diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto/testmgr.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | crypto/testmgr.c | 5700 |
1 files changed, 5700 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/testmgr.c b/crypto/testmgr.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..a64a639ed --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/testmgr.c @@ -0,0 +1,5700 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later +/* + * Algorithm testing framework and tests. + * + * Copyright (c) 2002 James Morris <jmorris@intercode.com.au> + * Copyright (c) 2002 Jean-Francois Dive <jef@linuxbe.org> + * Copyright (c) 2007 Nokia Siemens Networks + * Copyright (c) 2008 Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> + * Copyright (c) 2019 Google LLC + * + * Updated RFC4106 AES-GCM testing. + * Authors: Aidan O'Mahony (aidan.o.mahony@intel.com) + * Adrian Hoban <adrian.hoban@intel.com> + * Gabriele Paoloni <gabriele.paoloni@intel.com> + * Tadeusz Struk (tadeusz.struk@intel.com) + * Copyright (c) 2010, Intel Corporation. + */ + +#include <crypto/aead.h> +#include <crypto/hash.h> +#include <crypto/skcipher.h> +#include <linux/err.h> +#include <linux/fips.h> +#include <linux/module.h> +#include <linux/once.h> +#include <linux/random.h> +#include <linux/scatterlist.h> +#include <linux/slab.h> +#include <linux/string.h> +#include <linux/uio.h> +#include <crypto/rng.h> +#include <crypto/drbg.h> +#include <crypto/akcipher.h> +#include <crypto/kpp.h> +#include <crypto/acompress.h> +#include <crypto/internal/simd.h> + +#include "internal.h" + +static bool notests; +module_param(notests, bool, 0644); +MODULE_PARM_DESC(notests, "disable crypto self-tests"); + +static bool panic_on_fail; +module_param(panic_on_fail, bool, 0444); + +#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS +static bool noextratests; +module_param(noextratests, bool, 0644); +MODULE_PARM_DESC(noextratests, "disable expensive crypto self-tests"); + +static unsigned int fuzz_iterations = 100; +module_param(fuzz_iterations, uint, 0644); +MODULE_PARM_DESC(fuzz_iterations, "number of fuzz test iterations"); + +DEFINE_PER_CPU(bool, crypto_simd_disabled_for_test); +EXPORT_PER_CPU_SYMBOL_GPL(crypto_simd_disabled_for_test); +#endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_DISABLE_TESTS + +/* a perfect nop */ +int alg_test(const char *driver, const char *alg, u32 type, u32 mask) +{ + return 0; +} + +#else + +#include "testmgr.h" + +/* + * Need slab memory for testing (size in number of pages). + */ +#define XBUFSIZE 8 + +/* +* Used by test_cipher() +*/ +#define ENCRYPT 1 +#define DECRYPT 0 + +struct aead_test_suite { + const struct aead_testvec *vecs; + unsigned int count; + + /* + * Set if trying to decrypt an inauthentic ciphertext with this + * algorithm might result in EINVAL rather than EBADMSG, due to other + * validation the algorithm does on the inputs such as length checks. + */ + unsigned int einval_allowed : 1; + + /* + * Set if this algorithm requires that the IV be located at the end of + * the AAD buffer, in addition to being given in the normal way. The + * behavior when the two IV copies differ is implementation-defined. + */ + unsigned int aad_iv : 1; +}; + +struct cipher_test_suite { + const struct cipher_testvec *vecs; + unsigned int count; +}; + +struct comp_test_suite { + struct { + const struct comp_testvec *vecs; + unsigned int count; + } comp, decomp; +}; + +struct hash_test_suite { + const struct hash_testvec *vecs; + unsigned int count; +}; + +struct cprng_test_suite { + const struct cprng_testvec *vecs; + unsigned int count; +}; + +struct drbg_test_suite { + const struct drbg_testvec *vecs; + unsigned int count; +}; + +struct akcipher_test_suite { + const struct akcipher_testvec *vecs; + unsigned int count; +}; + +struct kpp_test_suite { + const struct kpp_testvec *vecs; + unsigned int count; +}; + +struct alg_test_desc { + const char *alg; + const char *generic_driver; + int (*test)(const struct alg_test_desc *desc, const char *driver, + u32 type, u32 mask); + int fips_allowed; /* set if alg is allowed in fips mode */ + + union { + struct aead_test_suite aead; + struct cipher_test_suite cipher; + struct comp_test_suite comp; + struct hash_test_suite hash; + struct cprng_test_suite cprng; + struct drbg_test_suite drbg; + struct akcipher_test_suite akcipher; + struct kpp_test_suite kpp; + } suite; +}; + +static void hexdump(unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len) +{ + print_hex_dump(KERN_CONT, "", DUMP_PREFIX_OFFSET, + 16, 1, + buf, len, false); +} + +static int __testmgr_alloc_buf(char *buf[XBUFSIZE], int order) +{ + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < XBUFSIZE; i++) { + buf[i] = (char *)__get_free_pages(GFP_KERNEL, order); + if (!buf[i]) + goto err_free_buf; + } + + return 0; + +err_free_buf: + while (i-- > 0) + free_pages((unsigned long)buf[i], order); + + return -ENOMEM; +} + +static int testmgr_alloc_buf(char *buf[XBUFSIZE]) +{ + return __testmgr_alloc_buf(buf, 0); +} + +static void __testmgr_free_buf(char *buf[XBUFSIZE], int order) +{ + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < XBUFSIZE; i++) + free_pages((unsigned long)buf[i], order); +} + +static void testmgr_free_buf(char *buf[XBUFSIZE]) +{ + __testmgr_free_buf(buf, 0); +} + +#define TESTMGR_POISON_BYTE 0xfe +#define TESTMGR_POISON_LEN 16 + +static inline void testmgr_poison(void *addr, size_t len) +{ + memset(addr, TESTMGR_POISON_BYTE, len); +} + +/* Is the memory region still fully poisoned? */ +static inline bool testmgr_is_poison(const void *addr, size_t len) +{ + return memchr_inv(addr, TESTMGR_POISON_BYTE, len) == NULL; +} + +/* flush type for hash algorithms */ +enum flush_type { + /* merge with update of previous buffer(s) */ + FLUSH_TYPE_NONE = 0, + + /* update with previous buffer(s) before doing this one */ + FLUSH_TYPE_FLUSH, + + /* likewise, but also export and re-import the intermediate state */ + FLUSH_TYPE_REIMPORT, +}; + +/* finalization function for hash algorithms */ +enum finalization_type { + FINALIZATION_TYPE_FINAL, /* use final() */ + FINALIZATION_TYPE_FINUP, /* use finup() */ + FINALIZATION_TYPE_DIGEST, /* use digest() */ +}; + +#define TEST_SG_TOTAL 10000 + +/** + * struct test_sg_division - description of a scatterlist entry + * + * This struct describes one entry of a scatterlist being constructed to check a + * crypto test vector. + * + * @proportion_of_total: length of this chunk relative to the total length, + * given as a proportion out of TEST_SG_TOTAL so that it + * scales to fit any test vector + * @offset: byte offset into a 2-page buffer at which this chunk will start + * @offset_relative_to_alignmask: if true, add the algorithm's alignmask to the + * @offset + * @flush_type: for hashes, whether an update() should be done now vs. + * continuing to accumulate data + * @nosimd: if doing the pending update(), do it with SIMD disabled? + */ +struct test_sg_division { + unsigned int proportion_of_total; + unsigned int offset; + bool offset_relative_to_alignmask; + enum flush_type flush_type; + bool nosimd; +}; + +/** + * struct testvec_config - configuration for testing a crypto test vector + * + * This struct describes the data layout and other parameters with which each + * crypto test vector can be tested. + * + * @name: name of this config, logged for debugging purposes if a test fails + * @inplace: operate on the data in-place, if applicable for the algorithm type? + * @req_flags: extra request_flags, e.g. CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP + * @src_divs: description of how to arrange the source scatterlist + * @dst_divs: description of how to arrange the dst scatterlist, if applicable + * for the algorithm type. Defaults to @src_divs if unset. + * @iv_offset: misalignment of the IV in the range [0..MAX_ALGAPI_ALIGNMASK+1], + * where 0 is aligned to a 2*(MAX_ALGAPI_ALIGNMASK+1) byte boundary + * @iv_offset_relative_to_alignmask: if true, add the algorithm's alignmask to + * the @iv_offset + * @key_offset: misalignment of the key, where 0 is default alignment + * @key_offset_relative_to_alignmask: if true, add the algorithm's alignmask to + * the @key_offset + * @finalization_type: what finalization function to use for hashes + * @nosimd: execute with SIMD disabled? Requires !CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP. + */ +struct testvec_config { + const char *name; + bool inplace; + u32 req_flags; + struct test_sg_division src_divs[XBUFSIZE]; + struct test_sg_division dst_divs[XBUFSIZE]; + unsigned int iv_offset; + unsigned int key_offset; + bool iv_offset_relative_to_alignmask; + bool key_offset_relative_to_alignmask; + enum finalization_type finalization_type; + bool nosimd; +}; + +#define TESTVEC_CONFIG_NAMELEN 192 + +/* + * The following are the lists of testvec_configs to test for each algorithm + * type when the basic crypto self-tests are enabled, i.e. when + * CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_DISABLE_TESTS is unset. They aim to provide good test + * coverage, while keeping the test time much shorter than the full fuzz tests + * so that the basic tests can be enabled in a wider range of circumstances. + */ + +/* Configs for skciphers and aeads */ +static const struct testvec_config default_cipher_testvec_configs[] = { + { + .name = "in-place", + .inplace = true, + .src_divs = { { .proportion_of_total = 10000 } }, + }, { + .name = "out-of-place", + .src_divs = { { .proportion_of_total = 10000 } }, + }, { + .name = "unaligned buffer, offset=1", + .src_divs = { { .proportion_of_total = 10000, .offset = 1 } }, + .iv_offset = 1, + .key_offset = 1, + }, { + .name = "buffer aligned only to alignmask", + .src_divs = { + { + .proportion_of_total = 10000, + .offset = 1, + .offset_relative_to_alignmask = true, + }, + }, + .iv_offset = 1, + .iv_offset_relative_to_alignmask = true, + .key_offset = 1, + .key_offset_relative_to_alignmask = true, + }, { + .name = "two even aligned splits", + .src_divs = { + { .proportion_of_total = 5000 }, + { .proportion_of_total = 5000 }, + }, + }, { + .name = "uneven misaligned splits, may sleep", + .req_flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP, + .src_divs = { + { .proportion_of_total = 1900, .offset = 33 }, + { .proportion_of_total = 3300, .offset = 7 }, + { .proportion_of_total = 4800, .offset = 18 }, + }, + .iv_offset = 3, + .key_offset = 3, + }, { + .name = "misaligned splits crossing pages, inplace", + .inplace = true, + .src_divs = { + { + .proportion_of_total = 7500, + .offset = PAGE_SIZE - 32 + }, { + .proportion_of_total = 2500, + .offset = PAGE_SIZE - 7 + }, + }, + } +}; + +static const struct testvec_config default_hash_testvec_configs[] = { + { + .name = "init+update+final aligned buffer", + .src_divs = { { .proportion_of_total = 10000 } }, + .finalization_type = FINALIZATION_TYPE_FINAL, + }, { + .name = "init+finup aligned buffer", + .src_divs = { { .proportion_of_total = 10000 } }, + .finalization_type = FINALIZATION_TYPE_FINUP, + }, { + .name = "digest aligned buffer", + .src_divs = { { .proportion_of_total = 10000 } }, + .finalization_type = FINALIZATION_TYPE_DIGEST, + }, { + .name = "init+update+final misaligned buffer", + .src_divs = { { .proportion_of_total = 10000, .offset = 1 } }, + .finalization_type = FINALIZATION_TYPE_FINAL, + .key_offset = 1, + }, { + .name = "digest buffer aligned only to alignmask", + .src_divs = { + { + .proportion_of_total = 10000, + .offset = 1, + .offset_relative_to_alignmask = true, + }, + }, + .finalization_type = FINALIZATION_TYPE_DIGEST, + .key_offset = 1, + .key_offset_relative_to_alignmask = true, + }, { + .name = "init+update+update+final two even splits", + .src_divs = { + { .proportion_of_total = 5000 }, + { + .proportion_of_total = 5000, + .flush_type = FLUSH_TYPE_FLUSH, + }, + }, + .finalization_type = FINALIZATION_TYPE_FINAL, + }, { + .name = "digest uneven misaligned splits, may sleep", + .req_flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP, + .src_divs = { + { .proportion_of_total = 1900, .offset = 33 }, + { .proportion_of_total = 3300, .offset = 7 }, + { .proportion_of_total = 4800, .offset = 18 }, + }, + .finalization_type = FINALIZATION_TYPE_DIGEST, + }, { + .name = "digest misaligned splits crossing pages", + .src_divs = { + { + .proportion_of_total = 7500, + .offset = PAGE_SIZE - 32, + }, { + .proportion_of_total = 2500, + .offset = PAGE_SIZE - 7, + }, + }, + .finalization_type = FINALIZATION_TYPE_DIGEST, + }, { + .name = "import/export", + .src_divs = { + { + .proportion_of_total = 6500, + .flush_type = FLUSH_TYPE_REIMPORT, + }, { + .proportion_of_total = 3500, + .flush_type = FLUSH_TYPE_REIMPORT, + }, + }, + .finalization_type = FINALIZATION_TYPE_FINAL, + } +}; + +static unsigned int count_test_sg_divisions(const struct test_sg_division *divs) +{ + unsigned int remaining = TEST_SG_TOTAL; + unsigned int ndivs = 0; + + do { + remaining -= divs[ndivs++].proportion_of_total; + } while (remaining); + + return ndivs; +} + +#define SGDIVS_HAVE_FLUSHES BIT(0) +#define SGDIVS_HAVE_NOSIMD BIT(1) + +static bool valid_sg_divisions(const struct test_sg_division *divs, + unsigned int count, int *flags_ret) +{ + unsigned int total = 0; + unsigned int i; + + for (i = 0; i < count && total != TEST_SG_TOTAL; i++) { + if (divs[i].proportion_of_total <= 0 || + divs[i].proportion_of_total > TEST_SG_TOTAL - total) + return false; + total += divs[i].proportion_of_total; + if (divs[i].flush_type != FLUSH_TYPE_NONE) + *flags_ret |= SGDIVS_HAVE_FLUSHES; + if (divs[i].nosimd) + *flags_ret |= SGDIVS_HAVE_NOSIMD; + } + return total == TEST_SG_TOTAL && + memchr_inv(&divs[i], 0, (count - i) * sizeof(divs[0])) == NULL; +} + +/* + * Check whether the given testvec_config is valid. This isn't strictly needed + * since every testvec_config should be valid, but check anyway so that people + * don't unknowingly add broken configs that don't do what they wanted. + */ +static bool valid_testvec_config(const struct testvec_config *cfg) +{ + int flags = 0; + + if (cfg->name == NULL) + return false; + + if (!valid_sg_divisions(cfg->src_divs, ARRAY_SIZE(cfg->src_divs), + &flags)) + return false; + + if (cfg->dst_divs[0].proportion_of_total) { + if (!valid_sg_divisions(cfg->dst_divs, + ARRAY_SIZE(cfg->dst_divs), &flags)) + return false; + } else { + if (memchr_inv(cfg->dst_divs, 0, sizeof(cfg->dst_divs))) + return false; + /* defaults to dst_divs=src_divs */ + } + + if (cfg->iv_offset + + (cfg->iv_offset_relative_to_alignmask ? MAX_ALGAPI_ALIGNMASK : 0) > + MAX_ALGAPI_ALIGNMASK + 1) + return false; + + if ((flags & (SGDIVS_HAVE_FLUSHES | SGDIVS_HAVE_NOSIMD)) && + cfg->finalization_type == FINALIZATION_TYPE_DIGEST) + return false; + + if ((cfg->nosimd || (flags & SGDIVS_HAVE_NOSIMD)) && + (cfg->req_flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP)) + return false; + + return true; +} + +struct test_sglist { + char *bufs[XBUFSIZE]; + struct scatterlist sgl[XBUFSIZE]; + struct scatterlist sgl_saved[XBUFSIZE]; + struct scatterlist *sgl_ptr; + unsigned int nents; +}; + +static int init_test_sglist(struct test_sglist *tsgl) +{ + return __testmgr_alloc_buf(tsgl->bufs, 1 /* two pages per buffer */); +} + +static void destroy_test_sglist(struct test_sglist *tsgl) +{ + return __testmgr_free_buf(tsgl->bufs, 1 /* two pages per buffer */); +} + +/** + * build_test_sglist() - build a scatterlist for a crypto test + * + * @tsgl: the scatterlist to build. @tsgl->bufs[] contains an array of 2-page + * buffers which the scatterlist @tsgl->sgl[] will be made to point into. + * @divs: the layout specification on which the scatterlist will be based + * @alignmask: the algorithm's alignmask + * @total_len: the total length of the scatterlist to build in bytes + * @data: if non-NULL, the buffers will be filled with this data until it ends. + * Otherwise the buffers will be poisoned. In both cases, some bytes + * past the end of each buffer will be poisoned to help detect overruns. + * @out_divs: if non-NULL, the test_sg_division to which each scatterlist entry + * corresponds will be returned here. This will match @divs except + * that divisions resolving to a length of 0 are omitted as they are + * not included in the scatterlist. + * + * Return: 0 or a -errno value + */ +static int build_test_sglist(struct test_sglist *tsgl, + const struct test_sg_division *divs, + const unsigned int alignmask, + const unsigned int total_len, + struct iov_iter *data, + const struct test_sg_division *out_divs[XBUFSIZE]) +{ + struct { + const struct test_sg_division *div; + size_t length; + } partitions[XBUFSIZE]; + const unsigned int ndivs = count_test_sg_divisions(divs); + unsigned int len_remaining = total_len; + unsigned int i; + + BUILD_BUG_ON(ARRAY_SIZE(partitions) != ARRAY_SIZE(tsgl->sgl)); + if (WARN_ON(ndivs > ARRAY_SIZE(partitions))) + return -EINVAL; + + /* Calculate the (div, length) pairs */ + tsgl->nents = 0; + for (i = 0; i < ndivs; i++) { + unsigned int len_this_sg = + min(len_remaining, + (total_len * divs[i].proportion_of_total + + TEST_SG_TOTAL / 2) / TEST_SG_TOTAL); + + if (len_this_sg != 0) { + partitions[tsgl->nents].div = &divs[i]; + partitions[tsgl->nents].length = len_this_sg; + tsgl->nents++; + len_remaining -= len_this_sg; + } + } + if (tsgl->nents == 0) { + partitions[tsgl->nents].div = &divs[0]; + partitions[tsgl->nents].length = 0; + tsgl->nents++; + } + partitions[tsgl->nents - 1].length += len_remaining; + + /* Set up the sgl entries and fill the data or poison */ + sg_init_table(tsgl->sgl, tsgl->nents); + for (i = 0; i < tsgl->nents; i++) { + unsigned int offset = partitions[i].div->offset; + void *addr; + + if (partitions[i].div->offset_relative_to_alignmask) + offset += alignmask; + + while (offset + partitions[i].length + TESTMGR_POISON_LEN > + 2 * PAGE_SIZE) { + if (WARN_ON(offset <= 0)) + return -EINVAL; + offset /= 2; + } + + addr = &tsgl->bufs[i][offset]; + sg_set_buf(&tsgl->sgl[i], addr, partitions[i].length); + + if (out_divs) + out_divs[i] = partitions[i].div; + + if (data) { + size_t copy_len, copied; + + copy_len = min(partitions[i].length, data->count); + copied = copy_from_iter(addr, copy_len, data); + if (WARN_ON(copied != copy_len)) + return -EINVAL; + testmgr_poison(addr + copy_len, partitions[i].length + + TESTMGR_POISON_LEN - copy_len); + } else { + testmgr_poison(addr, partitions[i].length + + TESTMGR_POISON_LEN); + } + } + + sg_mark_end(&tsgl->sgl[tsgl->nents - 1]); + tsgl->sgl_ptr = tsgl->sgl; + memcpy(tsgl->sgl_saved, tsgl->sgl, tsgl->nents * sizeof(tsgl->sgl[0])); + return 0; +} + +/* + * Verify that a scatterlist crypto operation produced the correct output. + * + * @tsgl: scatterlist containing the actual output + * @expected_output: buffer containing the expected output + * @len_to_check: length of @expected_output in bytes + * @unchecked_prefix_len: number of ignored bytes in @tsgl prior to real result + * @check_poison: verify that the poison bytes after each chunk are intact? + * + * Return: 0 if correct, -EINVAL if incorrect, -EOVERFLOW if buffer overrun. + */ +static int verify_correct_output(const struct test_sglist *tsgl, + const char *expected_output, + unsigned int len_to_check, + unsigned int unchecked_prefix_len, + bool check_poison) +{ + unsigned int i; + + for (i = 0; i < tsgl->nents; i++) { + struct scatterlist *sg = &tsgl->sgl_ptr[i]; + unsigned int len = sg->length; + unsigned int offset = sg->offset; + const char *actual_output; + + if (unchecked_prefix_len) { + if (unchecked_prefix_len >= len) { + unchecked_prefix_len -= len; + continue; + } + offset += unchecked_prefix_len; + len -= unchecked_prefix_len; + unchecked_prefix_len = 0; + } + len = min(len, len_to_check); + actual_output = page_address(sg_page(sg)) + offset; + if (memcmp(expected_output, actual_output, len) != 0) + return -EINVAL; + if (check_poison && + !testmgr_is_poison(actual_output + len, TESTMGR_POISON_LEN)) + return -EOVERFLOW; + len_to_check -= len; + expected_output += len; + } + if (WARN_ON(len_to_check != 0)) + return -EINVAL; + return 0; +} + +static bool is_test_sglist_corrupted(const struct test_sglist *tsgl) +{ + unsigned int i; + + for (i = 0; i < tsgl->nents; i++) { + if (tsgl->sgl[i].page_link != tsgl->sgl_saved[i].page_link) + return true; + if (tsgl->sgl[i].offset != tsgl->sgl_saved[i].offset) + return true; + if (tsgl->sgl[i].length != tsgl->sgl_saved[i].length) + return true; + } + return false; +} + +struct cipher_test_sglists { + struct test_sglist src; + struct test_sglist dst; +}; + +static struct cipher_test_sglists *alloc_cipher_test_sglists(void) +{ + struct cipher_test_sglists *tsgls; + + tsgls = kmalloc(sizeof(*tsgls), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!tsgls) + return NULL; + + if (init_test_sglist(&tsgls->src) != 0) + goto fail_kfree; + if (init_test_sglist(&tsgls->dst) != 0) + goto fail_destroy_src; + + return tsgls; + +fail_destroy_src: + destroy_test_sglist(&tsgls->src); +fail_kfree: + kfree(tsgls); + return NULL; +} + +static void free_cipher_test_sglists(struct cipher_test_sglists *tsgls) +{ + if (tsgls) { + destroy_test_sglist(&tsgls->src); + destroy_test_sglist(&tsgls->dst); + kfree(tsgls); + } +} + +/* Build the src and dst scatterlists for an skcipher or AEAD test */ +static int build_cipher_test_sglists(struct cipher_test_sglists *tsgls, + const struct testvec_config *cfg, + unsigned int alignmask, + unsigned int src_total_len, + unsigned int dst_total_len, + const struct kvec *inputs, + unsigned int nr_inputs) +{ + struct iov_iter input; + int err; + + iov_iter_kvec(&input, WRITE, inputs, nr_inputs, src_total_len); + err = build_test_sglist(&tsgls->src, cfg->src_divs, alignmask, + cfg->inplace ? + max(dst_total_len, src_total_len) : + src_total_len, + &input, NULL); + if (err) + return err; + + if (cfg->inplace) { + tsgls->dst.sgl_ptr = tsgls->src.sgl; + tsgls->dst.nents = tsgls->src.nents; + return 0; + } + return build_test_sglist(&tsgls->dst, + cfg->dst_divs[0].proportion_of_total ? + cfg->dst_divs : cfg->src_divs, + alignmask, dst_total_len, NULL, NULL); +} + +/* + * Support for testing passing a misaligned key to setkey(): + * + * If cfg->key_offset is set, copy the key into a new buffer at that offset, + * optionally adding alignmask. Else, just use the key directly. + */ +static int prepare_keybuf(const u8 *key, unsigned int ksize, + const struct testvec_config *cfg, + unsigned int alignmask, + const u8 **keybuf_ret, const u8 **keyptr_ret) +{ + unsigned int key_offset = cfg->key_offset; + u8 *keybuf = NULL, *keyptr = (u8 *)key; + + if (key_offset != 0) { + if (cfg->key_offset_relative_to_alignmask) + key_offset += alignmask; + keybuf = kmalloc(key_offset + ksize, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!keybuf) + return -ENOMEM; + keyptr = keybuf + key_offset; + memcpy(keyptr, key, ksize); + } + *keybuf_ret = keybuf; + *keyptr_ret = keyptr; + return 0; +} + +/* Like setkey_f(tfm, key, ksize), but sometimes misalign the key */ +#define do_setkey(setkey_f, tfm, key, ksize, cfg, alignmask) \ +({ \ + const u8 *keybuf, *keyptr; \ + int err; \ + \ + err = prepare_keybuf((key), (ksize), (cfg), (alignmask), \ + &keybuf, &keyptr); \ + if (err == 0) { \ + err = setkey_f((tfm), keyptr, (ksize)); \ + kfree(keybuf); \ + } \ + err; \ +}) + +#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS + +/* Generate a random length in range [0, max_len], but prefer smaller values */ +static unsigned int generate_random_length(unsigned int max_len) +{ + unsigned int len = prandom_u32() % (max_len + 1); + + switch (prandom_u32() % 4) { + case 0: + return len % 64; + case 1: + return len % 256; + case 2: + return len % 1024; + default: + return len; + } +} + +/* Flip a random bit in the given nonempty data buffer */ +static void flip_random_bit(u8 *buf, size_t size) +{ + size_t bitpos; + + bitpos = prandom_u32() % (size * 8); + buf[bitpos / 8] ^= 1 << (bitpos % 8); +} + +/* Flip a random byte in the given nonempty data buffer */ +static void flip_random_byte(u8 *buf, size_t size) +{ + buf[prandom_u32() % size] ^= 0xff; +} + +/* Sometimes make some random changes to the given nonempty data buffer */ +static void mutate_buffer(u8 *buf, size_t size) +{ + size_t num_flips; + size_t i; + + /* Sometimes flip some bits */ + if (prandom_u32() % 4 == 0) { + num_flips = min_t(size_t, 1 << (prandom_u32() % 8), size * 8); + for (i = 0; i < num_flips; i++) + flip_random_bit(buf, size); + } + + /* Sometimes flip some bytes */ + if (prandom_u32() % 4 == 0) { + num_flips = min_t(size_t, 1 << (prandom_u32() % 8), size); + for (i = 0; i < num_flips; i++) + flip_random_byte(buf, size); + } +} + +/* Randomly generate 'count' bytes, but sometimes make them "interesting" */ +static void generate_random_bytes(u8 *buf, size_t count) +{ + u8 b; + u8 increment; + size_t i; + + if (count == 0) + return; + + switch (prandom_u32() % 8) { /* Choose a generation strategy */ + case 0: + case 1: + /* All the same byte, plus optional mutations */ + switch (prandom_u32() % 4) { + case 0: + b = 0x00; + break; + case 1: + b = 0xff; + break; + default: + b = (u8)prandom_u32(); + break; + } + memset(buf, b, count); + mutate_buffer(buf, count); + break; + case 2: + /* Ascending or descending bytes, plus optional mutations */ + increment = (u8)prandom_u32(); + b = (u8)prandom_u32(); + for (i = 0; i < count; i++, b += increment) + buf[i] = b; + mutate_buffer(buf, count); + break; + default: + /* Fully random bytes */ + for (i = 0; i < count; i++) + buf[i] = (u8)prandom_u32(); + } +} + +static char *generate_random_sgl_divisions(struct test_sg_division *divs, + size_t max_divs, char *p, char *end, + bool gen_flushes, u32 req_flags) +{ + struct test_sg_division *div = divs; + unsigned int remaining = TEST_SG_TOTAL; + + do { + unsigned int this_len; + const char *flushtype_str; + + if (div == &divs[max_divs - 1] || prandom_u32() % 2 == 0) + this_len = remaining; + else + this_len = 1 + (prandom_u32() % remaining); + div->proportion_of_total = this_len; + + if (prandom_u32() % 4 == 0) + div->offset = (PAGE_SIZE - 128) + (prandom_u32() % 128); + else if (prandom_u32() % 2 == 0) + div->offset = prandom_u32() % 32; + else + div->offset = prandom_u32() % PAGE_SIZE; + if (prandom_u32() % 8 == 0) + div->offset_relative_to_alignmask = true; + + div->flush_type = FLUSH_TYPE_NONE; + if (gen_flushes) { + switch (prandom_u32() % 4) { + case 0: + div->flush_type = FLUSH_TYPE_REIMPORT; + break; + case 1: + div->flush_type = FLUSH_TYPE_FLUSH; + break; + } + } + + if (div->flush_type != FLUSH_TYPE_NONE && + !(req_flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP) && + prandom_u32() % 2 == 0) + div->nosimd = true; + + switch (div->flush_type) { + case FLUSH_TYPE_FLUSH: + if (div->nosimd) + flushtype_str = "<flush,nosimd>"; + else + flushtype_str = "<flush>"; + break; + case FLUSH_TYPE_REIMPORT: + if (div->nosimd) + flushtype_str = "<reimport,nosimd>"; + else + flushtype_str = "<reimport>"; + break; + default: + flushtype_str = ""; + break; + } + + BUILD_BUG_ON(TEST_SG_TOTAL != 10000); /* for "%u.%u%%" */ + p += scnprintf(p, end - p, "%s%u.%u%%@%s+%u%s", flushtype_str, + this_len / 100, this_len % 100, + div->offset_relative_to_alignmask ? + "alignmask" : "", + div->offset, this_len == remaining ? "" : ", "); + remaining -= this_len; + div++; + } while (remaining); + + return p; +} + +/* Generate a random testvec_config for fuzz testing */ +static void generate_random_testvec_config(struct testvec_config *cfg, + char *name, size_t max_namelen) +{ + char *p = name; + char * const end = name + max_namelen; + + memset(cfg, 0, sizeof(*cfg)); + + cfg->name = name; + + p += scnprintf(p, end - p, "random:"); + + if (prandom_u32() % 2 == 0) { + cfg->inplace = true; + p += scnprintf(p, end - p, " inplace"); + } + + if (prandom_u32() % 2 == 0) { + cfg->req_flags |= CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP; + p += scnprintf(p, end - p, " may_sleep"); + } + + switch (prandom_u32() % 4) { + case 0: + cfg->finalization_type = FINALIZATION_TYPE_FINAL; + p += scnprintf(p, end - p, " use_final"); + break; + case 1: + cfg->finalization_type = FINALIZATION_TYPE_FINUP; + p += scnprintf(p, end - p, " use_finup"); + break; + default: + cfg->finalization_type = FINALIZATION_TYPE_DIGEST; + p += scnprintf(p, end - p, " use_digest"); + break; + } + + if (!(cfg->req_flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP) && + prandom_u32() % 2 == 0) { + cfg->nosimd = true; + p += scnprintf(p, end - p, " nosimd"); + } + + p += scnprintf(p, end - p, " src_divs=["); + p = generate_random_sgl_divisions(cfg->src_divs, + ARRAY_SIZE(cfg->src_divs), p, end, + (cfg->finalization_type != + FINALIZATION_TYPE_DIGEST), + cfg->req_flags); + p += scnprintf(p, end - p, "]"); + + if (!cfg->inplace && prandom_u32() % 2 == 0) { + p += scnprintf(p, end - p, " dst_divs=["); + p = generate_random_sgl_divisions(cfg->dst_divs, + ARRAY_SIZE(cfg->dst_divs), + p, end, false, + cfg->req_flags); + p += scnprintf(p, end - p, "]"); + } + + if (prandom_u32() % 2 == 0) { + cfg->iv_offset = 1 + (prandom_u32() % MAX_ALGAPI_ALIGNMASK); + p += scnprintf(p, end - p, " iv_offset=%u", cfg->iv_offset); + } + + if (prandom_u32() % 2 == 0) { + cfg->key_offset = 1 + (prandom_u32() % MAX_ALGAPI_ALIGNMASK); + p += scnprintf(p, end - p, " key_offset=%u", cfg->key_offset); + } + + WARN_ON_ONCE(!valid_testvec_config(cfg)); +} + +static void crypto_disable_simd_for_test(void) +{ + preempt_disable(); + __this_cpu_write(crypto_simd_disabled_for_test, true); +} + +static void crypto_reenable_simd_for_test(void) +{ + __this_cpu_write(crypto_simd_disabled_for_test, false); + preempt_enable(); +} + +/* + * Given an algorithm name, build the name of the generic implementation of that + * algorithm, assuming the usual naming convention. Specifically, this appends + * "-generic" to every part of the name that is not a template name. Examples: + * + * aes => aes-generic + * cbc(aes) => cbc(aes-generic) + * cts(cbc(aes)) => cts(cbc(aes-generic)) + * rfc7539(chacha20,poly1305) => rfc7539(chacha20-generic,poly1305-generic) + * + * Return: 0 on success, or -ENAMETOOLONG if the generic name would be too long + */ +static int build_generic_driver_name(const char *algname, + char driver_name[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME]) +{ + const char *in = algname; + char *out = driver_name; + size_t len = strlen(algname); + + if (len >= CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME) + goto too_long; + do { + const char *in_saved = in; + + while (*in && *in != '(' && *in != ')' && *in != ',') + *out++ = *in++; + if (*in != '(' && in > in_saved) { + len += 8; + if (len >= CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME) + goto too_long; + memcpy(out, "-generic", 8); + out += 8; + } + } while ((*out++ = *in++) != '\0'); + return 0; + +too_long: + pr_err("alg: generic driver name for \"%s\" would be too long\n", + algname); + return -ENAMETOOLONG; +} +#else /* !CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS */ +static void crypto_disable_simd_for_test(void) +{ +} + +static void crypto_reenable_simd_for_test(void) +{ +} +#endif /* !CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS */ + +static int build_hash_sglist(struct test_sglist *tsgl, + const struct hash_testvec *vec, + const struct testvec_config *cfg, + unsigned int alignmask, + const struct test_sg_division *divs[XBUFSIZE]) +{ + struct kvec kv; + struct iov_iter input; + + kv.iov_base = (void *)vec->plaintext; + kv.iov_len = vec->psize; + iov_iter_kvec(&input, WRITE, &kv, 1, vec->psize); + return build_test_sglist(tsgl, cfg->src_divs, alignmask, vec->psize, + &input, divs); +} + +static int check_hash_result(const char *type, + const u8 *result, unsigned int digestsize, + const struct hash_testvec *vec, + const char *vec_name, + const char *driver, + const struct testvec_config *cfg) +{ + if (memcmp(result, vec->digest, digestsize) != 0) { + pr_err("alg: %s: %s test failed (wrong result) on test vector %s, cfg=\"%s\"\n", + type, driver, vec_name, cfg->name); + return -EINVAL; + } + if (!testmgr_is_poison(&result[digestsize], TESTMGR_POISON_LEN)) { + pr_err("alg: %s: %s overran result buffer on test vector %s, cfg=\"%s\"\n", + type, driver, vec_name, cfg->name); + return -EOVERFLOW; + } + return 0; +} + +static inline int check_shash_op(const char *op, int err, + const char *driver, const char *vec_name, + const struct testvec_config *cfg) +{ + if (err) + pr_err("alg: shash: %s %s() failed with err %d on test vector %s, cfg=\"%s\"\n", + driver, op, err, vec_name, cfg->name); + return err; +} + +static inline const void *sg_data(struct scatterlist *sg) +{ + return page_address(sg_page(sg)) + sg->offset; +} + +/* Test one hash test vector in one configuration, using the shash API */ +static int test_shash_vec_cfg(const char *driver, + const struct hash_testvec *vec, + const char *vec_name, + const struct testvec_config *cfg, + struct shash_desc *desc, + struct test_sglist *tsgl, + u8 *hashstate) +{ + struct crypto_shash *tfm = desc->tfm; + const unsigned int alignmask = crypto_shash_alignmask(tfm); + const unsigned int digestsize = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm); + const unsigned int statesize = crypto_shash_statesize(tfm); + const struct test_sg_division *divs[XBUFSIZE]; + unsigned int i; + u8 result[HASH_MAX_DIGESTSIZE + TESTMGR_POISON_LEN]; + int err; + + /* Set the key, if specified */ + if (vec->ksize) { + err = do_setkey(crypto_shash_setkey, tfm, vec->key, vec->ksize, + cfg, alignmask); + if (err) { + if (err == vec->setkey_error) + return 0; + pr_err("alg: shash: %s setkey failed on test vector %s; expected_error=%d, actual_error=%d, flags=%#x\n", + driver, vec_name, vec->setkey_error, err, + crypto_shash_get_flags(tfm)); + return err; + } + if (vec->setkey_error) { + pr_err("alg: shash: %s setkey unexpectedly succeeded on test vector %s; expected_error=%d\n", + driver, vec_name, vec->setkey_error); + return -EINVAL; + } + } + + /* Build the scatterlist for the source data */ + err = build_hash_sglist(tsgl, vec, cfg, alignmask, divs); + if (err) { + pr_err("alg: shash: %s: error preparing scatterlist for test vector %s, cfg=\"%s\"\n", + driver, vec_name, cfg->name); + return err; + } + + /* Do the actual hashing */ + + testmgr_poison(desc->__ctx, crypto_shash_descsize(tfm)); + testmgr_poison(result, digestsize + TESTMGR_POISON_LEN); + + if (cfg->finalization_type == FINALIZATION_TYPE_DIGEST || + vec->digest_error) { + /* Just using digest() */ + if (tsgl->nents != 1) + return 0; + if (cfg->nosimd) + crypto_disable_simd_for_test(); + err = crypto_shash_digest(desc, sg_data(&tsgl->sgl[0]), + tsgl->sgl[0].length, result); + if (cfg->nosimd) + crypto_reenable_simd_for_test(); + if (err) { + if (err == vec->digest_error) + return 0; + pr_err("alg: shash: %s digest() failed on test vector %s; expected_error=%d, actual_error=%d, cfg=\"%s\"\n", + driver, vec_name, vec->digest_error, err, + cfg->name); + return err; + } + if (vec->digest_error) { + pr_err("alg: shash: %s digest() unexpectedly succeeded on test vector %s; expected_error=%d, cfg=\"%s\"\n", + driver, vec_name, vec->digest_error, cfg->name); + return -EINVAL; + } + goto result_ready; + } + + /* Using init(), zero or more update(), then final() or finup() */ + + if (cfg->nosimd) + crypto_disable_simd_for_test(); + err = crypto_shash_init(desc); + if (cfg->nosimd) + crypto_reenable_simd_for_test(); + err = check_shash_op("init", err, driver, vec_name, cfg); + if (err) + return err; + + for (i = 0; i < tsgl->nents; i++) { + if (i + 1 == tsgl->nents && + cfg->finalization_type == FINALIZATION_TYPE_FINUP) { + if (divs[i]->nosimd) + crypto_disable_simd_for_test(); + err = crypto_shash_finup(desc, sg_data(&tsgl->sgl[i]), + tsgl->sgl[i].length, result); + if (divs[i]->nosimd) + crypto_reenable_simd_for_test(); + err = check_shash_op("finup", err, driver, vec_name, + cfg); + if (err) + return err; + goto result_ready; + } + if (divs[i]->nosimd) + crypto_disable_simd_for_test(); + err = crypto_shash_update(desc, sg_data(&tsgl->sgl[i]), + tsgl->sgl[i].length); + if (divs[i]->nosimd) + crypto_reenable_simd_for_test(); + err = check_shash_op("update", err, driver, vec_name, cfg); + if (err) + return err; + if (divs[i]->flush_type == FLUSH_TYPE_REIMPORT) { + /* Test ->export() and ->import() */ + testmgr_poison(hashstate + statesize, + TESTMGR_POISON_LEN); + err = crypto_shash_export(desc, hashstate); + err = check_shash_op("export", err, driver, vec_name, + cfg); + if (err) + return err; + if (!testmgr_is_poison(hashstate + statesize, + TESTMGR_POISON_LEN)) { + pr_err("alg: shash: %s export() overran state buffer on test vector %s, cfg=\"%s\"\n", + driver, vec_name, cfg->name); + return -EOVERFLOW; + } + testmgr_poison(desc->__ctx, crypto_shash_descsize(tfm)); + err = crypto_shash_import(desc, hashstate); + err = check_shash_op("import", err, driver, vec_name, + cfg); + if (err) + return err; + } + } + + if (cfg->nosimd) + crypto_disable_simd_for_test(); + err = crypto_shash_final(desc, result); + if (cfg->nosimd) + crypto_reenable_simd_for_test(); + err = check_shash_op("final", err, driver, vec_name, cfg); + if (err) + return err; +result_ready: + return check_hash_result("shash", result, digestsize, vec, vec_name, + driver, cfg); +} + +static int do_ahash_op(int (*op)(struct ahash_request *req), + struct ahash_request *req, + struct crypto_wait *wait, bool nosimd) +{ + int err; + + if (nosimd) + crypto_disable_simd_for_test(); + + err = op(req); + + if (nosimd) + crypto_reenable_simd_for_test(); + + return crypto_wait_req(err, wait); +} + +static int check_nonfinal_ahash_op(const char *op, int err, + u8 *result, unsigned int digestsize, + const char *driver, const char *vec_name, + const struct testvec_config *cfg) +{ + if (err) { + pr_err("alg: ahash: %s %s() failed with err %d on test vector %s, cfg=\"%s\"\n", + driver, op, err, vec_name, cfg->name); + return err; + } + if (!testmgr_is_poison(result, digestsize)) { + pr_err("alg: ahash: %s %s() used result buffer on test vector %s, cfg=\"%s\"\n", + driver, op, vec_name, cfg->name); + return -EINVAL; + } + return 0; +} + +/* Test one hash test vector in one configuration, using the ahash API */ +static int test_ahash_vec_cfg(const char *driver, + const struct hash_testvec *vec, + const char *vec_name, + const struct testvec_config *cfg, + struct ahash_request *req, + struct test_sglist *tsgl, + u8 *hashstate) +{ + struct crypto_ahash *tfm = crypto_ahash_reqtfm(req); + const unsigned int alignmask = crypto_ahash_alignmask(tfm); + const unsigned int digestsize = crypto_ahash_digestsize(tfm); + const unsigned int statesize = crypto_ahash_statesize(tfm); + const u32 req_flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG | cfg->req_flags; + const struct test_sg_division *divs[XBUFSIZE]; + DECLARE_CRYPTO_WAIT(wait); + unsigned int i; + struct scatterlist *pending_sgl; + unsigned int pending_len; + u8 result[HASH_MAX_DIGESTSIZE + TESTMGR_POISON_LEN]; + int err; + + /* Set the key, if specified */ + if (vec->ksize) { + err = do_setkey(crypto_ahash_setkey, tfm, vec->key, vec->ksize, + cfg, alignmask); + if (err) { + if (err == vec->setkey_error) + return 0; + pr_err("alg: ahash: %s setkey failed on test vector %s; expected_error=%d, actual_error=%d, flags=%#x\n", + driver, vec_name, vec->setkey_error, err, + crypto_ahash_get_flags(tfm)); + return err; + } + if (vec->setkey_error) { + pr_err("alg: ahash: %s setkey unexpectedly succeeded on test vector %s; expected_error=%d\n", + driver, vec_name, vec->setkey_error); + return -EINVAL; + } + } + + /* Build the scatterlist for the source data */ + err = build_hash_sglist(tsgl, vec, cfg, alignmask, divs); + if (err) { + pr_err("alg: ahash: %s: error preparing scatterlist for test vector %s, cfg=\"%s\"\n", + driver, vec_name, cfg->name); + return err; + } + + /* Do the actual hashing */ + + testmgr_poison(req->__ctx, crypto_ahash_reqsize(tfm)); + testmgr_poison(result, digestsize + TESTMGR_POISON_LEN); + + if (cfg->finalization_type == FINALIZATION_TYPE_DIGEST || + vec->digest_error) { + /* Just using digest() */ + ahash_request_set_callback(req, req_flags, crypto_req_done, + &wait); + ahash_request_set_crypt(req, tsgl->sgl, result, vec->psize); + err = do_ahash_op(crypto_ahash_digest, req, &wait, cfg->nosimd); + if (err) { + if (err == vec->digest_error) + return 0; + pr_err("alg: ahash: %s digest() failed on test vector %s; expected_error=%d, actual_error=%d, cfg=\"%s\"\n", + driver, vec_name, vec->digest_error, err, + cfg->name); + return err; + } + if (vec->digest_error) { + pr_err("alg: ahash: %s digest() unexpectedly succeeded on test vector %s; expected_error=%d, cfg=\"%s\"\n", + driver, vec_name, vec->digest_error, cfg->name); + return -EINVAL; + } + goto result_ready; + } + + /* Using init(), zero or more update(), then final() or finup() */ + + ahash_request_set_callback(req, req_flags, crypto_req_done, &wait); + ahash_request_set_crypt(req, NULL, result, 0); + err = do_ahash_op(crypto_ahash_init, req, &wait, cfg->nosimd); + err = check_nonfinal_ahash_op("init", err, result, digestsize, + driver, vec_name, cfg); + if (err) + return err; + + pending_sgl = NULL; + pending_len = 0; + for (i = 0; i < tsgl->nents; i++) { + if (divs[i]->flush_type != FLUSH_TYPE_NONE && + pending_sgl != NULL) { + /* update() with the pending data */ + ahash_request_set_callback(req, req_flags, + crypto_req_done, &wait); + ahash_request_set_crypt(req, pending_sgl, result, + pending_len); + err = do_ahash_op(crypto_ahash_update, req, &wait, + divs[i]->nosimd); + err = check_nonfinal_ahash_op("update", err, + result, digestsize, + driver, vec_name, cfg); + if (err) + return err; + pending_sgl = NULL; + pending_len = 0; + } + if (divs[i]->flush_type == FLUSH_TYPE_REIMPORT) { + /* Test ->export() and ->import() */ + testmgr_poison(hashstate + statesize, + TESTMGR_POISON_LEN); + err = crypto_ahash_export(req, hashstate); + err = check_nonfinal_ahash_op("export", err, + result, digestsize, + driver, vec_name, cfg); + if (err) + return err; + if (!testmgr_is_poison(hashstate + statesize, + TESTMGR_POISON_LEN)) { + pr_err("alg: ahash: %s export() overran state buffer on test vector %s, cfg=\"%s\"\n", + driver, vec_name, cfg->name); + return -EOVERFLOW; + } + + testmgr_poison(req->__ctx, crypto_ahash_reqsize(tfm)); + err = crypto_ahash_import(req, hashstate); + err = check_nonfinal_ahash_op("import", err, + result, digestsize, + driver, vec_name, cfg); + if (err) + return err; + } + if (pending_sgl == NULL) + pending_sgl = &tsgl->sgl[i]; + pending_len += tsgl->sgl[i].length; + } + + ahash_request_set_callback(req, req_flags, crypto_req_done, &wait); + ahash_request_set_crypt(req, pending_sgl, result, pending_len); + if (cfg->finalization_type == FINALIZATION_TYPE_FINAL) { + /* finish with update() and final() */ + err = do_ahash_op(crypto_ahash_update, req, &wait, cfg->nosimd); + err = check_nonfinal_ahash_op("update", err, result, digestsize, + driver, vec_name, cfg); + if (err) + return err; + err = do_ahash_op(crypto_ahash_final, req, &wait, cfg->nosimd); + if (err) { + pr_err("alg: ahash: %s final() failed with err %d on test vector %s, cfg=\"%s\"\n", + driver, err, vec_name, cfg->name); + return err; + } + } else { + /* finish with finup() */ + err = do_ahash_op(crypto_ahash_finup, req, &wait, cfg->nosimd); + if (err) { + pr_err("alg: ahash: %s finup() failed with err %d on test vector %s, cfg=\"%s\"\n", + driver, err, vec_name, cfg->name); + return err; + } + } + +result_ready: + return check_hash_result("ahash", result, digestsize, vec, vec_name, + driver, cfg); +} + +static int test_hash_vec_cfg(const char *driver, + const struct hash_testvec *vec, + const char *vec_name, + const struct testvec_config *cfg, + struct ahash_request *req, + struct shash_desc *desc, + struct test_sglist *tsgl, + u8 *hashstate) +{ + int err; + + /* + * For algorithms implemented as "shash", most bugs will be detected by + * both the shash and ahash tests. Test the shash API first so that the + * failures involve less indirection, so are easier to debug. + */ + + if (desc) { + err = test_shash_vec_cfg(driver, vec, vec_name, cfg, desc, tsgl, + hashstate); + if (err) + return err; + } + + return test_ahash_vec_cfg(driver, vec, vec_name, cfg, req, tsgl, + hashstate); +} + +static int test_hash_vec(const char *driver, const struct hash_testvec *vec, + unsigned int vec_num, struct ahash_request *req, + struct shash_desc *desc, struct test_sglist *tsgl, + u8 *hashstate) +{ + char vec_name[16]; + unsigned int i; + int err; + + sprintf(vec_name, "%u", vec_num); + + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(default_hash_testvec_configs); i++) { + err = test_hash_vec_cfg(driver, vec, vec_name, + &default_hash_testvec_configs[i], + req, desc, tsgl, hashstate); + if (err) + return err; + } + +#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS + if (!noextratests) { + struct testvec_config cfg; + char cfgname[TESTVEC_CONFIG_NAMELEN]; + + for (i = 0; i < fuzz_iterations; i++) { + generate_random_testvec_config(&cfg, cfgname, + sizeof(cfgname)); + err = test_hash_vec_cfg(driver, vec, vec_name, &cfg, + req, desc, tsgl, hashstate); + if (err) + return err; + cond_resched(); + } + } +#endif + return 0; +} + +#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS +/* + * Generate a hash test vector from the given implementation. + * Assumes the buffers in 'vec' were already allocated. + */ +static void generate_random_hash_testvec(struct shash_desc *desc, + struct hash_testvec *vec, + unsigned int maxkeysize, + unsigned int maxdatasize, + char *name, size_t max_namelen) +{ + /* Data */ + vec->psize = generate_random_length(maxdatasize); + generate_random_bytes((u8 *)vec->plaintext, vec->psize); + + /* + * Key: length in range [1, maxkeysize], but usually choose maxkeysize. + * If algorithm is unkeyed, then maxkeysize == 0 and set ksize = 0. + */ + vec->setkey_error = 0; + vec->ksize = 0; + if (maxkeysize) { + vec->ksize = maxkeysize; + if (prandom_u32() % 4 == 0) + vec->ksize = 1 + (prandom_u32() % maxkeysize); + generate_random_bytes((u8 *)vec->key, vec->ksize); + + vec->setkey_error = crypto_shash_setkey(desc->tfm, vec->key, + vec->ksize); + /* If the key couldn't be set, no need to continue to digest. */ + if (vec->setkey_error) + goto done; + } + + /* Digest */ + vec->digest_error = crypto_shash_digest(desc, vec->plaintext, + vec->psize, (u8 *)vec->digest); +done: + snprintf(name, max_namelen, "\"random: psize=%u ksize=%u\"", + vec->psize, vec->ksize); +} + +/* + * Test the hash algorithm represented by @req against the corresponding generic + * implementation, if one is available. + */ +static int test_hash_vs_generic_impl(const char *driver, + const char *generic_driver, + unsigned int maxkeysize, + struct ahash_request *req, + struct shash_desc *desc, + struct test_sglist *tsgl, + u8 *hashstate) +{ + struct crypto_ahash *tfm = crypto_ahash_reqtfm(req); + const unsigned int digestsize = crypto_ahash_digestsize(tfm); + const unsigned int blocksize = crypto_ahash_blocksize(tfm); + const unsigned int maxdatasize = (2 * PAGE_SIZE) - TESTMGR_POISON_LEN; + const char *algname = crypto_hash_alg_common(tfm)->base.cra_name; + char _generic_driver[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME]; + struct crypto_shash *generic_tfm = NULL; + struct shash_desc *generic_desc = NULL; + unsigned int i; + struct hash_testvec vec = { 0 }; + char vec_name[64]; + struct testvec_config *cfg; + char cfgname[TESTVEC_CONFIG_NAMELEN]; + int err; + + if (noextratests) + return 0; + + if (!generic_driver) { /* Use default naming convention? */ + err = build_generic_driver_name(algname, _generic_driver); + if (err) + return err; + generic_driver = _generic_driver; + } + + if (strcmp(generic_driver, driver) == 0) /* Already the generic impl? */ + return 0; + + generic_tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(generic_driver, 0, 0); + if (IS_ERR(generic_tfm)) { + err = PTR_ERR(generic_tfm); + if (err == -ENOENT) { + pr_warn("alg: hash: skipping comparison tests for %s because %s is unavailable\n", + driver, generic_driver); + return 0; + } + pr_err("alg: hash: error allocating %s (generic impl of %s): %d\n", + generic_driver, algname, err); + return err; + } + + cfg = kzalloc(sizeof(*cfg), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!cfg) { + err = -ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + + generic_desc = kzalloc(sizeof(*desc) + + crypto_shash_descsize(generic_tfm), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!generic_desc) { + err = -ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + generic_desc->tfm = generic_tfm; + + /* Check the algorithm properties for consistency. */ + + if (digestsize != crypto_shash_digestsize(generic_tfm)) { + pr_err("alg: hash: digestsize for %s (%u) doesn't match generic impl (%u)\n", + driver, digestsize, + crypto_shash_digestsize(generic_tfm)); + err = -EINVAL; + goto out; + } + + if (blocksize != crypto_shash_blocksize(generic_tfm)) { + pr_err("alg: hash: blocksize for %s (%u) doesn't match generic impl (%u)\n", + driver, blocksize, crypto_shash_blocksize(generic_tfm)); + err = -EINVAL; + goto out; + } + + /* + * Now generate test vectors using the generic implementation, and test + * the other implementation against them. + */ + + vec.key = kmalloc(maxkeysize, GFP_KERNEL); + vec.plaintext = kmalloc(maxdatasize, GFP_KERNEL); + vec.digest = kmalloc(digestsize, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!vec.key || !vec.plaintext || !vec.digest) { + err = -ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + + for (i = 0; i < fuzz_iterations * 8; i++) { + generate_random_hash_testvec(generic_desc, &vec, + maxkeysize, maxdatasize, + vec_name, sizeof(vec_name)); + generate_random_testvec_config(cfg, cfgname, sizeof(cfgname)); + + err = test_hash_vec_cfg(driver, &vec, vec_name, cfg, + req, desc, tsgl, hashstate); + if (err) + goto out; + cond_resched(); + } + err = 0; +out: + kfree(cfg); + kfree(vec.key); + kfree(vec.plaintext); + kfree(vec.digest); + crypto_free_shash(generic_tfm); + kfree_sensitive(generic_desc); + return err; +} +#else /* !CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS */ +static int test_hash_vs_generic_impl(const char *driver, + const char *generic_driver, + unsigned int maxkeysize, + struct ahash_request *req, + struct shash_desc *desc, + struct test_sglist *tsgl, + u8 *hashstate) +{ + return 0; +} +#endif /* !CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS */ + +static int alloc_shash(const char *driver, u32 type, u32 mask, + struct crypto_shash **tfm_ret, + struct shash_desc **desc_ret) +{ + struct crypto_shash *tfm; + struct shash_desc *desc; + + tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(driver, type, mask); + if (IS_ERR(tfm)) { + if (PTR_ERR(tfm) == -ENOENT) { + /* + * This algorithm is only available through the ahash + * API, not the shash API, so skip the shash tests. + */ + return 0; + } + pr_err("alg: hash: failed to allocate shash transform for %s: %ld\n", + driver, PTR_ERR(tfm)); + return PTR_ERR(tfm); + } + + desc = kmalloc(sizeof(*desc) + crypto_shash_descsize(tfm), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!desc) { + crypto_free_shash(tfm); + return -ENOMEM; + } + desc->tfm = tfm; + + *tfm_ret = tfm; + *desc_ret = desc; + return 0; +} + +static int __alg_test_hash(const struct hash_testvec *vecs, + unsigned int num_vecs, const char *driver, + u32 type, u32 mask, + const char *generic_driver, unsigned int maxkeysize) +{ + struct crypto_ahash *atfm = NULL; + struct ahash_request *req = NULL; + struct crypto_shash *stfm = NULL; + struct shash_desc *desc = NULL; + struct test_sglist *tsgl = NULL; + u8 *hashstate = NULL; + unsigned int statesize; + unsigned int i; + int err; + + /* + * Always test the ahash API. This works regardless of whether the + * algorithm is implemented as ahash or shash. + */ + + atfm = crypto_alloc_ahash(driver, type, mask); + if (IS_ERR(atfm)) { + pr_err("alg: hash: failed to allocate transform for %s: %ld\n", + driver, PTR_ERR(atfm)); + return PTR_ERR(atfm); + } + + req = ahash_request_alloc(atfm, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!req) { + pr_err("alg: hash: failed to allocate request for %s\n", + driver); + err = -ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + + /* + * If available also test the shash API, to cover corner cases that may + * be missed by testing the ahash API only. + */ + err = alloc_shash(driver, type, mask, &stfm, &desc); + if (err) + goto out; + + tsgl = kmalloc(sizeof(*tsgl), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!tsgl || init_test_sglist(tsgl) != 0) { + pr_err("alg: hash: failed to allocate test buffers for %s\n", + driver); + kfree(tsgl); + tsgl = NULL; + err = -ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + + statesize = crypto_ahash_statesize(atfm); + if (stfm) + statesize = max(statesize, crypto_shash_statesize(stfm)); + hashstate = kmalloc(statesize + TESTMGR_POISON_LEN, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!hashstate) { + pr_err("alg: hash: failed to allocate hash state buffer for %s\n", + driver); + err = -ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + + for (i = 0; i < num_vecs; i++) { + err = test_hash_vec(driver, &vecs[i], i, req, desc, tsgl, + hashstate); + if (err) + goto out; + cond_resched(); + } + err = test_hash_vs_generic_impl(driver, generic_driver, maxkeysize, req, + desc, tsgl, hashstate); +out: + kfree(hashstate); + if (tsgl) { + destroy_test_sglist(tsgl); + kfree(tsgl); + } + kfree(desc); + crypto_free_shash(stfm); + ahash_request_free(req); + crypto_free_ahash(atfm); + return err; +} + +static int alg_test_hash(const struct alg_test_desc *desc, const char *driver, + u32 type, u32 mask) +{ + const struct hash_testvec *template = desc->suite.hash.vecs; + unsigned int tcount = desc->suite.hash.count; + unsigned int nr_unkeyed, nr_keyed; + unsigned int maxkeysize = 0; + int err; + + /* + * For OPTIONAL_KEY algorithms, we have to do all the unkeyed tests + * first, before setting a key on the tfm. To make this easier, we + * require that the unkeyed test vectors (if any) are listed first. + */ + + for (nr_unkeyed = 0; nr_unkeyed < tcount; nr_unkeyed++) { + if (template[nr_unkeyed].ksize) + break; + } + for (nr_keyed = 0; nr_unkeyed + nr_keyed < tcount; nr_keyed++) { + if (!template[nr_unkeyed + nr_keyed].ksize) { + pr_err("alg: hash: test vectors for %s out of order, " + "unkeyed ones must come first\n", desc->alg); + return -EINVAL; + } + maxkeysize = max_t(unsigned int, maxkeysize, + template[nr_unkeyed + nr_keyed].ksize); + } + + err = 0; + if (nr_unkeyed) { + err = __alg_test_hash(template, nr_unkeyed, driver, type, mask, + desc->generic_driver, maxkeysize); + template += nr_unkeyed; + } + + if (!err && nr_keyed) + err = __alg_test_hash(template, nr_keyed, driver, type, mask, + desc->generic_driver, maxkeysize); + + return err; +} + +static int test_aead_vec_cfg(const char *driver, int enc, + const struct aead_testvec *vec, + const char *vec_name, + const struct testvec_config *cfg, + struct aead_request *req, + struct cipher_test_sglists *tsgls) +{ + struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req); + const unsigned int alignmask = crypto_aead_alignmask(tfm); + const unsigned int ivsize = crypto_aead_ivsize(tfm); + const unsigned int authsize = vec->clen - vec->plen; + const u32 req_flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG | cfg->req_flags; + const char *op = enc ? "encryption" : "decryption"; + DECLARE_CRYPTO_WAIT(wait); + u8 _iv[3 * (MAX_ALGAPI_ALIGNMASK + 1) + MAX_IVLEN]; + u8 *iv = PTR_ALIGN(&_iv[0], 2 * (MAX_ALGAPI_ALIGNMASK + 1)) + + cfg->iv_offset + + (cfg->iv_offset_relative_to_alignmask ? alignmask : 0); + struct kvec input[2]; + int err; + + /* Set the key */ + if (vec->wk) + crypto_aead_set_flags(tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_FORBID_WEAK_KEYS); + else + crypto_aead_clear_flags(tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_FORBID_WEAK_KEYS); + + err = do_setkey(crypto_aead_setkey, tfm, vec->key, vec->klen, + cfg, alignmask); + if (err && err != vec->setkey_error) { + pr_err("alg: aead: %s setkey failed on test vector %s; expected_error=%d, actual_error=%d, flags=%#x\n", + driver, vec_name, vec->setkey_error, err, + crypto_aead_get_flags(tfm)); + return err; + } + if (!err && vec->setkey_error) { + pr_err("alg: aead: %s setkey unexpectedly succeeded on test vector %s; expected_error=%d\n", + driver, vec_name, vec->setkey_error); + return -EINVAL; + } + + /* Set the authentication tag size */ + err = crypto_aead_setauthsize(tfm, authsize); + if (err && err != vec->setauthsize_error) { + pr_err("alg: aead: %s setauthsize failed on test vector %s; expected_error=%d, actual_error=%d\n", + driver, vec_name, vec->setauthsize_error, err); + return err; + } + if (!err && vec->setauthsize_error) { + pr_err("alg: aead: %s setauthsize unexpectedly succeeded on test vector %s; expected_error=%d\n", + driver, vec_name, vec->setauthsize_error); + return -EINVAL; + } + + if (vec->setkey_error || vec->setauthsize_error) + return 0; + + /* The IV must be copied to a buffer, as the algorithm may modify it */ + if (WARN_ON(ivsize > MAX_IVLEN)) + return -EINVAL; + if (vec->iv) + memcpy(iv, vec->iv, ivsize); + else + memset(iv, 0, ivsize); + + /* Build the src/dst scatterlists */ + input[0].iov_base = (void *)vec->assoc; + input[0].iov_len = vec->alen; + input[1].iov_base = enc ? (void *)vec->ptext : (void *)vec->ctext; + input[1].iov_len = enc ? vec->plen : vec->clen; + err = build_cipher_test_sglists(tsgls, cfg, alignmask, + vec->alen + (enc ? vec->plen : + vec->clen), + vec->alen + (enc ? vec->clen : + vec->plen), + input, 2); + if (err) { + pr_err("alg: aead: %s %s: error preparing scatterlists for test vector %s, cfg=\"%s\"\n", + driver, op, vec_name, cfg->name); + return err; + } + + /* Do the actual encryption or decryption */ + testmgr_poison(req->__ctx, crypto_aead_reqsize(tfm)); + aead_request_set_callback(req, req_flags, crypto_req_done, &wait); + aead_request_set_crypt(req, tsgls->src.sgl_ptr, tsgls->dst.sgl_ptr, + enc ? vec->plen : vec->clen, iv); + aead_request_set_ad(req, vec->alen); + if (cfg->nosimd) + crypto_disable_simd_for_test(); + err = enc ? crypto_aead_encrypt(req) : crypto_aead_decrypt(req); + if (cfg->nosimd) + crypto_reenable_simd_for_test(); + err = crypto_wait_req(err, &wait); + + /* Check that the algorithm didn't overwrite things it shouldn't have */ + if (req->cryptlen != (enc ? vec->plen : vec->clen) || + req->assoclen != vec->alen || + req->iv != iv || + req->src != tsgls->src.sgl_ptr || + req->dst != tsgls->dst.sgl_ptr || + crypto_aead_reqtfm(req) != tfm || + req->base.complete != crypto_req_done || + req->base.flags != req_flags || + req->base.data != &wait) { + pr_err("alg: aead: %s %s corrupted request struct on test vector %s, cfg=\"%s\"\n", + driver, op, vec_name, cfg->name); + if (req->cryptlen != (enc ? vec->plen : vec->clen)) + pr_err("alg: aead: changed 'req->cryptlen'\n"); + if (req->assoclen != vec->alen) + pr_err("alg: aead: changed 'req->assoclen'\n"); + if (req->iv != iv) + pr_err("alg: aead: changed 'req->iv'\n"); + if (req->src != tsgls->src.sgl_ptr) + pr_err("alg: aead: changed 'req->src'\n"); + if (req->dst != tsgls->dst.sgl_ptr) + pr_err("alg: aead: changed 'req->dst'\n"); + if (crypto_aead_reqtfm(req) != tfm) + pr_err("alg: aead: changed 'req->base.tfm'\n"); + if (req->base.complete != crypto_req_done) + pr_err("alg: aead: changed 'req->base.complete'\n"); + if (req->base.flags != req_flags) + pr_err("alg: aead: changed 'req->base.flags'\n"); + if (req->base.data != &wait) + pr_err("alg: aead: changed 'req->base.data'\n"); + return -EINVAL; + } + if (is_test_sglist_corrupted(&tsgls->src)) { + pr_err("alg: aead: %s %s corrupted src sgl on test vector %s, cfg=\"%s\"\n", + driver, op, vec_name, cfg->name); + return -EINVAL; + } + if (tsgls->dst.sgl_ptr != tsgls->src.sgl && + is_test_sglist_corrupted(&tsgls->dst)) { + pr_err("alg: aead: %s %s corrupted dst sgl on test vector %s, cfg=\"%s\"\n", + driver, op, vec_name, cfg->name); + return -EINVAL; + } + + /* Check for unexpected success or failure, or wrong error code */ + if ((err == 0 && vec->novrfy) || + (err != vec->crypt_error && !(err == -EBADMSG && vec->novrfy))) { + char expected_error[32]; + + if (vec->novrfy && + vec->crypt_error != 0 && vec->crypt_error != -EBADMSG) + sprintf(expected_error, "-EBADMSG or %d", + vec->crypt_error); + else if (vec->novrfy) + sprintf(expected_error, "-EBADMSG"); + else + sprintf(expected_error, "%d", vec->crypt_error); + if (err) { + pr_err("alg: aead: %s %s failed on test vector %s; expected_error=%s, actual_error=%d, cfg=\"%s\"\n", + driver, op, vec_name, expected_error, err, + cfg->name); + return err; + } + pr_err("alg: aead: %s %s unexpectedly succeeded on test vector %s; expected_error=%s, cfg=\"%s\"\n", + driver, op, vec_name, expected_error, cfg->name); + return -EINVAL; + } + if (err) /* Expectedly failed. */ + return 0; + + /* Check for the correct output (ciphertext or plaintext) */ + err = verify_correct_output(&tsgls->dst, enc ? vec->ctext : vec->ptext, + enc ? vec->clen : vec->plen, + vec->alen, enc || !cfg->inplace); + if (err == -EOVERFLOW) { + pr_err("alg: aead: %s %s overran dst buffer on test vector %s, cfg=\"%s\"\n", + driver, op, vec_name, cfg->name); + return err; + } + if (err) { + pr_err("alg: aead: %s %s test failed (wrong result) on test vector %s, cfg=\"%s\"\n", + driver, op, vec_name, cfg->name); + return err; + } + + return 0; +} + +static int test_aead_vec(const char *driver, int enc, + const struct aead_testvec *vec, unsigned int vec_num, + struct aead_request *req, + struct cipher_test_sglists *tsgls) +{ + char vec_name[16]; + unsigned int i; + int err; + + if (enc && vec->novrfy) + return 0; + + sprintf(vec_name, "%u", vec_num); + + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(default_cipher_testvec_configs); i++) { + err = test_aead_vec_cfg(driver, enc, vec, vec_name, + &default_cipher_testvec_configs[i], + req, tsgls); + if (err) + return err; + } + +#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS + if (!noextratests) { + struct testvec_config cfg; + char cfgname[TESTVEC_CONFIG_NAMELEN]; + + for (i = 0; i < fuzz_iterations; i++) { + generate_random_testvec_config(&cfg, cfgname, + sizeof(cfgname)); + err = test_aead_vec_cfg(driver, enc, vec, vec_name, + &cfg, req, tsgls); + if (err) + return err; + cond_resched(); + } + } +#endif + return 0; +} + +#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS + +struct aead_extra_tests_ctx { + struct aead_request *req; + struct crypto_aead *tfm; + const char *driver; + const struct alg_test_desc *test_desc; + struct cipher_test_sglists *tsgls; + unsigned int maxdatasize; + unsigned int maxkeysize; + + struct aead_testvec vec; + char vec_name[64]; + char cfgname[TESTVEC_CONFIG_NAMELEN]; + struct testvec_config cfg; +}; + +/* + * Make at least one random change to a (ciphertext, AAD) pair. "Ciphertext" + * here means the full ciphertext including the authentication tag. The + * authentication tag (and hence also the ciphertext) is assumed to be nonempty. + */ +static void mutate_aead_message(struct aead_testvec *vec, bool aad_iv, + unsigned int ivsize) +{ + const unsigned int aad_tail_size = aad_iv ? ivsize : 0; + const unsigned int authsize = vec->clen - vec->plen; + + if (prandom_u32() % 2 == 0 && vec->alen > aad_tail_size) { + /* Mutate the AAD */ + flip_random_bit((u8 *)vec->assoc, vec->alen - aad_tail_size); + if (prandom_u32() % 2 == 0) + return; + } + if (prandom_u32() % 2 == 0) { + /* Mutate auth tag (assuming it's at the end of ciphertext) */ + flip_random_bit((u8 *)vec->ctext + vec->plen, authsize); + } else { + /* Mutate any part of the ciphertext */ + flip_random_bit((u8 *)vec->ctext, vec->clen); + } +} + +/* + * Minimum authentication tag size in bytes at which we assume that we can + * reliably generate inauthentic messages, i.e. not generate an authentic + * message by chance. + */ +#define MIN_COLLISION_FREE_AUTHSIZE 8 + +static void generate_aead_message(struct aead_request *req, + const struct aead_test_suite *suite, + struct aead_testvec *vec, + bool prefer_inauthentic) +{ + struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req); + const unsigned int ivsize = crypto_aead_ivsize(tfm); + const unsigned int authsize = vec->clen - vec->plen; + const bool inauthentic = (authsize >= MIN_COLLISION_FREE_AUTHSIZE) && + (prefer_inauthentic || prandom_u32() % 4 == 0); + + /* Generate the AAD. */ + generate_random_bytes((u8 *)vec->assoc, vec->alen); + if (suite->aad_iv && vec->alen >= ivsize) + /* Avoid implementation-defined behavior. */ + memcpy((u8 *)vec->assoc + vec->alen - ivsize, vec->iv, ivsize); + + if (inauthentic && prandom_u32() % 2 == 0) { + /* Generate a random ciphertext. */ + generate_random_bytes((u8 *)vec->ctext, vec->clen); + } else { + int i = 0; + struct scatterlist src[2], dst; + u8 iv[MAX_IVLEN]; + DECLARE_CRYPTO_WAIT(wait); + + /* Generate a random plaintext and encrypt it. */ + sg_init_table(src, 2); + if (vec->alen) + sg_set_buf(&src[i++], vec->assoc, vec->alen); + if (vec->plen) { + generate_random_bytes((u8 *)vec->ptext, vec->plen); + sg_set_buf(&src[i++], vec->ptext, vec->plen); + } + sg_init_one(&dst, vec->ctext, vec->alen + vec->clen); + memcpy(iv, vec->iv, ivsize); + aead_request_set_callback(req, 0, crypto_req_done, &wait); + aead_request_set_crypt(req, src, &dst, vec->plen, iv); + aead_request_set_ad(req, vec->alen); + vec->crypt_error = crypto_wait_req(crypto_aead_encrypt(req), + &wait); + /* If encryption failed, we're done. */ + if (vec->crypt_error != 0) + return; + memmove((u8 *)vec->ctext, vec->ctext + vec->alen, vec->clen); + if (!inauthentic) + return; + /* + * Mutate the authentic (ciphertext, AAD) pair to get an + * inauthentic one. + */ + mutate_aead_message(vec, suite->aad_iv, ivsize); + } + vec->novrfy = 1; + if (suite->einval_allowed) + vec->crypt_error = -EINVAL; +} + +/* + * Generate an AEAD test vector 'vec' using the implementation specified by + * 'req'. The buffers in 'vec' must already be allocated. + * + * If 'prefer_inauthentic' is true, then this function will generate inauthentic + * test vectors (i.e. vectors with 'vec->novrfy=1') more often. + */ +static void generate_random_aead_testvec(struct aead_request *req, + struct aead_testvec *vec, + const struct aead_test_suite *suite, + unsigned int maxkeysize, + unsigned int maxdatasize, + char *name, size_t max_namelen, + bool prefer_inauthentic) +{ + struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req); + const unsigned int ivsize = crypto_aead_ivsize(tfm); + const unsigned int maxauthsize = crypto_aead_maxauthsize(tfm); + unsigned int authsize; + unsigned int total_len; + + /* Key: length in [0, maxkeysize], but usually choose maxkeysize */ + vec->klen = maxkeysize; + if (prandom_u32() % 4 == 0) + vec->klen = prandom_u32() % (maxkeysize + 1); + generate_random_bytes((u8 *)vec->key, vec->klen); + vec->setkey_error = crypto_aead_setkey(tfm, vec->key, vec->klen); + + /* IV */ + generate_random_bytes((u8 *)vec->iv, ivsize); + + /* Tag length: in [0, maxauthsize], but usually choose maxauthsize */ + authsize = maxauthsize; + if (prandom_u32() % 4 == 0) + authsize = prandom_u32() % (maxauthsize + 1); + if (prefer_inauthentic && authsize < MIN_COLLISION_FREE_AUTHSIZE) + authsize = MIN_COLLISION_FREE_AUTHSIZE; + if (WARN_ON(authsize > maxdatasize)) + authsize = maxdatasize; + maxdatasize -= authsize; + vec->setauthsize_error = crypto_aead_setauthsize(tfm, authsize); + + /* AAD, plaintext, and ciphertext lengths */ + total_len = generate_random_length(maxdatasize); + if (prandom_u32() % 4 == 0) + vec->alen = 0; + else + vec->alen = generate_random_length(total_len); + vec->plen = total_len - vec->alen; + vec->clen = vec->plen + authsize; + + /* + * Generate the AAD, plaintext, and ciphertext. Not applicable if the + * key or the authentication tag size couldn't be set. + */ + vec->novrfy = 0; + vec->crypt_error = 0; + if (vec->setkey_error == 0 && vec->setauthsize_error == 0) + generate_aead_message(req, suite, vec, prefer_inauthentic); + snprintf(name, max_namelen, + "\"random: alen=%u plen=%u authsize=%u klen=%u novrfy=%d\"", + vec->alen, vec->plen, authsize, vec->klen, vec->novrfy); +} + +static void try_to_generate_inauthentic_testvec( + struct aead_extra_tests_ctx *ctx) +{ + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < 10; i++) { + generate_random_aead_testvec(ctx->req, &ctx->vec, + &ctx->test_desc->suite.aead, + ctx->maxkeysize, ctx->maxdatasize, + ctx->vec_name, + sizeof(ctx->vec_name), true); + if (ctx->vec.novrfy) + return; + } +} + +/* + * Generate inauthentic test vectors (i.e. ciphertext, AAD pairs that aren't the + * result of an encryption with the key) and verify that decryption fails. + */ +static int test_aead_inauthentic_inputs(struct aead_extra_tests_ctx *ctx) +{ + unsigned int i; + int err; + + for (i = 0; i < fuzz_iterations * 8; i++) { + /* + * Since this part of the tests isn't comparing the + * implementation to another, there's no point in testing any + * test vectors other than inauthentic ones (vec.novrfy=1) here. + * + * If we're having trouble generating such a test vector, e.g. + * if the algorithm keeps rejecting the generated keys, don't + * retry forever; just continue on. + */ + try_to_generate_inauthentic_testvec(ctx); + if (ctx->vec.novrfy) { + generate_random_testvec_config(&ctx->cfg, ctx->cfgname, + sizeof(ctx->cfgname)); + err = test_aead_vec_cfg(ctx->driver, DECRYPT, &ctx->vec, + ctx->vec_name, &ctx->cfg, + ctx->req, ctx->tsgls); + if (err) + return err; + } + cond_resched(); + } + return 0; +} + +/* + * Test the AEAD algorithm against the corresponding generic implementation, if + * one is available. + */ +static int test_aead_vs_generic_impl(struct aead_extra_tests_ctx *ctx) +{ + struct crypto_aead *tfm = ctx->tfm; + const char *algname = crypto_aead_alg(tfm)->base.cra_name; + const char *driver = ctx->driver; + const char *generic_driver = ctx->test_desc->generic_driver; + char _generic_driver[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME]; + struct crypto_aead *generic_tfm = NULL; + struct aead_request *generic_req = NULL; + unsigned int i; + int err; + + if (!generic_driver) { /* Use default naming convention? */ + err = build_generic_driver_name(algname, _generic_driver); + if (err) + return err; + generic_driver = _generic_driver; + } + + if (strcmp(generic_driver, driver) == 0) /* Already the generic impl? */ + return 0; + + generic_tfm = crypto_alloc_aead(generic_driver, 0, 0); + if (IS_ERR(generic_tfm)) { + err = PTR_ERR(generic_tfm); + if (err == -ENOENT) { + pr_warn("alg: aead: skipping comparison tests for %s because %s is unavailable\n", + driver, generic_driver); + return 0; + } + pr_err("alg: aead: error allocating %s (generic impl of %s): %d\n", + generic_driver, algname, err); + return err; + } + + generic_req = aead_request_alloc(generic_tfm, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!generic_req) { + err = -ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + + /* Check the algorithm properties for consistency. */ + + if (crypto_aead_maxauthsize(tfm) != + crypto_aead_maxauthsize(generic_tfm)) { + pr_err("alg: aead: maxauthsize for %s (%u) doesn't match generic impl (%u)\n", + driver, crypto_aead_maxauthsize(tfm), + crypto_aead_maxauthsize(generic_tfm)); + err = -EINVAL; + goto out; + } + + if (crypto_aead_ivsize(tfm) != crypto_aead_ivsize(generic_tfm)) { + pr_err("alg: aead: ivsize for %s (%u) doesn't match generic impl (%u)\n", + driver, crypto_aead_ivsize(tfm), + crypto_aead_ivsize(generic_tfm)); + err = -EINVAL; + goto out; + } + + if (crypto_aead_blocksize(tfm) != crypto_aead_blocksize(generic_tfm)) { + pr_err("alg: aead: blocksize for %s (%u) doesn't match generic impl (%u)\n", + driver, crypto_aead_blocksize(tfm), + crypto_aead_blocksize(generic_tfm)); + err = -EINVAL; + goto out; + } + + /* + * Now generate test vectors using the generic implementation, and test + * the other implementation against them. + */ + for (i = 0; i < fuzz_iterations * 8; i++) { + generate_random_aead_testvec(generic_req, &ctx->vec, + &ctx->test_desc->suite.aead, + ctx->maxkeysize, ctx->maxdatasize, + ctx->vec_name, + sizeof(ctx->vec_name), false); + generate_random_testvec_config(&ctx->cfg, ctx->cfgname, + sizeof(ctx->cfgname)); + if (!ctx->vec.novrfy) { + err = test_aead_vec_cfg(driver, ENCRYPT, &ctx->vec, + ctx->vec_name, &ctx->cfg, + ctx->req, ctx->tsgls); + if (err) + goto out; + } + if (ctx->vec.crypt_error == 0 || ctx->vec.novrfy) { + err = test_aead_vec_cfg(driver, DECRYPT, &ctx->vec, + ctx->vec_name, &ctx->cfg, + ctx->req, ctx->tsgls); + if (err) + goto out; + } + cond_resched(); + } + err = 0; +out: + crypto_free_aead(generic_tfm); + aead_request_free(generic_req); + return err; +} + +static int test_aead_extra(const char *driver, + const struct alg_test_desc *test_desc, + struct aead_request *req, + struct cipher_test_sglists *tsgls) +{ + struct aead_extra_tests_ctx *ctx; + unsigned int i; + int err; + + if (noextratests) + return 0; + + ctx = kzalloc(sizeof(*ctx), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!ctx) + return -ENOMEM; + ctx->req = req; + ctx->tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req); + ctx->driver = driver; + ctx->test_desc = test_desc; + ctx->tsgls = tsgls; + ctx->maxdatasize = (2 * PAGE_SIZE) - TESTMGR_POISON_LEN; + ctx->maxkeysize = 0; + for (i = 0; i < test_desc->suite.aead.count; i++) + ctx->maxkeysize = max_t(unsigned int, ctx->maxkeysize, + test_desc->suite.aead.vecs[i].klen); + + ctx->vec.key = kmalloc(ctx->maxkeysize, GFP_KERNEL); + ctx->vec.iv = kmalloc(crypto_aead_ivsize(ctx->tfm), GFP_KERNEL); + ctx->vec.assoc = kmalloc(ctx->maxdatasize, GFP_KERNEL); + ctx->vec.ptext = kmalloc(ctx->maxdatasize, GFP_KERNEL); + ctx->vec.ctext = kmalloc(ctx->maxdatasize, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!ctx->vec.key || !ctx->vec.iv || !ctx->vec.assoc || + !ctx->vec.ptext || !ctx->vec.ctext) { + err = -ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + + err = test_aead_vs_generic_impl(ctx); + if (err) + goto out; + + err = test_aead_inauthentic_inputs(ctx); +out: + kfree(ctx->vec.key); + kfree(ctx->vec.iv); + kfree(ctx->vec.assoc); + kfree(ctx->vec.ptext); + kfree(ctx->vec.ctext); + kfree(ctx); + return err; +} +#else /* !CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS */ +static int test_aead_extra(const char *driver, + const struct alg_test_desc *test_desc, + struct aead_request *req, + struct cipher_test_sglists *tsgls) +{ + return 0; +} +#endif /* !CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS */ + +static int test_aead(const char *driver, int enc, + const struct aead_test_suite *suite, + struct aead_request *req, + struct cipher_test_sglists *tsgls) +{ + unsigned int i; + int err; + + for (i = 0; i < suite->count; i++) { + err = test_aead_vec(driver, enc, &suite->vecs[i], i, req, + tsgls); + if (err) + return err; + cond_resched(); + } + return 0; +} + +static int alg_test_aead(const struct alg_test_desc *desc, const char *driver, + u32 type, u32 mask) +{ + const struct aead_test_suite *suite = &desc->suite.aead; + struct crypto_aead *tfm; + struct aead_request *req = NULL; + struct cipher_test_sglists *tsgls = NULL; + int err; + + if (suite->count <= 0) { + pr_err("alg: aead: empty test suite for %s\n", driver); + return -EINVAL; + } + + tfm = crypto_alloc_aead(driver, type, mask); + if (IS_ERR(tfm)) { + pr_err("alg: aead: failed to allocate transform for %s: %ld\n", + driver, PTR_ERR(tfm)); + return PTR_ERR(tfm); + } + + req = aead_request_alloc(tfm, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!req) { + pr_err("alg: aead: failed to allocate request for %s\n", + driver); + err = -ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + + tsgls = alloc_cipher_test_sglists(); + if (!tsgls) { + pr_err("alg: aead: failed to allocate test buffers for %s\n", + driver); + err = -ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + + err = test_aead(driver, ENCRYPT, suite, req, tsgls); + if (err) + goto out; + + err = test_aead(driver, DECRYPT, suite, req, tsgls); + if (err) + goto out; + + err = test_aead_extra(driver, desc, req, tsgls); +out: + free_cipher_test_sglists(tsgls); + aead_request_free(req); + crypto_free_aead(tfm); + return err; +} + +static int test_cipher(struct crypto_cipher *tfm, int enc, + const struct cipher_testvec *template, + unsigned int tcount) +{ + const char *algo = crypto_tfm_alg_driver_name(crypto_cipher_tfm(tfm)); + unsigned int i, j, k; + char *q; + const char *e; + const char *input, *result; + void *data; + char *xbuf[XBUFSIZE]; + int ret = -ENOMEM; + + if (testmgr_alloc_buf(xbuf)) + goto out_nobuf; + + if (enc == ENCRYPT) + e = "encryption"; + else + e = "decryption"; + + j = 0; + for (i = 0; i < tcount; i++) { + + if (fips_enabled && template[i].fips_skip) + continue; + + input = enc ? template[i].ptext : template[i].ctext; + result = enc ? template[i].ctext : template[i].ptext; + j++; + + ret = -EINVAL; + if (WARN_ON(template[i].len > PAGE_SIZE)) + goto out; + + data = xbuf[0]; + memcpy(data, input, template[i].len); + + crypto_cipher_clear_flags(tfm, ~0); + if (template[i].wk) + crypto_cipher_set_flags(tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_FORBID_WEAK_KEYS); + + ret = crypto_cipher_setkey(tfm, template[i].key, + template[i].klen); + if (ret) { + if (ret == template[i].setkey_error) + continue; + pr_err("alg: cipher: %s setkey failed on test vector %u; expected_error=%d, actual_error=%d, flags=%#x\n", + algo, j, template[i].setkey_error, ret, + crypto_cipher_get_flags(tfm)); + goto out; + } + if (template[i].setkey_error) { + pr_err("alg: cipher: %s setkey unexpectedly succeeded on test vector %u; expected_error=%d\n", + algo, j, template[i].setkey_error); + ret = -EINVAL; + goto out; + } + + for (k = 0; k < template[i].len; + k += crypto_cipher_blocksize(tfm)) { + if (enc) + crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(tfm, data + k, + data + k); + else + crypto_cipher_decrypt_one(tfm, data + k, + data + k); + } + + q = data; + if (memcmp(q, result, template[i].len)) { + printk(KERN_ERR "alg: cipher: Test %d failed " + "on %s for %s\n", j, e, algo); + hexdump(q, template[i].len); + ret = -EINVAL; + goto out; + } + } + + ret = 0; + +out: + testmgr_free_buf(xbuf); +out_nobuf: + return ret; +} + +static int test_skcipher_vec_cfg(const char *driver, int enc, + const struct cipher_testvec *vec, + const char *vec_name, + const struct testvec_config *cfg, + struct skcipher_request *req, + struct cipher_test_sglists *tsgls) +{ + struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req); + const unsigned int alignmask = crypto_skcipher_alignmask(tfm); + const unsigned int ivsize = crypto_skcipher_ivsize(tfm); + const u32 req_flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG | cfg->req_flags; + const char *op = enc ? "encryption" : "decryption"; + DECLARE_CRYPTO_WAIT(wait); + u8 _iv[3 * (MAX_ALGAPI_ALIGNMASK + 1) + MAX_IVLEN]; + u8 *iv = PTR_ALIGN(&_iv[0], 2 * (MAX_ALGAPI_ALIGNMASK + 1)) + + cfg->iv_offset + + (cfg->iv_offset_relative_to_alignmask ? alignmask : 0); + struct kvec input; + int err; + + /* Set the key */ + if (vec->wk) + crypto_skcipher_set_flags(tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_FORBID_WEAK_KEYS); + else + crypto_skcipher_clear_flags(tfm, + CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_FORBID_WEAK_KEYS); + err = do_setkey(crypto_skcipher_setkey, tfm, vec->key, vec->klen, + cfg, alignmask); + if (err) { + if (err == vec->setkey_error) + return 0; + pr_err("alg: skcipher: %s setkey failed on test vector %s; expected_error=%d, actual_error=%d, flags=%#x\n", + driver, vec_name, vec->setkey_error, err, + crypto_skcipher_get_flags(tfm)); + return err; + } + if (vec->setkey_error) { + pr_err("alg: skcipher: %s setkey unexpectedly succeeded on test vector %s; expected_error=%d\n", + driver, vec_name, vec->setkey_error); + return -EINVAL; + } + + /* The IV must be copied to a buffer, as the algorithm may modify it */ + if (ivsize) { + if (WARN_ON(ivsize > MAX_IVLEN)) + return -EINVAL; + if (vec->generates_iv && !enc) + memcpy(iv, vec->iv_out, ivsize); + else if (vec->iv) + memcpy(iv, vec->iv, ivsize); + else + memset(iv, 0, ivsize); + } else { + if (vec->generates_iv) { + pr_err("alg: skcipher: %s has ivsize=0 but test vector %s generates IV!\n", + driver, vec_name); + return -EINVAL; + } + iv = NULL; + } + + /* Build the src/dst scatterlists */ + input.iov_base = enc ? (void *)vec->ptext : (void *)vec->ctext; + input.iov_len = vec->len; + err = build_cipher_test_sglists(tsgls, cfg, alignmask, + vec->len, vec->len, &input, 1); + if (err) { + pr_err("alg: skcipher: %s %s: error preparing scatterlists for test vector %s, cfg=\"%s\"\n", + driver, op, vec_name, cfg->name); + return err; + } + + /* Do the actual encryption or decryption */ + testmgr_poison(req->__ctx, crypto_skcipher_reqsize(tfm)); + skcipher_request_set_callback(req, req_flags, crypto_req_done, &wait); + skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, tsgls->src.sgl_ptr, tsgls->dst.sgl_ptr, + vec->len, iv); + if (cfg->nosimd) + crypto_disable_simd_for_test(); + err = enc ? crypto_skcipher_encrypt(req) : crypto_skcipher_decrypt(req); + if (cfg->nosimd) + crypto_reenable_simd_for_test(); + err = crypto_wait_req(err, &wait); + + /* Check that the algorithm didn't overwrite things it shouldn't have */ + if (req->cryptlen != vec->len || + req->iv != iv || + req->src != tsgls->src.sgl_ptr || + req->dst != tsgls->dst.sgl_ptr || + crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req) != tfm || + req->base.complete != crypto_req_done || + req->base.flags != req_flags || + req->base.data != &wait) { + pr_err("alg: skcipher: %s %s corrupted request struct on test vector %s, cfg=\"%s\"\n", + driver, op, vec_name, cfg->name); + if (req->cryptlen != vec->len) + pr_err("alg: skcipher: changed 'req->cryptlen'\n"); + if (req->iv != iv) + pr_err("alg: skcipher: changed 'req->iv'\n"); + if (req->src != tsgls->src.sgl_ptr) + pr_err("alg: skcipher: changed 'req->src'\n"); + if (req->dst != tsgls->dst.sgl_ptr) + pr_err("alg: skcipher: changed 'req->dst'\n"); + if (crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req) != tfm) + pr_err("alg: skcipher: changed 'req->base.tfm'\n"); + if (req->base.complete != crypto_req_done) + pr_err("alg: skcipher: changed 'req->base.complete'\n"); + if (req->base.flags != req_flags) + pr_err("alg: skcipher: changed 'req->base.flags'\n"); + if (req->base.data != &wait) + pr_err("alg: skcipher: changed 'req->base.data'\n"); + return -EINVAL; + } + if (is_test_sglist_corrupted(&tsgls->src)) { + pr_err("alg: skcipher: %s %s corrupted src sgl on test vector %s, cfg=\"%s\"\n", + driver, op, vec_name, cfg->name); + return -EINVAL; + } + if (tsgls->dst.sgl_ptr != tsgls->src.sgl && + is_test_sglist_corrupted(&tsgls->dst)) { + pr_err("alg: skcipher: %s %s corrupted dst sgl on test vector %s, cfg=\"%s\"\n", + driver, op, vec_name, cfg->name); + return -EINVAL; + } + + /* Check for success or failure */ + if (err) { + if (err == vec->crypt_error) + return 0; + pr_err("alg: skcipher: %s %s failed on test vector %s; expected_error=%d, actual_error=%d, cfg=\"%s\"\n", + driver, op, vec_name, vec->crypt_error, err, cfg->name); + return err; + } + if (vec->crypt_error) { + pr_err("alg: skcipher: %s %s unexpectedly succeeded on test vector %s; expected_error=%d, cfg=\"%s\"\n", + driver, op, vec_name, vec->crypt_error, cfg->name); + return -EINVAL; + } + + /* Check for the correct output (ciphertext or plaintext) */ + err = verify_correct_output(&tsgls->dst, enc ? vec->ctext : vec->ptext, + vec->len, 0, true); + if (err == -EOVERFLOW) { + pr_err("alg: skcipher: %s %s overran dst buffer on test vector %s, cfg=\"%s\"\n", + driver, op, vec_name, cfg->name); + return err; + } + if (err) { + pr_err("alg: skcipher: %s %s test failed (wrong result) on test vector %s, cfg=\"%s\"\n", + driver, op, vec_name, cfg->name); + return err; + } + + /* If applicable, check that the algorithm generated the correct IV */ + if (vec->iv_out && memcmp(iv, vec->iv_out, ivsize) != 0) { + pr_err("alg: skcipher: %s %s test failed (wrong output IV) on test vector %s, cfg=\"%s\"\n", + driver, op, vec_name, cfg->name); + hexdump(iv, ivsize); + return -EINVAL; + } + + return 0; +} + +static int test_skcipher_vec(const char *driver, int enc, + const struct cipher_testvec *vec, + unsigned int vec_num, + struct skcipher_request *req, + struct cipher_test_sglists *tsgls) +{ + char vec_name[16]; + unsigned int i; + int err; + + if (fips_enabled && vec->fips_skip) + return 0; + + sprintf(vec_name, "%u", vec_num); + + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(default_cipher_testvec_configs); i++) { + err = test_skcipher_vec_cfg(driver, enc, vec, vec_name, + &default_cipher_testvec_configs[i], + req, tsgls); + if (err) + return err; + } + +#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS + if (!noextratests) { + struct testvec_config cfg; + char cfgname[TESTVEC_CONFIG_NAMELEN]; + + for (i = 0; i < fuzz_iterations; i++) { + generate_random_testvec_config(&cfg, cfgname, + sizeof(cfgname)); + err = test_skcipher_vec_cfg(driver, enc, vec, vec_name, + &cfg, req, tsgls); + if (err) + return err; + cond_resched(); + } + } +#endif + return 0; +} + +#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS +/* + * Generate a symmetric cipher test vector from the given implementation. + * Assumes the buffers in 'vec' were already allocated. + */ +static void generate_random_cipher_testvec(struct skcipher_request *req, + struct cipher_testvec *vec, + unsigned int maxdatasize, + char *name, size_t max_namelen) +{ + struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req); + const unsigned int maxkeysize = crypto_skcipher_max_keysize(tfm); + const unsigned int ivsize = crypto_skcipher_ivsize(tfm); + struct scatterlist src, dst; + u8 iv[MAX_IVLEN]; + DECLARE_CRYPTO_WAIT(wait); + + /* Key: length in [0, maxkeysize], but usually choose maxkeysize */ + vec->klen = maxkeysize; + if (prandom_u32() % 4 == 0) + vec->klen = prandom_u32() % (maxkeysize + 1); + generate_random_bytes((u8 *)vec->key, vec->klen); + vec->setkey_error = crypto_skcipher_setkey(tfm, vec->key, vec->klen); + + /* IV */ + generate_random_bytes((u8 *)vec->iv, ivsize); + + /* Plaintext */ + vec->len = generate_random_length(maxdatasize); + generate_random_bytes((u8 *)vec->ptext, vec->len); + + /* If the key couldn't be set, no need to continue to encrypt. */ + if (vec->setkey_error) + goto done; + + /* Ciphertext */ + sg_init_one(&src, vec->ptext, vec->len); + sg_init_one(&dst, vec->ctext, vec->len); + memcpy(iv, vec->iv, ivsize); + skcipher_request_set_callback(req, 0, crypto_req_done, &wait); + skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, &src, &dst, vec->len, iv); + vec->crypt_error = crypto_wait_req(crypto_skcipher_encrypt(req), &wait); + if (vec->crypt_error != 0) { + /* + * The only acceptable error here is for an invalid length, so + * skcipher decryption should fail with the same error too. + * We'll test for this. But to keep the API usage well-defined, + * explicitly initialize the ciphertext buffer too. + */ + memset((u8 *)vec->ctext, 0, vec->len); + } +done: + snprintf(name, max_namelen, "\"random: len=%u klen=%u\"", + vec->len, vec->klen); +} + +/* + * Test the skcipher algorithm represented by @req against the corresponding + * generic implementation, if one is available. + */ +static int test_skcipher_vs_generic_impl(const char *driver, + const char *generic_driver, + struct skcipher_request *req, + struct cipher_test_sglists *tsgls) +{ + struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req); + const unsigned int maxkeysize = crypto_skcipher_max_keysize(tfm); + const unsigned int ivsize = crypto_skcipher_ivsize(tfm); + const unsigned int blocksize = crypto_skcipher_blocksize(tfm); + const unsigned int maxdatasize = (2 * PAGE_SIZE) - TESTMGR_POISON_LEN; + const char *algname = crypto_skcipher_alg(tfm)->base.cra_name; + char _generic_driver[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME]; + struct crypto_skcipher *generic_tfm = NULL; + struct skcipher_request *generic_req = NULL; + unsigned int i; + struct cipher_testvec vec = { 0 }; + char vec_name[64]; + struct testvec_config *cfg; + char cfgname[TESTVEC_CONFIG_NAMELEN]; + int err; + + if (noextratests) + return 0; + + /* Keywrap isn't supported here yet as it handles its IV differently. */ + if (strncmp(algname, "kw(", 3) == 0) + return 0; + + if (!generic_driver) { /* Use default naming convention? */ + err = build_generic_driver_name(algname, _generic_driver); + if (err) + return err; + generic_driver = _generic_driver; + } + + if (strcmp(generic_driver, driver) == 0) /* Already the generic impl? */ + return 0; + + generic_tfm = crypto_alloc_skcipher(generic_driver, 0, 0); + if (IS_ERR(generic_tfm)) { + err = PTR_ERR(generic_tfm); + if (err == -ENOENT) { + pr_warn("alg: skcipher: skipping comparison tests for %s because %s is unavailable\n", + driver, generic_driver); + return 0; + } + pr_err("alg: skcipher: error allocating %s (generic impl of %s): %d\n", + generic_driver, algname, err); + return err; + } + + cfg = kzalloc(sizeof(*cfg), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!cfg) { + err = -ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + + generic_req = skcipher_request_alloc(generic_tfm, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!generic_req) { + err = -ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + + /* Check the algorithm properties for consistency. */ + + if (crypto_skcipher_min_keysize(tfm) != + crypto_skcipher_min_keysize(generic_tfm)) { + pr_err("alg: skcipher: min keysize for %s (%u) doesn't match generic impl (%u)\n", + driver, crypto_skcipher_min_keysize(tfm), + crypto_skcipher_min_keysize(generic_tfm)); + err = -EINVAL; + goto out; + } + + if (maxkeysize != crypto_skcipher_max_keysize(generic_tfm)) { + pr_err("alg: skcipher: max keysize for %s (%u) doesn't match generic impl (%u)\n", + driver, maxkeysize, + crypto_skcipher_max_keysize(generic_tfm)); + err = -EINVAL; + goto out; + } + + if (ivsize != crypto_skcipher_ivsize(generic_tfm)) { + pr_err("alg: skcipher: ivsize for %s (%u) doesn't match generic impl (%u)\n", + driver, ivsize, crypto_skcipher_ivsize(generic_tfm)); + err = -EINVAL; + goto out; + } + + if (blocksize != crypto_skcipher_blocksize(generic_tfm)) { + pr_err("alg: skcipher: blocksize for %s (%u) doesn't match generic impl (%u)\n", + driver, blocksize, + crypto_skcipher_blocksize(generic_tfm)); + err = -EINVAL; + goto out; + } + + /* + * Now generate test vectors using the generic implementation, and test + * the other implementation against them. + */ + + vec.key = kmalloc(maxkeysize, GFP_KERNEL); + vec.iv = kmalloc(ivsize, GFP_KERNEL); + vec.ptext = kmalloc(maxdatasize, GFP_KERNEL); + vec.ctext = kmalloc(maxdatasize, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!vec.key || !vec.iv || !vec.ptext || !vec.ctext) { + err = -ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + + for (i = 0; i < fuzz_iterations * 8; i++) { + generate_random_cipher_testvec(generic_req, &vec, maxdatasize, + vec_name, sizeof(vec_name)); + generate_random_testvec_config(cfg, cfgname, sizeof(cfgname)); + + err = test_skcipher_vec_cfg(driver, ENCRYPT, &vec, vec_name, + cfg, req, tsgls); + if (err) + goto out; + err = test_skcipher_vec_cfg(driver, DECRYPT, &vec, vec_name, + cfg, req, tsgls); + if (err) + goto out; + cond_resched(); + } + err = 0; +out: + kfree(cfg); + kfree(vec.key); + kfree(vec.iv); + kfree(vec.ptext); + kfree(vec.ctext); + crypto_free_skcipher(generic_tfm); + skcipher_request_free(generic_req); + return err; +} +#else /* !CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS */ +static int test_skcipher_vs_generic_impl(const char *driver, + const char *generic_driver, + struct skcipher_request *req, + struct cipher_test_sglists *tsgls) +{ + return 0; +} +#endif /* !CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS */ + +static int test_skcipher(const char *driver, int enc, + const struct cipher_test_suite *suite, + struct skcipher_request *req, + struct cipher_test_sglists *tsgls) +{ + unsigned int i; + int err; + + for (i = 0; i < suite->count; i++) { + err = test_skcipher_vec(driver, enc, &suite->vecs[i], i, req, + tsgls); + if (err) + return err; + cond_resched(); + } + return 0; +} + +static int alg_test_skcipher(const struct alg_test_desc *desc, + const char *driver, u32 type, u32 mask) +{ + const struct cipher_test_suite *suite = &desc->suite.cipher; + struct crypto_skcipher *tfm; + struct skcipher_request *req = NULL; + struct cipher_test_sglists *tsgls = NULL; + int err; + + if (suite->count <= 0) { + pr_err("alg: skcipher: empty test suite for %s\n", driver); + return -EINVAL; + } + + tfm = crypto_alloc_skcipher(driver, type, mask); + if (IS_ERR(tfm)) { + pr_err("alg: skcipher: failed to allocate transform for %s: %ld\n", + driver, PTR_ERR(tfm)); + return PTR_ERR(tfm); + } + + req = skcipher_request_alloc(tfm, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!req) { + pr_err("alg: skcipher: failed to allocate request for %s\n", + driver); + err = -ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + + tsgls = alloc_cipher_test_sglists(); + if (!tsgls) { + pr_err("alg: skcipher: failed to allocate test buffers for %s\n", + driver); + err = -ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + + err = test_skcipher(driver, ENCRYPT, suite, req, tsgls); + if (err) + goto out; + + err = test_skcipher(driver, DECRYPT, suite, req, tsgls); + if (err) + goto out; + + err = test_skcipher_vs_generic_impl(driver, desc->generic_driver, req, + tsgls); +out: + free_cipher_test_sglists(tsgls); + skcipher_request_free(req); + crypto_free_skcipher(tfm); + return err; +} + +static int test_comp(struct crypto_comp *tfm, + const struct comp_testvec *ctemplate, + const struct comp_testvec *dtemplate, + int ctcount, int dtcount) +{ + const char *algo = crypto_tfm_alg_driver_name(crypto_comp_tfm(tfm)); + char *output, *decomp_output; + unsigned int i; + int ret; + + output = kmalloc(COMP_BUF_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!output) + return -ENOMEM; + + decomp_output = kmalloc(COMP_BUF_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!decomp_output) { + kfree(output); + return -ENOMEM; + } + + for (i = 0; i < ctcount; i++) { + int ilen; + unsigned int dlen = COMP_BUF_SIZE; + + memset(output, 0, COMP_BUF_SIZE); + memset(decomp_output, 0, COMP_BUF_SIZE); + + ilen = ctemplate[i].inlen; + ret = crypto_comp_compress(tfm, ctemplate[i].input, + ilen, output, &dlen); + if (ret) { + printk(KERN_ERR "alg: comp: compression failed " + "on test %d for %s: ret=%d\n", i + 1, algo, + -ret); + goto out; + } + + ilen = dlen; + dlen = COMP_BUF_SIZE; + ret = crypto_comp_decompress(tfm, output, + ilen, decomp_output, &dlen); + if (ret) { + pr_err("alg: comp: compression failed: decompress: on test %d for %s failed: ret=%d\n", + i + 1, algo, -ret); + goto out; + } + + if (dlen != ctemplate[i].inlen) { + printk(KERN_ERR "alg: comp: Compression test %d " + "failed for %s: output len = %d\n", i + 1, algo, + dlen); + ret = -EINVAL; + goto out; + } + + if (memcmp(decomp_output, ctemplate[i].input, + ctemplate[i].inlen)) { + pr_err("alg: comp: compression failed: output differs: on test %d for %s\n", + i + 1, algo); + hexdump(decomp_output, dlen); + ret = -EINVAL; + goto out; + } + } + + for (i = 0; i < dtcount; i++) { + int ilen; + unsigned int dlen = COMP_BUF_SIZE; + + memset(decomp_output, 0, COMP_BUF_SIZE); + + ilen = dtemplate[i].inlen; + ret = crypto_comp_decompress(tfm, dtemplate[i].input, + ilen, decomp_output, &dlen); + if (ret) { + printk(KERN_ERR "alg: comp: decompression failed " + "on test %d for %s: ret=%d\n", i + 1, algo, + -ret); + goto out; + } + + if (dlen != dtemplate[i].outlen) { + printk(KERN_ERR "alg: comp: Decompression test %d " + "failed for %s: output len = %d\n", i + 1, algo, + dlen); + ret = -EINVAL; + goto out; + } + + if (memcmp(decomp_output, dtemplate[i].output, dlen)) { + printk(KERN_ERR "alg: comp: Decompression test %d " + "failed for %s\n", i + 1, algo); + hexdump(decomp_output, dlen); + ret = -EINVAL; + goto out; + } + } + + ret = 0; + +out: + kfree(decomp_output); + kfree(output); + return ret; +} + +static int test_acomp(struct crypto_acomp *tfm, + const struct comp_testvec *ctemplate, + const struct comp_testvec *dtemplate, + int ctcount, int dtcount) +{ + const char *algo = crypto_tfm_alg_driver_name(crypto_acomp_tfm(tfm)); + unsigned int i; + char *output, *decomp_out; + int ret; + struct scatterlist src, dst; + struct acomp_req *req; + struct crypto_wait wait; + + output = kmalloc(COMP_BUF_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!output) + return -ENOMEM; + + decomp_out = kmalloc(COMP_BUF_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!decomp_out) { + kfree(output); + return -ENOMEM; + } + + for (i = 0; i < ctcount; i++) { + unsigned int dlen = COMP_BUF_SIZE; + int ilen = ctemplate[i].inlen; + void *input_vec; + + input_vec = kmemdup(ctemplate[i].input, ilen, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!input_vec) { + ret = -ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + + memset(output, 0, dlen); + crypto_init_wait(&wait); + sg_init_one(&src, input_vec, ilen); + sg_init_one(&dst, output, dlen); + + req = acomp_request_alloc(tfm); + if (!req) { + pr_err("alg: acomp: request alloc failed for %s\n", + algo); + kfree(input_vec); + ret = -ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + + acomp_request_set_params(req, &src, &dst, ilen, dlen); + acomp_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG, + crypto_req_done, &wait); + + ret = crypto_wait_req(crypto_acomp_compress(req), &wait); + if (ret) { + pr_err("alg: acomp: compression failed on test %d for %s: ret=%d\n", + i + 1, algo, -ret); + kfree(input_vec); + acomp_request_free(req); + goto out; + } + + ilen = req->dlen; + dlen = COMP_BUF_SIZE; + sg_init_one(&src, output, ilen); + sg_init_one(&dst, decomp_out, dlen); + crypto_init_wait(&wait); + acomp_request_set_params(req, &src, &dst, ilen, dlen); + + ret = crypto_wait_req(crypto_acomp_decompress(req), &wait); + if (ret) { + pr_err("alg: acomp: compression failed on test %d for %s: ret=%d\n", + i + 1, algo, -ret); + kfree(input_vec); + acomp_request_free(req); + goto out; + } + + if (req->dlen != ctemplate[i].inlen) { + pr_err("alg: acomp: Compression test %d failed for %s: output len = %d\n", + i + 1, algo, req->dlen); + ret = -EINVAL; + kfree(input_vec); + acomp_request_free(req); + goto out; + } + + if (memcmp(input_vec, decomp_out, req->dlen)) { + pr_err("alg: acomp: Compression test %d failed for %s\n", + i + 1, algo); + hexdump(output, req->dlen); + ret = -EINVAL; + kfree(input_vec); + acomp_request_free(req); + goto out; + } + + kfree(input_vec); + acomp_request_free(req); + } + + for (i = 0; i < dtcount; i++) { + unsigned int dlen = COMP_BUF_SIZE; + int ilen = dtemplate[i].inlen; + void *input_vec; + + input_vec = kmemdup(dtemplate[i].input, ilen, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!input_vec) { + ret = -ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + + memset(output, 0, dlen); + crypto_init_wait(&wait); + sg_init_one(&src, input_vec, ilen); + sg_init_one(&dst, output, dlen); + + req = acomp_request_alloc(tfm); + if (!req) { + pr_err("alg: acomp: request alloc failed for %s\n", + algo); + kfree(input_vec); + ret = -ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + + acomp_request_set_params(req, &src, &dst, ilen, dlen); + acomp_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG, + crypto_req_done, &wait); + + ret = crypto_wait_req(crypto_acomp_decompress(req), &wait); + if (ret) { + pr_err("alg: acomp: decompression failed on test %d for %s: ret=%d\n", + i + 1, algo, -ret); + kfree(input_vec); + acomp_request_free(req); + goto out; + } + + if (req->dlen != dtemplate[i].outlen) { + pr_err("alg: acomp: Decompression test %d failed for %s: output len = %d\n", + i + 1, algo, req->dlen); + ret = -EINVAL; + kfree(input_vec); + acomp_request_free(req); + goto out; + } + + if (memcmp(output, dtemplate[i].output, req->dlen)) { + pr_err("alg: acomp: Decompression test %d failed for %s\n", + i + 1, algo); + hexdump(output, req->dlen); + ret = -EINVAL; + kfree(input_vec); + acomp_request_free(req); + goto out; + } + + kfree(input_vec); + acomp_request_free(req); + } + + ret = 0; + +out: + kfree(decomp_out); + kfree(output); + return ret; +} + +static int test_cprng(struct crypto_rng *tfm, + const struct cprng_testvec *template, + unsigned int tcount) +{ + const char *algo = crypto_tfm_alg_driver_name(crypto_rng_tfm(tfm)); + int err = 0, i, j, seedsize; + u8 *seed; + char result[32]; + + seedsize = crypto_rng_seedsize(tfm); + + seed = kmalloc(seedsize, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!seed) { + printk(KERN_ERR "alg: cprng: Failed to allocate seed space " + "for %s\n", algo); + return -ENOMEM; + } + + for (i = 0; i < tcount; i++) { + memset(result, 0, 32); + + memcpy(seed, template[i].v, template[i].vlen); + memcpy(seed + template[i].vlen, template[i].key, + template[i].klen); + memcpy(seed + template[i].vlen + template[i].klen, + template[i].dt, template[i].dtlen); + + err = crypto_rng_reset(tfm, seed, seedsize); + if (err) { + printk(KERN_ERR "alg: cprng: Failed to reset rng " + "for %s\n", algo); + goto out; + } + + for (j = 0; j < template[i].loops; j++) { + err = crypto_rng_get_bytes(tfm, result, + template[i].rlen); + if (err < 0) { + printk(KERN_ERR "alg: cprng: Failed to obtain " + "the correct amount of random data for " + "%s (requested %d)\n", algo, + template[i].rlen); + goto out; + } + } + + err = memcmp(result, template[i].result, + template[i].rlen); + if (err) { + printk(KERN_ERR "alg: cprng: Test %d failed for %s\n", + i, algo); + hexdump(result, template[i].rlen); + err = -EINVAL; + goto out; + } + } + +out: + kfree(seed); + return err; +} + +static int alg_test_cipher(const struct alg_test_desc *desc, + const char *driver, u32 type, u32 mask) +{ + const struct cipher_test_suite *suite = &desc->suite.cipher; + struct crypto_cipher *tfm; + int err; + + tfm = crypto_alloc_cipher(driver, type, mask); + if (IS_ERR(tfm)) { + printk(KERN_ERR "alg: cipher: Failed to load transform for " + "%s: %ld\n", driver, PTR_ERR(tfm)); + return PTR_ERR(tfm); + } + + err = test_cipher(tfm, ENCRYPT, suite->vecs, suite->count); + if (!err) + err = test_cipher(tfm, DECRYPT, suite->vecs, suite->count); + + crypto_free_cipher(tfm); + return err; +} + +static int alg_test_comp(const struct alg_test_desc *desc, const char *driver, + u32 type, u32 mask) +{ + struct crypto_comp *comp; + struct crypto_acomp *acomp; + int err; + u32 algo_type = type & CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_ACOMPRESS_MASK; + + if (algo_type == CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_ACOMPRESS) { + acomp = crypto_alloc_acomp(driver, type, mask); + if (IS_ERR(acomp)) { + pr_err("alg: acomp: Failed to load transform for %s: %ld\n", + driver, PTR_ERR(acomp)); + return PTR_ERR(acomp); + } + err = test_acomp(acomp, desc->suite.comp.comp.vecs, + desc->suite.comp.decomp.vecs, + desc->suite.comp.comp.count, + desc->suite.comp.decomp.count); + crypto_free_acomp(acomp); + } else { + comp = crypto_alloc_comp(driver, type, mask); + if (IS_ERR(comp)) { + pr_err("alg: comp: Failed to load transform for %s: %ld\n", + driver, PTR_ERR(comp)); + return PTR_ERR(comp); + } + + err = test_comp(comp, desc->suite.comp.comp.vecs, + desc->suite.comp.decomp.vecs, + desc->suite.comp.comp.count, + desc->suite.comp.decomp.count); + + crypto_free_comp(comp); + } + return err; +} + +static int alg_test_crc32c(const struct alg_test_desc *desc, + const char *driver, u32 type, u32 mask) +{ + struct crypto_shash *tfm; + __le32 val; + int err; + + err = alg_test_hash(desc, driver, type, mask); + if (err) + return err; + + tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(driver, type, mask); + if (IS_ERR(tfm)) { + if (PTR_ERR(tfm) == -ENOENT) { + /* + * This crc32c implementation is only available through + * ahash API, not the shash API, so the remaining part + * of the test is not applicable to it. + */ + return 0; + } + printk(KERN_ERR "alg: crc32c: Failed to load transform for %s: " + "%ld\n", driver, PTR_ERR(tfm)); + return PTR_ERR(tfm); + } + + do { + SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(shash, tfm); + u32 *ctx = (u32 *)shash_desc_ctx(shash); + + shash->tfm = tfm; + + *ctx = 420553207; + err = crypto_shash_final(shash, (u8 *)&val); + if (err) { + printk(KERN_ERR "alg: crc32c: Operation failed for " + "%s: %d\n", driver, err); + break; + } + + if (val != cpu_to_le32(~420553207)) { + pr_err("alg: crc32c: Test failed for %s: %u\n", + driver, le32_to_cpu(val)); + err = -EINVAL; + } + } while (0); + + crypto_free_shash(tfm); + + return err; +} + +static int alg_test_cprng(const struct alg_test_desc *desc, const char *driver, + u32 type, u32 mask) +{ + struct crypto_rng *rng; + int err; + + rng = crypto_alloc_rng(driver, type, mask); + if (IS_ERR(rng)) { + printk(KERN_ERR "alg: cprng: Failed to load transform for %s: " + "%ld\n", driver, PTR_ERR(rng)); + return PTR_ERR(rng); + } + + err = test_cprng(rng, desc->suite.cprng.vecs, desc->suite.cprng.count); + + crypto_free_rng(rng); + + return err; +} + + +static int drbg_cavs_test(const struct drbg_testvec *test, int pr, + const char *driver, u32 type, u32 mask) +{ + int ret = -EAGAIN; + struct crypto_rng *drng; + struct drbg_test_data test_data; + struct drbg_string addtl, pers, testentropy; + unsigned char *buf = kzalloc(test->expectedlen, GFP_KERNEL); + + if (!buf) + return -ENOMEM; + + drng = crypto_alloc_rng(driver, type, mask); + if (IS_ERR(drng)) { + printk(KERN_ERR "alg: drbg: could not allocate DRNG handle for " + "%s\n", driver); + kfree_sensitive(buf); + return -ENOMEM; + } + + test_data.testentropy = &testentropy; + drbg_string_fill(&testentropy, test->entropy, test->entropylen); + drbg_string_fill(&pers, test->pers, test->perslen); + ret = crypto_drbg_reset_test(drng, &pers, &test_data); + if (ret) { + printk(KERN_ERR "alg: drbg: Failed to reset rng\n"); + goto outbuf; + } + + drbg_string_fill(&addtl, test->addtla, test->addtllen); + if (pr) { + drbg_string_fill(&testentropy, test->entpra, test->entprlen); + ret = crypto_drbg_get_bytes_addtl_test(drng, + buf, test->expectedlen, &addtl, &test_data); + } else { + ret = crypto_drbg_get_bytes_addtl(drng, + buf, test->expectedlen, &addtl); + } + if (ret < 0) { + printk(KERN_ERR "alg: drbg: could not obtain random data for " + "driver %s\n", driver); + goto outbuf; + } + + drbg_string_fill(&addtl, test->addtlb, test->addtllen); + if (pr) { + drbg_string_fill(&testentropy, test->entprb, test->entprlen); + ret = crypto_drbg_get_bytes_addtl_test(drng, + buf, test->expectedlen, &addtl, &test_data); + } else { + ret = crypto_drbg_get_bytes_addtl(drng, + buf, test->expectedlen, &addtl); + } + if (ret < 0) { + printk(KERN_ERR "alg: drbg: could not obtain random data for " + "driver %s\n", driver); + goto outbuf; + } + + ret = memcmp(test->expected, buf, test->expectedlen); + +outbuf: + crypto_free_rng(drng); + kfree_sensitive(buf); + return ret; +} + + +static int alg_test_drbg(const struct alg_test_desc *desc, const char *driver, + u32 type, u32 mask) +{ + int err = 0; + int pr = 0; + int i = 0; + const struct drbg_testvec *template = desc->suite.drbg.vecs; + unsigned int tcount = desc->suite.drbg.count; + + if (0 == memcmp(driver, "drbg_pr_", 8)) + pr = 1; + + for (i = 0; i < tcount; i++) { + err = drbg_cavs_test(&template[i], pr, driver, type, mask); + if (err) { + printk(KERN_ERR "alg: drbg: Test %d failed for %s\n", + i, driver); + err = -EINVAL; + break; + } + } + return err; + +} + +static int do_test_kpp(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, const struct kpp_testvec *vec, + const char *alg) +{ + struct kpp_request *req; + void *input_buf = NULL; + void *output_buf = NULL; + void *a_public = NULL; + void *a_ss = NULL; + void *shared_secret = NULL; + struct crypto_wait wait; + unsigned int out_len_max; + int err = -ENOMEM; + struct scatterlist src, dst; + + req = kpp_request_alloc(tfm, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!req) + return err; + + crypto_init_wait(&wait); + + err = crypto_kpp_set_secret(tfm, vec->secret, vec->secret_size); + if (err < 0) + goto free_req; + + out_len_max = crypto_kpp_maxsize(tfm); + output_buf = kzalloc(out_len_max, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!output_buf) { + err = -ENOMEM; + goto free_req; + } + + /* Use appropriate parameter as base */ + kpp_request_set_input(req, NULL, 0); + sg_init_one(&dst, output_buf, out_len_max); + kpp_request_set_output(req, &dst, out_len_max); + kpp_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG, + crypto_req_done, &wait); + + /* Compute party A's public key */ + err = crypto_wait_req(crypto_kpp_generate_public_key(req), &wait); + if (err) { + pr_err("alg: %s: Party A: generate public key test failed. err %d\n", + alg, err); + goto free_output; + } + + if (vec->genkey) { + /* Save party A's public key */ + a_public = kmemdup(sg_virt(req->dst), out_len_max, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!a_public) { + err = -ENOMEM; + goto free_output; + } + } else { + /* Verify calculated public key */ + if (memcmp(vec->expected_a_public, sg_virt(req->dst), + vec->expected_a_public_size)) { + pr_err("alg: %s: Party A: generate public key test failed. Invalid output\n", + alg); + err = -EINVAL; + goto free_output; + } + } + + /* Calculate shared secret key by using counter part (b) public key. */ + input_buf = kmemdup(vec->b_public, vec->b_public_size, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!input_buf) { + err = -ENOMEM; + goto free_output; + } + + sg_init_one(&src, input_buf, vec->b_public_size); + sg_init_one(&dst, output_buf, out_len_max); + kpp_request_set_input(req, &src, vec->b_public_size); + kpp_request_set_output(req, &dst, out_len_max); + kpp_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG, + crypto_req_done, &wait); + err = crypto_wait_req(crypto_kpp_compute_shared_secret(req), &wait); + if (err) { + pr_err("alg: %s: Party A: compute shared secret test failed. err %d\n", + alg, err); + goto free_all; + } + + if (vec->genkey) { + /* Save the shared secret obtained by party A */ + a_ss = kmemdup(sg_virt(req->dst), vec->expected_ss_size, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!a_ss) { + err = -ENOMEM; + goto free_all; + } + + /* + * Calculate party B's shared secret by using party A's + * public key. + */ + err = crypto_kpp_set_secret(tfm, vec->b_secret, + vec->b_secret_size); + if (err < 0) + goto free_all; + + sg_init_one(&src, a_public, vec->expected_a_public_size); + sg_init_one(&dst, output_buf, out_len_max); + kpp_request_set_input(req, &src, vec->expected_a_public_size); + kpp_request_set_output(req, &dst, out_len_max); + kpp_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG, + crypto_req_done, &wait); + err = crypto_wait_req(crypto_kpp_compute_shared_secret(req), + &wait); + if (err) { + pr_err("alg: %s: Party B: compute shared secret failed. err %d\n", + alg, err); + goto free_all; + } + + shared_secret = a_ss; + } else { + shared_secret = (void *)vec->expected_ss; + } + + /* + * verify shared secret from which the user will derive + * secret key by executing whatever hash it has chosen + */ + if (memcmp(shared_secret, sg_virt(req->dst), + vec->expected_ss_size)) { + pr_err("alg: %s: compute shared secret test failed. Invalid output\n", + alg); + err = -EINVAL; + } + +free_all: + kfree(a_ss); + kfree(input_buf); +free_output: + kfree(a_public); + kfree(output_buf); +free_req: + kpp_request_free(req); + return err; +} + +static int test_kpp(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, const char *alg, + const struct kpp_testvec *vecs, unsigned int tcount) +{ + int ret, i; + + for (i = 0; i < tcount; i++) { + ret = do_test_kpp(tfm, vecs++, alg); + if (ret) { + pr_err("alg: %s: test failed on vector %d, err=%d\n", + alg, i + 1, ret); + return ret; + } + } + return 0; +} + +static int alg_test_kpp(const struct alg_test_desc *desc, const char *driver, + u32 type, u32 mask) +{ + struct crypto_kpp *tfm; + int err = 0; + + tfm = crypto_alloc_kpp(driver, type, mask); + if (IS_ERR(tfm)) { + pr_err("alg: kpp: Failed to load tfm for %s: %ld\n", + driver, PTR_ERR(tfm)); + return PTR_ERR(tfm); + } + if (desc->suite.kpp.vecs) + err = test_kpp(tfm, desc->alg, desc->suite.kpp.vecs, + desc->suite.kpp.count); + + crypto_free_kpp(tfm); + return err; +} + +static u8 *test_pack_u32(u8 *dst, u32 val) +{ + memcpy(dst, &val, sizeof(val)); + return dst + sizeof(val); +} + +static int test_akcipher_one(struct crypto_akcipher *tfm, + const struct akcipher_testvec *vecs) +{ + char *xbuf[XBUFSIZE]; + struct akcipher_request *req; + void *outbuf_enc = NULL; + void *outbuf_dec = NULL; + struct crypto_wait wait; + unsigned int out_len_max, out_len = 0; + int err = -ENOMEM; + struct scatterlist src, dst, src_tab[3]; + const char *m, *c; + unsigned int m_size, c_size; + const char *op; + u8 *key, *ptr; + + if (testmgr_alloc_buf(xbuf)) + return err; + + req = akcipher_request_alloc(tfm, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!req) + goto free_xbuf; + + crypto_init_wait(&wait); + + key = kmalloc(vecs->key_len + sizeof(u32) * 2 + vecs->param_len, + GFP_KERNEL); + if (!key) + goto free_req; + memcpy(key, vecs->key, vecs->key_len); + ptr = key + vecs->key_len; + ptr = test_pack_u32(ptr, vecs->algo); + ptr = test_pack_u32(ptr, vecs->param_len); + memcpy(ptr, vecs->params, vecs->param_len); + + if (vecs->public_key_vec) + err = crypto_akcipher_set_pub_key(tfm, key, vecs->key_len); + else + err = crypto_akcipher_set_priv_key(tfm, key, vecs->key_len); + if (err) + goto free_key; + + /* + * First run test which do not require a private key, such as + * encrypt or verify. + */ + err = -ENOMEM; + out_len_max = crypto_akcipher_maxsize(tfm); + outbuf_enc = kzalloc(out_len_max, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!outbuf_enc) + goto free_key; + + if (!vecs->siggen_sigver_test) { + m = vecs->m; + m_size = vecs->m_size; + c = vecs->c; + c_size = vecs->c_size; + op = "encrypt"; + } else { + /* Swap args so we could keep plaintext (digest) + * in vecs->m, and cooked signature in vecs->c. + */ + m = vecs->c; /* signature */ + m_size = vecs->c_size; + c = vecs->m; /* digest */ + c_size = vecs->m_size; + op = "verify"; + } + + err = -E2BIG; + if (WARN_ON(m_size > PAGE_SIZE)) + goto free_all; + memcpy(xbuf[0], m, m_size); + + sg_init_table(src_tab, 3); + sg_set_buf(&src_tab[0], xbuf[0], 8); + sg_set_buf(&src_tab[1], xbuf[0] + 8, m_size - 8); + if (vecs->siggen_sigver_test) { + if (WARN_ON(c_size > PAGE_SIZE)) + goto free_all; + memcpy(xbuf[1], c, c_size); + sg_set_buf(&src_tab[2], xbuf[1], c_size); + akcipher_request_set_crypt(req, src_tab, NULL, m_size, c_size); + } else { + sg_init_one(&dst, outbuf_enc, out_len_max); + akcipher_request_set_crypt(req, src_tab, &dst, m_size, + out_len_max); + } + akcipher_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG, + crypto_req_done, &wait); + + err = crypto_wait_req(vecs->siggen_sigver_test ? + /* Run asymmetric signature verification */ + crypto_akcipher_verify(req) : + /* Run asymmetric encrypt */ + crypto_akcipher_encrypt(req), &wait); + if (err) { + pr_err("alg: akcipher: %s test failed. err %d\n", op, err); + goto free_all; + } + if (!vecs->siggen_sigver_test && c) { + if (req->dst_len != c_size) { + pr_err("alg: akcipher: %s test failed. Invalid output len\n", + op); + err = -EINVAL; + goto free_all; + } + /* verify that encrypted message is equal to expected */ + if (memcmp(c, outbuf_enc, c_size) != 0) { + pr_err("alg: akcipher: %s test failed. Invalid output\n", + op); + hexdump(outbuf_enc, c_size); + err = -EINVAL; + goto free_all; + } + } + + /* + * Don't invoke (decrypt or sign) test which require a private key + * for vectors with only a public key. + */ + if (vecs->public_key_vec) { + err = 0; + goto free_all; + } + outbuf_dec = kzalloc(out_len_max, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!outbuf_dec) { + err = -ENOMEM; + goto free_all; + } + + if (!vecs->siggen_sigver_test && !c) { + c = outbuf_enc; + c_size = req->dst_len; + } + + err = -E2BIG; + op = vecs->siggen_sigver_test ? "sign" : "decrypt"; + if (WARN_ON(c_size > PAGE_SIZE)) + goto free_all; + memcpy(xbuf[0], c, c_size); + + sg_init_one(&src, xbuf[0], c_size); + sg_init_one(&dst, outbuf_dec, out_len_max); + crypto_init_wait(&wait); + akcipher_request_set_crypt(req, &src, &dst, c_size, out_len_max); + + err = crypto_wait_req(vecs->siggen_sigver_test ? + /* Run asymmetric signature generation */ + crypto_akcipher_sign(req) : + /* Run asymmetric decrypt */ + crypto_akcipher_decrypt(req), &wait); + if (err) { + pr_err("alg: akcipher: %s test failed. err %d\n", op, err); + goto free_all; + } + out_len = req->dst_len; + if (out_len < m_size) { + pr_err("alg: akcipher: %s test failed. Invalid output len %u\n", + op, out_len); + err = -EINVAL; + goto free_all; + } + /* verify that decrypted message is equal to the original msg */ + if (memchr_inv(outbuf_dec, 0, out_len - m_size) || + memcmp(m, outbuf_dec + out_len - m_size, m_size)) { + pr_err("alg: akcipher: %s test failed. Invalid output\n", op); + hexdump(outbuf_dec, out_len); + err = -EINVAL; + } +free_all: + kfree(outbuf_dec); + kfree(outbuf_enc); +free_key: + kfree(key); +free_req: + akcipher_request_free(req); +free_xbuf: + testmgr_free_buf(xbuf); + return err; +} + +static int test_akcipher(struct crypto_akcipher *tfm, const char *alg, + const struct akcipher_testvec *vecs, + unsigned int tcount) +{ + const char *algo = + crypto_tfm_alg_driver_name(crypto_akcipher_tfm(tfm)); + int ret, i; + + for (i = 0; i < tcount; i++) { + ret = test_akcipher_one(tfm, vecs++); + if (!ret) + continue; + + pr_err("alg: akcipher: test %d failed for %s, err=%d\n", + i + 1, algo, ret); + return ret; + } + return 0; +} + +static int alg_test_akcipher(const struct alg_test_desc *desc, + const char *driver, u32 type, u32 mask) +{ + struct crypto_akcipher *tfm; + int err = 0; + + tfm = crypto_alloc_akcipher(driver, type, mask); + if (IS_ERR(tfm)) { + pr_err("alg: akcipher: Failed to load tfm for %s: %ld\n", + driver, PTR_ERR(tfm)); + return PTR_ERR(tfm); + } + if (desc->suite.akcipher.vecs) + err = test_akcipher(tfm, desc->alg, desc->suite.akcipher.vecs, + desc->suite.akcipher.count); + + crypto_free_akcipher(tfm); + return err; +} + +static int alg_test_null(const struct alg_test_desc *desc, + const char *driver, u32 type, u32 mask) +{ + return 0; +} + +#define ____VECS(tv) .vecs = tv, .count = ARRAY_SIZE(tv) +#define __VECS(tv) { ____VECS(tv) } + +/* Please keep this list sorted by algorithm name. */ +static const struct alg_test_desc alg_test_descs[] = { + { + .alg = "adiantum(xchacha12,aes)", + .generic_driver = "adiantum(xchacha12-generic,aes-generic,nhpoly1305-generic)", + .test = alg_test_skcipher, + .suite = { + .cipher = __VECS(adiantum_xchacha12_aes_tv_template) + }, + }, { + .alg = "adiantum(xchacha20,aes)", + .generic_driver = "adiantum(xchacha20-generic,aes-generic,nhpoly1305-generic)", + .test = alg_test_skcipher, + .suite = { + .cipher = __VECS(adiantum_xchacha20_aes_tv_template) + }, + }, { + .alg = "aegis128", + .test = alg_test_aead, + .suite = { + .aead = __VECS(aegis128_tv_template) + } + }, { + .alg = "ansi_cprng", + .test = alg_test_cprng, + .suite = { + .cprng = __VECS(ansi_cprng_aes_tv_template) + } + }, { + .alg = "authenc(hmac(md5),ecb(cipher_null))", + .test = alg_test_aead, + .suite = { + .aead = __VECS(hmac_md5_ecb_cipher_null_tv_template) + } + }, { + .alg = "authenc(hmac(sha1),cbc(aes))", + .test = alg_test_aead, + .fips_allowed = 1, + .suite = { + .aead = __VECS(hmac_sha1_aes_cbc_tv_temp) + } + }, { + .alg = "authenc(hmac(sha1),cbc(des))", + .test = alg_test_aead, + .suite = { + .aead = __VECS(hmac_sha1_des_cbc_tv_temp) + } + }, { + .alg = "authenc(hmac(sha1),cbc(des3_ede))", + .test = alg_test_aead, + .fips_allowed = 1, + .suite = { + .aead = __VECS(hmac_sha1_des3_ede_cbc_tv_temp) + } + }, { + .alg = "authenc(hmac(sha1),ctr(aes))", + .test = alg_test_null, + .fips_allowed = 1, + }, { + .alg = "authenc(hmac(sha1),ecb(cipher_null))", + .test = alg_test_aead, + .suite = { + .aead = __VECS(hmac_sha1_ecb_cipher_null_tv_temp) + } + }, { + .alg = "authenc(hmac(sha1),rfc3686(ctr(aes)))", + .test = alg_test_null, + .fips_allowed = 1, + }, { + .alg = "authenc(hmac(sha224),cbc(des))", + .test = alg_test_aead, + .suite = { + .aead = __VECS(hmac_sha224_des_cbc_tv_temp) + } + }, { + .alg = "authenc(hmac(sha224),cbc(des3_ede))", + .test = alg_test_aead, + .fips_allowed = 1, + .suite = { + .aead = __VECS(hmac_sha224_des3_ede_cbc_tv_temp) + } + }, { + .alg = "authenc(hmac(sha256),cbc(aes))", + .test = alg_test_aead, + .fips_allowed = 1, + .suite = { + .aead = __VECS(hmac_sha256_aes_cbc_tv_temp) + } + }, { + .alg = "authenc(hmac(sha256),cbc(des))", + .test = alg_test_aead, + .suite = { + .aead = __VECS(hmac_sha256_des_cbc_tv_temp) + } + }, { + .alg = "authenc(hmac(sha256),cbc(des3_ede))", + .test = alg_test_aead, + .fips_allowed = 1, + .suite = { + .aead = __VECS(hmac_sha256_des3_ede_cbc_tv_temp) + } + }, { + .alg = "authenc(hmac(sha256),ctr(aes))", + .test = alg_test_null, + .fips_allowed = 1, + }, { + .alg = "authenc(hmac(sha256),rfc3686(ctr(aes)))", + .test = alg_test_null, + .fips_allowed = 1, + }, { + .alg = "authenc(hmac(sha384),cbc(des))", + .test = alg_test_aead, + .suite = { + .aead = __VECS(hmac_sha384_des_cbc_tv_temp) + } + }, { + .alg = "authenc(hmac(sha384),cbc(des3_ede))", + .test = alg_test_aead, + .fips_allowed = 1, + .suite = { + .aead = __VECS(hmac_sha384_des3_ede_cbc_tv_temp) + } + }, { + .alg = "authenc(hmac(sha384),ctr(aes))", + .test = alg_test_null, + .fips_allowed = 1, + }, { + .alg = "authenc(hmac(sha384),rfc3686(ctr(aes)))", + .test = alg_test_null, + .fips_allowed = 1, + }, { + .alg = "authenc(hmac(sha512),cbc(aes))", + .fips_allowed = 1, + .test = alg_test_aead, + .suite = { + .aead = __VECS(hmac_sha512_aes_cbc_tv_temp) + } + }, { + .alg = "authenc(hmac(sha512),cbc(des))", + .test = alg_test_aead, + .suite = { + .aead = __VECS(hmac_sha512_des_cbc_tv_temp) + } + }, { + .alg = "authenc(hmac(sha512),cbc(des3_ede))", + .test = alg_test_aead, + .fips_allowed = 1, + .suite = { + .aead = __VECS(hmac_sha512_des3_ede_cbc_tv_temp) + } + }, { + .alg = "authenc(hmac(sha512),ctr(aes))", + .test = alg_test_null, + .fips_allowed = 1, + }, { + .alg = "authenc(hmac(sha512),rfc3686(ctr(aes)))", + .test = alg_test_null, + .fips_allowed = 1, + }, { + .alg = "blake2b-160", + .test = alg_test_hash, + .fips_allowed = 0, + .suite = { + .hash = __VECS(blake2b_160_tv_template) + } + }, { + .alg = "blake2b-256", + .test = alg_test_hash, + .fips_allowed = 0, + .suite = { + .hash = __VECS(blake2b_256_tv_template) + } + }, { + .alg = "blake2b-384", + .test = alg_test_hash, + .fips_allowed = 0, + .suite = { + .hash = __VECS(blake2b_384_tv_template) + } + }, { + .alg = "blake2b-512", + .test = alg_test_hash, + .fips_allowed = 0, + .suite = { + .hash = __VECS(blake2b_512_tv_template) + } + }, { + .alg = "blake2s-128", + .test = alg_test_hash, + .suite = { + .hash = __VECS(blakes2s_128_tv_template) + } + }, { + .alg = "blake2s-160", + .test = alg_test_hash, + .suite = { + .hash = __VECS(blakes2s_160_tv_template) + } + }, { + .alg = "blake2s-224", + .test = alg_test_hash, + .suite = { + .hash = __VECS(blakes2s_224_tv_template) + } + }, { + .alg = "blake2s-256", + .test = alg_test_hash, + .suite = { + .hash = __VECS(blakes2s_256_tv_template) + } + }, { + .alg = "cbc(aes)", + .test = alg_test_skcipher, + .fips_allowed = 1, + .suite = { + .cipher = __VECS(aes_cbc_tv_template) + }, + }, { + .alg = "cbc(anubis)", + .test = alg_test_skcipher, + .suite = { + .cipher = __VECS(anubis_cbc_tv_template) + }, + }, { + .alg = "cbc(blowfish)", + .test = alg_test_skcipher, + .suite = { + .cipher = __VECS(bf_cbc_tv_template) + }, + }, { + .alg = "cbc(camellia)", + .test = alg_test_skcipher, + .suite = { + .cipher = __VECS(camellia_cbc_tv_template) + }, + }, { + .alg = "cbc(cast5)", + .test = alg_test_skcipher, + .suite = { + .cipher = __VECS(cast5_cbc_tv_template) + }, + }, { + .alg = "cbc(cast6)", + .test = alg_test_skcipher, + .suite = { + .cipher = __VECS(cast6_cbc_tv_template) + }, + }, { + .alg = "cbc(des)", + .test = alg_test_skcipher, + .suite = { + .cipher = __VECS(des_cbc_tv_template) + }, + }, { + .alg = "cbc(des3_ede)", + .test = alg_test_skcipher, + .fips_allowed = 1, + .suite = { + .cipher = __VECS(des3_ede_cbc_tv_template) + }, + }, { + /* Same as cbc(aes) except the key is stored in + * hardware secure memory which we reference by index + */ + .alg = "cbc(paes)", + .test = alg_test_null, + .fips_allowed = 1, + }, { + /* Same as cbc(sm4) except the key is stored in + * hardware secure memory which we reference by index + */ + .alg = "cbc(psm4)", + .test = alg_test_null, + }, { + .alg = "cbc(serpent)", + .test = alg_test_skcipher, + .suite = { + .cipher = __VECS(serpent_cbc_tv_template) + }, + }, { + .alg = "cbc(sm4)", + .test = alg_test_skcipher, + .suite = { + .cipher = __VECS(sm4_cbc_tv_template) + } + }, { + .alg = "cbc(twofish)", + .test = alg_test_skcipher, + .suite = { + .cipher = __VECS(tf_cbc_tv_template) + }, + }, { +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_PAES_S390) + .alg = "cbc-paes-s390", + .fips_allowed = 1, + .test = alg_test_skcipher, + .suite = { + .cipher = __VECS(aes_cbc_tv_template) + } + }, { +#endif + .alg = "cbcmac(aes)", + .fips_allowed = 1, + .test = alg_test_hash, + .suite = { + .hash = __VECS(aes_cbcmac_tv_template) + } + }, { + .alg = "ccm(aes)", + .generic_driver = "ccm_base(ctr(aes-generic),cbcmac(aes-generic))", + .test = alg_test_aead, + .fips_allowed = 1, + .suite = { + .aead = { + ____VECS(aes_ccm_tv_template), + .einval_allowed = 1, + } + } + }, { + .alg = "cfb(aes)", + .test = alg_test_skcipher, + .fips_allowed = 1, + .suite = { + .cipher = __VECS(aes_cfb_tv_template) + }, + }, { + .alg = "cfb(sm4)", + .test = alg_test_skcipher, + .suite = { + .cipher = __VECS(sm4_cfb_tv_template) + } + }, { + .alg = "chacha20", + .test = alg_test_skcipher, + .suite = { + .cipher = __VECS(chacha20_tv_template) + }, + }, { + .alg = "cmac(aes)", + .fips_allowed = 1, + .test = alg_test_hash, + .suite = { + .hash = __VECS(aes_cmac128_tv_template) + } + }, { + .alg = "cmac(des3_ede)", + .fips_allowed = 1, + .test = alg_test_hash, + .suite = { + .hash = __VECS(des3_ede_cmac64_tv_template) + } + }, { + .alg = "compress_null", + .test = alg_test_null, + }, { + .alg = "crc32", + .test = alg_test_hash, + .fips_allowed = 1, + .suite = { + .hash = __VECS(crc32_tv_template) + } + }, { + .alg = "crc32c", + .test = alg_test_crc32c, + .fips_allowed = 1, + .suite = { + .hash = __VECS(crc32c_tv_template) + } + }, { + .alg = "crct10dif", + .test = alg_test_hash, + .fips_allowed = 1, + .suite = { + .hash = __VECS(crct10dif_tv_template) + } + }, { + .alg = "ctr(aes)", + .test = alg_test_skcipher, + .fips_allowed = 1, + .suite = { + .cipher = __VECS(aes_ctr_tv_template) + } + }, { + .alg = "ctr(blowfish)", + .test = alg_test_skcipher, + .suite = { + .cipher = __VECS(bf_ctr_tv_template) + } + }, { + .alg = "ctr(camellia)", + .test = alg_test_skcipher, + .suite = { + .cipher = __VECS(camellia_ctr_tv_template) + } + }, { + .alg = "ctr(cast5)", + .test = alg_test_skcipher, + .suite = { + .cipher = __VECS(cast5_ctr_tv_template) + } + }, { + .alg = "ctr(cast6)", + .test = alg_test_skcipher, + .suite = { + .cipher = __VECS(cast6_ctr_tv_template) + } + }, { + .alg = "ctr(des)", + .test = alg_test_skcipher, + .suite = { + .cipher = __VECS(des_ctr_tv_template) + } + }, { + .alg = "ctr(des3_ede)", + .test = alg_test_skcipher, + .fips_allowed = 1, + .suite = { + .cipher = __VECS(des3_ede_ctr_tv_template) + } + }, { + /* Same as ctr(aes) except the key is stored in + * hardware secure memory which we reference by index + */ + .alg = "ctr(paes)", + .test = alg_test_null, + .fips_allowed = 1, + }, { + + /* Same as ctr(sm4) except the key is stored in + * hardware secure memory which we reference by index + */ + .alg = "ctr(psm4)", + .test = alg_test_null, + }, { + .alg = "ctr(serpent)", + .test = alg_test_skcipher, + .suite = { + .cipher = __VECS(serpent_ctr_tv_template) + } + }, { + .alg = "ctr(sm4)", + .test = alg_test_skcipher, + .suite = { + .cipher = __VECS(sm4_ctr_tv_template) + } + }, { + .alg = "ctr(twofish)", + .test = alg_test_skcipher, + .suite = { + .cipher = __VECS(tf_ctr_tv_template) + } + }, { +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_PAES_S390) + .alg = "ctr-paes-s390", + .fips_allowed = 1, + .test = alg_test_skcipher, + .suite = { + .cipher = __VECS(aes_ctr_tv_template) + } + }, { +#endif + .alg = "cts(cbc(aes))", + .test = alg_test_skcipher, + .fips_allowed = 1, + .suite = { + .cipher = __VECS(cts_mode_tv_template) + } + }, { + /* Same as cts(cbc((aes)) except the key is stored in + * hardware secure memory which we reference by index + */ + .alg = "cts(cbc(paes))", + .test = alg_test_null, + .fips_allowed = 1, + }, { + .alg = "curve25519", + .test = alg_test_kpp, + .suite = { + .kpp = __VECS(curve25519_tv_template) + } + }, { + .alg = "deflate", + .test = alg_test_comp, + .fips_allowed = 1, + .suite = { + .comp = { + .comp = __VECS(deflate_comp_tv_template), + .decomp = __VECS(deflate_decomp_tv_template) + } + } + }, { + .alg = "dh", + .test = alg_test_kpp, + .fips_allowed = 1, + .suite = { + .kpp = __VECS(dh_tv_template) + } + }, { + .alg = "digest_null", + .test = alg_test_null, + }, { + .alg = "drbg_nopr_ctr_aes128", + .test = alg_test_drbg, + .fips_allowed = 1, + .suite = { + .drbg = __VECS(drbg_nopr_ctr_aes128_tv_template) + } + }, { + .alg = "drbg_nopr_ctr_aes192", + .test = alg_test_drbg, + .fips_allowed = 1, + .suite = { + .drbg = __VECS(drbg_nopr_ctr_aes192_tv_template) + } + }, { + .alg = "drbg_nopr_ctr_aes256", + .test = alg_test_drbg, + .fips_allowed = 1, + .suite = { + .drbg = __VECS(drbg_nopr_ctr_aes256_tv_template) + } + }, { + /* + * There is no need to specifically test the DRBG with every + * backend cipher -- covered by drbg_nopr_hmac_sha256 test + */ + .alg = "drbg_nopr_hmac_sha1", + .fips_allowed = 1, + .test = alg_test_null, + }, { + .alg = "drbg_nopr_hmac_sha256", + .test = alg_test_drbg, + .fips_allowed = 1, + .suite = { + .drbg = __VECS(drbg_nopr_hmac_sha256_tv_template) + } + }, { + /* covered by drbg_nopr_hmac_sha256 test */ + .alg = "drbg_nopr_hmac_sha384", + .fips_allowed = 1, + .test = alg_test_null, + }, { + .alg = "drbg_nopr_hmac_sha512", + .test = alg_test_null, + .fips_allowed = 1, + }, { + .alg = "drbg_nopr_sha1", + .fips_allowed = 1, + .test = alg_test_null, + }, { + .alg = "drbg_nopr_sha256", + .test = alg_test_drbg, + .fips_allowed = 1, + .suite = { + .drbg = __VECS(drbg_nopr_sha256_tv_template) + } + }, { + /* covered by drbg_nopr_sha256 test */ + .alg = "drbg_nopr_sha384", + .fips_allowed = 1, + .test = alg_test_null, + }, { + .alg = "drbg_nopr_sha512", + .fips_allowed = 1, + .test = alg_test_null, + }, { + .alg = "drbg_pr_ctr_aes128", + .test = alg_test_drbg, + .fips_allowed = 1, + .suite = { + .drbg = __VECS(drbg_pr_ctr_aes128_tv_template) + } + }, { + /* covered by drbg_pr_ctr_aes128 test */ + .alg = "drbg_pr_ctr_aes192", + .fips_allowed = 1, + .test = alg_test_null, + }, { + .alg = "drbg_pr_ctr_aes256", + .fips_allowed = 1, + .test = alg_test_null, + }, { + .alg = "drbg_pr_hmac_sha1", + .fips_allowed = 1, + .test = alg_test_null, + }, { + .alg = "drbg_pr_hmac_sha256", + .test = alg_test_drbg, + .fips_allowed = 1, + .suite = { + .drbg = __VECS(drbg_pr_hmac_sha256_tv_template) + } + }, { + /* covered by drbg_pr_hmac_sha256 test */ + .alg = "drbg_pr_hmac_sha384", + .fips_allowed = 1, + .test = alg_test_null, + }, { + .alg = "drbg_pr_hmac_sha512", + .test = alg_test_null, + .fips_allowed = 1, + }, { + .alg = "drbg_pr_sha1", + .fips_allowed = 1, + .test = alg_test_null, + }, { + .alg = "drbg_pr_sha256", + .test = alg_test_drbg, + .fips_allowed = 1, + .suite = { + .drbg = __VECS(drbg_pr_sha256_tv_template) + } + }, { + /* covered by drbg_pr_sha256 test */ + .alg = "drbg_pr_sha384", + .fips_allowed = 1, + .test = alg_test_null, + }, { + .alg = "drbg_pr_sha512", + .fips_allowed = 1, + .test = alg_test_null, + }, { + .alg = "ecb(aes)", + .test = alg_test_skcipher, + .fips_allowed = 1, + .suite = { + .cipher = __VECS(aes_tv_template) + } + }, { + .alg = "ecb(anubis)", + .test = alg_test_skcipher, + .suite = { + .cipher = __VECS(anubis_tv_template) + } + }, { + .alg = "ecb(arc4)", + .generic_driver = "ecb(arc4)-generic", + .test = alg_test_skcipher, + .suite = { + .cipher = __VECS(arc4_tv_template) + } + }, { + .alg = "ecb(blowfish)", + .test = alg_test_skcipher, + .suite = { + .cipher = __VECS(bf_tv_template) + } + }, { + .alg = "ecb(camellia)", + .test = alg_test_skcipher, + .suite = { + .cipher = __VECS(camellia_tv_template) + } + }, { + .alg = "ecb(cast5)", + .test = alg_test_skcipher, + .suite = { + .cipher = __VECS(cast5_tv_template) + } + }, { + .alg = "ecb(cast6)", + .test = alg_test_skcipher, + .suite = { + .cipher = __VECS(cast6_tv_template) + } + }, { + .alg = "ecb(cipher_null)", + .test = alg_test_null, + .fips_allowed = 1, + }, { + .alg = "ecb(des)", + .test = alg_test_skcipher, + .suite = { + .cipher = __VECS(des_tv_template) + } + }, { + .alg = "ecb(des3_ede)", + .test = alg_test_skcipher, + .fips_allowed = 1, + .suite = { + .cipher = __VECS(des3_ede_tv_template) + } + }, { + .alg = "ecb(fcrypt)", + .test = alg_test_skcipher, + .suite = { + .cipher = { + .vecs = fcrypt_pcbc_tv_template, + .count = 1 + } + } + }, { + .alg = "ecb(khazad)", + .test = alg_test_skcipher, + .suite = { + .cipher = __VECS(khazad_tv_template) + } + }, { + /* Same as ecb(aes) except the key is stored in + * hardware secure memory which we reference by index + */ + .alg = "ecb(paes)", + .test = alg_test_null, + .fips_allowed = 1, + }, { + .alg = "ecb(seed)", + .test = alg_test_skcipher, + .suite = { + .cipher = __VECS(seed_tv_template) + } + }, { + .alg = "ecb(serpent)", + .test = alg_test_skcipher, + .suite = { + .cipher = __VECS(serpent_tv_template) + } + }, { + .alg = "ecb(sm4)", + .test = alg_test_skcipher, + .suite = { + .cipher = __VECS(sm4_tv_template) + } + }, { + .alg = "ecb(tea)", + .test = alg_test_skcipher, + .suite = { + .cipher = __VECS(tea_tv_template) + } + }, { + .alg = "ecb(tnepres)", + .test = alg_test_skcipher, + .suite = { + .cipher = __VECS(tnepres_tv_template) + } + }, { + .alg = "ecb(twofish)", + .test = alg_test_skcipher, + .suite = { + .cipher = __VECS(tf_tv_template) + } + }, { + .alg = "ecb(xeta)", + .test = alg_test_skcipher, + .suite = { + .cipher = __VECS(xeta_tv_template) + } + }, { + .alg = "ecb(xtea)", + .test = alg_test_skcipher, + .suite = { + .cipher = __VECS(xtea_tv_template) + } + }, { +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_PAES_S390) + .alg = "ecb-paes-s390", + .fips_allowed = 1, + .test = alg_test_skcipher, + .suite = { + .cipher = __VECS(aes_tv_template) + } + }, { +#endif + .alg = "ecdh", + .test = alg_test_kpp, + .fips_allowed = 1, + .suite = { + .kpp = __VECS(ecdh_tv_template) + } + }, { + .alg = "ecrdsa", + .test = alg_test_akcipher, + .suite = { + .akcipher = __VECS(ecrdsa_tv_template) + } + }, { + .alg = "essiv(authenc(hmac(sha256),cbc(aes)),sha256)", + .test = alg_test_aead, + .fips_allowed = 1, + .suite = { + .aead = __VECS(essiv_hmac_sha256_aes_cbc_tv_temp) + } + }, { + .alg = "essiv(cbc(aes),sha256)", + .test = alg_test_skcipher, + .fips_allowed = 1, + .suite = { + .cipher = __VECS(essiv_aes_cbc_tv_template) + } + }, { + .alg = "gcm(aes)", + .generic_driver = "gcm_base(ctr(aes-generic),ghash-generic)", + .test = alg_test_aead, + .fips_allowed = 1, + .suite = { + .aead = __VECS(aes_gcm_tv_template) + } + }, { + .alg = "ghash", + .test = alg_test_hash, + .fips_allowed = 1, + .suite = { + .hash = __VECS(ghash_tv_template) + } + }, { + .alg = "hmac(md5)", + .test = alg_test_hash, + .suite = { + .hash = __VECS(hmac_md5_tv_template) + } + }, { + .alg = "hmac(rmd128)", + .test = alg_test_hash, + .suite = { + .hash = __VECS(hmac_rmd128_tv_template) + } + }, { + .alg = "hmac(rmd160)", + .test = alg_test_hash, + .suite = { + .hash = __VECS(hmac_rmd160_tv_template) + } + }, { + .alg = "hmac(sha1)", + .test = alg_test_hash, + .fips_allowed = 1, + .suite = { + .hash = __VECS(hmac_sha1_tv_template) + } + }, { + .alg = "hmac(sha224)", + .test = alg_test_hash, + .fips_allowed = 1, + .suite = { + .hash = __VECS(hmac_sha224_tv_template) + } + }, { + .alg = "hmac(sha256)", + .test = alg_test_hash, + .fips_allowed = 1, + .suite = { + .hash = __VECS(hmac_sha256_tv_template) + } + }, { + .alg = "hmac(sha3-224)", + .test = alg_test_hash, + .fips_allowed = 1, + .suite = { + .hash = __VECS(hmac_sha3_224_tv_template) + } + }, { + .alg = "hmac(sha3-256)", + .test = alg_test_hash, + .fips_allowed = 1, + .suite = { + .hash = __VECS(hmac_sha3_256_tv_template) + } + }, { + .alg = "hmac(sha3-384)", + .test = alg_test_hash, + .fips_allowed = 1, + .suite = { + .hash = __VECS(hmac_sha3_384_tv_template) + } + }, { + .alg = "hmac(sha3-512)", + .test = alg_test_hash, + .fips_allowed = 1, + .suite = { + .hash = __VECS(hmac_sha3_512_tv_template) + } + }, { + .alg = "hmac(sha384)", + .test = alg_test_hash, + .fips_allowed = 1, + .suite = { + .hash = __VECS(hmac_sha384_tv_template) + } + }, { + .alg = "hmac(sha512)", + .test = alg_test_hash, + .fips_allowed = 1, + .suite = { + .hash = __VECS(hmac_sha512_tv_template) + } + }, { + .alg = "hmac(sm3)", + .test = alg_test_hash, + .suite = { + .hash = __VECS(hmac_sm3_tv_template) + } + }, { + .alg = "hmac(streebog256)", + .test = alg_test_hash, + .suite = { + .hash = __VECS(hmac_streebog256_tv_template) + } + }, { + .alg = "hmac(streebog512)", + .test = alg_test_hash, + .suite = { + .hash = __VECS(hmac_streebog512_tv_template) + } + }, { + .alg = "jitterentropy_rng", + .fips_allowed = 1, + .test = alg_test_null, + }, { + .alg = "kw(aes)", + .test = alg_test_skcipher, + .fips_allowed = 1, + .suite = { + .cipher = __VECS(aes_kw_tv_template) + } + }, { + .alg = "lrw(aes)", + .generic_driver = "lrw(ecb(aes-generic))", + .test = alg_test_skcipher, + .suite = { + .cipher = __VECS(aes_lrw_tv_template) + } + }, { + .alg = "lrw(camellia)", + .generic_driver = "lrw(ecb(camellia-generic))", + .test = alg_test_skcipher, + .suite = { + .cipher = __VECS(camellia_lrw_tv_template) + } + }, { + .alg = "lrw(cast6)", + .generic_driver = "lrw(ecb(cast6-generic))", + .test = alg_test_skcipher, + .suite = { + .cipher = __VECS(cast6_lrw_tv_template) + } + }, { + .alg = "lrw(serpent)", + .generic_driver = "lrw(ecb(serpent-generic))", + .test = alg_test_skcipher, + .suite = { + .cipher = __VECS(serpent_lrw_tv_template) + } + }, { + .alg = "lrw(twofish)", + .generic_driver = "lrw(ecb(twofish-generic))", + .test = alg_test_skcipher, + .suite = { + .cipher = __VECS(tf_lrw_tv_template) + } + }, { + .alg = "lz4", + .test = alg_test_comp, + .fips_allowed = 1, + .suite = { + .comp = { + .comp = __VECS(lz4_comp_tv_template), + .decomp = __VECS(lz4_decomp_tv_template) + } + } + }, { + .alg = "lz4hc", + .test = alg_test_comp, + .fips_allowed = 1, + .suite = { + .comp = { + .comp = __VECS(lz4hc_comp_tv_template), + .decomp = __VECS(lz4hc_decomp_tv_template) + } + } + }, { + .alg = "lzo", + .test = alg_test_comp, + .fips_allowed = 1, + .suite = { + .comp = { + .comp = __VECS(lzo_comp_tv_template), + .decomp = __VECS(lzo_decomp_tv_template) + } + } + }, { + .alg = "lzo-rle", + .test = alg_test_comp, + .fips_allowed = 1, + .suite = { + .comp = { + .comp = __VECS(lzorle_comp_tv_template), + .decomp = __VECS(lzorle_decomp_tv_template) + } + } + }, { + .alg = "md4", + .test = alg_test_hash, + .suite = { + .hash = __VECS(md4_tv_template) + } + }, { + .alg = "md5", + .test = alg_test_hash, + .suite = { + .hash = __VECS(md5_tv_template) + } + }, { + .alg = "michael_mic", + .test = alg_test_hash, + .suite = { + .hash = __VECS(michael_mic_tv_template) + } + }, { + .alg = "nhpoly1305", + .test = alg_test_hash, + .suite = { + .hash = __VECS(nhpoly1305_tv_template) + } + }, { + .alg = "ofb(aes)", + .test = alg_test_skcipher, + .fips_allowed = 1, + .suite = { + .cipher = __VECS(aes_ofb_tv_template) + } + }, { + /* Same as ofb(aes) except the key is stored in + * hardware secure memory which we reference by index + */ + .alg = "ofb(paes)", + .test = alg_test_null, + .fips_allowed = 1, + }, { + .alg = "ofb(sm4)", + .test = alg_test_skcipher, + .suite = { + .cipher = __VECS(sm4_ofb_tv_template) + } + }, { + .alg = "pcbc(fcrypt)", + .test = alg_test_skcipher, + .suite = { + .cipher = __VECS(fcrypt_pcbc_tv_template) + } + }, { + .alg = "pkcs1pad(rsa,sha224)", + .test = alg_test_null, + .fips_allowed = 1, + }, { + .alg = "pkcs1pad(rsa,sha256)", + .test = alg_test_akcipher, + .fips_allowed = 1, + .suite = { + .akcipher = __VECS(pkcs1pad_rsa_tv_template) + } + }, { + .alg = "pkcs1pad(rsa,sha384)", + .test = alg_test_null, + .fips_allowed = 1, + }, { + .alg = "pkcs1pad(rsa,sha512)", + .test = alg_test_null, + .fips_allowed = 1, + }, { + .alg = "poly1305", + .test = alg_test_hash, + .suite = { + .hash = __VECS(poly1305_tv_template) + } + }, { + .alg = "rfc3686(ctr(aes))", + .test = alg_test_skcipher, + .fips_allowed = 1, + .suite = { + .cipher = __VECS(aes_ctr_rfc3686_tv_template) + } + }, { + .alg = "rfc3686(ctr(sm4))", + .test = alg_test_skcipher, + .suite = { + .cipher = __VECS(sm4_ctr_rfc3686_tv_template) + } + }, { + .alg = "rfc4106(gcm(aes))", + .generic_driver = "rfc4106(gcm_base(ctr(aes-generic),ghash-generic))", + .test = alg_test_aead, + .fips_allowed = 1, + .suite = { + .aead = { + ____VECS(aes_gcm_rfc4106_tv_template), + .einval_allowed = 1, + .aad_iv = 1, + } + } + }, { + .alg = "rfc4309(ccm(aes))", + .generic_driver = "rfc4309(ccm_base(ctr(aes-generic),cbcmac(aes-generic)))", + .test = alg_test_aead, + .fips_allowed = 1, + .suite = { + .aead = { + ____VECS(aes_ccm_rfc4309_tv_template), + .einval_allowed = 1, + .aad_iv = 1, + } + } + }, { + .alg = "rfc4543(gcm(aes))", + .generic_driver = "rfc4543(gcm_base(ctr(aes-generic),ghash-generic))", + .test = alg_test_aead, + .suite = { + .aead = { + ____VECS(aes_gcm_rfc4543_tv_template), + .einval_allowed = 1, + .aad_iv = 1, + } + } + }, { + .alg = "rfc7539(chacha20,poly1305)", + .test = alg_test_aead, + .suite = { + .aead = __VECS(rfc7539_tv_template) + } + }, { + .alg = "rfc7539esp(chacha20,poly1305)", + .test = alg_test_aead, + .suite = { + .aead = { + ____VECS(rfc7539esp_tv_template), + .einval_allowed = 1, + .aad_iv = 1, + } + } + }, { + .alg = "rmd128", + .test = alg_test_hash, + .suite = { + .hash = __VECS(rmd128_tv_template) + } + }, { + .alg = "rmd160", + .test = alg_test_hash, + .suite = { + .hash = __VECS(rmd160_tv_template) + } + }, { + .alg = "rmd256", + .test = alg_test_hash, + .suite = { + .hash = __VECS(rmd256_tv_template) + } + }, { + .alg = "rmd320", + .test = alg_test_hash, + .suite = { + .hash = __VECS(rmd320_tv_template) + } + }, { + .alg = "rsa", + .test = alg_test_akcipher, + .fips_allowed = 1, + .suite = { + .akcipher = __VECS(rsa_tv_template) + } + }, { + .alg = "salsa20", + .test = alg_test_skcipher, + .suite = { + .cipher = __VECS(salsa20_stream_tv_template) + } + }, { + .alg = "sha1", + .test = alg_test_hash, + .fips_allowed = 1, + .suite = { + .hash = __VECS(sha1_tv_template) + } + }, { + .alg = "sha224", + .test = alg_test_hash, + .fips_allowed = 1, + .suite = { + .hash = __VECS(sha224_tv_template) + } + }, { + .alg = "sha256", + .test = alg_test_hash, + .fips_allowed = 1, + .suite = { + .hash = __VECS(sha256_tv_template) + } + }, { + .alg = "sha3-224", + .test = alg_test_hash, + .fips_allowed = 1, + .suite = { + .hash = __VECS(sha3_224_tv_template) + } + }, { + .alg = "sha3-256", + .test = alg_test_hash, + .fips_allowed = 1, + .suite = { + .hash = __VECS(sha3_256_tv_template) + } + }, { + .alg = "sha3-384", + .test = alg_test_hash, + .fips_allowed = 1, + .suite = { + .hash = __VECS(sha3_384_tv_template) + } + }, { + .alg = "sha3-512", + .test = alg_test_hash, + .fips_allowed = 1, + .suite = { + .hash = __VECS(sha3_512_tv_template) + } + }, { + .alg = "sha384", + .test = alg_test_hash, + .fips_allowed = 1, + .suite = { + .hash = __VECS(sha384_tv_template) + } + }, { + .alg = "sha512", + .test = alg_test_hash, + .fips_allowed = 1, + .suite = { + .hash = __VECS(sha512_tv_template) + } + }, { + .alg = "sm2", + .test = alg_test_akcipher, + .suite = { + .akcipher = __VECS(sm2_tv_template) + } + }, { + .alg = "sm3", + .test = alg_test_hash, + .suite = { + .hash = __VECS(sm3_tv_template) + } + }, { + .alg = "streebog256", + .test = alg_test_hash, + .suite = { + .hash = __VECS(streebog256_tv_template) + } + }, { + .alg = "streebog512", + .test = alg_test_hash, + .suite = { + .hash = __VECS(streebog512_tv_template) + } + }, { + .alg = "tgr128", + .test = alg_test_hash, + .suite = { + .hash = __VECS(tgr128_tv_template) + } + }, { + .alg = "tgr160", + .test = alg_test_hash, + .suite = { + .hash = __VECS(tgr160_tv_template) + } + }, { + .alg = "tgr192", + .test = alg_test_hash, + .suite = { + .hash = __VECS(tgr192_tv_template) + } + }, { + .alg = "vmac64(aes)", + .test = alg_test_hash, + .suite = { + .hash = __VECS(vmac64_aes_tv_template) + } + }, { + .alg = "wp256", + .test = alg_test_hash, + .suite = { + .hash = __VECS(wp256_tv_template) + } + }, { + .alg = "wp384", + .test = alg_test_hash, + .suite = { + .hash = __VECS(wp384_tv_template) + } + }, { + .alg = "wp512", + .test = alg_test_hash, + .suite = { + .hash = __VECS(wp512_tv_template) + } + }, { + .alg = "xcbc(aes)", + .test = alg_test_hash, + .suite = { + .hash = __VECS(aes_xcbc128_tv_template) + } + }, { + .alg = "xchacha12", + .test = alg_test_skcipher, + .suite = { + .cipher = __VECS(xchacha12_tv_template) + }, + }, { + .alg = "xchacha20", + .test = alg_test_skcipher, + .suite = { + .cipher = __VECS(xchacha20_tv_template) + }, + }, { + .alg = "xts(aes)", + .generic_driver = "xts(ecb(aes-generic))", + .test = alg_test_skcipher, + .fips_allowed = 1, + .suite = { + .cipher = __VECS(aes_xts_tv_template) + } + }, { + .alg = "xts(camellia)", + .generic_driver = "xts(ecb(camellia-generic))", + .test = alg_test_skcipher, + .suite = { + .cipher = __VECS(camellia_xts_tv_template) + } + }, { + .alg = "xts(cast6)", + .generic_driver = "xts(ecb(cast6-generic))", + .test = alg_test_skcipher, + .suite = { + .cipher = __VECS(cast6_xts_tv_template) + } + }, { + /* Same as xts(aes) except the key is stored in + * hardware secure memory which we reference by index + */ + .alg = "xts(paes)", + .test = alg_test_null, + .fips_allowed = 1, + }, { + .alg = "xts(serpent)", + .generic_driver = "xts(ecb(serpent-generic))", + .test = alg_test_skcipher, + .suite = { + .cipher = __VECS(serpent_xts_tv_template) + } + }, { + .alg = "xts(twofish)", + .generic_driver = "xts(ecb(twofish-generic))", + .test = alg_test_skcipher, + .suite = { + .cipher = __VECS(tf_xts_tv_template) + } + }, { +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_PAES_S390) + .alg = "xts-paes-s390", + .fips_allowed = 1, + .test = alg_test_skcipher, + .suite = { + .cipher = __VECS(aes_xts_tv_template) + } + }, { +#endif + .alg = "xts4096(paes)", + .test = alg_test_null, + .fips_allowed = 1, + }, { + .alg = "xts512(paes)", + .test = alg_test_null, + .fips_allowed = 1, + }, { + .alg = "xxhash64", + .test = alg_test_hash, + .fips_allowed = 1, + .suite = { + .hash = __VECS(xxhash64_tv_template) + } + }, { + .alg = "zlib-deflate", + .test = alg_test_comp, + .fips_allowed = 1, + .suite = { + .comp = { + .comp = __VECS(zlib_deflate_comp_tv_template), + .decomp = __VECS(zlib_deflate_decomp_tv_template) + } + } + }, { + .alg = "zstd", + .test = alg_test_comp, + .fips_allowed = 1, + .suite = { + .comp = { + .comp = __VECS(zstd_comp_tv_template), + .decomp = __VECS(zstd_decomp_tv_template) + } + } + } +}; + +static void alg_check_test_descs_order(void) +{ + int i; + + for (i = 1; i < ARRAY_SIZE(alg_test_descs); i++) { + int diff = strcmp(alg_test_descs[i - 1].alg, + alg_test_descs[i].alg); + + if (WARN_ON(diff > 0)) { + pr_warn("testmgr: alg_test_descs entries in wrong order: '%s' before '%s'\n", + alg_test_descs[i - 1].alg, + alg_test_descs[i].alg); + } + + if (WARN_ON(diff == 0)) { + pr_warn("testmgr: duplicate alg_test_descs entry: '%s'\n", + alg_test_descs[i].alg); + } + } +} + +static void alg_check_testvec_configs(void) +{ + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(default_cipher_testvec_configs); i++) + WARN_ON(!valid_testvec_config( + &default_cipher_testvec_configs[i])); + + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(default_hash_testvec_configs); i++) + WARN_ON(!valid_testvec_config( + &default_hash_testvec_configs[i])); +} + +static void testmgr_onetime_init(void) +{ + alg_check_test_descs_order(); + alg_check_testvec_configs(); + +#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS + pr_warn("alg: extra crypto tests enabled. This is intended for developer use only.\n"); +#endif +} + +static int alg_find_test(const char *alg) +{ + int start = 0; + int end = ARRAY_SIZE(alg_test_descs); + + while (start < end) { + int i = (start + end) / 2; + int diff = strcmp(alg_test_descs[i].alg, alg); + + if (diff > 0) { + end = i; + continue; + } + + if (diff < 0) { + start = i + 1; + continue; + } + + return i; + } + + return -1; +} + +int alg_test(const char *driver, const char *alg, u32 type, u32 mask) +{ + int i; + int j; + int rc; + + if (!fips_enabled && notests) { + printk_once(KERN_INFO "alg: self-tests disabled\n"); + return 0; + } + + DO_ONCE(testmgr_onetime_init); + + if ((type & CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_MASK) == CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_CIPHER) { + char nalg[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME]; + + if (snprintf(nalg, sizeof(nalg), "ecb(%s)", alg) >= + sizeof(nalg)) + return -ENAMETOOLONG; + + i = alg_find_test(nalg); + if (i < 0) + goto notest; + + if (fips_enabled && !alg_test_descs[i].fips_allowed) + goto non_fips_alg; + + rc = alg_test_cipher(alg_test_descs + i, driver, type, mask); + goto test_done; + } + + i = alg_find_test(alg); + j = alg_find_test(driver); + if (i < 0 && j < 0) + goto notest; + + if (fips_enabled && ((i >= 0 && !alg_test_descs[i].fips_allowed) || + (j >= 0 && !alg_test_descs[j].fips_allowed))) + goto non_fips_alg; + + rc = 0; + if (i >= 0) + rc |= alg_test_descs[i].test(alg_test_descs + i, driver, + type, mask); + if (j >= 0 && j != i) + rc |= alg_test_descs[j].test(alg_test_descs + j, driver, + type, mask); + +test_done: + if (rc && (fips_enabled || panic_on_fail)) { + fips_fail_notify(); + panic("alg: self-tests for %s (%s) failed in %s mode!\n", + driver, alg, fips_enabled ? "fips" : "panic_on_fail"); + } + + if (fips_enabled && !rc) + pr_info("alg: self-tests for %s (%s) passed\n", driver, alg); + + return rc; + +notest: + printk(KERN_INFO "alg: No test for %s (%s)\n", alg, driver); + return 0; +non_fips_alg: + return -EINVAL; +} + +#endif /* CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_DISABLE_TESTS */ + +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(alg_test); |