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author | Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org> | 2024-04-27 10:05:51 +0000 |
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committer | Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org> | 2024-04-27 10:05:51 +0000 |
commit | 5d1646d90e1f2cceb9f0828f4b28318cd0ec7744 (patch) | |
tree | a94efe259b9009378be6d90eb30d2b019d95c194 /kernel/ucount.c | |
parent | Initial commit. (diff) | |
download | linux-5d1646d90e1f2cceb9f0828f4b28318cd0ec7744.tar.xz linux-5d1646d90e1f2cceb9f0828f4b28318cd0ec7744.zip |
Adding upstream version 5.10.209.upstream/5.10.209upstream
Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel/ucount.c')
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/ucount.c | 242 |
1 files changed, 242 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/ucount.c b/kernel/ucount.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..11b1596e2 --- /dev/null +++ b/kernel/ucount.c @@ -0,0 +1,242 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only + +#include <linux/stat.h> +#include <linux/sysctl.h> +#include <linux/slab.h> +#include <linux/cred.h> +#include <linux/hash.h> +#include <linux/kmemleak.h> +#include <linux/user_namespace.h> + +#define UCOUNTS_HASHTABLE_BITS 10 +static struct hlist_head ucounts_hashtable[(1 << UCOUNTS_HASHTABLE_BITS)]; +static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(ucounts_lock); + +#define ucounts_hashfn(ns, uid) \ + hash_long((unsigned long)__kuid_val(uid) + (unsigned long)(ns), \ + UCOUNTS_HASHTABLE_BITS) +#define ucounts_hashentry(ns, uid) \ + (ucounts_hashtable + ucounts_hashfn(ns, uid)) + + +#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL +static struct ctl_table_set * +set_lookup(struct ctl_table_root *root) +{ + return ¤t_user_ns()->set; +} + +static int set_is_seen(struct ctl_table_set *set) +{ + return ¤t_user_ns()->set == set; +} + +static int set_permissions(struct ctl_table_header *head, + struct ctl_table *table) +{ + struct user_namespace *user_ns = + container_of(head->set, struct user_namespace, set); + int mode; + + /* Allow users with CAP_SYS_RESOURCE unrestrained access */ + if (ns_capable(user_ns, CAP_SYS_RESOURCE)) + mode = (table->mode & S_IRWXU) >> 6; + else + /* Allow all others at most read-only access */ + mode = table->mode & S_IROTH; + return (mode << 6) | (mode << 3) | mode; +} + +static struct ctl_table_root set_root = { + .lookup = set_lookup, + .permissions = set_permissions, +}; + +#define UCOUNT_ENTRY(name) \ + { \ + .procname = name, \ + .maxlen = sizeof(int), \ + .mode = 0644, \ + .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax, \ + .extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO, \ + .extra2 = SYSCTL_INT_MAX, \ + } +static struct ctl_table user_table[] = { + UCOUNT_ENTRY("max_user_namespaces"), + UCOUNT_ENTRY("max_pid_namespaces"), + UCOUNT_ENTRY("max_uts_namespaces"), + UCOUNT_ENTRY("max_ipc_namespaces"), + UCOUNT_ENTRY("max_net_namespaces"), + UCOUNT_ENTRY("max_mnt_namespaces"), + UCOUNT_ENTRY("max_cgroup_namespaces"), + UCOUNT_ENTRY("max_time_namespaces"), +#ifdef CONFIG_INOTIFY_USER + UCOUNT_ENTRY("max_inotify_instances"), + UCOUNT_ENTRY("max_inotify_watches"), +#endif + { } +}; +#endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */ + +bool setup_userns_sysctls(struct user_namespace *ns) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL + struct ctl_table *tbl; + + BUILD_BUG_ON(ARRAY_SIZE(user_table) != UCOUNT_COUNTS + 1); + setup_sysctl_set(&ns->set, &set_root, set_is_seen); + tbl = kmemdup(user_table, sizeof(user_table), GFP_KERNEL); + if (tbl) { + int i; + for (i = 0; i < UCOUNT_COUNTS; i++) { + tbl[i].data = &ns->ucount_max[i]; + } + ns->sysctls = __register_sysctl_table(&ns->set, "user", tbl); + } + if (!ns->sysctls) { + kfree(tbl); + retire_sysctl_set(&ns->set); + return false; + } +#endif + return true; +} + +void retire_userns_sysctls(struct user_namespace *ns) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL + struct ctl_table *tbl; + + tbl = ns->sysctls->ctl_table_arg; + unregister_sysctl_table(ns->sysctls); + retire_sysctl_set(&ns->set); + kfree(tbl); +#endif +} + +static struct ucounts *find_ucounts(struct user_namespace *ns, kuid_t uid, struct hlist_head *hashent) +{ + struct ucounts *ucounts; + + hlist_for_each_entry(ucounts, hashent, node) { + if (uid_eq(ucounts->uid, uid) && (ucounts->ns == ns)) + return ucounts; + } + return NULL; +} + +static struct ucounts *get_ucounts(struct user_namespace *ns, kuid_t uid) +{ + struct hlist_head *hashent = ucounts_hashentry(ns, uid); + struct ucounts *ucounts, *new; + + spin_lock_irq(&ucounts_lock); + ucounts = find_ucounts(ns, uid, hashent); + if (!ucounts) { + spin_unlock_irq(&ucounts_lock); + + new = kzalloc(sizeof(*new), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!new) + return NULL; + + new->ns = ns; + new->uid = uid; + new->count = 0; + + spin_lock_irq(&ucounts_lock); + ucounts = find_ucounts(ns, uid, hashent); + if (ucounts) { + kfree(new); + } else { + hlist_add_head(&new->node, hashent); + ucounts = new; + } + } + if (ucounts->count == INT_MAX) + ucounts = NULL; + else + ucounts->count += 1; + spin_unlock_irq(&ucounts_lock); + return ucounts; +} + +static void put_ucounts(struct ucounts *ucounts) +{ + unsigned long flags; + + spin_lock_irqsave(&ucounts_lock, flags); + ucounts->count -= 1; + if (!ucounts->count) + hlist_del_init(&ucounts->node); + else + ucounts = NULL; + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&ucounts_lock, flags); + + kfree(ucounts); +} + +static inline bool atomic_inc_below(atomic_t *v, int u) +{ + int c, old; + c = atomic_read(v); + for (;;) { + if (unlikely(c >= u)) + return false; + old = atomic_cmpxchg(v, c, c+1); + if (likely(old == c)) + return true; + c = old; + } +} + +struct ucounts *inc_ucount(struct user_namespace *ns, kuid_t uid, + enum ucount_type type) +{ + struct ucounts *ucounts, *iter, *bad; + struct user_namespace *tns; + ucounts = get_ucounts(ns, uid); + for (iter = ucounts; iter; iter = tns->ucounts) { + int max; + tns = iter->ns; + max = READ_ONCE(tns->ucount_max[type]); + if (!atomic_inc_below(&iter->ucount[type], max)) + goto fail; + } + return ucounts; +fail: + bad = iter; + for (iter = ucounts; iter != bad; iter = iter->ns->ucounts) + atomic_dec(&iter->ucount[type]); + + put_ucounts(ucounts); + return NULL; +} + +void dec_ucount(struct ucounts *ucounts, enum ucount_type type) +{ + struct ucounts *iter; + for (iter = ucounts; iter; iter = iter->ns->ucounts) { + int dec = atomic_dec_if_positive(&iter->ucount[type]); + WARN_ON_ONCE(dec < 0); + } + put_ucounts(ucounts); +} + +static __init int user_namespace_sysctl_init(void) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL + static struct ctl_table_header *user_header; + static struct ctl_table empty[1]; + /* + * It is necessary to register the user directory in the + * default set so that registrations in the child sets work + * properly. + */ + user_header = register_sysctl("user", empty); + kmemleak_ignore(user_header); + BUG_ON(!user_header); + BUG_ON(!setup_userns_sysctls(&init_user_ns)); +#endif + return 0; +} +subsys_initcall(user_namespace_sysctl_init); |