in the same bit pattern will all collide. +Some examples of where this is likely to occur are: + +* Strings encoded in base64 +* Null terminated strings (when working with C code) +* Integers that have the lower bits as zeros. (IE any multiple of small power of 2, which isn't a rare pattern in computer programs.) + * For example when taking lengths of data or locations in data it is common for values to +have a multiple of 1024, if these were used as keys in a map they will collide and end up in the same bucket. + +Like any non-keyed hash FxHash can be attacked. But FxHash is so prone to this that you may find yourself doing it accidentally. + +For example, it is possible to [accidentally introduce quadratic behavior by reading from one map in iteration order and writing to another.](https://accidentallyquadratic.tumblr.com/post/153545455987/rust-hash-iteration-reinsertion) + +Fxhash flaws make sense when you understand it for what it is. It is a quick and dirty hash, nothing more. +it was not published and promoted by its creator, it was **found**! + +Because it is error-prone, FxHash should never be used as a default. In specialized instances where the keys are understood +it makes sense, but given that aHash is faster on almost any object, it's probably not worth it. + +## FnvHash + +FnvHash is also a poor default. It only handles one byte at a time, so its performance really suffers with large inputs. +It is also non-keyed so it is still subject to DOS attacks and [accidentally quadratic behavior.](https://accidentallyquadratic.tumblr.com/post/153545455987/rust-hash-iteration-reinsertion) + +## MurmurHash, CityHash, MetroHash, FarmHash, HighwayHash, XXHash, SeaHash + +Murmur, City, Metro, Farm and Highway are all related, and appear to directly replace one another. Sea and XX are independent +and compete. + +They are all fine hashing algorithms, they do a good job of scrambling data, but they are all targeted at a different +usecase. They are intended to work in distributed systems where the hash is expected to be the same over time and from one +computer to the next, efficiently hashing large volumes of data. + +This is quite different from the needs of a Hasher used in a hashmap. In a map the typical value is under 10 bytes. None +of these algorithms scale down to handle that small of data at a competitive time. What's more the restriction that they +provide consistent output prevents them from taking advantage of different hardware capabilities on different CPUs. It makes +sense for a hashmap to work differently on a phone than on a server, or in wasm. + +If you need to persist or transmit a hash of a file, then using one of these is probably a good idea. HighwayHash seems to be the preferred solution du jour. But inside a simple Hashmap, stick with aHash. + +## AquaHash + +AquaHash is structured similarly to aHash. (Though the two were designed completely independently). AquaHash does not scale down nearly as well and +does poorly with for example a single `i32` as input. Its only implementation at this point is in C++. + +## t1ha + +T1ha is fairly fast at large sizes, and the output is of fairly high quality, but it is not clear what usecase it aims for. +It has many different versions and is very complex, and uses hardware tricks, so one might infer it is meant for +hashmaps like aHash. But any hash using it take at least **20ns**, and it doesn't outperform even SipHash until the +input sizes are larger than 128 bytes and is not designed to be DOS resistant. So uses are likely niche. + +# License + +Licensed under either of: + + * Apache License, Version 2.0, ([LICENSE-APACHE](LICENSE-APACHE) or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0) + * MIT license ([LICENSE-MIT](LICENSE-MIT) or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT) + +at your option. + +## Contribution + +Unless you explicitly state otherwise, any contribution intentionally submitted +for inclusion in the work by you, as defined in the Apache-2.0 license, shall be dual licensed as above, without any +additional terms or conditions. + |