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| -rw-r--r-- | doc/cracklib26.diff | 340 |
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diff --git a/doc/HOWTO b/doc/HOWTO new file mode 100644 index 0000000..01a90ed --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/HOWTO @@ -0,0 +1,1918 @@ +[ Note: the installation instructions in this document are somewhat + out of date - the package now uses GNU autoconf and is configured + just like most GNU packages: run ./configure then make. --marekm ] + + Linux Shadow Password HOWTO + Michael H. Jackson, mhjack@tscnet.com + v1.3, 3 April 1996 + + This document aims to describe how to obtain, install, and configure + the Linux password Shadow Suite. It also discusses obtaining, and + reinstalling other software and network daemons that require access to + user passwords. This other software is not actually part of the + Shadow Suite, but these programs will need to be recompiled to support + the Shadow Suite. This document also contains a programming example + for adding shadow support to a program. Answers to some of the more + frequently asked questions are included near the end of this document. + + 1. Introduction. + + This is the Linux Shadow-Password-HOWTO. This document describes why + and how to add shadow password support on a Linux system. Some + examples of how to use some of the Shadow Suite's features is also + included. + + When installing the Shadow Suite and when using many of the utility + programs, you must be logged in as root. When installing the Shadow + Suite you will be making changes to system software, and it is highly + recommended that you make backup copies of programs as indicated. I + also recommend that you read and understand all the instructions + before you begin. + + 1.1. Changes from the previous release. + + Additions: + Added a sub-section on why you might not want to install shadow + Added a sub-section on updating the xdm program + Added a section on how to put Shadow Suite features to work + Added a section containing frequently asked questions + + Corrections/Updates: + Corrected html references on Sunsite + Corrected section on wu-ftp to reflect adding -lshadow to the Makefile + Corrected minor spelling and verbiage errors + Changed section on wu-ftpd to support ELF + Updated to reflect security problems in various login programs + Updated to recommend the Linux Shadow Suite by Marek Michalkiewicz + + 1.2. New versions of this document. + + The latest released version of this document can always be retrieved + by anonymous FTP from: + + sunsite.unc.edu + + /pub/Linux/docs/HOWTO/Shadow-Password-HOWTO + + or: + + /pub/Linux/docs/HOWTO/other-formats/Shadow-Password-HOWTO{-html.tar,ps,dvi}.gz + + or via the World Wide Web from the Linux Documentation Project Web + Server <http://sunsite.unc.edu/mdw/linux.html>, at page: Shadow- + Password-HOWTO <http://sunsite.unc.edu/linux/HOWTO/Shadow-Password- + HOWTO.html> or directly from me, <mhjack@tscnet.com>. It will also be + posted to the newsgroup: comp.os.linux.answers + + This document is now packaged with the Shadow-YYDDMM packages. + + 1.3. Feedback. + + Please send any comments, updates, or suggestions to me: Michael H. + Jackson <mhjack@tscnet.com> The sooner I get feedback, the sooner I + can update and correct this document. If you find any problems with + it, please mail me directly as I very rarely stay up-to-date on the + newsgroups. + + 2. Why shadow your passwd file? + + By default, most current Linux distributions do not contain the Shadow + Suite installed. This includes Slackware 2.3, Slackware 3.0, and + other popular distributions. One of the reasons for this is that the + copyright notices in the original Shadow Suite were not clear on + redistribution if a fee was charged. Linux uses a GNU Copyright + (sometimes refereed to as a Copyleft) that allows people to package it + into a convenient package (like a CD-ROM distribution) and charge a + fee for it. + + The current maintainer of the Shadow Suite, Marek Michalkiewicz + <marekm@i17linuxb.ists.pwr.wroc.pl> received the source code from the + original author under a BSD style copyright that allowed + redistribution. Now that the copyright issues are resolved, it is + expected that future distributions will contain password shadowing by + default. Until then, you will need to install it yourself. + + If you installed your distribution from a CD-ROM, you may find that, + even though the distribution did not have the Shadow Suite installed, + some of the files you need to install the Shadow Suite may be on the + CD-ROM. + + However, Shadow Suite versions 3.3.1, 3.3.1-2, and shadow-mk all have + security problems with their login program and several other suid root + programs that came with them, and should no longer be used. + + All of the necessary files may be obtained via anonymous FTP or + through the World Wide Web. + + On a Linux system without the Shadow Suite installed, user information + including passwords is stored in the /etc/passwd file. The password + is stored in an encrypted format. If you ask a cryptography expert, + however, he or she will tell you that the password is actually in an + encoded rather than encrypted format because when using crypt(3), the + text is set to null and the password is the key. Therefore, from here + on, I will use the term encoded in this document. + + The algorithm used to encode the password field is technically + referred to as a one way hash function. This is an algorithm that is + easy to compute in one direction, but very difficult to calculate in + the reverse direction. More about the actual algorithm used can be + found in section 2.4 or your crypt(3) manual page. + + When a user picks or is assigned a password, it is encoded with a + randomly generated value called the salt. This means that any + particular password could be stored in 4096 different ways. The salt + value is then stored with the encoded password. + + When a user logs in and supplies a password, the salt is first + retrieved from the stored encoded password. Then the supplied + password is encoded with the salt value, and then compared with the + encoded password. If there is a match, then the user is + authenticated. + + It is computationally difficult (but not impossible) to take a + randomly encoded password and recover the original password. However, + on any system with more than just a few users, at least some of the + passwords will be common words (or simple variations of common words). + + System crackers know all this, and will simply encrypt a dictionary of + words and common passwords using all possible 4096 salt values. Then + they will compare the encoded passwords in your /etc/passwd file with + their database. Once they have found a match, they have the password + for another account. This is referred to as a dictionary attack, and + is one of the most common methods for gaining or expanding + unauthorized access to a system. + + If you think about it, an 8 character password encodes to 4096 * 13 + character strings. So a dictionary of say 400,000 common words, + names, passwords, and simple variations would easily fit on a 4GB hard + drive. The attacker need only sort them, and then check for matches. + Since a 4GB hard drive can be had for under $1000.00, this is well + within the means of most system crackers. + + Also, if a cracker obtains your /etc/passwd file first, they only need + to encode the dictionary with the salt values actually contained in + your /etc/passwd file. This method is usable by your average teenager + with a couple of hundred spare Megabytes and a 486 class computer. + + Even without lots of drive space, utilities like crack(1) can usually + break at least a couple of passwords on a system with enough users + (assuming the users of the system are allowed to pick their own + passwords). + + The /etc/passwd file also contains information like user ID's and + group ID's that are used by many system programs. Therefore, the + /etc/passwd file must remain world readable. If you were to change + the /etc/passwd file so that nobody can read it, the first thing that + you would notice is that the ls -l command now displays user ID's + instead of names! + + The Shadow Suite solves the problem by relocating the passwords to + another file (usually /etc/shadow). The /etc/shadow file is set so + that it cannot be read by just anyone. Only root will be able to read + and write to the /etc/shadow file. Some programs (like xlock) don't + need to be able to change passwords, they only need to be able to + verify them. These programs can either be run suid root or you can + set up a group shadow that is allowed read only access to the + /etc/shadow file. Then the program can be run sgid shadow. + + By moving the passwords to the /etc/shadow file, we are effectively + keeping the attacker from having access to the encoded passwords with + which to perform a dictionary attack. + + Additionally, the Shadow Suite adds lots of other nice features: + + · A configuration file to set login defaults (/etc/login.defs) + + · Utilities for adding, modifying, and deleting user accounts and + groups + + · Password aging and expiration + + · Account expiration and locking + + · Shadowed group passwords (optional) + + · Double length passwords (16 character passwords) NOT RECOMMENDED + + · Better control over user's password selection + + · Dial-up passwords + + · Secondary authentication programs NOT RECOMMENDED + + Installing the Shadow Suite contributes toward a more secure system, + but there are many other things that can also be done to improve the + security of a Linux system, and there will eventually be a series of + Linux Security HOWTO's that will discuss other security measures and + related issues. + + For current information on other Linux security issues, including + warnings on known vulnerabilities see the Linux Security home page. + <http://bach.cis.temple.edu/linux/linux-security/> + + 2.1. Why you might NOT want to shadow your passwd file. + + There are a few circumstances and configurations in which installing + the Shadow Suite would NOT be a good idea: + + · The machine does not contain user accounts. + + · Your machine is running on a LAN and is using NIS (Network + Information Services) to get or supply user names and passwords to + other machines on the network. (This can actually be done, but is + beyond the scope of this document, and really won't increase + security much anyway) + + · Your machine is being used by terminal servers to verify users via + NFS (Network File System), NIS, or some other method. + + · Your machine runs other software that validates users, and there is + no shadow version available, and you don't have the source code. + + 2.2. Format of the /etc/passwd file + + A non-shadowed /etc/passwd file has the following format: + + username:passwd:UID:GID:full_name:directory:shell + + Where: + + username + The user (login) name + + passwd + The encoded password + + UID + Numerical user ID + + GID + Numerical default group ID + + full_name + The user's full name - Actually this field is called the GECOS + (General Electric Comprehensive Operating System) field and can + store information other than just the full name. The Shadow + commands and manual pages refer to this field as the comment + field. + + directory + User's home directory (Full pathname) + + shell + User's login shell (Full Pathname) + + For example: + + username:Npge08pfz4wuk:503:100:Full Name:/home/username:/bin/sh + + Where Np is the salt and ge08pfz4wuk is the encoded password. The + encoded salt/password could just as easily have been kbeMVnZM0oL7I and + the two are exactly the same password. There are 4096 possible encod + ings for the same password. (The example password in this case is + 'password', a really bad password). + + Once the shadow suite is installed, the /etc/passwd file would instead + contain: + + username:x:503:100:Full Name:/home/username:/bin/sh + + The x in the second field in this case is now just a place holder. + The format of the /etc/passwd file really didn't change, it just no + longer contains the encoded password. This means that any program + that reads the /etc/passwd file but does not actually need to verify + passwords will still operate correctly. + + The passwords are now relocated to the shadow file (usually + /etc/shadow file). + + 2.3. Format of the shadow file + + The /etc/shadow file contains the following information: + + username:passwd:last:may:must:warn:expire:disable:reserved + + Where: + + username + The User Name + + passwd + The Encoded password + last + Days since Jan 1, 1970 that password was last changed + + may + Days before password may be changed + + must + Days after which password must be changed + + warn + Days before password is to expire that user is warned + + expire + Days after password expires that account is disabled + + disable + Days since Jan 1, 1970 that account is disabled + + reserved + A reserved field + + The previous example might then be: + + username:Npge08pfz4wuk:9479:0:10000:::: + + 2.4. Review of crypt(3). + + From the crypt(3) manual page: + + "crypt is the password encryption function. It is based on the Data + Encryption Standard algorithm with variations intended (among other + things) to discourage use of hardware implementations of a key search. + + The key is a user's typed password. The encoded string is all NULLs + + The salt is a two-character string chosen from the set a-zA-Z0-9./. + This string is used to perturb the algorithm in one of 4096 different + ways. + + By taking the lowest 7 bits of each character of the key, a 56-bit key + is obtained. This 56-bit key is used to encrypt repeatedly a constant + string (usually a string consisting of all zeros). The returned value + points to the encrypted password, a series of 13 printable ASCII + characters (the first two characters represent the salt itself). The + return value points to static data whose content is overwritten by + each call. + + Warning: The key space consists of 2**56 equal 7.2e16 possible values. + Exhaustive searches of this key space are possible using massively + parallel computers. Software, such as crack(1), is available which + will search the portion of this key space that is generally used by + humans for passwords. Hence, password selection should, at minimum, + avoid common words and names. The use of a passwd(1) program that + checks for crackable passwords during the selection process is + recommended. + + The DES algorithm itself has a few quirks which make the use of the + crypt(3) interface a very poor choice for anything other than password + authentication. If you are planning on using the crypt(3) interface + for a cryptography project, don't do it: get a good book on encryption + and one of the widely available DES libraries." + + Most Shadow Suites contain code for doubling the length of the + password to 16 characters. Experts in des recommend against this, as + the encoding is simply applied first to the left half and then to the + right half of the longer password. Because of the way crypt works, + this may make for a less secure encoded password then if double length + passwords were not used in the first place. Additionally, it is less + likely that a user will be able to remember a 16 character password. + + There is development work under way that would allow the + authentication algorithm to be replaced with something more secure and + with support for longer passwords (specifically the MD5 algorithm) and + retain compatibility with the crypt method. + + If you are looking for a good book on encryption, I recommend: + + "Applied Cryptography: Protocols, Algorithms, and Source Code in C" + by Bruce Schneier <schneier@chinet.com> + ISBN: 0-471-59756-2 + + 3. Getting the Shadow Suite. + + 3.1. History of the Shadow Suite for Linux + + DO NOT USE THE PACKAGES IN THIS SECTION, THEY HAVE SECURITY PROBLEMS + + The original Shadow Suite was written by Julianne F. Haugh + + There are several versions that have been used on Linux systems: + + · shadow-3.3.1 is the original. + + · shadow-3.3.1-2 is Linux specific patch made by Florian La Roche + <flla@stud.uni-sb.de> and contains some further enhancements. + + · shadow-mk was specifically packaged for Linux. + + The shadow-mk package contains the shadow-3.3.1 package distributed by + Julianne F. Haugh with the shadow-3.3.1-2 patch installed, a few fixes + made by Mohan Kokal <magnus@texas.net> that make installation a lot + easier, a patch by Joseph R.M. Zbiciak for login1.c (login.secure) + that eliminates the -f, -h security holes in /bin/login, and some + other miscellaneous patches. + + The shadow.mk package was the previously recommended package, but + should be replaced due to a security problem with the login program. + + There are security problems with Shadow versions 3.3.1, 3.3.1-2, and + shadow-mk involving the login program. This login bug involves not + checking the length of a login name. This causes the buffer to + overflow causing crashes or worse. It has been rumored that this + buffer overflow can allow someone with an account on the system to use + this bug and the shared libraries to gain root access. I won't + discuss exactly how this is possible because there are a lot of Linux + systems that are affected, but systems with these Shadow Suites + installed, and most pre-ELF distributions without the Shadow Suite are + vulnerable! + + For more information on this and other Linux security issues, see the + Linux Security home page (Shared Libraries and login Program + Vulnerability) <http://bach.cis.temple.edu/linux/linux-security/Linux- + Security-FAQ/Linux-telnetd.html> + + 3.2. Where to get the Shadow Suite. + + The only recommended Shadow Suite is still in BETA testing, however + the latest versions are safe in a production environment and don't + contain a vulnerable login program. + + The package uses the following naming convention: + + shadow-YYMMDD.tar.gz + + where YYMMDD is the issue date of the Suite. + + This version will eventually be Version 3.3.3 when it is released from + Beta testing, and is maintained by Marek Michalkiewicz + <marekm@i17linuxb.ists.pwr.wroc.pl>. It's available as: shadow- + current.tar.gz + <ftp://i17linuxb.ists.pwr.wroc.pl/pub/linux/shadow/shadow- + current.tar.gz>. + + The following mirror sites have also been established: + + · ftp://ftp.icm.edu.pl/pub/Linux/shadow/shadow-current.tar.gz + + · ftp://iguana.hut.fi/pub/linux/shadow/shadow-current.tar.gz + + · ftp://ftp.cin.net/usr/ggallag/shadow/shadow-current.tar.gz + + · ftp://ftp.netural.com/pub/linux/shadow/shadow-current.tar.gz + + You should use the currently available version. + + You should NOT use a version older than shadow-960129 as they also + have the login security problem discussed above. + + When this document refers to the Shadow Suite I am referring to the + this package. It is assumed that this is the package that you are + using. + + For reference, I used shadow-960129 to make these installation + instructions. + + If you were previously using shadow-mk, you should upgrade to this + version and rebuild everything that you originally compiled. + + 3.3. What is included with the Shadow Suite. + + The Shadow Suite contains replacement programs for: + + su, login, passwd, newgrp, chfn, chsh, and id + + The package also contains the new programs: + + chage, newusers, dpasswd, gpasswd, useradd, userdel, usermod, + groupadd, groupdel, groupmod, groups, pwck, grpck, lastlog, pwconv, + and pwunconv + + Additionally, the library: libshadow.a is included for writing and/or + compiling programs that need to access user passwords. + + Also, manual pages for the programs are also included. + + There is also a configuration file for the login program which will be + installed as /etc/login.defs. + + 4. Compiling the programs. + + 4.1. Unpacking the archive. + + The first step after retrieving the package is unpacking it. The + package is in the tar (tape archive) format and compressed using gzip, + so first move it to /usr/src, then type: + + tar -xzvf shadow-current.tar.gz + + This will unpack it into the directory: /usr/src/shadow-YYMMDD + + 4.2. Configuring with the config.h file + + The first thing that you need to do is to copy over the Makefile and + the config.h file: + + cd /usr/src/shadow-YYMMDD + cp Makefile.linux Makefile + cp config.h.linux config.h + + You should then take a look at the config.h file. This file contains + definitions for some of the configuration options. If you are using + the recommended package, I recommend that you disable group shadow + support for your first time around. + + By default shadowed group passwords are enabled. To disable these + edit the config.h file, and change the #define SHADOWGRP to #undef + SHADOWGRP. I recommend that you disable them to start with, and then + if you really want group passwords and group administrators that you + enable it later and recompile. If you leave it enabled, you must + create the file /etc/gshadow. + + Enabling the long passwords option is NOT recommended as discussed + above. + + Do NOT change the setting: #undef AUTOSHADOW + + The AUTOSHADOW option was originally designed so that programs that + were shadow ignorant would still function. This sounds good in + theory, but does not work correctly. If you enable this option, and + the program runs as root, it may call getpwnam() as root, and later + write the modified entry back to the /etc/passwd file (with the no- + longer-shadowed password). Such programs include chfn and chsh. (You + can't get around this by swapping real and effective uid before + calling getpwnam() because root may use chfn and chsh too.) + + The same warning is also valid if you are building libc, it has a + SHADOW_COMPAT option which does the same thing. It should NOT be + used! If you start getting encoded passwords back in your /etc/passwd + file, this is the problem. + + If you are using a libc version prior to 4.6.27, you will need to make + a couple more changes to config.h and the Makefile. To config.h edit + and change: + + #define HAVE_BASENAME + + to: + + #undef HAVE_BASENAME + + And then in the Makefile, change: + + SOBJS = smain.o env.o entry.o susetup.o shell.o \ + sub.o mail.o motd.o sulog.o age.o tz.o hushed.o + + SSRCS = smain.c env.c entry.c setup.c shell.c \ + pwent.c sub.c mail.c motd.c sulog.c shadow.c age.c pwpack.c rad64.c \ + tz.c hushed.c + + SOBJS = smain.o env.o entry.o susetup.o shell.o \ + sub.o mail.o motd.o sulog.o age.o tz.o hushed.o basename.o + + SSRCS = smain.c env.c entry.c setup.c shell.c \ + pwent.c sub.c mail.c motd.c sulog.c shadow.c age.c pwpack.c rad64.c \ + tz.c hushed.c basename.c + + These changes add the code contained in basename.c which is contained + in libc 4.6.27 and later. + + 4.3. Making backup copies of your original programs. + + It would also be a good idea to track down and make backup copies of + the programs that the shadow suite will replace. On a Slackware 3.0 + system these are: + + · /bin/su + + · /bin/login + + · /usr/bin/passwd + + · /usr/bin/newgrp + + · /usr/bin/chfn + + · /usr/bin/chsh + + · /usr/bin/id + + The BETA package has a save target in the Makefile, but it's commented + out because different distributions place the programs in different + places. + + You should also make a backup copy of your /etc/passwd file, but be + careful to name it something else if you place it in the same + directory so you don't overwrite the passwd command. + + 4.4. Running make + + You need to be logged as root to do most of the installation. + + Run make to compile the executables in the package: + + make all + + You may see the warning: rcsid defined but not used. This is fine, it + just happens because the author is using a version control package. + + 5. Installing + + 5.1. Have a boot disk handy in case you break anything. + + If something goes terribly wrong, it would be handy to have a boot + disk. If you have a boot/root combination from your installation, + that will work, otherwise see the Bootdisk-HOWTO + <http://sunsite.unc.edu/mdw/HOWTO/Bootdisk-HOWTO.html>, which + describes how to make a bootable disk. + + 5.2. Removing duplicate man pages + + You should also move the manual pages that are about to be replaced. + Even if you are brave enough install the Shadow Suite without making + backups, you will still want to remove the old manual pages. The new + manual pages won't normally overwrite the old ones because the old + ones are probably compressed. + + You can use a combination of: man -aW command and locate command to + locate the manual pages that need to be (re)moved. It's generally + easier to figure out which are the older pages before you run make + install. + + If you are using the Slackware 3.0 distribution, then the manual pages + you want to remove are: + + · /usr/man/man1/chfn.1.gz + + · /usr/man/man1/chsh.1.gz + + · /usr/man/man1/id.1.gz + + · /usr/man/man1/login.1.gz + + · /usr/man/man1/passwd.1.gz + + · /usr/man/man1/su.1.gz + + · /usr/man/man5/passwd.5.gz + + There may also be man pages of the same name in the /var/man/cat[1-9] + subdirectories that should also be deleted. + + 5.3. Running make install + + You are now ready to type: (do this as root) + + make install + + This will install the new and replacement programs and fix-up the file + permissions. It will also install the man pages. + + This also takes care of installing the Shadow Suite include files in + the correct places in /usr/include/shadow. + + Using the BETA package you must manually copy the file login.defs to + the /etc subdirectory and make sure that only root can make changes to + it. + + cp login.defs /etc + chmod 700 /etc/login.defs + + This file is the configuration file for the login program. You should + review and make changes to this file for your particular system. This + is where you decide which tty's root can login from, and set other + security policy settings (like password expiration defaults). + + 5.4. Running pwconv + + The next step is to run pwconv. This must also be done as root, and + is best done from the /etc subdirectory: + + cd /etc + /usr/sbin/pwconv + + pwconv takes your /etc/passwd file and strips out the fields to create + two files: /etc/npasswd and /etc/nshadow. + + A pwunconv program is also provided if you need to make a normal + /etc/passwd file out of an /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow combination. + + 5.5. Renaming npasswd and nshadow + + Now that you have run pwconv you have created the files /etc/npasswd + and /etc/nshadow. These need to be copied over to /etc/passwd and + /etc/shadow. We also want to make a backup copy of the original + /etc/passwd file, and make sure only root can read it. We'll put the + backup in root's home directory: + + cd /etc + cp passwd ~passwd + chmod 600 ~passwd + mv npasswd passwd + mv nshadow shadow + + You should also ensure that the file ownerships and permissions are + correct. If you are going to be using X-Windows, the xlock and xdm + programs need to be able to read the shadow file (but not write it). + + There are two ways that this can be done. You can set xlock to suid + root (xdm is usually run as root anyway). Or you can make the shadow + file owned by root with a group of shadow, but before you do this, + make sure that you have a shadow group (look in /etc/group). None of + the users on the system should actually be in the shadow group. + + chown root.root passwd + chown root.shadow shadow + chmod 0644 passwd + chmod 0640 shadow + + Your system now has the password file shadowed. You should now pop + over to another virtual terminal and verify that you can login. + + Really, do this now! + + If you can't, then something is wrong! To get back to a non-shadowed + state, do the following the following: + + cd /etc + cp ~passwd passwd + chmod 644 passwd + + You would then restore the files that you saved earlier to their + proper locations. + + 6. Other programs you may need to upgrade or patch + + Even though the shadow suite contains replacement programs for most + programs that need to access passwords, there are a few additional + programs on most systems that require access to passwords. + + If you are running a Debian Distribution (or even if you are not), you + can obtain Debian sources for the programs that need to be rebuild + from: ftp://ftp.debian.org/debian/stable/source/ + + The remainder of this section discusses how to upgrade adduser, + wu_ftpd, ftpd, pop3d, xlock, xdm and sudo so that they support the + shadow suite. + + See the section ``Adding Shadow Support to a C program'' for a + discussion on how to put shadow support into any other program that + needs it (although the program must then be run SUID root or SGID + shadow to be able to actually access the shadow file). + + 6.1. Slackware adduser program + + Slackware distributions (and possibly some others) contain a + interactive program for adding users called /sbin/adduser. A shadow + version of this program can be obtained from + ftp://sunsite.unc.edu/pub/Linux/ + system/Admin/accounts/adduser.shadow-1.4.tar.gz. + + I would encourage you to use the programs that are supplied with the + Shadow Suite (useradd, usermod, and userdel) instead of the slackware + adduser program. They take a little time to learn how to use, but + it's well worth the effort because you have much more control and they + perform proper file locking on the /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow file + (adduser doesn't). + + See the section on ``Putting the Shadow Suite to use'' for more + information. + + But if you gotta have it, here is what you do: + + tar -xzvf adduser.shadow-1.4.tar.gz + cd adduser + make clean + make adduser + chmod 700 adduser + cp adduser /sbin + + 6.2. The wu_ftpd Server + + Most Linux systems some with the wu_ftpd server. If your distribution + does not come with shadow installed, then your wu_ftpd will not be + compiled for shadow. wu_ftpd is launched from inetd/tcpd as a root + process. If you are running an old wu_ftpd daemon, you will want to + upgrade it anyway because older ones had a bug that would allow the + root account to be compromised (For more info see the Linux security + home page <http://bach.cis.temple.edu/linux/linux-security/Linux- + Security-FAQ/Linux-wu.ftpd-2.4-Update.html>). + + Fortunately, you only need to get the source code and recompile it + with shadow enabled. + + If you are not running an ELF system, The wu_ftp server can be found + on Sunsite as wu-ftp-2.4-fixed.tar.gz + <ftp://sunsite.unc.edu/pub/Linux/system/Network/file-transfer/wu- + ftpd-2.4-fixed.tar.gz> + + Once you retrieve the server, put it in /usr/src, then type: + + cd /usr/src + tar -xzvf wu-ftpd-2.4-fixed.tar.gz + cd wu-ftpd-2.4-fixed + cp ./src/config/config.lnx.shadow ./src/config/config.lnx + + Then edit ./src/makefiles/Makefile.lnx, and change the line: + + LIBES = -lbsd -support + + to: + + LIBES = -lbsd -support -lshadow + + Now you are ready to run the build script and install: + + cd /usr/src/wu-ftpd-2.4-fixed + /usr/src/wu-ftp-2.4.fixed/build lnx + cp /usr/sbin/wu.ftpd /usr/sbin/wu.ftpd.old + cp ./bin/ftpd /usr/sbin/wu.ftpd + + This uses the Linux shadow configuration file, compiles and installs + the server. + + On my Slackware 2.3 system I also had to do the following before + running build: + + cd /usr/include/netinet + ln -s in_systm.h in_system.h + cd - + + Problems have been reported compiling this package under ELF systems, + but the Beta version of the next release works fine. It can be found + as wu-ftp-2.4.2-beta-10.tar.gz + <ftp://tscnet.com/pub/linux/network/ftp/wu-ftpd-2.4.2-beta-10.tar.gz> + + Once you retrieve the server, put it in /usr/src, then type: + + cd /usr/src + tar -xzvf wu-ftpd-2.4.2-beta-9.tar.gz + cd wu-ftpd-beta-9 + cd ./src/config + + Then edit config.lnx, and change: + + #undef SHADOW.PASSWORD + + to: + + #define SHADOW.PASSWORD + + Then, + + cd ../Makefiles + + and edit the file Makefile.lnx and change: + + LIBES = -lsupport -lbsd # -lshadow + + to: + + LIBES = -lsupport -lbsd -lshadow + + Then build and install: + + cd .. + build lnx + cp /usr/sbin/wu.ftpd /usr/sbin/wu.ftpd.old + cp ./bin/ftpd /usr/sbin/wu.ftpd + + Note that you should check your /etc/inetd.conf file to make sure that + this is where your wu.ftpd server really lives. It has been reported + that some distributions place the server daemons in different places, + and then wu.ftpd in particular may be named something else. + + 6.3. Standard ftpd + + If you are running the standard ftpd server, I would recommend that + you upgrade to the wu_ftpd server. Aside from the known bug discussed + above, it's generally thought to be more secure. + + If you insist on the standard one, or you need NIS support, Sunsite + has ftpd-shadow-nis.tgz + <ftp://sunsite.unc.edu/pub/Linux/system/Network/file-transfer/ftpd- + shadow-nis.tgz> + + 6.4. pop3d (Post Office Protocol 3) + + If you need to support the third Post Office Protocol (POP3), you will + need to recompile a pop3d program. pop3d is normally run by + inetd/tcpd as root. + + There are two versions available from Sunsite: + pop3d-1.00.4.linux.shadow.tar.gz + <ftp://sunsite.unc.edu/pub/Linux/system/Mail/pop/pop3d-1.00.4.linux.shadow.tar.gz> + and pop3d+shadow+elf.tar.gz + <ftp://sunsite.unc.edu/pub/Linux/system/Mail/pop/pop3d+shadow+elf.tar.gz> + + Both of these are fairly straight forward to install. + + 6.5. xlock + + If you install the shadow suite, and then run X Windows System and + lock the screen without upgrading your xlock, you will have to use + CNTL-ALT-Fx to switch to another tty, login, and kill the xlock + process (or use CNTL-ALT-BS to kill the X server). Fortunately it's + fairly easy to upgrade your xlock program. + + If you are running XFree86 Versions 3.x.x, you are probably using + xlockmore (which is a great screen-saver in addition to a lock). This + package supports shadow with a recompile. If you have an older xlock, + I recommend that you upgrade to this one. + + xlockmore-3.5.tgz is available at: + <ftp://sunsite.unc.edu/pub/Linux/X11/xutils/screensavers/xlockmore-3.7.tgz> + + Basically, this is what you need to do: + + Get the xlockmore-3.7.tgz file and put it in /usr/src unpack it: + + tar -xzvf xlockmore-3.7.tgz + + Edit the file: /usr/X11R6/lib/X11/config/linux.cf, and change the + line: + + #define HasShadowPasswd NO + + to + + #define HasShadowPasswd YES + + Then build the executables: + + cd /usr/src/xlockmore + xmkmf + make depend + make + + Then move everything into place and update file ownerships and + permissions: + + cp xlock /usr/X11R6/bin/ + cp XLock /var/X11R6/lib/app-defaults/ + chown root.shadow /usr/X11R6/bin/xlock + chmod 2755 /usr/X11R6/bin/xlock + chown root.shadow /etc/shadow + chmod 640 /etc/shadow + + Your xlock will now work correctly. + + 6.6. xdm + + xdm is a program that presents a login screen for X-Windows. Some + systems start xdm when the system is told to goto a specified run + level (see /etc/inittab. + + With the Shadow Suite install, xdm will need to be updated. + Fortunately it's fairly easy to upgrade your xdm program. + + xdm.tar.gz is available at: + <ftp://sunsite.unc.edu/pub/Linux/X11/xutils/xdm.tar.gz> + + Get the xdm.tar.gz file and put it in /usr/src, then to unpack it: + + tar -xzvf xdm.tar.gz + + Edit the file: /usr/X11R6/lib/X11/config/linux.cf, and change the + line: + + #define HasShadowPasswd NO + + to + + #define HasShadowPasswd YES + + Then build the executables: + + cd /usr/src/xdm + xmkmf + make depend + make + + Then move everything into place: + + cp xdm /usr/X11R6/bin/ + + xdm is run as root so you don't need to change it file permissions. + + 6.7. sudo + + The program sudo allows a system administrator to let users run + programs that would normally require root access. This is handy + because it lets the administrator limit access to the root account + itself while still allowing users to do things like mounting drives. + + sudo needs to read passwords because it verifies the users password + when it's invoked. sudo already runs SUID root, so accessing the + /etc/shadow file is not a problem. + + sudo for the shadow suite, is available as at: + <ftp://sunsite.unc.edu/pub/Linux/system/Admin/sudo-1.2-shadow.tgz> + + Warning: When you install sudo your /etc/sudoers file will be replaced + with a default one, so you need to make a backup of it if you have + added anything to the default one. (you could also edit the Makefile + and remove the line that copies the default file to /etc). + + The package is already setup for shadow, so all that's required is to + recompile the package (put it in /usr/src): + + cd /usr/src + tar -xzvf sudo-1.2-shadow.tgz + cd sudo-1.2-shadow + make all + make install + + 6.8. imapd (E-Mail pine package) + + imapd is an e-mail server similar to pop3d. imapd comes with the Pine + E-mail package. The documentation that comes with the package states + that the default for Linux systems is to include support for shadow. + However, I have found that this is not true. Furthermore, the build + script / Makefile combination on this package is makes it very + difficult to add the libshadow.a library at compile time, so I was + unable to add shadow support for imapd. + + If anyone has this figured out, please E-mail me, and I'll include the + solution here. + + 6.9. pppd (Point-to-Point Protocol Server) + + The pppd server can be setup to use several types of authentication: + Password Authentication Protocol (PAP) and Cryptographic Handshake + Authentication Protocol (CHAP). The pppd server usually reads the + password strings that it uses from /etc/ppp/chap-secrets and/or + /etc/ppp/pap-secrets. If you are using this default behavior of pppd, + it is not necessary to reinstall pppd. + + pppd also allows you to use the login parameter (either on the command + line, or in the configuration or options file). If the login option + is given, then pppd will use the /etc/passwd file for the username and + passwords for the PAP. This, of course, will no longer work now that + our password file is shadowed. For pppd-1.2.1d this requires adding + code for shadow support. + + The example given in the next section is adding shadow support to + pppd-1.2.1d (an older version of pppd). + + pppd-2.2.0 already contains shadow support. + + 7. Putting the Shadow Suite to use. + + This section discusses some of the things that you will want to know + now that you have the Shadow Suite installed on your system. More + information is contained in the manual pages for each command. + + 7.1. Adding, Modifying, and deleting users + + The Shadow Suite added the following command line oriented commands + for adding, modifying, and deleting users. You may also have + installed the adduser program. + + 7.1.1. useradd + + The useradd command can be used to add users to the system. You also + invoke this command to change the default settings. + + The first thing that you should do is to examine the default settings + and make changes specific to your system: + + useradd -D + + ______________________________________________________________________ + GROUP=1 + HOME=/home + INACTIVE=0 + EXPIRE=0 + SHELL= + SKEL=/etc/skel + ______________________________________________________________________ + + The defaults are probably not what you want, so if you started adding + users now you would have to specify all the information for each user. + However, we can and should change the default values. + + On my system: + + · I want the default group to be 100 + + · I want passwords to expire every 60 days + + · I don't want to lock an account because the password is expired + + · I want to default shell to be /bin/bash + + To make these changes I would use: + + useradd -D -g100 -e60 -f0 -s/bin/bash + + Now running useradd -D will give: + + ______________________________________________________________________ + GROUP=100 + HOME=/home + INACTIVE=0 + EXPIRE=60 + SHELL=/bin/bash + SKEL=/etc/skel + ______________________________________________________________________ + + Just in case you wanted to know, these defaults are stored in the file + /etc/default/useradd. + + Now you can use useradd to add users to the system. For example, to + add the user fred, using the defaults, you would use the following: + + useradd -m -c "Fred Flintstone" fred + + This will create the following entry in the /etc/passwd file: + + fred:*:505:100:Fred Flintstone:/home/fred:/bin/bash + + And the following entry in the /etc/shadow file: + + fred:!:0:0:60:0:0:0:0 + + fred's home directory will be created and the contents of /etc/skel + will be copied there because of the -m switch. + + Also, since we did not specify a UID, the next available one was used. + + fred's account is created, but fred still won't be able to login until + we unlock the account. We do this by changing the password. + + passwd fred + + ______________________________________________________________________ + Changing password for fred + Enter the new password (minimum of 5 characters) + Please use a combination of upper and lower case letters and numbers. + New Password: ******* + Re-enter new password: ******* + ______________________________________________________________________ + + Now the /etc/shadow will contain: + + fred:J0C.WDR1amIt6:9559:0:60:0:0:0:0 + + And fred will now be able to login and use the system. The nice thing + about useradd and the other programs that come with the Shadow Suite + is that they make changes to the /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow files + atomically. So if you are adding a user, and another user is changing + their password at the same time, both operations will be performed + correctly. + + You should use the supplied commands rather than directly editing + /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow. If you were editing the /etc/shadow + file, and a user were to change his password while you are editing, + and then you were to save the file you were editing, the user's + password change would be lost. + + Here is a small interactive script that adds users using useradd and + passwd: + + ______________________________________________________________________ + #!/bin/bash + # + # /sbin/newuser - A script to add users to the system using the Shadow + # Suite's useradd and passwd commands. + # + # Written my Mike Jackson <mhjack@tscnet.com> as an example for the Linux + # Shadow Password Howto. Permission to use and modify is expressly granted. + # + # This could be modified to show the defaults and allow modification similar + # to the Slackware Adduser program. It could also be modified to disallow + # stupid entries. (i.e. better error checking). + # + ## + # Defaults for the useradd command + ## + GROUP=100 # Default Group + HOME=/home # Home directory location (/home/username) + SKEL=/etc/skel # Skeleton Directory + INACTIVE=0 # Days after password expires to disable account (0=never) + EXPIRE=60 # Days that a passwords lasts + SHELL=/bin/bash # Default Shell (full path) + ## + # Defaults for the passwd command + ## + PASSMIN=0 # Days between password changes + PASSWARN=14 # Days before password expires that a warning is given + ## + # Ensure that root is running the script. + ## + WHOAMI=`/usr/bin/whoami` + if [ $WHOAMI != "root" ]; then + echo "You must be root to add news users!" + exit 1 + fi + ## + # Ask for username and fullname. + ## + echo "" + echo -n "Username: " + read USERNAME + echo -n "Full name: " + read FULLNAME + # + echo "Adding user: $USERNAME." + # + # Note that the "" around $FULLNAME is required because this field is + # almost always going to contain at least on space, and without the "'s + # the useradd command would think that you we moving on to the next + # parameter when it reached the SPACE character. + # + /usr/sbin/useradd -c"$FULLNAME" -d$HOME/$USERNAME -e$EXPIRE \ + -f$INACTIVE -g$GROUP -m -k$SKEL -s$SHELL $USERNAME + ## + # Set password defaults + ## + /bin/passwd -n $PASSMIN -w $PASSWARN $USERNAME >/dev/null 2>&1 + ## + # Let the passwd command actually ask for password (twice) + ## + /bin/passwd $USERNAME + ## + # Show what was done. + ## + echo "" + echo "Entry from /etc/passwd:" + echo -n " " + grep "$USERNAME:" /etc/passwd + echo "Entry from /etc/shadow:" + echo -n " " + grep "$USERNAME:" /etc/shadow + echo "Summary output of the passwd command:" + echo -n " " + passwd -S $USERNAME + echo "" + ______________________________________________________________________ + + Using a script to add new users is really much more preferable than + editing the /etc/passwd or /etc/shadow files directly or using a + program like the Slackware adduser program. Feel free to use and + modify this script for your particular system. + + For more information on the useradd see the online manual page. + + 7.1.2. usermod + + The usermod program is used to modify the information on a user. The + switches are similar to the useradd program. + + Let's say that you want to change fred's shell, you would do the + following: + + usermod -s /bin/tcsh fred + + Now fred's /etc/passwd file entry would be change to this: + + fred:*:505:100:Fred Flintstone:/home/fred:/bin/tcsh + + Let's make fred's account expire on 09/15/97: + + usermod -e 09/15/97 fred + + Now fred's entry in /etc/shadow becomes: + + fred:J0C.WDR1amIt6:9559:0:60:0:0:10119:0 + + For more information on the usermod command see the online manual + page. + + 7.1.3. userdel + + userdel does just what you would expect, it deletes the user's + account. You simply use: + + userdel -r username + + The -r causes all files in the user's home directory to be removed + along with the home directory itself. Files located in other file + system will have to be searched for and deleted manually. + + If you want to simply lock the account rather than delete it, use the + passwd command instead. + + 7.2. The passwd command and passwd aging. + + The passwd command has the obvious use of changing passwords. + Additionally, it is used by the root user to: + + · Lock and unlock accounts (-l and -u) + + · Set the maximum number of days that a password remains valid (-x) + + · Set the minimum days between password changes (-n) + + · Sets the number of days of warning that a password is about to + expire (-w) + + · Sets the number of days after the password expires before the + account is locked (-i) + + · Allow viewing of account information in a clearer format (-S) + + For example, let look again at fred + + passwd -S fred + fred P 03/04/96 0 60 0 0 + + This means that fred's password is valid, it was last changed on + 03/04/96, it can be changed at any time, it expires after 60 days, + fred will not be warned, and and the account won't be disabled when + the password expires. + + This simply means that if fred logs in after the password expires, he + will be prompted for a new password at login. + + If we decide that we want to warn fred 14 days before his password + expires and make his account inactive 14 days after he lets it expire, + we would need to do the following: + + passwd -w14 -i14 fred + + Now fred is changed to: + fred P 03/04/96 0 60 14 14 + + For more information on the passwd command see the online manual page. + + 7.3. The login.defs file. + + The file /etc/login is the configuration file for the login program + and also for the Shadow Suite as a whole. + + /etc/login contains settings from what the prompts will look like to + what the default expiration will be when a user changes his password. + + The /etc/login.defs file is quite well documented just by the comments + that are contained within it. However, there are a few things to + note: + + · It contains flags that can be turned on or off that determine the + amount of logging that takes place. + + · It contains pointers to other configuration files. + + · It contains defaults assignments for things like password aging. + + From the above list you can see that this is a rather important file, + and you should make sure that it is present, and that the settings are + what you desire for your system. + + 7.4. Group passwords. + + The /etc/groups file may contain passwords that permit a user to + become a member of a particular group. This function is enabled if + you define the constant SHADOWGRP in the /usr/src/shadow- + YYMMDD/config.h file. + + If you define this constant and then compile, you must create an + /etc/gshadow file to hold the group passwords and the group + administrator information. + + When you created the /etc/shadow, you used a program called pwconv, + there no equivalent program to create the /etc/gshadow file, but it + really doesn't matter, it takes care of itself. + + To create the initial /etc/gshadow file do the following: + + touch /etc/gshadow + chown root.root /etc/gshadow + chmod 700 /etc/gshadow + + Once you create new groups, they will be added to the /etc/group and + the /etc/gshadow files. If you modify a group by adding or removing + users or changing the group password, the /etc/gshadow file will be + changed. + + The programs groups, groupadd, groupmod, and groupdel are provided as + part of the Shadow Suite to modify groups. + + The format of the /etc/group file is as follows: + + groupname:!:GID:member,member,... + + Where: + + groupname + The name of the group + + ! The field that normally holds the password, but that is now + relocated to the /etc/gshadow file. + + GID + The numerical group ID number + + member + List of group members + + The format of the /etc/gshadow file is as follows: + + groupname:password:admin,admin,...:member,member,... + + Where: + + groupname + The name of the group + + password + The encoded group password. + + admin + List of group administrators + + member + List of group members + + The command gpasswd is used only for adding or removing administrators + and members to or from a group. root or someone in the list of + administrators may add or remove group members. + + The groups password can be changed using the passwd command by root or + anyone listed as an administrator for the group. + + Despite the fact that there is not currently a manual page for + gpasswd, typing gpasswd without any parameters gives a listing of + options. It's fairly easy to grasp how it all works once you + understand the file formats and the concepts. + + 7.5. Consistency checking programs + + 7.5.1. pwck + + The program pwck is provided to provide a consistency check on the + /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow files. It will check each username and + verify that it has the following: + + · the correct number of fields + + · unique user name + + · valid user and group identifier + + · valid primary group + + · valid home directory + + · valid login shell + + It will also warn of any account that has no password. + + It's a good idea to run pwck after installing the Shadow Suite. It's + also a good idea to run it periodically, perhaps weekly or monthly. + If you use the -r option, you can use cron to run it on a regular + basis and have the report mailed to you. + + 7.5.2. grpck + + grpck is the consistency checking program for the /etc/group and + /etc/gshadow files. It performs the following checks: + + · the correct number of fields + + · unique group name + + · valid list of members and administrators + + It also has the -r option for automated reports. + + 7.6. Dial-up passwords. + + Dial-up passwords are another optional line of defense for systems + that allow dial-in access. If you have a system that allows many + people to connect locally or via a network, but you want to limit who + can dial in and connect, then dial-up passwords are for you. To + enable dial-up passwords, you must edit the file /etc/login.defs and + ensure that DIALUPS_CHECK_ENAB is set to yes. + + Two files contain the dial-up information, /etc/dialups which contains + the ttys (one per line, with the leading "/dev/" removed). If a tty + is listed then dial-up checks are performed. + + The second file is the /etc/d_passwd file. This file contains the + fully qualified path name of a shell, followed by an optional + password. + + If a user logs into a line that is listed in /etc/dialups, and his + shell is listed in the file /etc/d_passwd he will be allowed access + only by suppling the correct password. + + Another useful purpose for using dial-up passwords might be to setup a + line that only allows a certain type of connect (perhaps a PPP or UUCP + connection). If a user tries to get another type of connection (i.e. + a list of shells), he must know a password to use the line. + + Before you can use the dial-up feature, you must create the files. + + The command dpasswd is provided to assign passwords to the shells in + the /etc/d_passwd file. See the manual page for more information. + 8. Adding shadow support to a C program + + Adding shadow support to a program is actually fairly straightforward. + The only problem is that the program must be run by root (or SUID + root) in order for the the program to be able to access the + /etc/shadow file. + + This presents one big problem: very careful programming practices must + be followed when creating SUID programs. For instance, if a program + has a shell escape, this must not occur as root if the program is SUID + root. + + For adding shadow support to a program so that it can check passwords, + but otherwise does need to run as root, it's a lot safer to run the + program SUID shadow instead. The xlock program is an example of this. + + In the example given below, pppd-1.2.1d already runs SUID as root, so + adding shadow support should not make the program any more vulnerable. + + 8.1. Header files + + The header files should reside in /usr/include/shadow. There should + also be a /usr/include/shadow.h, but it will be a symbolic link to + /usr/include/shadow/shadow.h. + + To add shadow support to a program, you need to include the header + files: + + #include <shadow/shadow.h> + #include <shadow/pwauth.h> + + It might be a good idea to use compiler directives to conditionally + compile the shadow code (I do in the example below). + + 8.2. libshadow.a library + + When you installed the Shadow Suite the libshadow.a file was created + and installed in /usr/lib. + + When compiling shadow support into a program, the linker needs to be + told to include the libshadow.a library into the link. + + This is done by: + + gcc program.c -o program -lshadow + + However, as we will see in the example below, most large programs use + a Makefile, and usually have a variable called LIBS=... that we will + modify. + + 8.3. Shadow Structure + + The libshadow.a library uses a structure called spwd for the + information it retrieves from the /etc/shadow file. This is the + definition of the spwd structure from the /usr/include/shadow/shadow.h + header file: + + ______________________________________________________________________ + struct spwd + { + char *sp_namp; /* login name */ + char *sp_pwdp; /* encrypted password */ + sptime sp_lstchg; /* date of last change */ + sptime sp_min; /* minimum number of days between changes */ + sptime sp_max; /* maximum number of days between changes */ + sptime sp_warn; /* number of days of warning before password + expires */ + sptime sp_inact; /* number of days after password expires + until the account becomes unusable. */ + sptime sp_expire; /* days since 1/1/70 until account expires + */ + unsigned long sp_flag; /* reserved for future use */ + }; + ______________________________________________________________________ + + The Shadow Suite can put things into the sp_pwdp field besides just + the encoded passwd. The password field could contain: + + username:Npge08pfz4wuk;@/sbin/extra:9479:0:10000:::: + + This means that in addition to the password, the program /sbin/extra + should be called for further authentication. The program called will + get passed the username and a switch that indicates why it's being + called. See the file /usr/include/shadow/pwauth.h and the source code + for pwauth.c for more information. + + What this means is that we should use the function pwauth to perform + the actual authentication, as it will take care of the secondary + authentication as well. The example below does this. + + The author of the Shadow Suite indicates that since most programs in + existence don't do this, and that it may be removed or changed in + future versions of the Shadow Suite. + + 8.4. Shadow Functions + + The shadow.h file also contains the function prototypes for the + functions contained in the libshadow.a library: + + ______________________________________________________________________ + extern void setspent __P ((void)); + extern void endspent __P ((void)); + extern struct spwd *sgetspent __P ((__const char *__string)); + extern struct spwd *fgetspent __P ((FILE *__fp)); + extern struct spwd *getspent __P ((void)); + extern struct spwd *getspnam __P ((__const char *__name)); + extern int putspent __P ((__const struct spwd *__sp, FILE *__fp)); + ______________________________________________________________________ + + The function that we are going to use in the example is: getspnam + which will retrieve for us a spwd structure for the supplied name. + + 8.5. Example + + This is an example of adding shadow support to a program that needs + it, but does not have it by default. + + This example uses the Point-to-Point Protocol Server (pppd-1.2.1d), + which has a mode in which it performs PAP authentication using user + names and passwords from the /etc/passwd file instead of the PAP or + CHAP files. You would not need to add this code to pppd-2.2.0 because + it's already there. + + This feature of pppd probably isn't used very much, but if you + installed the Shadow Suite, it won't work anymore because the + passwords are no longer stored in /etc/passwd. + + The code for authenticating users under pppd-1.2.1d is located in the + /usr/src/pppd-1.2.1d/pppd/auth.c file. + + The following code needs to be added to the top of the file where all + the other #include directives are. We have surrounded the #includes + with conditional directives (i.e. only include if we are compiling for + shadow support). + + ______________________________________________________________________ + #ifdef HAS_SHADOW + #include <shadow.h> + #include <shadow/pwauth.h> + #endif + ______________________________________________________________________ + + The next thing to do is to modify the actual code. We are still + making changes to the auth.c file. + + Function auth.c before modifications: + + ______________________________________________________________________ + /* + * login - Check the user name and password against the system + * password database, and login the user if OK. + * + * returns: + * UPAP_AUTHNAK: Login failed. + * UPAP_AUTHACK: Login succeeded. + * In either case, msg points to an appropriate message. + */ + static int + login(user, passwd, msg, msglen) + char *user; + char *passwd; + char **msg; + int *msglen; + { + struct passwd *pw; + char *epasswd; + char *tty; + + if ((pw = getpwnam(user)) == NULL) { + return (UPAP_AUTHNAK); + } + /* + * XXX If no passwd, let them login without one. + */ + if (pw->pw_passwd == '\0') { + return (UPAP_AUTHACK); + } + + epasswd = crypt(passwd, pw->pw_passwd); + if (strcmp(epasswd, pw->pw_passwd)) { + return (UPAP_AUTHNAK); + } + + syslog(LOG_INFO, "user %s logged in", user); + + /* + * Write a wtmp entry for this user. + */ + tty = strrchr(devname, '/'); + if (tty == NULL) + tty = devname; + else + tty++; + logwtmp(tty, user, ""); /* Add wtmp login entry */ + logged_in = TRUE; + + return (UPAP_AUTHACK); + } + ______________________________________________________________________ + + The user's password is placed into pw->pw_passwd, so all we really + need to do is add the function getspnam. This will put the password + into spwd->sp_pwdp. + + We will add the function pwauth to perform the actual authentication. + This will automatically perform secondary authentication if the shadow + file is setup for it. + + Function auth.c after modifications to support shadow: + + ______________________________________________________________________ + /* + * login - Check the user name and password against the system + * password database, and login the user if OK. + * + * This function has been modified to support the Linux Shadow Password + * Suite if USE_SHADOW is defined. + * + * returns: + * UPAP_AUTHNAK: Login failed. + * UPAP_AUTHACK: Login succeeded. + * In either case, msg points to an appropriate message. + */ + static int + login(user, passwd, msg, msglen) + char *user; + char *passwd; + char **msg; + int *msglen; + { + struct passwd *pw; + char *epasswd; + char *tty; + + #ifdef USE_SHADOW + struct spwd *spwd; + struct spwd *getspnam(); + #endif + + if ((pw = getpwnam(user)) == NULL) { + return (UPAP_AUTHNAK); + } + + #ifdef USE_SHADOW + spwd = getspnam(user); + if (spwd) + pw->pw_passwd = spwd->sp-pwdp; + #endif + + /* + * XXX If no passwd, let NOT them login without one. + */ + if (pw->pw_passwd == '\0') { + return (UPAP_AUTHNAK); + } + #ifdef HAS_SHADOW + if ((pw->pw_passwd && pw->pw_passwd[0] == '@' + && pw_auth (pw->pw_passwd+1, pw->pw_name, PW_LOGIN, NULL)) + || !valid (passwd, pw)) { + return (UPAP_AUTHNAK); + } + #else + epasswd = crypt(passwd, pw->pw_passwd); + if (strcmp(epasswd, pw->pw_passwd)) { + return (UPAP_AUTHNAK); + } + #endif + + syslog(LOG_INFO, "user %s logged in", user); + + /* + * Write a wtmp entry for this user. + */ + tty = strrchr(devname, '/'); + if (tty == NULL) + tty = devname; + else + tty++; + logwtmp(tty, user, ""); /* Add wtmp login entry */ + logged_in = TRUE; + + return (UPAP_AUTHACK); + } + ______________________________________________________________________ + + Careful examination will reveal that we made another change as well. + The original version allowed access (returned UPAP_AUTHACK if there + was NO password in the /etc/passwd file. This is not good, because a + common use of this login feature is to use one account to allow access + to the PPP process and then check the username and password supplied + by PAP with the username in the /etc/passwd file and the password in + the /etc/shadow file. + + So if we had set the original version up to run as the shell for a + user i.e. ppp, then anyone could get a ppp connection by setting + their PAP to user ppp and a password of null. + + We fixed this also by returning UPAP_AUTHNAK instead of UPAP_AUTHACK + if the password field was empty. + + Interestingly enough, pppd-2.2.0 has the same problem. + + Next we need to modify the Makefile so that two things occur: + USE_SHADOW must be defined, and libshadow.a needs to be added to the + linking process. + + Edit the Makefile, and add: + + LIBS = -lshadow + + Then we find the line: + + COMPILE_FLAGS = -I.. -D_linux_=1 -DGIDSET_TYPE=gid_t + + And change it to: + + COMPILE_FLAGS = -I.. -D_linux_=1 -DGIDSET_TYPE=gid_t -DUSE_SHADOW + + Now make and install. + + 9. Frequently Asked Questions. + + Q: I used to control which tty's root could log into using the file + /etc/securettys, but it doesn't seem to work anymore, what's going on? + + A: The file /etc/securettys does absolutely nothing now that the + Shadow Suite is installed. The tty's that root can use are now + located in the login configuration file /etc/login.defs. The entry in + this file may point to another file. + + Q: I installed the Shadow Suite, but now I can't login, what did I + miss? + + A: You probably installed the Shadow programs, but didn't run pwconv + or you forgot to copy /etc/npasswd to /etc/passwd and /etc/nshadow to + /etc/shadow. Also, you may need to copy login.defs to /etc. + + Q: In the section on xlock, it said to change the group ownership of + the /etc/shadow file to shadow. I don't have a shadow group, what do + I do? + + A: You can add one. Simply edit the /etc/group file, and insert a + line for the shadow group. You need to ensure that the group number + is not used by another group, and you need to insert it before the + nogroup entry. Or you can simply suid xlock to root. + + Q: Is there a mailing list for the Linux Shadow Password Suite? + + A: Yes, but it's for the development and beta testing of the next + Shadow Suite for Linux. You can get added to the list by mailing to: + shadow-list-request@neptune.cin.net with a subject of: subscribe. The + list is actually for discussions of the Linux shadow-YYMMSS series of + releases. You should join if you want to get involved in further + development or if you install the Suite on your system and want to get + information on newer releases. + + Q: I installed the Shadow Suite, but when I use the userdel command, I + get "userdel: cannot open shadow group file", what did I do wrong? + + A: You compiled the Shadow Suite with the SHADOWGRP option enabled, + but you don't have an /etc/gshadow file. You need to either edit the + config.h file and recompile, or create an /etc/group file. See the + section on shadow groups. + + Q: I installed the Shadow Suite but now I'm getting encoded passwords + back in my /etc/passwd file, what's wrong? + + A: You either enabled the AUTOSHADOW option in the Shadow config.h + file, or your libc was compiled with the SAHDOW_COMPAT option. You + need to determine which is the problem, and recompile. + + 10. Copyright Message. + + The Linux Shadow Password HOWTO is Copyright (c) 1996 Michael H. + Jackson. + + Permission is granted to make and distribute verbatim copies of this + document provided the copyright notice and this permission notice are + preserved on all copies. + + Permission is granted to copy and distribute modified versions of this + document under the conditions for verbatim copies above, provided a + notice clearly stating that the document is a modified version is also + included in the modified document. + + Permission is granted to copy and distribute translations of this + document into another language, under the conditions specified above + for modified versions. + + Permission is granted to convert this document into another media + under the conditions specified above for modified versions provided + the requirement to acknowledge the source document is fulfilled by + inclusion of an obvious reference to the source document in the new + media. Where there is any doubt as to what defines 'obvious' the + copyright owner reserves the right to decide. + + 11. Miscellaneous and Acknowledgments. + + The code examples for auth.c are taken from pppd-1.2.1d and + ppp-2.1.0e, Copyright (c) 1993 and The Australian National University + and Copyright (c) 1989 Carnegie Mellon University. + + Thanks to Marek Michalkiewicz <marekm@i17linuxb.ists.pwr.wroc.pl> for + writing and maintaining the Shadow Suite for Linux, and for his review + and comments on this document. + + Thanks to Ron Tidd <rtidd@tscnet.com> for his helpful review and + testing. + + Thanks to everyone who has sent me feedback to help improve this + document. + + Please, if you have any comments or suggestions then mail them to me. + + regards + + Michael H. 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The port and some additional features have been added +by Cristian Gafton (gafton@sorosis.ro). + + +Changes: + - 96/04/16 + - {spaces,tabs} allowed within limits string + - Warn via syslog multiple default limits + - added few paragraphs to the login man page + - 96/04/14 + - code merged into lmain.c --cristiang + +TODO: - support groups in the limits file + (only usernames are supported at this moment :-( ) + +Setting user limits for shadow login program + +First, make a root-only-readable file (/etc/limits by default or LIMITS_FILE +defined config.h) that describes the resource limits you wish to impose. By +default no quotas are imposed on 'root'. In fact, there is no way to impose +limits via this procedure to root-equiv accounts (accounts with UID 0). + +Each line describes a limit for a user in the form: + + user LIMITS_STRING + +The LIMITS_STRING is a string of a concatenated list of resource limits. +Each limit consists of a letter identifier followed by a numerical limit. +The valid identifiers are: + + A: max address space (KB) + C: max core file size (KB) + D: max data size (KB) + F: maximum filesize (KB) + M: max locked-in-memory address space (KB) + N: max number of open files + R: max resident set size (KB) + S: max stack size (KB) + T: max CPU time (MIN) + U: max number of processes + L: max number of logins for this user + +For example, L2D2048N5 is a valid LIMITS_STRING. For reading convenience, +the following entries are equivalent: + +username L2D2048N5 +username L2 D2048 N5 + +Be aware that after <username> the rest of the line is considered a limit +string, thus comments are not allowed. A invalid limits string will be +rejected (not considered) by the login program. + +The default entry is denoted by username '*'. If you have multiple 'default' +entries in your LIMITS_FILE, then the last one will be used as the default +entry. + +To completely disable limits for a user, a single dash (-) will do. + +Also, please note that all limit settings are set PER LOGIN. They are +not global, nor are they permanent. Perhaps global limits will come, but +for now this will have to do ;) + diff --git a/doc/README.platforms b/doc/README.platforms new file mode 100644 index 0000000..295d125 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/README.platforms @@ -0,0 +1,33 @@ +# $Id$ +# +# This is the current (still incomplete) list of platforms this +# package has been verified to work on. Additions (preferably +# in the format as described below) are welcome. Thanks! +# +# V: last version reported to work +# H: host type +# L: Linux libc version +# D: Linux distribution, or other OS name and version +# C: changes (if any) +# R: reported by + +V: 980529 +H: sparc-unknown-linux-gnu +L: glibc-2.0.7 +D: Ultrapenguin-1.0.9 +C: had to explicitly disable desrpc. +R: Bjorn Christianson <bjorn@cascade.psychology.mcmaster.ca> + +V: 980724 +H: i486-pc-linux-gnulibc1 +L: libc-5.4.33 +D: Debian-1.3.1.r6 +C: none (use dpkg-buildpackage) +R: Marek Michalkiewicz <marekm@linux.org.pl> + +V: current +H: i686-pc-linux-gnu +L: glibc-2.0.7.19981211 +D: Debian-2.1 +C: none (use dpkg-buildpackage) +R: Marek Michalkiewicz <marekm@linux.org.pl> diff --git a/doc/WISHLIST b/doc/WISHLIST new file mode 100644 index 0000000..61390bd --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/WISHLIST @@ -0,0 +1,40 @@ +$Id$ + +This is my wishlist for the shadow suite, in no particular order. Feel +free to do anything from this list and mail me the diffs :-). + +Patches in diff -u format, against the latest version (sometimes in the +"beta" directory) are preferred and make my job easier. Please, no +MIME, base64, quoted-printable, or HTML. For very big patches, or if +your mailer can corrupt them, please use gzip and uuencode. Thanks! + +New ideas to add to this list are welcome, too. --marekm + +- fix all the bugs, of course +- implement "su only" accounts (no logins, only su from other account) +- rewrite getdef.c to be more general? (no hardcoded names) +- patch for rlogind/telnetd to create utmp entry and fill in ut_addr +- option to specify encrypted password in passwd (for yppasswdd, so it + doesn't need to know about shadow/non-shadow); should probably use a pipe + (less insecure than command line arguments) +- add support for changing NIS passwords +- add option to check passwords by piping them to external programs +- add functionality of the contrib/rpasswd.c wrapper to passwd +- option to generate pronounceable passwords (like on SCO), external program? +- poppassd (remote password change for eudora etc.) +- add support for passwd/shadow db files (glibc) +- vipw: check password files for errors after editing +- add "maximum time users allowed to stay logged in" limit option to logoutd +- handle quotes in /etc/environment like the shell does (but sshd doesn't...) +- better utmpx support (logoutd, ...) +- better OPIE support (report number of logins left, etc.) +- new option for /etc/suauth: don't load user's environment (force "su -") + suggested by Ulisses Alonso Camaro +- find out why recent releases won't compile on Solaris +- newusers should be able to copy /etc/skel to the new home directory + (like useradd) +- add directories where other packages can add hooks for package-specific + per-user configuration, to be executed with run-parts. Some hooks should + be executed at package install time for existing users, likewise for + package removal and possibly modification. (Debian Bug#36019) + diff --git a/doc/console.c.spec.txt b/doc/console.c.spec.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b7c0d0d --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/console.c.spec.txt @@ -0,0 +1,36 @@ +$Id$ + +Specification for console.c source file -- + +input values -- + tty -- character pointer to device name with leading "/dev/" + removed. + +return values -- + 0 -- false + 1 -- true + +int console (char * tty) + if "CONSOLE" string value is not present in login.defs + return true + + if the first character of "CONSOLE" string value is not "/" + treat the string as a ":" delimited list of device + names and search for the value of tty in that + tokenized list. + + if a match is found + return true + + return false + + if the file named by "CONSOLE" cannot be opened + return true + + scan the file looking for a match between the input line + and the value of tty + + if a match is found + return true + + return false diff --git a/doc/cracklib26.diff b/doc/cracklib26.diff new file mode 100644 index 0000000..09160b8 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/cracklib26.diff @@ -0,0 +1,340 @@ +diff -ur orig/cracklib26_small/cracklib/fascist.c cracklib26_small/cracklib/fascist.c +--- orig/cracklib26_small/cracklib/fascist.c Mon Dec 15 02:56:55 1997 ++++ cracklib26_small/cracklib/fascist.c Sat Apr 4 22:14:45 1998 +@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ + #include <ctype.h> + #include <sys/types.h> + #include <pwd.h> ++#include <string.h> + + #define ISSKIP(x) (isspace(x) || ispunct(x)) + +@@ -460,28 +461,27 @@ + } + + char * +-FascistGecos(password, uid) ++FascistGecosPw(password, pwd) + char *password; +- int uid; ++ struct passwd *pwd; + { + int i; + int j; + int wc; + char *ptr; +- struct passwd *pwp; + char gbuffer[STRINGSIZE]; + char tbuffer[STRINGSIZE]; + char *uwords[STRINGSIZE]; + char longbuffer[STRINGSIZE * 2]; + +- if (!(pwp = getpwuid(uid))) ++ if (!pwd) + { + return ("you are not registered in the password file"); + } + + /* lets get really paranoid and assume a dangerously long gecos entry */ + +- strncpy(tbuffer, pwp->pw_name, STRINGSIZE); ++ strncpy(tbuffer, pwd->pw_name, STRINGSIZE); + tbuffer[STRINGSIZE-1] = '\0'; + if (GTry(tbuffer, password)) + { +@@ -490,12 +490,13 @@ + + /* it never used to be that you got passwd strings > 1024 chars, but now... */ + +- strncpy(tbuffer, pwp->pw_gecos, STRINGSIZE); ++ strncpy(tbuffer, pwd->pw_gecos, STRINGSIZE); + tbuffer[STRINGSIZE-1] = '\0'; + strcpy(gbuffer, Lowercase(tbuffer)); + + wc = 0; + ptr = gbuffer; ++ uwords[0] = (char *) 0; + + while (*ptr) + { +@@ -530,6 +531,8 @@ + *(ptr++) = '\0'; + } + } ++ if (!uwords[0]) ++ return ((char *) 0); /* empty gecos */ + #ifdef DEBUG + for (i = 0; uwords[i]; i++) + { +@@ -586,9 +589,10 @@ + } + + char * +-FascistLook(pwp, instring) ++FascistLookPw(pwp, instring, pwd) + PWDICT *pwp; + char *instring; ++ struct passwd *pwd; + { + int i; + char *ptr; +@@ -667,7 +671,7 @@ + return ("it looks like a National Insurance number."); + } + +- if (ptr = FascistGecos(password, getuid())) ++ if (ptr = FascistGecosPw(password, pwd ? pwd : getpwuid(getuid()))) + { + return (ptr); + } +@@ -715,9 +719,10 @@ + } + + char * +-FascistCheck(password, path) ++FascistCheckPw(password, path, pwd) + char *password; + char *path; ++ struct passwd *pwd; + { + static char lastpath[STRINGSIZE]; + static PWDICT *pwp; +@@ -750,5 +755,29 @@ + strncpy(lastpath, path, STRINGSIZE); + } + +- return (FascistLook(pwp, pwtrunced)); ++ return (FascistLookPw(pwp, pwtrunced, pwd)); ++} ++ ++char * ++FascistGecos(password, uid) ++ char *password; ++ int uid; ++{ ++ return (FascistGecosPw(password, getpwuid(uid))); ++} ++ ++char * ++FascistLook(pwp, instring) ++ PWDICT *pwp; ++ char *instring; ++{ ++ return (FascistLookPw(pwp, instring, (char *) 0)); ++} ++ ++char * ++FascistCheck(password, path) ++ char *password; ++ char *path; ++{ ++ return (FascistCheckPw(password, path, (char *) 0)); + } +diff -ur orig/cracklib26_small/cracklib/packer.h cracklib26_small/cracklib/packer.h +--- orig/cracklib26_small/cracklib/packer.h Mon Dec 15 00:09:30 1997 ++++ cracklib26_small/cracklib/packer.h Sat Jan 10 22:13:46 1998 +@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ + FILE *dfp; + FILE *wfp; + ++ int canfree; + int32 flags; + #define PFOR_WRITE 0x0001 + #define PFOR_FLUSH 0x0002 +diff -ur orig/cracklib26_small/cracklib/packlib.c cracklib26_small/cracklib/packlib.c +--- orig/cracklib26_small/cracklib/packlib.c Fri Jul 9 22:22:58 1993 ++++ cracklib26_small/cracklib/packlib.c Sat Jan 10 22:28:49 1998 +@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ + char *mode; + { + int32 i; +- static PWDICT pdesc; ++ PWDICT *pdesc; + char iname[STRINGSIZE]; + char dname[STRINGSIZE]; + char wname[STRINGSIZE]; +@@ -25,92 +25,94 @@ + FILE *ifp; + FILE *wfp; + +- if (pdesc.header.pih_magic == PIH_MAGIC) +- { +- fprintf(stderr, "%s: another dictionary already open\n", prefix); ++ if ((pdesc = (PWDICT *) malloc(sizeof(PWDICT))) == 0) + return ((PWDICT *) 0); +- } + +- memset(&pdesc, '\0', sizeof(pdesc)); ++ memset(pdesc, '\0', sizeof(*pdesc)); + + sprintf(iname, "%s.pwi", prefix); + sprintf(dname, "%s.pwd", prefix); + sprintf(wname, "%s.hwm", prefix); + +- if (!(pdesc.dfp = fopen(dname, mode))) ++ if (!(pdesc->dfp = fopen(dname, mode))) + { + perror(dname); ++ free(pdesc); + return ((PWDICT *) 0); + } + +- if (!(pdesc.ifp = fopen(iname, mode))) ++ if (!(pdesc->ifp = fopen(iname, mode))) + { +- fclose(pdesc.dfp); ++ fclose(pdesc->dfp); + perror(iname); ++ free(pdesc); + return ((PWDICT *) 0); + } + +- if (pdesc.wfp = fopen(wname, mode)) ++ if (pdesc->wfp = fopen(wname, mode)) + { +- pdesc.flags |= PFOR_USEHWMS; ++ pdesc->flags |= PFOR_USEHWMS; + } + +- ifp = pdesc.ifp; +- dfp = pdesc.dfp; +- wfp = pdesc.wfp; ++ ifp = pdesc->ifp; ++ dfp = pdesc->dfp; ++ wfp = pdesc->wfp; + + if (mode[0] == 'w') + { +- pdesc.flags |= PFOR_WRITE; +- pdesc.header.pih_magic = PIH_MAGIC; +- pdesc.header.pih_blocklen = NUMWORDS; +- pdesc.header.pih_numwords = 0; ++ pdesc->flags |= PFOR_WRITE; ++ pdesc->header.pih_magic = PIH_MAGIC; ++ pdesc->header.pih_blocklen = NUMWORDS; ++ pdesc->header.pih_numwords = 0; + +- fwrite((char *) &pdesc.header, sizeof(pdesc.header), 1, ifp); ++ fwrite((char *) &pdesc->header, sizeof(pdesc->header), 1, ifp); + } else + { +- pdesc.flags &= ~PFOR_WRITE; ++ pdesc->flags &= ~PFOR_WRITE; + +- if (!fread((char *) &pdesc.header, sizeof(pdesc.header), 1, ifp)) ++ if (!fread((char *) &pdesc->header, sizeof(pdesc->header), 1, ifp)) + { + fprintf(stderr, "%s: error reading header\n", prefix); + +- pdesc.header.pih_magic = 0; ++ pdesc->header.pih_magic = 0; + fclose(ifp); + fclose(dfp); ++ free(pdesc); + return ((PWDICT *) 0); + } + +- if (pdesc.header.pih_magic != PIH_MAGIC) ++ if (pdesc->header.pih_magic != PIH_MAGIC) + { + fprintf(stderr, "%s: magic mismatch\n", prefix); + +- pdesc.header.pih_magic = 0; ++ pdesc->header.pih_magic = 0; + fclose(ifp); + fclose(dfp); ++ free(pdesc); + return ((PWDICT *) 0); + } + +- if (pdesc.header.pih_blocklen != NUMWORDS) ++ if (pdesc->header.pih_blocklen != NUMWORDS) + { + fprintf(stderr, "%s: size mismatch\n", prefix); + +- pdesc.header.pih_magic = 0; ++ pdesc->header.pih_magic = 0; + fclose(ifp); + fclose(dfp); ++ free(pdesc); + return ((PWDICT *) 0); + } + +- if (pdesc.flags & PFOR_USEHWMS) ++ if (pdesc->flags & PFOR_USEHWMS) + { +- if (fread(pdesc.hwms, 1, sizeof(pdesc.hwms), wfp) != sizeof(pdesc.hwms)) ++ if (fread(pdesc->hwms, 1, sizeof(pdesc->hwms), wfp) != sizeof(pdesc->hwms)) + { +- pdesc.flags &= ~PFOR_USEHWMS; ++ pdesc->flags &= ~PFOR_USEHWMS; + } + } + } +- +- return (&pdesc); ++ pdesc->canfree = 1; ++ return (pdesc); + } + + int +@@ -159,8 +161,13 @@ + + fclose(pwp->ifp); + fclose(pwp->dfp); ++ if (pwp->wfp) ++ fclose(pwp->wfp); + +- pwp->header.pih_magic = 0; ++ if (pwp->canfree) ++ free(pwp); ++ else ++ pwp->header.pih_magic = 0; + + return (0); + } +@@ -307,6 +314,11 @@ + register char *this; + int idx; + ++/* ++ * comment in npasswd-2.0beta4 says this: ++ * This does not work under all circumstances, so don't bother ++ */ ++#if 0 + if (pwp->flags & PFOR_USEHWMS) + { + idx = string[0] & 0xff; +@@ -317,6 +329,10 @@ + lwm = 0; + hwm = PW_WORDS(pwp) - 1; + } ++#else ++ lwm = 0; ++ hwm = PW_WORDS(pwp); ++#endif + + #ifdef DEBUG + printf("---- %lu, %lu ----\n", lwm, hwm); +diff -ur orig/cracklib26_small/util/mkdict cracklib26_small/util/mkdict +--- orig/cracklib26_small/util/mkdict Fri Jul 9 22:23:03 1993 ++++ cracklib26_small/util/mkdict Sat Apr 4 22:31:45 1998 +@@ -14,9 +14,16 @@ + SORT="sort" + ###SORT="sort -T /tmp" + +-cat $* | ++### Use zcat to read compressed (as well as uncompressed) dictionaries. ++### Compressed dictionaries can save quite a lot of disk space. ++ ++CAT="gzip -cdf" ++###CAT="zcat" ++###CAT="cat" ++ ++$CAT $* | + tr '[A-Z]' '[a-z]' | +- tr -cd '[\012a-z0-9]' | ++ tr -cd '\012[a-z][0-9]' | + $SORT | + uniq | + grep -v '^#' | |