Adding upstream version 2.4.57+dfsg.upstream/2.4.57+dfsgupstream

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

1 files changed, 2610 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/servers/slapd/overlays/ppolicy.c b/servers/slapd/overlays/ppolicy.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7b2ed48
--- /dev/null
+++ b/servers/slapd/overlays/ppolicy.c
@@ -0,0 +1,2610 @@
+/* $OpenLDAP$ */
+/* This work is part of OpenLDAP Software <http://www.openldap.org/>.
+ *
+ * Copyright 2004-2021 The OpenLDAP Foundation.
+ * Portions Copyright 2004-2005 Howard Chu, Symas Corporation.
+ * Portions Copyright 2004 Hewlett-Packard Company.
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted only as authorized by the OpenLDAP
+ * Public License.
+ *
+ * A copy of this license is available in the file LICENSE in the
+ * top-level directory of the distribution or, alternatively, at
+ * <http://www.OpenLDAP.org/license.html>.
+ */
+/* ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS:
+ * This work was developed by Howard Chu for inclusion in
+ * OpenLDAP Software, based on prior work by Neil Dunbar (HP).
+ * This work was sponsored by the Hewlett-Packard Company.
+ */
+
+#include "portable.h"
+
+/* This file implements "Password Policy for LDAP Directories",
+ * based on draft behera-ldap-password-policy-09
+ */
+
+#ifdef SLAPD_OVER_PPOLICY
+
+#include <ldap.h>
+#include "lutil.h"
+#include "slap.h"
+#ifdef SLAPD_MODULES
+#define LIBLTDL_DLL_IMPORT	/* Win32: don't re-export libltdl's symbols */
+#include <ltdl.h>
+#endif
+#include <ac/errno.h>
+#include <ac/time.h>
+#include <ac/string.h>
+#include <ac/ctype.h>
+#include "config.h"
+
+#ifndef MODULE_NAME_SZ
+#define MODULE_NAME_SZ 256
+#endif
+
+#ifndef PPOLICY_DEFAULT_MAXRECORDED_FAILURE
+#define PPOLICY_DEFAULT_MAXRECORDED_FAILURE	5
+#endif
+
+/* Per-instance configuration information */
+typedef struct pp_info {
+	struct berval def_policy;	/* DN of default policy subentry */
+	int use_lockout;		/* send AccountLocked result? */
+	int hash_passwords;		/* transparently hash cleartext pwds */
+	int forward_updates;	/* use frontend for policy state updates */
+	int send_netscape_controls;	/* send netscape password controls */
+	ldap_pvt_thread_mutex_t pwdFailureTime_mutex;
+} pp_info;
+
+/* Our per-connection info - note, it is not per-instance, it is 
+ * used by all instances
+ */
+typedef struct pw_conn {
+	struct berval dn;	/* DN of restricted user */
+} pw_conn;
+
+static pw_conn *pwcons;
+static int ppolicy_cid;
+static int ov_count;
+
+typedef struct pass_policy {
+	AttributeDescription *ad; /* attribute to which the policy applies */
+	int pwdMinAge; /* minimum time (seconds) until passwd can change */
+	int pwdMaxAge; /* time in seconds until pwd will expire after change */
+	int pwdInHistory; /* number of previous passwords kept */
+	int pwdCheckQuality; /* 0 = don't check quality, 1 = check if possible,
+						   2 = check mandatory; fail if not possible */
+	int pwdMinLength; /* minimum number of chars in password */
+	int pwdExpireWarning; /* number of seconds that warning controls are
+							sent before a password expires */
+	int pwdGraceAuthNLimit; /* number of times you can log in with an
+							expired password */
+	int pwdLockout; /* 0 = do not lockout passwords, 1 = lock them out */
+	int pwdLockoutDuration; /* time in seconds a password is locked out for */
+	int pwdMaxFailure; /* number of failed binds allowed before lockout */
+	int pwdMaxRecordedFailure;	/* number of failed binds to store */
+	int pwdFailureCountInterval; /* number of seconds before failure
+									counts are zeroed */
+	int pwdMustChange; /* 0 = users can use admin set password
+							1 = users must change password after admin set */
+	int pwdAllowUserChange; /* 0 = users cannot change their passwords
+								1 = users can change them */
+	int pwdSafeModify; /* 0 = old password doesn't need to come
+								with password change request
+							1 = password change must supply existing pwd */
+	char pwdCheckModule[MODULE_NAME_SZ]; /* name of module to dynamically
+										    load to check password */
+} PassPolicy;
+
+typedef struct pw_hist {
+	time_t t;	/* timestamp of history entry */
+	struct berval pw;	/* old password hash */
+	struct berval bv;	/* text of entire entry */
+	struct pw_hist *next;
+} pw_hist;
+
+/* Operational attributes */
+static AttributeDescription *ad_pwdChangedTime, *ad_pwdAccountLockedTime,
+	*ad_pwdFailureTime, *ad_pwdHistory, *ad_pwdGraceUseTime, *ad_pwdReset,
+	*ad_pwdPolicySubentry;
+
+static struct schema_info {
+	char *def;
+	AttributeDescription **ad;
+} pwd_OpSchema[] = {
+	{	"( 1.3.6.1.4.1.42.2.27.8.1.16 "
+		"NAME ( 'pwdChangedTime' ) "
+		"DESC 'The time the password was last changed' "
+		"EQUALITY generalizedTimeMatch "
+		"ORDERING generalizedTimeOrderingMatch "
+		"SYNTAX 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.24 "
+		"SINGLE-VALUE NO-USER-MODIFICATION USAGE directoryOperation )",
+		&ad_pwdChangedTime },
+	{	"( 1.3.6.1.4.1.42.2.27.8.1.17 "
+		"NAME ( 'pwdAccountLockedTime' ) "
+		"DESC 'The time an user account was locked' "
+		"EQUALITY generalizedTimeMatch "
+		"ORDERING generalizedTimeOrderingMatch "
+		"SYNTAX 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.24 "
+		"SINGLE-VALUE "
+#if 0
+		/* Not until Relax control is released */
+		"NO-USER-MODIFICATION "
+#endif
+		"USAGE directoryOperation )",
+		&ad_pwdAccountLockedTime },
+	{	"( 1.3.6.1.4.1.42.2.27.8.1.19 "
+		"NAME ( 'pwdFailureTime' ) "
+		"DESC 'The timestamps of the last consecutive authentication failures' "
+		"EQUALITY generalizedTimeMatch "
+		"ORDERING generalizedTimeOrderingMatch "
+		"SYNTAX 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.24 "
+		"NO-USER-MODIFICATION USAGE directoryOperation )",
+		&ad_pwdFailureTime },
+	{	"( 1.3.6.1.4.1.42.2.27.8.1.20 "
+		"NAME ( 'pwdHistory' ) "
+		"DESC 'The history of users passwords' "
+		"EQUALITY octetStringMatch "
+		"SYNTAX 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.40 "
+		"NO-USER-MODIFICATION USAGE directoryOperation )",
+		&ad_pwdHistory },
+	{	"( 1.3.6.1.4.1.42.2.27.8.1.21 "
+		"NAME ( 'pwdGraceUseTime' ) "
+		"DESC 'The timestamps of the grace login once the password has expired' "
+		"EQUALITY generalizedTimeMatch "
+		"SYNTAX 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.24 "
+		"NO-USER-MODIFICATION USAGE directoryOperation )",
+		&ad_pwdGraceUseTime }, 
+	{	"( 1.3.6.1.4.1.42.2.27.8.1.22 "
+		"NAME ( 'pwdReset' ) "
+		"DESC 'The indication that the password has been reset' "
+		"EQUALITY booleanMatch "
+		"SYNTAX 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.7 "
+		"SINGLE-VALUE USAGE directoryOperation )",
+		&ad_pwdReset },
+	{	"( 1.3.6.1.4.1.42.2.27.8.1.23 "
+		"NAME ( 'pwdPolicySubentry' ) "
+		"DESC 'The pwdPolicy subentry in effect for this object' "
+		"EQUALITY distinguishedNameMatch "
+		"SYNTAX 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.12 "
+		"SINGLE-VALUE "
+#if 0
+		/* Not until Relax control is released */
+		"NO-USER-MODIFICATION "
+#endif
+		"USAGE directoryOperation )",
+		&ad_pwdPolicySubentry },
+	{ NULL, NULL }
+};
+
+/* User attributes */
+static AttributeDescription *ad_pwdMinAge, *ad_pwdMaxAge, *ad_pwdInHistory,
+	*ad_pwdCheckQuality, *ad_pwdMinLength, *ad_pwdMaxFailure, 
+	*ad_pwdGraceAuthNLimit, *ad_pwdExpireWarning, *ad_pwdLockoutDuration,
+	*ad_pwdFailureCountInterval, *ad_pwdCheckModule, *ad_pwdLockout,
+	*ad_pwdMustChange, *ad_pwdAllowUserChange, *ad_pwdSafeModify,
+	*ad_pwdAttribute, *ad_pwdMaxRecordedFailure;
+
+#define TAB(name)	{ #name, &ad_##name }
+
+static struct schema_info pwd_UsSchema[] = {
+	TAB(pwdAttribute),
+	TAB(pwdMinAge),
+	TAB(pwdMaxAge),
+	TAB(pwdInHistory),
+	TAB(pwdCheckQuality),
+	TAB(pwdMinLength),
+	TAB(pwdMaxFailure),
+	TAB(pwdMaxRecordedFailure),
+	TAB(pwdGraceAuthNLimit),
+	TAB(pwdExpireWarning),
+	TAB(pwdLockout),
+	TAB(pwdLockoutDuration),
+	TAB(pwdFailureCountInterval),
+	TAB(pwdCheckModule),
+	TAB(pwdMustChange),
+	TAB(pwdAllowUserChange),
+	TAB(pwdSafeModify),
+	{ NULL, NULL }
+};
+
+static ldap_pvt_thread_mutex_t chk_syntax_mutex;
+
+enum {
+	PPOLICY_DEFAULT = 1,
+	PPOLICY_HASH_CLEARTEXT,
+	PPOLICY_USE_LOCKOUT
+};
+
+static ConfigDriver ppolicy_cf_default;
+
+static ConfigTable ppolicycfg[] = {
+	{ "ppolicy_default", "policyDN", 2, 2, 0,
+	  ARG_DN|ARG_QUOTE|ARG_MAGIC|PPOLICY_DEFAULT, ppolicy_cf_default,
+	  "( OLcfgOvAt:12.1 NAME 'olcPPolicyDefault' "
+	  "DESC 'DN of a pwdPolicy object for uncustomized objects' "
+	  "SYNTAX OMsDN SINGLE-VALUE )", NULL, NULL },
+	{ "ppolicy_hash_cleartext", "on|off", 1, 2, 0,
+	  ARG_ON_OFF|ARG_OFFSET|PPOLICY_HASH_CLEARTEXT,
+	  (void *)offsetof(pp_info,hash_passwords),
+	  "( OLcfgOvAt:12.2 NAME 'olcPPolicyHashCleartext' "
+	  "DESC 'Hash passwords on add or modify' "
+	  "SYNTAX OMsBoolean SINGLE-VALUE )", NULL, NULL },
+	{ "ppolicy_forward_updates", "on|off", 1, 2, 0,
+	  ARG_ON_OFF|ARG_OFFSET,
+	  (void *)offsetof(pp_info,forward_updates),
+	  "( OLcfgOvAt:12.4 NAME 'olcPPolicyForwardUpdates' "
+	  "DESC 'Allow policy state updates to be forwarded via updateref' "
+	  "SYNTAX OMsBoolean SINGLE-VALUE )", NULL, NULL },
+	{ "ppolicy_use_lockout", "on|off", 1, 2, 0,
+	  ARG_ON_OFF|ARG_OFFSET|PPOLICY_USE_LOCKOUT,
+	  (void *)offsetof(pp_info,use_lockout),
+	  "( OLcfgOvAt:12.3 NAME 'olcPPolicyUseLockout' "
+	  "DESC 'Warn clients with AccountLocked' "
+	  "SYNTAX OMsBoolean SINGLE-VALUE )", NULL, NULL },
+	{ "ppolicy_send_netscape_controls", "on|off", 1, 2, 0,
+	  ARG_ON_OFF|ARG_OFFSET,
+	  (void *)offsetof(pp_info,send_netscape_controls),
+	  "( OLcfgOvAt:12.6 NAME 'olcPPolicySendNetscapeControls' "
+	  "DESC 'Send Netscape policy controls' "
+	  "EQUALITY booleanMatch "
+	  "SYNTAX OMsBoolean SINGLE-VALUE )", NULL, NULL },
+	{ NULL, NULL, 0, 0, 0, ARG_IGNORED }
+};
+
+static ConfigOCs ppolicyocs[] = {
+	{ "( OLcfgOvOc:12.1 "
+	  "NAME 'olcPPolicyConfig' "
+	  "DESC 'Password Policy configuration' "
+	  "SUP olcOverlayConfig "
+	  "MAY ( olcPPolicyDefault $ olcPPolicyHashCleartext $ "
+	  "olcPPolicyUseLockout $ olcPPolicyForwardUpdates $ "
+	  "olcPPolicySendNetscapeControls ) )",
+	  Cft_Overlay, ppolicycfg },
+	{ NULL, 0, NULL }
+};
+
+static int
+ppolicy_cf_default( ConfigArgs *c )
+{
+	slap_overinst *on = (slap_overinst *)c->bi;
+	pp_info *pi = (pp_info *)on->on_bi.bi_private;
+	int rc = ARG_BAD_CONF;
+
+	assert ( c->type == PPOLICY_DEFAULT );
+	Debug(LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE, "==> ppolicy_cf_default\n", 0, 0, 0);
+
+	switch ( c->op ) {
+	case SLAP_CONFIG_EMIT:
+		Debug(LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE, "==> ppolicy_cf_default emit\n", 0, 0, 0);
+		rc = 0;
+		if ( !BER_BVISEMPTY( &pi->def_policy )) {
+			rc = value_add_one( &c->rvalue_vals,
+					    &pi->def_policy );
+			if ( rc ) return rc;
+			rc = value_add_one( &c->rvalue_nvals,
+					    &pi->def_policy );
+		}
+		break;
+	case LDAP_MOD_DELETE:
+		Debug(LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE, "==> ppolicy_cf_default delete\n", 0, 0, 0);
+		if ( pi->def_policy.bv_val ) {
+			ber_memfree ( pi->def_policy.bv_val );
+			pi->def_policy.bv_val = NULL;
+		}
+		pi->def_policy.bv_len = 0;
+		rc = 0;
+		break;
+	case SLAP_CONFIG_ADD:
+		/* fallthrough to LDAP_MOD_ADD */
+	case LDAP_MOD_ADD:
+		Debug(LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE, "==> ppolicy_cf_default add\n", 0, 0, 0);
+		if ( pi->def_policy.bv_val ) {
+			ber_memfree ( pi->def_policy.bv_val );
+		}
+		pi->def_policy = c->value_ndn;
+		ber_memfree( c->value_dn.bv_val );
+		BER_BVZERO( &c->value_dn );
+		BER_BVZERO( &c->value_ndn );
+		rc = 0;
+		break;
+	default:
+		abort ();
+	}
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static time_t
+parse_time( char *atm )
+{
+	struct lutil_tm tm;
+	struct lutil_timet tt;
+	time_t ret = (time_t)-1;
+
+	if ( lutil_parsetime( atm, &tm ) == 0) {
+		lutil_tm2time( &tm, &tt );
+		ret = tt.tt_sec;
+	}
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int
+account_locked( Operation *op, Entry *e,
+		PassPolicy *pp, Modifications **mod ) 
+{
+	Attribute       *la;
+
+	assert(mod != NULL);
+
+	if ( !pp->pwdLockout )
+		return 0;
+
+	if ( (la = attr_find( e->e_attrs, ad_pwdAccountLockedTime )) != NULL ) {
+		BerVarray vals = la->a_nvals;
+
+		/*
+		 * there is a lockout stamp - we now need to know if it's
+		 * a valid one.
+		 */
+		if (vals[0].bv_val != NULL) {
+			time_t then, now;
+			Modifications *m;
+
+			if (!pp->pwdLockoutDuration)
+				return 1;
+
+			if ((then = parse_time( vals[0].bv_val )) == (time_t)0)
+				return 1;
+
+			now = slap_get_time();
+
+			if (now < then + pp->pwdLockoutDuration)
+				return 1;
+
+			m = ch_calloc( sizeof(Modifications), 1 );
+			m->sml_op = LDAP_MOD_DELETE;
+			m->sml_flags = 0;
+			m->sml_type = ad_pwdAccountLockedTime->ad_cname;
+			m->sml_desc = ad_pwdAccountLockedTime;
+			m->sml_next = *mod;
+			*mod = m;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* IMPLICIT TAGS, all context-specific */
+#define PPOLICY_WARNING 0xa0L	/* constructed + 0 */
+#define PPOLICY_ERROR 0x81L		/* primitive + 1 */
+ 
+#define PPOLICY_EXPIRE 0x80L	/* primitive + 0 */
+#define PPOLICY_GRACE  0x81L	/* primitive + 1 */
+
+static const char ppolicy_ctrl_oid[] = LDAP_CONTROL_PASSWORDPOLICYRESPONSE;
+static const char ppolicy_pwd_expired_oid[] = LDAP_CONTROL_X_PASSWORD_EXPIRED;
+static const char ppolicy_pwd_expiring_oid[] = LDAP_CONTROL_X_PASSWORD_EXPIRING;
+
+static LDAPControl *
+create_passcontrol( Operation *op, int exptime, int grace, LDAPPasswordPolicyError err )
+{
+	BerElementBuffer berbuf, bb2;
+	BerElement *ber = (BerElement *) &berbuf, *b2 = (BerElement *) &bb2;
+	LDAPControl c = { 0 }, *cp;
+	struct berval bv;
+	int rc;
+
+	BER_BVZERO( &c.ldctl_value );
+
+	ber_init2( ber, NULL, LBER_USE_DER );
+	ber_printf( ber, "{" /*}*/ );
+
+	if ( exptime >= 0 ) {
+		ber_init2( b2, NULL, LBER_USE_DER );
+		ber_printf( b2, "ti", PPOLICY_EXPIRE, exptime );
+		rc = ber_flatten2( b2, &bv, 1 );
+		(void)ber_free_buf(b2);
+		if (rc == -1) {
+			cp = NULL;
+			goto fail;
+		}
+		ber_printf( ber, "tO", PPOLICY_WARNING, &bv );
+		ch_free( bv.bv_val );
+	} else if ( grace > 0 ) {
+		ber_init2( b2, NULL, LBER_USE_DER );
+		ber_printf( b2, "ti", PPOLICY_GRACE, grace );
+		rc = ber_flatten2( b2, &bv, 1 );
+		(void)ber_free_buf(b2);
+		if (rc == -1) {
+			cp = NULL;
+			goto fail;
+		}
+		ber_printf( ber, "tO", PPOLICY_WARNING, &bv );
+		ch_free( bv.bv_val );
+	}
+
+	if (err != PP_noError ) {
+		ber_printf( ber, "te", PPOLICY_ERROR, err );
+	}
+	ber_printf( ber, /*{*/ "N}" );
+
+	if (ber_flatten2( ber, &c.ldctl_value, 0 ) == -1) {
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	cp = op->o_tmpalloc( sizeof( LDAPControl ) + c.ldctl_value.bv_len, op->o_tmpmemctx );
+	cp->ldctl_oid = (char *)ppolicy_ctrl_oid;
+	cp->ldctl_iscritical = 0;
+	cp->ldctl_value.bv_val = (char *)&cp[1];
+	cp->ldctl_value.bv_len = c.ldctl_value.bv_len;
+	AC_MEMCPY( cp->ldctl_value.bv_val, c.ldctl_value.bv_val, c.ldctl_value.bv_len );
+fail:
+	(void)ber_free_buf(ber);
+	
+	return cp;
+}
+
+static LDAPControl *
+create_passexpiry( Operation *op, int expired, int warn )
+{
+	LDAPControl *cp;
+	char buf[sizeof("-2147483648")];
+	struct berval bv = { .bv_val = buf, .bv_len = sizeof(buf) };
+
+	bv.bv_len = snprintf( bv.bv_val, bv.bv_len, "%d", warn );
+
+	cp = op->o_tmpalloc( sizeof( LDAPControl ) + bv.bv_len, op->o_tmpmemctx );
+	if ( expired ) {
+		cp->ldctl_oid = (char *)ppolicy_pwd_expired_oid;
+	} else {
+		cp->ldctl_oid = (char *)ppolicy_pwd_expiring_oid;
+	}
+	cp->ldctl_iscritical = 0;
+	cp->ldctl_value.bv_val = (char *)&cp[1];
+	cp->ldctl_value.bv_len = bv.bv_len;
+	AC_MEMCPY( cp->ldctl_value.bv_val, bv.bv_val, bv.bv_len );
+	return cp;
+}
+
+static LDAPControl **
+add_passcontrol( Operation *op, SlapReply *rs, LDAPControl *ctrl )
+{
+	LDAPControl **ctrls, **oldctrls = rs->sr_ctrls;
+	int n;
+
+	n = 0;
+	if ( oldctrls ) {
+		for ( ; oldctrls[n]; n++ )
+			;
+	}
+	n += 2;
+
+	ctrls = op->o_tmpcalloc( sizeof( LDAPControl * ), n, op->o_tmpmemctx );
+
+	n = 0;
+	if ( oldctrls ) {
+		for ( ; oldctrls[n]; n++ ) {
+			ctrls[n] = oldctrls[n];
+		}
+	}
+	ctrls[n] = ctrl;
+	ctrls[n+1] = NULL;
+
+	rs->sr_ctrls = ctrls;
+
+	return oldctrls;
+}
+
+static void
+ppolicy_get_default( PassPolicy *pp )
+{
+	memset( pp, 0, sizeof(PassPolicy) );
+
+	pp->ad = slap_schema.si_ad_userPassword;
+
+	/* Users can change their own password by default */
+	pp->pwdAllowUserChange = 1;
+	if ( !pp->pwdMaxRecordedFailure )
+		pp->pwdMaxRecordedFailure = PPOLICY_DEFAULT_MAXRECORDED_FAILURE;
+}
+
+
+static void
+ppolicy_get( Operation *op, Entry *e, PassPolicy *pp )
+{
+	slap_overinst *on = (slap_overinst *)op->o_bd->bd_info;
+	pp_info *pi = on->on_bi.bi_private;
+	Attribute *a;
+	BerVarray vals;
+	int rc;
+	Entry *pe = NULL;
+#if 0
+	const char *text;
+#endif
+
+	ppolicy_get_default( pp );
+
+	if ((a = attr_find( e->e_attrs, ad_pwdPolicySubentry )) == NULL) {
+		/*
+		 * entry has no password policy assigned - use default
+		 */
+		vals = &pi->def_policy;
+		if ( !vals->bv_val )
+			goto defaultpol;
+	} else {
+		vals = a->a_nvals;
+		if (vals[0].bv_val == NULL) {
+			Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ANY,
+				"ppolicy_get: NULL value for policySubEntry\n", 0, 0, 0 );
+			goto defaultpol;
+		}
+	}
+
+	op->o_bd->bd_info = (BackendInfo *)on->on_info;
+	rc = be_entry_get_rw( op, vals, NULL, NULL, 0, &pe );
+	op->o_bd->bd_info = (BackendInfo *)on;
+
+	if ( rc ) goto defaultpol;
+
+#if 0	/* Only worry about userPassword for now */
+	if ((a = attr_find( pe->e_attrs, ad_pwdAttribute )))
+		slap_bv2ad( &a->a_vals[0], &pp->ad, &text );
+#endif
+
+	if ( ( a = attr_find( pe->e_attrs, ad_pwdMinAge ) )
+			&& lutil_atoi( &pp->pwdMinAge, a->a_vals[0].bv_val ) != 0 )
+		goto defaultpol;
+	if ( ( a = attr_find( pe->e_attrs, ad_pwdMaxAge ) )
+			&& lutil_atoi( &pp->pwdMaxAge, a->a_vals[0].bv_val ) != 0 )
+		goto defaultpol;
+	if ( ( a = attr_find( pe->e_attrs, ad_pwdInHistory ) )
+			&& lutil_atoi( &pp->pwdInHistory, a->a_vals[0].bv_val ) != 0 )
+		goto defaultpol;
+	if ( ( a = attr_find( pe->e_attrs, ad_pwdCheckQuality ) )
+			&& lutil_atoi( &pp->pwdCheckQuality, a->a_vals[0].bv_val ) != 0 )
+		goto defaultpol;
+	if ( ( a = attr_find( pe->e_attrs, ad_pwdMinLength ) )
+			&& lutil_atoi( &pp->pwdMinLength, a->a_vals[0].bv_val ) != 0 )
+		goto defaultpol;
+	if ( ( a = attr_find( pe->e_attrs, ad_pwdMaxFailure ) )
+			&& lutil_atoi( &pp->pwdMaxFailure, a->a_vals[0].bv_val ) != 0 )
+		goto defaultpol;
+	if ( ( a = attr_find( pe->e_attrs, ad_pwdMaxRecordedFailure ) )
+			&& lutil_atoi( &pp->pwdMaxRecordedFailure, a->a_vals[0].bv_val ) != 0 )
+		goto defaultpol;
+	if ( ( a = attr_find( pe->e_attrs, ad_pwdGraceAuthNLimit ) )
+			&& lutil_atoi( &pp->pwdGraceAuthNLimit, a->a_vals[0].bv_val ) != 0 )
+		goto defaultpol;
+	if ( ( a = attr_find( pe->e_attrs, ad_pwdExpireWarning ) )
+			&& lutil_atoi( &pp->pwdExpireWarning, a->a_vals[0].bv_val ) != 0 )
+		goto defaultpol;
+	if ( ( a = attr_find( pe->e_attrs, ad_pwdFailureCountInterval ) )
+			&& lutil_atoi( &pp->pwdFailureCountInterval, a->a_vals[0].bv_val ) != 0 )
+		goto defaultpol;
+	if ( ( a = attr_find( pe->e_attrs, ad_pwdLockoutDuration ) )
+			&& lutil_atoi( &pp->pwdLockoutDuration, a->a_vals[0].bv_val ) != 0 )
+		goto defaultpol;
+
+	if ( ( a = attr_find( pe->e_attrs, ad_pwdCheckModule ) ) ) {
+		strncpy( pp->pwdCheckModule, a->a_vals[0].bv_val,
+			sizeof(pp->pwdCheckModule) );
+		pp->pwdCheckModule[sizeof(pp->pwdCheckModule)-1] = '\0';
+	}
+
+	if ((a = attr_find( pe->e_attrs, ad_pwdLockout )))
+    		pp->pwdLockout = bvmatch( &a->a_nvals[0], &slap_true_bv );
+	if ((a = attr_find( pe->e_attrs, ad_pwdMustChange )))
+    		pp->pwdMustChange = bvmatch( &a->a_nvals[0], &slap_true_bv );
+	if ((a = attr_find( pe->e_attrs, ad_pwdAllowUserChange )))
+	    	pp->pwdAllowUserChange = bvmatch( &a->a_nvals[0], &slap_true_bv );
+	if ((a = attr_find( pe->e_attrs, ad_pwdSafeModify )))
+	    	pp->pwdSafeModify = bvmatch( &a->a_nvals[0], &slap_true_bv );
+    
+	if ( pp->pwdMaxRecordedFailure < pp->pwdMaxFailure )
+		pp->pwdMaxRecordedFailure = pp->pwdMaxFailure;
+	if ( !pp->pwdMaxRecordedFailure )
+		pp->pwdMaxRecordedFailure = PPOLICY_DEFAULT_MAXRECORDED_FAILURE;
+
+	op->o_bd->bd_info = (BackendInfo *)on->on_info;
+	be_entry_release_r( op, pe );
+	op->o_bd->bd_info = (BackendInfo *)on;
+
+	return;
+
+defaultpol:
+	if ( pe ) {
+		op->o_bd->bd_info = (BackendInfo *)on->on_info;
+		be_entry_release_r( op, pe );
+		op->o_bd->bd_info = (BackendInfo *)on;
+	}
+
+	Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE,
+		"ppolicy_get: using default policy\n", 0, 0, 0 );
+
+	ppolicy_get_default( pp );
+
+	return;
+}
+
+static int
+password_scheme( struct berval *cred, struct berval *sch )
+{
+	int e;
+    
+	assert( cred != NULL );
+
+	if (sch) {
+		sch->bv_val = NULL;
+		sch->bv_len = 0;
+	}
+    
+	if ((cred->bv_len == 0) || (cred->bv_val == NULL) ||
+		(cred->bv_val[0] != '{')) return LDAP_OTHER;
+
+	for(e = 1; cred->bv_val[e] && cred->bv_val[e] != '}'; e++);
+	if (cred->bv_val[e]) {
+		int rc;
+		rc = lutil_passwd_scheme( cred->bv_val );
+		if (rc) {
+			if (sch) {
+				sch->bv_val = cred->bv_val;
+				sch->bv_len = e;
+			}
+			return LDAP_SUCCESS;
+		}
+	}
+	return LDAP_OTHER;
+}
+
+static int
+check_password_quality( struct berval *cred, PassPolicy *pp, LDAPPasswordPolicyError *err, Entry *e, char **txt )
+{
+	int rc = LDAP_SUCCESS, ok = LDAP_SUCCESS;
+	char *ptr;
+	struct berval sch;
+
+	assert( cred != NULL );
+	assert( pp != NULL );
+	assert( txt != NULL );
+
+	ptr = cred->bv_val;
+
+	*txt = NULL;
+
+	if ((cred->bv_len == 0) || (pp->pwdMinLength > cred->bv_len)) {
+		rc = LDAP_CONSTRAINT_VIOLATION;
+		if ( err ) *err = PP_passwordTooShort;
+		return rc;
+	}
+
+        /*
+         * We need to know if the password is already hashed - if so
+         * what scheme is it. The reason being that the "hash" of
+         * {cleartext} still allows us to check the password.
+         */
+	rc = password_scheme( cred, &sch );
+	if (rc == LDAP_SUCCESS) {
+		if ((sch.bv_val) && (strncasecmp( sch.bv_val, "{cleartext}",
+			sch.bv_len ) == 0)) {
+			/*
+			 * We can check the cleartext "hash"
+			 */
+			ptr = cred->bv_val + sch.bv_len;
+		} else {
+			/* everything else, we can't check */
+			if (pp->pwdCheckQuality == 2) {
+				rc = LDAP_CONSTRAINT_VIOLATION;
+				if (err) *err = PP_insufficientPasswordQuality;
+				return rc;
+			}
+			/*
+			 * We can't check the syntax of the password, but it's not
+			 * mandatory (according to the policy), so we return success.
+			 */
+		    
+			return LDAP_SUCCESS;
+		}
+	}
+
+	rc = LDAP_SUCCESS;
+
+	if (pp->pwdCheckModule[0]) {
+#ifdef SLAPD_MODULES
+		lt_dlhandle mod;
+		const char *err;
+		
+		if ((mod = lt_dlopen( pp->pwdCheckModule )) == NULL) {
+			err = lt_dlerror();
+
+			Debug(LDAP_DEBUG_ANY,
+			"check_password_quality: lt_dlopen failed: (%s) %s.\n",
+				pp->pwdCheckModule, err, 0 );
+			ok = LDAP_OTHER; /* internal error */
+		} else {
+			/* FIXME: the error message ought to be passed thru a
+			 * struct berval, with preallocated buffer and size
+			 * passed in. Module can still allocate a buffer for
+			 * it if the provided one is too small.
+			 */
+			int (*prog)( char *passwd, char **text, Entry *ent );
+
+			if ((prog = lt_dlsym( mod, "check_password" )) == NULL) {
+				err = lt_dlerror();
+			    
+				Debug(LDAP_DEBUG_ANY,
+					"check_password_quality: lt_dlsym failed: (%s) %s.\n",
+					pp->pwdCheckModule, err, 0 );
+				ok = LDAP_OTHER;
+			} else {
+				ldap_pvt_thread_mutex_lock( &chk_syntax_mutex );
+				ok = prog( ptr, txt, e );
+				ldap_pvt_thread_mutex_unlock( &chk_syntax_mutex );
+				if (ok != LDAP_SUCCESS) {
+					Debug(LDAP_DEBUG_ANY,
+						"check_password_quality: module error: (%s) %s.[%d]\n",
+						pp->pwdCheckModule, *txt ? *txt : "", ok );
+				}
+			}
+			    
+			lt_dlclose( mod );
+		}
+#else
+	Debug(LDAP_DEBUG_ANY, "check_password_quality: external modules not "
+		"supported. pwdCheckModule ignored.\n", 0, 0, 0);
+#endif /* SLAPD_MODULES */
+	}
+		
+		    
+	if (ok != LDAP_SUCCESS) {
+		rc = LDAP_CONSTRAINT_VIOLATION;
+		if (err) *err = PP_insufficientPasswordQuality;
+	}
+	
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int
+parse_pwdhistory( struct berval *bv, char **oid, time_t *oldtime, struct berval *oldpw )
+{
+	char *ptr;
+	struct berval nv, npw;
+	ber_len_t i, j;
+	
+	assert (bv && (bv->bv_len > 0) && (bv->bv_val) && oldtime && oldpw );
+
+	if ( oid ) {
+		*oid = 0;
+	}
+	*oldtime = (time_t)-1;
+	BER_BVZERO( oldpw );
+	
+	ber_dupbv( &nv, bv );
+
+	/* first get the time field */
+	for ( i = 0; (i < nv.bv_len) && (nv.bv_val[i] != '#'); i++ )
+		;
+	if ( i == nv.bv_len ) {
+		goto exit_failure; /* couldn't locate the '#' separator */
+	}
+	nv.bv_val[i++] = '\0'; /* terminate the string & move to next field */
+	ptr = nv.bv_val;
+	*oldtime = parse_time( ptr );
+	if (*oldtime == (time_t)-1) {
+		goto exit_failure;
+	}
+
+	/* get the OID field */
+	for (ptr = &(nv.bv_val[i]); (i < nv.bv_len) && (nv.bv_val[i] != '#'); i++ )
+		;
+	if ( i == nv.bv_len ) {
+		goto exit_failure; /* couldn't locate the '#' separator */
+	}
+	nv.bv_val[i++] = '\0'; /* terminate the string & move to next field */
+	if ( oid ) {
+		*oid = ber_strdup( ptr );
+	}
+	
+	/* get the length field */
+	for ( ptr = &(nv.bv_val[i]); (i < nv.bv_len) && (nv.bv_val[i] != '#'); i++ )
+		;
+	if ( i == nv.bv_len ) {
+		goto exit_failure; /* couldn't locate the '#' separator */
+	}
+	nv.bv_val[i++] = '\0'; /* terminate the string & move to next field */
+	oldpw->bv_len = strtol( ptr, NULL, 10 );
+	if (errno == ERANGE) {
+		goto exit_failure;
+	}
+
+	/* lastly, get the octets of the string */
+	for ( j = i, ptr = &(nv.bv_val[i]); i < nv.bv_len; i++ )
+		;
+	if ( i - j != oldpw->bv_len) {
+		goto exit_failure; /* length is wrong */
+	}
+
+	npw.bv_val = ptr;
+	npw.bv_len = oldpw->bv_len;
+	ber_dupbv( oldpw, &npw );
+	ber_memfree( nv.bv_val );
+	
+	return LDAP_SUCCESS;
+
+exit_failure:;
+	if ( oid && *oid ) {
+		ber_memfree(*oid);
+		*oid = NULL;
+	}
+	if ( oldpw->bv_val ) {
+		ber_memfree( oldpw->bv_val);
+		BER_BVZERO( oldpw );
+	}
+	ber_memfree( nv.bv_val );
+
+	return LDAP_OTHER;
+}
+
+static void
+add_to_pwd_history( pw_hist **l, time_t t,
+                    struct berval *oldpw, struct berval *bv )
+{
+	pw_hist *p, *p1, *p2;
+    
+	if (!l) return;
+
+	p = ch_malloc( sizeof( pw_hist ));
+	p->pw = *oldpw;
+	ber_dupbv( &p->bv, bv );
+	p->t = t;
+	p->next = NULL;
+	
+	if (*l == NULL) {
+		/* degenerate case */
+		*l = p;
+		return;
+	}
+	/*
+	 * advance p1 and p2 such that p1 is the node before the
+	 * new one, and p2 is the node after it
+	 */
+	for (p1 = NULL, p2 = *l; p2 && p2->t <= t; p1 = p2, p2=p2->next );
+	p->next = p2;
+	if (p1 == NULL) { *l = p; return; }
+	p1->next = p;
+}
+
+#ifndef MAX_PWD_HISTORY_SZ
+#define MAX_PWD_HISTORY_SZ 1024
+#endif /* MAX_PWD_HISTORY_SZ */
+
+static void
+make_pwd_history_value( char *timebuf, struct berval *bv, Attribute *pa )
+{
+	char str[ MAX_PWD_HISTORY_SZ ];
+	int nlen;
+
+	snprintf( str, MAX_PWD_HISTORY_SZ,
+		  "%s#%s#%lu#", timebuf,
+		  pa->a_desc->ad_type->sat_syntax->ssyn_oid,
+		  (unsigned long) pa->a_nvals[0].bv_len );
+	str[MAX_PWD_HISTORY_SZ-1] = 0;
+	nlen = strlen(str);
+
+        /*
+         * We have to assume that the string is a string of octets,
+         * not readable characters. In reality, yes, it probably is
+         * a readable (ie, base64) string, but we can't count on that
+         * Hence, while the first 3 fields of the password history
+         * are definitely readable (a timestamp, an OID and an integer
+         * length), the remaining octets of the actual password
+         * are deemed to be binary data.
+         */
+	AC_MEMCPY( str + nlen, pa->a_nvals[0].bv_val, pa->a_nvals[0].bv_len );
+	nlen += pa->a_nvals[0].bv_len;
+	bv->bv_val = ch_malloc( nlen + 1 );
+	AC_MEMCPY( bv->bv_val, str, nlen );
+	bv->bv_val[nlen] = '\0';
+	bv->bv_len = nlen;
+}
+
+static void
+free_pwd_history_list( pw_hist **l )
+{
+	pw_hist *p;
+    
+	if (!l) return;
+	p = *l;
+	while (p) {
+		pw_hist *pp = p->next;
+
+		free(p->pw.bv_val);
+		free(p->bv.bv_val);
+		free(p);
+		p = pp;
+	}
+	*l = NULL;
+}
+
+typedef struct ppbind {
+	slap_overinst *on;
+	int send_ctrl;
+	int set_restrict;
+	LDAPControl **oldctrls;
+	Modifications *mod;
+	LDAPPasswordPolicyError pErr;
+	PassPolicy pp;
+} ppbind;
+
+static void
+ctrls_cleanup( Operation *op, SlapReply *rs, LDAPControl **oldctrls )
+{
+	int n;
+
+	assert( rs->sr_ctrls != NULL );
+	assert( rs->sr_ctrls[0] != NULL );
+
+	for ( n = 0; rs->sr_ctrls[n]; n++ ) {
+		if ( rs->sr_ctrls[n]->ldctl_oid == ppolicy_ctrl_oid ||
+			rs->sr_ctrls[n]->ldctl_oid == ppolicy_pwd_expired_oid ||
+			rs->sr_ctrls[n]->ldctl_oid == ppolicy_pwd_expiring_oid ) {
+			op->o_tmpfree( rs->sr_ctrls[n], op->o_tmpmemctx );
+			rs->sr_ctrls[n] = (LDAPControl *)(-1);
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if ( rs->sr_ctrls[n] == NULL ) {
+		/* missed? */
+	}
+
+	op->o_tmpfree( rs->sr_ctrls, op->o_tmpmemctx );
+
+	rs->sr_ctrls = oldctrls;
+}
+
+static int
+ppolicy_ctrls_cleanup( Operation *op, SlapReply *rs )
+{
+	ppbind *ppb = op->o_callback->sc_private;
+	if ( ppb->send_ctrl ) {
+		ctrls_cleanup( op, rs, ppb->oldctrls );
+	}
+	return SLAP_CB_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+static int
+ppolicy_bind_response( Operation *op, SlapReply *rs )
+{
+	ppbind *ppb = op->o_callback->sc_private;
+	slap_overinst *on = ppb->on;
+	pp_info *pi = on->on_bi.bi_private;
+	Modifications *mod = ppb->mod, *m;
+	int pwExpired = 0;
+	int ngut = -1, warn = -1, age, rc;
+	Attribute *a;
+	time_t now, pwtime = (time_t)-1;
+	struct lutil_tm now_tm;
+	struct lutil_timet now_usec;
+	char nowstr[ LDAP_LUTIL_GENTIME_BUFSIZE ];
+	char nowstr_usec[ LDAP_LUTIL_GENTIME_BUFSIZE+8 ];
+	struct berval timestamp, timestamp_usec;
+	BackendInfo *bi = op->o_bd->bd_info;
+	LDAPControl *ctrl = NULL;
+	Entry *e;
+
+	ldap_pvt_thread_mutex_lock( &pi->pwdFailureTime_mutex );
+	/* If we already know it's locked, just get on with it */
+	if ( ppb->pErr != PP_noError ) {
+		goto locked;
+	}
+
+	op->o_bd->bd_info = (BackendInfo *)on->on_info;
+	rc = be_entry_get_rw( op, &op->o_req_ndn, NULL, NULL, 0, &e );
+	op->o_bd->bd_info = bi;
+
+	if ( rc != LDAP_SUCCESS ) {
+		ldap_pvt_thread_mutex_unlock( &pi->pwdFailureTime_mutex );
+		return SLAP_CB_CONTINUE;
+	}
+
+	ldap_pvt_gettime(&now_tm); /* stored for later consideration */
+	lutil_tm2time(&now_tm, &now_usec);
+	now = now_usec.tt_sec;
+	timestamp.bv_val = nowstr;
+	timestamp.bv_len = sizeof(nowstr);
+	slap_timestamp( &now, &timestamp );
+
+	/* Separate timestamp for pwdFailureTime with microsecond granularity */
+	strcpy(nowstr_usec, nowstr);
+	timestamp_usec.bv_val = nowstr_usec;
+	timestamp_usec.bv_len = timestamp.bv_len;
+	snprintf( timestamp_usec.bv_val + timestamp_usec.bv_len-1, sizeof(".123456Z"), ".%06dZ", now_usec.tt_usec );
+	timestamp_usec.bv_len += STRLENOF(".123456");
+
+	if ( rs->sr_err == LDAP_INVALID_CREDENTIALS ) {
+		int i = 0, fc = 0;
+
+		m = ch_calloc( sizeof(Modifications), 1 );
+		m->sml_op = LDAP_MOD_ADD;
+		m->sml_flags = 0;
+		m->sml_type = ad_pwdFailureTime->ad_cname;
+		m->sml_desc = ad_pwdFailureTime;
+		m->sml_numvals = 1;
+		m->sml_values = ch_calloc( sizeof(struct berval), 2 );
+		m->sml_nvalues = ch_calloc( sizeof(struct berval), 2 );
+
+		ber_dupbv( &m->sml_values[0], &timestamp_usec );
+		ber_dupbv( &m->sml_nvalues[0], &timestamp_usec );
+		m->sml_next = mod;
+		mod = m;
+
+		/*
+		 * Count the pwdFailureTimes - if it's
+		 * greater than the policy pwdMaxFailure,
+		 * then lock the account.
+		 */
+		if ((a = attr_find( e->e_attrs, ad_pwdFailureTime )) != NULL) {
+			for(i=0; a->a_nvals[i].bv_val; i++) {
+
+				/*
+				 * If the interval is 0, then failures
+				 * stay on the record until explicitly
+				 * reset by successful authentication.
+				 */
+				if (ppb->pp.pwdFailureCountInterval == 0) {
+					fc++;
+				} else if (now <=
+							parse_time(a->a_nvals[i].bv_val) +
+							ppb->pp.pwdFailureCountInterval) {
+
+					fc++;
+				}
+				/*
+				 * We only count those failures
+				 * which are not due to expire.
+				 */
+			}
+			/* Do we have too many timestamps? If so, delete some values.
+			 * We don't bother to sort the values here. OpenLDAP keeps the
+			 * values in order by default. Fundamentally, relying on the
+			 * information here is wrong anyway; monitoring systems should
+			 * be tracking Bind failures in syslog, not here.
+			 */
+			if (a->a_numvals >= ppb->pp.pwdMaxRecordedFailure) {
+				int j = ppb->pp.pwdMaxRecordedFailure-1;
+				/* If more than 2x, cheaper to perform a Replace */
+				if (a->a_numvals >= 2 * ppb->pp.pwdMaxRecordedFailure) {
+					struct berval v, nv;
+
+					/* Change the mod we constructed above */
+					m->sml_op = LDAP_MOD_REPLACE;
+					m->sml_numvals = ppb->pp.pwdMaxRecordedFailure;
+					v = m->sml_values[0];
+					nv = m->sml_nvalues[0];
+					ch_free(m->sml_values);
+					ch_free(m->sml_nvalues);
+					m->sml_values = ch_calloc( sizeof(struct berval), ppb->pp.pwdMaxRecordedFailure+1 );
+					m->sml_nvalues = ch_calloc( sizeof(struct berval), ppb->pp.pwdMaxRecordedFailure+1 );
+					for (i=0; i<j; i++) {
+						ber_dupbv(&m->sml_values[i], &a->a_vals[a->a_numvals-j+i]);
+						ber_dupbv(&m->sml_nvalues[i], &a->a_nvals[a->a_numvals-j+i]);
+					}
+					m->sml_values[i] = v;
+					m->sml_nvalues[i] = nv;
+				} else {
+				/* else just delete some */
+					m = ch_calloc( sizeof(Modifications), 1 );
+					m->sml_op = LDAP_MOD_DELETE;
+					m->sml_type = ad_pwdFailureTime->ad_cname;
+					m->sml_desc = ad_pwdFailureTime;
+					m->sml_numvals = a->a_numvals - j;
+					m->sml_values = ch_calloc( sizeof(struct berval), m->sml_numvals+1 );
+					m->sml_nvalues = ch_calloc( sizeof(struct berval), m->sml_numvals+1 );
+					for (i=0; i<m->sml_numvals; i++) {
+						ber_dupbv(&m->sml_values[i], &a->a_vals[i]);
+						ber_dupbv(&m->sml_nvalues[i], &a->a_nvals[i]);
+					}
+					m->sml_next = mod;
+					mod = m;
+				}
+			}
+		}
+		
+		if ((ppb->pp.pwdMaxFailure > 0) &&
+			(fc >= ppb->pp.pwdMaxFailure - 1)) {
+
+			/*
+			 * We subtract 1 from the failure max
+			 * because the new failure entry hasn't
+			 * made it to the entry yet.
+			 */
+			m = ch_calloc( sizeof(Modifications), 1 );
+			m->sml_op = LDAP_MOD_REPLACE;
+			m->sml_flags = 0;
+			m->sml_type = ad_pwdAccountLockedTime->ad_cname;
+			m->sml_desc = ad_pwdAccountLockedTime;
+			m->sml_numvals = 1;
+			m->sml_values = ch_calloc( sizeof(struct berval), 2 );
+			m->sml_nvalues = ch_calloc( sizeof(struct berval), 2 );
+			ber_dupbv( &m->sml_values[0], &timestamp );
+			ber_dupbv( &m->sml_nvalues[0], &timestamp );
+			m->sml_next = mod;
+			mod = m;
+		}
+	} else if ( rs->sr_err == LDAP_SUCCESS ) {
+		if ((a = attr_find( e->e_attrs, ad_pwdChangedTime )) != NULL)
+			pwtime = parse_time( a->a_nvals[0].bv_val );
+
+		/* delete all pwdFailureTimes */
+		if ( attr_find( e->e_attrs, ad_pwdFailureTime )) {
+			m = ch_calloc( sizeof(Modifications), 1 );
+			m->sml_op = LDAP_MOD_DELETE;
+			m->sml_flags = 0;
+			m->sml_type = ad_pwdFailureTime->ad_cname;
+			m->sml_desc = ad_pwdFailureTime;
+			m->sml_next = mod;
+			mod = m;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * check to see if the password must be changed
+		 */
+		if ( ppb->pp.pwdMustChange &&
+			(a = attr_find( e->e_attrs, ad_pwdReset )) &&
+			bvmatch( &a->a_nvals[0], &slap_true_bv ) )
+		{
+			/*
+			 * need to inject client controls here to give
+			 * more information. For the moment, we ensure
+			 * that we are disallowed from doing anything
+			 * other than change password.
+			 */
+			if ( ppb->set_restrict ) {
+				ber_dupbv( &pwcons[op->o_conn->c_conn_idx].dn,
+					&op->o_conn->c_ndn );
+			}
+
+			ppb->pErr = PP_changeAfterReset;
+
+		} else {
+			/*
+			 * the password does not need to be changed, so
+			 * we now check whether the password has expired.
+			 *
+			 * We can skip this bit if passwords don't age in
+			 * the policy. Also, if there was no pwdChangedTime
+			 * attribute in the entry, the password never expires.
+			 */
+			if (ppb->pp.pwdMaxAge == 0) goto grace;
+
+			if (pwtime != (time_t)-1) {
+				/*
+				 * Check: was the last change time of
+				 * the password older than the maximum age
+				 * allowed. (Ignore case 2 from I-D, it's just silly.)
+				 */
+				if (now - pwtime > ppb->pp.pwdMaxAge ) pwExpired = 1;
+			}
+		}
+
+grace:
+		if (!pwExpired) goto check_expiring_password;
+		
+		if ((a = attr_find( e->e_attrs, ad_pwdGraceUseTime )) == NULL)
+			ngut = ppb->pp.pwdGraceAuthNLimit;
+		else {
+			for(ngut=0; a->a_nvals[ngut].bv_val; ngut++);
+			ngut = ppb->pp.pwdGraceAuthNLimit - ngut;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * ngut is the number of remaining grace logins
+		 */
+		Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ANY,
+			"ppolicy_bind: Entry %s has an expired password: %d grace logins\n",
+			e->e_name.bv_val, ngut, 0);
+		
+		if (ngut < 1) {
+			ppb->pErr = PP_passwordExpired;
+			rs->sr_err = LDAP_INVALID_CREDENTIALS;
+			goto done;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * Add a grace user time to the entry
+		 */
+		m = ch_calloc( sizeof(Modifications), 1 );
+		m->sml_op = LDAP_MOD_ADD;
+		m->sml_flags = 0;
+		m->sml_type = ad_pwdGraceUseTime->ad_cname;
+		m->sml_desc = ad_pwdGraceUseTime;
+		m->sml_numvals = 1;
+		m->sml_values = ch_calloc( sizeof(struct berval), 2 );
+		m->sml_nvalues = ch_calloc( sizeof(struct berval), 2 );
+		ber_dupbv( &m->sml_values[0], &timestamp );
+		ber_dupbv( &m->sml_nvalues[0], &timestamp );
+		m->sml_next = mod;
+		mod = m;
+
+check_expiring_password:
+		/*
+		 * Now we need to check to see
+		 * if it is about to expire, and if so, should the user
+		 * be warned about it in the password policy control.
+		 *
+		 * If the password has expired, and we're in the grace period, then
+		 * we don't need to do this bit. Similarly, if we don't have password
+		 * aging, then there's no need to do this bit either.
+		 */
+		if ((ppb->pp.pwdMaxAge < 1) || (pwExpired) || (ppb->pp.pwdExpireWarning < 1))
+			goto done;
+
+		age = (int)(now - pwtime);
+		
+		/*
+		 * We know that there is a password Change Time attribute - if
+		 * there wasn't, then the pwdExpired value would be true, unless
+		 * there is no password aging - and if there is no password aging,
+		 * then this section isn't called anyway - you can't have an
+		 * expiring password if there's no limit to expire.
+		 */
+		if (ppb->pp.pwdMaxAge - age < ppb->pp.pwdExpireWarning ) {
+			/*
+			 * Set the warning value.
+			 */
+			warn = ppb->pp.pwdMaxAge - age; /* seconds left until expiry */
+			if (warn < 0) warn = 0; /* something weird here - why is pwExpired not set? */
+			
+			Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ANY,
+				"ppolicy_bind: Setting warning for password expiry for %s = %d seconds\n",
+				op->o_req_dn.bv_val, warn, 0 );
+		}
+	}
+
+done:
+	op->o_bd->bd_info = (BackendInfo *)on->on_info;
+	be_entry_release_r( op, e );
+
+locked:
+	if ( mod ) {
+		Operation op2 = *op;
+		SlapReply r2 = { REP_RESULT };
+		slap_callback cb = { NULL, slap_null_cb, NULL, NULL };
+		LDAPControl c, *ca[2];
+
+		op2.o_tag = LDAP_REQ_MODIFY;
+		op2.o_callback = &cb;
+		op2.orm_modlist = mod;
+		op2.orm_no_opattrs = 0;
+		op2.o_dn = op->o_bd->be_rootdn;
+		op2.o_ndn = op->o_bd->be_rootndn;
+
+		/* If this server is a shadow and forward_updates is true,
+		 * use the frontend to perform this modify. That will trigger
+		 * the update referral, which can then be forwarded by the
+		 * chain overlay. Obviously the updateref and chain overlay
+		 * must be configured appropriately for this to be useful.
+		 */
+		if ( SLAP_SHADOW( op->o_bd ) && pi->forward_updates ) {
+			op2.o_bd = frontendDB;
+
+			/* Must use Relax control since these are no-user-mod */
+			op2.o_relax = SLAP_CONTROL_CRITICAL;
+			op2.o_ctrls = ca;
+			ca[0] = &c;
+			ca[1] = NULL;
+			BER_BVZERO( &c.ldctl_value );
+			c.ldctl_iscritical = 1;
+			c.ldctl_oid = LDAP_CONTROL_RELAX;
+		} else {
+			/* If not forwarding, don't update opattrs and don't replicate */
+			if ( SLAP_SINGLE_SHADOW( op->o_bd )) {
+				op2.orm_no_opattrs = 1;
+				op2.o_dont_replicate = 1;
+			}
+			op2.o_bd->bd_info = (BackendInfo *)on->on_info;
+		}
+		rc = op2.o_bd->be_modify( &op2, &r2 );
+		slap_mods_free( mod, 1 );
+	}
+
+	if ( ppb->send_ctrl ) {
+
+		/* Do we really want to tell that the account is locked? */
+		if ( ppb->pErr == PP_accountLocked && !pi->use_lockout ) {
+			ppb->pErr = PP_noError;
+		}
+		ctrl = create_passcontrol( op, warn, ngut, ppb->pErr );
+	} else if ( pi->send_netscape_controls ) {
+		if ( ppb->pErr != PP_noError || pwExpired ) {
+			ctrl = create_passexpiry( op, 1, 0 );
+		} else if ( warn > 0 ) {
+			ctrl = create_passexpiry( op, 0, warn );
+		}
+	}
+	if ( ctrl ) {
+		ppb->oldctrls = add_passcontrol( op, rs, ctrl );
+		op->o_callback->sc_cleanup = ppolicy_ctrls_cleanup;
+	}
+	op->o_bd->bd_info = bi;
+	ldap_pvt_thread_mutex_unlock( &pi->pwdFailureTime_mutex );
+	return SLAP_CB_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+static int
+ppolicy_bind( Operation *op, SlapReply *rs )
+{
+	slap_overinst *on = (slap_overinst *)op->o_bd->bd_info;
+
+	/* Reset lockout status on all Bind requests */
+	if ( !BER_BVISEMPTY( &pwcons[op->o_conn->c_conn_idx].dn )) {
+		ch_free( pwcons[op->o_conn->c_conn_idx].dn.bv_val );
+		BER_BVZERO( &pwcons[op->o_conn->c_conn_idx].dn );
+	}
+
+	/* Root bypasses policy */
+	if ( !be_isroot_dn( op->o_bd, &op->o_req_ndn )) {
+		Entry *e;
+		int rc;
+		ppbind *ppb;
+		slap_callback *cb;
+
+		op->o_bd->bd_info = (BackendInfo *)on->on_info;
+		rc = be_entry_get_rw( op, &op->o_req_ndn, NULL, NULL, 0, &e );
+
+		if ( rc != LDAP_SUCCESS ) {
+			return SLAP_CB_CONTINUE;
+		}
+
+		cb = op->o_tmpcalloc( sizeof(ppbind)+sizeof(slap_callback),
+			1, op->o_tmpmemctx );
+		ppb = (ppbind *)(cb+1);
+		ppb->on = on;
+		ppb->pErr = PP_noError;
+		ppb->set_restrict = 1;
+
+		/* Setup a callback so we can munge the result */
+
+		cb->sc_response = ppolicy_bind_response;
+		cb->sc_private = ppb;
+		overlay_callback_after_backover( op, cb, 1 );
+
+		/* Did we receive a password policy request control? */
+		if ( op->o_ctrlflag[ppolicy_cid] ) {
+			ppb->send_ctrl = 1;
+		}
+
+		op->o_bd->bd_info = (BackendInfo *)on;
+		ppolicy_get( op, e, &ppb->pp );
+
+		rc = account_locked( op, e, &ppb->pp, &ppb->mod );
+
+		op->o_bd->bd_info = (BackendInfo *)on->on_info;
+		be_entry_release_r( op, e );
+
+		if ( rc ) {
+			ppb->pErr = PP_accountLocked;
+			send_ldap_error( op, rs, LDAP_INVALID_CREDENTIALS, NULL );
+			return rs->sr_err;
+		}
+
+	}
+
+	return SLAP_CB_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+/* Reset the restricted info for the next session on this connection */
+static int
+ppolicy_connection_destroy( BackendDB *bd, Connection *conn )
+{
+	if ( pwcons && !BER_BVISEMPTY( &pwcons[conn->c_conn_idx].dn )) {
+		ch_free( pwcons[conn->c_conn_idx].dn.bv_val );
+		BER_BVZERO( &pwcons[conn->c_conn_idx].dn );
+	}
+	return SLAP_CB_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+/* Check if this connection is restricted */
+static int
+ppolicy_restrict(
+	Operation *op,
+	SlapReply *rs )
+{
+	slap_overinst *on = (slap_overinst *)op->o_bd->bd_info;
+	int send_ctrl = 0;
+
+	/* Did we receive a password policy request control? */
+	if ( op->o_ctrlflag[ppolicy_cid] ) {
+		send_ctrl = 1;
+	}
+
+	if ( op->o_conn && !BER_BVISEMPTY( &pwcons[op->o_conn->c_conn_idx].dn )) {
+		LDAPControl **oldctrls;
+		/* if the current authcDN doesn't match the one we recorded,
+		 * then an intervening Bind has succeeded and the restriction
+		 * no longer applies. (ITS#4516)
+		 */
+		if ( !dn_match( &op->o_conn->c_ndn,
+				&pwcons[op->o_conn->c_conn_idx].dn )) {
+			ch_free( pwcons[op->o_conn->c_conn_idx].dn.bv_val );
+			BER_BVZERO( &pwcons[op->o_conn->c_conn_idx].dn );
+			return SLAP_CB_CONTINUE;
+		}
+
+		Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE,
+			"connection restricted to password changing only\n", 0, 0, 0);
+		if ( send_ctrl ) {
+			LDAPControl *ctrl = NULL;
+			ctrl = create_passcontrol( op, -1, -1, PP_changeAfterReset );
+			oldctrls = add_passcontrol( op, rs, ctrl );
+		}
+		op->o_bd->bd_info = (BackendInfo *)on->on_info;
+		send_ldap_error( op, rs, LDAP_INSUFFICIENT_ACCESS, 
+			"Operations are restricted to bind/unbind/abandon/StartTLS/modify password" );
+		if ( send_ctrl ) {
+			ctrls_cleanup( op, rs, oldctrls );
+		}
+		return rs->sr_err;
+	}
+
+	return SLAP_CB_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+static int
+ppolicy_compare_response(
+	Operation *op,
+	SlapReply *rs )
+{
+	/* map compare responses to bind responses */
+	if ( rs->sr_err == LDAP_COMPARE_TRUE )
+		rs->sr_err = LDAP_SUCCESS;
+	else if ( rs->sr_err == LDAP_COMPARE_FALSE )
+		rs->sr_err = LDAP_INVALID_CREDENTIALS;
+
+	ppolicy_bind_response( op, rs );
+
+	/* map back to compare */
+	if ( rs->sr_err == LDAP_SUCCESS )
+		rs->sr_err = LDAP_COMPARE_TRUE;
+	else if ( rs->sr_err == LDAP_INVALID_CREDENTIALS )
+		rs->sr_err = LDAP_COMPARE_FALSE;
+
+	return SLAP_CB_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+static int
+ppolicy_compare(
+	Operation *op,
+	SlapReply *rs )
+{
+	slap_overinst *on = (slap_overinst *)op->o_bd->bd_info;
+
+	if ( ppolicy_restrict( op, rs ) != SLAP_CB_CONTINUE )
+		return rs->sr_err;
+
+	/* Did we receive a password policy request control?
+	 * Are we testing the userPassword?
+	 */
+	if ( op->o_ctrlflag[ppolicy_cid] && 
+		op->orc_ava->aa_desc == slap_schema.si_ad_userPassword ) {
+		Entry *e;
+		int rc;
+		ppbind *ppb;
+		slap_callback *cb;
+
+		op->o_bd->bd_info = (BackendInfo *)on->on_info;
+		rc = be_entry_get_rw( op, &op->o_req_ndn, NULL, NULL, 0, &e );
+
+		if ( rc != LDAP_SUCCESS ) {
+			return SLAP_CB_CONTINUE;
+		}
+
+		cb = op->o_tmpcalloc( sizeof(ppbind)+sizeof(slap_callback),
+			1, op->o_tmpmemctx );
+		ppb = (ppbind *)(cb+1);
+		ppb->on = on;
+		ppb->pErr = PP_noError;
+		ppb->send_ctrl = 1;
+		/* failures here don't lockout the connection */
+		ppb->set_restrict = 0;
+
+		/* Setup a callback so we can munge the result */
+
+		cb->sc_response = ppolicy_compare_response;
+		cb->sc_private = ppb;
+		overlay_callback_after_backover( op, cb, 1 );
+
+		op->o_bd->bd_info = (BackendInfo *)on;
+		ppolicy_get( op, e, &ppb->pp );
+
+		rc = account_locked( op, e, &ppb->pp, &ppb->mod );
+
+		op->o_bd->bd_info = (BackendInfo *)on->on_info;
+		be_entry_release_r( op, e );
+
+		if ( rc ) {
+			ppb->pErr = PP_accountLocked;
+			send_ldap_error( op, rs, LDAP_COMPARE_FALSE, NULL );
+			return rs->sr_err;
+		}
+	}
+	return SLAP_CB_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+static int
+ppolicy_add(
+	Operation *op,
+	SlapReply *rs )
+{
+	slap_overinst *on = (slap_overinst *)op->o_bd->bd_info;
+	pp_info *pi = on->on_bi.bi_private;
+	PassPolicy pp;
+	Attribute *pa;
+	const char *txt;
+
+	if ( ppolicy_restrict( op, rs ) != SLAP_CB_CONTINUE )
+		return rs->sr_err;
+
+	/* If this is a replica, assume the provider checked everything */
+	if ( SLAPD_SYNC_IS_SYNCCONN( op->o_connid ) )
+		return SLAP_CB_CONTINUE;
+
+	/* Check for password in entry */
+	if ((pa = attr_find( op->oq_add.rs_e->e_attrs,
+		slap_schema.si_ad_userPassword )))
+	{
+		assert( pa->a_vals != NULL );
+		assert( !BER_BVISNULL( &pa->a_vals[ 0 ] ) );
+
+		if ( !BER_BVISNULL( &pa->a_vals[ 1 ] ) ) {
+			send_ldap_error( op, rs, LDAP_CONSTRAINT_VIOLATION, "Password policy only allows one password value" );
+			return rs->sr_err;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * new entry contains a password - if we're not the root user
+		 * then we need to check that the password fits in with the
+		 * security policy for the new entry.
+		 */
+		ppolicy_get( op, op->ora_e, &pp );
+		if (pp.pwdCheckQuality > 0 && !be_isroot( op )) {
+			struct berval *bv = &(pa->a_vals[0]);
+			int rc, send_ctrl = 0;
+			LDAPPasswordPolicyError pErr = PP_noError;
+			char *txt;
+
+			/* Did we receive a password policy request control? */
+			if ( op->o_ctrlflag[ppolicy_cid] ) {
+				send_ctrl = 1;
+			}
+			rc = check_password_quality( bv, &pp, &pErr, op->ora_e, &txt );
+			if (rc != LDAP_SUCCESS) {
+				LDAPControl **oldctrls = NULL;
+				op->o_bd->bd_info = (BackendInfo *)on->on_info;
+				if ( send_ctrl ) {
+					LDAPControl *ctrl = NULL;
+					ctrl = create_passcontrol( op, -1, -1, pErr );
+					oldctrls = add_passcontrol( op, rs, ctrl );
+				}
+				send_ldap_error( op, rs, rc, txt ? txt : "Password fails quality checking policy" );
+				if ( txt ) {
+					free( txt );
+				}
+				if ( send_ctrl ) {
+					ctrls_cleanup( op, rs, oldctrls );
+				}
+				return rs->sr_err;
+			}
+		}
+			/*
+			 * A controversial bit. We hash cleartext
+			 * passwords provided via add and modify operations
+			 * You're not really supposed to do this, since
+			 * the X.500 model says "store attributes" as they
+			 * get provided. By default, this is what we do
+			 *
+			 * But if the hash_passwords flag is set, we hash
+			 * any cleartext password attribute values via the
+			 * default password hashing scheme.
+			 */
+		if ((pi->hash_passwords) &&
+			(password_scheme( &(pa->a_vals[0]), NULL ) != LDAP_SUCCESS)) {
+			struct berval hpw;
+
+			slap_passwd_hash( &(pa->a_vals[0]), &hpw, &txt );
+			if (hpw.bv_val == NULL) {
+				/*
+				 * hashing didn't work. Emit an error.
+				 */
+				rs->sr_err = LDAP_OTHER;
+				rs->sr_text = txt;
+				send_ldap_error( op, rs, LDAP_OTHER, "Password hashing failed" );
+				return rs->sr_err;
+			}
+
+			memset( pa->a_vals[0].bv_val, 0, pa->a_vals[0].bv_len);
+			ber_memfree( pa->a_vals[0].bv_val );
+			pa->a_vals[0].bv_val = hpw.bv_val;
+			pa->a_vals[0].bv_len = hpw.bv_len;
+		}
+
+		/* If password aging is in effect, set the pwdChangedTime */
+		if ( pp.pwdMaxAge || pp.pwdMinAge ) {
+			struct berval timestamp;
+			char timebuf[ LDAP_LUTIL_GENTIME_BUFSIZE ];
+			time_t now = slap_get_time();
+
+			timestamp.bv_val = timebuf;
+			timestamp.bv_len = sizeof(timebuf);
+			slap_timestamp( &now, &timestamp );
+
+			attr_merge_one( op->ora_e, ad_pwdChangedTime, &timestamp, &timestamp );
+		}
+	}
+	return SLAP_CB_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+static int
+ppolicy_mod_cb( Operation *op, SlapReply *rs )
+{
+	slap_callback *sc = op->o_callback;
+	op->o_callback = sc->sc_next;
+	if ( rs->sr_err == LDAP_SUCCESS ) {
+		ch_free( pwcons[op->o_conn->c_conn_idx].dn.bv_val );
+		BER_BVZERO( &pwcons[op->o_conn->c_conn_idx].dn );
+	}
+	op->o_tmpfree( sc, op->o_tmpmemctx );
+	return SLAP_CB_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+static int
+ppolicy_modify( Operation *op, SlapReply *rs )
+{
+	slap_overinst		*on = (slap_overinst *)op->o_bd->bd_info;
+	pp_info			*pi = on->on_bi.bi_private;
+	int			i, rc, mod_pw_only, pwmod, pwmop = -1, deladd,
+				hsize = 0, hskip;
+	PassPolicy		pp;
+	Modifications		*mods = NULL, *modtail = NULL,
+				*ml, *delmod, *addmod;
+	Attribute		*pa, *ha, at;
+	const char		*txt;
+	pw_hist			*tl = NULL, *p;
+	int			zapReset, send_ctrl = 0, free_txt = 0;
+	Entry			*e;
+	struct berval		newpw = BER_BVNULL, oldpw = BER_BVNULL,
+				*bv, cr[2];
+	LDAPPasswordPolicyError pErr = PP_noError;
+	LDAPControl		*ctrl = NULL;
+	LDAPControl 		**oldctrls = NULL;
+	int			is_pwdexop = 0;
+	int got_del_grace = 0, got_del_lock = 0, got_pw = 0, got_del_fail = 0;
+	int got_changed = 0, got_history = 0;
+
+	op->o_bd->bd_info = (BackendInfo *)on->on_info;
+	rc = be_entry_get_rw( op, &op->o_req_ndn, NULL, NULL, 0, &e );
+	op->o_bd->bd_info = (BackendInfo *)on;
+
+	if ( rc != LDAP_SUCCESS ) return SLAP_CB_CONTINUE;
+
+	/* If this is a replica, we may need to tweak some of the
+	 * provider's modifications. Otherwise, just pass it through.
+	 */
+	if ( SLAPD_SYNC_IS_SYNCCONN( op->o_connid ) ) {
+		Modifications **prev;
+		Attribute *a_grace, *a_lock, *a_fail;
+
+		a_grace = attr_find( e->e_attrs, ad_pwdGraceUseTime );
+		a_lock = attr_find( e->e_attrs, ad_pwdAccountLockedTime );
+		a_fail = attr_find( e->e_attrs, ad_pwdFailureTime );
+
+		for( prev = &op->orm_modlist, ml = *prev; ml; ml = *prev ) {
+
+			if ( ml->sml_desc == slap_schema.si_ad_userPassword )
+				got_pw = 1;
+
+			/* If we're deleting an attr that didn't exist,
+			 * drop this delete op
+			 */
+			if ( ml->sml_op == LDAP_MOD_DELETE ||
+					ml->sml_op == SLAP_MOD_SOFTDEL ) {
+				int drop = 0;
+
+				if ( ml->sml_desc == ad_pwdGraceUseTime ) {
+					if ( !a_grace || got_del_grace ) {
+						drop = ml->sml_op == LDAP_MOD_DELETE;
+					} else {
+						got_del_grace = 1;
+					}
+				} else
+				if ( ml->sml_desc == ad_pwdAccountLockedTime ) {
+					if ( !a_lock || got_del_lock ) {
+						drop = ml->sml_op == LDAP_MOD_DELETE;
+					} else {
+						got_del_lock = 1;
+					}
+				} else
+				if ( ml->sml_desc == ad_pwdFailureTime ) {
+					if ( !a_fail || got_del_fail ) {
+						drop = ml->sml_op == LDAP_MOD_DELETE;
+					} else {
+						got_del_fail = 1;
+					}
+				}
+				if ( drop ) {
+					*prev = ml->sml_next;
+					ml->sml_next = NULL;
+					slap_mods_free( ml, 1 );
+					continue;
+				}
+			}
+			prev = &ml->sml_next;
+		}
+
+		/* If we're resetting the password, make sure grace, accountlock,
+		 * and failure also get removed.
+		 */
+		if ( got_pw ) {
+			if ( a_grace && !got_del_grace ) {
+				ml = (Modifications *) ch_malloc( sizeof( Modifications ) );
+				ml->sml_op = LDAP_MOD_DELETE;
+				ml->sml_flags = SLAP_MOD_INTERNAL;
+				ml->sml_type.bv_val = NULL;
+				ml->sml_desc = ad_pwdGraceUseTime;
+				ml->sml_numvals = 0;
+				ml->sml_values = NULL;
+				ml->sml_nvalues = NULL;
+				ml->sml_next = NULL;
+				*prev = ml;
+				prev = &ml->sml_next;
+			}
+			if ( a_lock && !got_del_lock ) {
+				ml = (Modifications *) ch_malloc( sizeof( Modifications ) );
+				ml->sml_op = LDAP_MOD_DELETE;
+				ml->sml_flags = SLAP_MOD_INTERNAL;
+				ml->sml_type.bv_val = NULL;
+				ml->sml_desc = ad_pwdAccountLockedTime;
+				ml->sml_numvals = 0;
+				ml->sml_values = NULL;
+				ml->sml_nvalues = NULL;
+				ml->sml_next = NULL;
+				*prev = ml;
+			}
+			if ( a_fail && !got_del_fail ) {
+				ml = (Modifications *) ch_malloc( sizeof( Modifications ) );
+				ml->sml_op = LDAP_MOD_DELETE;
+				ml->sml_flags = SLAP_MOD_INTERNAL;
+				ml->sml_type.bv_val = NULL;
+				ml->sml_desc = ad_pwdFailureTime;
+				ml->sml_numvals = 0;
+				ml->sml_values = NULL;
+				ml->sml_nvalues = NULL;
+				ml->sml_next = NULL;
+				*prev = ml;
+			}
+		}
+		op->o_bd->bd_info = (BackendInfo *)on->on_info;
+		be_entry_release_r( op, e );
+		return SLAP_CB_CONTINUE;
+	}
+
+	/* Did we receive a password policy request control? */
+	if ( op->o_ctrlflag[ppolicy_cid] ) {
+		send_ctrl = 1;
+	}
+
+	/* See if this is a pwdModify exop. If so, we can
+	 * access the plaintext passwords from that request.
+	 */
+	{
+		slap_callback *sc;
+
+		for ( sc = op->o_callback; sc; sc=sc->sc_next ) {
+			if ( sc->sc_response == slap_null_cb &&
+				sc->sc_private ) {
+				req_pwdexop_s *qpw = sc->sc_private;
+				newpw = qpw->rs_new;
+				oldpw = qpw->rs_old;
+				is_pwdexop = 1;
+			   	break;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	ppolicy_get( op, e, &pp );
+
+	for ( ml = op->orm_modlist,
+			pwmod = 0, mod_pw_only = 1,
+			deladd = 0, delmod = NULL,
+			addmod = NULL,
+			zapReset = 1;
+		ml != NULL; modtail = ml, ml = ml->sml_next )
+	{
+		if ( ml->sml_desc == pp.ad ) {
+			pwmod = 1;
+			pwmop = ml->sml_op;
+			if ((deladd == 0) && (ml->sml_op == LDAP_MOD_DELETE) &&
+				(ml->sml_values) && !BER_BVISNULL( &ml->sml_values[0] ))
+			{
+				deladd = 1;
+				delmod = ml;
+			}
+
+			if ((ml->sml_op == LDAP_MOD_ADD) ||
+				(ml->sml_op == LDAP_MOD_REPLACE))
+			{
+				if ( ml->sml_values && !BER_BVISNULL( &ml->sml_values[0] )) {
+					if ( deladd == 1 )
+						deladd = 2;
+
+					/* FIXME: there's no easy way to ensure
+					 * that add does not cause multiple
+					 * userPassword values; one way (that 
+					 * would be consistent with the single
+					 * password constraint) would be to turn
+					 * add into replace); another would be
+					 * to disallow add.
+					 *
+					 * Let's check at least that a single value
+					 * is being added
+					 */
+					if ( addmod || !BER_BVISNULL( &ml->sml_values[ 1 ] ) ) {
+						rs->sr_err = LDAP_CONSTRAINT_VIOLATION; 
+						rs->sr_text = "Password policy only allows one password value";
+						goto return_results;
+					}
+
+					addmod = ml;
+				} else {
+					/* replace can have no values, add cannot */
+					assert( ml->sml_op == LDAP_MOD_REPLACE );
+				}
+			}
+
+		} else if ( !(ml->sml_flags & SLAP_MOD_INTERNAL) && !is_at_operational( ml->sml_desc->ad_type ) ) {
+			mod_pw_only = 0;
+			/* modifying something other than password */
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * If there is a request to explicitly add a pwdReset
+		 * attribute, then we suppress the normal behaviour on
+		 * password change, which is to remove the pwdReset
+		 * attribute.
+		 *
+		 * This enables an administrator to assign a new password
+		 * and place a "must reset" flag on the entry, which will
+		 * stay until the user explicitly changes his/her password.
+		 */
+		if (ml->sml_desc == ad_pwdReset ) {
+			if ((ml->sml_op == LDAP_MOD_ADD) ||
+				(ml->sml_op == LDAP_MOD_REPLACE))
+				zapReset = 0;
+		}
+		if ( ml->sml_op == LDAP_MOD_DELETE ) {
+			if ( ml->sml_desc == ad_pwdGraceUseTime ) {
+				got_del_grace = 1;
+			} else if ( ml->sml_desc == ad_pwdAccountLockedTime ) {
+				got_del_lock = 1;
+			} else if ( ml->sml_desc == ad_pwdFailureTime ) {
+				got_del_fail = 1;
+			}
+		}
+		if ( ml->sml_desc == ad_pwdChangedTime ) {
+			got_changed = 1;
+		} else if (ml->sml_desc == ad_pwdHistory ) {
+			got_history = 1;
+		}
+	}
+	
+	if (!BER_BVISEMPTY( &pwcons[op->o_conn->c_conn_idx].dn ) && !mod_pw_only ) {
+		if ( dn_match( &op->o_conn->c_ndn,
+				&pwcons[op->o_conn->c_conn_idx].dn )) {
+			Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE,
+				"connection restricted to password changing only\n", 0, 0, 0 );
+			rs->sr_err = LDAP_INSUFFICIENT_ACCESS; 
+			rs->sr_text = "Operations are restricted to bind/unbind/abandon/StartTLS/modify password";
+			pErr = PP_changeAfterReset;
+			goto return_results;
+		} else {
+			ch_free( pwcons[op->o_conn->c_conn_idx].dn.bv_val );
+			BER_BVZERO( &pwcons[op->o_conn->c_conn_idx].dn );
+		}
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * if we have a "safe password modify policy", then we need to check if we're doing
+	 * a delete (with the old password), followed by an add (with the new password).
+	 *
+	 * If we got just a delete with nothing else, just let it go. We also skip all the checks if
+	 * the root user is bound. Root can do anything, including avoid the policies.
+	 */
+
+	if (!pwmod) goto do_modify;
+
+	/*
+	 * Build the password history list in ascending time order
+	 * We need this, even if the user is root, in order to maintain
+	 * the pwdHistory operational attributes properly.
+	 */
+	if (addmod && pp.pwdInHistory > 0 && (ha = attr_find( e->e_attrs, ad_pwdHistory ))) {
+		struct berval oldpw;
+		time_t oldtime;
+
+		for(i=0; ha->a_nvals[i].bv_val; i++) {
+			rc = parse_pwdhistory( &(ha->a_nvals[i]), NULL,
+				&oldtime, &oldpw );
+
+			if (rc != LDAP_SUCCESS) continue; /* invalid history entry */
+
+			if (oldpw.bv_val) {
+				add_to_pwd_history( &tl, oldtime, &oldpw,
+					&(ha->a_nvals[i]) );
+				oldpw.bv_val = NULL;
+				oldpw.bv_len = 0;
+			}
+		}
+		for(p=tl; p; p=p->next, hsize++); /* count history size */
+	}
+
+	if (be_isroot( op )) goto do_modify;
+
+	/* NOTE: according to draft-behera-ldap-password-policy
+	 * pwdAllowUserChange == FALSE must only prevent pwd changes
+	 * by the user the pwd belongs to (ITS#7021) */
+	if (!pp.pwdAllowUserChange && dn_match(&op->o_req_ndn, &op->o_ndn)) {
+		rs->sr_err = LDAP_INSUFFICIENT_ACCESS;
+		rs->sr_text = "User alteration of password is not allowed";
+		pErr = PP_passwordModNotAllowed;
+		goto return_results;
+	}
+
+	/* Just deleting? */
+	if (!addmod) {
+		/* skip everything else */
+		pwmod = 0;
+		goto do_modify;
+	}
+
+	/* This is a pwdModify exop that provided the old pw.
+	 * We need to create a Delete mod for this old pw and 
+	 * let the matching value get found later
+	 */
+	if (pp.pwdSafeModify && oldpw.bv_val ) {
+		ml = (Modifications *)ch_calloc( sizeof( Modifications ), 1 );
+		ml->sml_op = LDAP_MOD_DELETE;
+		ml->sml_flags = SLAP_MOD_INTERNAL;
+		ml->sml_desc = pp.ad;
+		ml->sml_type = pp.ad->ad_cname;
+		ml->sml_numvals = 1;
+		ml->sml_values = (BerVarray) ch_malloc( 2 * sizeof( struct berval ) );
+		ber_dupbv( &ml->sml_values[0], &oldpw );
+		BER_BVZERO( &ml->sml_values[1] );
+		ml->sml_next = op->orm_modlist;
+		op->orm_modlist = ml;
+		delmod = ml;
+		deladd = 2;
+	}
+
+	if (pp.pwdSafeModify && deladd != 2) {
+		Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE,
+			"change password must use DELETE followed by ADD/REPLACE\n",
+			0, 0, 0 );
+		rs->sr_err = LDAP_INSUFFICIENT_ACCESS;
+		rs->sr_text = "Must supply old password to be changed as well as new one";
+		pErr = PP_mustSupplyOldPassword;
+		goto return_results;
+	}
+
+	/* Check age, but only if pwdReset is not TRUE */
+	pa = attr_find( e->e_attrs, ad_pwdReset );
+	if ((!pa || !bvmatch( &pa->a_nvals[0], &slap_true_bv )) &&
+		pp.pwdMinAge > 0) {
+		time_t pwtime = (time_t)-1, now;
+		int age;
+
+		if ((pa = attr_find( e->e_attrs, ad_pwdChangedTime )) != NULL)
+			pwtime = parse_time( pa->a_nvals[0].bv_val );
+		now = slap_get_time();
+		age = (int)(now - pwtime);
+		if ((pwtime != (time_t)-1) && (age < pp.pwdMinAge)) {
+			rs->sr_err = LDAP_CONSTRAINT_VIOLATION;
+			rs->sr_text = "Password is too young to change";
+			pErr = PP_passwordTooYoung;
+			goto return_results;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* pa is used in password history check below, be sure it's set */
+	if ((pa = attr_find( e->e_attrs, pp.ad )) != NULL && delmod) {
+		/*
+		 * we have a password to check
+		 */
+		bv = oldpw.bv_val ? &oldpw : delmod->sml_values;
+		/* FIXME: no access checking? */
+		rc = slap_passwd_check( op, NULL, pa, bv, &txt );
+		if (rc != LDAP_SUCCESS) {
+			Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE,
+				"old password check failed: %s\n", txt, 0, 0 );
+			
+			rs->sr_err = LDAP_UNWILLING_TO_PERFORM;
+			rs->sr_text = "Must supply correct old password to change to new one";
+			pErr = PP_mustSupplyOldPassword;
+			goto return_results;
+
+		} else {
+			int i;
+			
+			/*
+			 * replace the delete value with the (possibly hashed)
+			 * value which is currently in the password.
+			 */
+			for ( i = 0; !BER_BVISNULL( &delmod->sml_values[i] ); i++ ) {
+				free( delmod->sml_values[i].bv_val );
+				BER_BVZERO( &delmod->sml_values[i] );
+			}
+			free( delmod->sml_values );
+			delmod->sml_values = ch_calloc( sizeof(struct berval), 2 );
+			BER_BVZERO( &delmod->sml_values[1] );
+			ber_dupbv( &(delmod->sml_values[0]),  &(pa->a_nvals[0]) );
+		}
+	}
+
+	bv = newpw.bv_val ? &newpw : &addmod->sml_values[0];
+	if (pp.pwdCheckQuality > 0) {
+
+		rc = check_password_quality( bv, &pp, &pErr, e, (char **)&txt );
+		if (rc != LDAP_SUCCESS) {
+			rs->sr_err = rc;
+			if ( txt ) {
+				rs->sr_text = txt;
+				free_txt = 1;
+			} else {
+				rs->sr_text = "Password fails quality checking policy";
+			}
+			goto return_results;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* If pwdInHistory is zero, passwords may be reused */
+	if (pa && pp.pwdInHistory > 0) {
+		/*
+		 * Last check - the password history.
+		 */
+		/* FIXME: no access checking? */
+		if (slap_passwd_check( op, NULL, pa, bv, &txt ) == LDAP_SUCCESS) {
+			/*
+			 * This is bad - it means that the user is attempting
+			 * to set the password to the same as the old one.
+			 */
+			rs->sr_err = LDAP_CONSTRAINT_VIOLATION;
+			rs->sr_text = "Password is not being changed from existing value";
+			pErr = PP_passwordInHistory;
+			goto return_results;
+		}
+
+		/* We need this when reduce pwdInHistory */
+		hskip = hsize - pp.pwdInHistory;
+
+		/*
+		 * Iterate through the password history, and fail on any
+		 * password matches.
+		 */
+		at = *pa;
+		at.a_vals = cr;
+		cr[1].bv_val = NULL;
+		for(p=tl; p; p=p->next) {
+			if(hskip > 0){
+				hskip--;
+				continue;
+			}
+			cr[0] = p->pw;
+			/* FIXME: no access checking? */
+			rc = slap_passwd_check( op, NULL, &at, bv, &txt );
+			
+			if (rc != LDAP_SUCCESS) continue;
+			
+			rs->sr_err = LDAP_CONSTRAINT_VIOLATION;
+			rs->sr_text = "Password is in history of old passwords";
+			pErr = PP_passwordInHistory;
+			goto return_results;
+		}
+	}
+
+do_modify:
+	if (pwmod) {
+		struct berval timestamp;
+		char timebuf[ LDAP_LUTIL_GENTIME_BUFSIZE ];
+		time_t now = slap_get_time();
+
+		/* If the conn is restricted, set a callback to clear it
+		 * if the pwmod succeeds
+		 */
+		if (!BER_BVISEMPTY( &pwcons[op->o_conn->c_conn_idx].dn )) {
+			slap_callback *sc = op->o_tmpcalloc( 1, sizeof( slap_callback ),
+				op->o_tmpmemctx );
+			sc->sc_next = op->o_callback;
+			/* Must use sc_response to insure we reset on success, before
+			 * the client sees the response. Must use sc_cleanup to insure
+			 * that it gets cleaned up if sc_response is not called.
+			 */
+			sc->sc_response = ppolicy_mod_cb;
+			sc->sc_cleanup = ppolicy_mod_cb;
+			op->o_callback = sc;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * keep the necessary pwd.. operational attributes
+		 * up to date.
+		 */
+
+		if (!got_changed) {
+			timestamp.bv_val = timebuf;
+			timestamp.bv_len = sizeof(timebuf);
+			slap_timestamp( &now, &timestamp );
+
+			mods = NULL;
+			if (pwmop != LDAP_MOD_DELETE) {
+				mods = (Modifications *) ch_calloc( sizeof( Modifications ), 1 );
+				mods->sml_op = LDAP_MOD_REPLACE;
+				mods->sml_numvals = 1;
+				mods->sml_values = (BerVarray) ch_calloc( sizeof( struct berval ), 2 );
+				mods->sml_nvalues = (BerVarray) ch_calloc( sizeof( struct berval ), 2 );
+
+				ber_dupbv( &mods->sml_values[0], &timestamp );
+				ber_dupbv( &mods->sml_nvalues[0], &timestamp );
+			} else if (attr_find(e->e_attrs, ad_pwdChangedTime )) {
+				mods = (Modifications *) ch_calloc( sizeof( Modifications ), 1 );
+				mods->sml_op = LDAP_MOD_DELETE;
+			}
+			if (mods) {
+				mods->sml_desc = ad_pwdChangedTime;
+				mods->sml_flags = SLAP_MOD_INTERNAL;
+				mods->sml_next = NULL;
+				modtail->sml_next = mods;
+				modtail = mods;
+			}
+		}
+
+		if (!got_del_grace && attr_find(e->e_attrs, ad_pwdGraceUseTime )) {
+			mods = (Modifications *) ch_calloc( sizeof( Modifications ), 1 );
+			mods->sml_op = LDAP_MOD_DELETE;
+			mods->sml_desc = ad_pwdGraceUseTime;
+			mods->sml_flags = SLAP_MOD_INTERNAL;
+			mods->sml_next = NULL;
+			modtail->sml_next = mods;
+			modtail = mods;
+		}
+
+		if (!got_del_lock && attr_find(e->e_attrs, ad_pwdAccountLockedTime )) {
+			mods = (Modifications *) ch_calloc( sizeof( Modifications ), 1 );
+			mods->sml_op = LDAP_MOD_DELETE;
+			mods->sml_desc = ad_pwdAccountLockedTime;
+			mods->sml_flags = SLAP_MOD_INTERNAL;
+			mods->sml_next = NULL;
+			modtail->sml_next = mods;
+			modtail = mods;
+		}
+
+		if (!got_del_fail && attr_find(e->e_attrs, ad_pwdFailureTime )) {
+			mods = (Modifications *) ch_calloc( sizeof( Modifications ), 1 );
+			mods->sml_op = LDAP_MOD_DELETE;
+			mods->sml_desc = ad_pwdFailureTime;
+			mods->sml_flags = SLAP_MOD_INTERNAL;
+			mods->sml_next = NULL;
+			modtail->sml_next = mods;
+			modtail = mods;
+		}
+
+		/* Delete the pwdReset attribute, since it's being reset */
+		if ((zapReset) && (attr_find(e->e_attrs, ad_pwdReset ))) {
+			mods = (Modifications *) ch_calloc( sizeof( Modifications ), 1 );
+			mods->sml_op = LDAP_MOD_DELETE;
+			mods->sml_desc = ad_pwdReset;
+			mods->sml_flags = SLAP_MOD_INTERNAL;
+			mods->sml_next = NULL;
+			modtail->sml_next = mods;
+			modtail = mods;
+		}
+
+		/* Delete all pwdInHistory attribute */
+		if (!got_history && pp.pwdInHistory == 0 &&
+            attr_find(e->e_attrs, ad_pwdHistory )){
+			mods = (Modifications *) ch_calloc( sizeof( Modifications ), 1 );
+			mods->sml_op = LDAP_MOD_DELETE;
+			mods->sml_flags = SLAP_MOD_INTERNAL;
+			mods->sml_desc = ad_pwdHistory;
+			mods->sml_next = NULL;
+			modtail->sml_next = mods;
+			modtail = mods;
+		}
+
+		if (!got_history && pp.pwdInHistory > 0){
+			if (hsize >= pp.pwdInHistory) {
+				/*
+				 * We use the >= operator, since we are going to add
+				 * the existing password attribute value into the
+				 * history - thus the cardinality of history values is
+				 * about to rise by one.
+				 *
+				 * If this would push it over the limit of history
+				 * values (remembering - the password policy could have
+				 * changed since the password was last altered), we must
+				 * delete at least 1 value from the pwdHistory list.
+				 *
+				 * In fact, we delete '(#pwdHistory attrs - max pwd
+				 * history length) + 1' values, starting with the oldest.
+				 * This is easily evaluated, since the linked list is
+				 * created in ascending time order.
+				 */
+				mods = (Modifications *) ch_calloc( sizeof( Modifications ), 1 );
+				mods->sml_op = LDAP_MOD_DELETE;
+				mods->sml_flags = SLAP_MOD_INTERNAL;
+				mods->sml_desc = ad_pwdHistory;
+				mods->sml_numvals = hsize - pp.pwdInHistory + 1;
+				mods->sml_values = ch_calloc( sizeof( struct berval ),
+					hsize - pp.pwdInHistory + 2 );
+				BER_BVZERO( &mods->sml_values[ hsize - pp.pwdInHistory + 1 ] );
+				for(i=0,p=tl; i < (hsize - pp.pwdInHistory + 1); i++, p=p->next) {
+					BER_BVZERO( &mods->sml_values[i] );
+					ber_dupbv( &(mods->sml_values[i]), &p->bv );
+				}
+				mods->sml_next = NULL;
+				modtail->sml_next = mods;
+				modtail = mods;
+			}
+			free_pwd_history_list( &tl );
+
+			/*
+			 * Now add the existing password into the history list.
+			 * This will be executed even if the operation is to delete
+			 * the password entirely.
+			 *
+			 * This isn't in the spec explicitly, but it seems to make
+			 * sense that the password history list is the list of all
+			 * previous passwords - even if they were deleted. Thus, if
+			 * someone tries to add a historical password at some future
+			 * point, it will fail.
+			 */
+			if ((pa = attr_find( e->e_attrs, pp.ad )) != NULL) {
+				mods = (Modifications *) ch_malloc( sizeof( Modifications ) );
+				mods->sml_op = LDAP_MOD_ADD;
+				mods->sml_flags = SLAP_MOD_INTERNAL;
+				mods->sml_type.bv_val = NULL;
+				mods->sml_desc = ad_pwdHistory;
+				mods->sml_nvalues = NULL;
+				mods->sml_numvals = 1;
+				mods->sml_values = ch_calloc( sizeof( struct berval ), 2 );
+				mods->sml_values[ 1 ].bv_val = NULL;
+				mods->sml_values[ 1 ].bv_len = 0;
+				make_pwd_history_value( timebuf, &mods->sml_values[0], pa );
+				mods->sml_next = NULL;
+				modtail->sml_next = mods;
+				modtail = mods;
+
+			} else {
+				Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE,
+				"ppolicy_modify: password attr lookup failed\n", 0, 0, 0 );
+			}
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * Controversial bit here. If the new password isn't hashed
+		 * (ie, is cleartext), we probably should hash it according
+		 * to the default hash. The reason for this is that we want
+		 * to use the policy if possible, but if we hash the password
+		 * before, then we're going to run into trouble when it
+		 * comes time to check the password.
+		 *
+		 * Now, the right thing to do is to use the extended password
+		 * modify operation, but not all software can do this,
+		 * therefore it makes sense to hash the new password, now
+		 * we know it passes the policy requirements.
+		 *
+		 * Of course, if the password is already hashed, then we
+		 * leave it alone.
+		 */
+
+		if ((pi->hash_passwords) && (addmod) && !newpw.bv_val && 
+			(password_scheme( &(addmod->sml_values[0]), NULL ) != LDAP_SUCCESS))
+		{
+			struct berval hpw, bv;
+			
+			slap_passwd_hash( &(addmod->sml_values[0]), &hpw, &txt );
+			if (hpw.bv_val == NULL) {
+					/*
+					 * hashing didn't work. Emit an error.
+					 */
+				rs->sr_err = LDAP_OTHER;
+				rs->sr_text = txt;
+				goto return_results;
+			}
+			bv = addmod->sml_values[0];
+				/* clear and discard the clear password */
+			memset(bv.bv_val, 0, bv.bv_len);
+			ber_memfree(bv.bv_val);
+			addmod->sml_values[0] = hpw;
+		}
+	}
+	op->o_bd->bd_info = (BackendInfo *)on->on_info;
+	be_entry_release_r( op, e );
+	return SLAP_CB_CONTINUE;
+
+return_results:
+	free_pwd_history_list( &tl );
+	op->o_bd->bd_info = (BackendInfo *)on->on_info;
+	be_entry_release_r( op, e );
+	if ( send_ctrl ) {
+		ctrl = create_passcontrol( op, -1, -1, pErr );
+		oldctrls = add_passcontrol( op, rs, ctrl );
+	}
+	send_ldap_result( op, rs );
+	if ( free_txt ) {
+		free( (char *)txt );
+		rs->sr_text = NULL;
+	}
+	if ( send_ctrl ) {
+		if ( is_pwdexop ) {
+			if ( rs->sr_flags & REP_CTRLS_MUSTBEFREED ) {
+				op->o_tmpfree( oldctrls, op->o_tmpmemctx );
+			}
+			oldctrls = NULL;
+			rs->sr_flags |= REP_CTRLS_MUSTBEFREED;
+
+		} else {
+			ctrls_cleanup( op, rs, oldctrls );
+		}
+	}
+	return rs->sr_err;
+}
+
+static int
+ppolicy_parseCtrl(
+	Operation *op,
+	SlapReply *rs,
+	LDAPControl *ctrl )
+{
+	if ( !BER_BVISNULL( &ctrl->ldctl_value ) ) {
+		rs->sr_text = "passwordPolicyRequest control value not absent";
+		return LDAP_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
+	}
+	op->o_ctrlflag[ppolicy_cid] = ctrl->ldctl_iscritical
+		? SLAP_CONTROL_CRITICAL
+		: SLAP_CONTROL_NONCRITICAL;
+
+	return LDAP_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+static int
+attrPretty(
+	Syntax *syntax,
+	struct berval *val,
+	struct berval *out,
+	void *ctx )
+{
+	AttributeDescription *ad = NULL;
+	const char *err;
+	int code;
+
+	code = slap_bv2ad( val, &ad, &err );
+	if ( !code ) {
+		ber_dupbv_x( out, &ad->ad_type->sat_cname, ctx );
+	}
+	return code;
+}
+
+static int
+attrNormalize(
+	slap_mask_t use,
+	Syntax *syntax,
+	MatchingRule *mr,
+	struct berval *val,
+	struct berval *out,
+	void *ctx )
+{
+	AttributeDescription *ad = NULL;
+	const char *err;
+	int code;
+
+	code = slap_bv2ad( val, &ad, &err );
+	if ( !code ) {
+		ber_str2bv_x( ad->ad_type->sat_oid, 0, 1, out, ctx );
+	}
+	return code;
+}
+
+static int
+ppolicy_db_init(
+	BackendDB *be,
+	ConfigReply *cr
+)
+{
+	slap_overinst *on = (slap_overinst *) be->bd_info;
+	pp_info *pi;
+
+	if ( SLAP_ISGLOBALOVERLAY( be ) ) {
+		/* do not allow slapo-ppolicy to be global by now (ITS#5858) */
+		if ( cr ){
+			snprintf( cr->msg, sizeof(cr->msg), 
+				"slapo-ppolicy cannot be global" );
+			Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ANY, "%s\n", cr->msg, 0, 0 );
+		}
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	/* Has User Schema been initialized yet? */
+	if ( !pwd_UsSchema[0].ad[0] ) {
+		const char *err;
+		int i, code;
+
+		for (i=0; pwd_UsSchema[i].def; i++) {
+			code = slap_str2ad( pwd_UsSchema[i].def, pwd_UsSchema[i].ad, &err );
+			if ( code ) {
+				if ( cr ){
+					snprintf( cr->msg, sizeof(cr->msg), 
+						"User Schema load failed for attribute \"%s\". Error code %d: %s",
+						pwd_UsSchema[i].def, code, err );
+					Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ANY, "%s\n", cr->msg, 0, 0 );
+				}
+				return code;
+			}
+		}
+		{
+			Syntax *syn;
+			MatchingRule *mr;
+
+			syn = ch_malloc( sizeof( Syntax ));
+			*syn = *ad_pwdAttribute->ad_type->sat_syntax;
+			syn->ssyn_pretty = attrPretty;
+			ad_pwdAttribute->ad_type->sat_syntax = syn;
+
+			mr = ch_malloc( sizeof( MatchingRule ));
+			*mr = *ad_pwdAttribute->ad_type->sat_equality;
+			mr->smr_normalize = attrNormalize;
+			ad_pwdAttribute->ad_type->sat_equality = mr;
+		}
+	}
+
+	pi = on->on_bi.bi_private = ch_calloc( sizeof(pp_info), 1 );
+
+	if ( !pwcons ) {
+		/* accommodate for c_conn_idx == -1 */
+		pwcons = ch_calloc( sizeof(pw_conn), dtblsize + 1 );
+		pwcons++;
+	}
+
+	ov_count++;
+
+	ldap_pvt_thread_mutex_init( &pi->pwdFailureTime_mutex );
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+ppolicy_db_open(
+	BackendDB *be,
+	ConfigReply *cr
+)
+{
+	return overlay_register_control( be, LDAP_CONTROL_PASSWORDPOLICYREQUEST );
+}
+
+static int
+ppolicy_db_close(
+	BackendDB *be,
+	ConfigReply *cr
+)
+{
+#ifdef SLAP_CONFIG_DELETE
+	overlay_unregister_control( be, LDAP_CONTROL_PASSWORDPOLICYREQUEST );
+#endif /* SLAP_CONFIG_DELETE */
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+ppolicy_db_destroy(
+	BackendDB *be,
+	ConfigReply *cr
+)
+{
+	slap_overinst *on = (slap_overinst *) be->bd_info;
+	pp_info *pi = on->on_bi.bi_private;
+
+	on->on_bi.bi_private = NULL;
+	ldap_pvt_thread_mutex_destroy( &pi->pwdFailureTime_mutex );
+	free( pi->def_policy.bv_val );
+	free( pi );
+
+	ov_count--;
+	if ( ov_count <=0 && pwcons ) {
+		pw_conn *pwc = pwcons;
+		pwcons = NULL;
+		pwc--;
+		ch_free( pwc );
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static char *extops[] = {
+	LDAP_EXOP_MODIFY_PASSWD,
+	NULL
+};
+
+static slap_overinst ppolicy;
+
+int ppolicy_initialize()
+{
+	int i, code;
+
+	for (i=0; pwd_OpSchema[i].def; i++) {
+		code = register_at( pwd_OpSchema[i].def, pwd_OpSchema[i].ad, 0 );
+		if ( code ) {
+			Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ANY,
+				"ppolicy_initialize: register_at failed\n", 0, 0, 0 );
+			return code;
+		}
+		/* Allow Manager to set these as needed */
+		if ( is_at_no_user_mod( (*pwd_OpSchema[i].ad)->ad_type )) {
+			(*pwd_OpSchema[i].ad)->ad_type->sat_flags |=
+				SLAP_AT_MANAGEABLE;
+		}
+	}
+
+	code = register_supported_control( LDAP_CONTROL_PASSWORDPOLICYREQUEST,
+		SLAP_CTRL_ADD|SLAP_CTRL_BIND|SLAP_CTRL_MODIFY, extops,
+		ppolicy_parseCtrl, &ppolicy_cid );
+	if ( code != LDAP_SUCCESS ) {
+		Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ANY, "Failed to register control %d\n", code, 0, 0 );
+		return code;
+	}
+
+	/* We don't expect to receive these controls, only send them */
+	code = register_supported_control( LDAP_CONTROL_X_PASSWORD_EXPIRED,
+		0, NULL, NULL, NULL );
+	if ( code != LDAP_SUCCESS ) {
+		Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ANY, "Failed to register control %d\n", code, 0, 0 );
+		return code;
+	}
+
+	code = register_supported_control( LDAP_CONTROL_X_PASSWORD_EXPIRING,
+		0, NULL, NULL, NULL );
+	if ( code != LDAP_SUCCESS ) {
+		Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ANY, "Failed to register control %d\n", code, 0, 0 );
+		return code;
+	}
+
+	ldap_pvt_thread_mutex_init( &chk_syntax_mutex );
+
+	ppolicy.on_bi.bi_type = "ppolicy";
+	ppolicy.on_bi.bi_flags = SLAPO_BFLAG_SINGLE;
+	ppolicy.on_bi.bi_db_init = ppolicy_db_init;
+	ppolicy.on_bi.bi_db_open = ppolicy_db_open;
+	ppolicy.on_bi.bi_db_close = ppolicy_db_close;
+	ppolicy.on_bi.bi_db_destroy = ppolicy_db_destroy;
+
+	ppolicy.on_bi.bi_op_add = ppolicy_add;
+	ppolicy.on_bi.bi_op_bind = ppolicy_bind;
+	ppolicy.on_bi.bi_op_compare = ppolicy_compare;
+	ppolicy.on_bi.bi_op_delete = ppolicy_restrict;
+	ppolicy.on_bi.bi_op_modify = ppolicy_modify;
+	ppolicy.on_bi.bi_op_search = ppolicy_restrict;
+	ppolicy.on_bi.bi_connection_destroy = ppolicy_connection_destroy;
+
+	ppolicy.on_bi.bi_cf_ocs = ppolicyocs;
+	code = config_register_schema( ppolicycfg, ppolicyocs );
+	if ( code ) return code;
+
+	return overlay_register( &ppolicy );
+}
+
+#if SLAPD_OVER_PPOLICY == SLAPD_MOD_DYNAMIC
+int init_module(int argc, char *argv[]) {
+	return ppolicy_initialize();
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif	/* defined(SLAPD_OVER_PPOLICY) */