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Diffstat (limited to 'include/arch/aarch64/el3_common_macros.S')
| -rw-r--r-- | include/arch/aarch64/el3_common_macros.S | 464 |
1 files changed, 464 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/include/arch/aarch64/el3_common_macros.S b/include/arch/aarch64/el3_common_macros.S new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a78837f --- /dev/null +++ b/include/arch/aarch64/el3_common_macros.S @@ -0,0 +1,464 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2015-2023, Arm Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +#ifndef EL3_COMMON_MACROS_S +#define EL3_COMMON_MACROS_S + +#include <arch.h> +#include <asm_macros.S> +#include <assert_macros.S> +#include <context.h> +#include <lib/xlat_tables/xlat_tables_defs.h> + + /* + * Helper macro to initialise EL3 registers we care about. + */ + .macro el3_arch_init_common + /* --------------------------------------------------------------------- + * SCTLR_EL3 has already been initialised - read current value before + * modifying. + * + * SCTLR_EL3.I: Enable the instruction cache. + * + * SCTLR_EL3.SA: Enable Stack Alignment check. A SP alignment fault + * exception is generated if a load or store instruction executed at + * EL3 uses the SP as the base address and the SP is not aligned to a + * 16-byte boundary. + * + * SCTLR_EL3.A: Enable Alignment fault checking. All instructions that + * load or store one or more registers have an alignment check that the + * address being accessed is aligned to the size of the data element(s) + * being accessed. + * --------------------------------------------------------------------- + */ + mov x1, #(SCTLR_I_BIT | SCTLR_A_BIT | SCTLR_SA_BIT) + mrs x0, sctlr_el3 + orr x0, x0, x1 + msr sctlr_el3, x0 + isb + +#ifdef IMAGE_BL31 + /* --------------------------------------------------------------------- + * Initialise the per-cpu cache pointer to the CPU. + * This is done early to enable crash reporting to have access to crash + * stack. Since crash reporting depends on cpu_data to report the + * unhandled exception, not doing so can lead to recursive exceptions + * due to a NULL TPIDR_EL3. + * --------------------------------------------------------------------- + */ + bl init_cpu_data_ptr +#endif /* IMAGE_BL31 */ + + /* --------------------------------------------------------------------- + * Initialise SCR_EL3, setting all fields rather than relying on hw. + * All fields are architecturally UNKNOWN on reset. The following fields + * do not change during the TF lifetime. The remaining fields are set to + * zero here but are updated ahead of transitioning to a lower EL in the + * function cm_init_context_common(). + * + * SCR_EL3.SIF: Set to one to disable instruction fetches from + * Non-secure memory. + * + * SCR_EL3.EA: Set to one to route External Aborts and SError Interrupts + * to EL3 when executing at any EL. + * --------------------------------------------------------------------- + */ + mov_imm x0, (SCR_RESET_VAL | SCR_EA_BIT | SCR_SIF_BIT) + msr scr_el3, x0 + + /* --------------------------------------------------------------------- + * Initialise MDCR_EL3, setting all fields rather than relying on hw. + * Some fields are architecturally UNKNOWN on reset. + * + * MDCR_EL3.SDD: Set to one to disable AArch64 Secure self-hosted debug. + * Debug exceptions, other than Breakpoint Instruction exceptions, are + * disabled from all ELs in Secure state. + * + * MDCR_EL3.SPD32: Set to 0b10 to disable AArch32 Secure self-hosted + * privileged debug from S-EL1. + * + * MDCR_EL3.TDOSA: Set to zero so that EL2 and EL2 System register + * access to the powerdown debug registers do not trap to EL3. + * + * MDCR_EL3.TDA: Set to zero to allow EL0, EL1 and EL2 access to the + * debug registers, other than those registers that are controlled by + * MDCR_EL3.TDOSA. + */ + mov_imm x0, ((MDCR_EL3_RESET_VAL | MDCR_SDD_BIT | \ + MDCR_SPD32(MDCR_SPD32_DISABLE)) & \ + ~(MDCR_TDOSA_BIT | MDCR_TDA_BIT)) + + msr mdcr_el3, x0 + + /* --------------------------------------------------------------------- + * Enable External Aborts and SError Interrupts now that the exception + * vectors have been setup. + * --------------------------------------------------------------------- + */ + msr daifclr, #DAIF_ABT_BIT + + /* --------------------------------------------------------------------- + * Initialise CPTR_EL3, setting all fields rather than relying on hw. + * All fields are architecturally UNKNOWN on reset. + * --------------------------------------------------------------------- + */ + mov_imm x0, CPTR_EL3_RESET_VAL + msr cptr_el3, x0 + + /* + * If Data Independent Timing (DIT) functionality is implemented, + * always enable DIT in EL3. + * First assert that the FEAT_DIT build flag matches the feature id + * register value for DIT. + */ +#if ENABLE_FEAT_DIT +#if ENABLE_ASSERTIONS || ENABLE_FEAT_DIT > 1 + mrs x0, id_aa64pfr0_el1 + ubfx x0, x0, #ID_AA64PFR0_DIT_SHIFT, #ID_AA64PFR0_DIT_LENGTH +#if ENABLE_FEAT_DIT > 1 + cbz x0, 1f +#else + cmp x0, #ID_AA64PFR0_DIT_SUPPORTED + ASM_ASSERT(eq) +#endif + +#endif /* ENABLE_ASSERTIONS */ + mov x0, #DIT_BIT + msr DIT, x0 +1: +#endif + .endm + +/* ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- + * This is the super set of actions that need to be performed during a cold boot + * or a warm boot in EL3. This code is shared by BL1 and BL31. + * + * This macro will always perform reset handling, architectural initialisations + * and stack setup. The rest of the actions are optional because they might not + * be needed, depending on the context in which this macro is called. This is + * why this macro is parameterised ; each parameter allows to enable/disable + * some actions. + * + * _init_sctlr: + * Whether the macro needs to initialise SCTLR_EL3, including configuring + * the endianness of data accesses. + * + * _warm_boot_mailbox: + * Whether the macro needs to detect the type of boot (cold/warm). The + * detection is based on the platform entrypoint address : if it is zero + * then it is a cold boot, otherwise it is a warm boot. In the latter case, + * this macro jumps on the platform entrypoint address. + * + * _secondary_cold_boot: + * Whether the macro needs to identify the CPU that is calling it: primary + * CPU or secondary CPU. The primary CPU will be allowed to carry on with + * the platform initialisations, while the secondaries will be put in a + * platform-specific state in the meantime. + * + * If the caller knows this macro will only be called by the primary CPU + * then this parameter can be defined to 0 to skip this step. + * + * _init_memory: + * Whether the macro needs to initialise the memory. + * + * _init_c_runtime: + * Whether the macro needs to initialise the C runtime environment. + * + * _exception_vectors: + * Address of the exception vectors to program in the VBAR_EL3 register. + * + * _pie_fixup_size: + * Size of memory region to fixup Global Descriptor Table (GDT). + * + * A non-zero value is expected when firmware needs GDT to be fixed-up. + * + * ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- + */ + .macro el3_entrypoint_common \ + _init_sctlr, _warm_boot_mailbox, _secondary_cold_boot, \ + _init_memory, _init_c_runtime, _exception_vectors, \ + _pie_fixup_size + + .if \_init_sctlr + /* ------------------------------------------------------------- + * This is the initialisation of SCTLR_EL3 and so must ensure + * that all fields are explicitly set rather than relying on hw. + * Some fields reset to an IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED value and + * others are architecturally UNKNOWN on reset. + * + * SCTLR.EE: Set the CPU endianness before doing anything that + * might involve memory reads or writes. Set to zero to select + * Little Endian. + * + * SCTLR_EL3.WXN: For the EL3 translation regime, this field can + * force all memory regions that are writeable to be treated as + * XN (Execute-never). Set to zero so that this control has no + * effect on memory access permissions. + * + * SCTLR_EL3.SA: Set to zero to disable Stack Alignment check. + * + * SCTLR_EL3.A: Set to zero to disable Alignment fault checking. + * + * SCTLR.DSSBS: Set to zero to disable speculation store bypass + * safe behaviour upon exception entry to EL3. + * ------------------------------------------------------------- + */ + mov_imm x0, (SCTLR_RESET_VAL & ~(SCTLR_EE_BIT | SCTLR_WXN_BIT \ + | SCTLR_SA_BIT | SCTLR_A_BIT | SCTLR_DSSBS_BIT)) +#if ENABLE_FEAT_RAS + /* If FEAT_RAS is present assume FEAT_IESB is also present */ + orr x0, x0, #SCTLR_IESB_BIT +#endif + msr sctlr_el3, x0 + isb + .endif /* _init_sctlr */ + + .if \_warm_boot_mailbox + /* ------------------------------------------------------------- + * This code will be executed for both warm and cold resets. + * Now is the time to distinguish between the two. + * Query the platform entrypoint address and if it is not zero + * then it means it is a warm boot so jump to this address. + * ------------------------------------------------------------- + */ + bl plat_get_my_entrypoint + cbz x0, do_cold_boot + br x0 + + do_cold_boot: + .endif /* _warm_boot_mailbox */ + + .if \_pie_fixup_size +#if ENABLE_PIE + /* + * ------------------------------------------------------------ + * If PIE is enabled fixup the Global descriptor Table only + * once during primary core cold boot path. + * + * Compile time base address, required for fixup, is calculated + * using "pie_fixup" label present within first page. + * ------------------------------------------------------------ + */ + pie_fixup: + ldr x0, =pie_fixup + and x0, x0, #~(PAGE_SIZE_MASK) + mov_imm x1, \_pie_fixup_size + add x1, x1, x0 + bl fixup_gdt_reloc +#endif /* ENABLE_PIE */ + .endif /* _pie_fixup_size */ + + /* --------------------------------------------------------------------- + * Set the exception vectors. + * --------------------------------------------------------------------- + */ + adr x0, \_exception_vectors + msr vbar_el3, x0 + isb + +#if !(defined(IMAGE_BL2) && ENABLE_RME) + /* --------------------------------------------------------------------- + * It is a cold boot. + * Perform any processor specific actions upon reset e.g. cache, TLB + * invalidations etc. + * --------------------------------------------------------------------- + */ + bl reset_handler +#endif + + el3_arch_init_common + + .if \_secondary_cold_boot + /* ------------------------------------------------------------- + * Check if this is a primary or secondary CPU cold boot. + * The primary CPU will set up the platform while the + * secondaries are placed in a platform-specific state until the + * primary CPU performs the necessary actions to bring them out + * of that state and allows entry into the OS. + * ------------------------------------------------------------- + */ + bl plat_is_my_cpu_primary + cbnz w0, do_primary_cold_boot + + /* This is a cold boot on a secondary CPU */ + bl plat_secondary_cold_boot_setup + /* plat_secondary_cold_boot_setup() is not supposed to return */ + bl el3_panic + + do_primary_cold_boot: + .endif /* _secondary_cold_boot */ + + /* --------------------------------------------------------------------- + * Initialize memory now. Secondary CPU initialization won't get to this + * point. + * --------------------------------------------------------------------- + */ + + .if \_init_memory + bl platform_mem_init + .endif /* _init_memory */ + + /* --------------------------------------------------------------------- + * Init C runtime environment: + * - Zero-initialise the NOBITS sections. There are 2 of them: + * - the .bss section; + * - the coherent memory section (if any). + * - Relocate the data section from ROM to RAM, if required. + * --------------------------------------------------------------------- + */ + .if \_init_c_runtime +#if defined(IMAGE_BL31) || (defined(IMAGE_BL2) && \ + ((RESET_TO_BL2 && BL2_INV_DCACHE) || ENABLE_RME)) + /* ------------------------------------------------------------- + * Invalidate the RW memory used by the BL31 image. This + * includes the data and NOBITS sections. This is done to + * safeguard against possible corruption of this memory by + * dirty cache lines in a system cache as a result of use by + * an earlier boot loader stage. If PIE is enabled however, + * RO sections including the GOT may be modified during + * pie fixup. Therefore, to be on the safe side, invalidate + * the entire image region if PIE is enabled. + * ------------------------------------------------------------- + */ +#if ENABLE_PIE +#if SEPARATE_CODE_AND_RODATA + adrp x0, __TEXT_START__ + add x0, x0, :lo12:__TEXT_START__ +#else + adrp x0, __RO_START__ + add x0, x0, :lo12:__RO_START__ +#endif /* SEPARATE_CODE_AND_RODATA */ +#else + adrp x0, __RW_START__ + add x0, x0, :lo12:__RW_START__ +#endif /* ENABLE_PIE */ + adrp x1, __RW_END__ + add x1, x1, :lo12:__RW_END__ + sub x1, x1, x0 + bl inv_dcache_range +#if defined(IMAGE_BL31) && SEPARATE_NOBITS_REGION + adrp x0, __NOBITS_START__ + add x0, x0, :lo12:__NOBITS_START__ + adrp x1, __NOBITS_END__ + add x1, x1, :lo12:__NOBITS_END__ + sub x1, x1, x0 + bl inv_dcache_range +#endif +#if defined(IMAGE_BL2) && SEPARATE_BL2_NOLOAD_REGION + adrp x0, __BL2_NOLOAD_START__ + add x0, x0, :lo12:__BL2_NOLOAD_START__ + adrp x1, __BL2_NOLOAD_END__ + add x1, x1, :lo12:__BL2_NOLOAD_END__ + sub x1, x1, x0 + bl inv_dcache_range +#endif +#endif + adrp x0, __BSS_START__ + add x0, x0, :lo12:__BSS_START__ + + adrp x1, __BSS_END__ + add x1, x1, :lo12:__BSS_END__ + sub x1, x1, x0 + bl zeromem + +#if USE_COHERENT_MEM + adrp x0, __COHERENT_RAM_START__ + add x0, x0, :lo12:__COHERENT_RAM_START__ + adrp x1, __COHERENT_RAM_END_UNALIGNED__ + add x1, x1, :lo12: __COHERENT_RAM_END_UNALIGNED__ + sub x1, x1, x0 + bl zeromem +#endif + +#if defined(IMAGE_BL1) || \ + (defined(IMAGE_BL2) && RESET_TO_BL2 && BL2_IN_XIP_MEM) + adrp x0, __DATA_RAM_START__ + add x0, x0, :lo12:__DATA_RAM_START__ + adrp x1, __DATA_ROM_START__ + add x1, x1, :lo12:__DATA_ROM_START__ + adrp x2, __DATA_RAM_END__ + add x2, x2, :lo12:__DATA_RAM_END__ + sub x2, x2, x0 + bl memcpy16 +#endif + .endif /* _init_c_runtime */ + + /* --------------------------------------------------------------------- + * Use SP_EL0 for the C runtime stack. + * --------------------------------------------------------------------- + */ + msr spsel, #0 + + /* --------------------------------------------------------------------- + * Allocate a stack whose memory will be marked as Normal-IS-WBWA when + * the MMU is enabled. There is no risk of reading stale stack memory + * after enabling the MMU as only the primary CPU is running at the + * moment. + * --------------------------------------------------------------------- + */ + bl plat_set_my_stack + +#if STACK_PROTECTOR_ENABLED + .if \_init_c_runtime + bl update_stack_protector_canary + .endif /* _init_c_runtime */ +#endif + .endm + + .macro apply_at_speculative_wa +#if ERRATA_SPECULATIVE_AT + /* + * This function expects x30 has been saved. + * Also, save x29 which will be used in the called function. + */ + str x29, [sp, #CTX_GPREGS_OFFSET + CTX_GPREG_X29] + bl save_and_update_ptw_el1_sys_regs + ldr x29, [sp, #CTX_GPREGS_OFFSET + CTX_GPREG_X29] +#endif + .endm + + .macro restore_ptw_el1_sys_regs +#if ERRATA_SPECULATIVE_AT + /* ----------------------------------------------------------- + * In case of ERRATA_SPECULATIVE_AT, must follow below order + * to ensure that page table walk is not enabled until + * restoration of all EL1 system registers. TCR_EL1 register + * should be updated at the end which restores previous page + * table walk setting of stage1 i.e.(TCR_EL1.EPDx) bits. ISB + * ensures that CPU does below steps in order. + * + * 1. Ensure all other system registers are written before + * updating SCTLR_EL1 using ISB. + * 2. Restore SCTLR_EL1 register. + * 3. Ensure SCTLR_EL1 written successfully using ISB. + * 4. Restore TCR_EL1 register. + * ----------------------------------------------------------- + */ + isb + ldp x28, x29, [sp, #CTX_EL1_SYSREGS_OFFSET + CTX_SCTLR_EL1] + msr sctlr_el1, x28 + isb + msr tcr_el1, x29 +#endif + .endm + +/* ----------------------------------------------------------------- + * The below macro reads SCR_EL3 from the context structure to + * determine the security state of the context upon ERET. + * ------------------------------------------------------------------ + */ + .macro get_security_state _ret:req, _scr_reg:req + ubfx \_ret, \_scr_reg, #SCR_NSE_SHIFT, #1 + cmp \_ret, #1 + beq realm_state + bfi \_ret, \_scr_reg, #0, #1 + b end + realm_state: + mov \_ret, #2 + end: + .endm + +#endif /* EL3_COMMON_MACROS_S */ |