Adding upstream version 2.2.27.upstream/2.2.27upstream

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

1 files changed, 2808 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/g10/mainproc.c b/g10/mainproc.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..762fc79
--- /dev/null
+++ b/g10/mainproc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,2808 @@
+/* mainproc.c - handle packets
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2009 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ * Copyright (C) 2013-2014 Werner Koch
+ * Copyright (C) 2020 g10 Code GmbH
+ *
+ * This file is part of GnuPG.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+ */
+
+#include <config.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <time.h>
+
+#include "gpg.h"
+#include "../common/util.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "../common/iobuf.h"
+#include "options.h"
+#include "keydb.h"
+#include "filter.h"
+#include "main.h"
+#include "../common/status.h"
+#include "../common/i18n.h"
+#include "trustdb.h"
+#include "keyserver-internal.h"
+#include "photoid.h"
+#include "../common/mbox-util.h"
+#include "call-dirmngr.h"
+#include "../common/compliance.h"
+
+/* Put an upper limit on nested packets.  The 32 is an arbitrary
+   value, a much lower should actually be sufficient.  */
+#define MAX_NESTING_DEPTH 32
+
+
+/* An object to build a list of keyid related info.  */
+struct kidlist_item
+{
+  struct kidlist_item *next;
+  u32 kid[2];
+  int pubkey_algo;
+  int reason;
+};
+
+
+/*
+ * Object to hold the processing context.
+ */
+typedef struct mainproc_context *CTX;
+struct mainproc_context
+{
+  ctrl_t ctrl;
+  struct mainproc_context *anchor;  /* May be useful in the future. */
+  PKT_public_key *last_pubkey;
+  PKT_user_id     *last_user_id;
+  md_filter_context_t mfx;
+  int sigs_only;    /* Process only signatures and reject all other stuff. */
+  int encrypt_only; /* Process only encryption messages. */
+
+  /* Name of the file with the complete signature or the file with the
+     detached signature.  This is currently only used to deduce the
+     file name of the data file if that has not been given. */
+  const char *sigfilename;
+
+  /* A structure to describe the signed data in case of a detached
+     signature. */
+  struct
+  {
+    /* A file descriptor of the signed data.  Only used if not -1. */
+    int data_fd;
+    /* A list of filenames with the data files or NULL. This is only
+       used if DATA_FD is -1. */
+    strlist_t data_names;
+    /* Flag to indicated that either one of the next previous fields
+       is used.  This is only needed for better readability. */
+    int used;
+  } signed_data;
+
+  DEK *dek;
+  int last_was_session_key;
+  kbnode_t list;    /* The current list of packets. */
+  iobuf_t iobuf;    /* Used to get the filename etc. */
+  int trustletter;  /* Temporary usage in list_node. */
+  ulong symkeys;    /* Number of symmetrically encrypted session keys.  */
+  struct kidlist_item *pkenc_list; /* List of encryption packets. */
+  int seen_pkt_encrypted_aead; /* PKT_ENCRYPTED_AEAD packet seen. */
+  struct {
+    unsigned int sig_seen:1;      /* Set to true if a signature packet
+                                     has been seen. */
+    unsigned int data:1;          /* Any data packet seen */
+    unsigned int uncompress_failed:1;
+  } any;
+};
+
+
+/* Counter with the number of literal data packets seen.  Note that
+ * this is also bumped at the end of an encryption.  This counter is
+ * used for a basic consistency check of a received PGP message.  */
+static int literals_seen;
+
+
+/*** Local prototypes.  ***/
+static int do_proc_packets (ctrl_t ctrl, CTX c, iobuf_t a);
+static void list_node (CTX c, kbnode_t node);
+static void proc_tree (CTX c, kbnode_t node);
+
+
+/*** Functions.  ***/
+
+/* Reset the literal data counter.  This is required to setup a new
+ * decryption or verification context.  */
+void
+reset_literals_seen(void)
+{
+  literals_seen = 0;
+}
+
+
+static void
+release_list( CTX c )
+{
+  proc_tree (c, c->list);
+  release_kbnode (c->list);
+  while (c->pkenc_list)
+    {
+      struct kidlist_item *tmp = c->pkenc_list->next;
+      xfree (c->pkenc_list);
+      c->pkenc_list = tmp;
+    }
+  c->pkenc_list = NULL;
+  c->list = NULL;
+  c->any.data = 0;
+  c->any.uncompress_failed = 0;
+  c->last_was_session_key = 0;
+  c->seen_pkt_encrypted_aead = 0;
+  xfree (c->dek);
+  c->dek = NULL;
+}
+
+
+static int
+add_onepass_sig (CTX c, PACKET *pkt)
+{
+  kbnode_t node;
+
+  if (c->list) /* Add another packet. */
+    add_kbnode (c->list, new_kbnode (pkt));
+  else /* Insert the first one.  */
+    c->list = node = new_kbnode (pkt);
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+
+static int
+add_gpg_control (CTX c, PACKET *pkt)
+{
+  if ( pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control == CTRLPKT_CLEARSIGN_START )
+    {
+      /* New clear text signature.
+       * Process the last one and reset everything */
+      release_list(c);
+    }
+
+  if (c->list)  /* Add another packet.  */
+    add_kbnode (c->list, new_kbnode (pkt));
+  else /* Insert the first one. */
+    c->list = new_kbnode (pkt);
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+
+static int
+add_user_id (CTX c, PACKET *pkt)
+{
+  if (!c->list)
+    {
+      log_error ("orphaned user ID\n");
+      return 0;
+    }
+  add_kbnode (c->list, new_kbnode (pkt));
+  return 1;
+}
+
+
+static int
+add_subkey (CTX c, PACKET *pkt)
+{
+  if (!c->list)
+    {
+      log_error ("subkey w/o mainkey\n");
+      return 0;
+    }
+  add_kbnode (c->list, new_kbnode (pkt));
+  return 1;
+}
+
+
+static int
+add_ring_trust (CTX c, PACKET *pkt)
+{
+  if (!c->list)
+    {
+      log_error ("ring trust w/o key\n");
+      return 0;
+    }
+  add_kbnode (c->list, new_kbnode (pkt));
+  return 1;
+}
+
+
+static int
+add_signature (CTX c, PACKET *pkt)
+{
+  kbnode_t node;
+
+  c->any.sig_seen = 1;
+  if (pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE && !c->list)
+    {
+      /* This is the first signature for the following datafile.
+       * GPG does not write such packets; instead it always uses
+       * onepass-sig packets.  The drawback of PGP's method
+       * of prepending the signature to the data is
+       * that it is not possible to make a signature from data read
+       * from stdin.	(GPG is able to read PGP stuff anyway.) */
+      node = new_kbnode (pkt);
+      c->list = node;
+      return 1;
+    }
+  else if (!c->list)
+    return 0; /* oops (invalid packet sequence)*/
+  else if (!c->list->pkt)
+    BUG();    /* so nicht */
+
+  /* Add a new signature node item at the end. */
+  node = new_kbnode (pkt);
+  add_kbnode (c->list, node);
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+
+static gpg_error_t
+symkey_decrypt_seskey (DEK *dek, byte *seskey, size_t slen)
+{
+  gpg_error_t err;
+  gcry_cipher_hd_t hd;
+  enum gcry_cipher_modes ciphermode;
+  unsigned int noncelen, keylen;
+
+  if (dek->use_aead)
+    {
+      err = openpgp_aead_algo_info (dek->use_aead, &ciphermode, &noncelen);
+      if (err)
+        return err;
+    }
+  else
+    {
+      ciphermode = GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CFB;
+      noncelen = 0;
+    }
+
+  /* Check that the session key has a size of 16 to 32 bytes.  */
+  if ((dek->use_aead && (slen < (noncelen + 16 + 16)
+                         || slen > (noncelen + 32 + 16)))
+      || (!dek->use_aead && (slen < 17 || slen > 33)))
+    {
+      log_error ( _("weird size for an encrypted session key (%d)\n"),
+		  (int)slen);
+      return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_KEY);
+    }
+
+  err = openpgp_cipher_open (&hd, dek->algo, ciphermode, 1);
+  if (!err)
+    err = gcry_cipher_setkey (hd, dek->key, dek->keylen);
+  if (!err)
+    err = gcry_cipher_setiv (hd, noncelen? seskey : NULL, noncelen);
+  if (err)
+    goto leave;
+
+  if (dek->use_aead)
+    {
+      byte ad[4];
+
+      ad[0] = (0xc0 | PKT_SYMKEY_ENC);
+      ad[1] = 5;
+      ad[2] = dek->algo;
+      ad[3] = dek->use_aead;
+      err = gcry_cipher_authenticate (hd, ad, 4);
+      if (err)
+        goto leave;
+      gcry_cipher_final (hd);
+      keylen = slen - noncelen - 16;
+      err = gcry_cipher_decrypt (hd, seskey+noncelen, keylen, NULL, 0);
+      if (err)
+        goto leave;
+      err = gcry_cipher_checktag (hd, seskey+noncelen+keylen, 16);
+      if (err)
+        goto leave;
+      /* Now we replace the dek components with the real session key to
+       * decrypt the contents of the sequencing packet. */
+      if (keylen > DIM(dek->key))
+        {
+          err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_TOO_LARGE);
+          goto leave;
+        }
+      dek->keylen = keylen;
+      memcpy (dek->key, seskey + noncelen, dek->keylen);
+    }
+  else
+    {
+      gcry_cipher_decrypt (hd, seskey, slen, NULL, 0);
+
+      /* Here we can only test whether the algo given in decrypted
+       * session key is a valid OpenPGP algo.  With 11 defined
+       * symmetric algorithms we will miss 4.3% of wrong passphrases
+       * here.  The actual checking is done later during bulk
+       * decryption; we can't bring this check forward easily.  We
+       * need to use the GPG_ERR_CHECKSUM so that we won't run into
+       * the gnupg < 2.2 bug compatible case which would terminate the
+       * process on GPG_ERR_CIPHER_ALGO.  Note that with AEAD (above)
+       * we will have a reliable test here.  */
+      if (openpgp_cipher_test_algo (seskey[0])
+          || openpgp_cipher_get_algo_keylen (seskey[0]) != slen - 1)
+        {
+          err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_CHECKSUM);
+          goto leave;
+        }
+
+      /* Now we replace the dek components with the real session key to
+       * decrypt the contents of the sequencing packet. */
+      keylen = slen-1;
+      if (keylen > DIM(dek->key))
+        {
+          err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_TOO_LARGE);
+          goto leave;
+        }
+      dek->algo = seskey[0];
+      dek->keylen = slen-1;
+      memcpy (dek->key, seskey + 1, dek->keylen);
+    }
+
+  /*log_hexdump( "thekey", dek->key, dek->keylen );*/
+
+ leave:
+  gcry_cipher_close (hd);
+  return 0;
+}
+
+
+static void
+proc_symkey_enc (CTX c, PACKET *pkt)
+{
+  gpg_error_t err;
+  PKT_symkey_enc *enc;
+
+  enc = pkt->pkt.symkey_enc;
+  if (!enc)
+    log_error ("invalid symkey encrypted packet\n");
+  else if(!c->dek)
+    {
+      int algo = enc->cipher_algo;
+      const char *s = openpgp_cipher_algo_name (algo);
+      const char *a = (enc->aead_algo ? openpgp_aead_algo_name (enc->aead_algo)
+                       /**/           : "CFB");
+
+      if (!openpgp_cipher_test_algo (algo))
+        {
+          if (!opt.quiet)
+            {
+              /* Note: TMPSTR is only used to avoid i18n changes.  */
+              char *tmpstr = xstrconcat (s, ".", a, NULL);
+              if (enc->seskeylen)
+                log_info (_("%s encrypted session key\n"), tmpstr);
+              else
+                log_info (_("%s encrypted data\n"), tmpstr);
+              xfree (tmpstr);
+            }
+        }
+      else
+        log_error (_("encrypted with unknown algorithm %d\n"), algo);
+
+      if (openpgp_md_test_algo (enc->s2k.hash_algo))
+        {
+          log_error(_("passphrase generated with unknown digest"
+                      " algorithm %d\n"),enc->s2k.hash_algo);
+          s = NULL;
+        }
+
+      c->last_was_session_key = 2;
+      if (!s || opt.list_only)
+        goto leave;
+
+      if (opt.override_session_key)
+        {
+          c->dek = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *c->dek);
+          if (get_override_session_key (c->dek, opt.override_session_key))
+            {
+              xfree (c->dek);
+              c->dek = NULL;
+            }
+        }
+      else
+        {
+          c->dek = passphrase_to_dek (algo, &enc->s2k, 0, 0, NULL, NULL);
+          if (c->dek)
+            {
+              c->dek->symmetric = 1;
+              c->dek->use_aead = enc->aead_algo;
+
+              /* FIXME: This doesn't work perfectly if a symmetric key
+                 comes before a public key in the message - if the
+                 user doesn't know the passphrase, then there is a
+                 chance that the "decrypted" algorithm will happen to
+                 be a valid one, which will make the returned dek
+                 appear valid, so we won't try any public keys that
+                 come later. */
+              if (enc->seskeylen)
+                {
+                  err = symkey_decrypt_seskey (c->dek,
+                                               enc->seskey, enc->seskeylen);
+                  if (err)
+                    {
+                      log_info ("decryption of the symmetrically encrypted"
+                                 " session key failed: %s\n",
+                                 gpg_strerror (err));
+                      if (gpg_err_code (err) != GPG_ERR_BAD_KEY
+                          && gpg_err_code (err) != GPG_ERR_CHECKSUM)
+                        log_fatal ("process terminated to be bug compatible\n");
+                      if (c->dek->s2k_cacheid[0])
+                        {
+                          if (opt.debug)
+                            log_debug ("cleared passphrase cached with ID:"
+                                       " %s\n", c->dek->s2k_cacheid);
+                          passphrase_clear_cache (c->dek->s2k_cacheid);
+                        }
+                      xfree (c->dek);
+                      c->dek = NULL;
+                    }
+                }
+              else
+                c->dek->algo_info_printed = 1;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+ leave:
+  c->symkeys++;
+  free_packet (pkt, NULL);
+}
+
+
+static void
+proc_pubkey_enc (ctrl_t ctrl, CTX c, PACKET *pkt)
+{
+  PKT_pubkey_enc *enc;
+  int result = 0;
+
+  /* Check whether the secret key is available and store in this case.  */
+  c->last_was_session_key = 1;
+  enc = pkt->pkt.pubkey_enc;
+  /*printf("enc: encrypted by a pubkey with keyid %08lX\n", enc->keyid[1] );*/
+  /* Hmmm: why do I have this algo check here - anyway there is
+   * function to check it. */
+  if (opt.verbose)
+    log_info (_("public key is %s\n"), keystr (enc->keyid));
+
+  if (is_status_enabled())
+    {
+      char buf[50];
+      /* FIXME: For ECC support we need to map the OpenPGP algo number
+         to the Libgcrypt defined one.  This is due a chicken-egg
+         problem: We need to have code in Libgcrypt for a new
+         algorithm so to implement a proposed new algorithm before the
+         IANA will finally assign an OpenPGP identifier.  */
+      snprintf (buf, sizeof buf, "%08lX%08lX %d 0",
+		(ulong)enc->keyid[0], (ulong)enc->keyid[1], enc->pubkey_algo);
+      write_status_text (STATUS_ENC_TO, buf);
+    }
+
+  if (!opt.list_only && opt.override_session_key)
+    {
+      /* It does not make much sense to store the session key in
+       * secure memory because it has already been passed on the
+       * command line and the GCHQ knows about it.  */
+      c->dek = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *c->dek);
+      result = get_override_session_key (c->dek, opt.override_session_key);
+      if (result)
+        {
+          xfree (c->dek);
+          c->dek = NULL;
+	}
+    }
+  else if (enc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL_E
+           || enc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDH
+           || enc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA
+           || enc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA_E
+           || enc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL)
+    {
+      /* Note that we also allow type 20 Elgamal keys for decryption.
+         There are still a couple of those keys in active use as a
+         subkey.  */
+
+      /* FIXME: Store this all in a list and process it later so that
+         we can prioritize what key to use.  This gives a better user
+         experience if wildcard keyids are used.  */
+      if  (!c->dek && ((!enc->keyid[0] && !enc->keyid[1])
+                       || opt.try_all_secrets
+                       || have_secret_key_with_kid (enc->keyid)))
+        {
+          if(opt.list_only)
+            result = GPG_ERR_MISSING_ACTION; /* fixme: Use better error code. */
+          else
+            {
+              c->dek = xmalloc_secure_clear (sizeof *c->dek);
+              if ((result = get_session_key (ctrl, enc, c->dek)))
+                {
+                  /* Error: Delete the DEK. */
+                  xfree (c->dek);
+                  c->dek = NULL;
+		}
+	    }
+	}
+      else
+        result = GPG_ERR_NO_SECKEY;
+    }
+  else
+    result = GPG_ERR_PUBKEY_ALGO;
+
+  if (1)
+    {
+      /* Store it for later display.  */
+      struct kidlist_item *x = xmalloc (sizeof *x);
+      x->kid[0] = enc->keyid[0];
+      x->kid[1] = enc->keyid[1];
+      x->pubkey_algo = enc->pubkey_algo;
+      x->reason = result;
+      x->next = c->pkenc_list;
+      c->pkenc_list = x;
+
+      if (!result && opt.verbose > 1)
+        log_info (_("public key encrypted data: good DEK\n"));
+    }
+
+  free_packet(pkt, NULL);
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Print the list of public key encrypted packets which we could
+ * not decrypt.
+ */
+static void
+print_pkenc_list (ctrl_t ctrl, struct kidlist_item *list, int failed)
+{
+  for (; list; list = list->next)
+    {
+      PKT_public_key *pk;
+      const char *algstr;
+
+      if (failed && !list->reason)
+        continue;
+      if (!failed && list->reason)
+        continue;
+
+      algstr = openpgp_pk_algo_name (list->pubkey_algo);
+      pk = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *pk);
+
+      if (!algstr)
+        algstr = "[?]";
+      pk->pubkey_algo = list->pubkey_algo;
+      if (!get_pubkey (ctrl, pk, list->kid))
+        {
+          char *p;
+          log_info (_("encrypted with %u-bit %s key, ID %s, created %s\n"),
+                    nbits_from_pk (pk), algstr, keystr_from_pk(pk),
+                    strtimestamp (pk->timestamp));
+          p = get_user_id_native (ctrl, list->kid);
+          log_printf (_("      \"%s\"\n"), p);
+          xfree (p);
+        }
+      else
+        log_info (_("encrypted with %s key, ID %s\n"),
+                  algstr, keystr(list->kid));
+
+      free_public_key (pk);
+
+      if (gpg_err_code (list->reason) == GPG_ERR_NO_SECKEY)
+        {
+          if (is_status_enabled())
+            {
+              char buf[20];
+              snprintf (buf, sizeof buf, "%08lX%08lX",
+                        (ulong)list->kid[0], (ulong)list->kid[1]);
+              write_status_text (STATUS_NO_SECKEY, buf);
+	    }
+	}
+      else if (gpg_err_code (list->reason) == GPG_ERR_MISSING_ACTION)
+        {
+          /* Not tested for secret key due to --list-only mode.  */
+        }
+      else if (list->reason)
+        {
+          log_info (_("public key decryption failed: %s\n"),
+                    gpg_strerror (list->reason));
+          if (gpg_err_source (list->reason) == GPG_ERR_SOURCE_SCD
+              && gpg_err_code (list->reason) == GPG_ERR_INV_ID)
+            print_further_info ("a reason might be a card with replaced keys");
+          write_status_error ("pkdecrypt_failed", list->reason);
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+
+static void
+proc_encrypted (CTX c, PACKET *pkt)
+{
+  int result = 0;
+  int early_plaintext = literals_seen;
+
+  if (pkt->pkttype == PKT_ENCRYPTED_AEAD)
+    c->seen_pkt_encrypted_aead = 1;
+
+  if (early_plaintext)
+    {
+      log_info (_("WARNING: multiple plaintexts seen\n"));
+      write_status_errcode ("decryption.early_plaintext", GPG_ERR_BAD_DATA);
+      /* We fail only later so that we can print some more info first.  */
+    }
+
+  if (!opt.quiet)
+    {
+      if (c->symkeys>1)
+        log_info (_("encrypted with %lu passphrases\n"), c->symkeys);
+      else if (c->symkeys == 1)
+        log_info (_("encrypted with 1 passphrase\n"));
+      print_pkenc_list (c->ctrl, c->pkenc_list, 1 );
+      print_pkenc_list (c->ctrl, c->pkenc_list, 0 );
+    }
+
+  /* FIXME: Figure out the session key by looking at all pkenc packets. */
+
+  write_status (STATUS_BEGIN_DECRYPTION);
+
+  /*log_debug("dat: %sencrypted data\n", c->dek?"":"conventional ");*/
+  if (opt.list_only)
+    result = -1;
+  else if (!c->dek && !c->last_was_session_key)
+    {
+      int algo;
+      STRING2KEY s2kbuf;
+      STRING2KEY *s2k = NULL;
+      int canceled;
+
+      if (opt.override_session_key)
+        {
+          c->dek = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *c->dek);
+          result = get_override_session_key (c->dek, opt.override_session_key);
+          if (result)
+            {
+              xfree (c->dek);
+              c->dek = NULL;
+            }
+        }
+      else
+        {
+          /* Assume this is old style conventional encrypted data. */
+          algo = opt.def_cipher_algo;
+          if (algo)
+            log_info (_("assuming %s encrypted data\n"),
+                      openpgp_cipher_algo_name (algo));
+          else if (openpgp_cipher_test_algo (CIPHER_ALGO_IDEA))
+            {
+              algo = opt.def_cipher_algo;
+              if (!algo)
+                algo = opt.s2k_cipher_algo;
+              log_info (_("IDEA cipher unavailable, "
+                          "optimistically attempting to use %s instead\n"),
+                        openpgp_cipher_algo_name (algo));
+            }
+          else
+            {
+              algo = CIPHER_ALGO_IDEA;
+              if (!opt.s2k_digest_algo)
+                {
+                  /* If no digest is given we assume SHA-1. */
+                  s2kbuf.mode = 0;
+                  s2kbuf.hash_algo = DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1;
+                  s2k = &s2kbuf;
+                }
+              log_info (_("assuming %s encrypted data\n"), "IDEA");
+            }
+
+          c->dek = passphrase_to_dek (algo, s2k, 0, 0, NULL, &canceled);
+          if (c->dek)
+            c->dek->algo_info_printed = 1;
+          else if (canceled)
+            result = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_CANCELED);
+          else
+            result = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PASSPHRASE);
+        }
+    }
+  else if (!c->dek)
+    result = GPG_ERR_NO_SECKEY;
+
+  /* Compute compliance with CO_DE_VS.  */
+  if (!result && is_status_enabled ()
+      /* Symmetric encryption and asymmetric encryption voids compliance.  */
+      && (c->symkeys != !!c->pkenc_list )
+      /* Overriding session key voids compliance.  */
+      && !opt.override_session_key
+      /* Check symmetric cipher.  */
+      && gnupg_cipher_is_compliant (CO_DE_VS, c->dek->algo,
+                                    GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CFB))
+    {
+      struct kidlist_item *i;
+      int compliant = 1;
+      PKT_public_key *pk = xmalloc (sizeof *pk);
+
+      if ( !(c->pkenc_list || c->symkeys) )
+        log_debug ("%s: where else did the session key come from?\n", __func__);
+
+      /* Now check that every key used to encrypt the session key is
+       * compliant.  */
+      for (i = c->pkenc_list; i && compliant; i = i->next)
+        {
+          memset (pk, 0, sizeof *pk);
+          pk->pubkey_algo = i->pubkey_algo;
+          if (get_pubkey (c->ctrl, pk, i->kid) != 0
+              || ! gnupg_pk_is_compliant (CO_DE_VS, pk->pubkey_algo, 0,
+                                          pk->pkey, nbits_from_pk (pk), NULL))
+            compliant = 0;
+          release_public_key_parts (pk);
+        }
+
+      xfree (pk);
+
+      if (compliant)
+        write_status_strings (STATUS_DECRYPTION_COMPLIANCE_MODE,
+                              gnupg_status_compliance_flag (CO_DE_VS),
+                              NULL);
+
+    }
+
+
+  if (!result)
+    result = decrypt_data (c->ctrl, c, pkt->pkt.encrypted, c->dek );
+
+  /* Trigger the deferred error.  */
+  if (!result && early_plaintext)
+    result = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_DATA);
+
+  if (result == -1)
+    ;
+  else if (!result
+           && !opt.ignore_mdc_error
+           && !pkt->pkt.encrypted->mdc_method
+           && !pkt->pkt.encrypted->aead_algo)
+    {
+      /* The message has been decrypted but does not carry an MDC.
+       * The option --ignore-mdc-error has also not been used.  To
+       * avoid attacks changing an MDC message to a non-MDC message,
+       * we fail here.  */
+      log_error (_("WARNING: message was not integrity protected\n"));
+      if (!pkt->pkt.encrypted->mdc_method
+          && (openpgp_cipher_get_algo_blklen (c->dek->algo) == 8
+              || c->dek->algo == CIPHER_ALGO_TWOFISH))
+        {
+          /* Before 2.2.8 we did not fail hard for a missing MDC if
+           * one of the old ciphers where used.  Although these cases
+           * are rare in practice we print a hint on how to decrypt
+           * such messages.  */
+          log_string
+            (GPGRT_LOG_INFO,
+             _("Hint: If this message was created before the year 2003 it is\n"
+               "likely that this message is legitimate.  This is because back\n"
+               "then integrity protection was not widely used.\n"));
+          log_info (_("Use the option '%s' to decrypt anyway.\n"),
+                     "--ignore-mdc-error");
+          write_status_errcode ("nomdc_with_legacy_cipher",
+                                GPG_ERR_DECRYPT_FAILED);
+        }
+      log_info (_("decryption forced to fail!\n"));
+      write_status (STATUS_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
+    }
+  else if (!result || (gpg_err_code (result) == GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE
+                       && !pkt->pkt.encrypted->aead_algo
+                       && opt.ignore_mdc_error))
+    {
+      /* All is fine or for an MDC message the MDC failed but the
+       * --ignore-mdc-error option is active.  For compatibility
+       * reasons we issue GOODMDC also for AEAD messages.  */
+      write_status (STATUS_DECRYPTION_OKAY);
+      if (opt.verbose > 1)
+        log_info(_("decryption okay\n"));
+
+      if (pkt->pkt.encrypted->aead_algo)
+        write_status (STATUS_GOODMDC);
+      else if (pkt->pkt.encrypted->mdc_method && !result)
+        write_status (STATUS_GOODMDC);
+      else
+        log_info (_("WARNING: message was not integrity protected\n"));
+    }
+  else if (gpg_err_code (result) == GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE
+           || gpg_err_code (result) == GPG_ERR_TRUNCATED)
+    {
+      glo_ctrl.lasterr = result;
+      log_error (_("WARNING: encrypted message has been manipulated!\n"));
+      write_status (STATUS_BADMDC);
+      write_status (STATUS_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
+    }
+  else
+    {
+      if ((gpg_err_code (result) == GPG_ERR_BAD_KEY
+	   || gpg_err_code (result) == GPG_ERR_CHECKSUM
+	   || gpg_err_code (result) == GPG_ERR_CIPHER_ALGO)
+          && *c->dek->s2k_cacheid != '\0')
+        {
+          if (opt.debug)
+            log_debug ("cleared passphrase cached with ID: %s\n",
+                       c->dek->s2k_cacheid);
+          passphrase_clear_cache (c->dek->s2k_cacheid);
+        }
+      glo_ctrl.lasterr = result;
+      write_status (STATUS_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
+      log_error (_("decryption failed: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (result));
+      /* Hmmm: does this work when we have encrypted using multiple
+       * ways to specify the session key (symmmetric and PK). */
+    }
+
+  xfree (c->dek);
+  c->dek = NULL;
+  free_packet (pkt, NULL);
+  c->last_was_session_key = 0;
+  write_status (STATUS_END_DECRYPTION);
+
+  /* Bump the counter even if we have not seen a literal data packet
+   * inside an encryption container.  This acts as a sentinel in case
+   * a misplace extra literal data packets follows after this
+   * encrypted packet.  */
+  literals_seen++;
+}
+
+
+static int
+have_seen_pkt_encrypted_aead( CTX c )
+{
+  CTX cc;
+
+  for (cc = c; cc; cc = cc->anchor)
+    {
+      if (cc->seen_pkt_encrypted_aead)
+	return 1;
+    }
+
+  return 0;
+}
+
+
+static void
+proc_plaintext( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
+{
+  PKT_plaintext *pt = pkt->pkt.plaintext;
+  int any, clearsig, rc;
+  kbnode_t n;
+
+  /* This is a literal data packet.  Bumb a counter for later checks.  */
+  literals_seen++;
+
+  if (pt->namelen == 8 && !memcmp( pt->name, "_CONSOLE", 8))
+    log_info (_("Note: sender requested \"for-your-eyes-only\"\n"));
+  else if (opt.verbose)
+    {
+      /* We don't use print_utf8_buffer because that would require a
+       * string change which we don't want in 2.2.  It is also not
+       * clear whether the filename is always utf-8 encoded.  */
+      char *tmp = make_printable_string (pt->name, pt->namelen, 0);
+      log_info (_("original file name='%.*s'\n"), (int)strlen (tmp), tmp);
+      xfree (tmp);
+    }
+
+  free_md_filter_context (&c->mfx);
+  if (gcry_md_open (&c->mfx.md, 0, 0))
+    BUG ();
+  /* fixme: we may need to push the textfilter if we have sigclass 1
+   * and no armoring - Not yet tested
+   * Hmmm, why don't we need it at all if we have sigclass 1
+   * Should we assume that plaintext in mode 't' has always sigclass 1??
+   * See: Russ Allbery's mail 1999-02-09
+   */
+  any = clearsig = 0;
+  for (n=c->list; n; n = n->next )
+    {
+      if (n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_ONEPASS_SIG)
+        {
+          /* The onepass signature case. */
+          if (n->pkt->pkt.onepass_sig->digest_algo)
+            {
+              if (!opt.skip_verify)
+                gcry_md_enable (c->mfx.md,
+                                n->pkt->pkt.onepass_sig->digest_algo);
+
+              any = 1;
+            }
+        }
+      else if (n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_GPG_CONTROL
+               && n->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control == CTRLPKT_CLEARSIGN_START)
+        {
+          /* The clearsigned message case. */
+          size_t datalen = n->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->datalen;
+          const byte *data = n->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->data;
+
+          /* Check that we have at least the sigclass and one hash.  */
+          if  (datalen < 2)
+            log_fatal ("invalid control packet CTRLPKT_CLEARSIGN_START\n");
+          /* Note that we don't set the clearsig flag for not-dash-escaped
+           * documents.  */
+          clearsig = (*data == 0x01);
+          for (data++, datalen--; datalen; datalen--, data++)
+            if (!opt.skip_verify)
+              gcry_md_enable (c->mfx.md, *data);
+          any = 1;
+          break;  /* Stop here as one-pass signature packets are not
+                     expected.  */
+        }
+      else if (n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE)
+        {
+          /* The SIG+LITERAL case that PGP used to use.  */
+          if (!opt.skip_verify)
+            gcry_md_enable (c->mfx.md, n->pkt->pkt.signature->digest_algo);
+          any = 1;
+        }
+    }
+
+  if (!any && !opt.skip_verify && !have_seen_pkt_encrypted_aead(c))
+    {
+      /* This is for the old GPG LITERAL+SIG case.  It's not legal
+         according to 2440, so hopefully it won't come up that often.
+         There is no good way to specify what algorithms to use in
+         that case, so these there are the historical answer. */
+	gcry_md_enable (c->mfx.md, DIGEST_ALGO_RMD160);
+	gcry_md_enable (c->mfx.md, DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1);
+    }
+  if (DBG_HASHING)
+    {
+      gcry_md_debug (c->mfx.md, "verify");
+      if (c->mfx.md2)
+        gcry_md_debug (c->mfx.md2, "verify2");
+    }
+
+  rc=0;
+
+  if (literals_seen > 1)
+    {
+      log_info (_("WARNING: multiple plaintexts seen\n"));
+
+      if (!opt.flags.allow_multiple_messages)
+        {
+          write_status_text (STATUS_ERROR, "proc_pkt.plaintext 89_BAD_DATA");
+          log_inc_errorcount ();
+          rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNEXPECTED);
+        }
+    }
+
+  if (!rc)
+    {
+      /* It we are in --verify mode, we do not want to output the
+       * signed text.  However, if --output is also used we do what
+       * has been requested and write out the signed data.  */
+      rc = handle_plaintext (pt, &c->mfx,
+                             (opt.outfp || opt.outfile)? 0 :  c->sigs_only,
+                             clearsig);
+      if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_EACCES && !c->sigs_only)
+        {
+          /* Can't write output but we hash it anyway to check the
+             signature. */
+          rc = handle_plaintext( pt, &c->mfx, 1, clearsig );
+        }
+    }
+
+  if (rc)
+    log_error ("handle plaintext failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
+
+  free_packet (pkt, NULL);
+  c->last_was_session_key = 0;
+
+  /* We add a marker control packet instead of the plaintext packet.
+   * This is so that we can later detect invalid packet sequences.  */
+  n = new_kbnode (create_gpg_control (CTRLPKT_PLAINTEXT_MARK, NULL, 0));
+  if (c->list)
+    add_kbnode (c->list, n);
+  else
+    c->list = n;
+}
+
+
+static int
+proc_compressed_cb (iobuf_t a, void *info)
+{
+  if ( ((CTX)info)->signed_data.used
+       && ((CTX)info)->signed_data.data_fd != -1)
+    return proc_signature_packets_by_fd (((CTX)info)->ctrl, info, a,
+                                         ((CTX)info)->signed_data.data_fd);
+  else
+    return proc_signature_packets (((CTX)info)->ctrl, info, a,
+                                   ((CTX)info)->signed_data.data_names,
+                                   ((CTX)info)->sigfilename );
+}
+
+
+static int
+proc_encrypt_cb (iobuf_t a, void *info )
+{
+  CTX c = info;
+  return proc_encryption_packets (c->ctrl, info, a );
+}
+
+
+static int
+proc_compressed (CTX c, PACKET *pkt)
+{
+  PKT_compressed *zd = pkt->pkt.compressed;
+  int rc;
+
+  /*printf("zip: compressed data packet\n");*/
+  if (c->sigs_only)
+    rc = handle_compressed (c->ctrl, c, zd, proc_compressed_cb, c);
+  else if( c->encrypt_only )
+    rc = handle_compressed (c->ctrl, c, zd, proc_encrypt_cb, c);
+  else
+    rc = handle_compressed (c->ctrl, c, zd, NULL, NULL);
+
+  if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_BAD_DATA)
+    {
+      if  (!c->any.uncompress_failed)
+        {
+          CTX cc;
+
+          for (cc=c; cc; cc = cc->anchor)
+            cc->any.uncompress_failed = 1;
+          log_error ("uncompressing failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
+        }
+    }
+  else if (rc)
+    log_error ("uncompressing failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
+
+  free_packet (pkt, NULL);
+  c->last_was_session_key = 0;
+  return rc;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Check the signature.  If R_PK is not NULL a copy of the public key
+ * used to verify the signature will be stored there, or NULL if not
+ * found.  If FORCED_PK is not NULL, this public key is used to verify
+ * _data signatures_ and no key lookup is done.  Returns: 0 = valid
+ * signature or an error code
+ */
+static int
+do_check_sig (CTX c, kbnode_t node,
+              PKT_public_key *forced_pk, int *is_selfsig,
+	      int *is_expkey, int *is_revkey, PKT_public_key **r_pk)
+{
+  PKT_signature *sig;
+  gcry_md_hd_t md = NULL;
+  gcry_md_hd_t md2 = NULL;
+  gcry_md_hd_t md_good = NULL;
+  int algo, rc;
+
+  if (r_pk)
+    *r_pk = NULL;
+
+  log_assert (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE);
+  if (is_selfsig)
+    *is_selfsig = 0;
+  sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
+
+  algo = sig->digest_algo;
+  rc = openpgp_md_test_algo (algo);
+  if (rc)
+    return rc;
+
+  if (sig->sig_class == 0x00)
+    {
+      if (c->mfx.md)
+        {
+          if (gcry_md_copy (&md, c->mfx.md ))
+            BUG ();
+        }
+      else /* detached signature */
+        {
+          /* check_signature() will enable the md. */
+          if (gcry_md_open (&md, 0, 0 ))
+            BUG ();
+        }
+    }
+  else if (sig->sig_class == 0x01)
+    {
+      /* How do we know that we have to hash the (already hashed) text
+         in canonical mode ??? (calculating both modes???) */
+      if (c->mfx.md)
+        {
+          if (gcry_md_copy (&md, c->mfx.md ))
+            BUG ();
+          if (c->mfx.md2 && gcry_md_copy (&md2, c->mfx.md2))
+            BUG ();
+	}
+      else /* detached signature */
+        {
+          log_debug ("Do we really need this here?");
+          /* check_signature() will enable the md*/
+          if (gcry_md_open (&md, 0, 0 ))
+            BUG ();
+          if (gcry_md_open (&md2, 0, 0 ))
+            BUG ();
+	}
+    }
+  else if ((sig->sig_class&~3) == 0x10
+           ||   sig->sig_class == 0x18
+           ||   sig->sig_class == 0x1f
+	   ||   sig->sig_class == 0x20
+	   ||   sig->sig_class == 0x28
+           ||   sig->sig_class == 0x30)
+    {
+      if (c->list->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
+          || c->list->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
+        {
+          return check_key_signature (c->ctrl, c->list, node, is_selfsig);
+	}
+      else if (sig->sig_class == 0x20)
+        {
+          log_error (_("standalone revocation - "
+                       "use \"gpg --import\" to apply\n"));
+          return GPG_ERR_NOT_PROCESSED;
+	}
+      else
+        {
+          log_error ("invalid root packet for sigclass %02x\n", sig->sig_class);
+          return GPG_ERR_SIG_CLASS;
+	}
+    }
+  else
+    return GPG_ERR_SIG_CLASS;
+
+  /* We only get here if we are checking the signature of a binary
+     (0x00) or text document (0x01).  */
+  rc = check_signature2 (c->ctrl, sig, md,
+                         forced_pk,
+                         NULL, is_expkey, is_revkey, r_pk);
+  if (! rc)
+    md_good = md;
+  else if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE && md2)
+    {
+      PKT_public_key *pk2;
+
+      rc = check_signature2 (c->ctrl, sig, md2,
+                             forced_pk,
+                             NULL, is_expkey, is_revkey,
+                             r_pk? &pk2 : NULL);
+      if (!rc)
+        {
+          md_good = md2;
+          if (r_pk)
+            {
+              free_public_key (*r_pk);
+              *r_pk = pk2;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+  if (md_good)
+    {
+      unsigned char *buffer = gcry_md_read (md_good, sig->digest_algo);
+      sig->digest_len = gcry_md_get_algo_dlen (map_md_openpgp_to_gcry (algo));
+      memcpy (sig->digest, buffer, sig->digest_len);
+    }
+
+  gcry_md_close (md);
+  gcry_md_close (md2);
+
+  return rc;
+}
+
+
+static void
+print_userid (PACKET *pkt)
+{
+  if (!pkt)
+    BUG();
+
+  if (pkt->pkttype != PKT_USER_ID)
+    {
+      es_printf ("ERROR: unexpected packet type %d", pkt->pkttype );
+      return;
+    }
+  if (opt.with_colons)
+    {
+      if (pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data)
+        es_printf("%u %lu",
+                  pkt->pkt.user_id->numattribs,
+                  pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_len);
+      else
+        es_write_sanitized (es_stdout, pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
+                            pkt->pkt.user_id->len, ":", NULL);
+    }
+  else
+    print_utf8_buffer (es_stdout, pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
+                       pkt->pkt.user_id->len );
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * List the keyblock in a user friendly way
+ */
+static void
+list_node (CTX c, kbnode_t node)
+{
+  if (!node)
+    ;
+  else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
+           || node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
+    {
+      PKT_public_key *pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
+
+      if (opt.with_colons)
+        {
+          u32 keyid[2];
+
+          keyid_from_pk( pk, keyid );
+          if (pk->flags.primary)
+            c->trustletter = (opt.fast_list_mode
+                              ? 0
+                              : get_validity_info
+                                  (c->ctrl,
+                                   node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
+                                   ? node : NULL,
+                                   pk, NULL));
+          es_printf ("%s:", pk->flags.primary? "pub":"sub" );
+          if (c->trustletter)
+            es_putc (c->trustletter, es_stdout);
+          es_printf (":%u:%d:%08lX%08lX:%s:%s::",
+                     nbits_from_pk( pk ),
+                     pk->pubkey_algo,
+                     (ulong)keyid[0],(ulong)keyid[1],
+                     colon_datestr_from_pk( pk ),
+                     colon_strtime (pk->expiredate) );
+          if (pk->flags.primary && !opt.fast_list_mode)
+            es_putc (get_ownertrust_info (c->ctrl, pk, 1), es_stdout);
+          es_putc (':', es_stdout);
+          es_putc ('\n', es_stdout);
+        }
+      else
+        {
+          print_key_line (c->ctrl, es_stdout, pk, 0);
+        }
+
+      if (opt.keyid_format == KF_NONE && !opt.with_colons)
+        ; /* Already printed.  */
+      else if ((pk->flags.primary && opt.fingerprint) || opt.fingerprint > 1)
+        print_fingerprint (c->ctrl, NULL, pk, 0);
+
+      if (pk->flags.primary)
+        {
+          int kl = opt.keyid_format == KF_NONE? 0 : keystrlen ();
+
+          /* Now list all userids with their signatures. */
+          for (node = node->next; node; node = node->next)
+            {
+              if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE)
+                {
+                  list_node (c,  node );
+                }
+              else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
+                {
+                  if (opt.with_colons)
+                    es_printf ("%s:::::::::",
+                               node->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data?"uat":"uid");
+                  else
+                    es_printf ("uid%*s",
+                               kl + (opt.legacy_list_mode? 9:11),
+                               "" );
+                  print_userid (node->pkt);
+                  if (opt.with_colons)
+                    es_putc (':', es_stdout);
+                  es_putc ('\n', es_stdout);
+		}
+              else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
+                {
+                  list_node(c,  node );
+                }
+            }
+        }
+    }
+  else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY
+           || node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY)
+    {
+
+      log_debug ("FIXME: No way to print secret key packets here\n");
+      /* fixme: We may use a function to turn a secret key packet into
+         a public key one and use that here.  */
+    }
+  else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE)
+    {
+      PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
+      int is_selfsig = 0;
+      int rc2 = 0;
+      size_t n;
+      char *p;
+      int sigrc = ' ';
+
+      if (!opt.verbose)
+        return;
+
+      if (sig->sig_class == 0x20 || sig->sig_class == 0x30)
+        es_fputs ("rev", es_stdout);
+      else
+        es_fputs ("sig", es_stdout);
+      if (opt.check_sigs)
+        {
+          fflush (stdout);
+          rc2 = do_check_sig (c, node, NULL, &is_selfsig, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+          switch (gpg_err_code (rc2))
+            {
+            case 0:		          sigrc = '!'; break;
+            case GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE:   sigrc = '-'; break;
+            case GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY:
+            case GPG_ERR_UNUSABLE_PUBKEY: sigrc = '?'; break;
+            default:		          sigrc = '%'; break;
+	    }
+	}
+      else /* Check whether this is a self signature.  */
+        {
+          u32 keyid[2];
+
+          if (c->list->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
+              || c->list->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY )
+            {
+              keyid_from_pk (c->list->pkt->pkt.public_key, keyid);
+
+              if (keyid[0] == sig->keyid[0] && keyid[1] == sig->keyid[1])
+                is_selfsig = 1;
+            }
+	}
+
+      if (opt.with_colons)
+        {
+          es_putc (':', es_stdout);
+          if (sigrc != ' ')
+            es_putc (sigrc, es_stdout);
+          es_printf ("::%d:%08lX%08lX:%s:%s:", sig->pubkey_algo,
+                     (ulong)sig->keyid[0], (ulong)sig->keyid[1],
+                     colon_datestr_from_sig (sig),
+                     colon_expirestr_from_sig (sig));
+
+          if (sig->trust_depth || sig->trust_value)
+            es_printf ("%d %d",sig->trust_depth,sig->trust_value);
+          es_putc (':', es_stdout);
+
+          if (sig->trust_regexp)
+            es_write_sanitized (es_stdout, sig->trust_regexp,
+                                strlen (sig->trust_regexp), ":", NULL);
+          es_putc (':', es_stdout);
+	}
+      else
+        es_printf ("%c       %s %s   ",
+                   sigrc, keystr (sig->keyid), datestr_from_sig(sig));
+      if (sigrc == '%')
+        es_printf ("[%s] ", gpg_strerror (rc2) );
+      else if (sigrc == '?')
+        ;
+      else if (is_selfsig)
+        {
+          if (opt.with_colons)
+            es_putc (':', es_stdout);
+          es_fputs (sig->sig_class == 0x18? "[keybind]":"[selfsig]", es_stdout);
+          if (opt.with_colons)
+            es_putc (':', es_stdout);
+	}
+      else if (!opt.fast_list_mode)
+        {
+          p = get_user_id (c->ctrl, sig->keyid, &n, NULL);
+          es_write_sanitized (es_stdout, p, n,
+                              opt.with_colons?":":NULL, NULL );
+          xfree (p);
+	}
+      if (opt.with_colons)
+        es_printf (":%02x%c:", sig->sig_class, sig->flags.exportable?'x':'l');
+      es_putc ('\n', es_stdout);
+    }
+  else
+    log_error ("invalid node with packet of type %d\n", node->pkt->pkttype);
+}
+
+
+int
+proc_packets (ctrl_t ctrl, void *anchor, iobuf_t a )
+{
+  int rc;
+  CTX c = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *c);
+
+  c->ctrl = ctrl;
+  c->anchor = anchor;
+  rc = do_proc_packets (ctrl, c, a);
+  xfree (c);
+
+  return rc;
+}
+
+
+int
+proc_signature_packets (ctrl_t ctrl, void *anchor, iobuf_t a,
+			strlist_t signedfiles, const char *sigfilename )
+{
+  CTX c = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *c);
+  int rc;
+
+  c->ctrl = ctrl;
+  c->anchor = anchor;
+  c->sigs_only = 1;
+
+  c->signed_data.data_fd = -1;
+  c->signed_data.data_names = signedfiles;
+  c->signed_data.used = !!signedfiles;
+
+  c->sigfilename = sigfilename;
+  rc = do_proc_packets (ctrl, c, a);
+
+  /* If we have not encountered any signature we print an error
+     messages, send a NODATA status back and return an error code.
+     Using log_error is required because verify_files does not check
+     error codes for each file but we want to terminate the process
+     with an error. */
+  if (!rc && !c->any.sig_seen)
+    {
+      write_status_text (STATUS_NODATA, "4");
+      log_error (_("no signature found\n"));
+      rc = GPG_ERR_NO_DATA;
+    }
+
+  /* Propagate the signature seen flag upward. Do this only on success
+     so that we won't issue the nodata status several times.  */
+  if (!rc && c->anchor && c->any.sig_seen)
+    c->anchor->any.sig_seen = 1;
+
+  xfree (c);
+  return rc;
+}
+
+
+int
+proc_signature_packets_by_fd (ctrl_t ctrl,
+                              void *anchor, iobuf_t a, int signed_data_fd )
+{
+  int rc;
+  CTX c;
+
+  c = xtrycalloc (1, sizeof *c);
+  if (!c)
+    return gpg_error_from_syserror ();
+
+  c->ctrl = ctrl;
+  c->anchor = anchor;
+  c->sigs_only = 1;
+
+  c->signed_data.data_fd = signed_data_fd;
+  c->signed_data.data_names = NULL;
+  c->signed_data.used = (signed_data_fd != -1);
+
+  rc = do_proc_packets (ctrl, c, a);
+
+  /* If we have not encountered any signature we print an error
+     messages, send a NODATA status back and return an error code.
+     Using log_error is required because verify_files does not check
+     error codes for each file but we want to terminate the process
+     with an error. */
+  if (!rc && !c->any.sig_seen)
+    {
+      write_status_text (STATUS_NODATA, "4");
+      log_error (_("no signature found\n"));
+      rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_DATA);
+    }
+
+  /* Propagate the signature seen flag upward. Do this only on success
+     so that we won't issue the nodata status several times. */
+  if (!rc && c->anchor && c->any.sig_seen)
+    c->anchor->any.sig_seen = 1;
+
+  xfree ( c );
+  return rc;
+}
+
+
+int
+proc_encryption_packets (ctrl_t ctrl, void *anchor, iobuf_t a )
+{
+  CTX c = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *c);
+  int rc;
+
+  c->ctrl = ctrl;
+  c->anchor = anchor;
+  c->encrypt_only = 1;
+  rc = do_proc_packets (ctrl, c, a);
+  xfree (c);
+  return rc;
+}
+
+
+static int
+check_nesting (CTX c)
+{
+  int level;
+
+  for (level=0; c; c = c->anchor)
+    level++;
+
+  if (level > MAX_NESTING_DEPTH)
+    {
+      log_error ("input data with too deeply nested packets\n");
+      write_status_text (STATUS_UNEXPECTED, "1");
+      return GPG_ERR_BAD_DATA;
+    }
+
+  return 0;
+}
+
+
+static int
+do_proc_packets (ctrl_t ctrl, CTX c, iobuf_t a)
+{
+  PACKET *pkt;
+  struct parse_packet_ctx_s parsectx;
+  int rc = 0;
+  int any_data = 0;
+  int newpkt;
+
+  rc = check_nesting (c);
+  if (rc)
+    return rc;
+
+  pkt = xmalloc( sizeof *pkt );
+  c->iobuf = a;
+  init_packet(pkt);
+  init_parse_packet (&parsectx, a);
+  while ((rc=parse_packet (&parsectx, pkt)) != -1)
+    {
+      any_data = 1;
+      if (rc)
+        {
+          free_packet (pkt, &parsectx);
+          /* Stop processing when an invalid packet has been encountered
+           * but don't do so when we are doing a --list-packets.  */
+          if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET
+              && opt.list_packets == 0)
+            break;
+          continue;
+	}
+      newpkt = -1;
+      if (opt.list_packets)
+        {
+          switch (pkt->pkttype)
+            {
+            case PKT_PUBKEY_ENC:    proc_pubkey_enc (ctrl, c, pkt); break;
+            case PKT_SYMKEY_ENC:    proc_symkey_enc (c, pkt); break;
+            case PKT_ENCRYPTED:
+            case PKT_ENCRYPTED_MDC:
+            case PKT_ENCRYPTED_AEAD:proc_encrypted (c, pkt); break;
+            case PKT_COMPRESSED:    rc = proc_compressed (c, pkt); break;
+            default: newpkt = 0; break;
+	    }
+	}
+      else if (c->sigs_only)
+        {
+          switch (pkt->pkttype)
+            {
+            case PKT_PUBLIC_KEY:
+            case PKT_SECRET_KEY:
+            case PKT_USER_ID:
+            case PKT_SYMKEY_ENC:
+            case PKT_PUBKEY_ENC:
+            case PKT_ENCRYPTED:
+            case PKT_ENCRYPTED_MDC:
+            case PKT_ENCRYPTED_AEAD:
+              write_status_text( STATUS_UNEXPECTED, "0" );
+              rc = GPG_ERR_UNEXPECTED;
+              goto leave;
+
+            case PKT_SIGNATURE:   newpkt = add_signature (c, pkt); break;
+            case PKT_PLAINTEXT:   proc_plaintext (c, pkt); break;
+            case PKT_COMPRESSED:  rc = proc_compressed (c, pkt); break;
+            case PKT_ONEPASS_SIG: newpkt = add_onepass_sig (c, pkt); break;
+            case PKT_GPG_CONTROL: newpkt = add_gpg_control (c, pkt); break;
+            default: newpkt = 0; break;
+	    }
+	}
+      else if (c->encrypt_only)
+        {
+          switch (pkt->pkttype)
+            {
+            case PKT_PUBLIC_KEY:
+            case PKT_SECRET_KEY:
+            case PKT_USER_ID:
+              write_status_text (STATUS_UNEXPECTED, "0");
+              rc = GPG_ERR_UNEXPECTED;
+              goto leave;
+
+            case PKT_SIGNATURE:   newpkt = add_signature (c, pkt); break;
+            case PKT_SYMKEY_ENC:  proc_symkey_enc (c, pkt); break;
+            case PKT_PUBKEY_ENC:  proc_pubkey_enc (ctrl, c, pkt); break;
+            case PKT_ENCRYPTED:
+            case PKT_ENCRYPTED_MDC:
+            case PKT_ENCRYPTED_AEAD: proc_encrypted (c, pkt); break;
+            case PKT_PLAINTEXT:   proc_plaintext (c, pkt); break;
+            case PKT_COMPRESSED:  rc = proc_compressed (c, pkt); break;
+            case PKT_ONEPASS_SIG: newpkt = add_onepass_sig (c, pkt); break;
+            case PKT_GPG_CONTROL: newpkt = add_gpg_control (c, pkt); break;
+            default: newpkt = 0; break;
+	    }
+	}
+      else
+        {
+          switch (pkt->pkttype)
+            {
+            case PKT_PUBLIC_KEY:
+            case PKT_SECRET_KEY:
+              release_list (c);
+              c->list = new_kbnode (pkt);
+              newpkt = 1;
+              break;
+            case PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY:
+            case PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY:
+              newpkt = add_subkey (c, pkt);
+              break;
+            case PKT_USER_ID:     newpkt = add_user_id (c, pkt); break;
+            case PKT_SIGNATURE:   newpkt = add_signature (c, pkt); break;
+            case PKT_PUBKEY_ENC:  proc_pubkey_enc (ctrl, c, pkt); break;
+            case PKT_SYMKEY_ENC:  proc_symkey_enc (c, pkt); break;
+            case PKT_ENCRYPTED:
+            case PKT_ENCRYPTED_MDC:
+            case PKT_ENCRYPTED_AEAD: proc_encrypted (c, pkt); break;
+            case PKT_PLAINTEXT:   proc_plaintext (c, pkt); break;
+            case PKT_COMPRESSED:  rc = proc_compressed (c, pkt); break;
+            case PKT_ONEPASS_SIG: newpkt = add_onepass_sig (c, pkt); break;
+            case PKT_GPG_CONTROL: newpkt = add_gpg_control(c, pkt); break;
+            case PKT_RING_TRUST:  newpkt = add_ring_trust (c, pkt); break;
+            default: newpkt = 0; break;
+	    }
+	}
+
+      if (rc)
+        goto leave;
+
+      /* This is a very ugly construct and frankly, I don't remember why
+       * I used it.  Adding the MDC check here is a hack.
+       * The right solution is to initiate another context for encrypted
+       * packet and not to reuse the current one ...  It works right
+       * when there is a compression packet between which adds just
+       * an extra layer.
+       * Hmmm: Rewrite this whole module here??
+       */
+      if (pkt->pkttype != PKT_SIGNATURE && pkt->pkttype != PKT_MDC)
+        c->any.data = (pkt->pkttype == PKT_PLAINTEXT);
+
+      if (newpkt == -1)
+        ;
+      else if (newpkt)
+        {
+          pkt = xmalloc (sizeof *pkt);
+          init_packet (pkt);
+	}
+      else
+        free_packet (pkt, &parsectx);
+    }
+
+  if (rc == GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET)
+    write_status_text (STATUS_NODATA, "3");
+
+  if (any_data)
+    rc = 0;
+  else if (rc == -1)
+    write_status_text (STATUS_NODATA, "2");
+
+
+ leave:
+  release_list (c);
+  xfree(c->dek);
+  free_packet (pkt, &parsectx);
+  deinit_parse_packet (&parsectx);
+  xfree (pkt);
+  free_md_filter_context (&c->mfx);
+  return rc;
+}
+
+
+/* Helper for pka_uri_from_sig to parse the to-be-verified address out
+   of the notation data. */
+static pka_info_t *
+get_pka_address (PKT_signature *sig)
+{
+  pka_info_t *pka = NULL;
+  struct notation *nd,*notation;
+
+  notation=sig_to_notation(sig);
+
+  for(nd=notation;nd;nd=nd->next)
+    {
+      if(strcmp(nd->name,"pka-address@gnupg.org")!=0)
+        continue; /* Not the notation we want. */
+
+      /* For now we only use the first valid PKA notation. In future
+	 we might want to keep additional PKA notations in a linked
+	 list. */
+      if (is_valid_mailbox (nd->value))
+	{
+	  pka = xmalloc (sizeof *pka + strlen(nd->value));
+	  pka->valid = 0;
+	  pka->checked = 0;
+	  pka->uri = NULL;
+	  strcpy (pka->email, nd->value);
+	  break;
+	}
+    }
+
+  free_notation(notation);
+
+  return pka;
+}
+
+
+/* Return the URI from a DNS PKA record.  If this record has already
+   be retrieved for the signature we merely return it; if not we go
+   out and try to get that DNS record. */
+static const char *
+pka_uri_from_sig (CTX c, PKT_signature *sig)
+{
+  if (!sig->flags.pka_tried)
+    {
+      log_assert (!sig->pka_info);
+      sig->flags.pka_tried = 1;
+      sig->pka_info = get_pka_address (sig);
+      if (sig->pka_info)
+        {
+          char *url;
+          unsigned char *fpr;
+          size_t fprlen;
+
+          if (!gpg_dirmngr_get_pka (c->ctrl, sig->pka_info->email,
+                                    &fpr, &fprlen, &url))
+            {
+              if (fpr && fprlen == sizeof sig->pka_info->fpr)
+                {
+                  memcpy (sig->pka_info->fpr, fpr, fprlen);
+                  if (url)
+                    {
+                      sig->pka_info->valid = 1;
+                      if (!*url)
+                        xfree (url);
+                      else
+                        sig->pka_info->uri = url;
+                      url = NULL;
+                    }
+                }
+              xfree (fpr);
+              xfree (url);
+            }
+        }
+    }
+  return sig->pka_info? sig->pka_info->uri : NULL;
+}
+
+
+/* Return true if the AKL has the WKD method specified.  */
+static int
+akl_has_wkd_method (void)
+{
+  struct akl *akl;
+
+  for (akl = opt.auto_key_locate; akl; akl = akl->next)
+    if (akl->type == AKL_WKD)
+      return 1;
+  return 0;
+}
+
+
+/* Return the ISSUER fingerprint buffer and its lenbgth at R_LEN.
+ * Returns NULL if not available.  The returned buffer is valid as
+ * long as SIG is not modified.  */
+const byte *
+issuer_fpr_raw (PKT_signature *sig, size_t *r_len)
+{
+  const byte *p;
+  size_t n;
+
+  p = parse_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_ISSUER_FPR, &n);
+  if (p && n == 21 && p[0] == 4)
+    {
+      *r_len = n - 1;
+      return p+1;
+    }
+  *r_len = 0;
+  return NULL;
+}
+
+
+/* Return the ISSUER fingerprint string in human readable format if
+ * available.  Caller must release the string.  */
+/* FIXME: Move to another file.  */
+char *
+issuer_fpr_string (PKT_signature *sig)
+{
+  const byte *p;
+  size_t n;
+
+  p = issuer_fpr_raw (sig, &n);
+  return p? bin2hex (p, n, NULL) : NULL;
+}
+
+
+static void
+print_good_bad_signature (int statno, const char *keyid_str, kbnode_t un,
+                          PKT_signature *sig, int rc)
+{
+  char *p;
+
+  write_status_text_and_buffer (statno, keyid_str,
+                                un? un->pkt->pkt.user_id->name:"[?]",
+                                un? un->pkt->pkt.user_id->len:3,
+                                -1);
+
+  if (un)
+    p = utf8_to_native (un->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
+                        un->pkt->pkt.user_id->len, 0);
+  else
+    p = xstrdup ("[?]");
+
+  if (rc)
+    log_info (_("BAD signature from \"%s\""), p);
+  else if (sig->flags.expired)
+    log_info (_("Expired signature from \"%s\""), p);
+  else
+    log_info (_("Good signature from \"%s\""), p);
+
+  xfree (p);
+}
+
+
+static int
+check_sig_and_print (CTX c, kbnode_t node)
+{
+  PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
+  const char *astr;
+  int rc;
+  int is_expkey = 0;
+  int is_revkey = 0;
+  char *issuer_fpr = NULL;
+  PKT_public_key *pk = NULL;  /* The public key for the signature or NULL. */
+  kbnode_t included_keyblock = NULL;
+
+  if (opt.skip_verify)
+    {
+      log_info(_("signature verification suppressed\n"));
+      return 0;
+    }
+
+  /* Check that the message composition is valid.
+   *
+   * Per RFC-2440bis (-15) allowed:
+   *
+   * S{1,n}           -- detached signature.
+   * S{1,n} P         -- old style PGP2 signature
+   * O{1,n} P S{1,n}  -- standard OpenPGP signature.
+   * C P S{1,n}       -- cleartext signature.
+   *
+   *
+   *      O = One-Pass Signature packet.
+   *      S = Signature packet.
+   *      P = OpenPGP Message packet (Encrypted | Compressed | Literal)
+   *             (Note that the current rfc2440bis draft also allows
+   *              for a signed message but that does not work as it
+   *              introduces ambiguities.)
+   *          We keep track of these packages using the marker packet
+   *          CTRLPKT_PLAINTEXT_MARK.
+   *      C = Marker packet for cleartext signatures.
+   *
+   * We reject all other messages.
+   *
+   * Actually we are calling this too often, i.e. for verification of
+   * each message but better have some duplicate work than to silently
+   * introduce a bug here.
+   */
+  {
+    kbnode_t n;
+    int n_onepass, n_sig;
+
+/*     log_debug ("checking signature packet composition\n"); */
+/*     dump_kbnode (c->list); */
+
+    n = c->list;
+    log_assert (n);
+    if ( n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE )
+      {
+        /* This is either "S{1,n}" case (detached signature) or
+           "S{1,n} P" (old style PGP2 signature). */
+        for (n = n->next; n; n = n->next)
+          if (n->pkt->pkttype != PKT_SIGNATURE)
+            break;
+        if (!n)
+          ; /* Okay, this is a detached signature.  */
+        else if (n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_GPG_CONTROL
+                 && (n->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control
+                     == CTRLPKT_PLAINTEXT_MARK) )
+          {
+            if (n->next)
+              goto ambiguous;  /* We only allow one P packet. */
+          }
+        else
+          goto ambiguous;
+      }
+    else if (n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_ONEPASS_SIG)
+      {
+        /* This is the "O{1,n} P S{1,n}" case (standard signature). */
+        for (n_onepass=1, n = n->next;
+             n && n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_ONEPASS_SIG; n = n->next)
+          n_onepass++;
+        if (!n || !(n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_GPG_CONTROL
+                    && (n->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control
+                        == CTRLPKT_PLAINTEXT_MARK)))
+          goto ambiguous;
+        for (n_sig=0, n = n->next;
+             n && n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE; n = n->next)
+          n_sig++;
+        if (!n_sig)
+          goto ambiguous;
+
+	/* If we wanted to disallow multiple sig verification, we'd do
+	   something like this:
+
+	   if (n && !opt.allow_multisig_verification)
+             goto ambiguous;
+
+	   However, now that we have --allow-multiple-messages, this
+	   can stay allowable as we can't get here unless multiple
+	   messages (i.e. multiple literals) are allowed. */
+
+        if (n_onepass != n_sig)
+          {
+            log_info ("number of one-pass packets does not match "
+                      "number of signature packets\n");
+            goto ambiguous;
+          }
+      }
+    else if (n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_GPG_CONTROL
+             && n->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control == CTRLPKT_CLEARSIGN_START )
+      {
+        /* This is the "C P S{1,n}" case (clear text signature). */
+        n = n->next;
+        if (!n || !(n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_GPG_CONTROL
+                    && (n->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control
+                        == CTRLPKT_PLAINTEXT_MARK)))
+          goto ambiguous;
+        for (n_sig=0, n = n->next;
+             n && n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE; n = n->next)
+          n_sig++;
+        if (n || !n_sig)
+          goto ambiguous;
+      }
+    else
+      {
+      ambiguous:
+        log_error(_("can't handle this ambiguous signature data\n"));
+        return 0;
+      }
+  }
+
+  if (sig->signers_uid)
+    write_status_buffer (STATUS_NEWSIG,
+                         sig->signers_uid, strlen (sig->signers_uid), 0);
+  else
+    write_status_text (STATUS_NEWSIG, NULL);
+
+  astr = openpgp_pk_algo_name ( sig->pubkey_algo );
+  issuer_fpr = issuer_fpr_string (sig);
+
+  if (issuer_fpr)
+    {
+      log_info (_("Signature made %s\n"), asctimestamp(sig->timestamp));
+      log_info (_("               using %s key %s\n"),
+                astr? astr: "?", issuer_fpr);
+
+    }
+  else if (!keystrlen () || keystrlen () > 8)
+    {
+      log_info (_("Signature made %s\n"), asctimestamp(sig->timestamp));
+      log_info (_("               using %s key %s\n"),
+                astr? astr: "?", keystr(sig->keyid));
+    }
+  else /* Legacy format.  */
+    log_info (_("Signature made %s using %s key ID %s\n"),
+              asctimestamp(sig->timestamp), astr? astr: "?",
+              keystr(sig->keyid));
+
+  /* In verbose mode print the signers UID.  */
+  if (sig->signers_uid)
+    log_info (_("               issuer \"%s\"\n"), sig->signers_uid);
+
+  rc = do_check_sig (c, node, NULL, NULL, &is_expkey, &is_revkey, &pk);
+
+  /* If the key is not found but the signature includes a key block we
+   * use that key block for verification and on success import it.  */
+  if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY
+      && sig->flags.key_block
+      && opt.flags.auto_key_import)
+    {
+      PKT_public_key *included_pk;
+      const byte *kblock;
+      size_t kblock_len;
+
+      included_pk = xcalloc (1, sizeof *included_pk);
+      kblock = parse_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_KEY_BLOCK, &kblock_len);
+      if (kblock && kblock_len > 1
+          && !get_pubkey_from_buffer (c->ctrl, included_pk,
+                                      kblock+1, kblock_len-1,
+                                      sig->keyid, &included_keyblock))
+        {
+          rc = do_check_sig (c, node, included_pk,
+                             NULL, &is_expkey, &is_revkey, &pk);
+          if (!rc)
+            {
+              /* The keyblock has been verified, we now import it.  */
+              rc = import_included_key_block (c->ctrl, included_keyblock);
+            }
+
+        }
+      free_public_key (included_pk);
+    }
+
+  /* If the key isn't found, check for a preferred keyserver.  Note
+   * that this is only done if honor-keyserver-url has been set.  We
+   * test for this in the loop so that we can show info about the
+   * preferred keyservers.  */
+  if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY
+      && sig->flags.pref_ks)
+    {
+      const byte *p;
+      int seq = 0;
+      size_t n;
+      int any_pref_ks = 0;
+
+      while ((p=enum_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed,SIGSUBPKT_PREF_KS,&n,&seq,NULL)))
+        {
+          /* According to my favorite copy editor, in English grammar,
+             you say "at" if the key is located on a web page, but
+             "from" if it is located on a keyserver.  I'm not going to
+             even try to make two strings here :) */
+          log_info(_("Key available at: ") );
+          print_utf8_buffer (log_get_stream(), p, n);
+          log_printf ("\n");
+          any_pref_ks = 1;
+
+          if ((opt.keyserver_options.options&KEYSERVER_AUTO_KEY_RETRIEVE)
+              && (opt.keyserver_options.options&KEYSERVER_HONOR_KEYSERVER_URL))
+            {
+              struct keyserver_spec *spec;
+
+              spec = parse_preferred_keyserver (sig);
+              if (spec)
+                {
+                  int res;
+
+                  if (DBG_LOOKUP)
+                    log_debug ("trying auto-key-retrieve method %s\n",
+                               "Pref-KS");
+
+                  free_public_key (pk);
+                  pk = NULL;
+                  glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve++;
+                  res = keyserver_import_keyid (c->ctrl, sig->keyid,spec, 1);
+                  glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve--;
+                  if (!res)
+                    rc = do_check_sig (c, node, NULL,
+                                       NULL, &is_expkey, &is_revkey, &pk);
+                  else if (DBG_LOOKUP)
+                    log_debug ("lookup via %s failed: %s\n", "Pref-KS",
+                               gpg_strerror (res));
+                  free_keyserver_spec (spec);
+
+                  if (!rc)
+                    break;
+                }
+            }
+        }
+
+      if (any_pref_ks
+          && (opt.keyserver_options.options&KEYSERVER_AUTO_KEY_RETRIEVE)
+          && !(opt.keyserver_options.options&KEYSERVER_HONOR_KEYSERVER_URL))
+        log_info (_("Note: Use '%s' to make use of this info\n"),
+                  "--keyserver-option honor-keyserver-url");
+    }
+
+  /* If the above methods didn't work, our next try is to retrieve the
+   * key from the WKD.  This requires that WKD is in the AKL and the
+   * Signer's UID is in the signature.  */
+  if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY
+      && (opt.keyserver_options.options & KEYSERVER_AUTO_KEY_RETRIEVE)
+      && !opt.flags.disable_signer_uid
+      && akl_has_wkd_method ()
+      && sig->signers_uid)
+    {
+      int res;
+
+      if (DBG_LOOKUP)
+        log_debug ("trying auto-key-retrieve method %s\n", "WKD");
+      free_public_key (pk);
+      pk = NULL;
+      glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve++;
+      res = keyserver_import_wkd (c->ctrl, sig->signers_uid, 1, NULL, NULL);
+      glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve--;
+      /* Fixme: If the fingerprint is embedded in the signature,
+       * compare it to the fingerprint of the returned key.  */
+      if (!res)
+        rc = do_check_sig (c, node, NULL, NULL, &is_expkey, &is_revkey, &pk);
+      else if (DBG_LOOKUP)
+        log_debug ("lookup via %s failed: %s\n", "WKD", gpg_strerror (res));
+    }
+
+  /* If the avove methods didn't work, our next try is to use the URI
+   * from a DNS PKA record.  This is a legacy method which will
+   * eventually be removed.  */
+  if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY
+      && (opt.keyserver_options.options & KEYSERVER_AUTO_KEY_RETRIEVE)
+      && (opt.keyserver_options.options & KEYSERVER_HONOR_PKA_RECORD))
+    {
+      const char *uri = pka_uri_from_sig (c, sig);
+
+      if (uri)
+        {
+          /* FIXME: We might want to locate the key using the
+             fingerprint instead of the keyid. */
+          int res;
+          struct keyserver_spec *spec;
+
+          spec = parse_keyserver_uri (uri, 1);
+          if (spec)
+            {
+              if (DBG_LOOKUP)
+                log_debug ("trying auto-key-retrieve method %s\n", "PKA");
+
+              free_public_key (pk);
+              pk = NULL;
+              glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve++;
+              res = keyserver_import_keyid (c->ctrl, sig->keyid, spec, 1);
+              glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve--;
+              free_keyserver_spec (spec);
+              if (!res)
+                rc = do_check_sig (c, node, NULL,
+                                   NULL, &is_expkey, &is_revkey, &pk);
+              else if (DBG_LOOKUP)
+                log_debug ("lookup via %s failed: %s\n", "PKA",
+                           gpg_strerror (res));
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+  /* If the above methods didn't work, our next try is to locate
+   * the key via its fingerprint from a keyserver.  This requires
+   * that the signers fingerprint is encoded in the signature.  */
+  if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY
+      && (opt.keyserver_options.options&KEYSERVER_AUTO_KEY_RETRIEVE)
+      && keyserver_any_configured (c->ctrl))
+    {
+      int res;
+      const byte *p;
+      size_t n;
+
+      p = issuer_fpr_raw (sig, &n);
+      if (p)
+        {
+          /* v4 packet with a SHA-1 fingerprint.  */
+          if (DBG_LOOKUP)
+            log_debug ("trying auto-key-retrieve method %s\n", "KS");
+
+          free_public_key (pk);
+          pk = NULL;
+          glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve++;
+          res = keyserver_import_fprint (c->ctrl, p, n, opt.keyserver, 1);
+          glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve--;
+          if (!res)
+            rc = do_check_sig (c, node, NULL,
+                               NULL, &is_expkey, &is_revkey, &pk);
+          else if (DBG_LOOKUP)
+            log_debug ("lookup via %s failed: %s\n", "KS", gpg_strerror (res));
+        }
+    }
+
+  if (!rc || gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE)
+    {
+      kbnode_t un, keyblock;
+      int count = 0;
+      int statno;
+      char keyid_str[50];
+      PKT_public_key *mainpk = NULL;
+
+      if (rc)
+        statno = STATUS_BADSIG;
+      else if (sig->flags.expired)
+        statno = STATUS_EXPSIG;
+      else if (is_expkey)
+        statno = STATUS_EXPKEYSIG;
+      else if(is_revkey)
+        statno = STATUS_REVKEYSIG;
+      else
+        statno = STATUS_GOODSIG;
+
+      /* FIXME: We should have the public key in PK and thus the
+       * keyblock has already been fetched.  Thus we could use the
+       * fingerprint or PK itself to lookup the entire keyblock.  That
+       * would best be done with a cache.  */
+      if (included_keyblock)
+        {
+          keyblock = included_keyblock;
+          included_keyblock = NULL;
+        }
+      else
+        keyblock = get_pubkeyblock_for_sig (c->ctrl, sig);
+
+      snprintf (keyid_str, sizeof keyid_str, "%08lX%08lX [uncertain] ",
+                (ulong)sig->keyid[0], (ulong)sig->keyid[1]);
+
+      /* Find and print the primary user ID along with the
+         "Good|Expired|Bad signature" line.  */
+      for (un=keyblock; un; un = un->next)
+        {
+          int valid;
+
+          if (un->pkt->pkttype==PKT_PUBLIC_KEY)
+            {
+              mainpk = un->pkt->pkt.public_key;
+              continue;
+            }
+          if (un->pkt->pkttype != PKT_USER_ID)
+            continue;
+          if (!un->pkt->pkt.user_id->created)
+            continue;
+          if (un->pkt->pkt.user_id->flags.revoked)
+            continue;
+          if (un->pkt->pkt.user_id->flags.expired)
+            continue;
+          if (!un->pkt->pkt.user_id->flags.primary)
+            continue;
+          /* We want the textual primary user ID here */
+          if (un->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data)
+            continue;
+
+          log_assert (mainpk);
+
+	  /* Since this is just informational, don't actually ask the
+	     user to update any trust information.  (Note: we register
+	     the signature later.)  Because print_good_bad_signature
+	     does not print a LF we need to compute the validity
+	     before calling that function.  */
+          if ((opt.verify_options & VERIFY_SHOW_UID_VALIDITY))
+            valid = get_validity (c->ctrl, keyblock, mainpk,
+                                  un->pkt->pkt.user_id, NULL, 0);
+          else
+            valid = 0; /* Not used.  */
+
+          keyid_str[17] = 0; /* cut off the "[uncertain]" part */
+
+          print_good_bad_signature (statno, keyid_str, un, sig, rc);
+
+          if ((opt.verify_options & VERIFY_SHOW_UID_VALIDITY))
+            log_printf (" [%s]\n",trust_value_to_string(valid));
+          else
+            log_printf ("\n");
+
+          count++;
+	}
+
+      log_assert (mainpk);
+
+      /* In case we did not found a valid textual userid above
+         we print the first user id packet or a "[?]" instead along
+         with the "Good|Expired|Bad signature" line.  */
+      if (!count)
+        {
+          /* Try for an invalid textual userid */
+          for (un=keyblock; un; un = un->next)
+            {
+              if (un->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID
+                  && !un->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data)
+                break;
+            }
+
+          /* Try for any userid at all */
+          if (!un)
+            {
+              for (un=keyblock; un; un = un->next)
+                {
+                  if (un->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
+                    break;
+		}
+	    }
+
+          if (opt.trust_model==TM_ALWAYS || !un)
+            keyid_str[17] = 0; /* cut off the "[uncertain]" part */
+
+          print_good_bad_signature (statno, keyid_str, un, sig, rc);
+
+          if (opt.trust_model != TM_ALWAYS && un)
+            log_printf (" %s",_("[uncertain]") );
+          log_printf ("\n");
+	}
+
+      /* If we have a good signature and already printed
+       * the primary user ID, print all the other user IDs */
+      if (count
+          && !rc
+          && !(opt.verify_options & VERIFY_SHOW_PRIMARY_UID_ONLY))
+        {
+          char *p;
+          for( un=keyblock; un; un = un->next)
+            {
+              if (un->pkt->pkttype != PKT_USER_ID)
+                continue;
+              if ((un->pkt->pkt.user_id->flags.revoked
+                   || un->pkt->pkt.user_id->flags.expired)
+                  && !(opt.verify_options & VERIFY_SHOW_UNUSABLE_UIDS))
+                continue;
+              /* Skip textual primary user ids which we printed above. */
+              if (un->pkt->pkt.user_id->flags.primary
+                  && !un->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data )
+                continue;
+
+              /* If this user id has attribute data, print that.  */
+              if (un->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data)
+                {
+                  dump_attribs (un->pkt->pkt.user_id, mainpk);
+
+                  if (opt.verify_options&VERIFY_SHOW_PHOTOS)
+                    show_photos (c->ctrl,
+                                 un->pkt->pkt.user_id->attribs,
+                                 un->pkt->pkt.user_id->numattribs,
+                                 mainpk ,un->pkt->pkt.user_id);
+                }
+
+              p = utf8_to_native (un->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
+				  un->pkt->pkt.user_id->len, 0);
+              log_info (_("                aka \"%s\""), p);
+              xfree (p);
+
+              if ((opt.verify_options & VERIFY_SHOW_UID_VALIDITY))
+                {
+                  const char *valid;
+
+                  if (un->pkt->pkt.user_id->flags.revoked)
+                    valid = _("revoked");
+                  else if (un->pkt->pkt.user_id->flags.expired)
+                    valid = _("expired");
+                  else
+		    /* Since this is just informational, don't
+		       actually ask the user to update any trust
+		       information.  */
+                    valid = (trust_value_to_string
+                             (get_validity (c->ctrl, keyblock, mainpk,
+                                            un->pkt->pkt.user_id, NULL, 0)));
+                  log_printf (" [%s]\n",valid);
+                }
+              else
+                log_printf ("\n");
+            }
+	}
+
+      /* For good signatures print notation data.  */
+      if (!rc)
+        {
+          if ((opt.verify_options & VERIFY_SHOW_POLICY_URLS))
+            show_policy_url (sig, 0, 1);
+          else
+            show_policy_url (sig, 0, 2);
+
+          if ((opt.verify_options & VERIFY_SHOW_KEYSERVER_URLS))
+            show_keyserver_url (sig, 0, 1);
+          else
+            show_keyserver_url (sig, 0, 2);
+
+          if ((opt.verify_options & VERIFY_SHOW_NOTATIONS))
+            show_notation
+              (sig, 0, 1,
+               (((opt.verify_options&VERIFY_SHOW_STD_NOTATIONS)?1:0)
+                + ((opt.verify_options&VERIFY_SHOW_USER_NOTATIONS)?2:0)));
+          else
+            show_notation (sig, 0, 2, 0);
+        }
+
+      /* For good signatures print the VALIDSIG status line.  */
+      if (!rc && is_status_enabled () && pk)
+        {
+          char pkhex[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN*2+1];
+          char mainpkhex[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN*2+1];
+
+          hexfingerprint (pk, pkhex, sizeof pkhex);
+          hexfingerprint (mainpk, mainpkhex, sizeof mainpkhex);
+
+          /* TODO: Replace the reserved '0' in the field below with
+             bits for status flags (policy url, notation, etc.).  */
+          write_status_printf (STATUS_VALIDSIG,
+                               "%s %s %lu %lu %d 0 %d %d %02X %s",
+                               pkhex,
+                               strtimestamp (sig->timestamp),
+                               (ulong)sig->timestamp,
+                               (ulong)sig->expiredate,
+                               sig->version, sig->pubkey_algo,
+                               sig->digest_algo,
+                               sig->sig_class,
+                               mainpkhex);
+	}
+
+      /* Print compliance warning for Good signatures.  */
+      if (!rc && pk && !opt.quiet
+          && !gnupg_pk_is_compliant (opt.compliance, pk->pubkey_algo, 0,
+                                     pk->pkey, nbits_from_pk (pk), NULL))
+        {
+          log_info (_("WARNING: This key is not suitable for signing"
+                      " in %s mode\n"),
+                    gnupg_compliance_option_string (opt.compliance));
+        }
+
+      /* For good signatures compute and print the trust information.
+         Note that in the Tofu trust model this may ask the user on
+         how to resolve a conflict.  */
+      if (!rc)
+        {
+          if ((opt.verify_options & VERIFY_PKA_LOOKUPS))
+            pka_uri_from_sig (c, sig); /* Make sure PKA info is available. */
+          rc = check_signatures_trust (c->ctrl, sig);
+        }
+
+      /* Print extra information about the signature.  */
+      if (sig->flags.expired)
+        {
+          log_info (_("Signature expired %s\n"), asctimestamp(sig->expiredate));
+          rc = GPG_ERR_GENERAL; /* Need a better error here?  */
+        }
+      else if (sig->expiredate)
+        log_info (_("Signature expires %s\n"), asctimestamp(sig->expiredate));
+
+      if (opt.verbose)
+        {
+          char pkstrbuf[PUBKEY_STRING_SIZE];
+
+          if (pk)
+            pubkey_string (pk, pkstrbuf, sizeof pkstrbuf);
+          else
+            *pkstrbuf = 0;
+
+          log_info (_("%s signature, digest algorithm %s%s%s\n"),
+                    sig->sig_class==0x00?_("binary"):
+                    sig->sig_class==0x01?_("textmode"):_("unknown"),
+                    gcry_md_algo_name (sig->digest_algo),
+                    *pkstrbuf?_(", key algorithm "):"", pkstrbuf);
+        }
+
+      /* Print final warnings.  */
+      if (!rc && !c->signed_data.used)
+        {
+          /* Signature is basically good but we test whether the
+             deprecated command
+               gpg --verify FILE.sig
+             was used instead of
+               gpg --verify FILE.sig FILE
+             to verify a detached signature.  If we figure out that a
+             data file with a matching name exists, we print a warning.
+
+             The problem is that the first form would also verify a
+             standard signature.  This behavior could be used to
+             create a made up .sig file for a tarball by creating a
+             standard signature from a valid detached signature packet
+             (for example from a signed git tag).  Then replace the
+             sig file on the FTP server along with a changed tarball.
+             Using the first form the verify command would correctly
+             verify the signature but don't even consider the tarball.  */
+          kbnode_t n;
+          char *dfile;
+
+          dfile = get_matching_datafile (c->sigfilename);
+          if (dfile)
+            {
+              for (n = c->list; n; n = n->next)
+                if (n->pkt->pkttype != PKT_SIGNATURE)
+                  break;
+              if (n)
+                {
+                  /* Not only signature packets in the tree thus this
+                     is not a detached signature.  */
+                  log_info (_("WARNING: not a detached signature; "
+                              "file '%s' was NOT verified!\n"), dfile);
+                }
+              xfree (dfile);
+            }
+        }
+
+      /* Compute compliance with CO_DE_VS.  */
+      if (pk && is_status_enabled ()
+          && gnupg_pk_is_compliant (CO_DE_VS, pk->pubkey_algo, 0, pk->pkey,
+                                    nbits_from_pk (pk), NULL)
+          && gnupg_digest_is_compliant (CO_DE_VS, sig->digest_algo))
+        write_status_strings (STATUS_VERIFICATION_COMPLIANCE_MODE,
+                              gnupg_status_compliance_flag (CO_DE_VS),
+                              NULL);
+
+      free_public_key (pk);
+      pk = NULL;
+      release_kbnode( keyblock );
+      if (rc)
+        g10_errors_seen = 1;
+      if (opt.batch && rc)
+        g10_exit (1);
+    }
+  else
+    {
+      write_status_printf (STATUS_ERRSIG, "%08lX%08lX %d %d %02x %lu %d %s",
+                           (ulong)sig->keyid[0], (ulong)sig->keyid[1],
+                           sig->pubkey_algo, sig->digest_algo,
+                           sig->sig_class, (ulong)sig->timestamp,
+                           gpg_err_code (rc),
+                           issuer_fpr? issuer_fpr:"-");
+      if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY)
+        {
+          write_status_printf (STATUS_NO_PUBKEY, "%08lX%08lX",
+                               (ulong)sig->keyid[0], (ulong)sig->keyid[1]);
+	}
+      if (gpg_err_code (rc) != GPG_ERR_NOT_PROCESSED)
+        log_error (_("Can't check signature: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (rc));
+    }
+
+  free_public_key (pk);
+  release_kbnode (included_keyblock);
+  xfree (issuer_fpr);
+  return rc;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Process the tree which starts at node
+ */
+static void
+proc_tree (CTX c, kbnode_t node)
+{
+  kbnode_t n1;
+  int rc;
+
+  if (opt.list_packets || opt.list_only)
+    return;
+
+  /* We must skip our special plaintext marker packets here because
+     they may be the root packet.  These packets are only used in
+     additional checks and skipping them here doesn't matter.  */
+  while (node
+         && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_GPG_CONTROL
+          && node->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control == CTRLPKT_PLAINTEXT_MARK)
+    {
+      node = node->next;
+    }
+  if (!node)
+    return;
+
+  c->trustletter = ' ';
+  if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
+      || node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
+    {
+      merge_keys_and_selfsig (c->ctrl, node);
+      list_node (c, node);
+    }
+  else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY)
+    {
+      merge_keys_and_selfsig (c->ctrl, node);
+      list_node (c, node);
+    }
+  else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_ONEPASS_SIG)
+    {
+      /* Check all signatures.  */
+      if (!c->any.data)
+        {
+          int use_textmode = 0;
+
+          free_md_filter_context (&c->mfx);
+          /* Prepare to create all requested message digests.  */
+          rc = gcry_md_open (&c->mfx.md, 0, 0);
+          if (rc)
+            goto hash_err;
+
+          /* Fixme: why looking for the signature packet and not the
+             one-pass packet?  */
+          for (n1 = node; (n1 = find_next_kbnode (n1, PKT_SIGNATURE));)
+            gcry_md_enable (c->mfx.md, n1->pkt->pkt.signature->digest_algo);
+
+          if (n1 && n1->pkt->pkt.onepass_sig->sig_class == 0x01)
+            use_textmode = 1;
+
+          /* Ask for file and hash it. */
+          if (c->sigs_only)
+            {
+              if (c->signed_data.used && c->signed_data.data_fd != -1)
+                rc = hash_datafile_by_fd (c->mfx.md, NULL,
+                                          c->signed_data.data_fd,
+                                          use_textmode);
+              else
+                rc = hash_datafiles (c->mfx.md, NULL,
+                                     c->signed_data.data_names,
+                                     c->sigfilename,
+                                     use_textmode);
+	    }
+          else
+            {
+              rc = ask_for_detached_datafile (c->mfx.md, c->mfx.md2,
+                                              iobuf_get_real_fname (c->iobuf),
+                                              use_textmode);
+	    }
+
+        hash_err:
+          if (rc)
+            {
+              log_error ("can't hash datafile: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
+              return;
+	    }
+	}
+      else if (c->signed_data.used)
+        {
+          log_error (_("not a detached signature\n"));
+          return;
+        }
+
+      for (n1 = node; (n1 = find_next_kbnode (n1, PKT_SIGNATURE));)
+        check_sig_and_print (c, n1);
+
+    }
+  else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_GPG_CONTROL
+           && node->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control == CTRLPKT_CLEARSIGN_START)
+    {
+      /* Clear text signed message.  */
+      if (!c->any.data)
+        {
+          log_error ("cleartext signature without data\n");
+          return;
+        }
+      else if (c->signed_data.used)
+        {
+          log_error (_("not a detached signature\n"));
+          return;
+        }
+
+      for (n1 = node; (n1 = find_next_kbnode (n1, PKT_SIGNATURE));)
+        check_sig_and_print (c, n1);
+
+    }
+  else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE)
+    {
+      PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
+      int multiple_ok = 1;
+
+      n1 = find_next_kbnode (node, PKT_SIGNATURE);
+      if (n1)
+        {
+          byte class = sig->sig_class;
+          byte hash  = sig->digest_algo;
+
+          for (; n1; (n1 = find_next_kbnode(n1, PKT_SIGNATURE)))
+            {
+              /* We can't currently handle multiple signatures of
+               * different classes (we'd pretty much have to run a
+               * different hash context for each), but if they are all
+               * the same and it is detached signature, we make an
+               * exception.  Note that the old code also disallowed
+               * multiple signatures if the digest algorithms are
+               * different.  We softened this restriction only for
+               * detached signatures, to be on the safe side. */
+              if (n1->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class != class
+                  || (c->any.data
+                      && n1->pkt->pkt.signature->digest_algo != hash))
+                {
+                  multiple_ok = 0;
+                  log_info (_("WARNING: multiple signatures detected.  "
+                              "Only the first will be checked.\n"));
+                  break;
+                }
+            }
+        }
+
+      if (sig->sig_class != 0x00 && sig->sig_class != 0x01)
+        {
+          log_info(_("standalone signature of class 0x%02x\n"), sig->sig_class);
+        }
+      else if (!c->any.data)
+        {
+          /* Detached signature */
+          free_md_filter_context (&c->mfx);
+          rc = gcry_md_open (&c->mfx.md, sig->digest_algo, 0);
+          if (rc)
+            goto detached_hash_err;
+
+          if (multiple_ok)
+            {
+              /* If we have and want to handle multiple signatures we
+               * need to enable all hash algorithms for the context.  */
+              for (n1 = node; (n1 = find_next_kbnode (n1, PKT_SIGNATURE)); )
+                if (!openpgp_md_test_algo (n1->pkt->pkt.signature->digest_algo))
+                  gcry_md_enable (c->mfx.md,
+                                  map_md_openpgp_to_gcry
+                                  (n1->pkt->pkt.signature->digest_algo));
+            }
+
+          if (RFC2440 || RFC4880)
+            ; /* Strict RFC mode.  */
+          else if (sig->digest_algo == DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1
+                   && sig->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA
+                   && sig->sig_class == 0x01)
+            {
+              /* Enable a workaround for a pgp5 bug when the detached
+               * signature has been created in textmode.  Note that we
+               * do not implement this for multiple signatures with
+               * different hash algorithms. */
+              rc = gcry_md_open (&c->mfx.md2, sig->digest_algo, 0);
+              if (rc)
+                goto detached_hash_err;
+	    }
+
+          /* Here we used to have another hack to work around a pgp
+           * 2 bug: It worked by not using the textmode for detached
+           * signatures; this would let the first signature check
+           * (on md) fail but the second one (on md2), which adds an
+           * extra CR would then have produced the "correct" hash.
+           * This is very, very ugly hack but it may haved help in
+           * some cases (and break others).
+           *	 c->mfx.md2? 0 :(sig->sig_class == 0x01)
+           */
+
+          if (DBG_HASHING)
+            {
+              gcry_md_debug (c->mfx.md, "verify");
+              if (c->mfx.md2)
+                gcry_md_debug (c->mfx.md2, "verify2");
+            }
+
+          if (c->sigs_only)
+            {
+              if (c->signed_data.used && c->signed_data.data_fd != -1)
+                rc = hash_datafile_by_fd (c->mfx.md, c->mfx.md2,
+                                          c->signed_data.data_fd,
+                                          (sig->sig_class == 0x01));
+              else
+                rc = hash_datafiles (c->mfx.md, c->mfx.md2,
+                                     c->signed_data.data_names,
+                                     c->sigfilename,
+                                     (sig->sig_class == 0x01));
+	    }
+          else
+            {
+              rc = ask_for_detached_datafile (c->mfx.md, c->mfx.md2,
+                                              iobuf_get_real_fname(c->iobuf),
+                                              (sig->sig_class == 0x01));
+	    }
+
+        detached_hash_err:
+          if (rc)
+            {
+              log_error ("can't hash datafile: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
+              return;
+	    }
+	}
+      else if (c->signed_data.used)
+        {
+          log_error (_("not a detached signature\n"));
+          return;
+        }
+      else if (!opt.quiet)
+        log_info (_("old style (PGP 2.x) signature\n"));
+
+      if (multiple_ok)
+        {
+          for (n1 = node; n1; (n1 = find_next_kbnode(n1, PKT_SIGNATURE)))
+	    check_sig_and_print (c, n1);
+        }
+      else
+        check_sig_and_print (c, node);
+
+    }
+  else
+    {
+      dump_kbnode (c->list);
+      log_error ("invalid root packet detected in proc_tree()\n");
+      dump_kbnode (node);
+    }
+}