diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'bl32')
-rw-r--r-- | bl32/optee/optee.mk | 15 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | bl32/sp_min/aarch32/entrypoint.S | 367 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | bl32/sp_min/sp_min.ld.S | 157 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | bl32/sp_min/sp_min.mk | 84 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | bl32/sp_min/sp_min_main.c | 250 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | bl32/sp_min/sp_min_private.h | 14 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | bl32/sp_min/wa_cve_2017_5715_bpiall.S | 74 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | bl32/sp_min/wa_cve_2017_5715_icache_inv.S | 75 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | bl32/tsp/aarch64/tsp_entrypoint.S | 489 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | bl32/tsp/aarch64/tsp_exceptions.S | 162 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | bl32/tsp/aarch64/tsp_request.S | 30 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | bl32/tsp/ffa_helpers.c | 252 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | bl32/tsp/ffa_helpers.h | 116 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | bl32/tsp/tsp.ld.S | 129 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | bl32/tsp/tsp.mk | 49 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | bl32/tsp/tsp_common.c | 156 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | bl32/tsp/tsp_ffa_main.c | 656 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | bl32/tsp/tsp_interrupt.c | 115 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | bl32/tsp/tsp_main.c | 288 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | bl32/tsp/tsp_private.h | 145 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | bl32/tsp/tsp_timer.c | 91 |
21 files changed, 3714 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/bl32/optee/optee.mk b/bl32/optee/optee.mk new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c8aa7ce --- /dev/null +++ b/bl32/optee/optee.mk @@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ +# +# Copyright (c) 2016-2019, Arm Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. +# +# SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause +# +# This makefile only aims at complying with Trusted Firmware-A build process so +# that "optee" is a valid TF-A AArch32 Secure Playload identifier. + +ifneq ($(ARCH),aarch32) +$(error This directory targets AArch32 support) +endif + +$(eval $(call add_define,AARCH32_SP_OPTEE)) + +$(info Trusted Firmware-A built for OP-TEE payload support) diff --git a/bl32/sp_min/aarch32/entrypoint.S b/bl32/sp_min/aarch32/entrypoint.S new file mode 100644 index 0000000..693dd4b --- /dev/null +++ b/bl32/sp_min/aarch32/entrypoint.S @@ -0,0 +1,367 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2016-2023, Arm Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +#include <arch.h> +#include <asm_macros.S> +#include <common/bl_common.h> +#include <common/runtime_svc.h> +#include <context.h> +#include <el3_common_macros.S> +#include <lib/el3_runtime/cpu_data.h> +#include <lib/pmf/aarch32/pmf_asm_macros.S> +#include <lib/runtime_instr.h> +#include <lib/xlat_tables/xlat_tables_defs.h> +#include <smccc_helpers.h> +#include <smccc_macros.S> + + .globl sp_min_vector_table + .globl sp_min_entrypoint + .globl sp_min_warm_entrypoint + .globl sp_min_handle_smc + .globl sp_min_handle_fiq + +#define FIXUP_SIZE ((BL32_LIMIT) - (BL32_BASE)) + + .macro route_fiq_to_sp_min reg + /* ----------------------------------------------------- + * FIQs are secure interrupts trapped by Monitor and non + * secure is not allowed to mask the FIQs. + * ----------------------------------------------------- + */ + ldcopr \reg, SCR + orr \reg, \reg, #SCR_FIQ_BIT + bic \reg, \reg, #SCR_FW_BIT + stcopr \reg, SCR + .endm + + .macro clrex_on_monitor_entry +#if (ARM_ARCH_MAJOR == 7) + /* + * ARMv7 architectures need to clear the exclusive access when + * entering Monitor mode. + */ + clrex +#endif + .endm + +vector_base sp_min_vector_table + b sp_min_entrypoint + b plat_panic_handler /* Undef */ + b sp_min_handle_smc /* Syscall */ + b report_prefetch_abort /* Prefetch abort */ + b report_data_abort /* Data abort */ + b plat_panic_handler /* Reserved */ + b plat_panic_handler /* IRQ */ + b sp_min_handle_fiq /* FIQ */ + + +/* + * The Cold boot/Reset entrypoint for SP_MIN + */ +func sp_min_entrypoint + /* --------------------------------------------------------------- + * Stash the previous bootloader arguments r0 - r3 for later use. + * --------------------------------------------------------------- + */ + mov r9, r0 + mov r10, r1 + mov r11, r2 + mov r12, r3 + +#if !RESET_TO_SP_MIN + /* --------------------------------------------------------------------- + * For !RESET_TO_SP_MIN systems, only the primary CPU ever reaches + * sp_min_entrypoint() during the cold boot flow, so the cold/warm boot + * and primary/secondary CPU logic should not be executed in this case. + * + * Also, assume that the previous bootloader has already initialised the + * SCTLR, including the CPU endianness, and has initialised the memory. + * --------------------------------------------------------------------- + */ + el3_entrypoint_common \ + _init_sctlr=0 \ + _warm_boot_mailbox=0 \ + _secondary_cold_boot=0 \ + _init_memory=0 \ + _init_c_runtime=1 \ + _exception_vectors=sp_min_vector_table \ + _pie_fixup_size=FIXUP_SIZE +#else + /* --------------------------------------------------------------------- + * For RESET_TO_SP_MIN systems which have a programmable reset address, + * sp_min_entrypoint() is executed only on the cold boot path so we can + * skip the warm boot mailbox mechanism. + * --------------------------------------------------------------------- + */ + el3_entrypoint_common \ + _init_sctlr=1 \ + _warm_boot_mailbox=!PROGRAMMABLE_RESET_ADDRESS \ + _secondary_cold_boot=!COLD_BOOT_SINGLE_CPU \ + _init_memory=1 \ + _init_c_runtime=1 \ + _exception_vectors=sp_min_vector_table \ + _pie_fixup_size=FIXUP_SIZE +#endif /* RESET_TO_SP_MIN */ + +#if SP_MIN_WITH_SECURE_FIQ + route_fiq_to_sp_min r4 +#endif + + /* --------------------------------------------------------------------- + * Relay the previous bootloader's arguments to the platform layer + * --------------------------------------------------------------------- + */ + mov r0, r9 + mov r1, r10 + mov r2, r11 + mov r3, r12 + bl sp_min_early_platform_setup2 + bl sp_min_plat_arch_setup + + /* Jump to the main function */ + bl sp_min_main + + /* ------------------------------------------------------------- + * Clean the .data & .bss sections to main memory. This ensures + * that any global data which was initialised by the primary CPU + * is visible to secondary CPUs before they enable their data + * caches and participate in coherency. + * ------------------------------------------------------------- + */ + ldr r0, =__DATA_START__ + ldr r1, =__DATA_END__ + sub r1, r1, r0 + bl clean_dcache_range + + ldr r0, =__BSS_START__ + ldr r1, =__BSS_END__ + sub r1, r1, r0 + bl clean_dcache_range + + bl smc_get_next_ctx + + /* r0 points to `smc_ctx_t` */ + /* The PSCI cpu_context registers have been copied to `smc_ctx_t` */ + b sp_min_exit +endfunc sp_min_entrypoint + + +/* + * SMC handling function for SP_MIN. + */ +func sp_min_handle_smc + /* On SMC entry, `sp` points to `smc_ctx_t`. Save `lr`. */ + str lr, [sp, #SMC_CTX_LR_MON] + +#if ENABLE_RUNTIME_INSTRUMENTATION + /* + * Read the timestamp value and store it on top of the C runtime stack. + * The value will be saved to the per-cpu data once the C stack is + * available, as a valid stack is needed to call _cpu_data() + */ + strd r0, r1, [sp, #SMC_CTX_GPREG_R0] + ldcopr16 r0, r1, CNTPCT_64 + ldr lr, [sp, #SMC_CTX_SP_MON] + strd r0, r1, [lr, #-8]! + str lr, [sp, #SMC_CTX_SP_MON] + ldrd r0, r1, [sp, #SMC_CTX_GPREG_R0] +#endif + + smccc_save_gp_mode_regs + + clrex_on_monitor_entry + + /* + * `sp` still points to `smc_ctx_t`. Save it to a register + * and restore the C runtime stack pointer to `sp`. + */ + mov r2, sp /* handle */ + ldr sp, [r2, #SMC_CTX_SP_MON] + +#if ENABLE_RUNTIME_INSTRUMENTATION + /* Save handle to a callee saved register */ + mov r6, r2 + + /* + * Restore the timestamp value and store it in per-cpu data. The value + * will be extracted from per-cpu data by the C level SMC handler and + * saved to the PMF timestamp region. + */ + ldrd r4, r5, [sp], #8 + bl _cpu_data + strd r4, r5, [r0, #CPU_DATA_PMF_TS0_OFFSET] + + /* Restore handle */ + mov r2, r6 +#endif + + ldr r0, [r2, #SMC_CTX_SCR] + and r3, r0, #SCR_NS_BIT /* flags */ + + /* Switch to Secure Mode*/ + bic r0, #SCR_NS_BIT + stcopr r0, SCR + isb + + ldr r0, [r2, #SMC_CTX_GPREG_R0] /* smc_fid */ + /* Check whether an SMC64 is issued */ + tst r0, #(FUNCID_CC_MASK << FUNCID_CC_SHIFT) + beq 1f + /* SMC32 is not detected. Return error back to caller */ + mov r0, #SMC_UNK + str r0, [r2, #SMC_CTX_GPREG_R0] + mov r0, r2 + b sp_min_exit +1: + /* SMC32 is detected */ + mov r1, #0 /* cookie */ + bl handle_runtime_svc + + /* `r0` points to `smc_ctx_t` */ + b sp_min_exit +endfunc sp_min_handle_smc + +/* + * Secure Interrupts handling function for SP_MIN. + */ +func sp_min_handle_fiq +#if !SP_MIN_WITH_SECURE_FIQ + b plat_panic_handler +#else + /* FIQ has a +4 offset for lr compared to preferred return address */ + sub lr, lr, #4 + /* On SMC entry, `sp` points to `smc_ctx_t`. Save `lr`. */ + str lr, [sp, #SMC_CTX_LR_MON] + + smccc_save_gp_mode_regs + + clrex_on_monitor_entry + + /* load run-time stack */ + mov r2, sp + ldr sp, [r2, #SMC_CTX_SP_MON] + + /* Switch to Secure Mode */ + ldr r0, [r2, #SMC_CTX_SCR] + bic r0, #SCR_NS_BIT + stcopr r0, SCR + isb + + push {r2, r3} + bl sp_min_fiq + pop {r0, r3} + + b sp_min_exit +#endif +endfunc sp_min_handle_fiq + +/* + * The Warm boot entrypoint for SP_MIN. + */ +func sp_min_warm_entrypoint +#if ENABLE_RUNTIME_INSTRUMENTATION + /* + * This timestamp update happens with cache off. The next + * timestamp collection will need to do cache maintenance prior + * to timestamp update. + */ + pmf_calc_timestamp_addr rt_instr_svc, RT_INSTR_EXIT_HW_LOW_PWR + ldcopr16 r2, r3, CNTPCT_64 + strd r2, r3, [r0] +#endif + /* + * On the warm boot path, most of the EL3 initialisations performed by + * 'el3_entrypoint_common' must be skipped: + * + * - Only when the platform bypasses the BL1/BL32 (SP_MIN) entrypoint by + * programming the reset address do we need to initialied the SCTLR. + * In other cases, we assume this has been taken care by the + * entrypoint code. + * + * - No need to determine the type of boot, we know it is a warm boot. + * + * - Do not try to distinguish between primary and secondary CPUs, this + * notion only exists for a cold boot. + * + * - No need to initialise the memory or the C runtime environment, + * it has been done once and for all on the cold boot path. + */ + el3_entrypoint_common \ + _init_sctlr=PROGRAMMABLE_RESET_ADDRESS \ + _warm_boot_mailbox=0 \ + _secondary_cold_boot=0 \ + _init_memory=0 \ + _init_c_runtime=0 \ + _exception_vectors=sp_min_vector_table \ + _pie_fixup_size=0 + + /* + * We're about to enable MMU and participate in PSCI state coordination. + * + * The PSCI implementation invokes platform routines that enable CPUs to + * participate in coherency. On a system where CPUs are not + * cache-coherent without appropriate platform specific programming, + * having caches enabled until such time might lead to coherency issues + * (resulting from stale data getting speculatively fetched, among + * others). Therefore we keep data caches disabled even after enabling + * the MMU for such platforms. + * + * On systems with hardware-assisted coherency, or on single cluster + * platforms, such platform specific programming is not required to + * enter coherency (as CPUs already are); and there's no reason to have + * caches disabled either. + */ +#if HW_ASSISTED_COHERENCY || WARMBOOT_ENABLE_DCACHE_EARLY + mov r0, #0 +#else + mov r0, #DISABLE_DCACHE +#endif + bl bl32_plat_enable_mmu + +#if SP_MIN_WITH_SECURE_FIQ + route_fiq_to_sp_min r0 +#endif + + bl sp_min_warm_boot + bl smc_get_next_ctx + /* r0 points to `smc_ctx_t` */ + /* The PSCI cpu_context registers have been copied to `smc_ctx_t` */ + +#if ENABLE_RUNTIME_INSTRUMENTATION + /* Save smc_ctx_t */ + mov r5, r0 + + pmf_calc_timestamp_addr rt_instr_svc, RT_INSTR_EXIT_PSCI + mov r4, r0 + + /* + * Invalidate before updating timestamp to ensure previous timestamp + * updates on the same cache line with caches disabled are properly + * seen by the same core. Without the cache invalidate, the core might + * write into a stale cache line. + */ + mov r1, #PMF_TS_SIZE + bl inv_dcache_range + + ldcopr16 r0, r1, CNTPCT_64 + strd r0, r1, [r4] + + /* Restore smc_ctx_t */ + mov r0, r5 +#endif + + b sp_min_exit +endfunc sp_min_warm_entrypoint + +/* + * The function to restore the registers from SMC context and return + * to the mode restored to SPSR. + * + * Arguments : r0 must point to the SMC context to restore from. + */ +func sp_min_exit + monitor_exit +endfunc sp_min_exit diff --git a/bl32/sp_min/sp_min.ld.S b/bl32/sp_min/sp_min.ld.S new file mode 100644 index 0000000..dd81973 --- /dev/null +++ b/bl32/sp_min/sp_min.ld.S @@ -0,0 +1,157 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2016-2023, Arm Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +#include <common/bl_common.ld.h> +#include <lib/xlat_tables/xlat_tables_defs.h> + +OUTPUT_FORMAT(elf32-littlearm) +OUTPUT_ARCH(arm) +ENTRY(sp_min_vector_table) + +MEMORY { + RAM (rwx): ORIGIN = BL32_BASE, LENGTH = BL32_LIMIT - BL32_BASE +} + +#ifdef PLAT_SP_MIN_EXTRA_LD_SCRIPT +# include <plat_sp_min.ld.S> +#endif /* PLAT_SP_MIN_EXTRA_LD_SCRIPT */ + +SECTIONS { + RAM_REGION_START = ORIGIN(RAM); + RAM_REGION_LENGTH = LENGTH(RAM); + . = BL32_BASE; + + ASSERT(. == ALIGN(PAGE_SIZE), + "BL32_BASE address is not aligned on a page boundary.") + +#if SEPARATE_CODE_AND_RODATA + .text . : { + __TEXT_START__ = .; + + *entrypoint.o(.text*) + *(SORT_BY_ALIGNMENT(.text*)) + *(.vectors) + __TEXT_END_UNALIGNED__ = .; + + . = ALIGN(PAGE_SIZE); + + __TEXT_END__ = .; + } >RAM + + /* .ARM.extab and .ARM.exidx are only added because Clang needs them */ + .ARM.extab . : { + *(.ARM.extab* .gnu.linkonce.armextab.*) + } >RAM + + .ARM.exidx . : { + *(.ARM.exidx* .gnu.linkonce.armexidx.*) + } >RAM + + .rodata . : { + __RODATA_START__ = .; + *(SORT_BY_ALIGNMENT(.rodata*)) + + RODATA_COMMON + + . = ALIGN(8); + +# include <lib/el3_runtime/pubsub_events.h> + __RODATA_END_UNALIGNED__ = .; + + . = ALIGN(PAGE_SIZE); + + __RODATA_END__ = .; + } >RAM +#else /* SEPARATE_CODE_AND_RODATA */ + .ro . : { + __RO_START__ = .; + + *entrypoint.o(.text*) + *(SORT_BY_ALIGNMENT(.text*)) + *(SORT_BY_ALIGNMENT(.rodata*)) + + RODATA_COMMON + + . = ALIGN(8); + +# include <lib/el3_runtime/pubsub_events.h> + + *(.vectors) + + __RO_END_UNALIGNED__ = .; + + /* + * Memory page(s) mapped to this section will be marked as device + * memory. No other unexpected data must creep in. Ensure that the rest + * of the current memory page is unused. + */ + . = ALIGN(PAGE_SIZE); + + __RO_END__ = .; + } >RAM +#endif /* SEPARATE_CODE_AND_RODATA */ + + ASSERT(__CPU_OPS_END__ > __CPU_OPS_START__, + "cpu_ops not defined for this platform.") + + __RW_START__ = .; + + DATA_SECTION >RAM + RELA_SECTION >RAM + +#ifdef BL32_PROGBITS_LIMIT + ASSERT(. <= BL32_PROGBITS_LIMIT, "BL32 progbits has exceeded its limit.") +#endif /* BL32_PROGBITS_LIMIT */ + + STACK_SECTION >RAM + BSS_SECTION >RAM + XLAT_TABLE_SECTION >RAM + + __BSS_SIZE__ = SIZEOF(.bss); + +#if USE_COHERENT_MEM + /* + * The base address of the coherent memory section must be page-aligned to + * guarantee that the coherent data are stored on their own pages and are + * not mixed with normal data. This is required to set up the correct + * memory attributes for the coherent data page tables. + */ + .coherent_ram (NOLOAD) : ALIGN(PAGE_SIZE) { + __COHERENT_RAM_START__ = .; + + /* + * Bakery locks are stored in coherent memory. Each lock's data is + * contiguous and fully allocated by the compiler. + */ + *(.bakery_lock) + *(.tzfw_coherent_mem) + + __COHERENT_RAM_END_UNALIGNED__ = .; + + /* + * Memory page(s) mapped to this section will be marked as device + * memory. No other unexpected data must creep in. Ensure that the rest + * of the current memory page is unused. + */ + . = ALIGN(PAGE_SIZE); + + __COHERENT_RAM_END__ = .; + } >RAM + + __COHERENT_RAM_UNALIGNED_SIZE__ = + __COHERENT_RAM_END_UNALIGNED__ - __COHERENT_RAM_START__; +#endif /* USE_COHERENT_MEM */ + + __RW_END__ = .; + __BL32_END__ = .; + + /DISCARD/ : { + *(.dynsym .dynstr .hash .gnu.hash) + } + + ASSERT(. <= BL32_LIMIT, "BL32 image has exceeded its limit.") + RAM_REGION_END = .; +} diff --git a/bl32/sp_min/sp_min.mk b/bl32/sp_min/sp_min.mk new file mode 100644 index 0000000..065468c --- /dev/null +++ b/bl32/sp_min/sp_min.mk @@ -0,0 +1,84 @@ +# +# Copyright (c) 2016-2023, Arm Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. +# +# SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause +# + +ifneq (${ARCH}, aarch32) + $(error SP_MIN is only supported on AArch32 platforms) +endif + +include lib/extensions/amu/amu.mk +include lib/psci/psci_lib.mk + +INCLUDES += -Iinclude/bl32/sp_min + +BL32_SOURCES += bl32/sp_min/sp_min_main.c \ + bl32/sp_min/aarch32/entrypoint.S \ + common/runtime_svc.c \ + plat/common/aarch32/plat_sp_min_common.c\ + services/arm_arch_svc/arm_arch_svc_setup.c \ + services/std_svc/std_svc_setup.c \ + ${PSCI_LIB_SOURCES} + +ifeq (${ENABLE_PMF}, 1) +BL32_SOURCES += lib/pmf/pmf_main.c +endif + +ifneq (${ENABLE_FEAT_AMU},0) +BL32_SOURCES += ${AMU_SOURCES} +endif + +ifeq (${WORKAROUND_CVE_2017_5715},1) +BL32_SOURCES += bl32/sp_min/wa_cve_2017_5715_bpiall.S \ + bl32/sp_min/wa_cve_2017_5715_icache_inv.S +else +ifeq (${WORKAROUND_CVE_2022_23960},1) +BL32_SOURCES += bl32/sp_min/wa_cve_2017_5715_icache_inv.S +endif +endif + +ifeq (${TRNG_SUPPORT},1) +BL32_SOURCES += services/std_svc/trng/trng_main.c \ + services/std_svc/trng/trng_entropy_pool.c +endif + +ifeq (${ERRATA_ABI_SUPPORT}, 1) +BL32_SOURCES += services/std_svc/errata_abi/errata_abi_main.c +endif + +ifneq (${ENABLE_SYS_REG_TRACE_FOR_NS},0) +BL32_SOURCES += lib/extensions/sys_reg_trace/aarch32/sys_reg_trace.c +endif + +ifneq (${ENABLE_TRF_FOR_NS},0) +BL32_SOURCES += lib/extensions/trf/aarch32/trf.c +endif + +BL32_DEFAULT_LINKER_SCRIPT_SOURCE := bl32/sp_min/sp_min.ld.S + +ifneq ($(findstring gcc,$(notdir $(LD))),) + BL32_LDFLAGS += -Wl,--sort-section=alignment +else ifneq ($(findstring ld,$(notdir $(LD))),) + BL32_LDFLAGS += --sort-section=alignment +endif + +# Include the platform-specific SP_MIN Makefile +# If no platform-specific SP_MIN Makefile exists, it means SP_MIN is not supported +# on this platform. +SP_MIN_PLAT_MAKEFILE := $(wildcard ${PLAT_DIR}/sp_min/sp_min-${PLAT}.mk) +ifeq (,${SP_MIN_PLAT_MAKEFILE}) + $(error SP_MIN is not supported on platform ${PLAT}) +else + include ${SP_MIN_PLAT_MAKEFILE} +endif + +RESET_TO_SP_MIN := 0 +$(eval $(call add_define,RESET_TO_SP_MIN)) +$(eval $(call assert_boolean,RESET_TO_SP_MIN)) + +# Flag to allow SP_MIN to handle FIQ interrupts in monitor mode. The platform +# port is free to override this value. It is default disabled. +SP_MIN_WITH_SECURE_FIQ ?= 0 +$(eval $(call add_define,SP_MIN_WITH_SECURE_FIQ)) +$(eval $(call assert_boolean,SP_MIN_WITH_SECURE_FIQ)) diff --git a/bl32/sp_min/sp_min_main.c b/bl32/sp_min/sp_min_main.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..26cf207 --- /dev/null +++ b/bl32/sp_min/sp_min_main.c @@ -0,0 +1,250 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2016-2023, Arm Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +#include <assert.h> +#include <stddef.h> +#include <stdint.h> +#include <string.h> + +#include <platform_def.h> + +#include <arch.h> +#include <arch_helpers.h> +#include <common/bl_common.h> +#include <common/debug.h> +#include <common/runtime_svc.h> +#include <context.h> +#include <drivers/console.h> +#include <lib/el3_runtime/context_mgmt.h> +#include <lib/pmf/pmf.h> +#include <lib/psci/psci.h> +#include <lib/runtime_instr.h> +#include <lib/utils.h> +#include <plat/common/platform.h> +#include <platform_sp_min.h> +#include <services/std_svc.h> +#include <smccc_helpers.h> + +#include "sp_min_private.h" + +#if ENABLE_RUNTIME_INSTRUMENTATION +PMF_REGISTER_SERVICE_SMC(rt_instr_svc, PMF_RT_INSTR_SVC_ID, + RT_INSTR_TOTAL_IDS, PMF_STORE_ENABLE) +#endif + +/* Pointers to per-core cpu contexts */ +static void *sp_min_cpu_ctx_ptr[PLATFORM_CORE_COUNT]; + +/* SP_MIN only stores the non secure smc context */ +static smc_ctx_t sp_min_smc_context[PLATFORM_CORE_COUNT]; + +/****************************************************************************** + * Define the smccc helper library APIs + *****************************************************************************/ +void *smc_get_ctx(unsigned int security_state) +{ + assert(security_state == NON_SECURE); + return &sp_min_smc_context[plat_my_core_pos()]; +} + +void smc_set_next_ctx(unsigned int security_state) +{ + assert(security_state == NON_SECURE); + /* SP_MIN stores only non secure smc context. Nothing to do here */ +} + +void *smc_get_next_ctx(void) +{ + return &sp_min_smc_context[plat_my_core_pos()]; +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * This function returns a pointer to the most recent 'cpu_context' structure + * for the calling CPU that was set as the context for the specified security + * state. NULL is returned if no such structure has been specified. + ******************************************************************************/ +void *cm_get_context(uint32_t security_state) +{ + assert(security_state == NON_SECURE); + return sp_min_cpu_ctx_ptr[plat_my_core_pos()]; +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * This function sets the pointer to the current 'cpu_context' structure for the + * specified security state for the calling CPU + ******************************************************************************/ +void cm_set_context(void *context, uint32_t security_state) +{ + assert(security_state == NON_SECURE); + sp_min_cpu_ctx_ptr[plat_my_core_pos()] = context; +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * This function returns a pointer to the most recent 'cpu_context' structure + * for the CPU identified by `cpu_idx` that was set as the context for the + * specified security state. NULL is returned if no such structure has been + * specified. + ******************************************************************************/ +void *cm_get_context_by_index(unsigned int cpu_idx, + unsigned int security_state) +{ + assert(security_state == NON_SECURE); + return sp_min_cpu_ctx_ptr[cpu_idx]; +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * This function sets the pointer to the current 'cpu_context' structure for the + * specified security state for the CPU identified by CPU index. + ******************************************************************************/ +void cm_set_context_by_index(unsigned int cpu_idx, void *context, + unsigned int security_state) +{ + assert(security_state == NON_SECURE); + sp_min_cpu_ctx_ptr[cpu_idx] = context; +} + +static void copy_cpu_ctx_to_smc_stx(const regs_t *cpu_reg_ctx, + smc_ctx_t *next_smc_ctx) +{ + next_smc_ctx->r0 = read_ctx_reg(cpu_reg_ctx, CTX_GPREG_R0); + next_smc_ctx->r1 = read_ctx_reg(cpu_reg_ctx, CTX_GPREG_R1); + next_smc_ctx->r2 = read_ctx_reg(cpu_reg_ctx, CTX_GPREG_R2); + next_smc_ctx->lr_mon = read_ctx_reg(cpu_reg_ctx, CTX_LR); + next_smc_ctx->spsr_mon = read_ctx_reg(cpu_reg_ctx, CTX_SPSR); + next_smc_ctx->scr = read_ctx_reg(cpu_reg_ctx, CTX_SCR); +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * This function invokes the PSCI library interface to initialize the + * non secure cpu context and copies the relevant cpu context register values + * to smc context. These registers will get programmed during `smc_exit`. + ******************************************************************************/ +static void sp_min_prepare_next_image_entry(void) +{ + entry_point_info_t *next_image_info; + cpu_context_t *ctx = cm_get_context(NON_SECURE); + u_register_t ns_sctlr; + + /* Program system registers to proceed to non-secure */ + next_image_info = sp_min_plat_get_bl33_ep_info(); + assert(next_image_info); + assert(NON_SECURE == GET_SECURITY_STATE(next_image_info->h.attr)); + + INFO("SP_MIN: Preparing exit to normal world\n"); + print_entry_point_info(next_image_info); + + psci_prepare_next_non_secure_ctx(next_image_info); + smc_set_next_ctx(NON_SECURE); + + /* Copy r0, lr and spsr from cpu context to SMC context */ + copy_cpu_ctx_to_smc_stx(get_regs_ctx(cm_get_context(NON_SECURE)), + smc_get_next_ctx()); + + /* Temporarily set the NS bit to access NS SCTLR */ + write_scr(read_scr() | SCR_NS_BIT); + isb(); + ns_sctlr = read_ctx_reg(get_regs_ctx(ctx), CTX_NS_SCTLR); + write_sctlr(ns_sctlr); + isb(); + + write_scr(read_scr() & ~SCR_NS_BIT); + isb(); +} + +/****************************************************************************** + * Implement the ARM Standard Service function to get arguments for a + * particular service. + *****************************************************************************/ +uintptr_t get_arm_std_svc_args(unsigned int svc_mask) +{ + /* Setup the arguments for PSCI Library */ + DEFINE_STATIC_PSCI_LIB_ARGS_V1(psci_args, sp_min_warm_entrypoint); + + /* PSCI is the only ARM Standard Service implemented */ + assert(svc_mask == PSCI_FID_MASK); + + return (uintptr_t)&psci_args; +} + +/****************************************************************************** + * The SP_MIN main function. Do the platform and PSCI Library setup. Also + * initialize the runtime service framework. + *****************************************************************************/ +void sp_min_main(void) +{ + NOTICE("SP_MIN: %s\n", version_string); + NOTICE("SP_MIN: %s\n", build_message); + + /* Perform the SP_MIN platform setup */ + sp_min_platform_setup(); + + /* Initialize the runtime services e.g. psci */ + INFO("SP_MIN: Initializing runtime services\n"); + runtime_svc_init(); + + /* + * We are ready to enter the next EL. Prepare entry into the image + * corresponding to the desired security state after the next ERET. + */ + sp_min_prepare_next_image_entry(); + + /* + * Perform any platform specific runtime setup prior to cold boot exit + * from SP_MIN. + */ + sp_min_plat_runtime_setup(); + + console_flush(); +} + +/****************************************************************************** + * This function is invoked during warm boot. Invoke the PSCI library + * warm boot entry point which takes care of Architectural and platform setup/ + * restore. Copy the relevant cpu_context register values to smc context which + * will get programmed during `smc_exit`. + *****************************************************************************/ +void sp_min_warm_boot(void) +{ + smc_ctx_t *next_smc_ctx; + cpu_context_t *ctx = cm_get_context(NON_SECURE); + u_register_t ns_sctlr; + + psci_warmboot_entrypoint(); + + smc_set_next_ctx(NON_SECURE); + + next_smc_ctx = smc_get_next_ctx(); + zeromem(next_smc_ctx, sizeof(smc_ctx_t)); + + copy_cpu_ctx_to_smc_stx(get_regs_ctx(cm_get_context(NON_SECURE)), + next_smc_ctx); + + /* Temporarily set the NS bit to access NS SCTLR */ + write_scr(read_scr() | SCR_NS_BIT); + isb(); + ns_sctlr = read_ctx_reg(get_regs_ctx(ctx), CTX_NS_SCTLR); + write_sctlr(ns_sctlr); + isb(); + + write_scr(read_scr() & ~SCR_NS_BIT); + isb(); +} + +#if SP_MIN_WITH_SECURE_FIQ +/****************************************************************************** + * This function is invoked on secure interrupts. By construction of the + * SP_MIN, secure interrupts can only be handled when core executes in non + * secure state. + *****************************************************************************/ +void sp_min_fiq(void) +{ + uint32_t id; + + id = plat_ic_acknowledge_interrupt(); + sp_min_plat_fiq_handler(id); + plat_ic_end_of_interrupt(id); +} +#endif /* SP_MIN_WITH_SECURE_FIQ */ diff --git a/bl32/sp_min/sp_min_private.h b/bl32/sp_min/sp_min_private.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..628581a --- /dev/null +++ b/bl32/sp_min/sp_min_private.h @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2016, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +#ifndef SP_MIN_PRIVATE_H +#define SP_MIN_PRIVATE_H + +void sp_min_main(void); +void sp_min_warm_boot(void); +void sp_min_fiq(void); + +#endif /* SP_MIN_PRIVATE_H */ diff --git a/bl32/sp_min/wa_cve_2017_5715_bpiall.S b/bl32/sp_min/wa_cve_2017_5715_bpiall.S new file mode 100644 index 0000000..385f3d4 --- /dev/null +++ b/bl32/sp_min/wa_cve_2017_5715_bpiall.S @@ -0,0 +1,74 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2018, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +#include <asm_macros.S> + + .globl wa_cve_2017_5715_bpiall_vbar + +vector_base wa_cve_2017_5715_bpiall_vbar + /* We encode the exception entry in the bottom 3 bits of SP */ + add sp, sp, #1 /* Reset: 0b111 */ + add sp, sp, #1 /* Undef: 0b110 */ + add sp, sp, #1 /* Syscall: 0b101 */ + add sp, sp, #1 /* Prefetch abort: 0b100 */ + add sp, sp, #1 /* Data abort: 0b011 */ + add sp, sp, #1 /* Reserved: 0b010 */ + add sp, sp, #1 /* IRQ: 0b001 */ + nop /* FIQ: 0b000 */ + + /* + * Invalidate the branch predictor, `r0` is a dummy register + * and is unused. + */ + stcopr r0, BPIALL + isb + + /* + * As we cannot use any temporary registers and cannot + * clobber SP, we can decode the exception entry using + * an unrolled binary search. + * + * Note, if this code is re-used by other secure payloads, + * the below exception entry vectors must be changed to + * the vectors specific to that secure payload. + */ + + tst sp, #4 + bne 1f + + tst sp, #2 + bne 3f + + /* Expected encoding: 0x1 and 0x0 */ + tst sp, #1 + /* Restore original value of SP by clearing the bottom 3 bits */ + bic sp, sp, #0x7 + bne plat_panic_handler /* IRQ */ + b sp_min_handle_fiq /* FIQ */ + +1: + tst sp, #2 + bne 2f + + /* Expected encoding: 0x4 and 0x5 */ + tst sp, #1 + bic sp, sp, #0x7 + bne sp_min_handle_smc /* Syscall */ + b plat_panic_handler /* Prefetch abort */ + +2: + /* Expected encoding: 0x7 and 0x6 */ + tst sp, #1 + bic sp, sp, #0x7 + bne sp_min_entrypoint /* Reset */ + b plat_panic_handler /* Undef */ + +3: + /* Expected encoding: 0x2 and 0x3 */ + tst sp, #1 + bic sp, sp, #0x7 + bne plat_panic_handler /* Data abort */ + b plat_panic_handler /* Reserved */ diff --git a/bl32/sp_min/wa_cve_2017_5715_icache_inv.S b/bl32/sp_min/wa_cve_2017_5715_icache_inv.S new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d0a4625 --- /dev/null +++ b/bl32/sp_min/wa_cve_2017_5715_icache_inv.S @@ -0,0 +1,75 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2018, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +#include <asm_macros.S> + + .globl wa_cve_2017_5715_icache_inv_vbar + +vector_base wa_cve_2017_5715_icache_inv_vbar + /* We encode the exception entry in the bottom 3 bits of SP */ + add sp, sp, #1 /* Reset: 0b111 */ + add sp, sp, #1 /* Undef: 0b110 */ + add sp, sp, #1 /* Syscall: 0b101 */ + add sp, sp, #1 /* Prefetch abort: 0b100 */ + add sp, sp, #1 /* Data abort: 0b011 */ + add sp, sp, #1 /* Reserved: 0b010 */ + add sp, sp, #1 /* IRQ: 0b001 */ + nop /* FIQ: 0b000 */ + + /* + * Invalidate the instruction cache, which we assume also + * invalidates the branch predictor. This may depend on + * other CPU specific changes (e.g. an ACTLR setting). + */ + stcopr r0, ICIALLU + isb + + /* + * As we cannot use any temporary registers and cannot + * clobber SP, we can decode the exception entry using + * an unrolled binary search. + * + * Note, if this code is re-used by other secure payloads, + * the below exception entry vectors must be changed to + * the vectors specific to that secure payload. + */ + + tst sp, #4 + bne 1f + + tst sp, #2 + bne 3f + + /* Expected encoding: 0x1 and 0x0 */ + tst sp, #1 + /* Restore original value of SP by clearing the bottom 3 bits */ + bic sp, sp, #0x7 + bne plat_panic_handler /* IRQ */ + b sp_min_handle_fiq /* FIQ */ + +1: + /* Expected encoding: 0x4 and 0x5 */ + tst sp, #2 + bne 2f + + tst sp, #1 + bic sp, sp, #0x7 + bne sp_min_handle_smc /* Syscall */ + b plat_panic_handler /* Prefetch abort */ + +2: + /* Expected encoding: 0x7 and 0x6 */ + tst sp, #1 + bic sp, sp, #0x7 + bne sp_min_entrypoint /* Reset */ + b plat_panic_handler /* Undef */ + +3: + /* Expected encoding: 0x2 and 0x3 */ + tst sp, #1 + bic sp, sp, #0x7 + bne plat_panic_handler /* Data abort */ + b plat_panic_handler /* Reserved */ diff --git a/bl32/tsp/aarch64/tsp_entrypoint.S b/bl32/tsp/aarch64/tsp_entrypoint.S new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e5ea88c --- /dev/null +++ b/bl32/tsp/aarch64/tsp_entrypoint.S @@ -0,0 +1,489 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2013-2022, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +#include <platform_def.h> + +#include <arch.h> +#include <asm_macros.S> +#include <bl32/tsp/tsp.h> +#include <lib/xlat_tables/xlat_tables_defs.h> +#include <smccc_helpers.h> + +#include "../tsp_private.h" + + + .globl tsp_entrypoint + .globl tsp_vector_table +#if SPMC_AT_EL3 + .globl tsp_cpu_on_entry +#endif + + + + /* --------------------------------------------- + * Populate the params in x0-x7 from the pointer + * to the smc args structure in x0. + * --------------------------------------------- + */ + .macro restore_args_call_smc + ldp x6, x7, [x0, #SMC_ARG6] + ldp x4, x5, [x0, #SMC_ARG4] + ldp x2, x3, [x0, #SMC_ARG2] + ldp x0, x1, [x0, #SMC_ARG0] + smc #0 + .endm + + .macro save_eret_context reg1 reg2 + mrs \reg1, elr_el1 + mrs \reg2, spsr_el1 + stp \reg1, \reg2, [sp, #-0x10]! + stp x30, x18, [sp, #-0x10]! + .endm + + .macro restore_eret_context reg1 reg2 + ldp x30, x18, [sp], #0x10 + ldp \reg1, \reg2, [sp], #0x10 + msr elr_el1, \reg1 + msr spsr_el1, \reg2 + .endm + +func tsp_entrypoint _align=3 + +#if ENABLE_PIE + /* + * ------------------------------------------------------------ + * If PIE is enabled fixup the Global descriptor Table only + * once during primary core cold boot path. + * + * Compile time base address, required for fixup, is calculated + * using "pie_fixup" label present within first page. + * ------------------------------------------------------------ + */ + pie_fixup: + ldr x0, =pie_fixup + and x0, x0, #~(PAGE_SIZE_MASK) + mov_imm x1, (BL32_LIMIT - BL32_BASE) + add x1, x1, x0 + bl fixup_gdt_reloc +#endif /* ENABLE_PIE */ + + /* --------------------------------------------- + * Set the exception vector to something sane. + * --------------------------------------------- + */ + adr x0, tsp_exceptions + msr vbar_el1, x0 + isb + + /* --------------------------------------------- + * Enable the SError interrupt now that the + * exception vectors have been setup. + * --------------------------------------------- + */ + msr daifclr, #DAIF_ABT_BIT + + /* --------------------------------------------- + * Enable the instruction cache, stack pointer + * and data access alignment checks and disable + * speculative loads. + * --------------------------------------------- + */ + mov x1, #(SCTLR_I_BIT | SCTLR_A_BIT | SCTLR_SA_BIT) + mrs x0, sctlr_el1 + orr x0, x0, x1 + bic x0, x0, #SCTLR_DSSBS_BIT + msr sctlr_el1, x0 + isb + + /* --------------------------------------------- + * Invalidate the RW memory used by the BL32 + * image. This includes the data and NOBITS + * sections. This is done to safeguard against + * possible corruption of this memory by dirty + * cache lines in a system cache as a result of + * use by an earlier boot loader stage. If PIE + * is enabled however, RO sections including the + * GOT may be modified during pie fixup. + * Therefore, to be on the safe side, invalidate + * the entire image region if PIE is enabled. + * --------------------------------------------- + */ +#if ENABLE_PIE +#if SEPARATE_CODE_AND_RODATA + adrp x0, __TEXT_START__ + add x0, x0, :lo12:__TEXT_START__ +#else + adrp x0, __RO_START__ + add x0, x0, :lo12:__RO_START__ +#endif /* SEPARATE_CODE_AND_RODATA */ +#else + adrp x0, __RW_START__ + add x0, x0, :lo12:__RW_START__ +#endif /* ENABLE_PIE */ + adrp x1, __RW_END__ + add x1, x1, :lo12:__RW_END__ + sub x1, x1, x0 + bl inv_dcache_range + + /* --------------------------------------------- + * Zero out NOBITS sections. There are 2 of them: + * - the .bss section; + * - the coherent memory section. + * --------------------------------------------- + */ + adrp x0, __BSS_START__ + add x0, x0, :lo12:__BSS_START__ + adrp x1, __BSS_END__ + add x1, x1, :lo12:__BSS_END__ + sub x1, x1, x0 + bl zeromem + +#if USE_COHERENT_MEM + adrp x0, __COHERENT_RAM_START__ + add x0, x0, :lo12:__COHERENT_RAM_START__ + adrp x1, __COHERENT_RAM_END_UNALIGNED__ + add x1, x1, :lo12:__COHERENT_RAM_END_UNALIGNED__ + sub x1, x1, x0 + bl zeromem +#endif + + /* -------------------------------------------- + * Allocate a stack whose memory will be marked + * as Normal-IS-WBWA when the MMU is enabled. + * There is no risk of reading stale stack + * memory after enabling the MMU as only the + * primary cpu is running at the moment. + * -------------------------------------------- + */ + bl plat_set_my_stack + + /* --------------------------------------------- + * Initialize the stack protector canary before + * any C code is called. + * --------------------------------------------- + */ +#if STACK_PROTECTOR_ENABLED + bl update_stack_protector_canary +#endif + + /* --------------------------------------------- + * Perform TSP setup + * --------------------------------------------- + */ + bl tsp_setup + +#if ENABLE_PAUTH + /* --------------------------------------------- + * Program APIAKey_EL1 + * and enable pointer authentication + * --------------------------------------------- + */ + bl pauth_init_enable_el1 +#endif /* ENABLE_PAUTH */ + + /* --------------------------------------------- + * Jump to main function. + * --------------------------------------------- + */ + bl tsp_main + + /* --------------------------------------------- + * Tell TSPD that we are done initialising + * --------------------------------------------- + */ + mov x1, x0 + mov x0, #TSP_ENTRY_DONE + smc #0 + +tsp_entrypoint_panic: + b tsp_entrypoint_panic +endfunc tsp_entrypoint + + + /* ------------------------------------------- + * Table of entrypoint vectors provided to the + * TSPD for the various entrypoints + * ------------------------------------------- + */ +vector_base tsp_vector_table + b tsp_yield_smc_entry + b tsp_fast_smc_entry + b tsp_cpu_on_entry + b tsp_cpu_off_entry + b tsp_cpu_resume_entry + b tsp_cpu_suspend_entry + b tsp_sel1_intr_entry + b tsp_system_off_entry + b tsp_system_reset_entry + b tsp_abort_yield_smc_entry + + /*--------------------------------------------- + * This entrypoint is used by the TSPD when this + * cpu is to be turned off through a CPU_OFF + * psci call to ask the TSP to perform any + * bookeeping necessary. In the current + * implementation, the TSPD expects the TSP to + * re-initialise its state so nothing is done + * here except for acknowledging the request. + * --------------------------------------------- + */ +func tsp_cpu_off_entry + bl tsp_cpu_off_main + restore_args_call_smc +endfunc tsp_cpu_off_entry + + /*--------------------------------------------- + * This entrypoint is used by the TSPD when the + * system is about to be switched off (through + * a SYSTEM_OFF psci call) to ask the TSP to + * perform any necessary bookkeeping. + * --------------------------------------------- + */ +func tsp_system_off_entry + bl tsp_system_off_main + restore_args_call_smc +endfunc tsp_system_off_entry + + /*--------------------------------------------- + * This entrypoint is used by the TSPD when the + * system is about to be reset (through a + * SYSTEM_RESET psci call) to ask the TSP to + * perform any necessary bookkeeping. + * --------------------------------------------- + */ +func tsp_system_reset_entry + bl tsp_system_reset_main + restore_args_call_smc +endfunc tsp_system_reset_entry + + /*--------------------------------------------- + * This entrypoint is used by the TSPD when this + * cpu is turned on using a CPU_ON psci call to + * ask the TSP to initialise itself i.e. setup + * the mmu, stacks etc. Minimal architectural + * state will be initialised by the TSPD when + * this function is entered i.e. Caches and MMU + * will be turned off, the execution state + * will be aarch64 and exceptions masked. + * --------------------------------------------- + */ +func tsp_cpu_on_entry + /* --------------------------------------------- + * Set the exception vector to something sane. + * --------------------------------------------- + */ + adr x0, tsp_exceptions + msr vbar_el1, x0 + isb + + /* Enable the SError interrupt */ + msr daifclr, #DAIF_ABT_BIT + + /* --------------------------------------------- + * Enable the instruction cache, stack pointer + * and data access alignment checks + * --------------------------------------------- + */ + mov x1, #(SCTLR_I_BIT | SCTLR_A_BIT | SCTLR_SA_BIT) + mrs x0, sctlr_el1 + orr x0, x0, x1 + msr sctlr_el1, x0 + isb + + /* -------------------------------------------- + * Give ourselves a stack whose memory will be + * marked as Normal-IS-WBWA when the MMU is + * enabled. + * -------------------------------------------- + */ + bl plat_set_my_stack + + /* -------------------------------------------- + * Enable MMU and D-caches together. + * -------------------------------------------- + */ + mov x0, #0 + bl bl32_plat_enable_mmu + +#if ENABLE_PAUTH + /* --------------------------------------------- + * Program APIAKey_EL1 + * and enable pointer authentication + * --------------------------------------------- + */ + bl pauth_init_enable_el1 +#endif /* ENABLE_PAUTH */ + + /* --------------------------------------------- + * Enter C runtime to perform any remaining + * book keeping + * --------------------------------------------- + */ + bl tsp_cpu_on_main + restore_args_call_smc + + /* Should never reach here */ +tsp_cpu_on_entry_panic: + b tsp_cpu_on_entry_panic +endfunc tsp_cpu_on_entry + + /*--------------------------------------------- + * This entrypoint is used by the TSPD when this + * cpu is to be suspended through a CPU_SUSPEND + * psci call to ask the TSP to perform any + * bookeeping necessary. In the current + * implementation, the TSPD saves and restores + * the EL1 state. + * --------------------------------------------- + */ +func tsp_cpu_suspend_entry + bl tsp_cpu_suspend_main + restore_args_call_smc +endfunc tsp_cpu_suspend_entry + + /*------------------------------------------------- + * This entrypoint is used by the TSPD to pass + * control for `synchronously` handling a S-EL1 + * Interrupt which was triggered while executing + * in normal world. 'x0' contains a magic number + * which indicates this. TSPD expects control to + * be handed back at the end of interrupt + * processing. This is done through an SMC. + * The handover agreement is: + * + * 1. PSTATE.DAIF are set upon entry. 'x1' has + * the ELR_EL3 from the non-secure state. + * 2. TSP has to preserve the callee saved + * general purpose registers, SP_EL1/EL0 and + * LR. + * 3. TSP has to preserve the system and vfp + * registers (if applicable). + * 4. TSP can use 'x0-x18' to enable its C + * runtime. + * 5. TSP returns to TSPD using an SMC with + * 'x0' = TSP_HANDLED_S_EL1_INTR + * ------------------------------------------------ + */ +func tsp_sel1_intr_entry +#if DEBUG + mov_imm x2, TSP_HANDLE_SEL1_INTR_AND_RETURN + cmp x0, x2 + b.ne tsp_sel1_int_entry_panic +#endif + /*------------------------------------------------- + * Save any previous context needed to perform + * an exception return from S-EL1 e.g. context + * from a previous Non secure Interrupt. + * Update statistics and handle the S-EL1 + * interrupt before returning to the TSPD. + * IRQ/FIQs are not enabled since that will + * complicate the implementation. Execution + * will be transferred back to the normal world + * in any case. The handler can return 0 + * if the interrupt was handled or TSP_PREEMPTED + * if the expected interrupt was preempted + * by an interrupt that should be handled in EL3 + * e.g. Group 0 interrupt in GICv3. In both + * the cases switch to EL3 using SMC with id + * TSP_HANDLED_S_EL1_INTR. Any other return value + * from the handler will result in panic. + * ------------------------------------------------ + */ + save_eret_context x2 x3 + bl tsp_update_sync_sel1_intr_stats + bl tsp_common_int_handler + /* Check if the S-EL1 interrupt has been handled */ + cbnz x0, tsp_sel1_intr_check_preemption + b tsp_sel1_intr_return +tsp_sel1_intr_check_preemption: + /* Check if the S-EL1 interrupt has been preempted */ + mov_imm x1, TSP_PREEMPTED + cmp x0, x1 + b.ne tsp_sel1_int_entry_panic +tsp_sel1_intr_return: + mov_imm x0, TSP_HANDLED_S_EL1_INTR + restore_eret_context x2 x3 + smc #0 + + /* Should never reach here */ +tsp_sel1_int_entry_panic: + no_ret plat_panic_handler +endfunc tsp_sel1_intr_entry + + /*--------------------------------------------- + * This entrypoint is used by the TSPD when this + * cpu resumes execution after an earlier + * CPU_SUSPEND psci call to ask the TSP to + * restore its saved context. In the current + * implementation, the TSPD saves and restores + * EL1 state so nothing is done here apart from + * acknowledging the request. + * --------------------------------------------- + */ +func tsp_cpu_resume_entry + bl tsp_cpu_resume_main + restore_args_call_smc + + /* Should never reach here */ + no_ret plat_panic_handler +endfunc tsp_cpu_resume_entry + + /*--------------------------------------------- + * This entrypoint is used by the TSPD to ask + * the TSP to service a fast smc request. + * --------------------------------------------- + */ +func tsp_fast_smc_entry + bl tsp_smc_handler + restore_args_call_smc + + /* Should never reach here */ + no_ret plat_panic_handler +endfunc tsp_fast_smc_entry + + /*--------------------------------------------- + * This entrypoint is used by the TSPD to ask + * the TSP to service a Yielding SMC request. + * We will enable preemption during execution + * of tsp_smc_handler. + * --------------------------------------------- + */ +func tsp_yield_smc_entry + msr daifclr, #DAIF_FIQ_BIT | DAIF_IRQ_BIT + bl tsp_smc_handler + msr daifset, #DAIF_FIQ_BIT | DAIF_IRQ_BIT + restore_args_call_smc + + /* Should never reach here */ + no_ret plat_panic_handler +endfunc tsp_yield_smc_entry + + /*--------------------------------------------------------------------- + * This entrypoint is used by the TSPD to abort a pre-empted Yielding + * SMC. It could be on behalf of non-secure world or because a CPU + * suspend/CPU off request needs to abort the preempted SMC. + * -------------------------------------------------------------------- + */ +func tsp_abort_yield_smc_entry + + /* + * Exceptions masking is already done by the TSPD when entering this + * hook so there is no need to do it here. + */ + + /* Reset the stack used by the pre-empted SMC */ + bl plat_set_my_stack + + /* + * Allow some cleanup such as releasing locks. + */ + bl tsp_abort_smc_handler + + restore_args_call_smc + + /* Should never reach here */ + bl plat_panic_handler +endfunc tsp_abort_yield_smc_entry diff --git a/bl32/tsp/aarch64/tsp_exceptions.S b/bl32/tsp/aarch64/tsp_exceptions.S new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4c6a56a --- /dev/null +++ b/bl32/tsp/aarch64/tsp_exceptions.S @@ -0,0 +1,162 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2013-2020, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +#include <arch.h> +#include <asm_macros.S> +#include <bl32/tsp/tsp.h> +#include <common/bl_common.h> + + /* ---------------------------------------------------- + * The caller-saved registers x0-x18 and LR are saved + * here. + * ---------------------------------------------------- + */ + +#define SCRATCH_REG_SIZE #(20 * 8) + + .macro save_caller_regs_and_lr + sub sp, sp, SCRATCH_REG_SIZE + stp x0, x1, [sp] + stp x2, x3, [sp, #0x10] + stp x4, x5, [sp, #0x20] + stp x6, x7, [sp, #0x30] + stp x8, x9, [sp, #0x40] + stp x10, x11, [sp, #0x50] + stp x12, x13, [sp, #0x60] + stp x14, x15, [sp, #0x70] + stp x16, x17, [sp, #0x80] + stp x18, x30, [sp, #0x90] + .endm + + .macro restore_caller_regs_and_lr + ldp x0, x1, [sp] + ldp x2, x3, [sp, #0x10] + ldp x4, x5, [sp, #0x20] + ldp x6, x7, [sp, #0x30] + ldp x8, x9, [sp, #0x40] + ldp x10, x11, [sp, #0x50] + ldp x12, x13, [sp, #0x60] + ldp x14, x15, [sp, #0x70] + ldp x16, x17, [sp, #0x80] + ldp x18, x30, [sp, #0x90] + add sp, sp, SCRATCH_REG_SIZE + .endm + + /* ---------------------------------------------------- + * Common TSP interrupt handling routine + * ---------------------------------------------------- + */ + .macro handle_tsp_interrupt label + /* Enable the SError interrupt */ + msr daifclr, #DAIF_ABT_BIT + + save_caller_regs_and_lr + bl tsp_common_int_handler + cbz x0, interrupt_exit_\label + + /* + * This interrupt was not targetted to S-EL1 so send it to + * the monitor and wait for execution to resume. + */ + smc #0 +interrupt_exit_\label: + restore_caller_regs_and_lr + exception_return + .endm + + .globl tsp_exceptions + + /* ----------------------------------------------------- + * TSP exception handlers. + * ----------------------------------------------------- + */ +vector_base tsp_exceptions + /* ----------------------------------------------------- + * Current EL with _sp_el0 : 0x0 - 0x200. No exceptions + * are expected and treated as irrecoverable errors. + * ----------------------------------------------------- + */ +vector_entry sync_exception_sp_el0 + b plat_panic_handler +end_vector_entry sync_exception_sp_el0 + +vector_entry irq_sp_el0 + b plat_panic_handler +end_vector_entry irq_sp_el0 + +vector_entry fiq_sp_el0 + b plat_panic_handler +end_vector_entry fiq_sp_el0 + +vector_entry serror_sp_el0 + b plat_panic_handler +end_vector_entry serror_sp_el0 + + + /* ----------------------------------------------------- + * Current EL with SPx: 0x200 - 0x400. Only IRQs/FIQs + * are expected and handled + * ----------------------------------------------------- + */ +vector_entry sync_exception_sp_elx + b plat_panic_handler +end_vector_entry sync_exception_sp_elx + +vector_entry irq_sp_elx + handle_tsp_interrupt irq_sp_elx +end_vector_entry irq_sp_elx + +vector_entry fiq_sp_elx + handle_tsp_interrupt fiq_sp_elx +end_vector_entry fiq_sp_elx + +vector_entry serror_sp_elx + b plat_panic_handler +end_vector_entry serror_sp_elx + + + /* ----------------------------------------------------- + * Lower EL using AArch64 : 0x400 - 0x600. No exceptions + * are handled since TSP does not implement a lower EL + * ----------------------------------------------------- + */ +vector_entry sync_exception_aarch64 + b plat_panic_handler +end_vector_entry sync_exception_aarch64 + +vector_entry irq_aarch64 + b plat_panic_handler +end_vector_entry irq_aarch64 + +vector_entry fiq_aarch64 + b plat_panic_handler +end_vector_entry fiq_aarch64 + +vector_entry serror_aarch64 + b plat_panic_handler +end_vector_entry serror_aarch64 + + + /* ----------------------------------------------------- + * Lower EL using AArch32 : 0x600 - 0x800. No exceptions + * handled since the TSP does not implement a lower EL. + * ----------------------------------------------------- + */ +vector_entry sync_exception_aarch32 + b plat_panic_handler +end_vector_entry sync_exception_aarch32 + +vector_entry irq_aarch32 + b plat_panic_handler +end_vector_entry irq_aarch32 + +vector_entry fiq_aarch32 + b plat_panic_handler +end_vector_entry fiq_aarch32 + +vector_entry serror_aarch32 + b plat_panic_handler +end_vector_entry serror_aarch32 diff --git a/bl32/tsp/aarch64/tsp_request.S b/bl32/tsp/aarch64/tsp_request.S new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6e238ea --- /dev/null +++ b/bl32/tsp/aarch64/tsp_request.S @@ -0,0 +1,30 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2013-2020, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +#include <asm_macros.S> +#include <bl32/tsp/tsp.h> + + .globl tsp_get_magic + +/* + * This function raises an SMC to retrieve arguments from secure + * monitor/dispatcher, saves the returned arguments the array received in x0, + * and then returns to the caller + */ +func tsp_get_magic + /* Load arguments */ + ldr w0, _tsp_fid_get_magic + + /* Raise SMC */ + smc #0 + + /* Return arguments in x1:x0 */ + ret +endfunc tsp_get_magic + + .align 2 +_tsp_fid_get_magic: + .word TSP_GET_ARGS diff --git a/bl32/tsp/ffa_helpers.c b/bl32/tsp/ffa_helpers.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ad70c2b --- /dev/null +++ b/bl32/tsp/ffa_helpers.c @@ -0,0 +1,252 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2022, Arm Limited. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +#include <common/debug.h> +#include "ffa_helpers.h" +#include <services/ffa_svc.h> +#include "tsp_private.h" + +/******************************************************************************* + * Wrapper function to send a direct request. + ******************************************************************************/ +smc_args_t ffa_msg_send_direct_req(ffa_endpoint_id16_t sender, + ffa_endpoint_id16_t receiver, + uint32_t arg3, + uint32_t arg4, + uint32_t arg5, + uint32_t arg6, + uint32_t arg7) +{ + uint32_t src_dst_ids = (sender << FFA_DIRECT_MSG_SOURCE_SHIFT) | + (receiver << FFA_DIRECT_MSG_DESTINATION_SHIFT); + + + /* Send Direct Request. */ + return smc_helper(FFA_MSG_SEND_DIRECT_REQ_SMC64, src_dst_ids, + 0, arg3, arg4, arg5, arg6, arg7); +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * Wrapper function to send a direct response. + ******************************************************************************/ +smc_args_t *ffa_msg_send_direct_resp(ffa_endpoint_id16_t sender, + ffa_endpoint_id16_t receiver, + uint32_t arg3, + uint32_t arg4, + uint32_t arg5, + uint32_t arg6, + uint32_t arg7) +{ + uint32_t src_dst_ids = (sender << FFA_DIRECT_MSG_SOURCE_SHIFT) | + (receiver << FFA_DIRECT_MSG_DESTINATION_SHIFT); + + return set_smc_args(FFA_MSG_SEND_DIRECT_RESP_SMC64, src_dst_ids, + 0, arg3, arg4, arg5, arg6, arg7); +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * Memory Management Helpers. + ******************************************************************************/ + +/** + * Initialises the header of the given `ffa_mtd`, not including the + * composite memory region offset. + */ +static void ffa_memory_region_init_header( + struct ffa_mtd *memory_region, ffa_endpoint_id16_t sender, + ffa_mem_attr16_t attributes, ffa_mtd_flag32_t flags, + uint64_t handle, uint64_t tag, ffa_endpoint_id16_t *receivers, + uint32_t receiver_count, ffa_mem_perm8_t permissions) +{ + struct ffa_emad_v1_0 *emad; + + memory_region->emad_offset = sizeof(struct ffa_mtd); + memory_region->emad_size = sizeof(struct ffa_emad_v1_0); + emad = (struct ffa_emad_v1_0 *) + ((uint8_t *) memory_region + + memory_region->emad_offset); + memory_region->sender_id = sender; + memory_region->memory_region_attributes = attributes; + memory_region->reserved_36_39 = 0; + memory_region->flags = flags; + memory_region->handle = handle; + memory_region->tag = tag; + memory_region->reserved_40_47 = 0; + memory_region->emad_count = receiver_count; + for (uint32_t i = 0U; i < receiver_count; i++) { + emad[i].mapd.endpoint_id = receivers[i]; + emad[i].mapd.memory_access_permissions = permissions; + emad[i].mapd.flags = 0; + emad[i].comp_mrd_offset = 0; + emad[i].reserved_8_15 = 0; + } +} +/** + * Initialises the given `ffa_mtd` to be used for an + * `FFA_MEM_RETRIEVE_REQ` by the receiver of a memory transaction. + * TODO: Support differing attributes per receiver. + * + * Returns the size of the descriptor written. + */ +static uint32_t ffa_memory_retrieve_request_init( + struct ffa_mtd *memory_region, uint64_t handle, + ffa_endpoint_id16_t sender, ffa_endpoint_id16_t *receivers, uint32_t receiver_count, + uint64_t tag, ffa_mtd_flag32_t flags, + ffa_mem_perm8_t permissions, + ffa_mem_attr16_t attributes) +{ + ffa_memory_region_init_header(memory_region, sender, attributes, flags, + handle, tag, receivers, + receiver_count, permissions); + + return sizeof(struct ffa_mtd) + + memory_region->emad_count * sizeof(struct ffa_emad_v1_0); +} + +/* Relinquish access to memory region. */ +bool ffa_mem_relinquish(void) +{ + smc_args_t ret; + + ret = smc_helper(FFA_MEM_RELINQUISH, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0); + if (ffa_func_id(ret) != FFA_SUCCESS_SMC32) { + ERROR("%s failed to relinquish memory! error: (%x) %x\n", + __func__, ffa_func_id(ret), ffa_error_code(ret)); + return false; + } + return true; +} + +/* Retrieve memory shared by another partition. */ +smc_args_t ffa_mem_retrieve_req(uint32_t descriptor_length, + uint32_t fragment_length) +{ + return smc_helper(FFA_MEM_RETRIEVE_REQ_SMC32, + descriptor_length, + fragment_length, + 0, 0, 0, 0, 0); +} + +/* Retrieve the next memory descriptor fragment. */ +smc_args_t ffa_mem_frag_rx(uint64_t handle, uint32_t recv_length) +{ + return smc_helper(FFA_MEM_FRAG_RX, + FFA_MEM_HANDLE_LOW(handle), + FFA_MEM_HANDLE_HIGH(handle), + recv_length, + 0, 0, 0, 0); +} + +bool memory_retrieve(struct mailbox *mb, + struct ffa_mtd **retrieved, + uint64_t handle, ffa_endpoint_id16_t sender, + ffa_endpoint_id16_t *receivers, uint32_t receiver_count, + ffa_mtd_flag32_t flags, uint32_t *frag_length, + uint32_t *total_length) +{ + smc_args_t ret; + uint32_t descriptor_size; + struct ffa_mtd *memory_region; + + if (retrieved == NULL || mb == NULL) { + ERROR("Invalid parameters!\n"); + return false; + } + + memory_region = (struct ffa_mtd *)mb->tx_buffer; + + /* Clear TX buffer. */ + memset(memory_region, 0, PAGE_SIZE); + + /* Clear local buffer. */ + memset(mem_region_buffer, 0, REGION_BUF_SIZE); + + descriptor_size = ffa_memory_retrieve_request_init( + memory_region, handle, sender, receivers, receiver_count, 0, flags, + FFA_MEM_PERM_RW | FFA_MEM_PERM_NX, + FFA_MEM_ATTR_NORMAL_MEMORY_CACHED_WB | + FFA_MEM_ATTR_INNER_SHAREABLE); + + ret = ffa_mem_retrieve_req(descriptor_size, descriptor_size); + + if (ffa_func_id(ret) == FFA_ERROR) { + ERROR("Couldn't retrieve the memory page. Error: %x\n", + ffa_error_code(ret)); + return false; + } + + /* + * Following total_size and fragment_size are useful to keep track + * of the state of transaction. When the sum of all fragment_size of all + * fragments is equal to total_size, the memory transaction has been + * completed. + */ + *total_length = ret._regs[1]; + *frag_length = ret._regs[2]; + + /* Validate frag_length is less than total_length and mailbox size. */ + if (*frag_length == 0U || *total_length == 0U || + *frag_length > *total_length || *frag_length > (mb->rxtx_page_count * PAGE_SIZE)) { + ERROR("Invalid parameters!\n"); + return false; + } + + /* Copy response to local buffer. */ + memcpy(mem_region_buffer, mb->rx_buffer, *frag_length); + + if (ffa_rx_release()) { + ERROR("Failed to release buffer!\n"); + return false; + } + + *retrieved = (struct ffa_mtd *) mem_region_buffer; + + if ((*retrieved)->emad_count > MAX_MEM_SHARE_RECIPIENTS) { + VERBOSE("SPMC memory sharing supports max of %u receivers!\n", + MAX_MEM_SHARE_RECIPIENTS); + return false; + } + + /* + * We are sharing memory from the normal world therefore validate the NS + * bit was set by the SPMC. + */ + if (((*retrieved)->memory_region_attributes & FFA_MEM_ATTR_NS_BIT) == 0U) { + ERROR("SPMC has not set the NS bit! 0x%x\n", + (*retrieved)->memory_region_attributes); + return false; + } + + VERBOSE("Memory Descriptor Retrieved!\n"); + + return true; +} + +/* Relinquish the memory region. */ +bool memory_relinquish(struct ffa_mem_relinquish_descriptor *m, uint64_t handle, + ffa_endpoint_id16_t id) +{ + ffa_mem_relinquish_init(m, handle, 0, id); + return ffa_mem_relinquish(); +} + +/* Query SPMC that the rx buffer of the partition can be released. */ +bool ffa_rx_release(void) +{ + smc_args_t ret; + + ret = smc_helper(FFA_RX_RELEASE, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0); + return ret._regs[SMC_ARG0] != FFA_SUCCESS_SMC32; +} + +/* Map the provided buffers with the SPMC. */ +bool ffa_rxtx_map(uintptr_t send, uintptr_t recv, uint32_t pages) +{ + smc_args_t ret; + + ret = smc_helper(FFA_RXTX_MAP_SMC64, send, recv, pages, 0, 0, 0, 0); + return ret._regs[0] != FFA_SUCCESS_SMC32; +} diff --git a/bl32/tsp/ffa_helpers.h b/bl32/tsp/ffa_helpers.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e650a07 --- /dev/null +++ b/bl32/tsp/ffa_helpers.h @@ -0,0 +1,116 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2022, Arm Limited. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +#ifndef FFA_HELPERS_H +#define FFA_HELPERS_H + +#include <stdint.h> + +#include "../../services/std_svc/spm/el3_spmc/spmc.h" +#include "../../services/std_svc/spm/el3_spmc/spmc_shared_mem.h" +#include <services/el3_spmc_ffa_memory.h> +#include <services/ffa_svc.h> +#include "tsp_private.h" + +static inline uint32_t ffa_func_id(smc_args_t val) +{ + return (uint32_t) val._regs[0]; +} + +static inline int32_t ffa_error_code(smc_args_t val) +{ + return (uint32_t) val._regs[2]; +} + +extern uint8_t mem_region_buffer[4096 * 2] __aligned(PAGE_SIZE); +#define REGION_BUF_SIZE sizeof(mem_region_buffer) + +/** The maximum number of recipients a memory region may be sent to. */ +#define MAX_MEM_SHARE_RECIPIENTS 2U + +/* FFA Memory Management mode flags. */ +#define FFA_FLAG_SHARE_MEMORY (1U << 3) +#define FFA_FLAG_LEND_MEMORY (1U << 4) + +#define FFA_FLAG_MEMORY_MASK (3U << 3) + +#define FFA_MEM_HANDLE_LOW(x) (x & 0xFFFFFFFF) +#define FFA_MEM_HANDLE_HIGH(x) (x >> 32) + +#define FFA_MEM_PERM_DATA_OFFSET 0 +#define FFA_MEM_PERM_DATA_MASK 0x3 + +static inline uint32_t ffa_mem_relinquish_init( + struct ffa_mem_relinquish_descriptor *relinquish_request, + uint64_t handle, ffa_mtd_flag32_t flags, + ffa_endpoint_id16_t sender) +{ + relinquish_request->handle = handle; + relinquish_request->flags = flags; + relinquish_request->endpoint_count = 1; + relinquish_request->endpoint_array[0] = sender; + + return sizeof(struct ffa_mem_relinquish_descriptor) + sizeof(ffa_endpoint_id16_t); +} + +/** + * Gets the `ffa_comp_mrd` for the given receiver from an + * `ffa_mtd`, or NULL if it is not valid. + */ +static inline struct ffa_comp_mrd * +ffa_memory_region_get_composite(struct ffa_mtd *memory_region, + uint32_t receiver_index) +{ + struct ffa_emad_v1_0 *receivers; + uint32_t offset; + + receivers = (struct ffa_emad_v1_0 *) + ((uint8_t *) memory_region + + memory_region->emad_offset + + (memory_region->emad_size * receiver_index)); + offset = receivers->comp_mrd_offset; + + if (offset == 0U) { + return NULL; + } + + return (struct ffa_comp_mrd *) + ((uint8_t *) memory_region + offset); +} + +static inline uint32_t ffa_get_data_access_attr(ffa_mem_perm8_t perm) +{ + return ((perm >> FFA_MEM_PERM_DATA_OFFSET) & FFA_MEM_PERM_DATA_MASK); +} + +smc_args_t ffa_mem_frag_rx(uint64_t handle, uint32_t recv_length); +bool ffa_mem_relinquish(void); +bool ffa_rx_release(void); +bool memory_relinquish(struct ffa_mem_relinquish_descriptor *m, uint64_t handle, + ffa_endpoint_id16_t id); +bool ffa_rxtx_map(uintptr_t send, uintptr_t recv, uint32_t pages); +bool memory_retrieve(struct mailbox *mb, + struct ffa_mtd **retrieved, + uint64_t handle, ffa_endpoint_id16_t sender, + ffa_endpoint_id16_t *receivers, uint32_t receiver_count, + ffa_mtd_flag32_t flags, uint32_t *frag_length, + uint32_t *total_length); + +smc_args_t ffa_msg_send_direct_req(ffa_endpoint_id16_t sender, + ffa_endpoint_id16_t receiver, + uint32_t arg3, + uint32_t arg4, + uint32_t arg5, + uint32_t arg6, + uint32_t arg7); +smc_args_t *ffa_msg_send_direct_resp(ffa_endpoint_id16_t sender, + ffa_endpoint_id16_t receiver, + uint32_t arg3, + uint32_t arg4, + uint32_t arg5, + uint32_t arg6, + uint32_t arg7); +#endif /* FFA_HELPERS_H */ diff --git a/bl32/tsp/tsp.ld.S b/bl32/tsp/tsp.ld.S new file mode 100644 index 0000000..22bf11d --- /dev/null +++ b/bl32/tsp/tsp.ld.S @@ -0,0 +1,129 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2013-2023, Arm Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +#include <common/bl_common.ld.h> +#include <lib/xlat_tables/xlat_tables_defs.h> + +OUTPUT_FORMAT(PLATFORM_LINKER_FORMAT) +OUTPUT_ARCH(PLATFORM_LINKER_ARCH) +ENTRY(tsp_entrypoint) + +MEMORY { + RAM (rwx): ORIGIN = TSP_SEC_MEM_BASE, LENGTH = TSP_SEC_MEM_SIZE +} + +SECTIONS { + RAM_REGION_START = ORIGIN(RAM); + RAM_REGION_LENGTH = LENGTH(RAM); + . = BL32_BASE; + + ASSERT(. == ALIGN(PAGE_SIZE), + "BL32_BASE address is not aligned on a page boundary.") + +#if SEPARATE_CODE_AND_RODATA + .text . : { + __TEXT_START__ = .; + + *tsp_entrypoint.o(.text*) + *(.text*) + *(.vectors) + __TEXT_END_UNALIGNED__ = .; + + . = ALIGN(PAGE_SIZE); + + __TEXT_END__ = .; + } >RAM + + .rodata . : { + __RODATA_START__ = .; + + *(.rodata*) + + RODATA_COMMON + + __RODATA_END_UNALIGNED__ = .; + . = ALIGN(PAGE_SIZE); + + __RODATA_END__ = .; + } >RAM +#else /* SEPARATE_CODE_AND_RODATA */ + .ro . : { + __RO_START__ = .; + + *tsp_entrypoint.o(.text*) + *(.text*) + *(.rodata*) + + RODATA_COMMON + + *(.vectors) + + __RO_END_UNALIGNED__ = .; + + /* + * Memory page(s) mapped to this section will be marked as read-only, + * executable. No RW data from the next section must creep in. Ensure + * that the rest of the current memory page is unused. + */ + . = ALIGN(PAGE_SIZE); + + __RO_END__ = .; + } >RAM +#endif /* SEPARATE_CODE_AND_RODATA */ + + __RW_START__ = .; + + DATA_SECTION >RAM + RELA_SECTION >RAM + +#ifdef TSP_PROGBITS_LIMIT + ASSERT(. <= TSP_PROGBITS_LIMIT, "TSP progbits has exceeded its limit.") +#endif /* TSP_PROGBITS_LIMIT */ + + STACK_SECTION >RAM + BSS_SECTION >RAM + XLAT_TABLE_SECTION >RAM + +#if USE_COHERENT_MEM + /* + * The base address of the coherent memory section must be page-aligned to + * guarantee that the coherent data are stored on their own pages and are + * not mixed with normal data. This is required to set up the correct memory + * attributes for the coherent data page tables. + */ + .coherent_ram (NOLOAD) : ALIGN(PAGE_SIZE) { + __COHERENT_RAM_START__ = .; + *(.tzfw_coherent_mem) + __COHERENT_RAM_END_UNALIGNED__ = .; + + /* + * Memory page(s) mapped to this section will be marked as device + * memory. No other unexpected data must creep in. Ensure that the rest + * of the current memory page is unused. + */ + . = ALIGN(PAGE_SIZE); + + __COHERENT_RAM_END__ = .; + } >RAM +#endif /* USE_COHERENT_MEM */ + + __RW_END__ = .; + __BL32_END__ = .; + + /DISCARD/ : { + *(.dynsym .dynstr .hash .gnu.hash) + } + + __BSS_SIZE__ = SIZEOF(.bss); + +#if USE_COHERENT_MEM + __COHERENT_RAM_UNALIGNED_SIZE__ = + __COHERENT_RAM_END_UNALIGNED__ - __COHERENT_RAM_START__; +#endif /* USE_COHERENT_MEM */ + + ASSERT(. <= BL32_LIMIT, "BL32 image has exceeded its limit.") + RAM_REGION_END = .; +} diff --git a/bl32/tsp/tsp.mk b/bl32/tsp/tsp.mk new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4c18131 --- /dev/null +++ b/bl32/tsp/tsp.mk @@ -0,0 +1,49 @@ +# +# Copyright (c) 2013-2023, Arm Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. +# +# SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause +# + +INCLUDES += -Iinclude/bl32/tsp + +ifeq (${SPMC_AT_EL3},1) + BL32_SOURCES += bl32/tsp/tsp_ffa_main.c \ + bl32/tsp/ffa_helpers.c +else + BL32_SOURCES += bl32/tsp/tsp_main.c +endif + +BL32_SOURCES += bl32/tsp/aarch64/tsp_entrypoint.S \ + bl32/tsp/aarch64/tsp_exceptions.S \ + bl32/tsp/aarch64/tsp_request.S \ + bl32/tsp/tsp_interrupt.c \ + bl32/tsp/tsp_timer.c \ + bl32/tsp/tsp_common.c \ + common/aarch64/early_exceptions.S \ + lib/locks/exclusive/aarch64/spinlock.S + +BL32_DEFAULT_LINKER_SCRIPT_SOURCE := bl32/tsp/tsp.ld.S + +ifneq ($(findstring gcc,$(notdir $(LD))),) + BL32_LDFLAGS += -Wl,--sort-section=alignment +else ifneq ($(findstring ld,$(notdir $(LD))),) + BL32_LDFLAGS += --sort-section=alignment +endif + +# This flag determines if the TSPD initializes BL32 in tspd_init() (synchronous +# method) or configures BL31 to pass control to BL32 instead of BL33 +# (asynchronous method). +TSP_INIT_ASYNC := 0 + +$(eval $(call assert_boolean,TSP_INIT_ASYNC)) +$(eval $(call add_define,TSP_INIT_ASYNC)) + +# Include the platform-specific TSP Makefile +# If no platform-specific TSP Makefile exists, it means TSP is not supported +# on this platform. +TSP_PLAT_MAKEFILE := $(wildcard ${PLAT_DIR}/tsp/tsp-${PLAT}.mk) +ifeq (,${TSP_PLAT_MAKEFILE}) + $(error TSP is not supported on platform ${PLAT}) +else + include ${TSP_PLAT_MAKEFILE} +endif diff --git a/bl32/tsp/tsp_common.c b/bl32/tsp/tsp_common.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..908b4ff --- /dev/null +++ b/bl32/tsp/tsp_common.c @@ -0,0 +1,156 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2022, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +#include <assert.h> +#include <inttypes.h> +#include <stdint.h> + +#include <arch_features.h> +#include <arch_helpers.h> +#include <bl32/tsp/tsp.h> +#include <common/bl_common.h> +#include <common/debug.h> +#include <lib/spinlock.h> +#include <plat/common/platform.h> +#include <platform_tsp.h> +#include "tsp_private.h" + +#include <platform_def.h> + +/******************************************************************************* + * Per cpu data structure to populate parameters for an SMC in C code and use + * a pointer to this structure in assembler code to populate x0-x7. + ******************************************************************************/ +static smc_args_t tsp_smc_args[PLATFORM_CORE_COUNT]; + +/******************************************************************************* + * Per cpu data structure to keep track of TSP activity + ******************************************************************************/ +work_statistics_t tsp_stats[PLATFORM_CORE_COUNT]; + +smc_args_t *set_smc_args(uint64_t arg0, + uint64_t arg1, + uint64_t arg2, + uint64_t arg3, + uint64_t arg4, + uint64_t arg5, + uint64_t arg6, + uint64_t arg7) +{ + uint32_t linear_id; + smc_args_t *pcpu_smc_args; + + /* + * Return to Secure Monitor by raising an SMC. The results of the + * service are passed as an arguments to the SMC. + */ + linear_id = plat_my_core_pos(); + pcpu_smc_args = &tsp_smc_args[linear_id]; + write_sp_arg(pcpu_smc_args, SMC_ARG0, arg0); + write_sp_arg(pcpu_smc_args, SMC_ARG1, arg1); + write_sp_arg(pcpu_smc_args, SMC_ARG2, arg2); + write_sp_arg(pcpu_smc_args, SMC_ARG3, arg3); + write_sp_arg(pcpu_smc_args, SMC_ARG4, arg4); + write_sp_arg(pcpu_smc_args, SMC_ARG5, arg5); + write_sp_arg(pcpu_smc_args, SMC_ARG6, arg6); + write_sp_arg(pcpu_smc_args, SMC_ARG7, arg7); + + return pcpu_smc_args; +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * Setup function for TSP. + ******************************************************************************/ +void tsp_setup(void) +{ + /* Perform early platform-specific setup. */ + tsp_early_platform_setup(); + + /* Perform late platform-specific setup. */ + tsp_plat_arch_setup(); + +#if ENABLE_PAUTH + /* + * Assert that the ARMv8.3-PAuth registers are present or an access + * fault will be triggered when they are being saved or restored. + */ + assert(is_armv8_3_pauth_present()); +#endif /* ENABLE_PAUTH */ +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * This function performs any remaining bookkeeping in the test secure payload + * before the system is switched off (in response to a psci SYSTEM_OFF request). + ******************************************************************************/ +smc_args_t *tsp_system_off_main(uint64_t arg0, + uint64_t arg1, + uint64_t arg2, + uint64_t arg3, + uint64_t arg4, + uint64_t arg5, + uint64_t arg6, + uint64_t arg7) +{ + uint32_t linear_id = plat_my_core_pos(); + + /* Update this cpu's statistics. */ + tsp_stats[linear_id].smc_count++; + tsp_stats[linear_id].eret_count++; + + INFO("TSP: cpu 0x%lx SYSTEM_OFF request\n", read_mpidr()); + INFO("TSP: cpu 0x%lx: %d smcs, %d erets requests\n", read_mpidr(), + tsp_stats[linear_id].smc_count, + tsp_stats[linear_id].eret_count); + + /* Indicate to the SPD that we have completed this request. */ + return set_smc_args(TSP_SYSTEM_OFF_DONE, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0); +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * This function performs any remaining bookkeeping in the test secure payload + * before the system is reset (in response to a psci SYSTEM_RESET request). + ******************************************************************************/ +smc_args_t *tsp_system_reset_main(uint64_t arg0, + uint64_t arg1, + uint64_t arg2, + uint64_t arg3, + uint64_t arg4, + uint64_t arg5, + uint64_t arg6, + uint64_t arg7) +{ + uint32_t linear_id = plat_my_core_pos(); + + /* Update this cpu's statistics. */ + tsp_stats[linear_id].smc_count++; + tsp_stats[linear_id].eret_count++; + + INFO("TSP: cpu 0x%lx SYSTEM_RESET request\n", read_mpidr()); + INFO("TSP: cpu 0x%lx: %d smcs, %d erets requests\n", read_mpidr(), + tsp_stats[linear_id].smc_count, + tsp_stats[linear_id].eret_count); + + /* Indicate to the SPD that we have completed this request. */ + return set_smc_args(TSP_SYSTEM_RESET_DONE, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0); +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * TSP smc abort handler. This function is called when aborting a preempted + * yielding SMC request. It should cleanup all resources owned by the SMC + * handler such as locks or dynamically allocated memory so following SMC + * request are executed in a clean environment. + ******************************************************************************/ +smc_args_t *tsp_abort_smc_handler(uint64_t func, + uint64_t arg1, + uint64_t arg2, + uint64_t arg3, + uint64_t arg4, + uint64_t arg5, + uint64_t arg6, + uint64_t arg7) +{ + return set_smc_args(TSP_ABORT_DONE, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0); +} diff --git a/bl32/tsp/tsp_ffa_main.c b/bl32/tsp/tsp_ffa_main.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1c8c68f --- /dev/null +++ b/bl32/tsp/tsp_ffa_main.c @@ -0,0 +1,656 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2013-2022, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +#include <assert.h> +#include <inttypes.h> +#include <stdint.h> + +#include "../../services/std_svc/spm/el3_spmc/spmc.h" +#include "../../services/std_svc/spm/el3_spmc/spmc_shared_mem.h" +#include <arch_features.h> +#include <arch_helpers.h> +#include <bl32/tsp/tsp.h> +#include <common/bl_common.h> +#include <common/debug.h> +#include "ffa_helpers.h" +#include <lib/psci/psci.h> +#include <lib/spinlock.h> +#include <lib/xlat_tables/xlat_tables_defs.h> +#include <lib/xlat_tables/xlat_tables_v2.h> +#include <plat/common/platform.h> +#include <platform_tsp.h> +#include <services/ffa_svc.h> +#include "tsp_private.h" + +#include <platform_def.h> + +static ffa_endpoint_id16_t tsp_id, spmc_id; +uint8_t mem_region_buffer[4096 * 2] __aligned(PAGE_SIZE); + +/* Partition Mailbox. */ +static uint8_t send_page[PAGE_SIZE] __aligned(PAGE_SIZE); +static uint8_t recv_page[PAGE_SIZE] __aligned(PAGE_SIZE); + +/* + * Declare a global mailbox for use within the TSP. + * This will be initialized appropriately when the buffers + * are mapped with the SPMC. + */ +static struct mailbox mailbox; + +/******************************************************************************* + * This enum is used to handle test cases driven from the FF-A Test Driver. + ******************************************************************************/ +/* Keep in Sync with FF-A Test Driver. */ +enum message_t { + /* Partition Only Messages. */ + FF_A_RELAY_MESSAGE = 0, + + /* Basic Functionality. */ + FF_A_ECHO_MESSAGE, + FF_A_RELAY_MESSAGE_EL3, + + /* Memory Sharing. */ + FF_A_MEMORY_SHARE, + FF_A_MEMORY_SHARE_FRAGMENTED, + FF_A_MEMORY_LEND, + FF_A_MEMORY_LEND_FRAGMENTED, + + FF_A_MEMORY_SHARE_MULTI_ENDPOINT, + FF_A_MEMORY_LEND_MULTI_ENDPOINT, + + LAST, + FF_A_RUN_ALL = 255, + FF_A_OP_MAX = 256 +}; + +#if SPMC_AT_EL3 +extern void tsp_cpu_on_entry(void); +#endif + +/******************************************************************************* + * Test Functions. + ******************************************************************************/ + +/******************************************************************************* + * Enable the TSP to forward the received message to another partition and ask + * it to echo the value back in order to validate direct messages functionality. + ******************************************************************************/ +static int ffa_test_relay(uint64_t arg0, + uint64_t arg1, + uint64_t arg2, + uint64_t arg3, + uint64_t arg4, + uint64_t arg5, + uint64_t arg6, + uint64_t arg7) +{ + smc_args_t ffa_forward_result; + ffa_endpoint_id16_t receiver = arg5; + + ffa_forward_result = ffa_msg_send_direct_req(tsp_id, + receiver, + FF_A_ECHO_MESSAGE, arg4, + 0, 0, 0); + return ffa_forward_result._regs[3]; +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * This function handles memory management tests, currently share and lend. + * This test supports the use of FRAG_RX to use memory descriptors that do not + * fit in a single 4KB buffer. + ******************************************************************************/ +static int test_memory_send(ffa_endpoint_id16_t sender, uint64_t handle, + ffa_mtd_flag32_t flags, bool multi_endpoint) +{ + struct ffa_mtd *m; + struct ffa_emad_v1_0 *receivers; + struct ffa_comp_mrd *composite; + int ret, status = 0; + unsigned int mem_attrs; + char *ptr; + ffa_endpoint_id16_t source = sender; + uint32_t total_length, recv_length = 0; + + /* + * In the case that we're testing multiple endpoints choose a partition + * ID that resides in the normal world so the SPMC won't detect it as + * invalid. + * TODO: Should get endpoint receiver id and flag as input from NWd. + */ + uint32_t receiver_count = multi_endpoint ? 2 : 1; + ffa_endpoint_id16_t test_receivers[2] = { tsp_id, 0x10 }; + + /* Ensure that the sender ID resides in the normal world. */ + if (ffa_is_secure_world_id(sender)) { + ERROR("Invalid sender ID 0x%x.\n", sender); + return FFA_ERROR_DENIED; + } + + if (!memory_retrieve(&mailbox, &m, handle, source, test_receivers, + receiver_count, flags, &recv_length, + &total_length)) { + return FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER; + } + + receivers = (struct ffa_emad_v1_0 *) + ((uint8_t *) m + m->emad_offset); + while (total_length != recv_length) { + smc_args_t ffa_return; + uint32_t frag_length; + + ffa_return = ffa_mem_frag_rx(handle, recv_length); + + if (ffa_return._regs[0] == FFA_ERROR) { + WARN("TSP: failed to resume mem with handle %lx\n", + handle); + return ffa_return._regs[2]; + } + frag_length = ffa_return._regs[3]; + + /* Validate frag_length is less than total_length and mailbox size. */ + if (frag_length > total_length || + frag_length > (mailbox.rxtx_page_count * PAGE_SIZE)) { + ERROR("Invalid parameters!\n"); + return FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER; + } + + /* Validate frag_length is less than remaining mem_region_buffer size. */ + if (frag_length + recv_length >= REGION_BUF_SIZE) { + ERROR("Out of memory!\n"); + return FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER; + } + + memcpy(&mem_region_buffer[recv_length], mailbox.rx_buffer, + frag_length); + + if (ffa_rx_release()) { + ERROR("Failed to release buffer!\n"); + return FFA_ERROR_DENIED; + } + + recv_length += frag_length; + + assert(recv_length <= total_length); + } + + composite = ffa_memory_region_get_composite(m, 0); + if (composite == NULL) { + WARN("Failed to get composite descriptor!\n"); + return FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER; + } + + VERBOSE("Address: %p; page_count: %x %lx\n", + (void *)composite->address_range_array[0].address, + composite->address_range_array[0].page_count, PAGE_SIZE); + + /* This test is only concerned with RW permissions. */ + if (ffa_get_data_access_attr( + receivers[0].mapd.memory_access_permissions) != FFA_MEM_PERM_RW) { + ERROR("Data permission in retrieve response %x does not match share/lend %x!\n", + ffa_get_data_access_attr(receivers[0].mapd.memory_access_permissions), + FFA_MEM_PERM_RW); + return FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER; + } + + mem_attrs = MT_RW_DATA | MT_EXECUTE_NEVER; + + /* Only expecting to be sent memory from NWd so map accordingly. */ + mem_attrs |= MT_NS; + + for (int32_t i = 0; i < (int32_t)composite->address_range_count; i++) { + size_t size = composite->address_range_array[i].page_count * PAGE_SIZE; + + ptr = (char *) composite->address_range_array[i].address; + ret = mmap_add_dynamic_region( + (uint64_t)ptr, + (uint64_t)ptr, + size, mem_attrs); + + if (ret != 0) { + ERROR("Failed [%d] mmap_add_dynamic_region %u (%lx) (%lx) (%x)!\n", + i, ret, + (uint64_t)composite->address_range_array[i].address, + size, mem_attrs); + + /* Remove mappings previously created in this transaction. */ + for (i--; i >= 0; i--) { + ret = mmap_remove_dynamic_region( + (uint64_t)composite->address_range_array[i].address, + composite->address_range_array[i].page_count * PAGE_SIZE); + + if (ret != 0) { + ERROR("Failed [%d] mmap_remove_dynamic_region!\n", i); + panic(); + } + } + + return FFA_ERROR_NO_MEMORY; + } + + /* Increment memory region for validation purposes. */ + ++(*ptr); + + /* + * Read initial magic number from memory region for + * validation purposes. + */ + if (!i) { + status = *ptr; + } + } + + for (uint32_t i = 0U; i < composite->address_range_count; i++) { + ret = mmap_remove_dynamic_region( + (uint64_t)composite->address_range_array[i].address, + composite->address_range_array[i].page_count * PAGE_SIZE); + + if (ret != 0) { + ERROR("Failed [%d] mmap_remove_dynamic_region!\n", i); + return FFA_ERROR_NO_MEMORY; + } + } + + if (!memory_relinquish((struct ffa_mem_relinquish_descriptor *)mailbox.tx_buffer, + m->handle, tsp_id)) { + ERROR("Failed to relinquish memory region!\n"); + return FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER; + } + return status; +} + +static smc_args_t *send_ffa_pm_success(void) +{ + return set_smc_args(FFA_MSG_SEND_DIRECT_RESP_SMC32, + ((tsp_id & FFA_DIRECT_MSG_ENDPOINT_ID_MASK) + << FFA_DIRECT_MSG_SOURCE_SHIFT) | spmc_id, + FFA_FWK_MSG_BIT | + (FFA_PM_MSG_PM_RESP & FFA_FWK_MSG_MASK), + 0, 0, 0, 0, 0); +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * This function performs any remaining book keeping in the test secure payload + * before this cpu is turned off in response to a psci cpu_off request. + ******************************************************************************/ +smc_args_t *tsp_cpu_off_main(uint64_t arg0, + uint64_t arg1, + uint64_t arg2, + uint64_t arg3, + uint64_t arg4, + uint64_t arg5, + uint64_t arg6, + uint64_t arg7) +{ + uint32_t linear_id = plat_my_core_pos(); + + /* + * This cpu is being turned off, so disable the timer to prevent the + * secure timer interrupt from interfering with power down. A pending + * interrupt will be lost but we do not care as we are turning off. + */ + tsp_generic_timer_stop(); + + /* Update this cpu's statistics. */ + tsp_stats[linear_id].smc_count++; + tsp_stats[linear_id].eret_count++; + tsp_stats[linear_id].cpu_off_count++; + + VERBOSE("TSP: cpu 0x%lx off request\n", read_mpidr()); + VERBOSE("TSP: cpu 0x%lx: %d smcs, %d erets %d cpu off requests\n", + read_mpidr(), + tsp_stats[linear_id].smc_count, + tsp_stats[linear_id].eret_count, + tsp_stats[linear_id].cpu_off_count); + + return send_ffa_pm_success(); +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * This function performs any book keeping in the test secure payload before + * this cpu's architectural state is saved in response to an earlier psci + * cpu_suspend request. + ******************************************************************************/ +smc_args_t *tsp_cpu_suspend_main(uint64_t arg0, + uint64_t arg1, + uint64_t arg2, + uint64_t arg3, + uint64_t arg4, + uint64_t arg5, + uint64_t arg6, + uint64_t arg7) +{ + uint32_t linear_id = plat_my_core_pos(); + + /* + * Save the time context and disable it to prevent the secure timer + * interrupt from interfering with wakeup from the suspend state. + */ + tsp_generic_timer_save(); + tsp_generic_timer_stop(); + + /* Update this cpu's statistics. */ + tsp_stats[linear_id].smc_count++; + tsp_stats[linear_id].eret_count++; + tsp_stats[linear_id].cpu_suspend_count++; + + VERBOSE("TSP: cpu 0x%lx: %d smcs, %d erets %d cpu suspend requests\n", + read_mpidr(), + tsp_stats[linear_id].smc_count, + tsp_stats[linear_id].eret_count, + tsp_stats[linear_id].cpu_suspend_count); + + return send_ffa_pm_success(); +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * This function performs any bookkeeping in the test secure payload after this + * cpu's architectural state has been restored after wakeup from an earlier psci + * cpu_suspend request. + ******************************************************************************/ +smc_args_t *tsp_cpu_resume_main(uint64_t max_off_pwrlvl, + uint64_t arg1, + uint64_t arg2, + uint64_t arg3, + uint64_t arg4, + uint64_t arg5, + uint64_t arg6, + uint64_t arg7) +{ + uint32_t linear_id = plat_my_core_pos(); + + /* Restore the generic timer context. */ + tsp_generic_timer_restore(); + + /* Update this cpu's statistics. */ + tsp_stats[linear_id].smc_count++; + tsp_stats[linear_id].eret_count++; + tsp_stats[linear_id].cpu_resume_count++; + + VERBOSE("TSP: cpu 0x%lx resumed. maximum off power level %" PRId64 "\n", + read_mpidr(), max_off_pwrlvl); + VERBOSE("TSP: cpu 0x%lx: %d smcs, %d erets %d cpu resume requests\n", + read_mpidr(), + tsp_stats[linear_id].smc_count, + tsp_stats[linear_id].eret_count, + tsp_stats[linear_id].cpu_resume_count); + + return send_ffa_pm_success(); +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * This function handles framework messages. Currently only PM. + ******************************************************************************/ +static smc_args_t *handle_framework_message(uint64_t arg0, + uint64_t arg1, + uint64_t arg2, + uint64_t arg3, + uint64_t arg4, + uint64_t arg5, + uint64_t arg6, + uint64_t arg7) +{ + /* Check if it is a power management message from the SPMC. */ + if (ffa_endpoint_source(arg1) != spmc_id) { + goto err; + } + + /* Check if it is a PM request message. */ + if ((arg2 & FFA_FWK_MSG_MASK) == FFA_FWK_MSG_PSCI) { + /* Check if it is a PSCI CPU_OFF request. */ + if (arg3 == PSCI_CPU_OFF) { + return tsp_cpu_off_main(arg0, arg1, arg2, arg3, + arg4, arg5, arg6, arg7); + } else if (arg3 == PSCI_CPU_SUSPEND_AARCH64) { + return tsp_cpu_suspend_main(arg0, arg1, arg2, arg3, + arg4, arg5, arg6, arg7); + } + } else if ((arg2 & FFA_FWK_MSG_MASK) == FFA_PM_MSG_WB_REQ) { + /* Check it is a PSCI Warm Boot request. */ + if (arg3 == FFA_WB_TYPE_NOTS2RAM) { + return tsp_cpu_resume_main(arg0, arg1, arg2, arg3, + arg4, arg5, arg6, arg7); + } + } + +err: + ERROR("%s: Unknown framework message!\n", __func__); + panic(); +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * Handles partition messages. Exercised from the FF-A Test Driver. + ******************************************************************************/ +static smc_args_t *handle_partition_message(uint64_t arg0, + uint64_t arg1, + uint64_t arg2, + uint64_t arg3, + uint64_t arg4, + uint64_t arg5, + uint64_t arg6, + uint64_t arg7) +{ + uint16_t sender = ffa_endpoint_source(arg1); + uint16_t receiver = ffa_endpoint_destination(arg1); + int status = -1; + const bool multi_endpoint = true; + + switch (arg3) { + case FF_A_MEMORY_SHARE: + INFO("TSP Tests: Memory Share Request--\n"); + status = test_memory_send(sender, arg4, FFA_FLAG_SHARE_MEMORY, !multi_endpoint); + break; + + case FF_A_MEMORY_LEND: + INFO("TSP Tests: Memory Lend Request--\n"); + status = test_memory_send(sender, arg4, FFA_FLAG_LEND_MEMORY, !multi_endpoint); + break; + + case FF_A_MEMORY_SHARE_MULTI_ENDPOINT: + INFO("TSP Tests: Multi Endpoint Memory Share Request--\n"); + status = test_memory_send(sender, arg4, FFA_FLAG_SHARE_MEMORY, multi_endpoint); + break; + + case FF_A_MEMORY_LEND_MULTI_ENDPOINT: + INFO("TSP Tests: Multi Endpoint Memory Lend Request--\n"); + status = test_memory_send(sender, arg4, FFA_FLAG_LEND_MEMORY, multi_endpoint); + break; + case FF_A_RELAY_MESSAGE: + INFO("TSP Tests: Relaying message--\n"); + status = ffa_test_relay(arg0, arg1, arg2, arg3, arg4, + arg5, arg6, arg7); + break; + + case FF_A_ECHO_MESSAGE: + INFO("TSP Tests: echo message--\n"); + status = arg4; + break; + + default: + INFO("TSP Tests: Unknown request ID %d--\n", (int) arg3); + } + + /* Swap the sender and receiver in the response. */ + return ffa_msg_send_direct_resp(receiver, sender, status, 0, 0, 0, 0); +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * This function implements the event loop for handling FF-A ABI invocations. + ******************************************************************************/ +static smc_args_t *tsp_event_loop(uint64_t smc_fid, + uint64_t arg1, + uint64_t arg2, + uint64_t arg3, + uint64_t arg4, + uint64_t arg5, + uint64_t arg6, + uint64_t arg7) +{ + /* Panic if the SPMC did not forward an FF-A call. */ + if (!is_ffa_fid(smc_fid)) { + ERROR("%s: Unknown SMC FID (0x%lx)\n", __func__, smc_fid); + panic(); + } + + switch (smc_fid) { + case FFA_INTERRUPT: + /* + * IRQs were enabled upon re-entry into the TSP. The interrupt + * must have been handled by now. Return to the SPMC indicating + * the same. + */ + return set_smc_args(FFA_MSG_WAIT, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0); + + case FFA_MSG_SEND_DIRECT_REQ_SMC64: + case FFA_MSG_SEND_DIRECT_REQ_SMC32: + /* Check if a framework message, handle accordingly. */ + if ((arg2 & FFA_FWK_MSG_BIT)) { + return handle_framework_message(smc_fid, arg1, arg2, arg3, + arg4, arg5, arg6, arg7); + } + return handle_partition_message(smc_fid, arg1, arg2, arg3, + arg4, arg5, arg6, arg7); + } + + ERROR("%s: Unsupported FF-A FID (0x%lx)\n", __func__, smc_fid); + panic(); +} + +static smc_args_t *tsp_loop(smc_args_t *args) +{ + smc_args_t ret; + + do { + /* -------------------------------------------- + * Mask FIQ interrupts to avoid preemption + * in case EL3 SPMC delegates an IRQ next or a + * managed exit. Lastly, unmask IRQs so that + * they can be handled immediately upon re-entry. + * --------------------------------------------- + */ + write_daifset(DAIF_FIQ_BIT); + write_daifclr(DAIF_IRQ_BIT); + ret = smc_helper(args->_regs[0], args->_regs[1], args->_regs[2], + args->_regs[3], args->_regs[4], args->_regs[5], + args->_regs[6], args->_regs[7]); + args = tsp_event_loop(ret._regs[0], ret._regs[1], ret._regs[2], + ret._regs[3], ret._regs[4], ret._regs[5], + ret._regs[6], ret._regs[7]); + } while (1); + + /* Not Reached. */ + return NULL; +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * TSP main entry point where it gets the opportunity to initialize its secure + * state/applications. Once the state is initialized, it must return to the + * SPD with a pointer to the 'tsp_vector_table' jump table. + ******************************************************************************/ +uint64_t tsp_main(void) +{ + smc_args_t smc_args = {0}; + + NOTICE("TSP: %s\n", version_string); + NOTICE("TSP: %s\n", build_message); + INFO("TSP: Total memory base : 0x%lx\n", (unsigned long) BL32_BASE); + INFO("TSP: Total memory size : 0x%lx bytes\n", BL32_TOTAL_SIZE); + uint32_t linear_id = plat_my_core_pos(); + + /* Initialize the platform. */ + tsp_platform_setup(); + + /* Initialize secure/applications state here. */ + tsp_generic_timer_start(); + + /* Register secondary entrypoint with the SPMC. */ + smc_args = smc_helper(FFA_SECONDARY_EP_REGISTER_SMC64, + (uint64_t) tsp_cpu_on_entry, + 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0); + if (smc_args._regs[SMC_ARG0] != FFA_SUCCESS_SMC32) { + ERROR("TSP could not register secondary ep (0x%lx)\n", + smc_args._regs[2]); + panic(); + } + /* Get TSP's endpoint id. */ + smc_args = smc_helper(FFA_ID_GET, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0); + if (smc_args._regs[SMC_ARG0] != FFA_SUCCESS_SMC32) { + ERROR("TSP could not get own ID (0x%lx) on core%d\n", + smc_args._regs[2], linear_id); + panic(); + } + + tsp_id = smc_args._regs[2]; + INFO("TSP FF-A endpoint id = 0x%x\n", tsp_id); + + /* Get the SPMC ID. */ + smc_args = smc_helper(FFA_SPM_ID_GET, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0); + if (smc_args._regs[SMC_ARG0] != FFA_SUCCESS_SMC32) { + ERROR("TSP could not get SPMC ID (0x%lx) on core%d\n", + smc_args._regs[2], linear_id); + panic(); + } + + spmc_id = smc_args._regs[2]; + + /* Call RXTX_MAP to map a 4k RX and TX buffer. */ + if (ffa_rxtx_map((uintptr_t) send_page, + (uintptr_t) recv_page, 1)) { + ERROR("TSP could not map it's RX/TX Buffers\n"); + panic(); + } + + mailbox.tx_buffer = send_page; + mailbox.rx_buffer = recv_page; + mailbox.rxtx_page_count = 1; + + /* Update this cpu's statistics. */ + tsp_stats[linear_id].smc_count++; + tsp_stats[linear_id].eret_count++; + tsp_stats[linear_id].cpu_on_count++; + + VERBOSE("TSP: cpu 0x%lx: %d smcs, %d erets %d cpu on requests\n", + read_mpidr(), + tsp_stats[linear_id].smc_count, + tsp_stats[linear_id].eret_count, + tsp_stats[linear_id].cpu_on_count); + + /* Tell SPMD that we are done initialising. */ + tsp_loop(set_smc_args(FFA_MSG_WAIT, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)); + + /* Not reached. */ + return 0; +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * This function performs any remaining book keeping in the test secure payload + * after this cpu's architectural state has been setup in response to an earlier + * psci cpu_on request. + ******************************************************************************/ +smc_args_t *tsp_cpu_on_main(void) +{ + uint32_t linear_id = plat_my_core_pos(); + + /* Initialize secure/applications state here. */ + tsp_generic_timer_start(); + + /* Update this cpu's statistics. */ + tsp_stats[linear_id].smc_count++; + tsp_stats[linear_id].eret_count++; + tsp_stats[linear_id].cpu_on_count++; + VERBOSE("TSP: cpu 0x%lx turned on\n", read_mpidr()); + VERBOSE("TSP: cpu 0x%lx: %d smcs, %d erets %d cpu on requests\n", + read_mpidr(), + tsp_stats[linear_id].smc_count, + tsp_stats[linear_id].eret_count, + tsp_stats[linear_id].cpu_on_count); + /* --------------------------------------------- + * Jump to the main event loop to return to EL3 + * and be ready for the next request on this cpu. + * --------------------------------------------- + */ + return tsp_loop(set_smc_args(FFA_MSG_WAIT, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)); +} diff --git a/bl32/tsp/tsp_interrupt.c b/bl32/tsp/tsp_interrupt.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a847b6c --- /dev/null +++ b/bl32/tsp/tsp_interrupt.c @@ -0,0 +1,115 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2014-2022, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +#include <assert.h> +#include <inttypes.h> + +#include <platform_def.h> + +#include <arch_helpers.h> +#include <bl32/tsp/tsp.h> +#include <common/debug.h> +#include <plat/common/platform.h> + +#include "tsp_private.h" + +/******************************************************************************* + * This function updates the TSP statistics for S-EL1 interrupts handled + * synchronously i.e the ones that have been handed over by the TSPD. It also + * keeps count of the number of times control was passed back to the TSPD + * after handling the interrupt. In the future it will be possible that the + * TSPD hands over an S-EL1 interrupt to the TSP but does not expect it to + * return execution. This statistic will be useful to distinguish between these + * two models of synchronous S-EL1 interrupt handling. The 'elr_el3' parameter + * contains the address of the instruction in normal world where this S-EL1 + * interrupt was generated. + ******************************************************************************/ +void tsp_update_sync_sel1_intr_stats(uint32_t type, uint64_t elr_el3) +{ + uint32_t linear_id = plat_my_core_pos(); + + tsp_stats[linear_id].sync_sel1_intr_count++; + if (type == TSP_HANDLE_SEL1_INTR_AND_RETURN) + tsp_stats[linear_id].sync_sel1_intr_ret_count++; + + VERBOSE("TSP: cpu 0x%lx sync s-el1 interrupt request from 0x%" PRIx64 "\n", + read_mpidr(), elr_el3); + VERBOSE("TSP: cpu 0x%lx: %d sync s-el1 interrupt requests," + " %d sync s-el1 interrupt returns\n", + read_mpidr(), + tsp_stats[linear_id].sync_sel1_intr_count, + tsp_stats[linear_id].sync_sel1_intr_ret_count); +} + +/****************************************************************************** + * This function is invoked when a non S-EL1 interrupt is received and causes + * the preemption of TSP. This function returns TSP_PREEMPTED and results + * in the control being handed over to EL3 for handling the interrupt. + *****************************************************************************/ +int32_t tsp_handle_preemption(void) +{ + uint32_t linear_id = plat_my_core_pos(); + + tsp_stats[linear_id].preempt_intr_count++; + VERBOSE("TSP: cpu 0x%lx: %d preempt interrupt requests\n", + read_mpidr(), tsp_stats[linear_id].preempt_intr_count); + return TSP_PREEMPTED; +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * TSP interrupt handler is called as a part of both synchronous and + * asynchronous handling of TSP interrupts. Currently the physical timer + * interrupt is the only S-EL1 interrupt that this handler expects. It returns + * 0 upon successfully handling the expected interrupt and all other + * interrupts are treated as normal world or EL3 interrupts. + ******************************************************************************/ +int32_t tsp_common_int_handler(void) +{ + uint32_t linear_id = plat_my_core_pos(), id; + + /* + * Get the highest priority pending interrupt id and see if it is the + * secure physical generic timer interrupt in which case, handle it. + * Otherwise throw this interrupt at the EL3 firmware. + * + * There is a small time window between reading the highest priority + * pending interrupt and acknowledging it during which another + * interrupt of higher priority could become the highest pending + * interrupt. This is not expected to happen currently for TSP. + */ + id = plat_ic_get_pending_interrupt_id(); + + /* TSP can only handle the secure physical timer interrupt */ + if (id != TSP_IRQ_SEC_PHY_TIMER) { +#if SPMC_AT_EL3 + /* + * With the EL3 FF-A SPMC we expect only Timer secure interrupt to fire in + * the TSP, so panic if any other interrupt does. + */ + ERROR("Unexpected interrupt id %u\n", id); + panic(); +#else + return tsp_handle_preemption(); +#endif + } + + /* + * Acknowledge and handle the secure timer interrupt. Also sanity check + * if it has been preempted by another interrupt through an assertion. + */ + id = plat_ic_acknowledge_interrupt(); + assert(id == TSP_IRQ_SEC_PHY_TIMER); + tsp_generic_timer_handler(); + plat_ic_end_of_interrupt(id); + + /* Update the statistics and print some messages */ + tsp_stats[linear_id].sel1_intr_count++; + VERBOSE("TSP: cpu 0x%lx handled S-EL1 interrupt %d\n", + read_mpidr(), id); + VERBOSE("TSP: cpu 0x%lx: %d S-EL1 requests\n", + read_mpidr(), tsp_stats[linear_id].sel1_intr_count); + return 0; +} diff --git a/bl32/tsp/tsp_main.c b/bl32/tsp/tsp_main.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1ab2260 --- /dev/null +++ b/bl32/tsp/tsp_main.c @@ -0,0 +1,288 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2013-2022, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +#include <assert.h> +#include <inttypes.h> +#include <stdint.h> + +#include <arch_features.h> +#include <arch_helpers.h> +#include <bl32/tsp/tsp.h> +#include <common/bl_common.h> +#include <common/debug.h> +#include <lib/spinlock.h> +#include <plat/common/platform.h> +#include <platform_tsp.h> +#include "tsp_private.h" + +#include <platform_def.h> + +/******************************************************************************* + * TSP main entry point where it gets the opportunity to initialize its secure + * state/applications. Once the state is initialized, it must return to the + * SPD with a pointer to the 'tsp_vector_table' jump table. + ******************************************************************************/ +uint64_t tsp_main(void) +{ + NOTICE("TSP: %s\n", version_string); + NOTICE("TSP: %s\n", build_message); + INFO("TSP: Total memory base : 0x%lx\n", (unsigned long) BL32_BASE); + INFO("TSP: Total memory size : 0x%lx bytes\n", BL32_TOTAL_SIZE); + + uint32_t linear_id = plat_my_core_pos(); + + /* Initialize the platform */ + tsp_platform_setup(); + + /* Initialize secure/applications state here */ + tsp_generic_timer_start(); + + /* Update this cpu's statistics */ + tsp_stats[linear_id].smc_count++; + tsp_stats[linear_id].eret_count++; + tsp_stats[linear_id].cpu_on_count++; + + INFO("TSP: cpu 0x%lx: %d smcs, %d erets %d cpu on requests\n", + read_mpidr(), + tsp_stats[linear_id].smc_count, + tsp_stats[linear_id].eret_count, + tsp_stats[linear_id].cpu_on_count); + + console_flush(); + return (uint64_t) &tsp_vector_table; +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * This function performs any remaining book keeping in the test secure payload + * after this cpu's architectural state has been setup in response to an earlier + * psci cpu_on request. + ******************************************************************************/ +smc_args_t *tsp_cpu_on_main(void) +{ + uint32_t linear_id = plat_my_core_pos(); + + /* Initialize secure/applications state here */ + tsp_generic_timer_start(); + + /* Update this cpu's statistics */ + tsp_stats[linear_id].smc_count++; + tsp_stats[linear_id].eret_count++; + tsp_stats[linear_id].cpu_on_count++; + + INFO("TSP: cpu 0x%lx turned on\n", read_mpidr()); + INFO("TSP: cpu 0x%lx: %d smcs, %d erets %d cpu on requests\n", + read_mpidr(), + tsp_stats[linear_id].smc_count, + tsp_stats[linear_id].eret_count, + tsp_stats[linear_id].cpu_on_count); + /* Indicate to the SPD that we have completed turned ourselves on */ + return set_smc_args(TSP_ON_DONE, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0); +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * This function performs any remaining book keeping in the test secure payload + * before this cpu is turned off in response to a psci cpu_off request. + ******************************************************************************/ +smc_args_t *tsp_cpu_off_main(uint64_t arg0, + uint64_t arg1, + uint64_t arg2, + uint64_t arg3, + uint64_t arg4, + uint64_t arg5, + uint64_t arg6, + uint64_t arg7) +{ + uint32_t linear_id = plat_my_core_pos(); + + /* + * This cpu is being turned off, so disable the timer to prevent the + * secure timer interrupt from interfering with power down. A pending + * interrupt will be lost but we do not care as we are turning off. + */ + tsp_generic_timer_stop(); + + /* Update this cpu's statistics */ + tsp_stats[linear_id].smc_count++; + tsp_stats[linear_id].eret_count++; + tsp_stats[linear_id].cpu_off_count++; + + INFO("TSP: cpu 0x%lx off request\n", read_mpidr()); + INFO("TSP: cpu 0x%lx: %d smcs, %d erets %d cpu off requests\n", + read_mpidr(), + tsp_stats[linear_id].smc_count, + tsp_stats[linear_id].eret_count, + tsp_stats[linear_id].cpu_off_count); + + /* Indicate to the SPD that we have completed this request */ + return set_smc_args(TSP_OFF_DONE, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0); +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * This function performs any book keeping in the test secure payload before + * this cpu's architectural state is saved in response to an earlier psci + * cpu_suspend request. + ******************************************************************************/ +smc_args_t *tsp_cpu_suspend_main(uint64_t arg0, + uint64_t arg1, + uint64_t arg2, + uint64_t arg3, + uint64_t arg4, + uint64_t arg5, + uint64_t arg6, + uint64_t arg7) +{ + uint32_t linear_id = plat_my_core_pos(); + + /* + * Save the time context and disable it to prevent the secure timer + * interrupt from interfering with wakeup from the suspend state. + */ + tsp_generic_timer_save(); + tsp_generic_timer_stop(); + + /* Update this cpu's statistics */ + tsp_stats[linear_id].smc_count++; + tsp_stats[linear_id].eret_count++; + tsp_stats[linear_id].cpu_suspend_count++; + + INFO("TSP: cpu 0x%lx: %d smcs, %d erets %d cpu suspend requests\n", + read_mpidr(), + tsp_stats[linear_id].smc_count, + tsp_stats[linear_id].eret_count, + tsp_stats[linear_id].cpu_suspend_count); + + /* Indicate to the SPD that we have completed this request */ + return set_smc_args(TSP_SUSPEND_DONE, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0); +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * This function performs any book keeping in the test secure payload after this + * cpu's architectural state has been restored after wakeup from an earlier psci + * cpu_suspend request. + ******************************************************************************/ +smc_args_t *tsp_cpu_resume_main(uint64_t max_off_pwrlvl, + uint64_t arg1, + uint64_t arg2, + uint64_t arg3, + uint64_t arg4, + uint64_t arg5, + uint64_t arg6, + uint64_t arg7) +{ + uint32_t linear_id = plat_my_core_pos(); + + /* Restore the generic timer context */ + tsp_generic_timer_restore(); + + /* Update this cpu's statistics */ + tsp_stats[linear_id].smc_count++; + tsp_stats[linear_id].eret_count++; + tsp_stats[linear_id].cpu_resume_count++; + + INFO("TSP: cpu 0x%lx resumed. maximum off power level %" PRId64 "\n", + read_mpidr(), max_off_pwrlvl); + INFO("TSP: cpu 0x%lx: %d smcs, %d erets %d cpu resume requests\n", + read_mpidr(), + tsp_stats[linear_id].smc_count, + tsp_stats[linear_id].eret_count, + tsp_stats[linear_id].cpu_resume_count); + /* Indicate to the SPD that we have completed this request */ + return set_smc_args(TSP_RESUME_DONE, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0); +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * TSP fast smc handler. The secure monitor jumps to this function by + * doing the ERET after populating X0-X7 registers. The arguments are received + * in the function arguments in order. Once the service is rendered, this + * function returns to Secure Monitor by raising SMC. + ******************************************************************************/ +smc_args_t *tsp_smc_handler(uint64_t func, + uint64_t arg1, + uint64_t arg2, + uint64_t arg3, + uint64_t arg4, + uint64_t arg5, + uint64_t arg6, + uint64_t arg7) +{ + uint128_t service_args; + uint64_t service_arg0; + uint64_t service_arg1; + uint64_t results[2]; + uint32_t linear_id = plat_my_core_pos(); + u_register_t dit; + + /* Update this cpu's statistics */ + tsp_stats[linear_id].smc_count++; + tsp_stats[linear_id].eret_count++; + + INFO("TSP: cpu 0x%lx received %s smc 0x%" PRIx64 "\n", read_mpidr(), + ((func >> 31) & 1) == 1 ? "fast" : "yielding", + func); + INFO("TSP: cpu 0x%lx: %d smcs, %d erets\n", read_mpidr(), + tsp_stats[linear_id].smc_count, + tsp_stats[linear_id].eret_count); + + /* Render secure services and obtain results here */ + results[0] = arg1; + results[1] = arg2; + + /* + * Request a service back from dispatcher/secure monitor. + * This call returns and thereafter resumes execution. + */ + service_args = tsp_get_magic(); + service_arg0 = (uint64_t)service_args; + service_arg1 = (uint64_t)(service_args >> 64U); + +#if CTX_INCLUDE_MTE_REGS + /* + * Write a dummy value to an MTE register, to simulate usage in the + * secure world + */ + write_gcr_el1(0x99); +#endif + + /* Determine the function to perform based on the function ID */ + switch (TSP_BARE_FID(func)) { + case TSP_ADD: + results[0] += service_arg0; + results[1] += service_arg1; + break; + case TSP_SUB: + results[0] -= service_arg0; + results[1] -= service_arg1; + break; + case TSP_MUL: + results[0] *= service_arg0; + results[1] *= service_arg1; + break; + case TSP_DIV: + results[0] /= service_arg0 ? service_arg0 : 1; + results[1] /= service_arg1 ? service_arg1 : 1; + break; + case TSP_CHECK_DIT: + if (!is_feat_dit_supported()) { + ERROR("DIT not supported\n"); + results[0] = 0; + results[1] = 0xffff; + break; + } + dit = read_dit(); + results[0] = dit == service_arg0; + results[1] = dit; + /* Toggle the dit bit */ + write_dit(service_arg0 != 0U ? 0 : DIT_BIT); + break; + default: + break; + } + + return set_smc_args(func, 0, + results[0], + results[1], + 0, 0, 0, 0); +} diff --git a/bl32/tsp/tsp_private.h b/bl32/tsp/tsp_private.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..66873e2 --- /dev/null +++ b/bl32/tsp/tsp_private.h @@ -0,0 +1,145 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2014-2022, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +#ifndef TSP_PRIVATE_H +#define TSP_PRIVATE_H + +/******************************************************************************* + * The TSP memory footprint starts at address BL32_BASE and ends with the + * linker symbol __BL32_END__. Use these addresses to compute the TSP image + * size. + ******************************************************************************/ +#define BL32_TOTAL_LIMIT BL32_END +#define BL32_TOTAL_SIZE (BL32_TOTAL_LIMIT - (unsigned long) BL32_BASE) + +#ifndef __ASSEMBLER__ + +#include <stdint.h> + +#include <bl32/tsp/tsp.h> +#include <lib/cassert.h> +#include <lib/spinlock.h> +#include <smccc_helpers.h> + +typedef struct work_statistics { + /* Number of s-el1 interrupts on this cpu */ + uint32_t sel1_intr_count; + /* Number of non s-el1 interrupts on this cpu which preempted TSP */ + uint32_t preempt_intr_count; + /* Number of sync s-el1 interrupts on this cpu */ + uint32_t sync_sel1_intr_count; + /* Number of s-el1 interrupts returns on this cpu */ + uint32_t sync_sel1_intr_ret_count; + uint32_t smc_count; /* Number of returns on this cpu */ + uint32_t eret_count; /* Number of entries on this cpu */ + uint32_t cpu_on_count; /* Number of cpu on requests */ + uint32_t cpu_off_count; /* Number of cpu off requests */ + uint32_t cpu_suspend_count; /* Number of cpu suspend requests */ + uint32_t cpu_resume_count; /* Number of cpu resume requests */ +} __aligned(CACHE_WRITEBACK_GRANULE) work_statistics_t; + +/* Macros to access members of the above structure using their offsets */ +#define read_sp_arg(args, offset) ((args)->_regs[offset >> 3]) +#define write_sp_arg(args, offset, val) (((args)->_regs[offset >> 3]) \ + = val) + +uint128_t tsp_get_magic(void); + +smc_args_t *set_smc_args(uint64_t arg0, + uint64_t arg1, + uint64_t arg2, + uint64_t arg3, + uint64_t arg4, + uint64_t arg5, + uint64_t arg6, + uint64_t arg7); +smc_args_t *tsp_cpu_resume_main(uint64_t max_off_pwrlvl, + uint64_t arg1, + uint64_t arg2, + uint64_t arg3, + uint64_t arg4, + uint64_t arg5, + uint64_t arg6, + uint64_t arg7); +smc_args_t *tsp_cpu_suspend_main(uint64_t arg0, + uint64_t arg1, + uint64_t arg2, + uint64_t arg3, + uint64_t arg4, + uint64_t arg5, + uint64_t arg6, + uint64_t arg7); +smc_args_t *tsp_cpu_on_main(void); +smc_args_t *tsp_cpu_off_main(uint64_t arg0, + uint64_t arg1, + uint64_t arg2, + uint64_t arg3, + uint64_t arg4, + uint64_t arg5, + uint64_t arg6, + uint64_t arg7); + +/* Generic Timer functions */ +void tsp_generic_timer_start(void); +void tsp_generic_timer_handler(void); +void tsp_generic_timer_stop(void); +void tsp_generic_timer_save(void); +void tsp_generic_timer_restore(void); + +/* S-EL1 interrupt management functions */ +void tsp_update_sync_sel1_intr_stats(uint32_t type, uint64_t elr_el3); + + +/* Data structure to keep track of TSP statistics */ +extern work_statistics_t tsp_stats[PLATFORM_CORE_COUNT]; + +/* Vector table of jumps */ +extern tsp_vectors_t tsp_vector_table; + +/* functions */ +int32_t tsp_common_int_handler(void); +int32_t tsp_handle_preemption(void); + +smc_args_t *tsp_abort_smc_handler(uint64_t func, + uint64_t arg1, + uint64_t arg2, + uint64_t arg3, + uint64_t arg4, + uint64_t arg5, + uint64_t arg6, + uint64_t arg7); + +smc_args_t *tsp_smc_handler(uint64_t func, + uint64_t arg1, + uint64_t arg2, + uint64_t arg3, + uint64_t arg4, + uint64_t arg5, + uint64_t arg6, + uint64_t arg7); + +smc_args_t *tsp_system_reset_main(uint64_t arg0, + uint64_t arg1, + uint64_t arg2, + uint64_t arg3, + uint64_t arg4, + uint64_t arg5, + uint64_t arg6, + uint64_t arg7); + +smc_args_t *tsp_system_off_main(uint64_t arg0, + uint64_t arg1, + uint64_t arg2, + uint64_t arg3, + uint64_t arg4, + uint64_t arg5, + uint64_t arg6, + uint64_t arg7); + +uint64_t tsp_main(void); +#endif /* __ASSEMBLER__ */ + +#endif /* TSP_PRIVATE_H */ diff --git a/bl32/tsp/tsp_timer.c b/bl32/tsp/tsp_timer.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d1ff2b0 --- /dev/null +++ b/bl32/tsp/tsp_timer.c @@ -0,0 +1,91 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2014-2019, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +#include <assert.h> + +#include <arch_helpers.h> +#include <plat/common/platform.h> + +#include "tsp_private.h" + +/******************************************************************************* + * Data structure to keep track of per-cpu secure generic timer context across + * power management operations. + ******************************************************************************/ +typedef struct timer_context { + uint64_t cval; + uint32_t ctl; +} timer_context_t; + +static timer_context_t pcpu_timer_context[PLATFORM_CORE_COUNT]; + +/******************************************************************************* + * This function initializes the generic timer to fire every 0.5 second + ******************************************************************************/ +void tsp_generic_timer_start(void) +{ + uint64_t cval; + uint32_t ctl = 0; + + /* The timer will fire every 0.5 second */ + cval = read_cntpct_el0() + (read_cntfrq_el0() >> 1); + write_cntps_cval_el1(cval); + + /* Enable the secure physical timer */ + set_cntp_ctl_enable(ctl); + write_cntps_ctl_el1(ctl); +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * This function deasserts the timer interrupt and sets it up again + ******************************************************************************/ +void tsp_generic_timer_handler(void) +{ + /* Ensure that the timer did assert the interrupt */ + assert(get_cntp_ctl_istatus(read_cntps_ctl_el1())); + + /* + * Disable the timer and reprogram it. The barriers ensure that there is + * no reordering of instructions around the reprogramming code. + */ + isb(); + write_cntps_ctl_el1(0); + tsp_generic_timer_start(); + isb(); +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * This function deasserts the timer interrupt prior to cpu power down + ******************************************************************************/ +void tsp_generic_timer_stop(void) +{ + /* Disable the timer */ + write_cntps_ctl_el1(0); +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * This function saves the timer context prior to cpu suspension + ******************************************************************************/ +void tsp_generic_timer_save(void) +{ + uint32_t linear_id = plat_my_core_pos(); + + pcpu_timer_context[linear_id].cval = read_cntps_cval_el1(); + pcpu_timer_context[linear_id].ctl = read_cntps_ctl_el1(); + flush_dcache_range((uint64_t) &pcpu_timer_context[linear_id], + sizeof(pcpu_timer_context[linear_id])); +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * This function restores the timer context post cpu resumption + ******************************************************************************/ +void tsp_generic_timer_restore(void) +{ + uint32_t linear_id = plat_my_core_pos(); + + write_cntps_cval_el1(pcpu_timer_context[linear_id].cval); + write_cntps_ctl_el1(pcpu_timer_context[linear_id].ctl); +} |