diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'services')
92 files changed, 21639 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/services/arm_arch_svc/arm_arch_svc_setup.c b/services/arm_arch_svc/arm_arch_svc_setup.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..57d211e --- /dev/null +++ b/services/arm_arch_svc/arm_arch_svc_setup.c @@ -0,0 +1,179 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2018-2023, Arm Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +#include <common/debug.h> +#include <common/runtime_svc.h> +#include <lib/cpus/errata.h> +#include <lib/cpus/wa_cve_2017_5715.h> +#include <lib/cpus/wa_cve_2018_3639.h> +#include <lib/cpus/wa_cve_2022_23960.h> +#include <lib/smccc.h> +#include <services/arm_arch_svc.h> +#include <smccc_helpers.h> +#include <plat/common/platform.h> + +static int32_t smccc_version(void) +{ + return MAKE_SMCCC_VERSION(SMCCC_MAJOR_VERSION, SMCCC_MINOR_VERSION); +} + +static int32_t smccc_arch_features(u_register_t arg1) +{ + switch (arg1) { + case SMCCC_VERSION: + case SMCCC_ARCH_FEATURES: + return SMC_ARCH_CALL_SUCCESS; + case SMCCC_ARCH_SOC_ID: + return plat_is_smccc_feature_available(arg1); +#ifdef __aarch64__ + /* Workaround checks are currently only implemented for aarch64 */ +#if WORKAROUND_CVE_2017_5715 + case SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1: + if (check_wa_cve_2017_5715() == ERRATA_NOT_APPLIES) + return 1; + return 0; /* ERRATA_APPLIES || ERRATA_MISSING */ +#endif + +#if WORKAROUND_CVE_2018_3639 + case SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2: { +#if DYNAMIC_WORKAROUND_CVE_2018_3639 + unsigned long long ssbs; + + /* + * Firmware doesn't have to carry out dynamic workaround if the + * PE implements architectural Speculation Store Bypass Safe + * (SSBS) feature. + */ + ssbs = (read_id_aa64pfr1_el1() >> ID_AA64PFR1_EL1_SSBS_SHIFT) & + ID_AA64PFR1_EL1_SSBS_MASK; + + /* + * If architectural SSBS is available on this PE, no firmware + * mitigation via SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2 is required. + */ + if (ssbs != SSBS_UNAVAILABLE) + return 1; + + /* + * On a platform where at least one CPU requires + * dynamic mitigation but others are either unaffected + * or permanently mitigated, report the latter as not + * needing dynamic mitigation. + */ + if (wa_cve_2018_3639_get_disable_ptr() == NULL) + return 1; + /* + * If we get here, this CPU requires dynamic mitigation + * so report it as such. + */ + return 0; +#else + /* Either the CPUs are unaffected or permanently mitigated */ + return SMC_ARCH_CALL_NOT_REQUIRED; +#endif + } +#endif + +#if (WORKAROUND_CVE_2022_23960 || WORKAROUND_CVE_2017_5715) + case SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_3: + /* + * SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_3 should also take into account + * CVE-2017-5715 since this SMC can be used instead of + * SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1. + */ + if ((check_smccc_arch_wa3_applies() == ERRATA_NOT_APPLIES) && + (check_wa_cve_2017_5715() == ERRATA_NOT_APPLIES)) { + return 1; + } + return 0; /* ERRATA_APPLIES || ERRATA_MISSING */ +#endif +#endif /* __aarch64__ */ + + /* Fallthrough */ + + default: + return SMC_UNK; + } +} + +/* return soc revision or soc version on success otherwise + * return invalid parameter */ +static int32_t smccc_arch_id(u_register_t arg1) +{ + if (arg1 == SMCCC_GET_SOC_REVISION) { + return plat_get_soc_revision(); + } + if (arg1 == SMCCC_GET_SOC_VERSION) { + return plat_get_soc_version(); + } + return SMC_ARCH_CALL_INVAL_PARAM; +} + +/* + * Top-level Arm Architectural Service SMC handler. + */ +static uintptr_t arm_arch_svc_smc_handler(uint32_t smc_fid, + u_register_t x1, + u_register_t x2, + u_register_t x3, + u_register_t x4, + void *cookie, + void *handle, + u_register_t flags) +{ + switch (smc_fid) { + case SMCCC_VERSION: + SMC_RET1(handle, smccc_version()); + case SMCCC_ARCH_FEATURES: + SMC_RET1(handle, smccc_arch_features(x1)); + case SMCCC_ARCH_SOC_ID: + SMC_RET1(handle, smccc_arch_id(x1)); +#ifdef __aarch64__ +#if WORKAROUND_CVE_2017_5715 + case SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1: + /* + * The workaround has already been applied on affected PEs + * during entry to EL3. On unaffected PEs, this function + * has no effect. + */ + SMC_RET0(handle); +#endif +#if WORKAROUND_CVE_2018_3639 + case SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2: + /* + * The workaround has already been applied on affected PEs + * requiring dynamic mitigation during entry to EL3. + * On unaffected or statically mitigated PEs, this function + * has no effect. + */ + SMC_RET0(handle); +#endif +#if (WORKAROUND_CVE_2022_23960 || WORKAROUND_CVE_2017_5715) + case SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_3: + /* + * The workaround has already been applied on affected PEs + * during entry to EL3. On unaffected PEs, this function + * has no effect. + */ + SMC_RET0(handle); +#endif +#endif /* __aarch64__ */ + default: + WARN("Unimplemented Arm Architecture Service Call: 0x%x \n", + smc_fid); + SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK); + } +} + +/* Register Standard Service Calls as runtime service */ +DECLARE_RT_SVC( + arm_arch_svc, + OEN_ARM_START, + OEN_ARM_END, + SMC_TYPE_FAST, + NULL, + arm_arch_svc_smc_handler +); diff --git a/services/spd/opteed/opteed.mk b/services/spd/opteed/opteed.mk new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f394744 --- /dev/null +++ b/services/spd/opteed/opteed.mk @@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ +# +# Copyright (c) 2013-2023, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. +# +# SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause +# + +OPTEED_DIR := services/spd/opteed +SPD_INCLUDES := + +SPD_SOURCES := services/spd/opteed/opteed_common.c \ + services/spd/opteed/opteed_helpers.S \ + services/spd/opteed/opteed_main.c \ + services/spd/opteed/opteed_pm.c + +NEED_BL32 := yes + +# required so that optee code can control access to the timer registers +NS_TIMER_SWITCH := 1 + +# WARNING: This enables loading of OP-TEE via an SMC, which can be potentially +# insecure. This removes the boundary between the startup of the secure and +# non-secure worlds until the point where this SMC is invoked. Only use this +# setting if you can ensure that the non-secure OS can remain trusted up until +# the point where this SMC is invoked. +OPTEE_ALLOW_SMC_LOAD := 0 +ifeq ($(OPTEE_ALLOW_SMC_LOAD),1) +ifeq ($(PLAT_XLAT_TABLES_DYNAMIC),0) +$(error When OPTEE_ALLOW_SMC_LOAD=1, PLAT_XLAT_TABLES_DYNAMIC must also be 1) +endif +$(warning "OPTEE_ALLOW_SMC_LOAD is enabled which may result in an insecure \ + platform") +$(eval $(call add_define,PLAT_XLAT_TABLES_DYNAMIC)) +$(eval $(call add_define,OPTEE_ALLOW_SMC_LOAD)) +include lib/libfdt/libfdt.mk +endif diff --git a/services/spd/opteed/opteed_common.c b/services/spd/opteed/opteed_common.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9aa19c5 --- /dev/null +++ b/services/spd/opteed/opteed_common.c @@ -0,0 +1,111 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2013-2017, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +#include <assert.h> +#include <string.h> + +#include <arch_helpers.h> +#include <common/bl_common.h> +#include <lib/el3_runtime/context_mgmt.h> +#include <lib/utils.h> + +#include "opteed_private.h" + +/******************************************************************************* + * Given a OPTEE entrypoint info pointer, entry point PC, register width, + * cpu id & pointer to a context data structure, this function will + * initialize OPTEE context and entry point info for OPTEE. + ******************************************************************************/ +void opteed_init_optee_ep_state(struct entry_point_info *optee_entry_point, + uint32_t rw, uint64_t pc, + uint64_t pageable_part, uint64_t mem_limit, + uint64_t dt_addr, optee_context_t *optee_ctx) +{ + uint32_t ep_attr; + + /* Passing a NULL context is a critical programming error */ + assert(optee_ctx); + assert(optee_entry_point); + assert(pc); + + /* Associate this context with the cpu specified */ + optee_ctx->mpidr = read_mpidr_el1(); + optee_ctx->state = 0; + set_optee_pstate(optee_ctx->state, OPTEE_PSTATE_OFF); + + cm_set_context(&optee_ctx->cpu_ctx, SECURE); + + /* initialise an entrypoint to set up the CPU context */ + ep_attr = SECURE | EP_ST_ENABLE; + if (read_sctlr_el3() & SCTLR_EE_BIT) + ep_attr |= EP_EE_BIG; + SET_PARAM_HEAD(optee_entry_point, PARAM_EP, VERSION_1, ep_attr); + optee_entry_point->pc = pc; + if (rw == OPTEE_AARCH64) + optee_entry_point->spsr = SPSR_64(MODE_EL1, MODE_SP_ELX, + DISABLE_ALL_EXCEPTIONS); + else + optee_entry_point->spsr = SPSR_MODE32(MODE32_svc, SPSR_T_ARM, + SPSR_E_LITTLE, + DAIF_FIQ_BIT | + DAIF_IRQ_BIT | + DAIF_ABT_BIT); + zeromem(&optee_entry_point->args, sizeof(optee_entry_point->args)); + optee_entry_point->args.arg0 = pageable_part; + optee_entry_point->args.arg1 = mem_limit; + optee_entry_point->args.arg2 = dt_addr; +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * This function takes an OPTEE context pointer and: + * 1. Applies the S-EL1 system register context from optee_ctx->cpu_ctx. + * 2. Saves the current C runtime state (callee saved registers) on the stack + * frame and saves a reference to this state. + * 3. Calls el3_exit() so that the EL3 system and general purpose registers + * from the optee_ctx->cpu_ctx are used to enter the OPTEE image. + ******************************************************************************/ +uint64_t opteed_synchronous_sp_entry(optee_context_t *optee_ctx) +{ + uint64_t rc; + + assert(optee_ctx != NULL); + assert(optee_ctx->c_rt_ctx == 0); + + /* Apply the Secure EL1 system register context and switch to it */ + assert(cm_get_context(SECURE) == &optee_ctx->cpu_ctx); + cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(SECURE); + cm_set_next_eret_context(SECURE); + + rc = opteed_enter_sp(&optee_ctx->c_rt_ctx); +#if ENABLE_ASSERTIONS + optee_ctx->c_rt_ctx = 0; +#endif + + return rc; +} + + +/******************************************************************************* + * This function takes an OPTEE context pointer and: + * 1. Saves the S-EL1 system register context tp optee_ctx->cpu_ctx. + * 2. Restores the current C runtime state (callee saved registers) from the + * stack frame using the reference to this state saved in opteed_enter_sp(). + * 3. It does not need to save any general purpose or EL3 system register state + * as the generic smc entry routine should have saved those. + ******************************************************************************/ +void opteed_synchronous_sp_exit(optee_context_t *optee_ctx, uint64_t ret) +{ + assert(optee_ctx != NULL); + /* Save the Secure EL1 system register context */ + assert(cm_get_context(SECURE) == &optee_ctx->cpu_ctx); + cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(SECURE); + + assert(optee_ctx->c_rt_ctx != 0); + opteed_exit_sp(optee_ctx->c_rt_ctx, ret); + + /* Should never reach here */ + assert(0); +} diff --git a/services/spd/opteed/opteed_helpers.S b/services/spd/opteed/opteed_helpers.S new file mode 100644 index 0000000..075a71b --- /dev/null +++ b/services/spd/opteed/opteed_helpers.S @@ -0,0 +1,79 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2013-2014, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +#include <asm_macros.S> +#include "opteed_private.h" + + .global opteed_enter_sp + /* --------------------------------------------- + * This function is called with SP_EL0 as stack. + * Here we stash our EL3 callee-saved registers + * on to the stack as a part of saving the C + * runtime and enter the secure payload. + * 'x0' contains a pointer to the memory where + * the address of the C runtime context is to be + * saved. + * --------------------------------------------- + */ +func opteed_enter_sp + /* Make space for the registers that we're going to save */ + mov x3, sp + str x3, [x0, #0] + sub sp, sp, #OPTEED_C_RT_CTX_SIZE + + /* Save callee-saved registers on to the stack */ + stp x19, x20, [sp, #OPTEED_C_RT_CTX_X19] + stp x21, x22, [sp, #OPTEED_C_RT_CTX_X21] + stp x23, x24, [sp, #OPTEED_C_RT_CTX_X23] + stp x25, x26, [sp, #OPTEED_C_RT_CTX_X25] + stp x27, x28, [sp, #OPTEED_C_RT_CTX_X27] + stp x29, x30, [sp, #OPTEED_C_RT_CTX_X29] + + /* --------------------------------------------- + * Everything is setup now. el3_exit() will + * use the secure context to restore to the + * general purpose and EL3 system registers to + * ERET into OPTEE. + * --------------------------------------------- + */ + b el3_exit +endfunc opteed_enter_sp + + /* --------------------------------------------- + * This function is called 'x0' pointing to a C + * runtime context saved in opteed_enter_sp(). It + * restores the saved registers and jumps to + * that runtime with 'x0' as the new sp. This + * destroys the C runtime context that had been + * built on the stack below the saved context by + * the caller. Later the second parameter 'x1' + * is passed as return value to the caller + * --------------------------------------------- + */ + .global opteed_exit_sp +func opteed_exit_sp + /* Restore the previous stack */ + mov sp, x0 + + /* Restore callee-saved registers on to the stack */ + ldp x19, x20, [x0, #(OPTEED_C_RT_CTX_X19 - OPTEED_C_RT_CTX_SIZE)] + ldp x21, x22, [x0, #(OPTEED_C_RT_CTX_X21 - OPTEED_C_RT_CTX_SIZE)] + ldp x23, x24, [x0, #(OPTEED_C_RT_CTX_X23 - OPTEED_C_RT_CTX_SIZE)] + ldp x25, x26, [x0, #(OPTEED_C_RT_CTX_X25 - OPTEED_C_RT_CTX_SIZE)] + ldp x27, x28, [x0, #(OPTEED_C_RT_CTX_X27 - OPTEED_C_RT_CTX_SIZE)] + ldp x29, x30, [x0, #(OPTEED_C_RT_CTX_X29 - OPTEED_C_RT_CTX_SIZE)] + + /* --------------------------------------------- + * This should take us back to the instruction + * after the call to the last opteed_enter_sp(). + * Place the second parameter to x0 so that the + * caller will see it as a return value from the + * original entry call + * --------------------------------------------- + */ + mov x0, x1 + ret +endfunc opteed_exit_sp diff --git a/services/spd/opteed/opteed_main.c b/services/spd/opteed/opteed_main.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4d055db --- /dev/null +++ b/services/spd/opteed/opteed_main.c @@ -0,0 +1,695 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2013-2023, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + + +/******************************************************************************* + * This is the Secure Payload Dispatcher (SPD). The dispatcher is meant to be a + * plug-in component to the Secure Monitor, registered as a runtime service. The + * SPD is expected to be a functional extension of the Secure Payload (SP) that + * executes in Secure EL1. The Secure Monitor will delegate all SMCs targeting + * the Trusted OS/Applications range to the dispatcher. The SPD will either + * handle the request locally or delegate it to the Secure Payload. It is also + * responsible for initialising and maintaining communication with the SP. + ******************************************************************************/ +#include <assert.h> +#include <errno.h> +#include <inttypes.h> +#include <stddef.h> + +#include <arch_helpers.h> +#include <bl31/bl31.h> +#include <common/bl_common.h> +#include <common/debug.h> +#include <common/runtime_svc.h> +#include <lib/coreboot.h> +#include <lib/el3_runtime/context_mgmt.h> +#include <lib/optee_utils.h> +#include <lib/xlat_tables/xlat_tables_v2.h> +#if OPTEE_ALLOW_SMC_LOAD +#include <libfdt.h> +#endif /* OPTEE_ALLOW_SMC_LOAD */ +#include <plat/common/platform.h> +#include <tools_share/uuid.h> + +#include "opteed_private.h" +#include "teesmc_opteed.h" + +/******************************************************************************* + * Address of the entrypoint vector table in OPTEE. It is + * initialised once on the primary core after a cold boot. + ******************************************************************************/ +struct optee_vectors *optee_vector_table; + +/******************************************************************************* + * Array to keep track of per-cpu OPTEE state + ******************************************************************************/ +optee_context_t opteed_sp_context[OPTEED_CORE_COUNT]; +uint32_t opteed_rw; + +#if OPTEE_ALLOW_SMC_LOAD +static bool opteed_allow_load; +/* OP-TEE image loading service UUID */ +DEFINE_SVC_UUID2(optee_image_load_uuid, + 0xb1eafba3, 0x5d31, 0x4612, 0xb9, 0x06, + 0xc4, 0xc7, 0xa4, 0xbe, 0x3c, 0xc0); + +#define OPTEED_FDT_SIZE 256 +static uint8_t fdt_buf[OPTEED_FDT_SIZE] __aligned(CACHE_WRITEBACK_GRANULE); + +#else +static int32_t opteed_init(void); +#endif + +uint64_t dual32to64(uint32_t high, uint32_t low) +{ + return ((uint64_t)high << 32) | low; +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * This function is the handler registered for S-EL1 interrupts by the + * OPTEED. It validates the interrupt and upon success arranges entry into + * the OPTEE at 'optee_fiq_entry()' for handling the interrupt. + ******************************************************************************/ +static uint64_t opteed_sel1_interrupt_handler(uint32_t id, + uint32_t flags, + void *handle, + void *cookie) +{ + uint32_t linear_id; + optee_context_t *optee_ctx; + + /* Check the security state when the exception was generated */ + assert(get_interrupt_src_ss(flags) == NON_SECURE); + + /* Sanity check the pointer to this cpu's context */ + assert(handle == cm_get_context(NON_SECURE)); + + /* Save the non-secure context before entering the OPTEE */ + cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(NON_SECURE); + + /* Get a reference to this cpu's OPTEE context */ + linear_id = plat_my_core_pos(); + optee_ctx = &opteed_sp_context[linear_id]; + assert(&optee_ctx->cpu_ctx == cm_get_context(SECURE)); + + cm_set_elr_el3(SECURE, (uint64_t)&optee_vector_table->fiq_entry); + cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(SECURE); + cm_set_next_eret_context(SECURE); + + /* + * Tell the OPTEE that it has to handle an FIQ (synchronously). + * Also the instruction in normal world where the interrupt was + * generated is passed for debugging purposes. It is safe to + * retrieve this address from ELR_EL3 as the secure context will + * not take effect until el3_exit(). + */ + SMC_RET1(&optee_ctx->cpu_ctx, read_elr_el3()); +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * OPTEE Dispatcher setup. The OPTEED finds out the OPTEE entrypoint and type + * (aarch32/aarch64) if not already known and initialises the context for entry + * into OPTEE for its initialization. + ******************************************************************************/ +static int32_t opteed_setup(void) +{ +#if OPTEE_ALLOW_SMC_LOAD + opteed_allow_load = true; + INFO("Delaying OP-TEE setup until we receive an SMC call to load it\n"); + return 0; +#else + entry_point_info_t *optee_ep_info; + uint32_t linear_id; + uint64_t opteed_pageable_part; + uint64_t opteed_mem_limit; + uint64_t dt_addr; + + linear_id = plat_my_core_pos(); + + /* + * Get information about the Secure Payload (BL32) image. Its + * absence is a critical failure. TODO: Add support to + * conditionally include the SPD service + */ + optee_ep_info = bl31_plat_get_next_image_ep_info(SECURE); + if (!optee_ep_info) { + WARN("No OPTEE provided by BL2 boot loader, Booting device" + " without OPTEE initialization. SMC`s destined for OPTEE" + " will return SMC_UNK\n"); + return 1; + } + + /* + * If there's no valid entry point for SP, we return a non-zero value + * signalling failure initializing the service. We bail out without + * registering any handlers + */ + if (!optee_ep_info->pc) + return 1; + + opteed_rw = optee_ep_info->args.arg0; + opteed_pageable_part = optee_ep_info->args.arg1; + opteed_mem_limit = optee_ep_info->args.arg2; + dt_addr = optee_ep_info->args.arg3; + + opteed_init_optee_ep_state(optee_ep_info, + opteed_rw, + optee_ep_info->pc, + opteed_pageable_part, + opteed_mem_limit, + dt_addr, + &opteed_sp_context[linear_id]); + + /* + * All OPTEED initialization done. Now register our init function with + * BL31 for deferred invocation + */ + bl31_register_bl32_init(&opteed_init); + + return 0; +#endif /* OPTEE_ALLOW_SMC_LOAD */ +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * This function passes control to the OPTEE image (BL32) for the first time + * on the primary cpu after a cold boot. It assumes that a valid secure + * context has already been created by opteed_setup() which can be directly + * used. It also assumes that a valid non-secure context has been + * initialised by PSCI so it does not need to save and restore any + * non-secure state. This function performs a synchronous entry into + * OPTEE. OPTEE passes control back to this routine through a SMC. This returns + * a non-zero value on success and zero on failure. + ******************************************************************************/ +static int32_t +opteed_init_with_entry_point(entry_point_info_t *optee_entry_point) +{ + uint32_t linear_id = plat_my_core_pos(); + optee_context_t *optee_ctx = &opteed_sp_context[linear_id]; + uint64_t rc; + assert(optee_entry_point); + + cm_init_my_context(optee_entry_point); + + /* + * Arrange for an entry into OPTEE. It will be returned via + * OPTEE_ENTRY_DONE case + */ + rc = opteed_synchronous_sp_entry(optee_ctx); + assert(rc != 0); + + return rc; +} + +#if !OPTEE_ALLOW_SMC_LOAD +static int32_t opteed_init(void) +{ + entry_point_info_t *optee_entry_point; + /* + * Get information about the OP-TEE (BL32) image. Its + * absence is a critical failure. + */ + optee_entry_point = bl31_plat_get_next_image_ep_info(SECURE); + return opteed_init_with_entry_point(optee_entry_point); +} +#endif /* !OPTEE_ALLOW_SMC_LOAD */ + +#if OPTEE_ALLOW_SMC_LOAD +#if COREBOOT +/* + * Adds a firmware/coreboot node with the coreboot table information to a device + * tree. Returns zero on success or if there is no coreboot table information; + * failure code otherwise. + */ +static int add_coreboot_node(void *fdt) +{ + int ret; + uint64_t coreboot_table_addr; + uint32_t coreboot_table_size; + struct { + uint64_t addr; + uint32_t size; + } reg_node; + coreboot_get_table_location(&coreboot_table_addr, &coreboot_table_size); + if (!coreboot_table_addr || !coreboot_table_size) { + WARN("Unable to get coreboot table location for device tree"); + return 0; + } + ret = fdt_begin_node(fdt, "firmware"); + if (ret) + return ret; + + ret = fdt_property(fdt, "ranges", NULL, 0); + if (ret) + return ret; + + ret = fdt_begin_node(fdt, "coreboot"); + if (ret) + return ret; + + ret = fdt_property_string(fdt, "compatible", "coreboot"); + if (ret) + return ret; + + reg_node.addr = cpu_to_fdt64(coreboot_table_addr); + reg_node.size = cpu_to_fdt32(coreboot_table_size); + ret = fdt_property(fdt, "reg", ®_node, + sizeof(uint64_t) + sizeof(uint32_t)); + if (ret) + return ret; + + ret = fdt_end_node(fdt); + if (ret) + return ret; + + return fdt_end_node(fdt); +} +#endif /* COREBOOT */ + +/* + * Creates a device tree for passing into OP-TEE. Currently is populated with + * the coreboot table address. + * Returns 0 on success, error code otherwise. + */ +static int create_opteed_dt(void) +{ + int ret; + + ret = fdt_create(fdt_buf, OPTEED_FDT_SIZE); + if (ret) + return ret; + + ret = fdt_finish_reservemap(fdt_buf); + if (ret) + return ret; + + ret = fdt_begin_node(fdt_buf, ""); + if (ret) + return ret; + +#if COREBOOT + ret = add_coreboot_node(fdt_buf); + if (ret) + return ret; +#endif /* COREBOOT */ + + ret = fdt_end_node(fdt_buf); + if (ret) + return ret; + + return fdt_finish(fdt_buf); +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * This function is responsible for handling the SMC that loads the OP-TEE + * binary image via a non-secure SMC call. It takes the size and physical + * address of the payload as parameters. + ******************************************************************************/ +static int32_t opteed_handle_smc_load(uint64_t data_size, uint32_t data_pa) +{ + uintptr_t data_va = data_pa; + uint64_t mapped_data_pa; + uintptr_t mapped_data_va; + uint64_t data_map_size; + int32_t rc; + optee_header_t *image_header; + uint8_t *image_ptr; + uint64_t target_pa; + uint64_t target_end_pa; + uint64_t image_pa; + uintptr_t image_va; + optee_image_t *curr_image; + uintptr_t target_va; + uint64_t target_size; + entry_point_info_t optee_ep_info; + uint32_t linear_id = plat_my_core_pos(); + uint64_t dt_addr = 0; + + mapped_data_pa = page_align(data_pa, DOWN); + mapped_data_va = mapped_data_pa; + data_map_size = page_align(data_size + (mapped_data_pa - data_pa), UP); + + /* + * We do not validate the passed in address because we are trusting the + * non-secure world at this point still. + */ + rc = mmap_add_dynamic_region(mapped_data_pa, mapped_data_va, + data_map_size, MT_MEMORY | MT_RO | MT_NS); + if (rc != 0) { + return rc; + } + + image_header = (optee_header_t *)data_va; + if (image_header->magic != TEE_MAGIC_NUM_OPTEE || + image_header->version != 2 || image_header->nb_images != 1) { + mmap_remove_dynamic_region(mapped_data_va, data_map_size); + return -EINVAL; + } + + image_ptr = (uint8_t *)data_va + sizeof(optee_header_t) + + sizeof(optee_image_t); + if (image_header->arch == 1) { + opteed_rw = OPTEE_AARCH64; + } else { + opteed_rw = OPTEE_AARCH32; + } + + curr_image = &image_header->optee_image_list[0]; + image_pa = dual32to64(curr_image->load_addr_hi, + curr_image->load_addr_lo); + image_va = image_pa; + target_end_pa = image_pa + curr_image->size; + + /* Now also map the memory we want to copy it to. */ + target_pa = page_align(image_pa, DOWN); + target_va = target_pa; + target_size = page_align(target_end_pa, UP) - target_pa; + + rc = mmap_add_dynamic_region(target_pa, target_va, target_size, + MT_MEMORY | MT_RW | MT_SECURE); + if (rc != 0) { + mmap_remove_dynamic_region(mapped_data_va, data_map_size); + return rc; + } + + INFO("Loaded OP-TEE via SMC: size %d addr 0x%" PRIx64 "\n", + curr_image->size, image_va); + + memcpy((void *)image_va, image_ptr, curr_image->size); + flush_dcache_range(target_pa, target_size); + + mmap_remove_dynamic_region(mapped_data_va, data_map_size); + mmap_remove_dynamic_region(target_va, target_size); + + /* Save the non-secure state */ + cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(NON_SECURE); + + rc = create_opteed_dt(); + if (rc) { + ERROR("Failed device tree creation %d\n", rc); + return rc; + } + dt_addr = (uint64_t)fdt_buf; + flush_dcache_range(dt_addr, OPTEED_FDT_SIZE); + + opteed_init_optee_ep_state(&optee_ep_info, + opteed_rw, + image_pa, + 0, + 0, + dt_addr, + &opteed_sp_context[linear_id]); + if (opteed_init_with_entry_point(&optee_ep_info) == 0) { + rc = -EFAULT; + } + + /* Restore non-secure state */ + cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(NON_SECURE); + cm_set_next_eret_context(NON_SECURE); + + return rc; +} +#endif /* OPTEE_ALLOW_SMC_LOAD */ + +/******************************************************************************* + * This function is responsible for handling all SMCs in the Trusted OS/App + * range from the non-secure state as defined in the SMC Calling Convention + * Document. It is also responsible for communicating with the Secure + * payload to delegate work and return results back to the non-secure + * state. Lastly it will also return any information that OPTEE needs to do + * the work assigned to it. + ******************************************************************************/ +static uintptr_t opteed_smc_handler(uint32_t smc_fid, + u_register_t x1, + u_register_t x2, + u_register_t x3, + u_register_t x4, + void *cookie, + void *handle, + u_register_t flags) +{ + cpu_context_t *ns_cpu_context; + uint32_t linear_id = plat_my_core_pos(); + optee_context_t *optee_ctx = &opteed_sp_context[linear_id]; + uint64_t rc; + + /* + * Determine which security state this SMC originated from + */ + + if (is_caller_non_secure(flags)) { +#if OPTEE_ALLOW_SMC_LOAD + if (opteed_allow_load && smc_fid == NSSMC_OPTEED_CALL_UID) { + /* Provide the UUID of the image loading service. */ + SMC_UUID_RET(handle, optee_image_load_uuid); + } + if (smc_fid == NSSMC_OPTEED_CALL_LOAD_IMAGE) { + /* + * TODO: Consider wiping the code for SMC loading from + * memory after it has been invoked similar to what is + * done under RECLAIM_INIT, but extended to happen + * later. + */ + if (!opteed_allow_load) { + SMC_RET1(handle, -EPERM); + } + + opteed_allow_load = false; + uint64_t data_size = dual32to64(x1, x2); + uint64_t data_pa = dual32to64(x3, x4); + if (!data_size || !data_pa) { + /* + * This is invoked when the OP-TEE image didn't + * load correctly in the kernel but we want to + * block off loading of it later for security + * reasons. + */ + SMC_RET1(handle, -EINVAL); + } + SMC_RET1(handle, opteed_handle_smc_load( + data_size, data_pa)); + } +#endif /* OPTEE_ALLOW_SMC_LOAD */ + /* + * This is a fresh request from the non-secure client. + * The parameters are in x1 and x2. Figure out which + * registers need to be preserved, save the non-secure + * state and send the request to the secure payload. + */ + assert(handle == cm_get_context(NON_SECURE)); + + cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(NON_SECURE); + + /* + * We are done stashing the non-secure context. Ask the + * OP-TEE to do the work now. If we are loading vi an SMC, + * then we also need to init this CPU context if not done + * already. + */ + if (optee_vector_table == NULL) { + SMC_RET1(handle, -EINVAL); + } + + if (get_optee_pstate(optee_ctx->state) == + OPTEE_PSTATE_UNKNOWN) { + opteed_cpu_on_finish_handler(0); + } + + /* + * Verify if there is a valid context to use, copy the + * operation type and parameters to the secure context + * and jump to the fast smc entry point in the secure + * payload. Entry into S-EL1 will take place upon exit + * from this function. + */ + assert(&optee_ctx->cpu_ctx == cm_get_context(SECURE)); + + /* Set appropriate entry for SMC. + * We expect OPTEE to manage the PSTATE.I and PSTATE.F + * flags as appropriate. + */ + if (GET_SMC_TYPE(smc_fid) == SMC_TYPE_FAST) { + cm_set_elr_el3(SECURE, (uint64_t) + &optee_vector_table->fast_smc_entry); + } else { + cm_set_elr_el3(SECURE, (uint64_t) + &optee_vector_table->yield_smc_entry); + } + + cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(SECURE); + cm_set_next_eret_context(SECURE); + + write_ctx_reg(get_gpregs_ctx(&optee_ctx->cpu_ctx), + CTX_GPREG_X4, + read_ctx_reg(get_gpregs_ctx(handle), + CTX_GPREG_X4)); + write_ctx_reg(get_gpregs_ctx(&optee_ctx->cpu_ctx), + CTX_GPREG_X5, + read_ctx_reg(get_gpregs_ctx(handle), + CTX_GPREG_X5)); + write_ctx_reg(get_gpregs_ctx(&optee_ctx->cpu_ctx), + CTX_GPREG_X6, + read_ctx_reg(get_gpregs_ctx(handle), + CTX_GPREG_X6)); + /* Propagate hypervisor client ID */ + write_ctx_reg(get_gpregs_ctx(&optee_ctx->cpu_ctx), + CTX_GPREG_X7, + read_ctx_reg(get_gpregs_ctx(handle), + CTX_GPREG_X7)); + + SMC_RET4(&optee_ctx->cpu_ctx, smc_fid, x1, x2, x3); + } + + /* + * Returning from OPTEE + */ + + switch (smc_fid) { + /* + * OPTEE has finished initialising itself after a cold boot + */ + case TEESMC_OPTEED_RETURN_ENTRY_DONE: + /* + * Stash the OPTEE entry points information. This is done + * only once on the primary cpu + */ + assert(optee_vector_table == NULL); + optee_vector_table = (optee_vectors_t *) x1; + + if (optee_vector_table) { + set_optee_pstate(optee_ctx->state, OPTEE_PSTATE_ON); + + /* + * OPTEE has been successfully initialized. + * Register power management hooks with PSCI + */ + psci_register_spd_pm_hook(&opteed_pm); + + /* + * Register an interrupt handler for S-EL1 interrupts + * when generated during code executing in the + * non-secure state. + */ + flags = 0; + set_interrupt_rm_flag(flags, NON_SECURE); + rc = register_interrupt_type_handler(INTR_TYPE_S_EL1, + opteed_sel1_interrupt_handler, + flags); + if (rc) + panic(); + } + + /* + * OPTEE reports completion. The OPTEED must have initiated + * the original request through a synchronous entry into + * OPTEE. Jump back to the original C runtime context. + */ + opteed_synchronous_sp_exit(optee_ctx, x1); + break; + + + /* + * These function IDs is used only by OP-TEE to indicate it has + * finished: + * 1. turning itself on in response to an earlier psci + * cpu_on request + * 2. resuming itself after an earlier psci cpu_suspend + * request. + */ + case TEESMC_OPTEED_RETURN_ON_DONE: + case TEESMC_OPTEED_RETURN_RESUME_DONE: + + + /* + * These function IDs is used only by the SP to indicate it has + * finished: + * 1. suspending itself after an earlier psci cpu_suspend + * request. + * 2. turning itself off in response to an earlier psci + * cpu_off request. + */ + case TEESMC_OPTEED_RETURN_OFF_DONE: + case TEESMC_OPTEED_RETURN_SUSPEND_DONE: + case TEESMC_OPTEED_RETURN_SYSTEM_OFF_DONE: + case TEESMC_OPTEED_RETURN_SYSTEM_RESET_DONE: + + /* + * OPTEE reports completion. The OPTEED must have initiated the + * original request through a synchronous entry into OPTEE. + * Jump back to the original C runtime context, and pass x1 as + * return value to the caller + */ + opteed_synchronous_sp_exit(optee_ctx, x1); + break; + + /* + * OPTEE is returning from a call or being preempted from a call, in + * either case execution should resume in the normal world. + */ + case TEESMC_OPTEED_RETURN_CALL_DONE: + /* + * This is the result from the secure client of an + * earlier request. The results are in x0-x3. Copy it + * into the non-secure context, save the secure state + * and return to the non-secure state. + */ + assert(handle == cm_get_context(SECURE)); + cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(SECURE); + + /* Get a reference to the non-secure context */ + ns_cpu_context = cm_get_context(NON_SECURE); + assert(ns_cpu_context); + + /* Restore non-secure state */ + cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(NON_SECURE); + cm_set_next_eret_context(NON_SECURE); + + SMC_RET4(ns_cpu_context, x1, x2, x3, x4); + + /* + * OPTEE has finished handling a S-EL1 FIQ interrupt. Execution + * should resume in the normal world. + */ + case TEESMC_OPTEED_RETURN_FIQ_DONE: + /* Get a reference to the non-secure context */ + ns_cpu_context = cm_get_context(NON_SECURE); + assert(ns_cpu_context); + + /* + * Restore non-secure state. There is no need to save the + * secure system register context since OPTEE was supposed + * to preserve it during S-EL1 interrupt handling. + */ + cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(NON_SECURE); + cm_set_next_eret_context(NON_SECURE); + + SMC_RET0((uint64_t) ns_cpu_context); + + default: + panic(); + } +} + +/* Define an OPTEED runtime service descriptor for fast SMC calls */ +DECLARE_RT_SVC( + opteed_fast, + + OEN_TOS_START, + OEN_TOS_END, + SMC_TYPE_FAST, + opteed_setup, + opteed_smc_handler +); + +/* Define an OPTEED runtime service descriptor for yielding SMC calls */ +DECLARE_RT_SVC( + opteed_std, + + OEN_TOS_START, + OEN_TOS_END, + SMC_TYPE_YIELD, + NULL, + opteed_smc_handler +); diff --git a/services/spd/opteed/opteed_pm.c b/services/spd/opteed/opteed_pm.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..fa724a1 --- /dev/null +++ b/services/spd/opteed/opteed_pm.c @@ -0,0 +1,252 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2013-2023, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +#include <assert.h> + +#include <arch_helpers.h> +#include <common/bl_common.h> +#include <common/debug.h> +#include <lib/el3_runtime/context_mgmt.h> +#include <plat/common/platform.h> + +#include "opteed_private.h" + +/******************************************************************************* + * The target cpu is being turned on. Allow the OPTEED/OPTEE to perform any + * actions needed. Nothing at the moment. + ******************************************************************************/ +static void opteed_cpu_on_handler(u_register_t target_cpu) +{ +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * This cpu is being turned off. Allow the OPTEED/OPTEE to perform any actions + * needed + ******************************************************************************/ +static int32_t opteed_cpu_off_handler(u_register_t unused) +{ + int32_t rc = 0; + uint32_t linear_id = plat_my_core_pos(); + optee_context_t *optee_ctx = &opteed_sp_context[linear_id]; + + if (get_optee_pstate(optee_ctx->state) == OPTEE_PSTATE_UNKNOWN) { + return 0; + } + + assert(optee_vector_table); + assert(get_optee_pstate(optee_ctx->state) == OPTEE_PSTATE_ON); + + /* Program the entry point and enter OPTEE */ + cm_set_elr_el3(SECURE, (uint64_t) &optee_vector_table->cpu_off_entry); + rc = opteed_synchronous_sp_entry(optee_ctx); + + /* + * Read the response from OPTEE. A non-zero return means that + * something went wrong while communicating with OPTEE. + */ + if (rc != 0) + panic(); + + /* + * Reset OPTEE's context for a fresh start when this cpu is turned on + * subsequently. + */ + set_optee_pstate(optee_ctx->state, OPTEE_PSTATE_OFF); + + return 0; +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * This cpu is being suspended. S-EL1 state must have been saved in the + * resident cpu (mpidr format) if it is a UP/UP migratable OPTEE. + ******************************************************************************/ +static void opteed_cpu_suspend_handler(u_register_t max_off_pwrlvl) +{ + int32_t rc = 0; + uint32_t linear_id = plat_my_core_pos(); + optee_context_t *optee_ctx = &opteed_sp_context[linear_id]; + + if (get_optee_pstate(optee_ctx->state) == OPTEE_PSTATE_UNKNOWN) { + return; + } + + assert(optee_vector_table); + assert(get_optee_pstate(optee_ctx->state) == OPTEE_PSTATE_ON); + + write_ctx_reg(get_gpregs_ctx(&optee_ctx->cpu_ctx), CTX_GPREG_X0, + max_off_pwrlvl); + + /* Program the entry point and enter OPTEE */ + cm_set_elr_el3(SECURE, (uint64_t) &optee_vector_table->cpu_suspend_entry); + rc = opteed_synchronous_sp_entry(optee_ctx); + + /* + * Read the response from OPTEE. A non-zero return means that + * something went wrong while communicating with OPTEE. + */ + if (rc != 0) + panic(); + + /* Update its context to reflect the state OPTEE is in */ + set_optee_pstate(optee_ctx->state, OPTEE_PSTATE_SUSPEND); +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * This cpu has been turned on. Enter OPTEE to initialise S-EL1 and other bits + * before passing control back to the Secure Monitor. Entry in S-El1 is done + * after initialising minimal architectural state that guarantees safe + * execution. + ******************************************************************************/ +void opteed_cpu_on_finish_handler(u_register_t unused) +{ + int32_t rc = 0; + uint32_t linear_id = plat_my_core_pos(); + optee_context_t *optee_ctx = &opteed_sp_context[linear_id]; + entry_point_info_t optee_on_entrypoint; + + assert(optee_vector_table); + assert(get_optee_pstate(optee_ctx->state) == OPTEE_PSTATE_OFF || + get_optee_pstate(optee_ctx->state) == OPTEE_PSTATE_UNKNOWN); + + opteed_init_optee_ep_state(&optee_on_entrypoint, opteed_rw, + (uint64_t)&optee_vector_table->cpu_on_entry, + 0, 0, 0, optee_ctx); + + /* Initialise this cpu's secure context */ + cm_init_my_context(&optee_on_entrypoint); + + /* Enter OPTEE */ + rc = opteed_synchronous_sp_entry(optee_ctx); + + /* + * Read the response from OPTEE. A non-zero return means that + * something went wrong while communicating with OPTEE. + */ + if (rc != 0) + panic(); + + /* Update its context to reflect the state OPTEE is in */ + set_optee_pstate(optee_ctx->state, OPTEE_PSTATE_ON); +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * This cpu has resumed from suspend. The OPTEED saved the OPTEE context when it + * completed the preceding suspend call. Use that context to program an entry + * into OPTEE to allow it to do any remaining book keeping + ******************************************************************************/ +static void opteed_cpu_suspend_finish_handler(u_register_t max_off_pwrlvl) +{ + int32_t rc = 0; + uint32_t linear_id = plat_my_core_pos(); + optee_context_t *optee_ctx = &opteed_sp_context[linear_id]; + + if (get_optee_pstate(optee_ctx->state) == OPTEE_PSTATE_UNKNOWN) { + return; + } + + assert(optee_vector_table); + assert(get_optee_pstate(optee_ctx->state) == OPTEE_PSTATE_SUSPEND); + + /* Program the entry point, max_off_pwrlvl and enter the SP */ + write_ctx_reg(get_gpregs_ctx(&optee_ctx->cpu_ctx), + CTX_GPREG_X0, + max_off_pwrlvl); + cm_set_elr_el3(SECURE, (uint64_t) &optee_vector_table->cpu_resume_entry); + rc = opteed_synchronous_sp_entry(optee_ctx); + + /* + * Read the response from OPTEE. A non-zero return means that + * something went wrong while communicating with OPTEE. + */ + if (rc != 0) + panic(); + + /* Update its context to reflect the state OPTEE is in */ + set_optee_pstate(optee_ctx->state, OPTEE_PSTATE_ON); +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * Return the type of OPTEE the OPTEED is dealing with. Report the current + * resident cpu (mpidr format) if it is a UP/UP migratable OPTEE. + ******************************************************************************/ +static int32_t opteed_cpu_migrate_info(u_register_t *resident_cpu) +{ + return OPTEE_MIGRATE_INFO; +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * System is about to be switched off. Allow the OPTEED/OPTEE to perform + * any actions needed. + ******************************************************************************/ +static void opteed_system_off(void) +{ + uint32_t linear_id = plat_my_core_pos(); + optee_context_t *optee_ctx = &opteed_sp_context[linear_id]; + + /* + * OP-TEE must have been initialized in order to reach this location so + * it is safe to init the CPU context if not already done for this core. + */ + if (get_optee_pstate(optee_ctx->state) == OPTEE_PSTATE_UNKNOWN) { + opteed_cpu_on_finish_handler(0); + } + + assert(optee_vector_table); + assert(get_optee_pstate(optee_ctx->state) == OPTEE_PSTATE_ON); + + /* Program the entry point */ + cm_set_elr_el3(SECURE, (uint64_t) &optee_vector_table->system_off_entry); + + /* Enter OPTEE. We do not care about the return value because we + * must continue the shutdown anyway */ + opteed_synchronous_sp_entry(optee_ctx); +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * System is about to be reset. Allow the OPTEED/OPTEE to perform + * any actions needed. + ******************************************************************************/ +static void opteed_system_reset(void) +{ + uint32_t linear_id = plat_my_core_pos(); + optee_context_t *optee_ctx = &opteed_sp_context[linear_id]; + + /* + * OP-TEE must have been initialized in order to reach this location so + * it is safe to init the CPU context if not already done for this core. + */ + if (get_optee_pstate(optee_ctx->state) == OPTEE_PSTATE_UNKNOWN) { + opteed_cpu_on_finish_handler(0); + } + + assert(optee_vector_table); + assert(get_optee_pstate(optee_ctx->state) == OPTEE_PSTATE_ON); + + /* Program the entry point */ + cm_set_elr_el3(SECURE, (uint64_t) &optee_vector_table->system_reset_entry); + + /* Enter OPTEE. We do not care about the return value because we + * must continue the reset anyway */ + opteed_synchronous_sp_entry(optee_ctx); +} + + +/******************************************************************************* + * Structure populated by the OPTEE Dispatcher to be given a chance to + * perform any OPTEE bookkeeping before PSCI executes a power mgmt. + * operation. + ******************************************************************************/ +const spd_pm_ops_t opteed_pm = { + .svc_on = opteed_cpu_on_handler, + .svc_off = opteed_cpu_off_handler, + .svc_suspend = opteed_cpu_suspend_handler, + .svc_on_finish = opteed_cpu_on_finish_handler, + .svc_suspend_finish = opteed_cpu_suspend_finish_handler, + .svc_migrate = NULL, + .svc_migrate_info = opteed_cpu_migrate_info, + .svc_system_off = opteed_system_off, + .svc_system_reset = opteed_system_reset, +}; diff --git a/services/spd/opteed/opteed_private.h b/services/spd/opteed/opteed_private.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c8fbc22 --- /dev/null +++ b/services/spd/opteed/opteed_private.h @@ -0,0 +1,164 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2013-2023, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +#ifndef OPTEED_PRIVATE_H +#define OPTEED_PRIVATE_H + +#include <platform_def.h> + +#include <arch.h> +#include <bl31/interrupt_mgmt.h> +#include <context.h> +#include <lib/psci/psci.h> + +/******************************************************************************* + * OPTEE PM state information e.g. OPTEE is suspended, uninitialised etc + * and macros to access the state information in the per-cpu 'state' flags + ******************************************************************************/ +#define OPTEE_PSTATE_OFF 1 +#define OPTEE_PSTATE_ON 2 +#define OPTEE_PSTATE_SUSPEND 3 +#define OPTEE_PSTATE_UNKNOWN 0 +#define OPTEE_PSTATE_SHIFT 0 +#define OPTEE_PSTATE_MASK 0x3 +#define get_optee_pstate(state) ((state >> OPTEE_PSTATE_SHIFT) & \ + OPTEE_PSTATE_MASK) +#define clr_optee_pstate(state) (state &= ~(OPTEE_PSTATE_MASK \ + << OPTEE_PSTATE_SHIFT)) +#define set_optee_pstate(st, pst) do { \ + clr_optee_pstate(st); \ + st |= (pst & OPTEE_PSTATE_MASK) << \ + OPTEE_PSTATE_SHIFT; \ + } while (0) + + +/******************************************************************************* + * OPTEE execution state information i.e. aarch32 or aarch64 + ******************************************************************************/ +#define OPTEE_AARCH32 MODE_RW_32 +#define OPTEE_AARCH64 MODE_RW_64 + +/******************************************************************************* + * The OPTEED should know the type of OPTEE + ******************************************************************************/ +#define OPTEE_TYPE_UP PSCI_TOS_NOT_UP_MIG_CAP +#define OPTEE_TYPE_UPM PSCI_TOS_UP_MIG_CAP +#define OPTEE_TYPE_MP PSCI_TOS_NOT_PRESENT_MP + +/******************************************************************************* + * OPTEE migrate type information as known to the OPTEED. We assume that + * the OPTEED is dealing with an MP Secure Payload. + ******************************************************************************/ +#define OPTEE_MIGRATE_INFO OPTEE_TYPE_MP + +/******************************************************************************* + * Number of cpus that the present on this platform. TODO: Rely on a topology + * tree to determine this in the future to avoid assumptions about mpidr + * allocation + ******************************************************************************/ +#define OPTEED_CORE_COUNT PLATFORM_CORE_COUNT + +/******************************************************************************* + * Constants that allow assembler code to preserve callee-saved registers of the + * C runtime context while performing a security state switch. + ******************************************************************************/ +#define OPTEED_C_RT_CTX_X19 0x0 +#define OPTEED_C_RT_CTX_X20 0x8 +#define OPTEED_C_RT_CTX_X21 0x10 +#define OPTEED_C_RT_CTX_X22 0x18 +#define OPTEED_C_RT_CTX_X23 0x20 +#define OPTEED_C_RT_CTX_X24 0x28 +#define OPTEED_C_RT_CTX_X25 0x30 +#define OPTEED_C_RT_CTX_X26 0x38 +#define OPTEED_C_RT_CTX_X27 0x40 +#define OPTEED_C_RT_CTX_X28 0x48 +#define OPTEED_C_RT_CTX_X29 0x50 +#define OPTEED_C_RT_CTX_X30 0x58 +#define OPTEED_C_RT_CTX_SIZE 0x60 +#define OPTEED_C_RT_CTX_ENTRIES (OPTEED_C_RT_CTX_SIZE >> DWORD_SHIFT) + +#ifndef __ASSEMBLER__ + +#include <stdint.h> + +#include <lib/cassert.h> + +typedef uint32_t optee_vector_isn_t; + +typedef struct optee_vectors { + optee_vector_isn_t yield_smc_entry; + optee_vector_isn_t fast_smc_entry; + optee_vector_isn_t cpu_on_entry; + optee_vector_isn_t cpu_off_entry; + optee_vector_isn_t cpu_resume_entry; + optee_vector_isn_t cpu_suspend_entry; + optee_vector_isn_t fiq_entry; + optee_vector_isn_t system_off_entry; + optee_vector_isn_t system_reset_entry; +} optee_vectors_t; + +/* + * The number of arguments to save during a SMC call for OPTEE. + * Currently only x1 and x2 are used by OPTEE. + */ +#define OPTEE_NUM_ARGS 0x2 + +/* AArch64 callee saved general purpose register context structure. */ +DEFINE_REG_STRUCT(c_rt_regs, OPTEED_C_RT_CTX_ENTRIES); + +/* + * Compile time assertion to ensure that both the compiler and linker + * have the same double word aligned view of the size of the C runtime + * register context. + */ +CASSERT(OPTEED_C_RT_CTX_SIZE == sizeof(c_rt_regs_t), + assert_spd_c_rt_regs_size_mismatch); + +/******************************************************************************* + * Structure which helps the OPTEED to maintain the per-cpu state of OPTEE. + * 'state' - collection of flags to track OPTEE state e.g. on/off + * 'mpidr' - mpidr to associate a context with a cpu + * 'c_rt_ctx' - stack address to restore C runtime context from after + * returning from a synchronous entry into OPTEE. + * 'cpu_ctx' - space to maintain OPTEE architectural state + ******************************************************************************/ +typedef struct optee_context { + uint32_t state; + uint64_t mpidr; + uint64_t c_rt_ctx; + cpu_context_t cpu_ctx; +} optee_context_t; + +/* OPTEED power management handlers */ +extern const spd_pm_ops_t opteed_pm; + +/******************************************************************************* + * Forward declarations + ******************************************************************************/ +struct optee_vectors; + +/******************************************************************************* + * Function & Data prototypes + ******************************************************************************/ +uint64_t opteed_enter_sp(uint64_t *c_rt_ctx); +void __dead2 opteed_exit_sp(uint64_t c_rt_ctx, uint64_t ret); +uint64_t opteed_synchronous_sp_entry(optee_context_t *optee_ctx); +void __dead2 opteed_synchronous_sp_exit(optee_context_t *optee_ctx, uint64_t ret); +void opteed_init_optee_ep_state(struct entry_point_info *optee_entry_point, + uint32_t rw, + uint64_t pc, + uint64_t pageable_part, + uint64_t mem_limit, + uint64_t dt_addr, + optee_context_t *optee_ctx); +void opteed_cpu_on_finish_handler(u_register_t unused); + +extern optee_context_t opteed_sp_context[OPTEED_CORE_COUNT]; +extern uint32_t opteed_rw; +extern struct optee_vectors *optee_vector_table; +#endif /*__ASSEMBLER__*/ + +#endif /* OPTEED_PRIVATE_H */ diff --git a/services/spd/opteed/teesmc_opteed.h b/services/spd/opteed/teesmc_opteed.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4026fa4 --- /dev/null +++ b/services/spd/opteed/teesmc_opteed.h @@ -0,0 +1,169 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2014-2023, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +/* Copyright (c) 2014, Linaro Limited. All rights reserved. */ + +#ifndef TEESMC_OPTEED_H +#define TEESMC_OPTEED_H + +#include "teesmc_opteed_macros.h" + +/* + * This section specifies SMC function IDs used when returning from TEE to the + * secure monitor. + * + * All SMC Function IDs indicates SMC32 Calling Convention but will carry + * full 64 bit values in the argument registers if invoked from Aarch64 + * mode. This violates the SMC Calling Convention, but since this + * convention only coveres API towards Normal World it's something that + * only concerns the OP-TEE Dispatcher in Trusted Firmware-A and OP-TEE + * OS at Secure EL1. + */ + +/* + * Issued when returning from initial entry. + * + * Register usage: + * r0/x0 SMC Function ID, TEESMC_OPTEED_RETURN_ENTRY_DONE + * r1/x1 Pointer to entry vector + */ +#define TEESMC_OPTEED_FUNCID_RETURN_ENTRY_DONE 0 +#define TEESMC_OPTEED_RETURN_ENTRY_DONE \ + TEESMC_OPTEED_RV(TEESMC_OPTEED_FUNCID_RETURN_ENTRY_DONE) + + + +/* + * Issued when returning from "cpu_on" vector + * + * Register usage: + * r0/x0 SMC Function ID, TEESMC_OPTEED_RETURN_ON_DONE + * r1/x1 0 on success and anything else to indicate error condition + */ +#define TEESMC_OPTEED_FUNCID_RETURN_ON_DONE 1 +#define TEESMC_OPTEED_RETURN_ON_DONE \ + TEESMC_OPTEED_RV(TEESMC_OPTEED_FUNCID_RETURN_ON_DONE) + +/* + * Issued when returning from "cpu_off" vector + * + * Register usage: + * r0/x0 SMC Function ID, TEESMC_OPTEED_RETURN_OFF_DONE + * r1/x1 0 on success and anything else to indicate error condition + */ +#define TEESMC_OPTEED_FUNCID_RETURN_OFF_DONE 2 +#define TEESMC_OPTEED_RETURN_OFF_DONE \ + TEESMC_OPTEED_RV(TEESMC_OPTEED_FUNCID_RETURN_OFF_DONE) + +/* + * Issued when returning from "cpu_suspend" vector + * + * Register usage: + * r0/x0 SMC Function ID, TEESMC_OPTEED_RETURN_SUSPEND_DONE + * r1/x1 0 on success and anything else to indicate error condition + */ +#define TEESMC_OPTEED_FUNCID_RETURN_SUSPEND_DONE 3 +#define TEESMC_OPTEED_RETURN_SUSPEND_DONE \ + TEESMC_OPTEED_RV(TEESMC_OPTEED_FUNCID_RETURN_SUSPEND_DONE) + +/* + * Issued when returning from "cpu_resume" vector + * + * Register usage: + * r0/x0 SMC Function ID, TEESMC_OPTEED_RETURN_RESUME_DONE + * r1/x1 0 on success and anything else to indicate error condition + */ +#define TEESMC_OPTEED_FUNCID_RETURN_RESUME_DONE 4 +#define TEESMC_OPTEED_RETURN_RESUME_DONE \ + TEESMC_OPTEED_RV(TEESMC_OPTEED_FUNCID_RETURN_RESUME_DONE) + +/* + * Issued when returning from "std_smc" or "fast_smc" vector + * + * Register usage: + * r0/x0 SMC Function ID, TEESMC_OPTEED_RETURN_CALL_DONE + * r1-4/x1-4 Return value 0-3 which will passed to normal world in + * r0-3/x0-3 + */ +#define TEESMC_OPTEED_FUNCID_RETURN_CALL_DONE 5 +#define TEESMC_OPTEED_RETURN_CALL_DONE \ + TEESMC_OPTEED_RV(TEESMC_OPTEED_FUNCID_RETURN_CALL_DONE) + +/* + * Issued when returning from "fiq" vector + * + * Register usage: + * r0/x0 SMC Function ID, TEESMC_OPTEED_RETURN_FIQ_DONE + */ +#define TEESMC_OPTEED_FUNCID_RETURN_FIQ_DONE 6 +#define TEESMC_OPTEED_RETURN_FIQ_DONE \ + TEESMC_OPTEED_RV(TEESMC_OPTEED_FUNCID_RETURN_FIQ_DONE) + +/* + * Issued when returning from "system_off" vector + * + * Register usage: + * r0/x0 SMC Function ID, TEESMC_OPTEED_RETURN_SYSTEM_OFF_DONE + */ +#define TEESMC_OPTEED_FUNCID_RETURN_SYSTEM_OFF_DONE 7 +#define TEESMC_OPTEED_RETURN_SYSTEM_OFF_DONE \ + TEESMC_OPTEED_RV(TEESMC_OPTEED_FUNCID_RETURN_SYSTEM_OFF_DONE) + +/* + * Issued when returning from "system_reset" vector + * + * Register usage: + * r0/x0 SMC Function ID, TEESMC_OPTEED_RETURN_SYSTEM_RESET_DONE + */ +#define TEESMC_OPTEED_FUNCID_RETURN_SYSTEM_RESET_DONE 8 +#define TEESMC_OPTEED_RETURN_SYSTEM_RESET_DONE \ + TEESMC_OPTEED_RV(TEESMC_OPTEED_FUNCID_RETURN_SYSTEM_RESET_DONE) + +/* + * This section specifies SMC function IDs used when the secure monitor is + * invoked from the non-secure world. + */ + +/* + * Load OP-TEE image from the payload specified in the registers. + * + * WARNING: Use this cautiously as it could lead to insecure loading of the + * Trusted OS. Further details are in opteed.mk. + * + * Call register usage: + * x0 SMC Function ID, OPTEE_SMC_CALL_LOAD_IMAGE + * x1 Upper 32bit of a 64bit size for the payload + * x2 Lower 32bit of a 64bit size for the payload + * x3 Upper 32bit of the physical address for the payload + * x4 Lower 32bit of the physical address for the payload + * + * The payload consists of a optee_header struct that contains optee_image + * structs in a flex array, immediately following that in memory is the data + * referenced by the optee_image structs. + * Example: + * + * struct optee_header (with n images specified) + * image 0 data + * image 1 data + * ... + * image n-1 data + * + * Returns 0 on success and an error code otherwise. + */ +#define NSSMC_OPTEED_FUNCID_LOAD_IMAGE 2 +#define NSSMC_OPTEED_CALL_LOAD_IMAGE \ + NSSMC_OPTEED_CALL(NSSMC_OPTEED_FUNCID_LOAD_IMAGE) + +/* + * Returns the UID of the OP-TEE image loading service if image loading is + * enabled and the image had not been loaded yet. Otherwise this call will be + * passed through to OP-TEE where it will return the OP-TEE UID. + */ +#define NSSMC_OPTEED_FUNCID_CALLS_UID 0xFF01 +#define NSSMC_OPTEED_CALL_UID \ + NSSMC_OPTEED_CALL(NSSMC_OPTEED_FUNCID_CALLS_UID) + +#endif /*TEESMC_OPTEED_H*/ diff --git a/services/spd/opteed/teesmc_opteed_macros.h b/services/spd/opteed/teesmc_opteed_macros.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7219140 --- /dev/null +++ b/services/spd/opteed/teesmc_opteed_macros.h @@ -0,0 +1,23 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2014-2023, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ +#ifndef TEESMC_OPTEED_MACROS_H +#define TEESMC_OPTEED_MACROS_H + +#include <common/runtime_svc.h> + +#define TEESMC_OPTEED_RV(func_num) \ + ((SMC_TYPE_FAST << FUNCID_TYPE_SHIFT) | \ + ((SMC_32) << FUNCID_CC_SHIFT) | \ + (62 << FUNCID_OEN_SHIFT) | \ + ((func_num) & FUNCID_NUM_MASK)) + +#define NSSMC_OPTEED_CALL(func_num) \ + ((SMC_TYPE_FAST << FUNCID_TYPE_SHIFT) | \ + ((SMC_32) << FUNCID_CC_SHIFT) | \ + (63 << FUNCID_OEN_SHIFT) | \ + ((func_num) & FUNCID_NUM_MASK)) + +#endif /* TEESMC_OPTEED_MACROS_H */ diff --git a/services/spd/pncd/pncd.mk b/services/spd/pncd/pncd.mk new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0f8eb25 --- /dev/null +++ b/services/spd/pncd/pncd.mk @@ -0,0 +1,24 @@ +# Copyright (c) 2021-2022, ProvenRun S.A.S. All rights reserved. +# +# SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + +PNCD_DIR := services/spd/pncd +SPD_INCLUDES := -Iinclude/bl32/pnc +SPD_INCLUDES += -Iinclude/common/ + +SPD_SOURCES := services/spd/pncd/pncd_common.c \ + services/spd/pncd/pncd_helpers.S \ + services/spd/pncd/pncd_main.c + +NEED_BL32 := yes + +# The following constants need to be defined: +# - SPD_PNCD_NS_IRQ: IRQ number used to notify NS world when SMC_ACTION_FROM_S is received +# - SPD_PNCD_S_IRQ: IRQ number used to notify S world when SMC_ACTION_FROM_NS is received +$(eval $(call assert_numerics, SPD_PNCD_NS_IRQ SPD_PNCD_S_IRQ)) + +$(eval $(call add_defines,\ + $(sort \ + SPD_PNCD_NS_IRQ \ + SPD_PNCD_S_IRQ \ +))) diff --git a/services/spd/pncd/pncd_common.c b/services/spd/pncd/pncd_common.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6fdb629 --- /dev/null +++ b/services/spd/pncd/pncd_common.c @@ -0,0 +1,102 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2021-2022, ProvenRun S.A.S. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +#include <assert.h> +#include <string.h> + +#include <arch_helpers.h> +#include <common/bl_common.h> +#include <common/debug.h> +#include <lib/el3_runtime/context_mgmt.h> +#include <lib/utils.h> +#include <plat/common/platform.h> + +#include "pncd_private.h" + +/******************************************************************************* + * Given a secure payload entrypoint info pointer, entry point PC & pointer to a + * context data structure, this function will initialize pnc context and entry + * point info for the secure payload + ******************************************************************************/ +void pncd_init_pnc_ep_state(struct entry_point_info *pnc_entry_point, + uint64_t pc, + pnc_context_t *pnc_ctx) +{ + uint32_t ep_attr; + + /* Passing a NULL context is a critical programming error */ + assert(pnc_ctx); + assert(pnc_entry_point); + assert(pc); + + /* Associate this context with the current cpu */ + pnc_ctx->mpidr = read_mpidr(); + + cm_set_context(&pnc_ctx->cpu_ctx, SECURE); + + /* initialise an entrypoint to set up the CPU context */ + ep_attr = SECURE | EP_ST_ENABLE; + if (read_sctlr_el3() & SCTLR_EE_BIT) { + ep_attr |= EP_EE_BIG; + } + SET_PARAM_HEAD(pnc_entry_point, PARAM_EP, VERSION_1, ep_attr); + + pnc_entry_point->pc = pc; + pnc_entry_point->spsr = SPSR_64(MODE_EL1, + MODE_SP_ELX, + DISABLE_ALL_EXCEPTIONS); + memset(&pnc_entry_point->args, 0, sizeof(pnc_entry_point->args)); +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * This function takes an SP context pointer and: + * 1. Applies the S-EL1 system register context from pnc_ctx->cpu_ctx. + * 2. Saves the current C runtime state (callee saved registers) on the stack + * frame and saves a reference to this state. + * 3. Calls el3_exit() so that the EL3 system and general purpose registers + * from the pnc_ctx->cpu_ctx are used to enter the secure payload image. + ******************************************************************************/ +uint64_t pncd_synchronous_sp_entry(pnc_context_t *pnc_ctx) +{ + assert(pnc_ctx != NULL); + assert(pnc_ctx->c_rt_ctx == 0U); + + /* Apply the Secure EL1 system register context and switch to it */ + assert(cm_get_context(SECURE) == &pnc_ctx->cpu_ctx); + cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(SECURE); +#if CTX_INCLUDE_FPREGS + fpregs_context_restore(get_fpregs_ctx(cm_get_context(SECURE))); +#endif + cm_set_next_eret_context(SECURE); + + return pncd_enter_sp(&pnc_ctx->c_rt_ctx); +} + + +/******************************************************************************* + * This function takes an SP context pointer and: + * 1. Saves the S-EL1 system register context tp pnc_ctx->cpu_ctx. + * 2. Restores the current C runtime state (callee saved registers) from the + * stack frame using the reference to this state saved in pncd_enter_sp(). + * 3. It does not need to save any general purpose or EL3 system register state + * as the generic smc entry routine should have saved those. + ******************************************************************************/ +void pncd_synchronous_sp_exit(pnc_context_t *pnc_ctx, uint64_t ret) +{ + assert(pnc_ctx != NULL); + /* Save the Secure EL1 system register context */ + assert(cm_get_context(SECURE) == &pnc_ctx->cpu_ctx); + cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(SECURE); +#if CTX_INCLUDE_FPREGS + fpregs_context_save(get_fpregs_ctx(cm_get_context(SECURE))); +#endif + + assert(pnc_ctx->c_rt_ctx != 0); + pncd_exit_sp(pnc_ctx->c_rt_ctx, ret); + + /* Should never reach here */ + panic(); +} diff --git a/services/spd/pncd/pncd_helpers.S b/services/spd/pncd/pncd_helpers.S new file mode 100644 index 0000000..736b30f --- /dev/null +++ b/services/spd/pncd/pncd_helpers.S @@ -0,0 +1,79 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2021-2022, ProvenRun S.A.S. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +#include <asm_macros.S> +#include "pncd_private.h" + + .global pncd_enter_sp + /* --------------------------------------------- + * This function is called with SP_EL0 as stack. + * Here we stash our EL3 callee-saved registers + * on to the stack as a part of saving the C + * runtime and enter the secure payload. + * 'x0' contains a pointer to the memory where + * the address of the C runtime context is to be + * saved. + * --------------------------------------------- + */ +func pncd_enter_sp + /* Make space for the registers that we're going to save */ + mov x3, sp + str x3, [x0, #0] + sub sp, sp, #PNCD_C_RT_CTX_SIZE + + /* Save callee-saved registers on to the stack */ + stp x19, x20, [sp, #PNCD_C_RT_CTX_X19] + stp x21, x22, [sp, #PNCD_C_RT_CTX_X21] + stp x23, x24, [sp, #PNCD_C_RT_CTX_X23] + stp x25, x26, [sp, #PNCD_C_RT_CTX_X25] + stp x27, x28, [sp, #PNCD_C_RT_CTX_X27] + stp x29, x30, [sp, #PNCD_C_RT_CTX_X29] + + /* --------------------------------------------- + * Everything is setup now. el3_exit() will + * use the secure context to restore to the + * general purpose and EL3 system registers to + * ERET into the secure payload. + * --------------------------------------------- + */ + b el3_exit +endfunc pncd_enter_sp + + /* --------------------------------------------- + * This function is called 'x0' pointing to a C + * runtime context saved in pncd_enter_sp(). It + * restores the saved registers and jumps to + * that runtime with 'x0' as the new sp. This + * destroys the C runtime context that had been + * built on the stack below the saved context by + * the caller. Later the second parameter 'x1' + * is passed as return value to the caller + * --------------------------------------------- + */ + .global pncd_exit_sp +func pncd_exit_sp + /* Restore the previous stack */ + mov sp, x0 + + /* Restore callee-saved registers on to the stack */ + ldp x19, x20, [x0, #(PNCD_C_RT_CTX_X19 - PNCD_C_RT_CTX_SIZE)] + ldp x21, x22, [x0, #(PNCD_C_RT_CTX_X21 - PNCD_C_RT_CTX_SIZE)] + ldp x23, x24, [x0, #(PNCD_C_RT_CTX_X23 - PNCD_C_RT_CTX_SIZE)] + ldp x25, x26, [x0, #(PNCD_C_RT_CTX_X25 - PNCD_C_RT_CTX_SIZE)] + ldp x27, x28, [x0, #(PNCD_C_RT_CTX_X27 - PNCD_C_RT_CTX_SIZE)] + ldp x29, x30, [x0, #(PNCD_C_RT_CTX_X29 - PNCD_C_RT_CTX_SIZE)] + + /* --------------------------------------------- + * This should take us back to the instruction + * after the call to the last pncd_enter_sp(). + * Place the second parameter to x0 so that the + * caller will see it as a return value from the + * original entry call + * --------------------------------------------- + */ + mov x0, x1 + ret +endfunc pncd_exit_sp diff --git a/services/spd/pncd/pncd_main.c b/services/spd/pncd/pncd_main.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..99c4aa1 --- /dev/null +++ b/services/spd/pncd/pncd_main.c @@ -0,0 +1,471 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2021-2022, ProvenRun S.A.S. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +/******************************************************************************* + * This is the Secure Payload Dispatcher (SPD). The dispatcher is meant to be a + * plug-in component to the Secure Monitor, registered as a runtime service. The + * SPD is expected to be a functional extension of the Secure Payload (SP) that + * executes in Secure EL1. The Secure Monitor will delegate all SMCs targeting + * the Trusted OS/Applications range to the dispatcher. The SPD will either + * handle the request locally or delegate it to the Secure Payload. It is also + * responsible for initialising and maintaining communication with the SP. + ******************************************************************************/ + +#include <assert.h> +#include <errno.h> +#include <stddef.h> +#include <string.h> + +#include <arch_helpers.h> +#include <bl31/bl31.h> +#include <bl31/interrupt_mgmt.h> +#include <bl_common.h> +#include <common/debug.h> +#include <common/ep_info.h> +#include <drivers/arm/gic_common.h> +#include <lib/el3_runtime/context_mgmt.h> +#include <lib/spinlock.h> +#include <plat/common/platform.h> +#include <pnc.h> +#include "pncd_private.h" +#include <runtime_svc.h> +#include <tools_share/uuid.h> + +/******************************************************************************* + * Structure to keep track of ProvenCore state + ******************************************************************************/ +static pnc_context_t pncd_sp_context; + +static bool ree_info; +static uint64_t ree_base_addr; +static uint64_t ree_length; +static uint64_t ree_tag; + +static bool pnc_initialized; + +static spinlock_t smc_handler_lock; + +static int pncd_init(void); + +static void context_save(unsigned long security_state) +{ + assert(sec_state_is_valid(security_state)); + + cm_el1_sysregs_context_save((uint32_t) security_state); +#if CTX_INCLUDE_FPREGS + fpregs_context_save(get_fpregs_ctx(cm_get_context(security_state))); +#endif +} + +static void *context_restore(unsigned long security_state) +{ + void *handle; + + assert(sec_state_is_valid(security_state)); + + /* Get a reference to the next context */ + handle = cm_get_context((uint32_t) security_state); + assert(handle); + + /* Restore state */ + cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore((uint32_t) security_state); +#if CTX_INCLUDE_FPREGS + fpregs_context_restore(get_fpregs_ctx(cm_get_context(security_state))); +#endif + + cm_set_next_eret_context((uint32_t) security_state); + + return handle; +} + +static uint64_t pncd_sel1_interrupt_handler(uint32_t id, + uint32_t flags, void *handle, void *cookie); + +/******************************************************************************* + * Switch context to the specified security state and return the targeted + * handle. Note that the context may remain unchanged if the switch is not + * allowed. + ******************************************************************************/ +void *pncd_context_switch_to(unsigned long security_state) +{ + unsigned long sec_state_from = + security_state == SECURE ? NON_SECURE : SECURE; + + assert(sec_state_is_valid(security_state)); + + /* Check if this is the first world switch */ + if (!pnc_initialized) { + int rc; + uint32_t flags; + + assert(sec_state_from == SECURE); + + INFO("PnC initialization done\n"); + + /* + * Register an interrupt handler for S-EL1 interrupts + * when generated during code executing in the + * non-secure state. + */ + flags = 0U; + set_interrupt_rm_flag(flags, NON_SECURE); + rc = register_interrupt_type_handler(INTR_TYPE_S_EL1, + pncd_sel1_interrupt_handler, + flags); + if (rc != 0) { + ERROR("Failed to register S-EL1 interrupt handler (%d)\n", + rc); + panic(); + } + + context_save(SECURE); + + pnc_initialized = true; + + /* + * Release the lock before restoring the EL3 context to + * bl31_main. + */ + spin_unlock(&smc_handler_lock); + + /* + * SP reports completion. The SPD must have initiated + * the original request through a synchronous entry + * into the SP. Jump back to the original C runtime + * context. + */ + pncd_synchronous_sp_exit(&pncd_sp_context, (uint64_t) 0x0); + + /* Unreachable */ + ERROR("Returned from pncd_synchronous_sp_exit... Should not happen\n"); + panic(); + } + + /* Check that the world switch is allowed */ + if (read_mpidr() != pncd_sp_context.mpidr) { + if (sec_state_from == SECURE) { + /* + * Secure -> Non-Secure world switch initiated on a CPU where there + * should be no Trusted OS running + */ + WARN("Secure to Non-Secure switch requested on CPU where ProvenCore is not supposed to be running...\n"); + } + + /* + * Secure or Non-Secure world wants to switch world but there is no Secure + * software on this core + */ + return cm_get_context((uint32_t) sec_state_from); + } + + context_save(sec_state_from); + + return context_restore(security_state); +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * This function is the handler registered for S-EL1 interrupts by the PNCD. It + * validates the interrupt and upon success arranges entry into the PNC at + * 'pnc_sel1_intr_entry()' for handling the interrupt. + ******************************************************************************/ +static uint64_t pncd_sel1_interrupt_handler(uint32_t id, + uint32_t flags, + void *handle, + void *cookie) +{ + /* Check the security state when the exception was generated */ + assert(get_interrupt_src_ss(flags) == NON_SECURE); + + /* Sanity check the pointer to this cpu's context */ + assert(handle == cm_get_context(NON_SECURE)); + + /* switch to PnC */ + handle = pncd_context_switch_to(SECURE); + + assert(handle != NULL); + + SMC_RET0(handle); +} + +#pragma weak plat_pncd_setup +int plat_pncd_setup(void) +{ + return 0; +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * Secure Payload Dispatcher setup. The SPD finds out the SP entrypoint and type + * (aarch32/aarch64) if not already known and initialises the context for entry + * into the SP for its initialisation. + ******************************************************************************/ +static int pncd_setup(void) +{ + entry_point_info_t *pnc_ep_info; + + /* + * Get information about the Secure Payload (BL32) image. Its + * absence is a critical failure. + * + * TODO: Add support to conditionally include the SPD service + */ + pnc_ep_info = bl31_plat_get_next_image_ep_info(SECURE); + if (!pnc_ep_info) { + WARN("No PNC provided by BL2 boot loader, Booting device without PNC initialization. SMC`s destined for PNC will return SMC_UNK\n"); + return 1; + } + + /* + * If there's no valid entry point for SP, we return a non-zero value + * signalling failure initializing the service. We bail out without + * registering any handlers + */ + if (!pnc_ep_info->pc) { + return 1; + } + + pncd_init_pnc_ep_state(pnc_ep_info, + pnc_ep_info->pc, + &pncd_sp_context); + + /* + * All PNCD initialization done. Now register our init function with + * BL31 for deferred invocation + */ + bl31_register_bl32_init(&pncd_init); + bl31_set_next_image_type(NON_SECURE); + + return plat_pncd_setup(); +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * This function passes control to the Secure Payload image (BL32) for the first + * time on the primary cpu after a cold boot. It assumes that a valid secure + * context has already been created by pncd_setup() which can be directly used. + * It also assumes that a valid non-secure context has been initialised by PSCI + * so it does not need to save and restore any non-secure state. This function + * performs a synchronous entry into the Secure payload. The SP passes control + * back to this routine through a SMC. + ******************************************************************************/ +static int32_t pncd_init(void) +{ + entry_point_info_t *pnc_entry_point; + uint64_t rc = 0; + + /* + * Get information about the Secure Payload (BL32) image. Its + * absence is a critical failure. + */ + pnc_entry_point = bl31_plat_get_next_image_ep_info(SECURE); + assert(pnc_entry_point); + + cm_init_my_context(pnc_entry_point); + + /* + * Arrange for an entry into the test secure payload. It will be + * returned via PNC_ENTRY_DONE case + */ + rc = pncd_synchronous_sp_entry(&pncd_sp_context); + + /* + * If everything went well at this point, the return value should be 0. + */ + return rc == 0; +} + +#pragma weak plat_pncd_smc_handler +/******************************************************************************* + * This function is responsible for handling the platform-specific SMCs in the + * Trusted OS/App range as defined in the SMC Calling Convention Document. + ******************************************************************************/ +uintptr_t plat_pncd_smc_handler(uint32_t smc_fid, + u_register_t x1, + u_register_t x2, + u_register_t x3, + u_register_t x4, + void *cookie, + void *handle, + u_register_t flags) +{ + (void) smc_fid; + (void) x1; + (void) x2; + (void) x3; + (void) x4; + (void) cookie; + (void) flags; + + SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK); +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * This function is responsible for handling all SMCs in the Trusted OS/App + * range as defined in the SMC Calling Convention Document. It is also + * responsible for communicating with the Secure payload to delegate work and + * return results back to the non-secure state. Lastly it will also return any + * information that the secure payload needs to do the work assigned to it. + * + * It should only be called with the smc_handler_lock held. + ******************************************************************************/ +static uintptr_t pncd_smc_handler_unsafe(uint32_t smc_fid, + u_register_t x1, + u_register_t x2, + u_register_t x3, + u_register_t x4, + void *cookie, + void *handle, + u_register_t flags) +{ + uint32_t ns; + + /* Determine which security state this SMC originated from */ + ns = is_caller_non_secure(flags); + + assert(ns != 0 || read_mpidr() == pncd_sp_context.mpidr); + + switch (smc_fid) { + case SMC_CONFIG_SHAREDMEM: + if (ree_info) { + /* Do not Yield */ + SMC_RET0(handle); + } + + /* + * Fetch the physical base address (x1) and size (x2) of the + * shared memory allocated by the Non-Secure world. This memory + * will be used by PNC to communicate with the Non-Secure world. + * Verifying the validity of these values is up to the Trusted + * OS. + */ + ree_base_addr = x1 | (x2 << 32); + ree_length = x3; + ree_tag = x4; + + INFO("IN SMC_CONFIG_SHAREDMEM: addr=%lx, length=%lx, tag=%lx\n", + (unsigned long) ree_base_addr, + (unsigned long) ree_length, + (unsigned long) ree_tag); + + if ((ree_base_addr % 0x200000) != 0) { + SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK); + } + + if ((ree_length % 0x200000) != 0) { + SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK); + } + + ree_info = true; + + /* Do not Yield */ + SMC_RET4(handle, 0, 0, 0, 0); + + break; + + case SMC_GET_SHAREDMEM: + if (ree_info) { + x1 = (1U << 16) | ree_tag; + x2 = ree_base_addr & 0xFFFFFFFF; + x3 = (ree_base_addr >> 32) & 0xFFFFFFFF; + x4 = ree_length & 0xFFFFFFFF; + SMC_RET4(handle, x1, x2, x3, x4); + } else { + SMC_RET4(handle, 0, 0, 0, 0); + } + + break; + + case SMC_ACTION_FROM_NS: + if (ns == 0) { + SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK); + } + + if (SPD_PNCD_S_IRQ < MIN_PPI_ID) { + plat_ic_raise_s_el1_sgi(SPD_PNCD_S_IRQ, + pncd_sp_context.mpidr); + } else { + plat_ic_set_interrupt_pending(SPD_PNCD_S_IRQ); + } + + SMC_RET0(handle); + + break; + + case SMC_ACTION_FROM_S: + if (ns != 0) { + SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK); + } + + if (SPD_PNCD_NS_IRQ < MIN_PPI_ID) { + /* + * NS SGI is sent to the same core as the one running + * PNC + */ + plat_ic_raise_ns_sgi(SPD_PNCD_NS_IRQ, read_mpidr()); + } else { + plat_ic_set_interrupt_pending(SPD_PNCD_NS_IRQ); + } + + SMC_RET0(handle); + + break; + + case SMC_YIELD: + assert(handle == cm_get_context(ns != 0 ? NON_SECURE : SECURE)); + handle = pncd_context_switch_to(ns != 0 ? SECURE : NON_SECURE); + + assert(handle != NULL); + + SMC_RET0(handle); + + break; + + default: + INFO("Unknown smc: %x\n", smc_fid); + break; + } + + return plat_pncd_smc_handler(smc_fid, x1, x2, x3, x4, + cookie, handle, flags); +} + +static uintptr_t pncd_smc_handler(uint32_t smc_fid, + u_register_t x1, + u_register_t x2, + u_register_t x3, + u_register_t x4, + void *cookie, + void *handle, + u_register_t flags) +{ + uintptr_t ret; + + /* SMC handling is serialized */ + spin_lock(&smc_handler_lock); + ret = pncd_smc_handler_unsafe(smc_fid, x1, x2, x3, x4, cookie, handle, + flags); + spin_unlock(&smc_handler_lock); + + return ret; +} + +/* Define a SPD runtime service descriptor for fast SMC calls */ +DECLARE_RT_SVC( + pncd_fast, + OEN_TOS_START, + OEN_TOS_END, + SMC_TYPE_FAST, + pncd_setup, + pncd_smc_handler +); + +/* Define a SPD runtime service descriptor for standard SMC calls */ +DECLARE_RT_SVC( + pncd_std, + OEN_TOS_START, + OEN_TOS_END, + SMC_TYPE_YIELD, + NULL, + pncd_smc_handler +); diff --git a/services/spd/pncd/pncd_private.h b/services/spd/pncd/pncd_private.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8c9b634 --- /dev/null +++ b/services/spd/pncd/pncd_private.h @@ -0,0 +1,79 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2021-2022, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * Portions copyright (c) 2021-2022, ProvenRun S.A.S. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +#ifndef __PNCD_PRIVATE_H__ +#define __PNCD_PRIVATE_H__ + +#ifndef __ASSEMBLER__ +#include <stdint.h> +#endif /* __ASSEMBLER __ */ + +#include <context.h> +#ifndef __ASSEMBLER__ +#include <lib/cassert.h> +#endif /* __ASSEMBLER __ */ + +#include <platform_def.h> + +/******************************************************************************* + * Constants that allow assembler code to preserve callee-saved registers of the + * C runtime context while performing a security state switch. + ******************************************************************************/ +#define PNCD_C_RT_CTX_X19 U(0x0) +#define PNCD_C_RT_CTX_X20 U(0x8) +#define PNCD_C_RT_CTX_X21 U(0x10) +#define PNCD_C_RT_CTX_X22 U(0x18) +#define PNCD_C_RT_CTX_X23 U(0x20) +#define PNCD_C_RT_CTX_X24 U(0x28) +#define PNCD_C_RT_CTX_X25 U(0x30) +#define PNCD_C_RT_CTX_X26 U(0x38) +#define PNCD_C_RT_CTX_X27 U(0x40) +#define PNCD_C_RT_CTX_X28 U(0x48) +#define PNCD_C_RT_CTX_X29 U(0x50) +#define PNCD_C_RT_CTX_X30 U(0x58) +#define PNCD_C_RT_CTX_SIZE U(0x60) +#define PNCD_C_RT_CTX_ENTRIES (PNCD_C_RT_CTX_SIZE >> DWORD_SHIFT) + +#ifndef __ASSEMBLER__ + +/* AArch64 callee saved general purpose register context structure. */ +DEFINE_REG_STRUCT(c_rt_regs, PNCD_C_RT_CTX_ENTRIES); + +/* + * Compile time assertion to ensure that both the compiler and linker + * have the same double word aligned view of the size of the C runtime + * register context. + */ +CASSERT(sizeof(c_rt_regs_t) == PNCD_C_RT_CTX_SIZE, + assert_spd_c_rt_regs_size_mismatch); + +/******************************************************************************* + * Structure which helps the SPD to maintain the per-cpu state of the SP. + * 'mpidr' - mpidr of the CPU running PNC + * 'c_rt_ctx' - stack address to restore C runtime context from after + * returning from a synchronous entry into the SP. + * 'cpu_ctx' - space to maintain SP architectural state + ******************************************************************************/ +typedef struct pnc_context { + uint64_t mpidr; + uint64_t c_rt_ctx; + cpu_context_t cpu_ctx; +} pnc_context_t; + +/******************************************************************************* + * Function & Data prototypes + ******************************************************************************/ +uint64_t pncd_enter_sp(uint64_t *c_rt_ctx); +void __dead2 pncd_exit_sp(uint64_t c_rt_ctx, uint64_t ret); +uint64_t pncd_synchronous_sp_entry(pnc_context_t *pnc_ctx); +void __dead2 pncd_synchronous_sp_exit(pnc_context_t *pnc_ctx, uint64_t ret); +void pncd_init_pnc_ep_state(struct entry_point_info *pnc_ep, + uint64_t pc, + pnc_context_t *pnc_ctx); +#endif /* __ASSEMBLER__ */ + +#endif /* __PNCD_PRIVATE_H__ */ diff --git a/services/spd/tlkd/tlkd.mk b/services/spd/tlkd/tlkd.mk new file mode 100644 index 0000000..56de0a6 --- /dev/null +++ b/services/spd/tlkd/tlkd.mk @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +# +# Copyright (c) 2015, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. +# +# SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause +# + +ifeq (${ERROR_DEPRECATED},0) +SPD_INCLUDES := -Iinclude/bl32/payloads +endif + +SPD_SOURCES := services/spd/tlkd/tlkd_common.c \ + services/spd/tlkd/tlkd_helpers.S \ + services/spd/tlkd/tlkd_main.c \ + services/spd/tlkd/tlkd_pm.c diff --git a/services/spd/tlkd/tlkd_common.c b/services/spd/tlkd/tlkd_common.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..820bd8a --- /dev/null +++ b/services/spd/tlkd/tlkd_common.c @@ -0,0 +1,165 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2015-2018, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +#include <assert.h> +#include <string.h> + +#include <arch_helpers.h> +#include <common/bl_common.h> +#include <lib/el3_runtime/context_mgmt.h> + +#include "tlkd_private.h" + +#define AT_MASK 3 + +/******************************************************************************* + * This function helps the SP to translate NS/S virtual addresses. + ******************************************************************************/ +uint64_t tlkd_va_translate(uintptr_t va, int type) +{ + uint64_t pa; + + if (type & TLK_TRANSLATE_NS_VADDR) { + + /* save secure context */ + cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(SECURE); + + /* restore non-secure context */ + cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(NON_SECURE); + + /* switch NS bit to start using 64-bit, non-secure mappings */ + write_scr(cm_get_scr_el3(NON_SECURE)); + isb(); + } + + int at = type & AT_MASK; + switch (at) { + case 0: + AT(ats12e1r, va); + break; + case 1: + AT(ats12e1w, va); + break; + case 2: + AT(ats12e0r, va); + break; + case 3: + AT(ats12e0w, va); + break; + default: + assert(0); /* Unreachable */ + break; + } + + /* get the (NS/S) physical address */ + isb(); + pa = read_par_el1(); + + /* Restore secure state */ + if (type & TLK_TRANSLATE_NS_VADDR) { + + /* restore secure context */ + cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(SECURE); + + /* switch NS bit to start using 32-bit, secure mappings */ + write_scr(cm_get_scr_el3(SECURE)); + isb(); + } + + return pa; +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * Given a secure payload entrypoint, register width, cpu id & pointer to a + * context data structure, this function will create a secure context ready for + * programming an entry into the secure payload. + ******************************************************************************/ +void tlkd_init_tlk_ep_state(struct entry_point_info *tlk_entry_point, + uint32_t rw, + uint64_t pc, + tlk_context_t *tlk_ctx) +{ + uint32_t ep_attr, spsr; + + /* Passing a NULL context is a critical programming error */ + assert(tlk_ctx); + assert(tlk_entry_point); + assert(pc); + + /* Associate this context with the cpu specified */ + tlk_ctx->mpidr = read_mpidr_el1(); + clr_yield_smc_active_flag(tlk_ctx->state); + cm_set_context(&tlk_ctx->cpu_ctx, SECURE); + + if (rw == SP_AARCH64) + spsr = SPSR_64(MODE_EL1, MODE_SP_ELX, DISABLE_ALL_EXCEPTIONS); + else + spsr = SPSR_MODE32(MODE32_svc, + SPSR_T_ARM, + read_sctlr_el3() & SCTLR_EE_BIT, + DISABLE_ALL_EXCEPTIONS); + + /* initialise an entrypoint to set up the CPU context */ + ep_attr = SECURE | EP_ST_ENABLE; + if (read_sctlr_el3() & SCTLR_EE_BIT) + ep_attr |= EP_EE_BIG; + SET_PARAM_HEAD(tlk_entry_point, PARAM_EP, VERSION_1, ep_attr); + + tlk_entry_point->pc = pc; + tlk_entry_point->spsr = spsr; +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * This function takes a TLK context pointer and: + * 1. Applies the S-EL1 system register context from tlk_ctx->cpu_ctx. + * 2. Saves the current C runtime state (callee saved registers) on the stack + * frame and saves a reference to this state. + * 3. Calls el3_exit() so that the EL3 system and general purpose registers + * from the tlk_ctx->cpu_ctx are used to enter the secure payload image. + ******************************************************************************/ +uint64_t tlkd_synchronous_sp_entry(tlk_context_t *tlk_ctx) +{ + uint64_t rc; + + /* Passing a NULL context is a critical programming error */ + assert(tlk_ctx); + + /* Apply the Secure EL1 system register context and switch to it */ + assert(cm_get_context(SECURE) == &tlk_ctx->cpu_ctx); + cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(SECURE); + cm_set_next_eret_context(SECURE); + + rc = tlkd_enter_sp(&tlk_ctx->c_rt_ctx); +#if ENABLE_ASSERTIONS + tlk_ctx->c_rt_ctx = 0; +#endif + + return rc; +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * This function takes a TLK context pointer and: + * 1. Saves the S-EL1 system register context to tlk_ctx->cpu_ctx. + * 2. Restores the current C runtime state (callee saved registers) from the + * stack frame using reference to this state saved in tlkd_enter_sp(). + * 3. It does not need to save any general purpose or EL3 system register state + * as the generic smc entry routine should have saved those. + ******************************************************************************/ +void tlkd_synchronous_sp_exit(tlk_context_t *tlk_ctx, uint64_t ret) +{ + /* Passing a NULL context is a critical programming error */ + assert(tlk_ctx); + + /* Save the Secure EL1 system register context */ + assert(cm_get_context(SECURE) == &tlk_ctx->cpu_ctx); + cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(SECURE); + + assert(tlk_ctx->c_rt_ctx != 0); + tlkd_exit_sp(tlk_ctx->c_rt_ctx, ret); + + /* Should never reach here */ + assert(0); +} diff --git a/services/spd/tlkd/tlkd_helpers.S b/services/spd/tlkd/tlkd_helpers.S new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6e616a6 --- /dev/null +++ b/services/spd/tlkd/tlkd_helpers.S @@ -0,0 +1,80 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2015, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +#include <asm_macros.S> +#include "tlkd_private.h" + + .global tlkd_enter_sp + .global tlkd_exit_sp + + /* --------------------------------------------- + * This function is called with SP_EL0 as stack. + * Here we stash our EL3 callee-saved registers + * on to the stack as a part of saving the C + * runtime and enter the secure payload. + * 'x0' contains a pointer to the memory where + * the address of the C runtime context is to be + * saved. + * --------------------------------------------- + */ +func tlkd_enter_sp + /* Make space for the registers that we're going to save */ + mov x3, sp + str x3, [x0, #0] + sub sp, sp, #TLKD_C_RT_CTX_SIZE + + /* Save callee-saved registers on to the stack */ + stp x19, x20, [sp, #TLKD_C_RT_CTX_X19] + stp x21, x22, [sp, #TLKD_C_RT_CTX_X21] + stp x23, x24, [sp, #TLKD_C_RT_CTX_X23] + stp x25, x26, [sp, #TLKD_C_RT_CTX_X25] + stp x27, x28, [sp, #TLKD_C_RT_CTX_X27] + stp x29, x30, [sp, #TLKD_C_RT_CTX_X29] + + /* ---------------------------------------------- + * Everything is setup now. el3_exit() will + * use the secure context to restore to the + * general purpose and EL3 system registers to + * ERET into the secure payload. + * ---------------------------------------------- + */ + b el3_exit +endfunc tlkd_enter_sp + + /* ---------------------------------------------- + * This function is called with 'x0' pointing to + * a C runtime context saved in tlkd_enter_sp(). + * It restores the saved registers and jumps to + * that runtime with 'x0' as the new sp. This + * destroys the C runtime context that had been + * built on the stack below the saved context by + * the caller. Later the second parameter 'x1' + * is passed as return value to the caller + * ---------------------------------------------- + */ +func tlkd_exit_sp + /* Restore the previous stack */ + mov sp, x0 + + /* Restore callee-saved registers on to the stack */ + ldp x19, x20, [x0, #(TLKD_C_RT_CTX_X19 - TLKD_C_RT_CTX_SIZE)] + ldp x21, x22, [x0, #(TLKD_C_RT_CTX_X21 - TLKD_C_RT_CTX_SIZE)] + ldp x23, x24, [x0, #(TLKD_C_RT_CTX_X23 - TLKD_C_RT_CTX_SIZE)] + ldp x25, x26, [x0, #(TLKD_C_RT_CTX_X25 - TLKD_C_RT_CTX_SIZE)] + ldp x27, x28, [x0, #(TLKD_C_RT_CTX_X27 - TLKD_C_RT_CTX_SIZE)] + ldp x29, x30, [x0, #(TLKD_C_RT_CTX_X29 - TLKD_C_RT_CTX_SIZE)] + + /* ------------------------------------------------ + * This should take us back to the instruction + * after the call to the last tlkd_enter_sp(). + * Place the second parameter to x0 so that the + * caller will see it as a return value from the + * original entry call + * ------------------------------------------------ + */ + mov x0, x1 + ret +endfunc tlkd_exit_sp diff --git a/services/spd/tlkd/tlkd_main.c b/services/spd/tlkd/tlkd_main.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ecac435 --- /dev/null +++ b/services/spd/tlkd/tlkd_main.c @@ -0,0 +1,546 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2015-2020, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 2020, NVIDIA Corporation. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +/******************************************************************************* + * This is the Secure Payload Dispatcher (SPD). The dispatcher is meant to be a + * plug-in component to the Secure Monitor, registered as a runtime service. The + * SPD is expected to be a functional extension of the Secure Payload (SP) that + * executes in Secure EL1. The Secure Monitor will delegate all SMCs targeting + * the Trusted OS/Applications range to the dispatcher. The SPD will either + * handle the request locally or delegate it to the Secure Payload. It is also + * responsible for initialising and maintaining communication with the SP. + ******************************************************************************/ +#include <assert.h> +#include <bl31/interrupt_mgmt.h> +#include <errno.h> +#include <stddef.h> + +#include <arch_helpers.h> +#include <bl31/bl31.h> +#include <bl32/payloads/tlk.h> +#include <common/bl_common.h> +#include <common/debug.h> +#include <common/runtime_svc.h> +#include <lib/el3_runtime/context_mgmt.h> +#include <plat/common/platform.h> +#include <tools_share/uuid.h> + +#include "tlkd_private.h" + +extern const spd_pm_ops_t tlkd_pm_ops; + +/******************************************************************************* + * Per-cpu Secure Payload state + ******************************************************************************/ +tlk_context_t tlk_ctx; + +/******************************************************************************* + * CPU number on which TLK booted up + ******************************************************************************/ +static uint32_t boot_cpu; + +/* TLK UID: RFC-4122 compliant UUID (version-5, sha-1) */ +DEFINE_SVC_UUID2(tlk_uuid, + 0xc9e911bd, 0xba2b, 0xee52, 0xb1, 0x72, + 0x46, 0x1f, 0xba, 0x97, 0x7f, 0x63); + +static int32_t tlkd_init(void); + +/******************************************************************************* + * Secure Payload Dispatcher's timer interrupt handler + ******************************************************************************/ +static uint64_t tlkd_interrupt_handler(uint32_t id, + uint32_t flags, + void *handle, + void *cookie) +{ + cpu_context_t *s_cpu_context; + int irq = plat_ic_get_pending_interrupt_id(); + + /* acknowledge the interrupt and mark it complete */ + (void)plat_ic_acknowledge_interrupt(); + plat_ic_end_of_interrupt(irq); + + /* + * Disable the routing of NS interrupts from secure world to + * EL3 while interrupted on this core. + */ + disable_intr_rm_local(INTR_TYPE_S_EL1, SECURE); + + /* Check the security state when the exception was generated */ + assert(get_interrupt_src_ss(flags) == NON_SECURE); + assert(handle == cm_get_context(NON_SECURE)); + + /* Save non-secure state */ + cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(NON_SECURE); + + /* Get a reference to the secure context */ + s_cpu_context = cm_get_context(SECURE); + assert(s_cpu_context); + + /* + * Restore non-secure state. There is no need to save the + * secure system register context since the SP was supposed + * to preserve it during S-EL1 interrupt handling. + */ + cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(SECURE); + cm_set_next_eret_context(SECURE); + + /* Provide the IRQ number to the SPD */ + SMC_RET4(s_cpu_context, (uint32_t)TLK_IRQ_FIRED, 0, (uint32_t)irq, 0); +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * Secure Payload Dispatcher setup. The SPD finds out the SP entrypoint and type + * (aarch32/aarch64) if not already known and initialises the context for entry + * into the SP for its initialisation. + ******************************************************************************/ +static int32_t tlkd_setup(void) +{ + entry_point_info_t *tlk_ep_info; + uint32_t flags; + int32_t ret; + + /* + * Get information about the Secure Payload (BL32) image. Its + * absence is a critical failure. + */ + tlk_ep_info = bl31_plat_get_next_image_ep_info(SECURE); + if (!tlk_ep_info) { + WARN("No SP provided. Booting device without SP" + " initialization. SMC`s destined for SP" + " will return SMC_UNK\n"); + return 1; + } + + /* + * If there's no valid entry point for SP, we return a non-zero value + * signalling failure initializing the service. We bail out without + * registering any handlers + */ + if (!tlk_ep_info->pc) + return 1; + + /* + * Inspect the SP image's SPSR and determine it's execution state + * i.e whether AArch32 or AArch64. + */ + tlkd_init_tlk_ep_state(tlk_ep_info, + (tlk_ep_info->spsr >> MODE_RW_SHIFT) & MODE_RW_MASK, + tlk_ep_info->pc, + &tlk_ctx); + + /* get a list of all S-EL1 IRQs from the platform */ + + /* register interrupt handler */ + flags = 0; + set_interrupt_rm_flag(flags, NON_SECURE); + ret = register_interrupt_type_handler(INTR_TYPE_S_EL1, + tlkd_interrupt_handler, + flags); + if (ret != 0) { + ERROR("failed to register tlkd interrupt handler (%d)\n", ret); + } + + /* + * All TLK SPD initialization done. Now register our init function + * with BL31 for deferred invocation + */ + bl31_register_bl32_init(&tlkd_init); + + return 0; +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * This function passes control to the Secure Payload image (BL32) for the first + * time on the primary cpu after a cold boot. It assumes that a valid secure + * context has already been created by tlkd_setup() which can be directly + * used. This function performs a synchronous entry into the Secure payload. + * The SP passes control back to this routine through a SMC. + ******************************************************************************/ +static int32_t tlkd_init(void) +{ + entry_point_info_t *tlk_entry_point; + + /* + * Get information about the Secure Payload (BL32) image. Its + * absence is a critical failure. + */ + tlk_entry_point = bl31_plat_get_next_image_ep_info(SECURE); + assert(tlk_entry_point); + + cm_init_my_context(tlk_entry_point); + + /* + * TLK runs only on a single CPU. Store the value of the boot + * CPU for sanity checking later. + */ + boot_cpu = plat_my_core_pos(); + + /* + * Arrange for an entry into the test secure payload. + */ + return tlkd_synchronous_sp_entry(&tlk_ctx); +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * This function is responsible for handling all SMCs in the Trusted OS/App + * range from the non-secure state as defined in the SMC Calling Convention + * Document. It is also responsible for communicating with the Secure payload + * to delegate work and return results back to the non-secure state. Lastly it + * will also return any information that the secure payload needs to do the + * work assigned to it. + ******************************************************************************/ +static uintptr_t tlkd_smc_handler(uint32_t smc_fid, + u_register_t x1, + u_register_t x2, + u_register_t x3, + u_register_t x4, + void *cookie, + void *handle, + u_register_t flags) +{ + cpu_context_t *ns_cpu_context; + gp_regs_t *gp_regs; + uint32_t ns; + uint64_t par; + + /* Passing a NULL context is a critical programming error */ + assert(handle); + + /* These SMCs are only supported by a single CPU */ + if (boot_cpu != plat_my_core_pos()) + SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK); + + /* Determine which security state this SMC originated from */ + ns = is_caller_non_secure(flags); + + switch (smc_fid) { + + /* + * This function ID is used by SP to indicate that it was + * preempted by a non-secure world IRQ. + */ + case TLK_PREEMPTED: + + if (ns) + SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK); + + assert(handle == cm_get_context(SECURE)); + cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(SECURE); + + /* Get a reference to the non-secure context */ + ns_cpu_context = cm_get_context(NON_SECURE); + assert(ns_cpu_context); + + /* + * Restore non-secure state. There is no need to save the + * secure system register context since the SP was supposed + * to preserve it during S-EL1 interrupt handling. + */ + cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(NON_SECURE); + cm_set_next_eret_context(NON_SECURE); + + SMC_RET1(ns_cpu_context, x1); + + /* + * This is a request from the non-secure context to: + * + * a. register shared memory with the SP for storing it's + * activity logs. + * b. register shared memory with the SP for passing args + * required for maintaining sessions with the Trusted + * Applications. + * c. register shared persistent buffers for secure storage + * d. register NS DRAM ranges passed by Cboot + * e. register Root of Trust parameters from Cboot for Verified Boot + * f. open/close sessions + * g. issue commands to the Trusted Apps + * h. resume the preempted yielding SMC call. + */ + case TLK_REGISTER_LOGBUF: + case TLK_REGISTER_REQBUF: + case TLK_SS_REGISTER_HANDLER: + case TLK_REGISTER_NS_DRAM_RANGES: + case TLK_SET_ROOT_OF_TRUST: + case TLK_OPEN_TA_SESSION: + case TLK_CLOSE_TA_SESSION: + case TLK_TA_LAUNCH_OP: + case TLK_TA_SEND_EVENT: + case TLK_RESUME_FID: + case TLK_SET_BL_VERSION: + case TLK_LOCK_BL_INTERFACE: + case TLK_BL_RPMB_SERVICE: + + if (!ns) + SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK); + + /* + * This is a fresh request from the non-secure client. + * The parameters are in x1 and x2. Figure out which + * registers need to be preserved, save the non-secure + * state and send the request to the secure payload. + */ + assert(handle == cm_get_context(NON_SECURE)); + + /* + * Check if we are already processing a yielding SMC + * call. Of all the supported fids, only the "resume" + * fid expects the flag to be set. + */ + if (smc_fid == TLK_RESUME_FID) { + if (!get_yield_smc_active_flag(tlk_ctx.state)) + SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK); + } else { + if (get_yield_smc_active_flag(tlk_ctx.state)) + SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK); + } + + cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(NON_SECURE); + + /* + * Verify if there is a valid context to use. + */ + assert(&tlk_ctx.cpu_ctx == cm_get_context(SECURE)); + + /* + * Mark the SP state as active. + */ + set_yield_smc_active_flag(tlk_ctx.state); + + /* + * We are done stashing the non-secure context. Ask the + * secure payload to do the work now. + */ + cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(SECURE); + cm_set_next_eret_context(SECURE); + + /* + * TLK is a 32-bit Trusted OS and so expects the SMC + * arguments via r0-r7. TLK expects the monitor frame + * registers to be 64-bits long. Hence, we pass x0 in + * r0-r1, x1 in r2-r3, x3 in r4-r5 and x4 in r6-r7. + * + * As smc_fid is a uint32 value, r1 contains 0. + */ + gp_regs = get_gpregs_ctx(&tlk_ctx.cpu_ctx); + write_ctx_reg(gp_regs, CTX_GPREG_X4, (uint32_t)x2); + write_ctx_reg(gp_regs, CTX_GPREG_X5, (uint32_t)(x2 >> 32)); + write_ctx_reg(gp_regs, CTX_GPREG_X6, (uint32_t)x3); + write_ctx_reg(gp_regs, CTX_GPREG_X7, (uint32_t)(x3 >> 32)); + SMC_RET4(&tlk_ctx.cpu_ctx, smc_fid, 0, (uint32_t)x1, + (uint32_t)(x1 >> 32)); + + /* + * Translate NS/EL1-S virtual addresses. + * + * x1 = virtual address + * x3 = type (NS/S) + * + * Returns PA:lo in r0, PA:hi in r1. + */ + case TLK_VA_TRANSLATE: + + /* Should be invoked only by secure world */ + if (ns) + SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK); + + /* NS virtual addresses are 64-bit long */ + if (x3 & TLK_TRANSLATE_NS_VADDR) + x1 = (uint32_t)x1 | (x2 << 32); + + if (!x1) + SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK); + + /* + * TODO: Sanity check x1. This would require platform + * support. + */ + + /* virtual address and type: ns/s */ + par = tlkd_va_translate(x1, x3); + + /* return physical address in r0-r1 */ + SMC_RET4(handle, (uint32_t)par, (uint32_t)(par >> 32), 0, 0); + + /* + * This is a request from the SP to mark completion of + * a yielding function ID. + */ + case TLK_REQUEST_DONE: + if (ns) + SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK); + + /* + * Mark the SP state as inactive. + */ + clr_yield_smc_active_flag(tlk_ctx.state); + + /* Get a reference to the non-secure context */ + ns_cpu_context = cm_get_context(NON_SECURE); + assert(ns_cpu_context); + + /* + * This is a request completion SMC and we must switch to + * the non-secure world to pass the result. + */ + cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(SECURE); + + /* + * We are done stashing the secure context. Switch to the + * non-secure context and return the result. + */ + cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(NON_SECURE); + cm_set_next_eret_context(NON_SECURE); + SMC_RET1(ns_cpu_context, x1); + + /* + * This function ID is used only by the SP to indicate it has + * finished initialising itself after a cold boot + */ + case TLK_ENTRY_DONE: + if (ns) + SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK); + + /* + * SP has been successfully initialized. Register power + * management hooks with PSCI + */ + psci_register_spd_pm_hook(&tlkd_pm_ops); + + /* + * TLK reports completion. The SPD must have initiated + * the original request through a synchronous entry + * into the SP. Jump back to the original C runtime + * context. + */ + tlkd_synchronous_sp_exit(&tlk_ctx, x1); + break; + + /* + * These function IDs are used only by TLK to indicate it has + * finished: + * 1. suspending itself after an earlier psci cpu_suspend + * request. + * 2. resuming itself after an earlier psci cpu_suspend + * request. + * 3. powering down after an earlier psci system_off/system_reset + * request. + */ + case TLK_SUSPEND_DONE: + case TLK_RESUME_DONE: + + if (ns) + SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK); + + /* + * TLK reports completion. TLKD must have initiated the + * original request through a synchronous entry into the SP. + * Jump back to the original C runtime context, and pass x1 as + * return value to the caller + */ + tlkd_synchronous_sp_exit(&tlk_ctx, x1); + break; + + /* + * This function ID is used by SP to indicate that it has completed + * handling the secure interrupt. + */ + case TLK_IRQ_DONE: + + if (ns) + SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK); + + assert(handle == cm_get_context(SECURE)); + + /* save secure world context */ + cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(SECURE); + + /* Get a reference to the non-secure context */ + ns_cpu_context = cm_get_context(NON_SECURE); + assert(ns_cpu_context); + + /* + * Restore non-secure state. There is no need to save the + * secure system register context since the SP was supposed + * to preserve it during S-EL1 interrupt handling. + */ + cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(NON_SECURE); + cm_set_next_eret_context(NON_SECURE); + + SMC_RET0(ns_cpu_context); + + /* + * Return the number of service function IDs implemented to + * provide service to non-secure + */ + case TOS_CALL_COUNT: + SMC_RET1(handle, TLK_NUM_FID); + + /* + * Return TLK's UID to the caller + */ + case TOS_UID: + SMC_UUID_RET(handle, tlk_uuid); + + /* + * Return the version of current implementation + */ + case TOS_CALL_VERSION: + SMC_RET2(handle, TLK_VERSION_MAJOR, TLK_VERSION_MINOR); + + default: + WARN("%s: Unhandled SMC: 0x%x\n", __func__, smc_fid); + break; + } + + SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK); +} + +/* Define a SPD runtime service descriptor for fast SMC calls */ +DECLARE_RT_SVC( + tlkd_tos_fast, + + OEN_TOS_START, + OEN_TOS_END, + SMC_TYPE_FAST, + tlkd_setup, + tlkd_smc_handler +); + +/* Define a SPD runtime service descriptor for yielding SMC calls */ +DECLARE_RT_SVC( + tlkd_tos_std, + + OEN_TOS_START, + OEN_TOS_END, + SMC_TYPE_YIELD, + NULL, + tlkd_smc_handler +); + +/* Define a SPD runtime service descriptor for fast SMC calls */ +DECLARE_RT_SVC( + tlkd_tap_fast, + + OEN_TAP_START, + OEN_TAP_END, + SMC_TYPE_FAST, + NULL, + tlkd_smc_handler +); + +/* Define a SPD runtime service descriptor for yielding SMC calls */ +DECLARE_RT_SVC( + tlkd_tap_std, + + OEN_TAP_START, + OEN_TAP_END, + SMC_TYPE_YIELD, + NULL, + tlkd_smc_handler +); diff --git a/services/spd/tlkd/tlkd_pm.c b/services/spd/tlkd/tlkd_pm.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ed5bf77 --- /dev/null +++ b/services/spd/tlkd/tlkd_pm.c @@ -0,0 +1,109 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2015, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 2020, NVIDIA Corporation. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +#include <assert.h> + +#include <arch_helpers.h> +#include <bl32/payloads/tlk.h> +#include <common/bl_common.h> +#include <common/debug.h> +#include <lib/el3_runtime/context_mgmt.h> +#include <lib/psci/psci.h> + +#include "tlkd_private.h" + +extern tlk_context_t tlk_ctx; + +#define MPIDR_CPU0 0x80000000 + +/******************************************************************************* + * Return the type of payload TLKD is dealing with. Report the current + * resident cpu (mpidr format) if it is a UP/UP migratable payload. + ******************************************************************************/ +static int32_t cpu_migrate_info(u_register_t *resident_cpu) +{ + /* the payload runs only on CPU0 */ + *resident_cpu = MPIDR_CPU0; + + /* Uniprocessor, not migrate capable payload */ + return PSCI_TOS_NOT_UP_MIG_CAP; +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * This cpu is being suspended. Inform TLK of the SYSTEM_SUSPEND event, so + * that it can pass this information to its Trusted Apps. + ******************************************************************************/ +static void cpu_suspend_handler(u_register_t suspend_level) +{ + gp_regs_t *gp_regs; + int cpu = read_mpidr() & MPIDR_CPU_MASK; + int32_t rc = 0; + + /* + * TLK runs only on CPU0 and suspends its Trusted Apps during + * SYSTEM_SUSPEND. It has no role to play during CPU_SUSPEND. + */ + if ((cpu != 0) || (suspend_level != PLAT_MAX_PWR_LVL)) + return; + + /* pass system suspend event to TLK */ + gp_regs = get_gpregs_ctx(&tlk_ctx.cpu_ctx); + write_ctx_reg(gp_regs, CTX_GPREG_X0, TLK_SYSTEM_SUSPEND); + + /* Program the entry point and enter TLK */ + rc = tlkd_synchronous_sp_entry(&tlk_ctx); + + /* + * Read the response from TLK. A non-zero return means that + * something went wrong while communicating with it. + */ + if (rc != 0) + panic(); +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * This cpu is being resumed. Inform TLK of the SYSTEM_SUSPEND exit, so + * that it can pass this information to its Trusted Apps. + ******************************************************************************/ +static void cpu_resume_handler(u_register_t suspend_level) +{ + gp_regs_t *gp_regs; + int cpu = read_mpidr() & MPIDR_CPU_MASK; + int32_t rc = 0; + + /* + * TLK runs only on CPU0 and resumes its Trusted Apps during + * SYSTEM_SUSPEND exit. It has no role to play during CPU_SUSPEND + * exit. + */ + if ((cpu != 0) || (suspend_level != PLAT_MAX_PWR_LVL)) + return; + + /* pass system resume event to TLK */ + gp_regs = get_gpregs_ctx(&tlk_ctx.cpu_ctx); + write_ctx_reg(gp_regs, CTX_GPREG_X0, TLK_SYSTEM_RESUME); + + /* Program the entry point and enter TLK */ + rc = tlkd_synchronous_sp_entry(&tlk_ctx); + + /* + * Read the response from TLK. A non-zero return means that + * something went wrong while communicating with it. + */ + if (rc != 0) + panic(); +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * Structure populated by the Dispatcher to be given a chance to perform any + * bookkeeping before PSCI executes a power mgmt. operation. + ******************************************************************************/ +const spd_pm_ops_t tlkd_pm_ops = { + .svc_migrate_info = cpu_migrate_info, + .svc_suspend = cpu_suspend_handler, + .svc_suspend_finish = cpu_resume_handler, +}; diff --git a/services/spd/tlkd/tlkd_private.h b/services/spd/tlkd/tlkd_private.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ad36f5e --- /dev/null +++ b/services/spd/tlkd/tlkd_private.h @@ -0,0 +1,124 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2015-2017, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +#ifndef TLKD_PRIVATE_H +#define TLKD_PRIVATE_H + +#include <platform_def.h> + +#include <arch.h> +#include <bl31/interrupt_mgmt.h> +#include <context.h> +#include <lib/psci/psci.h> + +/* + * This flag is used by the TLKD to determine if the SP is servicing a yielding + * SMC request prior to programming the next entry into the SP e.g. if SP + * execution is preempted by a non-secure interrupt and handed control to the + * normal world. If another request which is distinct from what the SP was + * previously doing arrives, then this flag will be help the TLKD to either + * reject the new request or service it while ensuring that the previous context + * is not corrupted. + */ +#define YIELD_SMC_ACTIVE_FLAG_SHIFT 2 +#define YIELD_SMC_ACTIVE_FLAG_MASK 1 +#define get_yield_smc_active_flag(state) \ + (((state) >> YIELD_SMC_ACTIVE_FLAG_SHIFT) \ + & YIELD_SMC_ACTIVE_FLAG_MASK) +#define set_yield_smc_active_flag(state) ((state) |= \ + (1 << YIELD_SMC_ACTIVE_FLAG_SHIFT)) +#define clr_yield_smc_active_flag(state) ((state) &= \ + ~(YIELD_SMC_ACTIVE_FLAG_MASK \ + << YIELD_SMC_ACTIVE_FLAG_SHIFT)) + +/******************************************************************************* + * Translate virtual address received from the NS world + ******************************************************************************/ +#define TLK_TRANSLATE_NS_VADDR 4 + +/******************************************************************************* + * Secure Payload execution state information i.e. aarch32 or aarch64 + ******************************************************************************/ +#define SP_AARCH32 MODE_RW_32 +#define SP_AARCH64 MODE_RW_64 + +/******************************************************************************* + * Number of cpus that the present on this platform. TODO: Rely on a topology + * tree to determine this in the future to avoid assumptions about mpidr + * allocation + ******************************************************************************/ +#define TLKD_CORE_COUNT PLATFORM_CORE_COUNT + +/******************************************************************************* + * Constants that allow assembler code to preserve callee-saved registers of the + * C runtime context while performing a security state switch. + ******************************************************************************/ +#define TLKD_C_RT_CTX_X19 0x0 +#define TLKD_C_RT_CTX_X20 0x8 +#define TLKD_C_RT_CTX_X21 0x10 +#define TLKD_C_RT_CTX_X22 0x18 +#define TLKD_C_RT_CTX_X23 0x20 +#define TLKD_C_RT_CTX_X24 0x28 +#define TLKD_C_RT_CTX_X25 0x30 +#define TLKD_C_RT_CTX_X26 0x38 +#define TLKD_C_RT_CTX_X27 0x40 +#define TLKD_C_RT_CTX_X28 0x48 +#define TLKD_C_RT_CTX_X29 0x50 +#define TLKD_C_RT_CTX_X30 0x58 +#define TLKD_C_RT_CTX_SIZE 0x60 +#define TLKD_C_RT_CTX_ENTRIES (TLKD_C_RT_CTX_SIZE >> DWORD_SHIFT) + +#ifndef __ASSEMBLER__ + +#include <stdint.h> + +#include <lib/cassert.h> + +/* AArch64 callee saved general purpose register context structure. */ +DEFINE_REG_STRUCT(c_rt_regs, TLKD_C_RT_CTX_ENTRIES); + +/* + * Compile time assertion to ensure that both the compiler and linker + * have the same double word aligned view of the size of the C runtime + * register context. + */ +CASSERT(TLKD_C_RT_CTX_SIZE == sizeof(c_rt_regs_t), + assert_tlkd_c_rt_regs_size_mismatch); + +/******************************************************************************* + * Structure which helps the SPD to maintain the per-cpu state of the SP. + * 'state' - collection of flags to track SP state e.g. on/off + * 'mpidr' - mpidr to associate a context with a cpu + * 'c_rt_ctx' - stack address to restore C runtime context from after + * returning from a synchronous entry into the SP. + * 'cpu_ctx' - space to maintain SP architectural state + * 'saved_tsp_args' - space to store arguments for TSP arithmetic operations + * which will queried using the TSP_GET_ARGS SMC by TSP. + ******************************************************************************/ +typedef struct tlk_context { + uint32_t state; + uint64_t mpidr; + uint64_t c_rt_ctx; + cpu_context_t cpu_ctx; +} tlk_context_t; + +/******************************************************************************* + * Function & Data prototypes + ******************************************************************************/ +uint64_t tlkd_va_translate(uintptr_t va, int type); +uint64_t tlkd_enter_sp(uint64_t *c_rt_ctx); +void __dead2 tlkd_exit_sp(uint64_t c_rt_ctx, uint64_t ret); +uint64_t tlkd_synchronous_sp_entry(tlk_context_t *tlk_ctx); +void __dead2 tlkd_synchronous_sp_exit(tlk_context_t *tlk_ctx, + uint64_t ret); +void tlkd_init_tlk_ep_state(struct entry_point_info *tlk_entry_point, + uint32_t rw, + uint64_t pc, + tlk_context_t *tlk_ctx); + +#endif /*__ASSEMBLER__*/ + +#endif /* TLKD_PRIVATE_H */ diff --git a/services/spd/trusty/generic-arm64-smcall.c b/services/spd/trusty/generic-arm64-smcall.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5c3a628 --- /dev/null +++ b/services/spd/trusty/generic-arm64-smcall.c @@ -0,0 +1,116 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2016-2019, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +#include <stdio.h> + +#include <common/debug.h> +#include <common/runtime_svc.h> +#include <platform_def.h> + +#include "generic-arm64-smcall.h" + +#ifndef PLAT_ARM_GICD_BASE +#ifdef GICD_BASE +#define PLAT_ARM_GICD_BASE GICD_BASE +#define PLAT_ARM_GICC_BASE GICC_BASE +#ifdef GICR_BASE +#define PLAT_ARM_GICR_BASE GICR_BASE +#endif +#else +#error PLAT_ARM_GICD_BASE or GICD_BASE must be defined +#endif +#endif + +#ifndef PLAT_ARM_GICR_BASE +#define PLAT_ARM_GICR_BASE SMC_UNK +#endif + +int trusty_disable_serial_debug; + +struct dputc_state { + char linebuf[128]; + unsigned l; +}; + +static struct dputc_state dputc_state[2]; + +static void trusty_dputc(char ch, int secure) +{ + unsigned i; + struct dputc_state *s = &dputc_state[!secure]; + + if (trusty_disable_serial_debug) + return; + + s->linebuf[s->l++] = ch; + if (s->l == sizeof(s->linebuf) || ch == '\n') { + if (secure) + printf("secure os: "); + else + printf("non-secure os: "); + for (i = 0; i < s->l; i++) { + putchar(s->linebuf[i]); + } + if (ch != '\n') { + printf(" <...>\n"); + } + s->l = 0; + } +} + +static uint64_t trusty_get_reg_base(uint32_t reg) +{ + switch (reg) { + case SMC_GET_GIC_BASE_GICD: + return PLAT_ARM_GICD_BASE; + + case SMC_GET_GIC_BASE_GICC: + return PLAT_ARM_GICC_BASE; + + case SMC_GET_GIC_BASE_GICR: + return PLAT_ARM_GICR_BASE; + + default: + NOTICE("%s(0x%x) unknown reg\n", __func__, reg); + return SMC_UNK; + } +} + +static uintptr_t trusty_generic_platform_smc(uint32_t smc_fid, + u_register_t x1, + u_register_t x2, + u_register_t x3, + u_register_t x4, + void *cookie, + void *handle, + u_register_t flags) +{ + switch (smc_fid) { + case SMC_FC_DEBUG_PUTC: + trusty_dputc(x1, is_caller_secure(flags)); + SMC_RET1(handle, 0); + + case SMC_FC_GET_REG_BASE: + case SMC_FC64_GET_REG_BASE: + SMC_RET1(handle, trusty_get_reg_base(x1)); + + default: + NOTICE("%s(0x%x, 0x%lx) unknown smc\n", __func__, smc_fid, x1); + SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK); + } +} + +/* Define a SPD runtime service descriptor for fast SMC calls */ +DECLARE_RT_SVC( + trusty_fast, + + SMC_ENTITY_PLATFORM_MONITOR, + SMC_ENTITY_PLATFORM_MONITOR, + SMC_TYPE_FAST, + NULL, + trusty_generic_platform_smc +); + diff --git a/services/spd/trusty/generic-arm64-smcall.h b/services/spd/trusty/generic-arm64-smcall.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ac03469 --- /dev/null +++ b/services/spd/trusty/generic-arm64-smcall.h @@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2016, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +#include "smcall.h" + +#define SMC_ENTITY_PLATFORM_MONITOR 61 + +/* + * SMC calls implemented by EL3 monitor + */ + +/* + * Write character in r1 to debug console + */ +#define SMC_FC_DEBUG_PUTC SMC_FASTCALL_NR(SMC_ENTITY_PLATFORM_MONITOR, 0x0) + +/* + * Get register base address + * r1: SMC_GET_GIC_BASE_GICD or SMC_GET_GIC_BASE_GICC + */ +#define SMC_GET_GIC_BASE_GICD 0 +#define SMC_GET_GIC_BASE_GICC 1 +#define SMC_GET_GIC_BASE_GICR 2 +#define SMC_FC_GET_REG_BASE SMC_FASTCALL_NR(SMC_ENTITY_PLATFORM_MONITOR, 0x1) +#define SMC_FC64_GET_REG_BASE SMC_FASTCALL64_NR(SMC_ENTITY_PLATFORM_MONITOR, 0x1) diff --git a/services/spd/trusty/sm_err.h b/services/spd/trusty/sm_err.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..80a8748 --- /dev/null +++ b/services/spd/trusty/sm_err.h @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2016, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +#ifndef SM_ERR_H +#define SM_ERR_H + +/* Errors from the secure monitor */ +#define SM_ERR_UNDEFINED_SMC 0xFFFFFFFF /* Unknown SMC (defined by ARM DEN 0028A(0.9.0) */ +#define SM_ERR_INVALID_PARAMETERS -2 +#define SM_ERR_INTERRUPTED -3 /* Got interrupted. Call back with restart SMC */ +#define SM_ERR_UNEXPECTED_RESTART -4 /* Got an restart SMC when we didn't expect it */ +#define SM_ERR_BUSY -5 /* Temporarily busy. Call back with original args */ +#define SM_ERR_INTERLEAVED_SMC -6 /* Got a trusted_service SMC when a restart SMC is required */ +#define SM_ERR_INTERNAL_FAILURE -7 /* Unknown error */ +#define SM_ERR_NOT_SUPPORTED -8 +#define SM_ERR_NOT_ALLOWED -9 /* SMC call not allowed */ +#define SM_ERR_END_OF_INPUT -10 + +#endif /* SM_ERR_H */ diff --git a/services/spd/trusty/smcall.h b/services/spd/trusty/smcall.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c66f7db --- /dev/null +++ b/services/spd/trusty/smcall.h @@ -0,0 +1,82 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2016-2017, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 2020, NVIDIA Corporation. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +#ifndef SMCALL_H +#define SMCALL_H + +#define SMC_NUM_ENTITIES 64U +#define SMC_NUM_ARGS 4U +#define SMC_NUM_PARAMS (SMC_NUM_ARGS - 1U) + +#define SMC_IS_FASTCALL(smc_nr) ((smc_nr) & 0x80000000U) +#define SMC_IS_SMC64(smc_nr) ((smc_nr) & 0x40000000U) +#define SMC_ENTITY(smc_nr) (((smc_nr) & 0x3F000000U) >> 24U) +#define SMC_FUNCTION(smc_nr) ((smc_nr) & 0x0000FFFFU) + +#define SMC_NR(entity, fn, fastcall, smc64) \ + (((((uint32_t)(fastcall)) & 0x1U) << 31U) | \ + (((smc64) & 0x1U) << 30U) | \ + (((entity) & 0x3FU) << 24U) | \ + ((fn) & 0xFFFFU)) + +#define SMC_FASTCALL_NR(entity, fn) SMC_NR((entity), (fn), 1U, 0U) +#define SMC_FASTCALL64_NR(entity, fn) SMC_NR((entity), (fn), 1U, 1U) +#define SMC_YIELDCALL_NR(entity, fn) SMC_NR((entity), (fn), 0U, 0U) +#define SMC_YIELDCALL64_NR(entity, fn) SMC_NR((entity), (fn), 0U, 1U) + +#define SMC_ENTITY_ARCH 0U /* ARM Architecture calls */ +#define SMC_ENTITY_CPU 1U /* CPU Service calls */ +#define SMC_ENTITY_SIP 2U /* SIP Service calls */ +#define SMC_ENTITY_OEM 3U /* OEM Service calls */ +#define SMC_ENTITY_STD 4U /* Standard Service calls */ +#define SMC_ENTITY_RESERVED 5U /* Reserved for future use */ +#define SMC_ENTITY_TRUSTED_APP 48U /* Trusted Application calls */ +#define SMC_ENTITY_TRUSTED_OS 50U /* Trusted OS calls */ +#define SMC_ENTITY_LOGGING 51U /* Used for secure -> nonsecure logging */ +#define SMC_ENTITY_SECURE_MONITOR 60U /* Trusted OS calls internal to secure monitor */ + +/* FC = Fast call, YC = Yielding call */ +#define SMC_YC_RESTART_LAST SMC_YIELDCALL_NR (SMC_ENTITY_SECURE_MONITOR, 0U) +#define SMC_YC_NOP SMC_YIELDCALL_NR (SMC_ENTITY_SECURE_MONITOR, 1U) + +/* + * Return from secure os to non-secure os with return value in r1 + */ +#define SMC_YC_NS_RETURN SMC_YIELDCALL_NR (SMC_ENTITY_SECURE_MONITOR, 0U) + +#define SMC_FC_RESERVED SMC_FASTCALL_NR (SMC_ENTITY_SECURE_MONITOR, 0U) +#define SMC_FC_FIQ_EXIT SMC_FASTCALL_NR (SMC_ENTITY_SECURE_MONITOR, 1U) +#define SMC_FC_REQUEST_FIQ SMC_FASTCALL_NR (SMC_ENTITY_SECURE_MONITOR, 2U) +#define SMC_FC_GET_NEXT_IRQ SMC_FASTCALL_NR (SMC_ENTITY_SECURE_MONITOR, 3U) +#define SMC_FC_FIQ_ENTER SMC_FASTCALL_NR (SMC_ENTITY_SECURE_MONITOR, 4U) + +#define SMC_FC64_SET_FIQ_HANDLER SMC_FASTCALL64_NR(SMC_ENTITY_SECURE_MONITOR, 5U) +#define SMC_FC64_GET_FIQ_REGS SMC_FASTCALL64_NR (SMC_ENTITY_SECURE_MONITOR, 6U) + +#define SMC_FC_CPU_SUSPEND SMC_FASTCALL_NR (SMC_ENTITY_SECURE_MONITOR, 7U) +#define SMC_FC_CPU_RESUME SMC_FASTCALL_NR (SMC_ENTITY_SECURE_MONITOR, 8U) + +#define SMC_FC_AARCH_SWITCH SMC_FASTCALL_NR (SMC_ENTITY_SECURE_MONITOR, 9U) +#define SMC_FC_GET_VERSION_STR SMC_FASTCALL_NR (SMC_ENTITY_SECURE_MONITOR, 10U) + +/* Trusted OS entity calls */ +#define SMC_YC_VIRTIO_GET_DESCR SMC_YIELDCALL_NR(SMC_ENTITY_TRUSTED_OS, 20U) +#define SMC_YC_VIRTIO_START SMC_YIELDCALL_NR(SMC_ENTITY_TRUSTED_OS, 21U) +#define SMC_YC_VIRTIO_STOP SMC_YIELDCALL_NR(SMC_ENTITY_TRUSTED_OS, 22U) + +#define SMC_YC_VDEV_RESET SMC_YIELDCALL_NR(SMC_ENTITY_TRUSTED_OS, 23U) +#define SMC_YC_VDEV_KICK_VQ SMC_YIELDCALL_NR(SMC_ENTITY_TRUSTED_OS, 24U) +#define SMC_YC_SET_ROT_PARAMS SMC_YIELDCALL_NR(SMC_ENTITY_TRUSTED_OS, 65535U) + +/* + * Standard Trusted OS Function IDs that fall under Trusted OS call range + * according to SMC calling convention + */ +#define SMC_FC64_GET_UUID SMC_FASTCALL64_NR(63U, 0xFF01U) /* Implementation UID */ +#define SMC_FC_GET_UUID SMC_FASTCALL_NR(63U, 0xFF01U) /* Implementation.UID */ + +#endif /* SMCALL_H */ diff --git a/services/spd/trusty/trusty.c b/services/spd/trusty/trusty.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7daebcd --- /dev/null +++ b/services/spd/trusty/trusty.c @@ -0,0 +1,541 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2016-2019, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 2020, NVIDIA Corporation. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +#include <assert.h> +#include <inttypes.h> +#include <lib/xlat_tables/xlat_tables_v2.h> +#include <stdbool.h> +#include <stdint.h> +#include <string.h> + +#include <arch_helpers.h> +#include <bl31/bl31.h> +#include <bl31/interrupt_mgmt.h> +#include <common/bl_common.h> +#include <common/debug.h> +#include <common/runtime_svc.h> +#include <lib/el3_runtime/context_mgmt.h> +#include <lib/smccc.h> +#include <plat/common/platform.h> +#include <tools_share/uuid.h> + +#include "sm_err.h" +#include "smcall.h" + +/* Trusty UID: RFC-4122 compliant UUID version 4 */ +DEFINE_SVC_UUID2(trusty_uuid, + 0x40ee25f0, 0xa2bc, 0x304c, 0x8c, 0x4c, + 0xa1, 0x73, 0xc5, 0x7d, 0x8a, 0xf1); + +/* macro to check if Hypervisor is enabled in the HCR_EL2 register */ +#define HYP_ENABLE_FLAG 0x286001U + +/* length of Trusty's input parameters (in bytes) */ +#define TRUSTY_PARAMS_LEN_BYTES (4096U * 2) + +struct trusty_stack { + uint8_t space[PLATFORM_STACK_SIZE] __aligned(16); + uint32_t end; +}; + +struct trusty_cpu_ctx { + cpu_context_t cpu_ctx; + void *saved_sp; + uint32_t saved_security_state; + int32_t fiq_handler_active; + uint64_t fiq_handler_pc; + uint64_t fiq_handler_cpsr; + uint64_t fiq_handler_sp; + uint64_t fiq_pc; + uint64_t fiq_cpsr; + uint64_t fiq_sp_el1; + gp_regs_t fiq_gpregs; + struct trusty_stack secure_stack; +}; + +struct smc_args { + uint64_t r0; + uint64_t r1; + uint64_t r2; + uint64_t r3; + uint64_t r4; + uint64_t r5; + uint64_t r6; + uint64_t r7; +}; + +static struct trusty_cpu_ctx trusty_cpu_ctx[PLATFORM_CORE_COUNT]; + +struct smc_args trusty_init_context_stack(void **sp, void *new_stack); +struct smc_args trusty_context_switch_helper(void **sp, void *smc_params); + +static uint32_t current_vmid; + +static struct trusty_cpu_ctx *get_trusty_ctx(void) +{ + return &trusty_cpu_ctx[plat_my_core_pos()]; +} + +static bool is_hypervisor_mode(void) +{ + uint64_t hcr = read_hcr(); + + return ((hcr & HYP_ENABLE_FLAG) != 0U) ? true : false; +} + +static struct smc_args trusty_context_switch(uint32_t security_state, uint64_t r0, + uint64_t r1, uint64_t r2, uint64_t r3) +{ + struct smc_args args, ret_args; + struct trusty_cpu_ctx *ctx = get_trusty_ctx(); + struct trusty_cpu_ctx *ctx_smc; + + assert(ctx->saved_security_state != security_state); + + args.r7 = 0; + if (is_hypervisor_mode()) { + /* According to the ARM DEN0028A spec, VMID is stored in x7 */ + ctx_smc = cm_get_context(NON_SECURE); + assert(ctx_smc != NULL); + args.r7 = SMC_GET_GP(ctx_smc, CTX_GPREG_X7); + } + /* r4, r5, r6 reserved for future use. */ + args.r6 = 0; + args.r5 = 0; + args.r4 = 0; + args.r3 = r3; + args.r2 = r2; + args.r1 = r1; + args.r0 = r0; + + /* + * To avoid the additional overhead in PSCI flow, skip FP context + * saving/restoring in case of CPU suspend and resume, assuming that + * when it's needed the PSCI caller has preserved FP context before + * going here. + */ + if (r0 != SMC_FC_CPU_SUSPEND && r0 != SMC_FC_CPU_RESUME) + fpregs_context_save(get_fpregs_ctx(cm_get_context(security_state))); + cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(security_state); + + ctx->saved_security_state = security_state; + ret_args = trusty_context_switch_helper(&ctx->saved_sp, &args); + + assert(ctx->saved_security_state == ((security_state == 0U) ? 1U : 0U)); + + cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(security_state); + if (r0 != SMC_FC_CPU_SUSPEND && r0 != SMC_FC_CPU_RESUME) + fpregs_context_restore(get_fpregs_ctx(cm_get_context(security_state))); + + cm_set_next_eret_context(security_state); + + return ret_args; +} + +static uint64_t trusty_fiq_handler(uint32_t id, + uint32_t flags, + void *handle, + void *cookie) +{ + struct smc_args ret; + struct trusty_cpu_ctx *ctx = get_trusty_ctx(); + + assert(!is_caller_secure(flags)); + + ret = trusty_context_switch(NON_SECURE, SMC_FC_FIQ_ENTER, 0, 0, 0); + if (ret.r0 != 0U) { + SMC_RET0(handle); + } + + if (ctx->fiq_handler_active != 0) { + INFO("%s: fiq handler already active\n", __func__); + SMC_RET0(handle); + } + + ctx->fiq_handler_active = 1; + (void)memcpy(&ctx->fiq_gpregs, get_gpregs_ctx(handle), sizeof(ctx->fiq_gpregs)); + ctx->fiq_pc = SMC_GET_EL3(handle, CTX_ELR_EL3); + ctx->fiq_cpsr = SMC_GET_EL3(handle, CTX_SPSR_EL3); + ctx->fiq_sp_el1 = read_ctx_reg(get_el1_sysregs_ctx(handle), CTX_SP_EL1); + + write_ctx_reg(get_el1_sysregs_ctx(handle), CTX_SP_EL1, ctx->fiq_handler_sp); + cm_set_elr_spsr_el3(NON_SECURE, ctx->fiq_handler_pc, (uint32_t)ctx->fiq_handler_cpsr); + + SMC_RET0(handle); +} + +static uint64_t trusty_set_fiq_handler(void *handle, uint64_t cpu, + uint64_t handler, uint64_t stack) +{ + struct trusty_cpu_ctx *ctx; + + if (cpu >= (uint64_t)PLATFORM_CORE_COUNT) { + ERROR("%s: cpu %" PRId64 " >= %d\n", __func__, cpu, PLATFORM_CORE_COUNT); + return (uint64_t)SM_ERR_INVALID_PARAMETERS; + } + + ctx = &trusty_cpu_ctx[cpu]; + ctx->fiq_handler_pc = handler; + ctx->fiq_handler_cpsr = SMC_GET_EL3(handle, CTX_SPSR_EL3); + ctx->fiq_handler_sp = stack; + + SMC_RET1(handle, 0); +} + +static uint64_t trusty_get_fiq_regs(void *handle) +{ + struct trusty_cpu_ctx *ctx = get_trusty_ctx(); + uint64_t sp_el0 = read_ctx_reg(&ctx->fiq_gpregs, CTX_GPREG_SP_EL0); + + SMC_RET4(handle, ctx->fiq_pc, ctx->fiq_cpsr, sp_el0, ctx->fiq_sp_el1); +} + +static uint64_t trusty_fiq_exit(void *handle, uint64_t x1, uint64_t x2, uint64_t x3) +{ + struct smc_args ret; + struct trusty_cpu_ctx *ctx = get_trusty_ctx(); + + if (ctx->fiq_handler_active == 0) { + NOTICE("%s: fiq handler not active\n", __func__); + SMC_RET1(handle, (uint64_t)SM_ERR_INVALID_PARAMETERS); + } + + ret = trusty_context_switch(NON_SECURE, SMC_FC_FIQ_EXIT, 0, 0, 0); + if (ret.r0 != 1U) { + INFO("%s(%p) SMC_FC_FIQ_EXIT returned unexpected value, %" PRId64 "\n", + __func__, handle, ret.r0); + } + + /* + * Restore register state to state recorded on fiq entry. + * + * x0, sp_el1, pc and cpsr need to be restored because el1 cannot + * restore them. + * + * x1-x4 and x8-x17 need to be restored here because smc_handler64 + * corrupts them (el1 code also restored them). + */ + (void)memcpy(get_gpregs_ctx(handle), &ctx->fiq_gpregs, sizeof(ctx->fiq_gpregs)); + ctx->fiq_handler_active = 0; + write_ctx_reg(get_el1_sysregs_ctx(handle), CTX_SP_EL1, ctx->fiq_sp_el1); + cm_set_elr_spsr_el3(NON_SECURE, ctx->fiq_pc, (uint32_t)ctx->fiq_cpsr); + + SMC_RET0(handle); +} + +static uintptr_t trusty_smc_handler(uint32_t smc_fid, + u_register_t x1, + u_register_t x2, + u_register_t x3, + u_register_t x4, + void *cookie, + void *handle, + u_register_t flags) +{ + struct smc_args ret; + uint32_t vmid = 0U; + entry_point_info_t *ep_info = bl31_plat_get_next_image_ep_info(SECURE); + + /* + * Return success for SET_ROT_PARAMS if Trusty is not present, as + * Verified Boot is not even supported and returning success here + * would not compromise the boot process. + */ + if ((ep_info == NULL) && (smc_fid == SMC_YC_SET_ROT_PARAMS)) { + SMC_RET1(handle, 0); + } else if (ep_info == NULL) { + SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK); + } else { + ; /* do nothing */ + } + + if (is_caller_secure(flags)) { + if (smc_fid == SMC_YC_NS_RETURN) { + ret = trusty_context_switch(SECURE, x1, 0, 0, 0); + SMC_RET8(handle, ret.r0, ret.r1, ret.r2, ret.r3, + ret.r4, ret.r5, ret.r6, ret.r7); + } + INFO("%s (0x%x, 0x%lx, 0x%lx, 0x%lx, 0x%lx, %p, %p, 0x%lx) \ + cpu %d, unknown smc\n", + __func__, smc_fid, x1, x2, x3, x4, cookie, handle, flags, + plat_my_core_pos()); + SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK); + } else { + switch (smc_fid) { + case SMC_FC64_GET_UUID: + case SMC_FC_GET_UUID: + /* provide the UUID for the service to the client */ + SMC_UUID_RET(handle, trusty_uuid); + break; + case SMC_FC64_SET_FIQ_HANDLER: + return trusty_set_fiq_handler(handle, x1, x2, x3); + case SMC_FC64_GET_FIQ_REGS: + return trusty_get_fiq_regs(handle); + case SMC_FC_FIQ_EXIT: + return trusty_fiq_exit(handle, x1, x2, x3); + default: + /* Not all OENs greater than SMC_ENTITY_SECURE_MONITOR are supported */ + if (SMC_ENTITY(smc_fid) > SMC_ENTITY_SECURE_MONITOR) { + VERBOSE("%s: unsupported SMC FID (0x%x)\n", __func__, smc_fid); + SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK); + } + + if (is_hypervisor_mode()) + vmid = SMC_GET_GP(handle, CTX_GPREG_X7); + + if ((current_vmid != 0) && (current_vmid != vmid)) { + /* This message will cause SMC mechanism + * abnormal in multi-guest environment. + * Change it to WARN in case you need it. + */ + VERBOSE("Previous SMC not finished.\n"); + SMC_RET1(handle, SM_ERR_BUSY); + } + current_vmid = vmid; + ret = trusty_context_switch(NON_SECURE, smc_fid, x1, + x2, x3); + current_vmid = 0; + SMC_RET1(handle, ret.r0); + } + } +} + +static int32_t trusty_init(void) +{ + entry_point_info_t *ep_info; + struct smc_args zero_args = {0}; + struct trusty_cpu_ctx *ctx = get_trusty_ctx(); + uint32_t cpu = plat_my_core_pos(); + uint64_t reg_width = GET_RW(read_ctx_reg(get_el3state_ctx(&ctx->cpu_ctx), + CTX_SPSR_EL3)); + + /* + * Get information about the Trusty image. Its absence is a critical + * failure. + */ + ep_info = bl31_plat_get_next_image_ep_info(SECURE); + assert(ep_info != NULL); + + fpregs_context_save(get_fpregs_ctx(cm_get_context(NON_SECURE))); + cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(NON_SECURE); + + cm_set_context(&ctx->cpu_ctx, SECURE); + cm_init_my_context(ep_info); + + /* + * Adjust secondary cpu entry point for 32 bit images to the + * end of exception vectors + */ + if ((cpu != 0U) && (reg_width == MODE_RW_32)) { + INFO("trusty: cpu %d, adjust entry point to 0x%lx\n", + cpu, ep_info->pc + (1U << 5)); + cm_set_elr_el3(SECURE, ep_info->pc + (1U << 5)); + } + + cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(SECURE); + fpregs_context_restore(get_fpregs_ctx(cm_get_context(SECURE))); + cm_set_next_eret_context(SECURE); + + ctx->saved_security_state = ~0U; /* initial saved state is invalid */ + (void)trusty_init_context_stack(&ctx->saved_sp, &ctx->secure_stack.end); + + (void)trusty_context_switch_helper(&ctx->saved_sp, &zero_args); + + cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(NON_SECURE); + fpregs_context_restore(get_fpregs_ctx(cm_get_context(NON_SECURE))); + cm_set_next_eret_context(NON_SECURE); + + return 1; +} + +static void trusty_cpu_suspend(uint32_t off) +{ + struct smc_args ret; + + ret = trusty_context_switch(NON_SECURE, SMC_FC_CPU_SUSPEND, off, 0, 0); + if (ret.r0 != 0U) { + INFO("%s: cpu %d, SMC_FC_CPU_SUSPEND returned unexpected value, %" PRId64 "\n", + __func__, plat_my_core_pos(), ret.r0); + } +} + +static void trusty_cpu_resume(uint32_t on) +{ + struct smc_args ret; + + ret = trusty_context_switch(NON_SECURE, SMC_FC_CPU_RESUME, on, 0, 0); + if (ret.r0 != 0U) { + INFO("%s: cpu %d, SMC_FC_CPU_RESUME returned unexpected value, %" PRId64 "\n", + __func__, plat_my_core_pos(), ret.r0); + } +} + +static int32_t trusty_cpu_off_handler(u_register_t max_off_lvl) +{ + trusty_cpu_suspend(max_off_lvl); + + return 0; +} + +static void trusty_cpu_on_finish_handler(u_register_t max_off_lvl) +{ + struct trusty_cpu_ctx *ctx = get_trusty_ctx(); + + if (ctx->saved_sp == NULL) { + (void)trusty_init(); + } else { + trusty_cpu_resume(max_off_lvl); + } +} + +static void trusty_cpu_suspend_handler(u_register_t max_off_lvl) +{ + trusty_cpu_suspend(max_off_lvl); +} + +static void trusty_cpu_suspend_finish_handler(u_register_t max_off_lvl) +{ + trusty_cpu_resume(max_off_lvl); +} + +static const spd_pm_ops_t trusty_pm = { + .svc_off = trusty_cpu_off_handler, + .svc_suspend = trusty_cpu_suspend_handler, + .svc_on_finish = trusty_cpu_on_finish_handler, + .svc_suspend_finish = trusty_cpu_suspend_finish_handler, +}; + +void plat_trusty_set_boot_args(aapcs64_params_t *args); + +#if !defined(TSP_SEC_MEM_SIZE) && defined(BL32_MEM_SIZE) +#define TSP_SEC_MEM_SIZE BL32_MEM_SIZE +#endif + +#ifdef TSP_SEC_MEM_SIZE +#pragma weak plat_trusty_set_boot_args +void plat_trusty_set_boot_args(aapcs64_params_t *args) +{ + args->arg0 = TSP_SEC_MEM_SIZE; +} +#endif + +static int32_t trusty_setup(void) +{ + entry_point_info_t *ep_info; + uint32_t instr; + uint32_t flags; + int32_t ret; + bool aarch32 = false; + + /* Get trusty's entry point info */ + ep_info = bl31_plat_get_next_image_ep_info(SECURE); + if (ep_info == NULL) { + VERBOSE("Trusty image missing.\n"); + return -1; + } + + /* memmap first page of trusty's code memory before peeking */ + ret = mmap_add_dynamic_region(ep_info->pc, /* PA */ + ep_info->pc, /* VA */ + PAGE_SIZE, /* size */ + MT_SECURE | MT_RW_DATA); /* attrs */ + assert(ret == 0); + + /* peek into trusty's code to see if we have a 32-bit or 64-bit image */ + instr = *(uint32_t *)ep_info->pc; + + if (instr >> 24 == 0xeaU) { + INFO("trusty: Found 32 bit image\n"); + aarch32 = true; + } else if (instr >> 8 == 0xd53810U || instr >> 16 == 0x9400U) { + INFO("trusty: Found 64 bit image\n"); + } else { + ERROR("trusty: Found unknown image, 0x%x\n", instr); + return -1; + } + + /* unmap trusty's memory page */ + (void)mmap_remove_dynamic_region(ep_info->pc, PAGE_SIZE); + + SET_PARAM_HEAD(ep_info, PARAM_EP, VERSION_1, SECURE | EP_ST_ENABLE); + if (!aarch32) + ep_info->spsr = SPSR_64(MODE_EL1, MODE_SP_ELX, + DISABLE_ALL_EXCEPTIONS); + else + ep_info->spsr = SPSR_MODE32(MODE32_svc, SPSR_T_ARM, + SPSR_E_LITTLE, + DAIF_FIQ_BIT | + DAIF_IRQ_BIT | + DAIF_ABT_BIT); + (void)memset(&ep_info->args, 0, sizeof(ep_info->args)); + plat_trusty_set_boot_args(&ep_info->args); + + /* register init handler */ + bl31_register_bl32_init(trusty_init); + + /* register power management hooks */ + psci_register_spd_pm_hook(&trusty_pm); + + /* register interrupt handler */ + flags = 0; + set_interrupt_rm_flag(flags, NON_SECURE); + ret = register_interrupt_type_handler(INTR_TYPE_S_EL1, + trusty_fiq_handler, + flags); + if (ret != 0) { + VERBOSE("trusty: failed to register fiq handler, ret = %d\n", ret); + } + + if (aarch32) { + entry_point_info_t *ns_ep_info; + uint32_t spsr; + + ns_ep_info = bl31_plat_get_next_image_ep_info(NON_SECURE); + if (ns_ep_info == NULL) { + NOTICE("Trusty: non-secure image missing.\n"); + return -1; + } + spsr = ns_ep_info->spsr; + if (GET_RW(spsr) == MODE_RW_64 && GET_EL(spsr) == MODE_EL2) { + spsr &= ~(MODE_EL_MASK << MODE_EL_SHIFT); + spsr |= MODE_EL1 << MODE_EL_SHIFT; + } + if (GET_RW(spsr) == MODE_RW_32 && GET_M32(spsr) == MODE32_hyp) { + spsr &= ~(MODE32_MASK << MODE32_SHIFT); + spsr |= MODE32_svc << MODE32_SHIFT; + } + if (spsr != ns_ep_info->spsr) { + NOTICE("Trusty: Switch bl33 from EL2 to EL1 (spsr 0x%x -> 0x%x)\n", + ns_ep_info->spsr, spsr); + ns_ep_info->spsr = spsr; + } + } + + return 0; +} + +/* Define a SPD runtime service descriptor for fast SMC calls */ +DECLARE_RT_SVC( + trusty_fast, + + OEN_TOS_START, + OEN_TOS_END, + SMC_TYPE_FAST, + trusty_setup, + trusty_smc_handler +); + +/* Define a SPD runtime service descriptor for yielding SMC calls */ +DECLARE_RT_SVC( + trusty_std, + + OEN_TAP_START, + SMC_ENTITY_SECURE_MONITOR, + SMC_TYPE_YIELD, + NULL, + trusty_smc_handler +); diff --git a/services/spd/trusty/trusty.mk b/services/spd/trusty/trusty.mk new file mode 100644 index 0000000..43b80bb --- /dev/null +++ b/services/spd/trusty/trusty.mk @@ -0,0 +1,18 @@ +# +# Copyright (c) 2016-2019, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. +# +# SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause +# + +SPD_INCLUDES := + +SPD_SOURCES := services/spd/trusty/trusty.c \ + services/spd/trusty/trusty_helpers.S + +ifeq (${TRUSTY_SPD_WITH_GENERIC_SERVICES},1) +SPD_SOURCES += services/spd/trusty/generic-arm64-smcall.c +endif + +NEED_BL32 := yes + +CTX_INCLUDE_FPREGS := 1 diff --git a/services/spd/trusty/trusty_helpers.S b/services/spd/trusty/trusty_helpers.S new file mode 100644 index 0000000..da5cb57 --- /dev/null +++ b/services/spd/trusty/trusty_helpers.S @@ -0,0 +1,69 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2016, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +#include <asm_macros.S> + +.macro push ra, rb, sp=sp + stp \ra, \rb, [\sp,#-16]! +.endm + +.macro pop ra, rb, sp=sp + ldp \ra, \rb, [\sp], #16 +.endm + + .global trusty_context_switch_helper +func trusty_context_switch_helper + push x8, xzr + push x19, x20 + push x21, x22 + push x23, x24 + push x25, x26 + push x27, x28 + push x29, x30 + + mov x9, sp + ldr x10, [x0] + mov sp, x10 + str x9, [x0] + + pop x29, x30 + pop x27, x28 + pop x25, x26 + pop x23, x24 + pop x21, x22 + pop x19, x20 + pop x8, xzr + + ldr x2, [x1] + ldr x3, [x1, #0x08] + ldr x4, [x1, #0x10] + ldr x5, [x1, #0x18] + ldr x6, [x1, #0x20] + ldr x7, [x1, #0x28] + ldr x10, [x1, #0x30] + ldr x11, [x1, #0x38] + + stp x2, x3, [x8] + stp x4, x5, [x8, #16] + stp x6, x7, [x8, #32] + stp x10, x11, [x8, #48] + + ret +endfunc trusty_context_switch_helper + + .global trusty_init_context_stack +func trusty_init_context_stack + push x8, xzr, x1 + push xzr, xzr, x1 + push xzr, xzr, x1 + push xzr, xzr, x1 + push xzr, xzr, x1 + push xzr, xzr, x1 + adr x9, el3_exit + push xzr, x9, x1 + str x1, [x0] + ret +endfunc trusty_init_context_stack diff --git a/services/spd/tspd/tspd.mk b/services/spd/tspd/tspd.mk new file mode 100644 index 0000000..bda8338 --- /dev/null +++ b/services/spd/tspd/tspd.mk @@ -0,0 +1,46 @@ +# +# Copyright (c) 2013-2018, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. +# +# SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause +# + +TSPD_DIR := services/spd/tspd + +ifeq (${ERROR_DEPRECATED},0) +SPD_INCLUDES := -Iinclude/bl32/tsp +endif + +SPD_SOURCES := services/spd/tspd/tspd_common.c \ + services/spd/tspd/tspd_helpers.S \ + services/spd/tspd/tspd_main.c \ + services/spd/tspd/tspd_pm.c + +# This dispatcher is paired with a Test Secure Payload source and we intend to +# build the Test Secure Payload along with this dispatcher. +# +# In cases where an associated Secure Payload lies outside this build +# system/source tree, the the dispatcher Makefile can either invoke an external +# build command or assume it pre-built + +BL32_ROOT := bl32/tsp + +# Include SP's Makefile. The assumption is that the TSP's build system is +# compatible with that of Trusted Firmware, and it'll add and populate necessary +# build targets and variables +include ${BL32_ROOT}/tsp.mk + +# Let the top-level Makefile know that we intend to build the SP from source +NEED_BL32 := yes + +# Flag used to enable routing of non-secure interrupts to EL3 when they are +# generated while the code is executing in S-EL1/0. +TSP_NS_INTR_ASYNC_PREEMPT := 0 + +ifeq ($(EL3_EXCEPTION_HANDLING),1) +ifeq ($(TSP_NS_INTR_ASYNC_PREEMPT),0) +$(error When EL3_EXCEPTION_HANDLING=1, TSP_NS_INTR_ASYNC_PREEMPT must also be 1) +endif +endif + +$(eval $(call assert_boolean,TSP_NS_INTR_ASYNC_PREEMPT)) +$(eval $(call add_define,TSP_NS_INTR_ASYNC_PREEMPT)) diff --git a/services/spd/tspd/tspd_common.c b/services/spd/tspd/tspd_common.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..063fd01 --- /dev/null +++ b/services/spd/tspd/tspd_common.c @@ -0,0 +1,140 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2013-2017, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +#include <assert.h> +#include <string.h> + +#include <arch_helpers.h> +#include <bl32/tsp/tsp.h> +#include <common/bl_common.h> +#include <common/debug.h> +#include <lib/el3_runtime/context_mgmt.h> +#include <lib/utils.h> + +#include "tspd_private.h" + +/******************************************************************************* + * Given a secure payload entrypoint info pointer, entry point PC, register + * width, cpu id & pointer to a context data structure, this function will + * initialize tsp context and entry point info for the secure payload + ******************************************************************************/ +void tspd_init_tsp_ep_state(struct entry_point_info *tsp_entry_point, + uint32_t rw, + uint64_t pc, + tsp_context_t *tsp_ctx) +{ + uint32_t ep_attr; + + /* Passing a NULL context is a critical programming error */ + assert(tsp_ctx); + assert(tsp_entry_point); + assert(pc); + + /* + * We support AArch64 TSP for now. + * TODO: Add support for AArch32 TSP + */ + assert(rw == TSP_AARCH64); + + /* Associate this context with the cpu specified */ + tsp_ctx->mpidr = read_mpidr_el1(); + tsp_ctx->state = 0; + set_tsp_pstate(tsp_ctx->state, TSP_PSTATE_OFF); + clr_yield_smc_active_flag(tsp_ctx->state); + + cm_set_context(&tsp_ctx->cpu_ctx, SECURE); + + /* initialise an entrypoint to set up the CPU context */ + ep_attr = SECURE | EP_ST_ENABLE; + if (read_sctlr_el3() & SCTLR_EE_BIT) + ep_attr |= EP_EE_BIG; + SET_PARAM_HEAD(tsp_entry_point, PARAM_EP, VERSION_1, ep_attr); + + tsp_entry_point->pc = pc; + tsp_entry_point->spsr = SPSR_64(MODE_EL1, + MODE_SP_ELX, + DISABLE_ALL_EXCEPTIONS); + zeromem(&tsp_entry_point->args, sizeof(tsp_entry_point->args)); +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * This function takes an SP context pointer and: + * 1. Applies the S-EL1 system register context from tsp_ctx->cpu_ctx. + * 2. Saves the current C runtime state (callee saved registers) on the stack + * frame and saves a reference to this state. + * 3. Calls el3_exit() so that the EL3 system and general purpose registers + * from the tsp_ctx->cpu_ctx are used to enter the secure payload image. + ******************************************************************************/ +uint64_t tspd_synchronous_sp_entry(tsp_context_t *tsp_ctx) +{ + uint64_t rc; + + assert(tsp_ctx != NULL); + assert(tsp_ctx->c_rt_ctx == 0); + + /* Apply the Secure EL1 system register context and switch to it */ + assert(cm_get_context(SECURE) == &tsp_ctx->cpu_ctx); + cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(SECURE); + cm_set_next_eret_context(SECURE); + + rc = tspd_enter_sp(&tsp_ctx->c_rt_ctx); +#if ENABLE_ASSERTIONS + tsp_ctx->c_rt_ctx = 0; +#endif + + return rc; +} + + +/******************************************************************************* + * This function takes an SP context pointer and: + * 1. Saves the S-EL1 system register context tp tsp_ctx->cpu_ctx. + * 2. Restores the current C runtime state (callee saved registers) from the + * stack frame using the reference to this state saved in tspd_enter_sp(). + * 3. It does not need to save any general purpose or EL3 system register state + * as the generic smc entry routine should have saved those. + ******************************************************************************/ +void tspd_synchronous_sp_exit(tsp_context_t *tsp_ctx, uint64_t ret) +{ + assert(tsp_ctx != NULL); + /* Save the Secure EL1 system register context */ + assert(cm_get_context(SECURE) == &tsp_ctx->cpu_ctx); + cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(SECURE); + + assert(tsp_ctx->c_rt_ctx != 0); + tspd_exit_sp(tsp_ctx->c_rt_ctx, ret); + + /* Should never reach here */ + assert(0); +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * This function takes an SP context pointer and abort any preempted SMC + * request. + * Return 1 if there was a preempted SMC request, 0 otherwise. + ******************************************************************************/ +int tspd_abort_preempted_smc(tsp_context_t *tsp_ctx) +{ + if (!get_yield_smc_active_flag(tsp_ctx->state)) + return 0; + + /* Abort any preempted SMC request */ + clr_yield_smc_active_flag(tsp_ctx->state); + + /* + * Arrange for an entry into the test secure payload. It will + * be returned via TSP_ABORT_DONE case in tspd_smc_handler. + */ + cm_set_elr_el3(SECURE, + (uint64_t) &tsp_vectors->abort_yield_smc_entry); + uint64_t rc = tspd_synchronous_sp_entry(tsp_ctx); + + if (rc != 0) + panic(); + + return 1; +} + diff --git a/services/spd/tspd/tspd_helpers.S b/services/spd/tspd/tspd_helpers.S new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f15d66b --- /dev/null +++ b/services/spd/tspd/tspd_helpers.S @@ -0,0 +1,79 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2013-2014, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +#include <asm_macros.S> +#include "tspd_private.h" + + .global tspd_enter_sp + /* --------------------------------------------- + * This function is called with SP_EL0 as stack. + * Here we stash our EL3 callee-saved registers + * on to the stack as a part of saving the C + * runtime and enter the secure payload. + * 'x0' contains a pointer to the memory where + * the address of the C runtime context is to be + * saved. + * --------------------------------------------- + */ +func tspd_enter_sp + /* Make space for the registers that we're going to save */ + mov x3, sp + str x3, [x0, #0] + sub sp, sp, #TSPD_C_RT_CTX_SIZE + + /* Save callee-saved registers on to the stack */ + stp x19, x20, [sp, #TSPD_C_RT_CTX_X19] + stp x21, x22, [sp, #TSPD_C_RT_CTX_X21] + stp x23, x24, [sp, #TSPD_C_RT_CTX_X23] + stp x25, x26, [sp, #TSPD_C_RT_CTX_X25] + stp x27, x28, [sp, #TSPD_C_RT_CTX_X27] + stp x29, x30, [sp, #TSPD_C_RT_CTX_X29] + + /* --------------------------------------------- + * Everything is setup now. el3_exit() will + * use the secure context to restore to the + * general purpose and EL3 system registers to + * ERET into the secure payload. + * --------------------------------------------- + */ + b el3_exit +endfunc tspd_enter_sp + + /* --------------------------------------------- + * This function is called 'x0' pointing to a C + * runtime context saved in tspd_enter_sp(). It + * restores the saved registers and jumps to + * that runtime with 'x0' as the new sp. This + * destroys the C runtime context that had been + * built on the stack below the saved context by + * the caller. Later the second parameter 'x1' + * is passed as return value to the caller + * --------------------------------------------- + */ + .global tspd_exit_sp +func tspd_exit_sp + /* Restore the previous stack */ + mov sp, x0 + + /* Restore callee-saved registers on to the stack */ + ldp x19, x20, [x0, #(TSPD_C_RT_CTX_X19 - TSPD_C_RT_CTX_SIZE)] + ldp x21, x22, [x0, #(TSPD_C_RT_CTX_X21 - TSPD_C_RT_CTX_SIZE)] + ldp x23, x24, [x0, #(TSPD_C_RT_CTX_X23 - TSPD_C_RT_CTX_SIZE)] + ldp x25, x26, [x0, #(TSPD_C_RT_CTX_X25 - TSPD_C_RT_CTX_SIZE)] + ldp x27, x28, [x0, #(TSPD_C_RT_CTX_X27 - TSPD_C_RT_CTX_SIZE)] + ldp x29, x30, [x0, #(TSPD_C_RT_CTX_X29 - TSPD_C_RT_CTX_SIZE)] + + /* --------------------------------------------- + * This should take us back to the instruction + * after the call to the last tspd_enter_sp(). + * Place the second parameter to x0 so that the + * caller will see it as a return value from the + * original entry call + * --------------------------------------------- + */ + mov x0, x1 + ret +endfunc tspd_exit_sp diff --git a/services/spd/tspd/tspd_main.c b/services/spd/tspd/tspd_main.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6cb4992 --- /dev/null +++ b/services/spd/tspd/tspd_main.c @@ -0,0 +1,819 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2013-2022, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + + +/******************************************************************************* + * This is the Secure Payload Dispatcher (SPD). The dispatcher is meant to be a + * plug-in component to the Secure Monitor, registered as a runtime service. The + * SPD is expected to be a functional extension of the Secure Payload (SP) that + * executes in Secure EL1. The Secure Monitor will delegate all SMCs targeting + * the Trusted OS/Applications range to the dispatcher. The SPD will either + * handle the request locally or delegate it to the Secure Payload. It is also + * responsible for initialising and maintaining communication with the SP. + ******************************************************************************/ +#include <assert.h> +#include <errno.h> +#include <stddef.h> +#include <string.h> + +#include <arch_helpers.h> +#include <bl31/bl31.h> +#include <bl31/ehf.h> +#include <bl32/tsp/tsp.h> +#include <common/bl_common.h> +#include <common/debug.h> +#include <common/runtime_svc.h> +#include <lib/el3_runtime/context_mgmt.h> +#include <plat/common/platform.h> +#include <tools_share/uuid.h> + +#include "tspd_private.h" + +/******************************************************************************* + * Address of the entrypoint vector table in the Secure Payload. It is + * initialised once on the primary core after a cold boot. + ******************************************************************************/ +tsp_vectors_t *tsp_vectors; + +/******************************************************************************* + * Array to keep track of per-cpu Secure Payload state + ******************************************************************************/ +tsp_context_t tspd_sp_context[TSPD_CORE_COUNT]; + + +/* TSP UID */ +DEFINE_SVC_UUID2(tsp_uuid, + 0xa056305b, 0x9132, 0x7b42, 0x98, 0x11, + 0x71, 0x68, 0xca, 0x50, 0xf3, 0xfa); + +int32_t tspd_init(void); + +/* + * This helper function handles Secure EL1 preemption. The preemption could be + * due Non Secure interrupts or EL3 interrupts. In both the cases we context + * switch to the normal world and in case of EL3 interrupts, it will again be + * routed to EL3 which will get handled at the exception vectors. + */ +uint64_t tspd_handle_sp_preemption(void *handle) +{ + cpu_context_t *ns_cpu_context; + + assert(handle == cm_get_context(SECURE)); + cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(SECURE); + /* Get a reference to the non-secure context */ + ns_cpu_context = cm_get_context(NON_SECURE); + assert(ns_cpu_context); + + /* + * To allow Secure EL1 interrupt handler to re-enter TSP while TSP + * is preempted, the secure system register context which will get + * overwritten must be additionally saved. This is currently done + * by the TSPD S-EL1 interrupt handler. + */ + + /* + * Restore non-secure state. + */ + cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(NON_SECURE); + cm_set_next_eret_context(NON_SECURE); + + /* + * The TSP was preempted during execution of a Yielding SMC Call. + * Return back to the normal world with SMC_PREEMPTED as error + * code in x0. + */ + SMC_RET1(ns_cpu_context, SMC_PREEMPTED); +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * This function is the handler registered for S-EL1 interrupts by the TSPD. It + * validates the interrupt and upon success arranges entry into the TSP at + * 'tsp_sel1_intr_entry()' for handling the interrupt. + * Typically, interrupts for a specific security state get handled in the same + * security execption level if the execution is in the same security state. For + * example, if a non-secure interrupt gets fired when CPU is executing in NS-EL2 + * it gets handled in the non-secure world. + * However, interrupts belonging to the opposite security state typically demand + * a world(context) switch. This is inline with the security principle which + * states a secure interrupt has to be handled in the secure world. + * Hence, the TSPD in EL3 expects the context(handle) for a secure interrupt to + * be non-secure and vice versa. + * However, a race condition between non-secure and secure interrupts can lead to + * a scenario where the above assumptions do not hold true. This is demonstrated + * below through Note 1. + ******************************************************************************/ +static uint64_t tspd_sel1_interrupt_handler(uint32_t id, + uint32_t flags, + void *handle, + void *cookie) +{ + uint32_t linear_id; + tsp_context_t *tsp_ctx; + + /* Get a reference to this cpu's TSP context */ + linear_id = plat_my_core_pos(); + tsp_ctx = &tspd_sp_context[linear_id]; + +#if TSP_NS_INTR_ASYNC_PREEMPT + + /* + * Note 1: + * Under the current interrupt routing model, interrupts from other + * world are routed to EL3 when TSP_NS_INTR_ASYNC_PREEMPT is enabled. + * Consider the following scenario: + * 1/ A non-secure payload(like tftf) requests a secure service from + * TSP by invoking a yielding SMC call. + * 2/ Later, execution jumps to TSP in S-EL1 with the help of TSP + * Dispatcher in Secure Monitor(EL3). + * 3/ While CPU is executing TSP, a Non-secure interrupt gets fired. + * this demands a context switch to the non-secure world through + * secure monitor. + * 4/ Consequently, TSP in S-EL1 get asynchronously pre-empted and + * execution switches to secure monitor(EL3). + * 5/ EL3 tries to triage the (Non-secure) interrupt based on the + * highest pending interrupt. + * 6/ However, while the NS Interrupt was pending, secure timer gets + * fired which makes a S-EL1 interrupt to be pending. + * 7/ Hence, execution jumps to this companion handler of S-EL1 + * interrupt (i.e., tspd_sel1_interrupt_handler) even though the TSP + * was pre-empted due to non-secure interrupt. + * 8/ The above sequence of events explain how TSP was pre-empted by + * S-EL1 interrupt indirectly in an asynchronous way. + * 9/ Hence, we track the TSP pre-emption by S-EL1 interrupt using a + * boolean variable per each core. + * 10/ This helps us to indicate that SMC call for TSP service was + * pre-empted when execution resumes in non-secure world. + */ + + /* Check the security state when the exception was generated */ + if (get_interrupt_src_ss(flags) == NON_SECURE) { + /* Sanity check the pointer to this cpu's context */ + assert(handle == cm_get_context(NON_SECURE)); + + /* Save the non-secure context before entering the TSP */ + cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(NON_SECURE); + tsp_ctx->preempted_by_sel1_intr = false; + } else { + /* Sanity check the pointer to this cpu's context */ + assert(handle == cm_get_context(SECURE)); + + /* Save the secure context before entering the TSP for S-EL1 + * interrupt handling + */ + cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(SECURE); + tsp_ctx->preempted_by_sel1_intr = true; + } +#else + /* Check the security state when the exception was generated */ + assert(get_interrupt_src_ss(flags) == NON_SECURE); + + /* Sanity check the pointer to this cpu's context */ + assert(handle == cm_get_context(NON_SECURE)); + + /* Save the non-secure context before entering the TSP */ + cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(NON_SECURE); +#endif + + assert(&tsp_ctx->cpu_ctx == cm_get_context(SECURE)); + + /* + * Determine if the TSP was previously preempted. Its last known + * context has to be preserved in this case. + * The TSP should return control to the TSPD after handling this + * S-EL1 interrupt. Preserve essential EL3 context to allow entry into + * the TSP at the S-EL1 interrupt entry point using the 'cpu_context' + * structure. There is no need to save the secure system register + * context since the TSP is supposed to preserve it during S-EL1 + * interrupt handling. + */ + if (get_yield_smc_active_flag(tsp_ctx->state)) { + tsp_ctx->saved_spsr_el3 = (uint32_t)SMC_GET_EL3(&tsp_ctx->cpu_ctx, + CTX_SPSR_EL3); + tsp_ctx->saved_elr_el3 = SMC_GET_EL3(&tsp_ctx->cpu_ctx, + CTX_ELR_EL3); +#if TSP_NS_INTR_ASYNC_PREEMPT + memcpy(&tsp_ctx->sp_ctx, &tsp_ctx->cpu_ctx, TSPD_SP_CTX_SIZE); +#endif + } + + cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(SECURE); + cm_set_elr_spsr_el3(SECURE, (uint64_t) &tsp_vectors->sel1_intr_entry, + SPSR_64(MODE_EL1, MODE_SP_ELX, DISABLE_ALL_EXCEPTIONS)); + + cm_set_next_eret_context(SECURE); + + /* + * Tell the TSP that it has to handle a S-EL1 interrupt synchronously. + * Also the instruction in normal world where the interrupt was + * generated is passed for debugging purposes. It is safe to retrieve + * this address from ELR_EL3 as the secure context will not take effect + * until el3_exit(). + */ + SMC_RET2(&tsp_ctx->cpu_ctx, TSP_HANDLE_SEL1_INTR_AND_RETURN, read_elr_el3()); +} + +#if TSP_NS_INTR_ASYNC_PREEMPT +/******************************************************************************* + * This function is the handler registered for Non secure interrupts by the + * TSPD. It validates the interrupt and upon success arranges entry into the + * normal world for handling the interrupt. + ******************************************************************************/ +static uint64_t tspd_ns_interrupt_handler(uint32_t id, + uint32_t flags, + void *handle, + void *cookie) +{ + /* Check the security state when the exception was generated */ + assert(get_interrupt_src_ss(flags) == SECURE); + + /* + * Disable the routing of NS interrupts from secure world to EL3 while + * interrupted on this core. + */ + disable_intr_rm_local(INTR_TYPE_NS, SECURE); + + return tspd_handle_sp_preemption(handle); +} +#endif + +/******************************************************************************* + * Secure Payload Dispatcher setup. The SPD finds out the SP entrypoint and type + * (aarch32/aarch64) if not already known and initialises the context for entry + * into the SP for its initialisation. + ******************************************************************************/ +static int32_t tspd_setup(void) +{ + entry_point_info_t *tsp_ep_info; + uint32_t linear_id; + + linear_id = plat_my_core_pos(); + + /* + * Get information about the Secure Payload (BL32) image. Its + * absence is a critical failure. TODO: Add support to + * conditionally include the SPD service + */ + tsp_ep_info = bl31_plat_get_next_image_ep_info(SECURE); + if (!tsp_ep_info) { + WARN("No TSP provided by BL2 boot loader, Booting device" + " without TSP initialization. SMC`s destined for TSP" + " will return SMC_UNK\n"); + return 1; + } + + /* + * If there's no valid entry point for SP, we return a non-zero value + * signalling failure initializing the service. We bail out without + * registering any handlers + */ + if (!tsp_ep_info->pc) + return 1; + + /* + * We could inspect the SP image and determine its execution + * state i.e whether AArch32 or AArch64. Assuming it's AArch64 + * for the time being. + */ + tspd_init_tsp_ep_state(tsp_ep_info, + TSP_AARCH64, + tsp_ep_info->pc, + &tspd_sp_context[linear_id]); + +#if TSP_INIT_ASYNC + bl31_set_next_image_type(SECURE); +#else + /* + * All TSPD initialization done. Now register our init function with + * BL31 for deferred invocation + */ + bl31_register_bl32_init(&tspd_init); +#endif + return 0; +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * This function passes control to the Secure Payload image (BL32) for the first + * time on the primary cpu after a cold boot. It assumes that a valid secure + * context has already been created by tspd_setup() which can be directly used. + * It also assumes that a valid non-secure context has been initialised by PSCI + * so it does not need to save and restore any non-secure state. This function + * performs a synchronous entry into the Secure payload. The SP passes control + * back to this routine through a SMC. + ******************************************************************************/ +int32_t tspd_init(void) +{ + uint32_t linear_id = plat_my_core_pos(); + tsp_context_t *tsp_ctx = &tspd_sp_context[linear_id]; + entry_point_info_t *tsp_entry_point; + uint64_t rc; + + /* + * Get information about the Secure Payload (BL32) image. Its + * absence is a critical failure. + */ + tsp_entry_point = bl31_plat_get_next_image_ep_info(SECURE); + assert(tsp_entry_point); + + cm_init_my_context(tsp_entry_point); + + /* + * Arrange for an entry into the test secure payload. It will be + * returned via TSP_ENTRY_DONE case + */ + rc = tspd_synchronous_sp_entry(tsp_ctx); + assert(rc != 0); + + return rc; +} + + +/******************************************************************************* + * This function is responsible for handling all SMCs in the Trusted OS/App + * range from the non-secure state as defined in the SMC Calling Convention + * Document. It is also responsible for communicating with the Secure payload + * to delegate work and return results back to the non-secure state. Lastly it + * will also return any information that the secure payload needs to do the + * work assigned to it. + ******************************************************************************/ +static uintptr_t tspd_smc_handler(uint32_t smc_fid, + u_register_t x1, + u_register_t x2, + u_register_t x3, + u_register_t x4, + void *cookie, + void *handle, + u_register_t flags) +{ + cpu_context_t *ns_cpu_context; + uint32_t linear_id = plat_my_core_pos(), ns; + tsp_context_t *tsp_ctx = &tspd_sp_context[linear_id]; + uint64_t rc; +#if TSP_INIT_ASYNC + entry_point_info_t *next_image_info; +#endif + + /* Determine which security state this SMC originated from */ + ns = is_caller_non_secure(flags); + + switch (smc_fid) { + + /* + * This function ID is used by TSP to indicate that it was + * preempted by a normal world IRQ. + * + */ + case TSP_PREEMPTED: + if (ns) + SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK); + + return tspd_handle_sp_preemption(handle); + + /* + * This function ID is used only by the TSP to indicate that it has + * finished handling a S-EL1 interrupt or was preempted by a higher + * priority pending EL3 interrupt. Execution should resume + * in the normal world. + */ + case TSP_HANDLED_S_EL1_INTR: + if (ns) + SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK); + + assert(handle == cm_get_context(SECURE)); + + /* + * Restore the relevant EL3 state which saved to service + * this SMC. + */ + if (get_yield_smc_active_flag(tsp_ctx->state)) { + SMC_SET_EL3(&tsp_ctx->cpu_ctx, + CTX_SPSR_EL3, + tsp_ctx->saved_spsr_el3); + SMC_SET_EL3(&tsp_ctx->cpu_ctx, + CTX_ELR_EL3, + tsp_ctx->saved_elr_el3); +#if TSP_NS_INTR_ASYNC_PREEMPT + /* + * Need to restore the previously interrupted + * secure context. + */ + memcpy(&tsp_ctx->cpu_ctx, &tsp_ctx->sp_ctx, + TSPD_SP_CTX_SIZE); +#endif + } + + /* Get a reference to the non-secure context */ + ns_cpu_context = cm_get_context(NON_SECURE); + assert(ns_cpu_context); + + /* + * Restore non-secure state. There is no need to save the + * secure system register context since the TSP was supposed + * to preserve it during S-EL1 interrupt handling. + */ + cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(NON_SECURE); + cm_set_next_eret_context(NON_SECURE); + + /* Refer to Note 1 in function tspd_sel1_interrupt_handler()*/ +#if TSP_NS_INTR_ASYNC_PREEMPT + if (tsp_ctx->preempted_by_sel1_intr) { + /* Reset the flag */ + tsp_ctx->preempted_by_sel1_intr = false; + + SMC_RET1(ns_cpu_context, SMC_PREEMPTED); + } else { + SMC_RET0((uint64_t) ns_cpu_context); + } +#else + SMC_RET0((uint64_t) ns_cpu_context); +#endif + + + /* + * This function ID is used only by the SP to indicate it has + * finished initialising itself after a cold boot + */ + case TSP_ENTRY_DONE: + if (ns) + SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK); + + /* + * Stash the SP entry points information. This is done + * only once on the primary cpu + */ + assert(tsp_vectors == NULL); + tsp_vectors = (tsp_vectors_t *) x1; + + if (tsp_vectors) { + set_tsp_pstate(tsp_ctx->state, TSP_PSTATE_ON); + + /* + * TSP has been successfully initialized. Register power + * management hooks with PSCI + */ + psci_register_spd_pm_hook(&tspd_pm); + + /* + * Register an interrupt handler for S-EL1 interrupts + * when generated during code executing in the + * non-secure state. + */ + flags = 0; + set_interrupt_rm_flag(flags, NON_SECURE); + rc = register_interrupt_type_handler(INTR_TYPE_S_EL1, + tspd_sel1_interrupt_handler, + flags); + if (rc) + panic(); + +#if TSP_NS_INTR_ASYNC_PREEMPT + /* + * Register an interrupt handler for NS interrupts when + * generated during code executing in secure state are + * routed to EL3. + */ + flags = 0; + set_interrupt_rm_flag(flags, SECURE); + + rc = register_interrupt_type_handler(INTR_TYPE_NS, + tspd_ns_interrupt_handler, + flags); + if (rc) + panic(); + + /* + * Disable the NS interrupt locally. + */ + disable_intr_rm_local(INTR_TYPE_NS, SECURE); +#endif + } + + +#if TSP_INIT_ASYNC + /* Save the Secure EL1 system register context */ + assert(cm_get_context(SECURE) == &tsp_ctx->cpu_ctx); + cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(SECURE); + + /* Program EL3 registers to enable entry into the next EL */ + next_image_info = bl31_plat_get_next_image_ep_info(NON_SECURE); + assert(next_image_info); + assert(NON_SECURE == + GET_SECURITY_STATE(next_image_info->h.attr)); + + cm_init_my_context(next_image_info); + cm_prepare_el3_exit(NON_SECURE); + SMC_RET0(cm_get_context(NON_SECURE)); +#else + /* + * SP reports completion. The SPD must have initiated + * the original request through a synchronous entry + * into the SP. Jump back to the original C runtime + * context. + */ + tspd_synchronous_sp_exit(tsp_ctx, x1); + break; +#endif + /* + * This function ID is used only by the SP to indicate it has finished + * aborting a preempted Yielding SMC Call. + */ + case TSP_ABORT_DONE: + + /* + * These function IDs are used only by the SP to indicate it has + * finished: + * 1. turning itself on in response to an earlier psci + * cpu_on request + * 2. resuming itself after an earlier psci cpu_suspend + * request. + */ + case TSP_ON_DONE: + case TSP_RESUME_DONE: + + /* + * These function IDs are used only by the SP to indicate it has + * finished: + * 1. suspending itself after an earlier psci cpu_suspend + * request. + * 2. turning itself off in response to an earlier psci + * cpu_off request. + */ + case TSP_OFF_DONE: + case TSP_SUSPEND_DONE: + case TSP_SYSTEM_OFF_DONE: + case TSP_SYSTEM_RESET_DONE: + if (ns) + SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK); + + /* + * SP reports completion. The SPD must have initiated the + * original request through a synchronous entry into the SP. + * Jump back to the original C runtime context, and pass x1 as + * return value to the caller + */ + tspd_synchronous_sp_exit(tsp_ctx, x1); + break; + + /* + * Request from non-secure client to perform an + * arithmetic operation or response from secure + * payload to an earlier request. + */ + case TSP_FAST_FID(TSP_ADD): + case TSP_FAST_FID(TSP_SUB): + case TSP_FAST_FID(TSP_MUL): + case TSP_FAST_FID(TSP_DIV): + + case TSP_YIELD_FID(TSP_ADD): + case TSP_YIELD_FID(TSP_SUB): + case TSP_YIELD_FID(TSP_MUL): + case TSP_YIELD_FID(TSP_DIV): + /* + * Request from non-secure client to perform a check + * of the DIT PSTATE bit. + */ + case TSP_YIELD_FID(TSP_CHECK_DIT): + if (ns) { + /* + * This is a fresh request from the non-secure client. + * The parameters are in x1 and x2. Figure out which + * registers need to be preserved, save the non-secure + * state and send the request to the secure payload. + */ + assert(handle == cm_get_context(NON_SECURE)); + + /* Check if we are already preempted */ + if (get_yield_smc_active_flag(tsp_ctx->state)) + SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK); + + cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(NON_SECURE); + + /* Save x1 and x2 for use by TSP_GET_ARGS call below */ + store_tsp_args(tsp_ctx, x1, x2); + + /* + * We are done stashing the non-secure context. Ask the + * secure payload to do the work now. + */ + + /* + * Verify if there is a valid context to use, copy the + * operation type and parameters to the secure context + * and jump to the fast smc entry point in the secure + * payload. Entry into S-EL1 will take place upon exit + * from this function. + */ + assert(&tsp_ctx->cpu_ctx == cm_get_context(SECURE)); + + /* Set appropriate entry for SMC. + * We expect the TSP to manage the PSTATE.I and PSTATE.F + * flags as appropriate. + */ + if (GET_SMC_TYPE(smc_fid) == SMC_TYPE_FAST) { + cm_set_elr_el3(SECURE, (uint64_t) + &tsp_vectors->fast_smc_entry); + } else { + set_yield_smc_active_flag(tsp_ctx->state); + cm_set_elr_el3(SECURE, (uint64_t) + &tsp_vectors->yield_smc_entry); +#if TSP_NS_INTR_ASYNC_PREEMPT + /* + * Enable the routing of NS interrupts to EL3 + * during processing of a Yielding SMC Call on + * this core. + */ + enable_intr_rm_local(INTR_TYPE_NS, SECURE); +#endif + +#if EL3_EXCEPTION_HANDLING + /* + * With EL3 exception handling, while an SMC is + * being processed, Non-secure interrupts can't + * preempt Secure execution. However, for + * yielding SMCs, we want preemption to happen; + * so explicitly allow NS preemption in this + * case, and supply the preemption return code + * for TSP. + */ + ehf_allow_ns_preemption(TSP_PREEMPTED); +#endif + } + + cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(SECURE); + cm_set_next_eret_context(SECURE); + SMC_RET3(&tsp_ctx->cpu_ctx, smc_fid, x1, x2); + } else { + /* + * This is the result from the secure client of an + * earlier request. The results are in x1-x3. Copy it + * into the non-secure context, save the secure state + * and return to the non-secure state. + */ + assert(handle == cm_get_context(SECURE)); + cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(SECURE); + + /* Get a reference to the non-secure context */ + ns_cpu_context = cm_get_context(NON_SECURE); + assert(ns_cpu_context); + + /* Restore non-secure state */ + cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(NON_SECURE); + cm_set_next_eret_context(NON_SECURE); + if (GET_SMC_TYPE(smc_fid) == SMC_TYPE_YIELD) { + clr_yield_smc_active_flag(tsp_ctx->state); +#if TSP_NS_INTR_ASYNC_PREEMPT + /* + * Disable the routing of NS interrupts to EL3 + * after processing of a Yielding SMC Call on + * this core is finished. + */ + disable_intr_rm_local(INTR_TYPE_NS, SECURE); +#endif + } + + SMC_RET3(ns_cpu_context, x1, x2, x3); + } + assert(0); /* Unreachable */ + + /* + * Request from the non-secure world to abort a preempted Yielding SMC + * Call. + */ + case TSP_FID_ABORT: + /* ABORT should only be invoked by normal world */ + if (!ns) { + assert(0); + break; + } + + assert(handle == cm_get_context(NON_SECURE)); + cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(NON_SECURE); + + /* Abort the preempted SMC request */ + if (!tspd_abort_preempted_smc(tsp_ctx)) { + /* + * If there was no preempted SMC to abort, return + * SMC_UNK. + * + * Restoring the NON_SECURE context is not necessary as + * the synchronous entry did not take place if the + * return code of tspd_abort_preempted_smc is zero. + */ + cm_set_next_eret_context(NON_SECURE); + break; + } + + cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(NON_SECURE); + cm_set_next_eret_context(NON_SECURE); + SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_OK); + + /* + * Request from non secure world to resume the preempted + * Yielding SMC Call. + */ + case TSP_FID_RESUME: + /* RESUME should be invoked only by normal world */ + if (!ns) { + assert(0); + break; + } + + /* + * This is a resume request from the non-secure client. + * save the non-secure state and send the request to + * the secure payload. + */ + assert(handle == cm_get_context(NON_SECURE)); + + /* Check if we are already preempted before resume */ + if (!get_yield_smc_active_flag(tsp_ctx->state)) + SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK); + + cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(NON_SECURE); + + /* + * We are done stashing the non-secure context. Ask the + * secure payload to do the work now. + */ +#if TSP_NS_INTR_ASYNC_PREEMPT + /* + * Enable the routing of NS interrupts to EL3 during resumption + * of a Yielding SMC Call on this core. + */ + enable_intr_rm_local(INTR_TYPE_NS, SECURE); +#endif + +#if EL3_EXCEPTION_HANDLING + /* + * Allow the resumed yielding SMC processing to be preempted by + * Non-secure interrupts. Also, supply the preemption return + * code for TSP. + */ + ehf_allow_ns_preemption(TSP_PREEMPTED); +#endif + + /* We just need to return to the preempted point in + * TSP and the execution will resume as normal. + */ + cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(SECURE); + cm_set_next_eret_context(SECURE); + SMC_RET0(&tsp_ctx->cpu_ctx); + + /* + * This is a request from the secure payload for more arguments + * for an ongoing arithmetic operation requested by the + * non-secure world. Simply return the arguments from the non- + * secure client in the original call. + */ + case TSP_GET_ARGS: + if (ns) + SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK); + + get_tsp_args(tsp_ctx, x1, x2); + SMC_RET2(handle, x1, x2); + + case TOS_CALL_COUNT: + /* + * Return the number of service function IDs implemented to + * provide service to non-secure + */ + SMC_RET1(handle, TSP_NUM_FID); + + case TOS_UID: + /* Return TSP UID to the caller */ + SMC_UUID_RET(handle, tsp_uuid); + + case TOS_CALL_VERSION: + /* Return the version of current implementation */ + SMC_RET2(handle, TSP_VERSION_MAJOR, TSP_VERSION_MINOR); + + default: + break; + } + + SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK); +} + +/* Define a SPD runtime service descriptor for fast SMC calls */ +DECLARE_RT_SVC( + tspd_fast, + + OEN_TOS_START, + OEN_TOS_END, + SMC_TYPE_FAST, + tspd_setup, + tspd_smc_handler +); + +/* Define a SPD runtime service descriptor for Yielding SMC Calls */ +DECLARE_RT_SVC( + tspd_std, + + OEN_TOS_START, + OEN_TOS_END, + SMC_TYPE_YIELD, + NULL, + tspd_smc_handler +); diff --git a/services/spd/tspd/tspd_pm.c b/services/spd/tspd/tspd_pm.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b95ee8f --- /dev/null +++ b/services/spd/tspd/tspd_pm.c @@ -0,0 +1,254 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2013-2016, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +#include <assert.h> + +#include <arch_helpers.h> +#include <bl32/tsp/tsp.h> +#include <common/bl_common.h> +#include <common/debug.h> +#include <lib/el3_runtime/context_mgmt.h> +#include <plat/common/platform.h> + +#include "tspd_private.h" + +/******************************************************************************* + * The target cpu is being turned on. Allow the TSPD/TSP to perform any actions + * needed. Nothing at the moment. + ******************************************************************************/ +static void tspd_cpu_on_handler(u_register_t target_cpu) +{ +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * This cpu is being turned off. Allow the TSPD/TSP to perform any actions + * needed + ******************************************************************************/ +static int32_t tspd_cpu_off_handler(u_register_t unused) +{ + int32_t rc = 0; + uint32_t linear_id = plat_my_core_pos(); + tsp_context_t *tsp_ctx = &tspd_sp_context[linear_id]; + + assert(tsp_vectors); + assert(get_tsp_pstate(tsp_ctx->state) == TSP_PSTATE_ON); + + /* + * Abort any preempted SMC request before overwriting the SECURE + * context. + */ + tspd_abort_preempted_smc(tsp_ctx); + + /* Program the entry point and enter the TSP */ + cm_set_elr_el3(SECURE, (uint64_t) &tsp_vectors->cpu_off_entry); + rc = tspd_synchronous_sp_entry(tsp_ctx); + + /* + * Read the response from the TSP. A non-zero return means that + * something went wrong while communicating with the TSP. + */ + if (rc != 0) + panic(); + + /* + * Reset TSP's context for a fresh start when this cpu is turned on + * subsequently. + */ + set_tsp_pstate(tsp_ctx->state, TSP_PSTATE_OFF); + + return 0; +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * This cpu is being suspended. S-EL1 state must have been saved in the + * resident cpu (mpidr format) if it is a UP/UP migratable TSP. + ******************************************************************************/ +static void tspd_cpu_suspend_handler(u_register_t max_off_pwrlvl) +{ + int32_t rc = 0; + uint32_t linear_id = plat_my_core_pos(); + tsp_context_t *tsp_ctx = &tspd_sp_context[linear_id]; + + assert(tsp_vectors); + assert(get_tsp_pstate(tsp_ctx->state) == TSP_PSTATE_ON); + + /* + * Abort any preempted SMC request before overwriting the SECURE + * context. + */ + tspd_abort_preempted_smc(tsp_ctx); + + /* Program the entry point and enter the TSP */ + cm_set_elr_el3(SECURE, (uint64_t) &tsp_vectors->cpu_suspend_entry); + rc = tspd_synchronous_sp_entry(tsp_ctx); + + /* + * Read the response from the TSP. A non-zero return means that + * something went wrong while communicating with the TSP. + */ + if (rc) + panic(); + + /* Update its context to reflect the state the TSP is in */ + set_tsp_pstate(tsp_ctx->state, TSP_PSTATE_SUSPEND); +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * This cpu has been turned on. Enter the TSP to initialise S-EL1 and other bits + * before passing control back to the Secure Monitor. Entry in S-EL1 is done + * after initialising minimal architectural state that guarantees safe + * execution. + ******************************************************************************/ +static void tspd_cpu_on_finish_handler(u_register_t unused) +{ + int32_t rc = 0; + uint32_t linear_id = plat_my_core_pos(); + tsp_context_t *tsp_ctx = &tspd_sp_context[linear_id]; + entry_point_info_t tsp_on_entrypoint; + + assert(tsp_vectors); + assert(get_tsp_pstate(tsp_ctx->state) == TSP_PSTATE_OFF); + + tspd_init_tsp_ep_state(&tsp_on_entrypoint, + TSP_AARCH64, + (uint64_t) &tsp_vectors->cpu_on_entry, + tsp_ctx); + + /* Initialise this cpu's secure context */ + cm_init_my_context(&tsp_on_entrypoint); + +#if TSP_NS_INTR_ASYNC_PREEMPT + /* + * Disable the NS interrupt locally since it will be enabled globally + * within cm_init_my_context. + */ + disable_intr_rm_local(INTR_TYPE_NS, SECURE); +#endif + + /* Enter the TSP */ + rc = tspd_synchronous_sp_entry(tsp_ctx); + + /* + * Read the response from the TSP. A non-zero return means that + * something went wrong while communicating with the SP. + */ + if (rc != 0) + panic(); + + /* Update its context to reflect the state the SP is in */ + set_tsp_pstate(tsp_ctx->state, TSP_PSTATE_ON); +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * This cpu has resumed from suspend. The SPD saved the TSP context when it + * completed the preceding suspend call. Use that context to program an entry + * into the TSP to allow it to do any remaining book keeping + ******************************************************************************/ +static void tspd_cpu_suspend_finish_handler(u_register_t max_off_pwrlvl) +{ + int32_t rc = 0; + uint32_t linear_id = plat_my_core_pos(); + tsp_context_t *tsp_ctx = &tspd_sp_context[linear_id]; + + assert(tsp_vectors); + assert(get_tsp_pstate(tsp_ctx->state) == TSP_PSTATE_SUSPEND); + + /* Program the entry point, max_off_pwrlvl and enter the SP */ + write_ctx_reg(get_gpregs_ctx(&tsp_ctx->cpu_ctx), + CTX_GPREG_X0, + max_off_pwrlvl); + cm_set_elr_el3(SECURE, (uint64_t) &tsp_vectors->cpu_resume_entry); + rc = tspd_synchronous_sp_entry(tsp_ctx); + + /* + * Read the response from the TSP. A non-zero return means that + * something went wrong while communicating with the TSP. + */ + if (rc != 0) + panic(); + + /* Update its context to reflect the state the SP is in */ + set_tsp_pstate(tsp_ctx->state, TSP_PSTATE_ON); +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * Return the type of TSP the TSPD is dealing with. Report the current resident + * cpu (mpidr format) if it is a UP/UP migratable TSP. + ******************************************************************************/ +static int32_t tspd_cpu_migrate_info(u_register_t *resident_cpu) +{ + return TSP_MIGRATE_INFO; +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * System is about to be switched off. Allow the TSPD/TSP to perform + * any actions needed. + ******************************************************************************/ +static void tspd_system_off(void) +{ + uint32_t linear_id = plat_my_core_pos(); + tsp_context_t *tsp_ctx = &tspd_sp_context[linear_id]; + + assert(tsp_vectors); + assert(get_tsp_pstate(tsp_ctx->state) == TSP_PSTATE_ON); + + /* + * Abort any preempted SMC request before overwriting the SECURE + * context. + */ + tspd_abort_preempted_smc(tsp_ctx); + + /* Program the entry point */ + cm_set_elr_el3(SECURE, (uint64_t) &tsp_vectors->system_off_entry); + + /* Enter the TSP. We do not care about the return value because we + * must continue the shutdown anyway */ + tspd_synchronous_sp_entry(tsp_ctx); +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * System is about to be reset. Allow the TSPD/TSP to perform + * any actions needed. + ******************************************************************************/ +static void tspd_system_reset(void) +{ + uint32_t linear_id = plat_my_core_pos(); + tsp_context_t *tsp_ctx = &tspd_sp_context[linear_id]; + + assert(tsp_vectors); + assert(get_tsp_pstate(tsp_ctx->state) == TSP_PSTATE_ON); + + /* + * Abort any preempted SMC request before overwriting the SECURE + * context. + */ + tspd_abort_preempted_smc(tsp_ctx); + + /* Program the entry point */ + cm_set_elr_el3(SECURE, (uint64_t) &tsp_vectors->system_reset_entry); + + /* + * Enter the TSP. We do not care about the return value because we + * must continue the reset anyway + */ + tspd_synchronous_sp_entry(tsp_ctx); +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * Structure populated by the TSP Dispatcher to be given a chance to perform any + * TSP bookkeeping before PSCI executes a power mgmt. operation. + ******************************************************************************/ +const spd_pm_ops_t tspd_pm = { + .svc_on = tspd_cpu_on_handler, + .svc_off = tspd_cpu_off_handler, + .svc_suspend = tspd_cpu_suspend_handler, + .svc_on_finish = tspd_cpu_on_finish_handler, + .svc_suspend_finish = tspd_cpu_suspend_finish_handler, + .svc_migrate = NULL, + .svc_migrate_info = tspd_cpu_migrate_info, + .svc_system_off = tspd_system_off, + .svc_system_reset = tspd_system_reset +}; diff --git a/services/spd/tspd/tspd_private.h b/services/spd/tspd/tspd_private.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..043644a --- /dev/null +++ b/services/spd/tspd/tspd_private.h @@ -0,0 +1,233 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2013-2021, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +#ifndef TSPD_PRIVATE_H +#define TSPD_PRIVATE_H + +#include <platform_def.h> + +#include <arch.h> +#include <bl31/interrupt_mgmt.h> +#include <context.h> +#include <lib/psci/psci.h> + +/******************************************************************************* + * Secure Payload PM state information e.g. SP is suspended, uninitialised etc + * and macros to access the state information in the per-cpu 'state' flags + ******************************************************************************/ +#define TSP_PSTATE_OFF 0 +#define TSP_PSTATE_ON 1 +#define TSP_PSTATE_SUSPEND 2 +#define TSP_PSTATE_SHIFT 0 +#define TSP_PSTATE_MASK 0x3 +#define get_tsp_pstate(state) ((state >> TSP_PSTATE_SHIFT) & TSP_PSTATE_MASK) +#define clr_tsp_pstate(state) (state &= ~(TSP_PSTATE_MASK \ + << TSP_PSTATE_SHIFT)) +#define set_tsp_pstate(st, pst) do { \ + clr_tsp_pstate(st); \ + st |= (pst & TSP_PSTATE_MASK) << \ + TSP_PSTATE_SHIFT; \ + } while (0); + + +/* + * This flag is used by the TSPD to determine if the TSP is servicing a yielding + * SMC request prior to programming the next entry into the TSP e.g. if TSP + * execution is preempted by a non-secure interrupt and handed control to the + * normal world. If another request which is distinct from what the TSP was + * previously doing arrives, then this flag will be help the TSPD to either + * reject the new request or service it while ensuring that the previous context + * is not corrupted. + */ +#define YIELD_SMC_ACTIVE_FLAG_SHIFT 2 +#define YIELD_SMC_ACTIVE_FLAG_MASK 1 +#define get_yield_smc_active_flag(state) \ + ((state >> YIELD_SMC_ACTIVE_FLAG_SHIFT) \ + & YIELD_SMC_ACTIVE_FLAG_MASK) +#define set_yield_smc_active_flag(state) (state |= \ + 1 << YIELD_SMC_ACTIVE_FLAG_SHIFT) +#define clr_yield_smc_active_flag(state) (state &= \ + ~(YIELD_SMC_ACTIVE_FLAG_MASK \ + << YIELD_SMC_ACTIVE_FLAG_SHIFT)) + +/******************************************************************************* + * Secure Payload execution state information i.e. aarch32 or aarch64 + ******************************************************************************/ +#define TSP_AARCH32 MODE_RW_32 +#define TSP_AARCH64 MODE_RW_64 + +/******************************************************************************* + * The SPD should know the type of Secure Payload. + ******************************************************************************/ +#define TSP_TYPE_UP PSCI_TOS_NOT_UP_MIG_CAP +#define TSP_TYPE_UPM PSCI_TOS_UP_MIG_CAP +#define TSP_TYPE_MP PSCI_TOS_NOT_PRESENT_MP + +/******************************************************************************* + * Secure Payload migrate type information as known to the SPD. We assume that + * the SPD is dealing with an MP Secure Payload. + ******************************************************************************/ +#define TSP_MIGRATE_INFO TSP_TYPE_MP + +/******************************************************************************* + * Number of cpus that the present on this platform. TODO: Rely on a topology + * tree to determine this in the future to avoid assumptions about mpidr + * allocation + ******************************************************************************/ +#define TSPD_CORE_COUNT PLATFORM_CORE_COUNT + +/******************************************************************************* + * Constants that allow assembler code to preserve callee-saved registers of the + * C runtime context while performing a security state switch. + ******************************************************************************/ +#define TSPD_C_RT_CTX_X19 0x0 +#define TSPD_C_RT_CTX_X20 0x8 +#define TSPD_C_RT_CTX_X21 0x10 +#define TSPD_C_RT_CTX_X22 0x18 +#define TSPD_C_RT_CTX_X23 0x20 +#define TSPD_C_RT_CTX_X24 0x28 +#define TSPD_C_RT_CTX_X25 0x30 +#define TSPD_C_RT_CTX_X26 0x38 +#define TSPD_C_RT_CTX_X27 0x40 +#define TSPD_C_RT_CTX_X28 0x48 +#define TSPD_C_RT_CTX_X29 0x50 +#define TSPD_C_RT_CTX_X30 0x58 +#define TSPD_C_RT_CTX_SIZE 0x60 +#define TSPD_C_RT_CTX_ENTRIES (TSPD_C_RT_CTX_SIZE >> DWORD_SHIFT) + +/******************************************************************************* + * Constants that allow assembler code to preserve caller-saved registers of the + * SP context while performing a TSP preemption. + * Note: These offsets have to match with the offsets for the corresponding + * registers in cpu_context as we are using memcpy to copy the values from + * cpu_context to sp_ctx. + ******************************************************************************/ +#define TSPD_SP_CTX_X0 0x0 +#define TSPD_SP_CTX_X1 0x8 +#define TSPD_SP_CTX_X2 0x10 +#define TSPD_SP_CTX_X3 0x18 +#define TSPD_SP_CTX_X4 0x20 +#define TSPD_SP_CTX_X5 0x28 +#define TSPD_SP_CTX_X6 0x30 +#define TSPD_SP_CTX_X7 0x38 +#define TSPD_SP_CTX_X8 0x40 +#define TSPD_SP_CTX_X9 0x48 +#define TSPD_SP_CTX_X10 0x50 +#define TSPD_SP_CTX_X11 0x58 +#define TSPD_SP_CTX_X12 0x60 +#define TSPD_SP_CTX_X13 0x68 +#define TSPD_SP_CTX_X14 0x70 +#define TSPD_SP_CTX_X15 0x78 +#define TSPD_SP_CTX_X16 0x80 +#define TSPD_SP_CTX_X17 0x88 +#define TSPD_SP_CTX_SIZE 0x90 +#define TSPD_SP_CTX_ENTRIES (TSPD_SP_CTX_SIZE >> DWORD_SHIFT) + +#ifndef __ASSEMBLER__ + +#include <stdint.h> + +#include <lib/cassert.h> + +/* + * The number of arguments to save during a SMC call for TSP. + * Currently only x1 and x2 are used by TSP. + */ +#define TSP_NUM_ARGS 0x2 + +/* AArch64 callee saved general purpose register context structure. */ +DEFINE_REG_STRUCT(c_rt_regs, TSPD_C_RT_CTX_ENTRIES); + +/* + * Compile time assertion to ensure that both the compiler and linker + * have the same double word aligned view of the size of the C runtime + * register context. + */ +CASSERT(TSPD_C_RT_CTX_SIZE == sizeof(c_rt_regs_t), + assert_spd_c_rt_regs_size_mismatch); + +/* SEL1 Secure payload (SP) caller saved register context structure. */ +DEFINE_REG_STRUCT(sp_ctx_regs, TSPD_SP_CTX_ENTRIES); + +/* + * Compile time assertion to ensure that both the compiler and linker + * have the same double word aligned view of the size of the C runtime + * register context. + */ +CASSERT(TSPD_SP_CTX_SIZE == sizeof(sp_ctx_regs_t), + assert_spd_sp_regs_size_mismatch); + +/******************************************************************************* + * Structure which helps the SPD to maintain the per-cpu state of the SP. + * 'saved_spsr_el3' - temporary copy to allow S-EL1 interrupt handling when + * the TSP has been preempted. + * 'saved_elr_el3' - temporary copy to allow S-EL1 interrupt handling when + * the TSP has been preempted. + * 'state' - collection of flags to track SP state e.g. on/off + * 'mpidr' - mpidr to associate a context with a cpu + * 'c_rt_ctx' - stack address to restore C runtime context from after + * returning from a synchronous entry into the SP. + * 'cpu_ctx' - space to maintain SP architectural state + * 'saved_tsp_args' - space to store arguments for TSP arithmetic operations + * which will queried using the TSP_GET_ARGS SMC by TSP. + * 'sp_ctx' - space to save the SEL1 Secure Payload(SP) caller saved + * register context after it has been preempted by an EL3 + * routed NS interrupt and when a Secure Interrupt is taken + * to SP. + ******************************************************************************/ +typedef struct tsp_context { + uint64_t saved_elr_el3; + uint32_t saved_spsr_el3; + uint32_t state; + uint64_t mpidr; + uint64_t c_rt_ctx; + cpu_context_t cpu_ctx; + uint64_t saved_tsp_args[TSP_NUM_ARGS]; +#if TSP_NS_INTR_ASYNC_PREEMPT + sp_ctx_regs_t sp_ctx; + bool preempted_by_sel1_intr; +#endif +} tsp_context_t; + +/* Helper macros to store and retrieve tsp args from tsp_context */ +#define store_tsp_args(_tsp_ctx, _x1, _x2) do {\ + _tsp_ctx->saved_tsp_args[0] = _x1;\ + _tsp_ctx->saved_tsp_args[1] = _x2;\ + } while (0) + +#define get_tsp_args(_tsp_ctx, _x1, _x2) do {\ + _x1 = _tsp_ctx->saved_tsp_args[0];\ + _x2 = _tsp_ctx->saved_tsp_args[1];\ + } while (0) + +/* TSPD power management handlers */ +extern const spd_pm_ops_t tspd_pm; + +/******************************************************************************* + * Forward declarations + ******************************************************************************/ +typedef struct tsp_vectors tsp_vectors_t; + +/******************************************************************************* + * Function & Data prototypes + ******************************************************************************/ +uint64_t tspd_enter_sp(uint64_t *c_rt_ctx); +void __dead2 tspd_exit_sp(uint64_t c_rt_ctx, uint64_t ret); +uint64_t tspd_synchronous_sp_entry(tsp_context_t *tsp_ctx); +void __dead2 tspd_synchronous_sp_exit(tsp_context_t *tsp_ctx, uint64_t ret); +void tspd_init_tsp_ep_state(struct entry_point_info *tsp_entry_point, + uint32_t rw, + uint64_t pc, + tsp_context_t *tsp_ctx); +int tspd_abort_preempted_smc(tsp_context_t *tsp_ctx); + +uint64_t tspd_handle_sp_preemption(void *handle); + +extern tsp_context_t tspd_sp_context[TSPD_CORE_COUNT]; +extern tsp_vectors_t *tsp_vectors; +#endif /*__ASSEMBLER__*/ + +#endif /* TSPD_PRIVATE_H */ diff --git a/services/std_svc/drtm/drtm_dma_prot.c b/services/std_svc/drtm/drtm_dma_prot.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..48317fd --- /dev/null +++ b/services/std_svc/drtm/drtm_dma_prot.c @@ -0,0 +1,263 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2022 Arm Limited. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + * + * DRTM DMA protection. + * + * Authors: + * Lucian Paul-Trifu <lucian.paultrifu@gmail.com> + * + */ + +#include <stdint.h> +#include <string.h> + +#include <common/debug.h> +#include <drivers/arm/smmu_v3.h> +#include "drtm_dma_prot.h" +#include "drtm_main.h" +#include "drtm_remediation.h" +#include <plat/common/platform.h> +#include <smccc_helpers.h> + +/* + * ________________________ LAUNCH success ________________________ + * | Initial | -------------------> | Prot engaged | + * |````````````````````````| |````````````````````````| + * | request.type == NONE | | request.type != NONE | + * | | <------------------- | | + * `________________________' UNPROTECT_MEM `________________________' + * + * Transitions that are not shown correspond to ABI calls that do not change + * state and result in an error being returned to the caller. + */ +static struct dma_prot active_prot = { + .type = PROTECT_NONE, +}; + +/* Version-independent type. */ +typedef struct drtm_dl_dma_prot_args_v1 struct_drtm_dl_dma_prot_args; + +/* + * This function checks that platform supports complete DMA protection. + * and returns false - if the platform supports complete DMA protection. + * and returns true - if the platform does not support complete DMA protection. + */ +bool drtm_dma_prot_init(void) +{ + bool must_init_fail = false; + const uintptr_t *smmus; + size_t num_smmus = 0; + unsigned int total_smmus; + + /* Warns presence of non-host platforms */ + if (plat_has_non_host_platforms()) { + WARN("DRTM: the platform includes trusted DMA-capable devices" + " (non-host platforms)\n"); + } + + /* + * DLME protection is uncertain on platforms with peripherals whose + * DMA is not managed by an SMMU. DRTM doesn't work on such platforms. + */ + if (plat_has_unmanaged_dma_peripherals()) { + ERROR("DRTM: this platform does not provide DMA protection\n"); + must_init_fail = true; + } + + /* + * Check that the platform reported all SMMUs. + * It is acceptable if the platform doesn't have any SMMUs when it + * doesn't have any DMA-capable devices. + */ + total_smmus = plat_get_total_smmus(); + plat_enumerate_smmus(&smmus, &num_smmus); + if (num_smmus != total_smmus) { + ERROR("DRTM: could not discover all SMMUs\n"); + must_init_fail = true; + } + + return must_init_fail; +} + +/* + * Checks that the DMA protection arguments are valid and that the given + * protected regions are covered by DMA protection. + */ +enum drtm_retc drtm_dma_prot_check_args(const struct_drtm_dl_dma_prot_args *a, + int a_dma_prot_type, + drtm_mem_region_t p) +{ + switch ((enum dma_prot_type)a_dma_prot_type) { + case PROTECT_MEM_ALL: + if (a->dma_prot_table_paddr || a->dma_prot_table_size) { + ERROR("DRTM: invalid launch due to inconsistent" + " DMA protection arguments\n"); + return MEM_PROTECT_INVALID; + } + /* + * Full DMA protection ought to ensure that the DLME and NWd + * DCE regions are protected, no further checks required. + */ + return SUCCESS; + + default: + ERROR("DRTM: invalid launch due to unsupported DMA protection type\n"); + return MEM_PROTECT_INVALID; + } +} + +enum drtm_retc drtm_dma_prot_engage(const struct_drtm_dl_dma_prot_args *a, + int a_dma_prot_type) +{ + const uintptr_t *smmus; + size_t num_smmus = 0; + + if (active_prot.type != PROTECT_NONE) { + ERROR("DRTM: launch denied as previous DMA protection" + " is still engaged\n"); + return DENIED; + } + + if (a_dma_prot_type == PROTECT_NONE) { + return SUCCESS; + /* Only PROTECT_MEM_ALL is supported currently. */ + } else if (a_dma_prot_type != PROTECT_MEM_ALL) { + ERROR("%s(): unimplemented DMA protection type\n", __func__); + panic(); + } + + /* + * Engage SMMUs in accordance with the request we have previously received. + * Only PROTECT_MEM_ALL is implemented currently. + */ + plat_enumerate_smmus(&smmus, &num_smmus); + for (const uintptr_t *smmu = smmus; smmu < smmus+num_smmus; smmu++) { + /* + * TODO: Invalidate SMMU's Stage-1 and Stage-2 TLB entries. This ensures + * that any outstanding device transactions are completed, see Section + * 3.21.1, specification IHI_0070_C_a for an approximate reference. + */ + int rc = smmuv3_ns_set_abort_all(*smmu); + if (rc != 0) { + ERROR("DRTM: SMMU at PA 0x%lx failed to engage DMA protection" + " rc=%d\n", *smmu, rc); + return INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + } + + /* + * TODO: Restrict DMA from the GIC. + * + * Full DMA protection may be achieved as follows: + * + * With a GICv3: + * - Set GICR_CTLR.EnableLPIs to 0, for each GICR; + * GICR_CTLR.RWP == 0 must be the case before finishing, for each GICR. + * - Set GITS_CTLR.Enabled to 0; + * GITS_CTLR.Quiescent == 1 must be the case before finishing. + * + * In addition, with a GICv4: + * - Set GICR_VPENDBASER.Valid to 0, for each GICR; + * GICR_CTLR.RWP == 0 must be the case before finishing, for each GICR. + * + * Alternatively, e.g. if some bit values cannot be changed at runtime, + * this procedure should return an error if the LPI Pending and + * Configuration tables overlap the regions being protected. + */ + + active_prot.type = a_dma_prot_type; + + return SUCCESS; +} + +/* + * Undo what has previously been done in drtm_dma_prot_engage(), or enter + * remediation if it is not possible. + */ +enum drtm_retc drtm_dma_prot_disengage(void) +{ + const uintptr_t *smmus; + size_t num_smmus = 0; + const char *err_str = "cannot undo PROTECT_MEM_ALL SMMU config"; + + if (active_prot.type == PROTECT_NONE) { + return SUCCESS; + /* Only PROTECT_MEM_ALL is supported currently. */ + } else if (active_prot.type != PROTECT_MEM_ALL) { + ERROR("%s(): unimplemented DMA protection type\n", __func__); + panic(); + } + + /* + * For PROTECT_MEM_ALL, undo the SMMU configuration for "abort all" mode + * done during engage(). + */ + /* Simply enter remediation for now. */ + (void)smmus; + (void)num_smmus; + drtm_enter_remediation(1ULL, err_str); + + /* TODO: Undo GIC DMA restrictions. */ + + active_prot.type = PROTECT_NONE; + + return SUCCESS; +} + +uint64_t drtm_unprotect_mem(void *ctx) +{ + enum drtm_retc ret; + + switch (active_prot.type) { + case PROTECT_NONE: + ERROR("DRTM: invalid UNPROTECT_MEM, no DMA protection has" + " previously been engaged\n"); + ret = DENIED; + break; + + case PROTECT_MEM_ALL: + /* + * UNPROTECT_MEM is a no-op for PROTECT_MEM_ALL: DRTM must not touch + * the NS SMMU as it is expected that the DLME has configured it. + */ + active_prot.type = PROTECT_NONE; + + ret = SUCCESS; + break; + + default: + ret = drtm_dma_prot_disengage(); + break; + } + + SMC_RET1(ctx, ret); +} + +void drtm_dma_prot_serialise_table(uint8_t *dst, size_t *size_out) +{ + if (active_prot.type == PROTECT_NONE) { + return; + } else if (active_prot.type != PROTECT_MEM_ALL) { + ERROR("%s(): unimplemented DMA protection type\n", __func__); + panic(); + } + + struct __packed descr_table_1 { + drtm_memory_region_descriptor_table_t header; + drtm_mem_region_t regions[1]; + } prot_table = { + .header = { + .revision = 1, + .num_regions = sizeof(((struct descr_table_1 *)NULL)->regions) / + sizeof(((struct descr_table_1 *)NULL)->regions[0]) + }, + .regions = { + {.region_address = 0, PAGES_AND_TYPE(UINT64_MAX, 0x3)}, + } + }; + + memcpy(dst, &prot_table, sizeof(prot_table)); + *size_out = sizeof(prot_table); +} diff --git a/services/std_svc/drtm/drtm_dma_prot.h b/services/std_svc/drtm/drtm_dma_prot.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..79dc9cb --- /dev/null +++ b/services/std_svc/drtm/drtm_dma_prot.h @@ -0,0 +1,50 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2022 Arm Limited. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + * + */ +#ifndef DRTM_DMA_PROT_H +#define DRTM_DMA_PROT_H + +#include <stdint.h> +#include <plat/common/platform.h> +#include <services/drtm_svc.h> + +struct __packed drtm_dl_dma_prot_args_v1 { + uint64_t dma_prot_table_paddr; + uint64_t dma_prot_table_size; +}; + +/* Values for DRTM_PROTECT_MEMORY */ +enum dma_prot_type { + PROTECT_NONE = -1, + PROTECT_MEM_ALL = 0, + PROTECT_MEM_REGION = 2, +}; + +struct dma_prot { + enum dma_prot_type type; +}; + +#define DRTM_MEM_REGION_PAGES_AND_TYPE(pages, type) \ + (((uint64_t)(pages) & (((uint64_t)1 << 52) - 1)) \ + | (((uint64_t)(type) & 0x7) << 52)) + +#define PAGES_AND_TYPE(pages, type) \ + .region_size_type = DRTM_MEM_REGION_PAGES_AND_TYPE(pages, type) + +/* Opaque / encapsulated type. */ +typedef struct drtm_dl_dma_prot_args_v1 drtm_dl_dma_prot_args_v1_t; + +bool drtm_dma_prot_init(void); +enum drtm_retc drtm_dma_prot_check_args(const drtm_dl_dma_prot_args_v1_t *a, + int a_dma_prot_type, + drtm_mem_region_t p); +enum drtm_retc drtm_dma_prot_engage(const drtm_dl_dma_prot_args_v1_t *a, + int a_dma_prot_type); +enum drtm_retc drtm_dma_prot_disengage(void); +uint64_t drtm_unprotect_mem(void *ctx); +void drtm_dma_prot_serialise_table(uint8_t *dst, size_t *size_out); + +#endif /* DRTM_DMA_PROT_H */ diff --git a/services/std_svc/drtm/drtm_main.c b/services/std_svc/drtm/drtm_main.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3acf683 --- /dev/null +++ b/services/std_svc/drtm/drtm_main.c @@ -0,0 +1,839 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2022 Arm Limited. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + * + * DRTM service + * + * Authors: + * Lucian Paul-Trifu <lucian.paultrifu@gmail.com> + * Brian Nezvadovitz <brinez@microsoft.com> 2021-02-01 + */ + +#include <stdint.h> + +#include <arch.h> +#include <arch_helpers.h> +#include <common/bl_common.h> +#include <common/debug.h> +#include <common/runtime_svc.h> +#include <drivers/auth/crypto_mod.h> +#include "drtm_main.h" +#include "drtm_measurements.h" +#include "drtm_remediation.h" +#include <lib/el3_runtime/context_mgmt.h> +#include <lib/psci/psci_lib.h> +#include <lib/xlat_tables/xlat_tables_v2.h> +#include <plat/common/platform.h> +#include <services/drtm_svc.h> +#include <services/sdei.h> +#include <platform_def.h> + +/* Structure to store DRTM features specific to the platform. */ +static drtm_features_t plat_drtm_features; + +/* DRTM-formatted memory map. */ +static drtm_memory_region_descriptor_table_t *plat_drtm_mem_map; + +/* DLME header */ +struct_dlme_data_header dlme_data_hdr_init; + +/* Minimum data memory requirement */ +uint64_t dlme_data_min_size; + +int drtm_setup(void) +{ + bool rc; + const plat_drtm_tpm_features_t *plat_tpm_feat; + const plat_drtm_dma_prot_features_t *plat_dma_prot_feat; + + INFO("DRTM service setup\n"); + + /* Read boot PE ID from MPIDR */ + plat_drtm_features.boot_pe_id = read_mpidr_el1() & MPIDR_AFFINITY_MASK; + + rc = drtm_dma_prot_init(); + if (rc) { + return INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + /* + * initialise the platform supported crypto module that will + * be used by the DRTM-service to calculate hash of DRTM- + * implementation specific components + */ + crypto_mod_init(); + + /* Build DRTM-compatible address map. */ + plat_drtm_mem_map = drtm_build_address_map(); + if (plat_drtm_mem_map == NULL) { + return INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + /* Get DRTM features from platform hooks. */ + plat_tpm_feat = plat_drtm_get_tpm_features(); + if (plat_tpm_feat == NULL) { + return INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + plat_dma_prot_feat = plat_drtm_get_dma_prot_features(); + if (plat_dma_prot_feat == NULL) { + return INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + /* + * Add up minimum DLME data memory. + * + * For systems with complete DMA protection there is only one entry in + * the protected regions table. + */ + if (plat_dma_prot_feat->dma_protection_support == + ARM_DRTM_DMA_PROT_FEATURES_DMA_SUPPORT_COMPLETE) { + dlme_data_min_size = + sizeof(drtm_memory_region_descriptor_table_t) + + sizeof(drtm_mem_region_t); + dlme_data_hdr_init.dlme_prot_regions_size = dlme_data_min_size; + } else { + /* + * TODO set protected regions table size based on platform DMA + * protection configuration + */ + panic(); + } + + dlme_data_hdr_init.dlme_addr_map_size = drtm_get_address_map_size(); + dlme_data_hdr_init.dlme_tcb_hashes_table_size = + plat_drtm_get_tcb_hash_table_size(); + dlme_data_hdr_init.dlme_impdef_region_size = + plat_drtm_get_imp_def_dlme_region_size(); + + dlme_data_min_size += dlme_data_hdr_init.dlme_addr_map_size + + PLAT_DRTM_EVENT_LOG_MAX_SIZE + + dlme_data_hdr_init.dlme_tcb_hashes_table_size + + dlme_data_hdr_init.dlme_impdef_region_size; + + dlme_data_min_size = page_align(dlme_data_min_size, UP)/PAGE_SIZE; + + /* Fill out platform DRTM features structure */ + /* Only support default PCR schema (0x1) in this implementation. */ + ARM_DRTM_TPM_FEATURES_SET_PCR_SCHEMA(plat_drtm_features.tpm_features, + ARM_DRTM_TPM_FEATURES_PCR_SCHEMA_DEFAULT); + ARM_DRTM_TPM_FEATURES_SET_TPM_HASH(plat_drtm_features.tpm_features, + plat_tpm_feat->tpm_based_hash_support); + ARM_DRTM_TPM_FEATURES_SET_FW_HASH(plat_drtm_features.tpm_features, + plat_tpm_feat->firmware_hash_algorithm); + ARM_DRTM_MIN_MEM_REQ_SET_MIN_DLME_DATA_SIZE(plat_drtm_features.minimum_memory_requirement, + dlme_data_min_size); + ARM_DRTM_MIN_MEM_REQ_SET_DCE_SIZE(plat_drtm_features.minimum_memory_requirement, + plat_drtm_get_min_size_normal_world_dce()); + ARM_DRTM_DMA_PROT_FEATURES_SET_MAX_REGIONS(plat_drtm_features.dma_prot_features, + plat_dma_prot_feat->max_num_mem_prot_regions); + ARM_DRTM_DMA_PROT_FEATURES_SET_DMA_SUPPORT(plat_drtm_features.dma_prot_features, + plat_dma_prot_feat->dma_protection_support); + ARM_DRTM_TCB_HASH_FEATURES_SET_MAX_NUM_HASHES(plat_drtm_features.tcb_hash_features, + plat_drtm_get_tcb_hash_features()); + + return 0; +} + +static inline void invalidate_icache_all(void) +{ + __asm__ volatile("ic ialluis"); + dsb(); + isb(); +} + +static inline uint64_t drtm_features_tpm(void *ctx) +{ + SMC_RET2(ctx, 1ULL, /* TPM feature is supported */ + plat_drtm_features.tpm_features); +} + +static inline uint64_t drtm_features_mem_req(void *ctx) +{ + SMC_RET2(ctx, 1ULL, /* memory req Feature is supported */ + plat_drtm_features.minimum_memory_requirement); +} + +static inline uint64_t drtm_features_boot_pe_id(void *ctx) +{ + SMC_RET2(ctx, 1ULL, /* Boot PE feature is supported */ + plat_drtm_features.boot_pe_id); +} + +static inline uint64_t drtm_features_dma_prot(void *ctx) +{ + SMC_RET2(ctx, 1ULL, /* DMA protection feature is supported */ + plat_drtm_features.dma_prot_features); +} + +static inline uint64_t drtm_features_tcb_hashes(void *ctx) +{ + SMC_RET2(ctx, 1ULL, /* TCB hash feature is supported */ + plat_drtm_features.tcb_hash_features); +} + +static enum drtm_retc drtm_dl_check_caller_el(void *ctx) +{ + uint64_t spsr_el3 = read_ctx_reg(get_el3state_ctx(ctx), CTX_SPSR_EL3); + uint64_t dl_caller_el; + uint64_t dl_caller_aarch; + + dl_caller_el = spsr_el3 >> MODE_EL_SHIFT & MODE_EL_MASK; + dl_caller_aarch = spsr_el3 >> MODE_RW_SHIFT & MODE_RW_MASK; + + /* Caller's security state is checked from drtm_smc_handle function */ + + /* Caller can be NS-EL2/EL1 */ + if (dl_caller_el == MODE_EL3) { + ERROR("DRTM: invalid launch from EL3\n"); + return DENIED; + } + + if (dl_caller_aarch != MODE_RW_64) { + ERROR("DRTM: invalid launch from non-AArch64 execution state\n"); + return DENIED; + } + + return SUCCESS; +} + +static enum drtm_retc drtm_dl_check_cores(void) +{ + bool running_on_single_core; + uint64_t this_pe_aff_value = read_mpidr_el1() & MPIDR_AFFINITY_MASK; + + if (this_pe_aff_value != plat_drtm_features.boot_pe_id) { + ERROR("DRTM: invalid launch on a non-boot PE\n"); + return DENIED; + } + + running_on_single_core = psci_is_last_on_cpu_safe(); + if (!running_on_single_core) { + ERROR("DRTM: invalid launch due to non-boot PE not being turned off\n"); + return DENIED; + } + + return SUCCESS; +} + +static enum drtm_retc drtm_dl_prepare_dlme_data(const struct_drtm_dl_args *args) +{ + int rc; + uint64_t dlme_data_paddr; + size_t dlme_data_max_size; + uintptr_t dlme_data_mapping; + struct_dlme_data_header *dlme_data_hdr; + uint8_t *dlme_data_cursor; + size_t dlme_data_mapping_bytes; + size_t serialised_bytes_actual; + + dlme_data_paddr = args->dlme_paddr + args->dlme_data_off; + dlme_data_max_size = args->dlme_size - args->dlme_data_off; + + /* + * The capacity of the given DLME data region is checked when + * the other dynamic launch arguments are. + */ + if (dlme_data_max_size < dlme_data_min_size) { + ERROR("%s: assertion failed:" + " dlme_data_max_size (%ld) < dlme_data_total_bytes_req (%ld)\n", + __func__, dlme_data_max_size, dlme_data_min_size); + panic(); + } + + /* Map the DLME data region as NS memory. */ + dlme_data_mapping_bytes = ALIGNED_UP(dlme_data_max_size, DRTM_PAGE_SIZE); + rc = mmap_add_dynamic_region_alloc_va(dlme_data_paddr, + &dlme_data_mapping, + dlme_data_mapping_bytes, + MT_RW_DATA | MT_NS | + MT_SHAREABILITY_ISH); + if (rc != 0) { + WARN("DRTM: %s: mmap_add_dynamic_region() failed rc=%d\n", + __func__, rc); + return INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + dlme_data_hdr = (struct_dlme_data_header *)dlme_data_mapping; + dlme_data_cursor = (uint8_t *)dlme_data_hdr + sizeof(*dlme_data_hdr); + + memcpy(dlme_data_hdr, (const void *)&dlme_data_hdr_init, + sizeof(*dlme_data_hdr)); + + /* Set the header version and size. */ + dlme_data_hdr->version = 1; + dlme_data_hdr->this_hdr_size = sizeof(*dlme_data_hdr); + + /* Prepare DLME protected regions. */ + drtm_dma_prot_serialise_table(dlme_data_cursor, + &serialised_bytes_actual); + assert(serialised_bytes_actual == + dlme_data_hdr->dlme_prot_regions_size); + dlme_data_cursor += serialised_bytes_actual; + + /* Prepare DLME address map. */ + if (plat_drtm_mem_map != NULL) { + memcpy(dlme_data_cursor, plat_drtm_mem_map, + dlme_data_hdr->dlme_addr_map_size); + } else { + WARN("DRTM: DLME address map is not in the cache\n"); + } + dlme_data_cursor += dlme_data_hdr->dlme_addr_map_size; + + /* Prepare DRTM event log for DLME. */ + drtm_serialise_event_log(dlme_data_cursor, &serialised_bytes_actual); + assert(serialised_bytes_actual <= PLAT_DRTM_EVENT_LOG_MAX_SIZE); + dlme_data_hdr->dlme_tpm_log_size = serialised_bytes_actual; + dlme_data_cursor += serialised_bytes_actual; + + /* + * TODO: Prepare the TCB hashes for DLME, currently its size + * 0 + */ + dlme_data_cursor += dlme_data_hdr->dlme_tcb_hashes_table_size; + + /* Implementation-specific region size is unused. */ + dlme_data_cursor += dlme_data_hdr->dlme_impdef_region_size; + + /* + * Prepare DLME data size, includes all data region referenced above + * alongwith the DLME data header + */ + dlme_data_hdr->dlme_data_size = dlme_data_cursor - (uint8_t *)dlme_data_hdr; + + /* Unmap the DLME data region. */ + rc = mmap_remove_dynamic_region(dlme_data_mapping, dlme_data_mapping_bytes); + if (rc != 0) { + ERROR("%s(): mmap_remove_dynamic_region() failed" + " unexpectedly rc=%d\n", __func__, rc); + panic(); + } + + return SUCCESS; +} + +/* + * Note: accesses to the dynamic launch args, and to the DLME data are + * little-endian as required, thanks to TF-A BL31 init requirements. + */ +static enum drtm_retc drtm_dl_check_args(uint64_t x1, + struct_drtm_dl_args *a_out) +{ + uint64_t dlme_start, dlme_end; + uint64_t dlme_img_start, dlme_img_ep, dlme_img_end; + uint64_t dlme_data_start, dlme_data_end; + uintptr_t va_mapping; + size_t va_mapping_size; + struct_drtm_dl_args *a; + struct_drtm_dl_args args_buf; + int rc; + + if (x1 % DRTM_PAGE_SIZE != 0) { + ERROR("DRTM: parameters structure is not " + DRTM_PAGE_SIZE_STR "-aligned\n"); + return INVALID_PARAMETERS; + } + + va_mapping_size = ALIGNED_UP(sizeof(struct_drtm_dl_args), DRTM_PAGE_SIZE); + + /* check DRTM parameters are within NS address region */ + rc = plat_drtm_validate_ns_region(x1, va_mapping_size); + if (rc != 0) { + ERROR("DRTM: parameters lies within secure memory\n"); + return INVALID_PARAMETERS; + } + + rc = mmap_add_dynamic_region_alloc_va(x1, &va_mapping, va_mapping_size, + MT_MEMORY | MT_NS | MT_RO | + MT_SHAREABILITY_ISH); + if (rc != 0) { + WARN("DRTM: %s: mmap_add_dynamic_region() failed rc=%d\n", + __func__, rc); + return INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + a = (struct_drtm_dl_args *)va_mapping; + + /* Sanitize cache of data passed in args by the DCE Preamble. */ + flush_dcache_range(va_mapping, va_mapping_size); + + args_buf = *a; + + rc = mmap_remove_dynamic_region(va_mapping, va_mapping_size); + if (rc) { + ERROR("%s(): mmap_remove_dynamic_region() failed unexpectedly" + " rc=%d\n", __func__, rc); + panic(); + } + a = &args_buf; + + if (!((a->version >= ARM_DRTM_PARAMS_MIN_VERSION) && + (a->version <= ARM_DRTM_PARAMS_MAX_VERSION))) { + ERROR("DRTM: parameters structure version %u is unsupported\n", + a->version); + return NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + + if (!(a->dlme_img_off < a->dlme_size && + a->dlme_data_off < a->dlme_size)) { + ERROR("DRTM: argument offset is outside of the DLME region\n"); + return INVALID_PARAMETERS; + } + dlme_start = a->dlme_paddr; + dlme_end = a->dlme_paddr + a->dlme_size; + dlme_img_start = a->dlme_paddr + a->dlme_img_off; + dlme_img_ep = dlme_img_start + a->dlme_img_ep_off; + dlme_img_end = dlme_img_start + a->dlme_img_size; + dlme_data_start = a->dlme_paddr + a->dlme_data_off; + dlme_data_end = dlme_end; + + /* Check the DLME regions arguments. */ + if ((dlme_start % DRTM_PAGE_SIZE) != 0) { + ERROR("DRTM: argument DLME region is not " + DRTM_PAGE_SIZE_STR "-aligned\n"); + return INVALID_PARAMETERS; + } + + if (!(dlme_start < dlme_end && + dlme_start <= dlme_img_start && dlme_img_start < dlme_img_end && + dlme_start <= dlme_data_start && dlme_data_start < dlme_data_end)) { + ERROR("DRTM: argument DLME region is discontiguous\n"); + return INVALID_PARAMETERS; + } + + if (dlme_img_start < dlme_data_end && dlme_data_start < dlme_img_end) { + ERROR("DRTM: argument DLME regions overlap\n"); + return INVALID_PARAMETERS; + } + + /* Check the DLME image region arguments. */ + if ((dlme_img_start % DRTM_PAGE_SIZE) != 0) { + ERROR("DRTM: argument DLME image region is not " + DRTM_PAGE_SIZE_STR "-aligned\n"); + return INVALID_PARAMETERS; + } + + if (!(dlme_img_start <= dlme_img_ep && dlme_img_ep < dlme_img_end)) { + ERROR("DRTM: DLME entry point is outside of the DLME image region\n"); + return INVALID_PARAMETERS; + } + + if ((dlme_img_ep % 4) != 0) { + ERROR("DRTM: DLME image entry point is not 4-byte-aligned\n"); + return INVALID_PARAMETERS; + } + + /* Check the DLME data region arguments. */ + if ((dlme_data_start % DRTM_PAGE_SIZE) != 0) { + ERROR("DRTM: argument DLME data region is not " + DRTM_PAGE_SIZE_STR "-aligned\n"); + return INVALID_PARAMETERS; + } + + if (dlme_data_end - dlme_data_start < dlme_data_min_size) { + ERROR("DRTM: argument DLME data region is short of %lu bytes\n", + dlme_data_min_size - (size_t)(dlme_data_end - dlme_data_start)); + return INVALID_PARAMETERS; + } + + /* check DLME region (paddr + size) is within a NS address region */ + rc = plat_drtm_validate_ns_region(dlme_start, (size_t)a->dlme_size); + if (rc != 0) { + ERROR("DRTM: DLME region lies within secure memory\n"); + return INVALID_PARAMETERS; + } + + /* Check the Normal World DCE region arguments. */ + if (a->dce_nwd_paddr != 0) { + uint32_t dce_nwd_start = a->dce_nwd_paddr; + uint32_t dce_nwd_end = dce_nwd_start + a->dce_nwd_size; + + if (!(dce_nwd_start < dce_nwd_end)) { + ERROR("DRTM: argument Normal World DCE region is dicontiguous\n"); + return INVALID_PARAMETERS; + } + + if (dce_nwd_start < dlme_end && dlme_start < dce_nwd_end) { + ERROR("DRTM: argument Normal World DCE regions overlap\n"); + return INVALID_PARAMETERS; + } + } + + /* + * Map and sanitize the cache of data range passed by DCE Preamble. This + * is required to avoid / defend against racing with cache evictions + */ + va_mapping_size = ALIGNED_UP((dlme_end - dlme_start), DRTM_PAGE_SIZE); + rc = mmap_add_dynamic_region_alloc_va(dlme_img_start, &va_mapping, va_mapping_size, + MT_MEMORY | MT_NS | MT_RO | + MT_SHAREABILITY_ISH); + if (rc != 0) { + ERROR("DRTM: %s: mmap_add_dynamic_region_alloc_va() failed rc=%d\n", + __func__, rc); + return INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + flush_dcache_range(va_mapping, va_mapping_size); + + rc = mmap_remove_dynamic_region(va_mapping, va_mapping_size); + if (rc) { + ERROR("%s(): mmap_remove_dynamic_region() failed unexpectedly" + " rc=%d\n", __func__, rc); + panic(); + } + + *a_out = *a; + return SUCCESS; +} + +static void drtm_dl_reset_dlme_el_state(enum drtm_dlme_el dlme_el) +{ + uint64_t sctlr; + + /* + * TODO: Set PE state according to the PSCI's specification of the initial + * state after CPU_ON, or to reset values if unspecified, where they exist, + * or define sensible values otherwise. + */ + + switch (dlme_el) { + case DLME_AT_EL1: + sctlr = read_sctlr_el1(); + break; + + case DLME_AT_EL2: + sctlr = read_sctlr_el2(); + break; + + default: /* Not reached */ + ERROR("%s(): dlme_el has the unexpected value %d\n", + __func__, dlme_el); + panic(); + } + + sctlr &= ~(/* Disable DLME's EL MMU, since the existing page-tables are untrusted. */ + SCTLR_M_BIT + | SCTLR_EE_BIT /* Little-endian data accesses. */ + ); + + sctlr |= SCTLR_C_BIT | SCTLR_I_BIT; /* Allow instruction and data caching. */ + + switch (dlme_el) { + case DLME_AT_EL1: + write_sctlr_el1(sctlr); + break; + + case DLME_AT_EL2: + write_sctlr_el2(sctlr); + break; + } +} + +static void drtm_dl_reset_dlme_context(enum drtm_dlme_el dlme_el) +{ + void *ns_ctx = cm_get_context(NON_SECURE); + gp_regs_t *gpregs = get_gpregs_ctx(ns_ctx); + uint64_t spsr_el3 = read_ctx_reg(get_el3state_ctx(ns_ctx), CTX_SPSR_EL3); + + /* Reset all gpregs, including SP_EL0. */ + memset(gpregs, 0, sizeof(*gpregs)); + + /* Reset SP_ELx. */ + switch (dlme_el) { + case DLME_AT_EL1: + write_sp_el1(0); + break; + + case DLME_AT_EL2: + write_sp_el2(0); + break; + } + + /* + * DLME's async exceptions are masked to avoid a NWd attacker's timed + * interference with any state we established trust in or measured. + */ + spsr_el3 |= SPSR_DAIF_MASK << SPSR_DAIF_SHIFT; + + write_ctx_reg(get_el3state_ctx(ns_ctx), CTX_SPSR_EL3, spsr_el3); +} + +static void drtm_dl_prepare_eret_to_dlme(const struct_drtm_dl_args *args, enum drtm_dlme_el dlme_el) +{ + void *ctx = cm_get_context(NON_SECURE); + uint64_t dlme_ep = DL_ARGS_GET_DLME_ENTRY_POINT(args); + uint64_t spsr_el3 = read_ctx_reg(get_el3state_ctx(ctx), CTX_SPSR_EL3); + + /* Next ERET is to the DLME's EL. */ + spsr_el3 &= ~(MODE_EL_MASK << MODE_EL_SHIFT); + switch (dlme_el) { + case DLME_AT_EL1: + spsr_el3 |= MODE_EL1 << MODE_EL_SHIFT; + break; + + case DLME_AT_EL2: + spsr_el3 |= MODE_EL2 << MODE_EL_SHIFT; + break; + } + + /* Next ERET is to the DLME entry point. */ + cm_set_elr_spsr_el3(NON_SECURE, dlme_ep, spsr_el3); +} + +static uint64_t drtm_dynamic_launch(uint64_t x1, void *handle) +{ + enum drtm_retc ret = SUCCESS; + enum drtm_retc dma_prot_ret; + struct_drtm_dl_args args; + /* DLME should be highest NS exception level */ + enum drtm_dlme_el dlme_el = (el_implemented(2) != EL_IMPL_NONE) ? MODE_EL2 : MODE_EL1; + + /* Ensure that only boot PE is powered on */ + ret = drtm_dl_check_cores(); + if (ret != SUCCESS) { + SMC_RET1(handle, ret); + } + + /* + * Ensure that execution state is AArch64 and the caller + * is highest non-secure exception level + */ + ret = drtm_dl_check_caller_el(handle); + if (ret != SUCCESS) { + SMC_RET1(handle, ret); + } + + ret = drtm_dl_check_args(x1, &args); + if (ret != SUCCESS) { + SMC_RET1(handle, ret); + } + + /* Ensure that there are no SDEI event registered */ +#if SDEI_SUPPORT + if (sdei_get_registered_event_count() != 0) { + SMC_RET1(handle, DENIED); + } +#endif /* SDEI_SUPPORT */ + + /* + * Engage the DMA protections. The launch cannot proceed without the DMA + * protections due to potential TOC/TOU vulnerabilities w.r.t. the DLME + * region (and to the NWd DCE region). + */ + ret = drtm_dma_prot_engage(&args.dma_prot_args, + DL_ARGS_GET_DMA_PROT_TYPE(&args)); + if (ret != SUCCESS) { + SMC_RET1(handle, ret); + } + + /* + * The DMA protection is now engaged. Note that any failure mode that + * returns an error to the DRTM-launch caller must now disengage DMA + * protections before returning to the caller. + */ + + ret = drtm_take_measurements(&args); + if (ret != SUCCESS) { + goto err_undo_dma_prot; + } + + ret = drtm_dl_prepare_dlme_data(&args); + if (ret != SUCCESS) { + goto err_undo_dma_prot; + } + + /* + * Note that, at the time of writing, the DRTM spec allows a successful + * launch from NS-EL1 to return to a DLME in NS-EL2. The practical risk + * of a privilege escalation, e.g. due to a compromised hypervisor, is + * considered small enough not to warrant the specification of additional + * DRTM conduits that would be necessary to maintain OSs' abstraction from + * the presence of EL2 were the dynamic launch only be allowed from the + * highest NS EL. + */ + + dlme_el = (el_implemented(2) != EL_IMPL_NONE) ? MODE_EL2 : MODE_EL1; + + drtm_dl_reset_dlme_el_state(dlme_el); + drtm_dl_reset_dlme_context(dlme_el); + + drtm_dl_prepare_eret_to_dlme(&args, dlme_el); + + /* + * As per DRTM beta0 spec table #28 invalidate the instruction cache + * before jumping to the DLME. This is required to defend against + * potentially-malicious cache contents. + */ + invalidate_icache_all(); + + /* Return the DLME region's address in x0, and the DLME data offset in x1.*/ + SMC_RET2(handle, args.dlme_paddr, args.dlme_data_off); + +err_undo_dma_prot: + dma_prot_ret = drtm_dma_prot_disengage(); + if (dma_prot_ret != SUCCESS) { + ERROR("%s(): drtm_dma_prot_disengage() failed unexpectedly" + " rc=%d\n", __func__, ret); + panic(); + } + + SMC_RET1(handle, ret); +} + +uint64_t drtm_smc_handler(uint32_t smc_fid, + uint64_t x1, + uint64_t x2, + uint64_t x3, + uint64_t x4, + void *cookie, + void *handle, + uint64_t flags) +{ + /* Check that the SMC call is from the Normal World. */ + if (!is_caller_non_secure(flags)) { + SMC_RET1(handle, NOT_SUPPORTED); + } + + switch (smc_fid) { + case ARM_DRTM_SVC_VERSION: + INFO("DRTM service handler: version\n"); + /* Return the version of current implementation */ + SMC_RET1(handle, ARM_DRTM_VERSION); + break; /* not reached */ + + case ARM_DRTM_SVC_FEATURES: + if (((x1 >> ARM_DRTM_FUNC_SHIFT) & ARM_DRTM_FUNC_MASK) == + ARM_DRTM_FUNC_ID) { + /* Dispatch function-based queries. */ + switch (x1 & FUNCID_MASK) { + case ARM_DRTM_SVC_VERSION: + SMC_RET1(handle, SUCCESS); + break; /* not reached */ + + case ARM_DRTM_SVC_FEATURES: + SMC_RET1(handle, SUCCESS); + break; /* not reached */ + + case ARM_DRTM_SVC_UNPROTECT_MEM: + SMC_RET1(handle, SUCCESS); + break; /* not reached */ + + case ARM_DRTM_SVC_DYNAMIC_LAUNCH: + SMC_RET1(handle, SUCCESS); + break; /* not reached */ + + case ARM_DRTM_SVC_CLOSE_LOCALITY: + WARN("ARM_DRTM_SVC_CLOSE_LOCALITY feature %s", + "is not supported\n"); + SMC_RET1(handle, NOT_SUPPORTED); + break; /* not reached */ + + case ARM_DRTM_SVC_GET_ERROR: + SMC_RET1(handle, SUCCESS); + break; /* not reached */ + + case ARM_DRTM_SVC_SET_ERROR: + SMC_RET1(handle, SUCCESS); + break; /* not reached */ + + case ARM_DRTM_SVC_SET_TCB_HASH: + WARN("ARM_DRTM_SVC_TCB_HASH feature %s", + "is not supported\n"); + SMC_RET1(handle, NOT_SUPPORTED); + break; /* not reached */ + + case ARM_DRTM_SVC_LOCK_TCB_HASH: + WARN("ARM_DRTM_SVC_LOCK_TCB_HASH feature %s", + "is not supported\n"); + SMC_RET1(handle, NOT_SUPPORTED); + break; /* not reached */ + + default: + ERROR("Unknown DRTM service function\n"); + SMC_RET1(handle, NOT_SUPPORTED); + break; /* not reached */ + } + } else { + /* Dispatch feature-based queries. */ + switch (x1 & ARM_DRTM_FEAT_ID_MASK) { + case ARM_DRTM_FEATURES_TPM: + INFO("++ DRTM service handler: TPM features\n"); + return drtm_features_tpm(handle); + break; /* not reached */ + + case ARM_DRTM_FEATURES_MEM_REQ: + INFO("++ DRTM service handler: Min. mem." + " requirement features\n"); + return drtm_features_mem_req(handle); + break; /* not reached */ + + case ARM_DRTM_FEATURES_DMA_PROT: + INFO("++ DRTM service handler: " + "DMA protection features\n"); + return drtm_features_dma_prot(handle); + break; /* not reached */ + + case ARM_DRTM_FEATURES_BOOT_PE_ID: + INFO("++ DRTM service handler: " + "Boot PE ID features\n"); + return drtm_features_boot_pe_id(handle); + break; /* not reached */ + + case ARM_DRTM_FEATURES_TCB_HASHES: + INFO("++ DRTM service handler: " + "TCB-hashes features\n"); + return drtm_features_tcb_hashes(handle); + break; /* not reached */ + + default: + ERROR("Unknown ARM DRTM service feature\n"); + SMC_RET1(handle, NOT_SUPPORTED); + break; /* not reached */ + } + } + + case ARM_DRTM_SVC_UNPROTECT_MEM: + INFO("DRTM service handler: unprotect mem\n"); + return drtm_unprotect_mem(handle); + break; /* not reached */ + + case ARM_DRTM_SVC_DYNAMIC_LAUNCH: + INFO("DRTM service handler: dynamic launch\n"); + return drtm_dynamic_launch(x1, handle); + break; /* not reached */ + + case ARM_DRTM_SVC_CLOSE_LOCALITY: + WARN("DRTM service handler: close locality %s\n", + "is not supported"); + SMC_RET1(handle, NOT_SUPPORTED); + break; /* not reached */ + + case ARM_DRTM_SVC_GET_ERROR: + INFO("DRTM service handler: get error\n"); + drtm_get_error(handle); + break; /* not reached */ + + case ARM_DRTM_SVC_SET_ERROR: + INFO("DRTM service handler: set error\n"); + drtm_set_error(x1, handle); + break; /* not reached */ + + case ARM_DRTM_SVC_SET_TCB_HASH: + WARN("DRTM service handler: set TCB hash %s\n", + "is not supported"); + SMC_RET1(handle, NOT_SUPPORTED); + break; /* not reached */ + + case ARM_DRTM_SVC_LOCK_TCB_HASH: + WARN("DRTM service handler: lock TCB hash %s\n", + "is not supported"); + SMC_RET1(handle, NOT_SUPPORTED); + break; /* not reached */ + + default: + ERROR("Unknown DRTM service function: 0x%x\n", smc_fid); + SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK); + break; /* not reached */ + } + + /* not reached */ + SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK); +} diff --git a/services/std_svc/drtm/drtm_main.h b/services/std_svc/drtm/drtm_main.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6005163 --- /dev/null +++ b/services/std_svc/drtm/drtm_main.h @@ -0,0 +1,106 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2022 Arm Limited. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + * + */ +#ifndef DRTM_MAIN_H +#define DRTM_MAIN_H + +#include <stdint.h> + +#include <assert.h> +#include <lib/smccc.h> + +#include "drtm_dma_prot.h" + +#define ALIGNED_UP(x, a) __extension__ ({ \ + __typeof__(a) _a = (a); \ + __typeof__(a) _one = 1; \ + assert(IS_POWER_OF_TWO(_a)); \ + ((x) + (_a - _one)) & ~(_a - _one); \ +}) + +#define ALIGNED_DOWN(x, a) __extension__ ({ \ + __typeof__(a) _a = (a); \ + __typeof__(a) _one = 1; \ + assert(IS_POWER_OF_TWO(_a)); \ + (x) & ~(_a - _one); \ +}) + +#define DRTM_PAGE_SIZE (4 * (1 << 10)) +#define DRTM_PAGE_SIZE_STR "4-KiB" + +#define DL_ARGS_GET_DMA_PROT_TYPE(a) (((a)->features >> 3) & 0x7U) +#define DL_ARGS_GET_PCR_SCHEMA(a) (((a)->features >> 1) & 0x3U) +#define DL_ARGS_GET_DLME_ENTRY_POINT(a) \ + (((a)->dlme_paddr + (a)->dlme_img_off + (a)->dlme_img_ep_off)) + +/* + * Range(Min/Max) of DRTM parameter structure versions supported + */ +#define ARM_DRTM_PARAMS_MIN_VERSION U(1) +#define ARM_DRTM_PARAMS_MAX_VERSION U(1) + +enum drtm_dlme_el { + DLME_AT_EL1 = MODE_EL1, + DLME_AT_EL2 = MODE_EL2 +}; + +enum drtm_retc { + SUCCESS = SMC_OK, + NOT_SUPPORTED = SMC_UNK, + INVALID_PARAMETERS = -2, + DENIED = -3, + NOT_FOUND = -4, + INTERNAL_ERROR = -5, + MEM_PROTECT_INVALID = -6, +}; + +typedef struct { + uint64_t tpm_features; + uint64_t minimum_memory_requirement; + uint64_t dma_prot_features; + uint64_t boot_pe_id; + uint64_t tcb_hash_features; +} drtm_features_t; + +struct __packed drtm_dl_args_v1 { + uint16_t version; /* Must be 1. */ + uint8_t __res[2]; + uint32_t features; + uint64_t dlme_paddr; + uint64_t dlme_size; + uint64_t dlme_img_off; + uint64_t dlme_img_ep_off; + uint64_t dlme_img_size; + uint64_t dlme_data_off; + uint64_t dce_nwd_paddr; + uint64_t dce_nwd_size; + drtm_dl_dma_prot_args_v1_t dma_prot_args; +} __aligned(__alignof(uint16_t /* First member's type, `uint16_t version' */)); + +struct __packed dlme_data_header_v1 { + uint16_t version; /* Must be 1. */ + uint16_t this_hdr_size; + uint8_t __res[4]; + uint64_t dlme_data_size; + uint64_t dlme_prot_regions_size; + uint64_t dlme_addr_map_size; + uint64_t dlme_tpm_log_size; + uint64_t dlme_tcb_hashes_table_size; + uint64_t dlme_impdef_region_size; +} __aligned(__alignof(uint16_t /* First member's type, `uint16_t version'. */)); + +typedef struct dlme_data_header_v1 struct_dlme_data_header; + +drtm_memory_region_descriptor_table_t *drtm_build_address_map(void); +uint64_t drtm_get_address_map_size(void); + +/* + * Version-independent type. May be used to avoid excessive line of code + * changes when migrating to new struct versions. + */ +typedef struct drtm_dl_args_v1 struct_drtm_dl_args; + +#endif /* DRTM_MAIN_H */ diff --git a/services/std_svc/drtm/drtm_measurements.c b/services/std_svc/drtm/drtm_measurements.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8d514b7 --- /dev/null +++ b/services/std_svc/drtm/drtm_measurements.c @@ -0,0 +1,214 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2022 Arm Limited. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + * + * DRTM measurements into TPM PCRs. + * + * Authors: + * Lucian Paul-Trifu <lucian.paultrifu@gmail.com> + * + */ +#include <assert.h> + +#include <common/debug.h> +#include <drivers/auth/crypto_mod.h> +#include <drivers/measured_boot/event_log/event_log.h> +#include "drtm_main.h" +#include "drtm_measurements.h" +#include <lib/xlat_tables/xlat_tables_v2.h> + +/* Event Log buffer */ +static uint8_t drtm_event_log[PLAT_DRTM_EVENT_LOG_MAX_SIZE]; + +/* + * Calculate and write hash of various payloads as per DRTM specification + * to Event Log. + * + * @param[in] data_base Address of data + * @param[in] data_size Size of data + * @param[in] event_type Type of Event + * @param[in] event_name Name of the Event + * @return: + * 0 = success + * < 0 = error + */ +static int drtm_event_log_measure_and_record(uintptr_t data_base, + uint32_t data_size, + uint32_t event_type, + const char *event_name, + unsigned int pcr) +{ + int rc; + unsigned char hash_data[CRYPTO_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + event_log_metadata_t metadata = {0}; + + metadata.name = event_name; + metadata.pcr = pcr; + + /* + * Measure the payloads requested by D-CRTM and DCE components + * Hash algorithm decided by the Event Log driver at build-time + */ + rc = event_log_measure(data_base, data_size, hash_data); + if (rc != 0) { + return rc; + } + + /* Record the mesasurement in the EventLog buffer */ + event_log_record(hash_data, event_type, &metadata); + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Initialise Event Log global variables, used during the recording + * of various payload measurements into the Event Log buffer + * + * @param[in] event_log_start Base address of Event Log buffer + * @param[in] event_log_finish End address of Event Log buffer, + * it is a first byte past end of the + * buffer + */ +static void drtm_event_log_init(uint8_t *event_log_start, + uint8_t *event_log_finish) +{ + event_log_buf_init(event_log_start, event_log_finish); + event_log_write_specid_event(); +} + +enum drtm_retc drtm_take_measurements(const struct_drtm_dl_args *a) +{ + int rc; + uintptr_t dlme_img_mapping; + uint64_t dlme_img_ep; + size_t dlme_img_mapping_bytes; + uint8_t drtm_null_data = 0U; + uint8_t pcr_schema = DL_ARGS_GET_PCR_SCHEMA(a); + const char *drtm_event_arm_sep_data = "ARM_DRTM"; + + /* Initialise the EventLog driver */ + drtm_event_log_init(drtm_event_log, drtm_event_log + + sizeof(drtm_event_log)); + + /** + * Measurements extended into PCR-17. + * + * PCR-17: Measure the DCE image. Extend digest of (char)0 into PCR-17 + * since the D-CRTM and the DCE are not separate. + */ + rc = drtm_event_log_measure_and_record((uintptr_t)&drtm_null_data, + sizeof(drtm_null_data), + DRTM_EVENT_ARM_DCE, NULL, + PCR_17); + CHECK_RC(rc, drtm_event_log_measure_and_record(DRTM_EVENT_ARM_DCE)); + + /* PCR-17: Measure the PCR schema DRTM launch argument. */ + rc = drtm_event_log_measure_and_record((uintptr_t)&pcr_schema, + sizeof(pcr_schema), + DRTM_EVENT_ARM_PCR_SCHEMA, + NULL, PCR_17); + CHECK_RC(rc, + drtm_event_log_measure_and_record(DRTM_EVENT_ARM_PCR_SCHEMA)); + + /* PCR-17: Measure the enable state of external-debug, and trace. */ + /* + * TODO: Measure the enable state of external-debug and trace. This should + * be returned through a platform-specific hook. + */ + + /* PCR-17: Measure the security lifecycle state. */ + /* + * TODO: Measure the security lifecycle state. This is an implementation- + * defined value, retrieved through an implementation-defined mechanisms. + */ + + /* + * PCR-17: Optionally measure the NWd DCE. + * It is expected that such subsequent DCE stages are signed and verified. + * Whether they are measured in addition to signing is implementation + * -defined. + * Here the choice is to not measure any NWd DCE, in favour of PCR value + * resilience to any NWd DCE updates. + */ + + /* PCR-17: End of DCE measurements. */ + rc = drtm_event_log_measure_and_record((uintptr_t)drtm_event_arm_sep_data, + strlen(drtm_event_arm_sep_data), + DRTM_EVENT_ARM_SEPARATOR, NULL, + PCR_17); + CHECK_RC(rc, drtm_event_log_measure_and_record(DRTM_EVENT_ARM_SEPARATOR)); + + /** + * Measurements extended into PCR-18. + * + * PCR-18: Measure the PCR schema DRTM launch argument. + */ + rc = drtm_event_log_measure_and_record((uintptr_t)&pcr_schema, + sizeof(pcr_schema), + DRTM_EVENT_ARM_PCR_SCHEMA, + NULL, PCR_18); + CHECK_RC(rc, + drtm_event_log_measure_and_record(DRTM_EVENT_ARM_PCR_SCHEMA)); + + /* + * PCR-18: Measure the public key used to verify DCE image(s) signatures. + * Extend digest of (char)0, since we do not expect the NWd DCE to be + * present. + */ + assert(a->dce_nwd_size == 0); + rc = drtm_event_log_measure_and_record((uintptr_t)&drtm_null_data, + sizeof(drtm_null_data), + DRTM_EVENT_ARM_DCE_PUBKEY, + NULL, PCR_18); + CHECK_RC(rc, + drtm_event_log_measure_and_record(DRTM_EVENT_ARM_DCE_PUBKEY)); + + /* PCR-18: Measure the DLME image. */ + dlme_img_mapping_bytes = page_align(a->dlme_img_size, UP); + rc = mmap_add_dynamic_region_alloc_va(a->dlme_paddr + a->dlme_img_off, + &dlme_img_mapping, + dlme_img_mapping_bytes, MT_RO_DATA | MT_NS); + if (rc) { + WARN("DRTM: %s: mmap_add_dynamic_region() failed rc=%d\n", + __func__, rc); + return INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + rc = drtm_event_log_measure_and_record(dlme_img_mapping, a->dlme_img_size, + DRTM_EVENT_ARM_DLME, NULL, + PCR_18); + CHECK_RC(rc, drtm_event_log_measure_and_record(DRTM_EVENT_ARM_DLME)); + + rc = mmap_remove_dynamic_region(dlme_img_mapping, dlme_img_mapping_bytes); + CHECK_RC(rc, mmap_remove_dynamic_region); + + /* PCR-18: Measure the DLME image entry point. */ + dlme_img_ep = DL_ARGS_GET_DLME_ENTRY_POINT(a); + drtm_event_log_measure_and_record((uintptr_t)&dlme_img_ep, + sizeof(dlme_img_ep), + DRTM_EVENT_ARM_DLME_EP, NULL, + PCR_18); + CHECK_RC(rc, drtm_event_log_measure_and_record(DRTM_EVENT_ARM_DLME_EP)); + + /* PCR-18: End of DCE measurements. */ + rc = drtm_event_log_measure_and_record((uintptr_t)drtm_event_arm_sep_data, + strlen(drtm_event_arm_sep_data), + DRTM_EVENT_ARM_SEPARATOR, NULL, + PCR_18); + CHECK_RC(rc, + drtm_event_log_measure_and_record(DRTM_EVENT_ARM_SEPARATOR)); + /* + * If the DCE is unable to log a measurement because there is no available + * space in the event log region, the DCE must extend a hash of the value + * 0xFF (1 byte in size) into PCR[17] and PCR[18] and enter remediation. + */ + + return SUCCESS; +} + +void drtm_serialise_event_log(uint8_t *dst, size_t *event_log_size_out) +{ + *event_log_size_out = event_log_get_cur_size(drtm_event_log); + memcpy(dst, drtm_event_log, *event_log_size_out); +} diff --git a/services/std_svc/drtm/drtm_measurements.h b/services/std_svc/drtm/drtm_measurements.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6d7a84e --- /dev/null +++ b/services/std_svc/drtm/drtm_measurements.h @@ -0,0 +1,40 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2022 Arm Limited. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + * + */ +#ifndef DRTM_MEASUREMENTS_H +#define DRTM_MEASUREMENTS_H + +#include <stdint.h> + +#include "drtm_main.h" +#include <platform_def.h> + +#define DRTM_EVENT_ARM_BASE 0x9000U +#define DRTM_EVENT_TYPE(n) (DRTM_EVENT_ARM_BASE + (unsigned int)(n)) + +#define DRTM_EVENT_ARM_PCR_SCHEMA DRTM_EVENT_TYPE(1) +#define DRTM_EVENT_ARM_DCE DRTM_EVENT_TYPE(2) +#define DRTM_EVENT_ARM_DCE_PUBKEY DRTM_EVENT_TYPE(3) +#define DRTM_EVENT_ARM_DLME DRTM_EVENT_TYPE(4) +#define DRTM_EVENT_ARM_DLME_EP DRTM_EVENT_TYPE(5) +#define DRTM_EVENT_ARM_DEBUG_CONFIG DRTM_EVENT_TYPE(6) +#define DRTM_EVENT_ARM_NONSECURE_CONFIG DRTM_EVENT_TYPE(7) +#define DRTM_EVENT_ARM_DCE_SECONDARY DRTM_EVENT_TYPE(8) +#define DRTM_EVENT_ARM_TZFW DRTM_EVENT_TYPE(9) +#define DRTM_EVENT_ARM_SEPARATOR DRTM_EVENT_TYPE(10) + +#define CHECK_RC(rc, func_call) { \ + if (rc != 0) { \ + ERROR("%s(): " #func_call "failed unexpectedly rc=%d\n", \ + __func__, rc); \ + panic(); \ + } \ +} + +enum drtm_retc drtm_take_measurements(const struct_drtm_dl_args *a); +void drtm_serialise_event_log(uint8_t *dst, size_t *event_log_size_out); + +#endif /* DRTM_MEASUREMENTS_H */ diff --git a/services/std_svc/drtm/drtm_remediation.c b/services/std_svc/drtm/drtm_remediation.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..696b4ea --- /dev/null +++ b/services/std_svc/drtm/drtm_remediation.c @@ -0,0 +1,59 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2022 Arm Limited. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + * + * DRTM support for DRTM error remediation. + * + */ +#include <inttypes.h> +#include <stdint.h> + +#include <common/debug.h> +#include <common/runtime_svc.h> +#include "drtm_main.h" +#include <plat/common/platform.h> + +uint64_t drtm_set_error(uint64_t x1, void *ctx) +{ + int rc; + + rc = plat_set_drtm_error(x1); + + if (rc != 0) { + SMC_RET1(ctx, INTERNAL_ERROR); + } + + SMC_RET1(ctx, SUCCESS); +} + +uint64_t drtm_get_error(void *ctx) +{ + uint64_t error_code; + int rc; + + rc = plat_get_drtm_error(&error_code); + + if (rc != 0) { + SMC_RET1(ctx, INTERNAL_ERROR); + } + + SMC_RET2(ctx, SUCCESS, error_code); +} + +void drtm_enter_remediation(uint64_t err_code, const char *err_str) +{ + int rc = plat_set_drtm_error(err_code); + + if (rc != 0) { + ERROR("%s(): drtm_error_set() failed unexpectedly rc=%d\n", + __func__, rc); + panic(); + } + + ERROR("DRTM: entering remediation of error:\n%" PRIu64 "\t\'%s\'\n", + err_code, err_str); + + ERROR("%s(): system reset is not yet supported\n", __func__); + plat_system_reset(); +} diff --git a/services/std_svc/drtm/drtm_remediation.h b/services/std_svc/drtm/drtm_remediation.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8f965f1 --- /dev/null +++ b/services/std_svc/drtm/drtm_remediation.h @@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2022 Arm Limited. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + * + */ +#ifndef DRTM_REMEDIATION_H +#define DRTM_REMEDIATION_H + +uint64_t drtm_set_error(uint64_t x1, void *ctx); +uint64_t drtm_get_error(void *ctx); + +void drtm_enter_remediation(uint64_t error_code, const char *error_str); + +#endif /* DRTM_REMEDIATION_H */ diff --git a/services/std_svc/drtm/drtm_res_address_map.c b/services/std_svc/drtm/drtm_res_address_map.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8636706 --- /dev/null +++ b/services/std_svc/drtm/drtm_res_address_map.c @@ -0,0 +1,88 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2022 Arm Limited. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +#include <stdint.h> + +#include <plat/common/platform.h> +#include <services/drtm_svc.h> +#include <platform_def.h> + +/* Address map revision generated by this code. */ +#define DRTM_ADDRESS_MAP_REVISION U(0x0001) + +/* Amount of space needed for address map based on PLAT_DRTM_MMAP_ENTRIES */ +#define DRTM_ADDRESS_MAP_SIZE (sizeof(drtm_memory_region_descriptor_table_t) + \ + (sizeof(drtm_mem_region_t) * \ + PLAT_DRTM_MMAP_ENTRIES)) + +/* Allocate space for DRTM-formatted address map to be constructed. */ +static uint8_t drtm_address_map[DRTM_ADDRESS_MAP_SIZE]; + +static uint64_t drtm_address_map_size; + +drtm_memory_region_descriptor_table_t *drtm_build_address_map(void) +{ + /* Set up pointer to DRTM memory map. */ + drtm_memory_region_descriptor_table_t *map = + (drtm_memory_region_descriptor_table_t *)drtm_address_map; + + /* Get the platform memory map. */ + const mmap_region_t *mmap = plat_get_addr_mmap(); + unsigned int i; + + /* Set up header for address map structure. */ + map->revision = DRTM_ADDRESS_MAP_REVISION; + map->reserved = 0x0000; + + /* Iterate through mmap and generate DRTM address map. */ + for (i = 0U; mmap[i].base_pa != 0UL; i++) { + /* Set PA of region. */ + map->region[i].region_address = mmap[i].base_pa; + + /* Set size of region (in 4kb chunks). */ + map->region[i].region_size_type = 0; + ARM_DRTM_REGION_SIZE_TYPE_SET_4K_PAGE_NUM( + map->region[i].region_size_type, + mmap[i].size / PAGE_SIZE_4KB); + + /* Set type and cacheability. */ + switch (MT_TYPE(mmap[i].attr)) { + case MT_DEVICE: + ARM_DRTM_REGION_SIZE_TYPE_SET_REGION_TYPE( + map->region[i].region_size_type, + ARM_DRTM_REGION_SIZE_TYPE_REGION_TYPE_DEVICE); + break; + case MT_NON_CACHEABLE: + ARM_DRTM_REGION_SIZE_TYPE_SET_REGION_TYPE( + map->region[i].region_size_type, + ARM_DRTM_REGION_SIZE_TYPE_REGION_TYPE_NCAR); + ARM_DRTM_REGION_SIZE_TYPE_SET_CACHEABILITY( + map->region[i].region_size_type, + ARM_DRTM_REGION_SIZE_TYPE_CACHEABILITY_NC); + break; + case MT_MEMORY: + ARM_DRTM_REGION_SIZE_TYPE_SET_REGION_TYPE( + map->region[i].region_size_type, + ARM_DRTM_REGION_SIZE_TYPE_REGION_TYPE_NORMAL); + break; + default: + return NULL; + } + } + + map->num_regions = i; + + /* Store total size of address map. */ + drtm_address_map_size = sizeof(drtm_memory_region_descriptor_table_t); + drtm_address_map_size += (i * sizeof(drtm_mem_region_t)); + + return map; +} + +uint64_t drtm_get_address_map_size(void) +{ + return drtm_address_map_size; +} diff --git a/services/std_svc/errata_abi/cpu_errata_info.h b/services/std_svc/errata_abi/cpu_errata_info.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e24a621 --- /dev/null +++ b/services/std_svc/errata_abi/cpu_errata_info.h @@ -0,0 +1,73 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2023, Arm Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +#ifndef ERRATA_CPUSPEC_H +#define ERRATA_CPUSPEC_H + +#include <stdint.h> +#include <arch_helpers.h> + +#if __aarch64__ +#include <cortex_a35.h> +#include <cortex_a510.h> +#include <cortex_a53.h> +#include <cortex_a57.h> +#include <cortex_a55.h> +#include <cortex_a710.h> +#include <cortex_a72.h> +#include <cortex_a73.h> +#include <cortex_a75.h> +#include <cortex_a76.h> +#include <cortex_a77.h> +#include <cortex_a78.h> +#include <cortex_a78_ae.h> +#include <cortex_a78c.h> +#include <cortex_a715.h> +#include <cortex_x1.h> +#include <cortex_x2.h> +#include <cortex_x3.h> +#include <neoverse_n1.h> +#include <neoverse_n2.h> +#include <neoverse_v1.h> +#include <neoverse_v2.h> +#else +#include <cortex_a15.h> +#include <cortex_a17.h> +#include <cortex_a57.h> +#include <cortex_a9.h> +#endif + +#define MAX_ERRATA_ENTRIES 32 + +#define ERRATA_LIST_END (MAX_ERRATA_ENTRIES - 1) + +/* Default values for unused memory in the array */ +#define UNDEF_ERRATA {UINT_MAX, UCHAR_MAX, UCHAR_MAX, false, false} + +#define EXTRACT_PARTNUM(x) ((x >> MIDR_PN_SHIFT) & MIDR_PN_MASK) + +#define RXPX_RANGE(x, y, z) (((x >= y) && (x <= z)) ? true : false) + +/* + * CPU specific values for errata handling + */ +struct em_cpu{ + unsigned int em_errata_id; + unsigned char em_rxpx_lo; /* lowest revision of errata applicable for the cpu */ + unsigned char em_rxpx_hi; /* highest revision of errata applicable for the cpu */ + bool errata_enabled; /* indicate if errata enabled */ + /* flag to indicate if errata query is based out of non-arm interconnect */ + bool non_arm_interconnect; +}; + +struct em_cpu_list{ + /* field to hold cpu specific part number defined in midr reg */ + unsigned long cpu_partnumber; + struct em_cpu cpu_errata_list[MAX_ERRATA_ENTRIES]; +}; + +int32_t verify_errata_implemented(uint32_t errata_id, uint32_t forward_flag); +#endif /* ERRATA_CPUSPEC_H */ diff --git a/services/std_svc/errata_abi/errata_abi_main.c b/services/std_svc/errata_abi/errata_abi_main.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0b263e5 --- /dev/null +++ b/services/std_svc/errata_abi/errata_abi_main.c @@ -0,0 +1,603 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2023, Arm Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +#include <assert.h> +#include "cpu_errata_info.h" +#include <lib/smccc.h> +#include <lib/utils_def.h> +#include <services/errata_abi_svc.h> +#include <smccc_helpers.h> + +/* + * Global pointer that points to the specific + * structure based on the MIDR part number + */ +struct em_cpu_list *cpu_ptr; + +extern uint8_t cpu_get_rev_var(void); + +/* Structure array that holds CPU specific errata information */ +struct em_cpu_list cpu_list[] = { +#if CORTEX_A9_H_INC +{ + .cpu_partnumber = CORTEX_A9_MIDR, + .cpu_errata_list = { + [0] = {794073, 0x00, 0xFF, ERRATA_A9_794073}, + [1 ... ERRATA_LIST_END] = UNDEF_ERRATA, + } +}, +#endif /* CORTEX_A9_H_INC */ + +#if CORTEX_A15_H_INC +{ + .cpu_partnumber = CORTEX_A15_MIDR, + .cpu_errata_list = { + [0] = {816470, 0x30, 0xFF, ERRATA_A15_816470}, + [1] = {827671, 0x30, 0xFF, ERRATA_A15_827671}, + [2 ... ERRATA_LIST_END] = UNDEF_ERRATA, + } +}, +#endif /* CORTEX_A15_H_INC */ + +#if CORTEX_A17_H_INC +{ + .cpu_partnumber = CORTEX_A17_MIDR, + .cpu_errata_list = { + [0] = {852421, 0x00, 0x12, ERRATA_A17_852421}, + [1] = {852423, 0x00, 0x12, ERRATA_A17_852423}, + [2 ... ERRATA_LIST_END] = UNDEF_ERRATA, + } +}, +#endif /* CORTEX_A17_H_INC */ + +#if CORTEX_A35_H_INC +{ + .cpu_partnumber = CORTEX_A35_MIDR, + .cpu_errata_list = { + [0] = {855472, 0x00, 0x00, ERRATA_A35_855472}, + [1 ... ERRATA_LIST_END] = UNDEF_ERRATA, + } +}, +#endif /* CORTEX_A35_H_INC */ + +#if CORTEX_A53_H_INC +{ + .cpu_partnumber = CORTEX_A53_MIDR, + .cpu_errata_list = { + [0] = {819472, 0x00, 0x01, ERRATA_A53_819472}, + [1] = {824069, 0x00, 0x02, ERRATA_A53_824069}, + [2] = {826319, 0x00, 0x02, ERRATA_A53_826319}, + [3] = {827319, 0x00, 0x02, ERRATA_A53_827319}, + [4] = {835769, 0x00, 0x04, ERRATA_A53_835769}, + [5] = {836870, 0x00, 0x03, ERRATA_A53_836870}, + [6] = {843419, 0x00, 0x04, ERRATA_A53_843419}, + [7] = {855873, 0x03, 0xFF, ERRATA_A53_855873}, + [8] = {1530924, 0x00, 0xFF, ERRATA_A53_1530924}, + [9 ... ERRATA_LIST_END] = UNDEF_ERRATA, + } +}, +#endif /* CORTEX_A53_H_INC */ + +#if CORTEX_A55_H_INC +{ + .cpu_partnumber = CORTEX_A55_MIDR, + .cpu_errata_list = { + [0] = {768277, 0x00, 0x00, ERRATA_A55_768277}, + [1] = {778703, 0x00, 0x00, ERRATA_A55_778703}, + [2] = {798797, 0x00, 0x00, ERRATA_A55_798797}, + [3] = {846532, 0x00, 0x01, ERRATA_A55_846532}, + [4] = {903758, 0x00, 0x01, ERRATA_A55_903758}, + [5] = {1221012, 0x00, 0x10, ERRATA_A55_1221012}, + [6] = {1530923, 0x00, 0xFF, ERRATA_A55_1530923}, + [7 ... ERRATA_LIST_END] = UNDEF_ERRATA, + } +}, +#endif /* CORTEX_A55_H_INC */ + +#if CORTEX_A57_H_INC +{ + .cpu_partnumber = CORTEX_A57_MIDR, + .cpu_errata_list = { + [0] = {806969, 0x00, 0x00, ERRATA_A57_806969}, + [1] = {813419, 0x00, 0x00, ERRATA_A57_813419}, + [2] = {813420, 0x00, 0x00, ERRATA_A57_813420}, + [3] = {814670, 0x00, 0x00, ERRATA_A57_814670}, + [4] = {817169, 0x00, 0x01, ERRATA_A57_817169}, + [5] = {826974, 0x00, 0x11, ERRATA_A57_826974}, + [6] = {826977, 0x00, 0x11, ERRATA_A57_826977}, + [7] = {828024, 0x00, 0x11, ERRATA_A57_828024}, + [8] = {829520, 0x00, 0x12, ERRATA_A57_829520}, + [9] = {833471, 0x00, 0x12, ERRATA_A57_833471}, + [10] = {859972, 0x00, 0x13, ERRATA_A57_859972}, + [11] = {1319537, 0x00, 0xFF, ERRATA_A57_1319537}, + [12 ... ERRATA_LIST_END] = UNDEF_ERRATA, + } +}, +#endif /* CORTEX_A57_H_INC */ + +#if CORTEX_A72_H_INC +{ + .cpu_partnumber = CORTEX_A72_MIDR, + .cpu_errata_list = { + [0] = {859971, 0x00, 0x03, ERRATA_A72_859971}, + [1] = {1319367, 0x00, 0xFF, ERRATA_A72_1319367}, + [2 ... ERRATA_LIST_END] = UNDEF_ERRATA, + } +}, +#endif /* CORTEX_A72_H_INC */ + +#if CORTEX_A73_H_INC +{ + .cpu_partnumber = CORTEX_A73_MIDR, + .cpu_errata_list = { + [0] = {852427, 0x00, 0x00, ERRATA_A73_852427}, + [1] = {855423, 0x00, 0x01, ERRATA_A73_855423}, + [2 ... ERRATA_LIST_END] = UNDEF_ERRATA, + } +}, +#endif /* CORTEX_A73_H_INC */ + +#if CORTEX_A75_H_INC +{ + .cpu_partnumber = CORTEX_A75_MIDR, + .cpu_errata_list = { + [0] = {764081, 0x00, 0x00, ERRATA_A75_764081}, + [1] = {790748, 0x00, 0x00, ERRATA_A75_790748}, + [2 ... ERRATA_LIST_END] = UNDEF_ERRATA, + } +}, +#endif /* CORTEX_A75_H_INC */ + +#if CORTEX_A76_H_INC +{ + .cpu_partnumber = CORTEX_A76_MIDR, + .cpu_errata_list = { + [0] = {1073348, 0x00, 0x10, ERRATA_A76_1073348}, + [1] = {1130799, 0x00, 0x20, ERRATA_A76_1130799}, + [2] = {1165522, 0x00, 0xFF, ERRATA_A76_1165522}, + [3] = {1220197, 0x00, 0x20, ERRATA_A76_1220197}, + [4] = {1257314, 0x00, 0x30, ERRATA_A76_1257314}, + [5] = {1262606, 0x00, 0x30, ERRATA_A76_1262606}, + [6] = {1262888, 0x00, 0x30, ERRATA_A76_1262888}, + [7] = {1275112, 0x00, 0x30, ERRATA_A76_1275112}, + [8] = {1286807, 0x00, 0x30, ERRATA_A76_1286807}, + [9] = {1791580, 0x00, 0x40, ERRATA_A76_1791580}, + [10] = {1868343, 0x00, 0x40, ERRATA_A76_1868343}, + [11] = {1946160, 0x30, 0x41, ERRATA_A76_1946160}, + [12] = {2743102, 0x00, 0x41, ERRATA_A76_2743102}, + [13 ... ERRATA_LIST_END] = UNDEF_ERRATA, + } +}, +#endif /* CORTEX_A76_H_INC */ + +#if CORTEX_A77_H_INC +{ + .cpu_partnumber = CORTEX_A77_MIDR, + .cpu_errata_list = { + [0] = {1508412, 0x00, 0x10, ERRATA_A77_1508412}, + [1] = {1791578, 0x00, 0x11, ERRATA_A77_1791578}, + [2] = {1800714, 0x00, 0x11, ERRATA_A77_1800714}, + [3] = {1925769, 0x00, 0x11, ERRATA_A77_1925769}, + [4] = {1946167, 0x00, 0x11, ERRATA_A77_1946167}, + [5] = {2356587, 0x00, 0x11, ERRATA_A77_2356587}, + [6] = {2743100, 0x00, 0x11, ERRATA_A77_2743100}, + [7 ... ERRATA_LIST_END] = UNDEF_ERRATA, + } +}, +#endif /* CORTEX_A77_H_INC */ + +#if CORTEX_A78_H_INC +{ + .cpu_partnumber = CORTEX_A78_MIDR, + .cpu_errata_list = { + [0] = {1688305, 0x00, 0x10, ERRATA_A78_1688305}, + [1] = {1821534, 0x00, 0x10, ERRATA_A78_1821534}, + [2] = {1941498, 0x00, 0x11, ERRATA_A78_1941498}, + [3] = {1951500, 0x10, 0x11, ERRATA_A78_1951500}, + [4] = {1952683, 0x00, 0x00, ERRATA_A78_1952683}, + [5] = {2132060, 0x00, 0x12, ERRATA_A78_2132060}, + [6] = {2242635, 0x10, 0x12, ERRATA_A78_2242635}, + [7] = {2376745, 0x00, 0x12, ERRATA_A78_2376745}, + [8] = {2395406, 0x00, 0x12, ERRATA_A78_2395406}, + [9] = {2712571, 0x00, 0x12, ERRATA_A78_2712571, \ + ERRATA_NON_ARM_INTERCONNECT}, + [10] = {2742426, 0x00, 0x12, ERRATA_A78_2742426}, + [11] = {2772019, 0x00, 0x12, ERRATA_A78_2772019}, + [12] = {2779479, 0x00, 0x12, ERRATA_A78_2779479}, + [13 ... ERRATA_LIST_END] = UNDEF_ERRATA, + } +}, +#endif /* CORTEX_A78_H_INC */ + +#if CORTEX_A78_AE_H_INC +{ + .cpu_partnumber = CORTEX_A78_AE_MIDR, + .cpu_errata_list = { + [0] = {1941500, 0x00, 0x01, ERRATA_A78_AE_1941500}, + [1] = {1951502, 0x00, 0x01, ERRATA_A78_AE_1951502}, + [2] = {2376748, 0x00, 0x02, ERRATA_A78_AE_2376748}, + [3] = {2395408, 0x00, 0x01, ERRATA_A78_AE_2395408}, + [4] = {2712574, 0x00, 0x02, ERRATA_A78_AE_2712574, \ + ERRATA_NON_ARM_INTERCONNECT}, + [5 ... ERRATA_LIST_END] = UNDEF_ERRATA, + } +}, +#endif /* CORTEX_A78_AE_H_INC */ + +#if CORTEX_A78C_H_INC +{ + .cpu_partnumber = CORTEX_A78C_MIDR, + .cpu_errata_list = { + [0] = {1827430, 0x00, 0x00, ERRATA_A78C_1827430}, + [1] = {1827440, 0x00, 0x00, ERRATA_A78C_1827440}, + [2] = {2132064, 0x01, 0x02, ERRATA_A78C_2132064}, + [3] = {2242638, 0x01, 0x02, ERRATA_A78C_2242638}, + [4] = {2376749, 0x01, 0x02, ERRATA_A78C_2376749}, + [5] = {2395411, 0x01, 0x02, ERRATA_A78C_2395411}, + [6] = {2712575, 0x01, 0x02, ERRATA_A78C_2712575, \ + ERRATA_NON_ARM_INTERCONNECT}, + [7] = {2772121, 0x00, 0x02, ERRATA_A78C_2772121}, + [8] = {2779484, 0x01, 0x02, ERRATA_A78C_2779484}, + [9 ... ERRATA_LIST_END] = UNDEF_ERRATA, + } +}, +#endif /* CORTEX_A78C_H_INC */ + +#if CORTEX_X1_H_INC +{ + .cpu_partnumber = CORTEX_X1_MIDR, + .cpu_errata_list = { + [0] = {1688305, 0x00, 0x10, ERRATA_X1_1688305}, + [1] = {1821534, 0x00, 0x10, ERRATA_X1_1821534}, + [2] = {1827429, 0x00, 0x10, ERRATA_X1_1827429}, + [3 ... ERRATA_LIST_END] = UNDEF_ERRATA, + } +}, +#endif /* CORTEX_X1_H_INC */ + +#if NEOVERSE_N1_H_INC +{ + .cpu_partnumber = NEOVERSE_N1_MIDR, + .cpu_errata_list = { + [0] = {1043202, 0x00, 0x10, ERRATA_N1_1043202}, + [1] = {1073348, 0x00, 0x10, ERRATA_N1_1073348}, + [2] = {1130799, 0x00, 0x20, ERRATA_N1_1130799}, + [3] = {1165347, 0x00, 0x20, ERRATA_N1_1165347}, + [4] = {1207823, 0x00, 0x20, ERRATA_N1_1207823}, + [5] = {1220197, 0x00, 0x20, ERRATA_N1_1220197}, + [6] = {1257314, 0x00, 0x30, ERRATA_N1_1257314}, + [7] = {1262606, 0x00, 0x30, ERRATA_N1_1262606}, + [8] = {1262888, 0x00, 0x30, ERRATA_N1_1262888}, + [9] = {1275112, 0x00, 0x30, ERRATA_N1_1275112}, + [10] = {1315703, 0x00, 0x30, ERRATA_N1_1315703}, + [11] = {1542419, 0x30, 0x40, ERRATA_N1_1542419}, + [12] = {1868343, 0x00, 0x40, ERRATA_N1_1868343}, + [13] = {1946160, 0x30, 0x41, ERRATA_N1_1946160}, + [14] = {2743102, 0x00, 0x41, ERRATA_N1_2743102}, + [15 ... ERRATA_LIST_END] = UNDEF_ERRATA, + } +}, +#endif /* NEOVERSE_N1_H_INC */ + +#if NEOVERSE_V1_H_INC +{ + .cpu_partnumber = NEOVERSE_V1_MIDR, + .cpu_errata_list = { + [0] = {1618635, 0x00, 0x00, ERRATA_V1_1618635}, + [1] = {1774420, 0x00, 0x10, ERRATA_V1_1774420}, + [2] = {1791573, 0x00, 0x10, ERRATA_V1_1791573}, + [3] = {1852267, 0x00, 0x10, ERRATA_V1_1852267}, + [4] = {1925756, 0x00, 0x11, ERRATA_V1_1925756}, + [5] = {1940577, 0x10, 0x11, ERRATA_V1_1940577}, + [6] = {1966096, 0x10, 0x11, ERRATA_V1_1966096}, + [7] = {2108267, 0x00, 0x12, ERRATA_V1_2108267}, + [8] = {2139242, 0x00, 0x11, ERRATA_V1_2139242}, + [9] = {2216392, 0x10, 0x11, ERRATA_V1_2216392}, + [10] = {2294912, 0x00, 0x12, ERRATA_V1_2294912}, + [11] = {2372203, 0x00, 0x11, ERRATA_V1_2372203}, + [12] = {2701953, 0x00, 0x11, ERRATA_V1_2701953, \ + ERRATA_NON_ARM_INTERCONNECT}, + [13] = {2743093, 0x00, 0x12, ERRATA_V1_2743093}, + [14] = {2743233, 0x00, 0x12, ERRATA_V1_2743233}, + [15] = {2779461, 0x00, 0x12, ERRATA_V1_2779461}, + [16 ... ERRATA_LIST_END] = UNDEF_ERRATA, + } +}, +#endif /* NEOVERSE_V1_H_INC */ + +#if CORTEX_A710_H_INC +{ + .cpu_partnumber = CORTEX_A710_MIDR, + .cpu_errata_list = { + [0] = {1987031, 0x00, 0x20, ERRATA_A710_1987031}, + [1] = {2008768, 0x00, 0x20, ERRATA_A710_2008768}, + [2] = {2017096, 0x00, 0x20, ERRATA_A710_2017096}, + [3] = {2055002, 0x10, 0x20, ERRATA_A710_2055002}, + [4] = {2058056, 0x00, 0x21, ERRATA_A710_2058056}, + [5] = {2081180, 0x00, 0x20, ERRATA_A710_2081180}, + [6] = {2083908, 0x20, 0x20, ERRATA_A710_2083908}, + [7] = {2136059, 0x00, 0x20, ERRATA_A710_2136059}, + [8] = {2147715, 0x20, 0x20, ERRATA_A710_2147715}, + [9] = {2216384, 0x00, 0x20, ERRATA_A710_2216384}, + [10] = {2267065, 0x00, 0x20, ERRATA_A710_2267065}, + [11] = {2282622, 0x00, 0x21, ERRATA_A710_2282622}, + [12] = {2291219, 0x00, 0x20, ERRATA_A710_2291219}, + [13] = {2371105, 0x00, 0x20, ERRATA_A710_2371105}, + [14] = {2701952, 0x00, 0x21, ERRATA_A710_2701952, \ + ERRATA_NON_ARM_INTERCONNECT}, + [15] = {2742423, 0x00, 0x21, ERRATA_A710_2742423}, + [16] = {2768515, 0x00, 0x21, ERRATA_A710_2768515}, + [17 ... ERRATA_LIST_END] = UNDEF_ERRATA, + } +}, +#endif /* CORTEX_A710_H_INC */ + +#if NEOVERSE_N2_H_INC +{ + .cpu_partnumber = NEOVERSE_N2_MIDR, + .cpu_errata_list = { + [0] = {2002655, 0x00, 0x00, ERRATA_N2_2002655}, + [1] = {2009478, 0x00, 0x00, ERRATA_N2_2009478}, + [2] = {2025414, 0x00, 0x00, ERRATA_N2_2025414}, + [3] = {2067956, 0x00, 0x00, ERRATA_N2_2067956}, + [4] = {2138953, 0x00, 0x03, ERRATA_N2_2138953}, + [5] = {2138956, 0x00, 0x00, ERRATA_N2_2138956}, + [6] = {2138958, 0x00, 0x00, ERRATA_N2_2138958}, + [7] = {2189731, 0x00, 0x00, ERRATA_N2_2189731}, + [8] = {2242400, 0x00, 0x00, ERRATA_N2_2242400}, + [9] = {2242415, 0x00, 0x00, ERRATA_N2_2242415}, + [10] = {2280757, 0x00, 0x00, ERRATA_N2_2280757}, + [11] = {2326639, 0x00, 0x00, ERRATA_N2_2326639}, + [12] = {2340933, 0x00, 0x00, ERRATA_N2_2340933}, + [13] = {2346952, 0x00, 0x02, ERRATA_N2_2346952}, + [14] = {2376738, 0x00, 0x00, ERRATA_N2_2376738}, + [15] = {2388450, 0x00, 0x00, ERRATA_N2_2388450}, + [16] = {2728475, 0x00, 0x02, ERRATA_N2_2728475, \ + ERRATA_NON_ARM_INTERCONNECT}, + [17] = {2743014, 0x00, 0x02, ERRATA_N2_2743014}, + [18] = {2743089, 0x00, 0x02, ERRATA_N2_2743089}, + [19] = {2779511, 0x00, 0x02, ERRATA_N2_2779511}, + [20 ... ERRATA_LIST_END] = UNDEF_ERRATA, + } +}, +#endif /* NEOVERSE_N2_H_INC */ + +#if CORTEX_X2_H_INC +{ + .cpu_partnumber = CORTEX_X2_MIDR, + .cpu_errata_list = { + [0] = {2002765, 0x00, 0x20, ERRATA_X2_2002765}, + [1] = {2017096, 0x00, 0x20, ERRATA_X2_2017096}, + [2] = {2058056, 0x00, 0x21, ERRATA_X2_2058056}, + [3] = {2081180, 0x00, 0x20, ERRATA_X2_2081180}, + [4] = {2083908, 0x20, 0x20, ERRATA_X2_2083908}, + [5] = {2147715, 0x20, 0x20, ERRATA_X2_2147715}, + [6] = {2216384, 0x00, 0x20, ERRATA_X2_2216384}, + [7] = {2282622, 0x00, 0x21, ERRATA_X2_2282622}, + [8] = {2371105, 0x00, 0x20, ERRATA_X2_2371105}, + [9] = {2701952, 0x00, 0x21, ERRATA_X2_2701952, \ + ERRATA_NON_ARM_INTERCONNECT}, + [10] = {2742423, 0x00, 0x21, ERRATA_X2_2742423}, + [11] = {2768515, 0x00, 0x21, ERRATA_X2_2768515}, + [12 ... ERRATA_LIST_END] = UNDEF_ERRATA, + } +}, +#endif /* CORTEX_X2_H_INC */ + +#if CORTEX_A510_H_INC +{ + .cpu_partnumber = CORTEX_A510_MIDR, + .cpu_errata_list = { + [0] = {1922240, 0x00, 0x00, ERRATA_A510_1922240}, + [1] = {2041909, 0x02, 0x02, ERRATA_A510_2041909}, + [2] = {2042739, 0x00, 0x02, ERRATA_A510_2042739}, + [3] = {2080326, 0x02, 0x02, ERRATA_A510_2080326}, + [4] = {2172148, 0x00, 0x10, ERRATA_A510_2172148}, + [5] = {2218950, 0x00, 0x10, ERRATA_A510_2218950}, + [6] = {2250311, 0x00, 0x10, ERRATA_A510_2250311}, + [7] = {2288014, 0x00, 0x10, ERRATA_A510_2288014}, + [8] = {2347730, 0x00, 0x11, ERRATA_A510_2347730}, + [9] = {2371937, 0x00, 0x11, ERRATA_A510_2371937}, + [10] = {2666669, 0x00, 0x11, ERRATA_A510_2666669}, + [11] = {2684597, 0x00, 0x12, ERRATA_A510_2684597}, + [12 ... ERRATA_LIST_END] = UNDEF_ERRATA, + } +}, +#endif /* CORTEX_A510_H_INC */ + +#if NEOVERSE_V2_H_INC +{ + .cpu_partnumber = NEOVERSE_V2_MIDR, + .cpu_errata_list = { + [0] = {2331132, 0x00, 0x02, ERRATA_V2_2331132}, + [1] = {2719103, 0x00, 0x01, ERRATA_V2_2719103, \ + ERRATA_NON_ARM_INTERCONNECT}, + [2] = {2719105, 0x00, 0x01, ERRATA_V2_2719105}, + [3] = {2743011, 0x00, 0x01, ERRATA_V2_2743011}, + [4] = {2779510, 0x00, 0x01, ERRATA_V2_2779510}, + [5] = {2801372, 0x00, 0x01, ERRATA_V2_2801372}, + [6 ... ERRATA_LIST_END] = UNDEF_ERRATA, + } +}, +#endif /* NEOVERSE_V2_H_INC */ + +#if CORTEX_A715_H_INC +{ + .cpu_partnumber = CORTEX_A715_MIDR, + .cpu_errata_list = { + [0] = {2701951, 0x00, 0x11, ERRATA_A715_2701951, \ + ERRATA_NON_ARM_INTERCONNECT}, + [1 ... ERRATA_LIST_END] = UNDEF_ERRATA, + } +}, +#endif /* CORTEX_A715_H_INC */ + +#if CORTEX_X3_H_INC +{ + .cpu_partnumber = CORTEX_X3_MIDR, + .cpu_errata_list = { + [0] = {2070301, 0x00, 0x12, ERRATA_X3_2070301}, + [1] = {2313909, 0x00, 0x10, ERRATA_X3_2313909}, + [2] = {2615812, 0x00, 0x11, ERRATA_X3_2615812}, + [3] = {2742421, 0x00, 0x11, ERRATA_X3_2742421}, + [4 ... ERRATA_LIST_END] = UNDEF_ERRATA, + } +}, +#endif /* CORTEX_X3_H_INC */ +}; + +/* + * Function to do binary search and check for the specific errata ID + * in the array of structures specific to the cpu identified. + */ +int32_t binary_search(struct em_cpu_list *ptr, uint32_t erratum_id, uint8_t rxpx_val) +{ + int low_index = 0U, mid_index = 0U; + + int high_index = MAX_ERRATA_ENTRIES - 1; + + assert(ptr != NULL); + + /* + * Pointer to the errata list of the cpu that matches + * extracted partnumber in the cpu list + */ + struct em_cpu *erratum_ptr = NULL; + + while (low_index <= high_index) { + mid_index = (low_index + high_index) / 2; + + erratum_ptr = &ptr->cpu_errata_list[mid_index]; + assert(erratum_ptr != NULL); + + if (erratum_id < erratum_ptr->em_errata_id) { + high_index = mid_index - 1; + } else if (erratum_id > erratum_ptr->em_errata_id) { + low_index = mid_index + 1; + } else if (erratum_id == erratum_ptr->em_errata_id) { + if (RXPX_RANGE(rxpx_val, erratum_ptr->em_rxpx_lo, \ + erratum_ptr->em_rxpx_hi)) { + if ((erratum_ptr->errata_enabled) && \ + (!(erratum_ptr->non_arm_interconnect))) { + return EM_HIGHER_EL_MITIGATION; + } + return EM_AFFECTED; + } + return EM_NOT_AFFECTED; + } + } + /* no matching errata ID */ + return EM_UNKNOWN_ERRATUM; +} + +/* Function to check if the errata exists for the specific CPU and rxpx */ +int32_t verify_errata_implemented(uint32_t errata_id, uint32_t forward_flag) +{ + /* + * Read MIDR value and extract the revision, variant and partnumber + */ + static uint32_t midr_val, cpu_partnum; + static uint8_t cpu_rxpx_val; + int32_t ret_val = EM_UNKNOWN_ERRATUM; + + /* Determine the number of cpu listed in the cpu list */ + uint8_t size_cpulist = ARRAY_SIZE(cpu_list); + + /* Read the midr reg to extract cpu, revision and variant info */ + midr_val = read_midr(); + + /* Extract revision and variant from the MIDR register */ + cpu_rxpx_val = cpu_get_rev_var(); + + /* Extract the cpu partnumber and check if the cpu is in the cpu list */ + cpu_partnum = EXTRACT_PARTNUM(midr_val); + + for (uint8_t i = 0; i < size_cpulist; i++) { + cpu_ptr = &cpu_list[i]; + uint16_t partnum_extracted = EXTRACT_PARTNUM(cpu_ptr->cpu_partnumber); + + if (partnum_extracted == cpu_partnum) { + /* + * If the midr value is in the cpu list, binary search + * for the errata ID and specific revision in the list. + */ + ret_val = binary_search(cpu_ptr, errata_id, cpu_rxpx_val); + break; + } + } + return ret_val; +} + +/* Predicate indicating that a function id is part of EM_ABI */ +bool is_errata_fid(uint32_t smc_fid) +{ + return ((smc_fid == ARM_EM_VERSION) || + (smc_fid == ARM_EM_FEATURES) || + (smc_fid == ARM_EM_CPU_ERRATUM_FEATURES)); + +} + +bool validate_spsr_mode(void) +{ + /* In AArch64, if the caller is EL1, return true */ + + #if __aarch64__ + if (GET_EL(read_spsr_el3()) == MODE_EL1) { + return true; + } + return false; + #else + + /* In AArch32, if in system/svc mode, return true */ + uint8_t read_el_state = GET_M32(read_spsr()); + + if ((read_el_state == (MODE32_svc)) || (read_el_state == MODE32_sys)) { + return true; + } + return false; + #endif /* __aarch64__ */ +} + +uintptr_t errata_abi_smc_handler(uint32_t smc_fid, u_register_t x1, + u_register_t x2, u_register_t x3, u_register_t x4, + void *cookie, void *handle, u_register_t flags) +{ + int32_t ret_id = EM_UNKNOWN_ERRATUM; + + switch (smc_fid) { + case ARM_EM_VERSION: + SMC_RET1(handle, MAKE_SMCCC_VERSION( + EM_VERSION_MAJOR, EM_VERSION_MINOR + )); + break; /* unreachable */ + case ARM_EM_FEATURES: + if (is_errata_fid((uint32_t)x1)) { + SMC_RET1(handle, EM_SUCCESS); + } + + SMC_RET1(handle, EM_NOT_SUPPORTED); + break; /* unreachable */ + case ARM_EM_CPU_ERRATUM_FEATURES: + + /* + * If the forward flag is greater than zero and the calling EL + * is EL1 in AArch64 or in system mode or svc mode in case of AArch32, + * return Invalid Parameters. + */ + if (((uint32_t)x2 != 0) && (validate_spsr_mode())) { + SMC_RET1(handle, EM_INVALID_PARAMETERS); + } + ret_id = verify_errata_implemented((uint32_t)x1, (uint32_t)x2); + SMC_RET1(handle, ret_id); + break; /* unreachable */ + default: + { + WARN("Unimplemented Errata ABI Service Call: 0x%x\n", smc_fid); + SMC_RET1(handle, EM_UNKNOWN_ERRATUM); + break; /* unreachable */ + } + } +} diff --git a/services/std_svc/pci_svc.c b/services/std_svc/pci_svc.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a02b8a7 --- /dev/null +++ b/services/std_svc/pci_svc.c @@ -0,0 +1,113 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2021, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +#include <assert.h> +#include <stdint.h> + +#include <common/debug.h> +#include <common/runtime_svc.h> +#include <services/pci_svc.h> +#include <services/std_svc.h> +#include <smccc_helpers.h> + +static uint64_t validate_rw_addr_sz(uint32_t addr, uint64_t off, uint64_t sz) +{ + uint32_t nseg; + uint32_t ret; + uint32_t start_end_bus; + + ret = pci_get_bus_for_seg(PCI_ADDR_SEG(addr), &start_end_bus, &nseg); + + if (ret != SMC_PCI_CALL_SUCCESS) { + return SMC_PCI_CALL_INVAL_PARAM; + } + switch (sz) { + case SMC_PCI_SZ_8BIT: + case SMC_PCI_SZ_16BIT: + case SMC_PCI_SZ_32BIT: + break; + default: + return SMC_PCI_CALL_INVAL_PARAM; + } + if ((off + sz) > (PCI_OFFSET_MASK + 1U)) { + return SMC_PCI_CALL_INVAL_PARAM; + } + return SMC_PCI_CALL_SUCCESS; +} + +uint64_t pci_smc_handler(uint32_t smc_fid, + u_register_t x1, + u_register_t x2, + u_register_t x3, + u_register_t x4, + void *cookie, + void *handle, + u_register_t flags) +{ + switch (smc_fid) { + case SMC_PCI_VERSION: { + pcie_version ver; + + ver.major = 1U; + ver.minor = 0U; + SMC_RET4(handle, ver.val, 0U, 0U, 0U); + } + case SMC_PCI_FEATURES: + switch (x1) { + case SMC_PCI_VERSION: + case SMC_PCI_FEATURES: + case SMC_PCI_READ: + case SMC_PCI_WRITE: + case SMC_PCI_SEG_INFO: + SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_PCI_CALL_SUCCESS); + default: + SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_PCI_CALL_NOT_SUPPORTED); + } + break; + case SMC_PCI_READ: { + uint32_t ret; + + if (validate_rw_addr_sz(x1, x2, x3) != SMC_PCI_CALL_SUCCESS) { + SMC_RET2(handle, SMC_PCI_CALL_INVAL_PARAM, 0U); + } + if (x4 != 0U) { + SMC_RET2(handle, SMC_PCI_CALL_INVAL_PARAM, 0U); + } + if (pci_read_config(x1, x2, x3, &ret) != 0U) { + SMC_RET2(handle, SMC_PCI_CALL_INVAL_PARAM, 0U); + } else { + SMC_RET2(handle, SMC_PCI_CALL_SUCCESS, ret); + } + break; + } + case SMC_PCI_WRITE: { + uint32_t ret; + + if (validate_rw_addr_sz(x1, x2, x3) != SMC_PCI_CALL_SUCCESS) { + SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_PCI_CALL_INVAL_PARAM); + } + ret = pci_write_config(x1, x2, x3, x4); + SMC_RET1(handle, ret); + break; + } + case SMC_PCI_SEG_INFO: { + uint32_t nseg; + uint32_t ret; + uint32_t start_end_bus; + + if ((x2 != 0U) || (x3 != 0U) || (x4 != 0U)) { + SMC_RET3(handle, SMC_PCI_CALL_INVAL_PARAM, 0U, 0U); + } + ret = pci_get_bus_for_seg(x1, &start_end_bus, &nseg); + SMC_RET3(handle, ret, start_end_bus, nseg); + break; + } + default: + /* should be unreachable */ + WARN("Unimplemented PCI Service Call: 0x%x\n", smc_fid); + SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_PCI_CALL_NOT_SUPPORTED); + } +} diff --git a/services/std_svc/rmmd/aarch64/rmmd_helpers.S b/services/std_svc/rmmd/aarch64/rmmd_helpers.S new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6229baf --- /dev/null +++ b/services/std_svc/rmmd/aarch64/rmmd_helpers.S @@ -0,0 +1,73 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2021, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +#include "../rmmd_private.h" +#include <asm_macros.S> + + .global rmmd_rmm_enter + .global rmmd_rmm_exit + + /* --------------------------------------------------------------------- + * This function is called with SP_EL0 as stack. Here we stash our EL3 + * callee-saved registers on to the stack as a part of saving the C + * runtime and enter the secure payload. + * 'x0' contains a pointer to the memory where the address of the C + * runtime context is to be saved. + * --------------------------------------------------------------------- + */ +func rmmd_rmm_enter + /* Make space for the registers that we're going to save */ + mov x3, sp + str x3, [x0, #0] + sub sp, sp, #RMMD_C_RT_CTX_SIZE + + /* Save callee-saved registers on to the stack */ + stp x19, x20, [sp, #RMMD_C_RT_CTX_X19] + stp x21, x22, [sp, #RMMD_C_RT_CTX_X21] + stp x23, x24, [sp, #RMMD_C_RT_CTX_X23] + stp x25, x26, [sp, #RMMD_C_RT_CTX_X25] + stp x27, x28, [sp, #RMMD_C_RT_CTX_X27] + stp x29, x30, [sp, #RMMD_C_RT_CTX_X29] + + /* --------------------------------------------------------------------- + * Everything is setup now. el3_exit() will use the secure context to + * restore to the general purpose and EL3 system registers to ERET + * into the secure payload. + * --------------------------------------------------------------------- + */ + b el3_exit +endfunc rmmd_rmm_enter + + /* --------------------------------------------------------------------- + * This function is called with 'x0' pointing to a C runtime context. + * It restores the saved registers and jumps to that runtime with 'x0' + * as the new SP register. This destroys the C runtime context that had + * been built on the stack below the saved context by the caller. Later + * the second parameter 'x1' is passed as a return value to the caller. + * --------------------------------------------------------------------- + */ +func rmmd_rmm_exit + /* Restore the previous stack */ + mov sp, x0 + + /* Restore callee-saved registers on to the stack */ + ldp x19, x20, [x0, #(RMMD_C_RT_CTX_X19 - RMMD_C_RT_CTX_SIZE)] + ldp x21, x22, [x0, #(RMMD_C_RT_CTX_X21 - RMMD_C_RT_CTX_SIZE)] + ldp x23, x24, [x0, #(RMMD_C_RT_CTX_X23 - RMMD_C_RT_CTX_SIZE)] + ldp x25, x26, [x0, #(RMMD_C_RT_CTX_X25 - RMMD_C_RT_CTX_SIZE)] + ldp x27, x28, [x0, #(RMMD_C_RT_CTX_X27 - RMMD_C_RT_CTX_SIZE)] + ldp x29, x30, [x0, #(RMMD_C_RT_CTX_X29 - RMMD_C_RT_CTX_SIZE)] + + /* --------------------------------------------------------------------- + * This should take us back to the instruction after the call to the + * last rmmd_rmm_enter().* Place the second parameter to x0 + * so that the caller will see it as a return value from the original + * entry call. + * --------------------------------------------------------------------- + */ + mov x0, x1 + ret +endfunc rmmd_rmm_exit diff --git a/services/std_svc/rmmd/rmmd.mk b/services/std_svc/rmmd/rmmd.mk new file mode 100644 index 0000000..bcf54e1 --- /dev/null +++ b/services/std_svc/rmmd/rmmd.mk @@ -0,0 +1,19 @@ +# +# Copyright (c) 2021-2022, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. +# +# SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause +# + +ifneq (${ARCH},aarch64) + $(error "Error: RMMD is only supported on aarch64.") +endif + +include services/std_svc/rmmd/trp/trp.mk + +RMMD_SOURCES += $(addprefix services/std_svc/rmmd/, \ + ${ARCH}/rmmd_helpers.S \ + rmmd_main.c \ + rmmd_attest.c) + +# Let the top-level Makefile know that we intend to include RMM image +NEED_RMM := yes diff --git a/services/std_svc/rmmd/rmmd_attest.c b/services/std_svc/rmmd/rmmd_attest.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..25adf50 --- /dev/null +++ b/services/std_svc/rmmd/rmmd_attest.c @@ -0,0 +1,153 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2022, Arm Limited. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ +#include <stdint.h> +#include <string.h> + +#include <common/debug.h> +#include <lib/spinlock.h> +#include <lib/xlat_tables/xlat_tables_v2.h> +#include <plat/common/platform.h> +#include "rmmd_private.h" +#include <services/rmmd_svc.h> + +static spinlock_t lock; + +/* For printing Realm attestation token hash */ +#define DIGITS_PER_BYTE 2UL +#define LENGTH_OF_TERMINATING_ZERO_IN_BYTES 1UL +#define BYTES_PER_LINE_BASE 4UL + +static void print_challenge(uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_size) +{ + size_t leftover; + /* + * bytes_per_line is always a power of two, so it can be used to + * construct mask with it when it is necessary to count remainder. + * + */ + const size_t bytes_per_line = 1 << BYTES_PER_LINE_BASE; + char hash_text[(1 << BYTES_PER_LINE_BASE) * DIGITS_PER_BYTE + + LENGTH_OF_TERMINATING_ZERO_IN_BYTES]; + const char hex_chars[] = {'0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', + '8', '9', 'a', 'b', 'c', 'd', 'e', 'f'}; + unsigned int i; + + for (i = 0U; i < hash_size; ++i) { + hash_text[(i & (bytes_per_line - 1)) * DIGITS_PER_BYTE] = + hex_chars[hash[i] >> 4]; + hash_text[(i & (bytes_per_line - 1)) * DIGITS_PER_BYTE + 1] = + hex_chars[hash[i] & 0x0f]; + if (((i + 1) & (bytes_per_line - 1)) == 0U) { + hash_text[bytes_per_line * DIGITS_PER_BYTE] = '\0'; + VERBOSE("hash part %u = %s\n", + (i >> BYTES_PER_LINE_BASE) + 1, hash_text); + } + } + + leftover = (size_t)i & (bytes_per_line - 1); + + if (leftover != 0UL) { + hash_text[leftover * DIGITS_PER_BYTE] = '\0'; + VERBOSE("hash part %u = %s\n", (i >> BYTES_PER_LINE_BASE) + 1, + hash_text); + } +} + +/* + * Helper function to validate that the buffer base and length are + * within range. + */ +static int validate_buffer_params(uint64_t buf_pa, uint64_t buf_len) +{ + unsigned long shared_buf_page; + uintptr_t shared_buf_base; + + (void)plat_rmmd_get_el3_rmm_shared_mem(&shared_buf_base); + + shared_buf_page = shared_buf_base & ~PAGE_SIZE_MASK; + + /* Validate the buffer pointer */ + if ((buf_pa & ~PAGE_SIZE_MASK) != shared_buf_page) { + ERROR("Buffer PA out of range\n"); + return E_RMM_BAD_ADDR; + } + + /* Validate the size of the shared area */ + if (((buf_pa + buf_len - 1UL) & ~PAGE_SIZE_MASK) != shared_buf_page) { + ERROR("Invalid buffer length\n"); + return E_RMM_INVAL; + } + + return 0; /* No error */ +} + +int rmmd_attest_get_platform_token(uint64_t buf_pa, uint64_t *buf_size, + uint64_t c_size) +{ + int err; + uint8_t temp_buf[SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE]; + + err = validate_buffer_params(buf_pa, *buf_size); + if (err != 0) { + return err; + } + + if ((c_size != SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE) && + (c_size != SHA384_DIGEST_SIZE) && + (c_size != SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE)) { + ERROR("Invalid hash size: %lu\n", c_size); + return E_RMM_INVAL; + } + + spin_lock(&lock); + + (void)memcpy(temp_buf, (void *)buf_pa, c_size); + + print_challenge((uint8_t *)temp_buf, c_size); + + /* Get the platform token. */ + err = plat_rmmd_get_cca_attest_token((uintptr_t)buf_pa, + buf_size, (uintptr_t)temp_buf, c_size); + + if (err != 0) { + ERROR("Failed to get platform token: %d.\n", err); + err = E_RMM_UNK; + } + + spin_unlock(&lock); + + return err; +} + +int rmmd_attest_get_signing_key(uint64_t buf_pa, uint64_t *buf_size, + uint64_t ecc_curve) +{ + int err; + + err = validate_buffer_params(buf_pa, *buf_size); + if (err != 0) { + return err; + } + + if (ecc_curve != ATTEST_KEY_CURVE_ECC_SECP384R1) { + ERROR("Invalid ECC curve specified\n"); + return E_RMM_INVAL; + } + + spin_lock(&lock); + + /* Get the Realm attestation key. */ + err = plat_rmmd_get_cca_realm_attest_key((uintptr_t)buf_pa, buf_size, + (unsigned int)ecc_curve); + if (err != 0) { + ERROR("Failed to get attestation key: %d.\n", err); + err = E_RMM_UNK; + } + + spin_unlock(&lock); + + return err; +} diff --git a/services/std_svc/rmmd/rmmd_initial_context.h b/services/std_svc/rmmd/rmmd_initial_context.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d7a743d --- /dev/null +++ b/services/std_svc/rmmd/rmmd_initial_context.h @@ -0,0 +1,33 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2021, Arm Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +#ifndef RMMD_INITIAL_CONTEXT_H +#define RMMD_INITIAL_CONTEXT_H + +#include <arch.h> + +/* + * SPSR_EL2 + * M=0x9 (0b1001 EL2h) + * M[4]=0 + * DAIF=0xF Exceptions masked on entry. + * BTYPE=0 BTI not yet supported. + * SSBS=0 Not yet supported. + * IL=0 Not an illegal exception return. + * SS=0 Not single stepping. + * PAN=1 RMM shouldn't access realm memory. + * UAO=0 + * DIT=0 + * TCO=0 + * NZCV=0 + */ +#define REALM_SPSR_EL2 ( \ + SPSR_M_EL2H | \ + (0xF << SPSR_DAIF_SHIFT) | \ + SPSR_PAN_BIT \ + ) + +#endif /* RMMD_INITIAL_CONTEXT_H */ diff --git a/services/std_svc/rmmd/rmmd_main.c b/services/std_svc/rmmd/rmmd_main.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8b78b13 --- /dev/null +++ b/services/std_svc/rmmd/rmmd_main.c @@ -0,0 +1,485 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2021-2023, Arm Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +#include <assert.h> +#include <errno.h> +#include <inttypes.h> +#include <stdint.h> +#include <string.h> + +#include <arch_helpers.h> +#include <arch_features.h> +#include <bl31/bl31.h> +#include <common/debug.h> +#include <common/runtime_svc.h> +#include <context.h> +#include <lib/el3_runtime/context_mgmt.h> +#include <lib/el3_runtime/cpu_data.h> +#include <lib/el3_runtime/pubsub.h> +#include <lib/extensions/pmuv3.h> +#include <lib/extensions/sys_reg_trace.h> +#include <lib/gpt_rme/gpt_rme.h> + +#include <lib/spinlock.h> +#include <lib/utils.h> +#include <lib/xlat_tables/xlat_tables_v2.h> +#include <plat/common/common_def.h> +#include <plat/common/platform.h> +#include <platform_def.h> +#include <services/rmmd_svc.h> +#include <smccc_helpers.h> +#include <lib/extensions/sme.h> +#include <lib/extensions/sve.h> +#include "rmmd_initial_context.h" +#include "rmmd_private.h" + +/******************************************************************************* + * RMM boot failure flag + ******************************************************************************/ +static bool rmm_boot_failed; + +/******************************************************************************* + * RMM context information. + ******************************************************************************/ +rmmd_rmm_context_t rmm_context[PLATFORM_CORE_COUNT]; + +/******************************************************************************* + * RMM entry point information. Discovered on the primary core and reused + * on secondary cores. + ******************************************************************************/ +static entry_point_info_t *rmm_ep_info; + +/******************************************************************************* + * Static function declaration. + ******************************************************************************/ +static int32_t rmm_init(void); + +/******************************************************************************* + * This function takes an RMM context pointer and performs a synchronous entry + * into it. + ******************************************************************************/ +uint64_t rmmd_rmm_sync_entry(rmmd_rmm_context_t *rmm_ctx) +{ + uint64_t rc; + + assert(rmm_ctx != NULL); + + cm_set_context(&(rmm_ctx->cpu_ctx), REALM); + + /* Restore the realm context assigned above */ + cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(REALM); + cm_el2_sysregs_context_restore(REALM); + cm_set_next_eret_context(REALM); + + /* Enter RMM */ + rc = rmmd_rmm_enter(&rmm_ctx->c_rt_ctx); + + /* + * Save realm context. EL1 and EL2 Non-secure + * contexts will be restored before exiting to + * Non-secure world, therefore there is no need + * to clear EL1 and EL2 context registers. + */ + cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(REALM); + cm_el2_sysregs_context_save(REALM); + + return rc; +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * This function returns to the place where rmmd_rmm_sync_entry() was + * called originally. + ******************************************************************************/ +__dead2 void rmmd_rmm_sync_exit(uint64_t rc) +{ + rmmd_rmm_context_t *ctx = &rmm_context[plat_my_core_pos()]; + + /* Get context of the RMM in use by this CPU. */ + assert(cm_get_context(REALM) == &(ctx->cpu_ctx)); + + /* + * The RMMD must have initiated the original request through a + * synchronous entry into RMM. Jump back to the original C runtime + * context with the value of rc in x0; + */ + rmmd_rmm_exit(ctx->c_rt_ctx, rc); + + panic(); +} + +static void rmm_el2_context_init(el2_sysregs_t *regs) +{ + regs->ctx_regs[CTX_SPSR_EL2 >> 3] = REALM_SPSR_EL2; + regs->ctx_regs[CTX_SCTLR_EL2 >> 3] = SCTLR_EL2_RES1; +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * Enable architecture extensions on first entry to Realm world. + ******************************************************************************/ + +static void manage_extensions_realm(cpu_context_t *ctx) +{ + pmuv3_enable(ctx); + + /* + * Enable access to TPIDR2_EL0 if SME/SME2 is enabled for Non Secure world. + */ + if (is_feat_sme_supported()) { + sme_enable(ctx); + } +} + +static void manage_extensions_realm_per_world(void) +{ + if (is_feat_sve_supported()) { + /* + * Enable SVE and FPU in realm context when it is enabled for NS. + * Realm manager must ensure that the SVE and FPU register + * contexts are properly managed. + */ + sve_enable_per_world(&per_world_context[CPU_CONTEXT_REALM]); + } + + /* NS can access this but Realm shouldn't */ + if (is_feat_sys_reg_trace_supported()) { + sys_reg_trace_disable_per_world(&per_world_context[CPU_CONTEXT_REALM]); + } + + /* + * If SME/SME2 is supported and enabled for NS world, then disable trapping + * of SME instructions for Realm world. RMM will save/restore required + * registers that are shared with SVE/FPU so that Realm can use FPU or SVE. + */ + if (is_feat_sme_supported()) { + sme_enable_per_world(&per_world_context[CPU_CONTEXT_REALM]); + } +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * Jump to the RMM for the first time. + ******************************************************************************/ +static int32_t rmm_init(void) +{ + long rc; + rmmd_rmm_context_t *ctx = &rmm_context[plat_my_core_pos()]; + + INFO("RMM init start.\n"); + + /* Enable architecture extensions */ + manage_extensions_realm(&ctx->cpu_ctx); + + manage_extensions_realm_per_world(); + + /* Initialize RMM EL2 context. */ + rmm_el2_context_init(&ctx->cpu_ctx.el2_sysregs_ctx); + + rc = rmmd_rmm_sync_entry(ctx); + if (rc != E_RMM_BOOT_SUCCESS) { + ERROR("RMM init failed: %ld\n", rc); + /* Mark the boot as failed for all the CPUs */ + rmm_boot_failed = true; + return 0; + } + + INFO("RMM init end.\n"); + + return 1; +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * Load and read RMM manifest, setup RMM. + ******************************************************************************/ +int rmmd_setup(void) +{ + size_t shared_buf_size __unused; + uintptr_t shared_buf_base; + uint32_t ep_attr; + unsigned int linear_id = plat_my_core_pos(); + rmmd_rmm_context_t *rmm_ctx = &rmm_context[linear_id]; + struct rmm_manifest *manifest; + int rc; + + /* Make sure RME is supported. */ + assert(get_armv9_2_feat_rme_support() != 0U); + + rmm_ep_info = bl31_plat_get_next_image_ep_info(REALM); + if (rmm_ep_info == NULL) { + WARN("No RMM image provided by BL2 boot loader, Booting " + "device without RMM initialization. SMCs destined for " + "RMM will return SMC_UNK\n"); + return -ENOENT; + } + + /* Under no circumstances will this parameter be 0 */ + assert(rmm_ep_info->pc == RMM_BASE); + + /* Initialise an entrypoint to set up the CPU context */ + ep_attr = EP_REALM; + if ((read_sctlr_el3() & SCTLR_EE_BIT) != 0U) { + ep_attr |= EP_EE_BIG; + } + + SET_PARAM_HEAD(rmm_ep_info, PARAM_EP, VERSION_1, ep_attr); + rmm_ep_info->spsr = SPSR_64(MODE_EL2, + MODE_SP_ELX, + DISABLE_ALL_EXCEPTIONS); + + shared_buf_size = + plat_rmmd_get_el3_rmm_shared_mem(&shared_buf_base); + + assert((shared_buf_size == SZ_4K) && + ((void *)shared_buf_base != NULL)); + + /* Load the boot manifest at the beginning of the shared area */ + manifest = (struct rmm_manifest *)shared_buf_base; + rc = plat_rmmd_load_manifest(manifest); + if (rc != 0) { + ERROR("Error loading RMM Boot Manifest (%i)\n", rc); + return rc; + } + flush_dcache_range((uintptr_t)shared_buf_base, shared_buf_size); + + /* + * Prepare coldboot arguments for RMM: + * arg0: This CPUID (primary processor). + * arg1: Version for this Boot Interface. + * arg2: PLATFORM_CORE_COUNT. + * arg3: Base address for the EL3 <-> RMM shared area. The boot + * manifest will be stored at the beginning of this area. + */ + rmm_ep_info->args.arg0 = linear_id; + rmm_ep_info->args.arg1 = RMM_EL3_INTERFACE_VERSION; + rmm_ep_info->args.arg2 = PLATFORM_CORE_COUNT; + rmm_ep_info->args.arg3 = shared_buf_base; + + /* Initialise RMM context with this entry point information */ + cm_setup_context(&rmm_ctx->cpu_ctx, rmm_ep_info); + + INFO("RMM setup done.\n"); + + /* Register init function for deferred init. */ + bl31_register_rmm_init(&rmm_init); + + return 0; +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * Forward SMC to the other security state + ******************************************************************************/ +static uint64_t rmmd_smc_forward(uint32_t src_sec_state, + uint32_t dst_sec_state, uint64_t x0, + uint64_t x1, uint64_t x2, uint64_t x3, + uint64_t x4, void *handle) +{ + cpu_context_t *ctx = cm_get_context(dst_sec_state); + + /* Save incoming security state */ + cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(src_sec_state); + cm_el2_sysregs_context_save(src_sec_state); + + /* Restore outgoing security state */ + cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(dst_sec_state); + cm_el2_sysregs_context_restore(dst_sec_state); + cm_set_next_eret_context(dst_sec_state); + + /* + * As per SMCCCv1.2, we need to preserve x4 to x7 unless + * being used as return args. Hence we differentiate the + * onward and backward path. Support upto 8 args in the + * onward path and 4 args in return path. + * Register x4 will be preserved by RMM in case it is not + * used in return path. + */ + if (src_sec_state == NON_SECURE) { + SMC_RET8(ctx, x0, x1, x2, x3, x4, + SMC_GET_GP(handle, CTX_GPREG_X5), + SMC_GET_GP(handle, CTX_GPREG_X6), + SMC_GET_GP(handle, CTX_GPREG_X7)); + } + + SMC_RET5(ctx, x0, x1, x2, x3, x4); +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * This function handles all SMCs in the range reserved for RMI. Each call is + * either forwarded to the other security state or handled by the RMM dispatcher + ******************************************************************************/ +uint64_t rmmd_rmi_handler(uint32_t smc_fid, uint64_t x1, uint64_t x2, + uint64_t x3, uint64_t x4, void *cookie, + void *handle, uint64_t flags) +{ + uint32_t src_sec_state; + + /* If RMM failed to boot, treat any RMI SMC as unknown */ + if (rmm_boot_failed) { + WARN("RMMD: Failed to boot up RMM. Ignoring RMI call\n"); + SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK); + } + + /* Determine which security state this SMC originated from */ + src_sec_state = caller_sec_state(flags); + + /* RMI must not be invoked by the Secure world */ + if (src_sec_state == SMC_FROM_SECURE) { + WARN("RMMD: RMI invoked by secure world.\n"); + SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK); + } + + /* + * Forward an RMI call from the Normal world to the Realm world as it + * is. + */ + if (src_sec_state == SMC_FROM_NON_SECURE) { + /* + * If SVE hint bit is set in the flags then update the SMC + * function id and pass it on to the lower EL. + */ + if (is_sve_hint_set(flags)) { + smc_fid |= (FUNCID_SVE_HINT_MASK << + FUNCID_SVE_HINT_SHIFT); + } + VERBOSE("RMMD: RMI call from non-secure world.\n"); + return rmmd_smc_forward(NON_SECURE, REALM, smc_fid, + x1, x2, x3, x4, handle); + } + + if (src_sec_state != SMC_FROM_REALM) { + SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK); + } + + switch (smc_fid) { + case RMM_RMI_REQ_COMPLETE: { + uint64_t x5 = SMC_GET_GP(handle, CTX_GPREG_X5); + + return rmmd_smc_forward(REALM, NON_SECURE, x1, + x2, x3, x4, x5, handle); + } + default: + WARN("RMMD: Unsupported RMM call 0x%08x\n", smc_fid); + SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK); + } +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * This cpu has been turned on. Enter RMM to initialise R-EL2. Entry into RMM + * is done after initialising minimal architectural state that guarantees safe + * execution. + ******************************************************************************/ +static void *rmmd_cpu_on_finish_handler(const void *arg) +{ + long rc; + uint32_t linear_id = plat_my_core_pos(); + rmmd_rmm_context_t *ctx = &rmm_context[linear_id]; + + if (rmm_boot_failed) { + /* RMM Boot failed on a previous CPU. Abort. */ + ERROR("RMM Failed to initialize. Ignoring for CPU%d\n", + linear_id); + return NULL; + } + + /* + * Prepare warmboot arguments for RMM: + * arg0: This CPUID. + * arg1 to arg3: Not used. + */ + rmm_ep_info->args.arg0 = linear_id; + rmm_ep_info->args.arg1 = 0ULL; + rmm_ep_info->args.arg2 = 0ULL; + rmm_ep_info->args.arg3 = 0ULL; + + /* Initialise RMM context with this entry point information */ + cm_setup_context(&ctx->cpu_ctx, rmm_ep_info); + + /* Enable architecture extensions */ + manage_extensions_realm(&ctx->cpu_ctx); + + /* Initialize RMM EL2 context. */ + rmm_el2_context_init(&ctx->cpu_ctx.el2_sysregs_ctx); + + rc = rmmd_rmm_sync_entry(ctx); + + if (rc != E_RMM_BOOT_SUCCESS) { + ERROR("RMM init failed on CPU%d: %ld\n", linear_id, rc); + /* Mark the boot as failed for any other booting CPU */ + rmm_boot_failed = true; + } + + return NULL; +} + +/* Subscribe to PSCI CPU on to initialize RMM on secondary */ +SUBSCRIBE_TO_EVENT(psci_cpu_on_finish, rmmd_cpu_on_finish_handler); + +/* Convert GPT lib error to RMMD GTS error */ +static int gpt_to_gts_error(int error, uint32_t smc_fid, uint64_t address) +{ + int ret; + + if (error == 0) { + return E_RMM_OK; + } + + if (error == -EINVAL) { + ret = E_RMM_BAD_ADDR; + } else { + /* This is the only other error code we expect */ + assert(error == -EPERM); + ret = E_RMM_BAD_PAS; + } + + ERROR("RMMD: PAS Transition failed. GPT ret = %d, PA: 0x%"PRIx64 ", FID = 0x%x\n", + error, address, smc_fid); + return ret; +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * This function handles RMM-EL3 interface SMCs + ******************************************************************************/ +uint64_t rmmd_rmm_el3_handler(uint32_t smc_fid, uint64_t x1, uint64_t x2, + uint64_t x3, uint64_t x4, void *cookie, + void *handle, uint64_t flags) +{ + uint32_t src_sec_state; + int ret; + + /* If RMM failed to boot, treat any RMM-EL3 interface SMC as unknown */ + if (rmm_boot_failed) { + WARN("RMMD: Failed to boot up RMM. Ignoring RMM-EL3 call\n"); + SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK); + } + + /* Determine which security state this SMC originated from */ + src_sec_state = caller_sec_state(flags); + + if (src_sec_state != SMC_FROM_REALM) { + WARN("RMMD: RMM-EL3 call originated from secure or normal world\n"); + SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK); + } + + switch (smc_fid) { + case RMM_GTSI_DELEGATE: + ret = gpt_delegate_pas(x1, PAGE_SIZE_4KB, SMC_FROM_REALM); + SMC_RET1(handle, gpt_to_gts_error(ret, smc_fid, x1)); + case RMM_GTSI_UNDELEGATE: + ret = gpt_undelegate_pas(x1, PAGE_SIZE_4KB, SMC_FROM_REALM); + SMC_RET1(handle, gpt_to_gts_error(ret, smc_fid, x1)); + case RMM_ATTEST_GET_PLAT_TOKEN: + ret = rmmd_attest_get_platform_token(x1, &x2, x3); + SMC_RET2(handle, ret, x2); + case RMM_ATTEST_GET_REALM_KEY: + ret = rmmd_attest_get_signing_key(x1, &x2, x3); + SMC_RET2(handle, ret, x2); + + case RMM_BOOT_COMPLETE: + VERBOSE("RMMD: running rmmd_rmm_sync_exit\n"); + rmmd_rmm_sync_exit(x1); + + default: + WARN("RMMD: Unsupported RMM-EL3 call 0x%08x\n", smc_fid); + SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK); + } +} diff --git a/services/std_svc/rmmd/rmmd_private.h b/services/std_svc/rmmd/rmmd_private.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4954a43 --- /dev/null +++ b/services/std_svc/rmmd/rmmd_private.h @@ -0,0 +1,63 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2021-2022, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +#ifndef RMMD_PRIVATE_H +#define RMMD_PRIVATE_H + +#include <context.h> + +/******************************************************************************* + * Constants that allow assembler code to preserve callee-saved registers of the + * C runtime context while performing a security state switch. + ******************************************************************************/ +#define RMMD_C_RT_CTX_X19 0x0 +#define RMMD_C_RT_CTX_X20 0x8 +#define RMMD_C_RT_CTX_X21 0x10 +#define RMMD_C_RT_CTX_X22 0x18 +#define RMMD_C_RT_CTX_X23 0x20 +#define RMMD_C_RT_CTX_X24 0x28 +#define RMMD_C_RT_CTX_X25 0x30 +#define RMMD_C_RT_CTX_X26 0x38 +#define RMMD_C_RT_CTX_X27 0x40 +#define RMMD_C_RT_CTX_X28 0x48 +#define RMMD_C_RT_CTX_X29 0x50 +#define RMMD_C_RT_CTX_X30 0x58 + +#define RMMD_C_RT_CTX_SIZE 0x60 +#define RMMD_C_RT_CTX_ENTRIES (RMMD_C_RT_CTX_SIZE >> DWORD_SHIFT) + +#ifndef __ASSEMBLER__ +#include <stdint.h> + +/* + * Data structure used by the RMM dispatcher (RMMD) in EL3 to track context of + * the RMM at R-EL2. + */ +typedef struct rmmd_rmm_context { + uint64_t c_rt_ctx; + cpu_context_t cpu_ctx; +} rmmd_rmm_context_t; + +/* Functions used to enter/exit the RMM synchronously */ +uint64_t rmmd_rmm_sync_entry(rmmd_rmm_context_t *ctx); +__dead2 void rmmd_rmm_sync_exit(uint64_t rc); + +/* Functions implementing attestation utilities for RMM */ +int rmmd_attest_get_platform_token(uint64_t buf_pa, uint64_t *buf_size, + uint64_t c_size); +int rmmd_attest_get_signing_key(uint64_t buf_pa, uint64_t *buf_size, + uint64_t ecc_curve); + +/* Assembly helpers */ +uint64_t rmmd_rmm_enter(uint64_t *c_rt_ctx); +void __dead2 rmmd_rmm_exit(uint64_t c_rt_ctx, uint64_t ret); + +/* Reference to PM ops for the RMMD */ +extern const spd_pm_ops_t rmmd_pm; + +#endif /* __ASSEMBLER__ */ + +#endif /* RMMD_PRIVATE_H */ diff --git a/services/std_svc/rmmd/trp/linker.ld.S b/services/std_svc/rmmd/trp/linker.ld.S new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9895cf9 --- /dev/null +++ b/services/std_svc/rmmd/trp/linker.ld.S @@ -0,0 +1,72 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2021-2023, Arm Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +#include <common/bl_common.ld.h> +#include <lib/xlat_tables/xlat_tables_defs.h> + +/* Mapped using 4K pages, requires us to align different sections with + * different property at the same granularity. */ +PAGE_SIZE_4K = 4096; + +OUTPUT_FORMAT("elf64-littleaarch64") +OUTPUT_ARCH(aarch64) +ENTRY(trp_head) + +MEMORY { + RAM (rwx): ORIGIN = RMM_BASE, LENGTH = RMM_LIMIT - RMM_BASE +} + + +SECTIONS +{ + . = RMM_BASE; + + .text : { + *(.head.text) + . = ALIGN(8); + *(.text*) + } >RAM + + . = ALIGN(PAGE_SIZE_4K); + + .rodata : { + *(.rodata*) + } >RAM + + . = ALIGN(PAGE_SIZE_4K); + + __RW_START__ = . ; + + .data : { + *(.data*) + } >RAM + + .bss (NOLOAD) : { + __BSS_START__ = .; + *(.bss*) + __BSS_END__ = .; + } >RAM + __BSS_SIZE__ = SIZEOF(.bss); + + + STACK_SECTION >RAM + + + /* + * Define a linker symbol to mark the end of the RW memory area for this + * image. + */ + __RW_END__ = .; + __RMM_END__ = .; + + + /DISCARD/ : { *(.dynstr*) } + /DISCARD/ : { *(.dynamic*) } + /DISCARD/ : { *(.plt*) } + /DISCARD/ : { *(.interp*) } + /DISCARD/ : { *(.gnu*) } + /DISCARD/ : { *(.note*) } +} diff --git a/services/std_svc/rmmd/trp/trp.mk b/services/std_svc/rmmd/trp/trp.mk new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b7bd317 --- /dev/null +++ b/services/std_svc/rmmd/trp/trp.mk @@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ +# +# Copyright (c) 2021-2023 Arm Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. +# +# SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause +# + +RMM_SOURCES += services/std_svc/rmmd/trp/trp_entry.S \ + services/std_svc/rmmd/trp/trp_main.c \ + services/std_svc/rmmd/trp/trp_helpers.c + +RMM_DEFAULT_LINKER_SCRIPT_SOURCE := services/std_svc/rmmd/trp/linker.ld.S + +ifneq ($(findstring gcc,$(notdir $(LD))),) + RMM_LDFLAGS += -Wl,--sort-section=alignment +else ifneq ($(findstring ld,$(notdir $(LD))),) + RMM_LDFLAGS += --sort-section=alignment +endif + +# Include the platform-specific TRP Makefile +# If no platform-specific TRP Makefile exists, it means TRP is not supported +# on this platform. +TRP_PLAT_MAKEFILE := $(wildcard ${PLAT_DIR}/trp/trp-${PLAT}.mk) +ifeq (,${TRP_PLAT_MAKEFILE}) + $(error TRP is not supported on platform ${PLAT}) +else + include ${TRP_PLAT_MAKEFILE} +endif diff --git a/services/std_svc/rmmd/trp/trp_entry.S b/services/std_svc/rmmd/trp/trp_entry.S new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3e1d8c9 --- /dev/null +++ b/services/std_svc/rmmd/trp/trp_entry.S @@ -0,0 +1,153 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2021-2022, Arm Limited. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +#include <asm_macros.S> +#include <services/rmmd_svc.h> + +#include <platform_def.h> +#include "trp_private.h" + +.global trp_head +.global trp_smc + +.section ".head.text", "ax" + + /* --------------------------------------------- + * Populate the params in x0-x7 from the pointer + * to the smc args structure in x0. + * --------------------------------------------- + */ + .macro restore_args_call_smc + ldp x6, x7, [x0, #TRP_ARG6] + ldp x4, x5, [x0, #TRP_ARG4] + ldp x2, x3, [x0, #TRP_ARG2] + ldp x0, x1, [x0, #TRP_ARG0] + smc #0 + .endm + + /* --------------------------------------------- + * Entry point for TRP + * --------------------------------------------- + */ +trp_head: + /* + * Stash arguments from previous boot stage + */ + mov x20, x0 + mov x21, x1 + mov x22, x2 + mov x23, x3 + + /* + * Validate CPUId before allocating a stack. + */ + cmp x20, #PLATFORM_CORE_COUNT + b.lo 1f + + mov_imm x0, RMM_BOOT_COMPLETE + mov_imm x1, E_RMM_BOOT_CPU_ID_OUT_OF_RANGE + smc #0 + + /* EL3 should never return back here, so panic if it does */ + b trp_panic + +1: + bl plat_set_my_stack + + /* + * Find out whether this is a cold or warm boot + */ + ldr x1, cold_boot_flag + cbz x1, warm_boot + + /* + * Update cold boot flag to indicate cold boot is done + */ + adr x2, cold_boot_flag + str xzr, [x2] + + /* --------------------------------------------- + * Zero out BSS section + * --------------------------------------------- + */ + ldr x0, =__BSS_START__ + ldr x1, =__BSS_SIZE__ + bl zeromem + + mov x0, x20 + mov x1, x21 + mov x2, x22 + mov x3, x23 + bl trp_setup + bl trp_main + b 1f + +warm_boot: + mov x0, x20 + mov x1, x21 + mov x2, x22 + mov x3, x23 + bl trp_validate_warmboot_args + cbnz x0, trp_panic /* Failed to validate warmboot args */ + +1: + mov_imm x0, RMM_BOOT_COMPLETE + mov x1, xzr /* RMM_BOOT_SUCCESS */ + smc #0 + b trp_handler + +trp_panic: + no_ret plat_panic_handler + + /* + * Flag to mark if it is a cold boot. + * 1: cold boot, 0: warmboot. + */ +.align 3 +cold_boot_flag: + .dword 1 + + /* --------------------------------------------- + * Direct SMC call to BL31 service provided by + * RMM Dispatcher + * --------------------------------------------- + */ +func trp_smc + restore_args_call_smc + ret +endfunc trp_smc + + /* --------------------------------------------- + * RMI call handler + * --------------------------------------------- + */ +func trp_handler + /* + * Save Link Register and X4, as per SMCCC v1.2 its value + * must be preserved unless it contains result, as specified + * in the function definition. + */ + stp x4, lr, [sp, #-16]! + + /* + * Zero the space for X0-X3 in trp_smc_result structure + * and pass its address as the last argument. + */ + stp xzr, xzr, [sp, #-16]! + stp xzr, xzr, [sp, #-16]! + mov x7, sp + + bl trp_rmi_handler + + ldp x1, x2, [sp], #16 + ldp x3, x4, [sp], #16 + ldp x5, lr, [sp], #16 + + ldr x0, =RMM_RMI_REQ_COMPLETE + smc #0 + + b trp_handler +endfunc trp_handler diff --git a/services/std_svc/rmmd/trp/trp_helpers.c b/services/std_svc/rmmd/trp/trp_helpers.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..159f3a5 --- /dev/null +++ b/services/std_svc/rmmd/trp/trp_helpers.c @@ -0,0 +1,58 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2022, Arm Limited. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + + +#include <plat/common/platform.h> +#include <services/rmmd_svc.h> +#include "trp_private.h" + +/* + * Per cpu data structure to populate parameters for an SMC in C code and use + * a pointer to this structure in assembler code to populate x0-x7 + */ +static trp_args_t trp_smc_args[PLATFORM_CORE_COUNT]; + +/* + * Set the arguments for SMC call + */ +trp_args_t *set_smc_args(uint64_t arg0, + uint64_t arg1, + uint64_t arg2, + uint64_t arg3, + uint64_t arg4, + uint64_t arg5, + uint64_t arg6, + uint64_t arg7) +{ + uint32_t linear_id; + trp_args_t *pcpu_smc_args; + + /* + * Return to Secure Monitor by raising an SMC. The results of the + * service are passed as an arguments to the SMC + */ + linear_id = plat_my_core_pos(); + pcpu_smc_args = &trp_smc_args[linear_id]; + write_trp_arg(pcpu_smc_args, TRP_ARG0, arg0); + write_trp_arg(pcpu_smc_args, TRP_ARG1, arg1); + write_trp_arg(pcpu_smc_args, TRP_ARG2, arg2); + write_trp_arg(pcpu_smc_args, TRP_ARG3, arg3); + write_trp_arg(pcpu_smc_args, TRP_ARG4, arg4); + write_trp_arg(pcpu_smc_args, TRP_ARG5, arg5); + write_trp_arg(pcpu_smc_args, TRP_ARG6, arg6); + write_trp_arg(pcpu_smc_args, TRP_ARG7, arg7); + + return pcpu_smc_args; +} + +/* + * Abort the boot process with the reason given in err. + */ +__dead2 void trp_boot_abort(uint64_t err) +{ + (void)trp_smc(set_smc_args(RMM_BOOT_COMPLETE, err, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)); + panic(); +} diff --git a/services/std_svc/rmmd/trp/trp_main.c b/services/std_svc/rmmd/trp/trp_main.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..33f2fb0 --- /dev/null +++ b/services/std_svc/rmmd/trp/trp_main.c @@ -0,0 +1,185 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2021-2022, Arm Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +#include <common/debug.h> +#include <plat/common/platform.h> +#include <services/rmm_core_manifest.h> +#include <services/rmmd_svc.h> +#include <services/trp/platform_trp.h> +#include <trp_helpers.h> +#include "trp_private.h" + +#include <platform_def.h> + +/* Parameters received from the previous image */ +static unsigned int trp_boot_abi_version; +static uintptr_t trp_shared_region_start; + +/* Parameters received from boot manifest */ +uint32_t trp_boot_manifest_version; + +/******************************************************************************* + * Setup function for TRP. + ******************************************************************************/ +void trp_setup(uint64_t x0, + uint64_t x1, + uint64_t x2, + uint64_t x3) +{ + /* + * Validate boot parameters + * + * According to the Boot Interface ABI v.0.1, + * the parameters received from EL3 are: + * x0: CPUID (verified earlier, so not used) + * x1: Boot Interface version + * x2: PLATFORM_CORE_COUNT + * x3: Pointer to the shared memory area. + */ + + (void)x0; + + if (TRP_RMM_EL3_VERSION_GET_MAJOR(x1) != TRP_RMM_EL3_ABI_VERS_MAJOR) { + trp_boot_abort(E_RMM_BOOT_VERSION_MISMATCH); + } + + if ((void *)x3 == NULL) { + trp_boot_abort(E_RMM_BOOT_INVALID_SHARED_BUFFER); + } + + if (x2 > TRP_PLATFORM_CORE_COUNT) { + trp_boot_abort(E_RMM_BOOT_CPUS_OUT_OF_RANGE); + } + + trp_boot_abi_version = x1; + trp_shared_region_start = x3; + flush_dcache_range((uintptr_t)&trp_boot_abi_version, + sizeof(trp_boot_abi_version)); + flush_dcache_range((uintptr_t)&trp_shared_region_start, + sizeof(trp_shared_region_start)); + + /* Perform early platform-specific setup */ + trp_early_platform_setup((struct rmm_manifest *)trp_shared_region_start); +} + +int trp_validate_warmboot_args(uint64_t x0, uint64_t x1, + uint64_t x2, uint64_t x3) +{ + /* + * Validate boot parameters for warm boot + * + * According to the Boot Interface ABI v.0.1, the parameters + * received from EL3 during warm boot are: + * + * x0: CPUID (verified earlier so not used here) + * [x1:x3]: RES0 + */ + + (void)x0; + + return ((x1 | x2 | x3) == 0UL) ? 0 : E_RMM_BOOT_UNKNOWN; +} + +/* Main function for TRP */ +void trp_main(void) +{ + NOTICE("TRP: %s\n", version_string); + NOTICE("TRP: %s\n", build_message); + NOTICE("TRP: Supported RMM-EL3 Interface ABI: v.%u.%u\n", + TRP_RMM_EL3_ABI_VERS_MAJOR, TRP_RMM_EL3_ABI_VERS_MINOR); + NOTICE("TRP: Boot Manifest Version: v.%u.%u\n", + RMMD_GET_MANIFEST_VERSION_MAJOR(trp_boot_manifest_version), + RMMD_GET_MANIFEST_VERSION_MINOR(trp_boot_manifest_version)); + INFO("TRP: Memory base: 0x%lx\n", (unsigned long)RMM_BASE); + INFO("TRP: Shared region base address: 0x%lx\n", + (unsigned long)trp_shared_region_start); + INFO("TRP: Total size: 0x%lx bytes\n", + (unsigned long)(RMM_END - RMM_BASE)); + INFO("TRP: RMM-EL3 Interface ABI reported by EL3: v.%u.%u\n", + TRP_RMM_EL3_VERSION_GET_MAJOR(trp_boot_abi_version), + TRP_RMM_EL3_VERSION_GET_MINOR(trp_boot_abi_version)); +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * Returning RMI version back to Normal World + ******************************************************************************/ +static void trp_ret_rmi_version(unsigned long long rmi_version, + struct trp_smc_result *smc_ret) +{ + if (rmi_version != RMI_ABI_VERSION) { + smc_ret->x[0] = RMI_ERROR_INPUT; + } else { + smc_ret->x[0] = RMI_SUCCESS; + } + VERBOSE("RMM version is %u.%u\n", RMI_ABI_VERSION_MAJOR, + RMI_ABI_VERSION_MINOR); + smc_ret->x[1] = RMI_ABI_VERSION; + smc_ret->x[2] = RMI_ABI_VERSION; +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * Transitioning granule of NON-SECURE type to REALM type + ******************************************************************************/ +static void trp_asc_mark_realm(unsigned long long x1, + struct trp_smc_result *smc_ret) +{ + VERBOSE("Delegating granule 0x%llx\n", x1); + smc_ret->x[0] = trp_smc(set_smc_args(RMM_GTSI_DELEGATE, x1, + 0UL, 0UL, 0UL, 0UL, 0UL, 0UL)); + + if (smc_ret->x[0] != 0ULL) { + ERROR("Granule transition from NON-SECURE type to REALM type " + "failed 0x%llx\n", smc_ret->x[0]); + } +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * Transitioning granule of REALM type to NON-SECURE type + ******************************************************************************/ +static void trp_asc_mark_nonsecure(unsigned long long x1, + struct trp_smc_result *smc_ret) +{ + VERBOSE("Undelegating granule 0x%llx\n", x1); + smc_ret->x[0] = trp_smc(set_smc_args(RMM_GTSI_UNDELEGATE, x1, + 0UL, 0UL, 0UL, 0UL, 0UL, 0UL)); + + if (smc_ret->x[0] != 0ULL) { + ERROR("Granule transition from REALM type to NON-SECURE type " + "failed 0x%llx\n", smc_ret->x[0]); + } +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * Main RMI SMC handler function + ******************************************************************************/ +void trp_rmi_handler(unsigned long fid, + unsigned long long x1, unsigned long long x2, + unsigned long long x3, unsigned long long x4, + unsigned long long x5, unsigned long long x6, + struct trp_smc_result *smc_ret) +{ + /* Not used in the current implementation */ + (void)x2; + (void)x3; + (void)x4; + (void)x5; + (void)x6; + + switch (fid) { + case RMI_RMM_REQ_VERSION: + trp_ret_rmi_version(x1, smc_ret); + break; + case RMI_RMM_GRANULE_DELEGATE: + trp_asc_mark_realm(x1, smc_ret); + break; + case RMI_RMM_GRANULE_UNDELEGATE: + trp_asc_mark_nonsecure(x1, smc_ret); + break; + default: + ERROR("Invalid SMC code to %s, FID %lx\n", __func__, fid); + smc_ret->x[0] = SMC_UNK; + } +} diff --git a/services/std_svc/rmmd/trp/trp_private.h b/services/std_svc/rmmd/trp/trp_private.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d8c6960 --- /dev/null +++ b/services/std_svc/rmmd/trp/trp_private.h @@ -0,0 +1,61 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2021-2022, Arm Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +#ifndef TRP_PRIVATE_H +#define TRP_PRIVATE_H + +#include <services/rmmd_svc.h> +#include <trp_helpers.h> + +/* Definitions for RMM-EL3 Interface ABI VERSION */ +#define TRP_RMM_EL3_ABI_VERS_MAJOR RMM_EL3_IFC_VERSION_MAJOR +#define TRP_RMM_EL3_ABI_VERS_MINOR RMM_EL3_IFC_VERSION_MINOR +#define TRP_RMM_EL3_ABI_VERS (((TRP_RMM_EL3_ABI_VERS_MAJOR & 0x7FFF) << 16) | \ + (TRP_RMM_EL3_ABI_VERS_MINOR & 0xFFFF)) + +#define TRP_PLATFORM_CORE_COUNT PLATFORM_CORE_COUNT + +#ifndef __ASSEMBLER__ + +#include <stdint.h> + +#define write_trp_arg(args, offset, val) (((args)->regs[offset >> 3]) \ + = val) +/* RMI SMC64 FIDs handled by the TRP */ +#define RMI_RMM_REQ_VERSION SMC64_RMI_FID(U(0)) +#define RMI_RMM_GRANULE_DELEGATE SMC64_RMI_FID(U(1)) +#define RMI_RMM_GRANULE_UNDELEGATE SMC64_RMI_FID(U(2)) + +/* Definitions for RMI VERSION */ +#define RMI_ABI_VERSION_MAJOR U(0x0) +#define RMI_ABI_VERSION_MINOR U(0x0) +#define RMI_ABI_VERSION (((RMI_ABI_VERSION_MAJOR & 0x7FFF) \ + << 16) | \ + (RMI_ABI_VERSION_MINOR & 0xFFFF)) + +#define TRP_RMM_EL3_VERSION_GET_MAJOR(x) \ + RMM_EL3_IFC_VERSION_GET_MAJOR((x)) +#define TRP_RMM_EL3_VERSION_GET_MINOR(x) \ + RMM_EL3_IFC_VERSION_GET_MAJOR_MINOR((x)) + +/* Helper to issue SMC calls to BL31 */ +uint64_t trp_smc(trp_args_t *); + +/* The main function to executed only by Primary CPU */ +void trp_main(void); + +/* Setup TRP. Executed only by Primary CPU */ +void trp_setup(uint64_t x0, + uint64_t x1, + uint64_t x2, + uint64_t x3); + +/* Validate arguments for warm boot only */ +int trp_validate_warmboot_args(uint64_t x0, uint64_t x1, + uint64_t x2, uint64_t x3); + +#endif /* __ASSEMBLER__ */ +#endif /* TRP_PRIVATE_H */ diff --git a/services/std_svc/sdei/sdei_dispatch.S b/services/std_svc/sdei/sdei_dispatch.S new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8449e4b --- /dev/null +++ b/services/std_svc/sdei/sdei_dispatch.S @@ -0,0 +1,26 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2018-2019, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +#include <asm_macros.S> + + .globl begin_sdei_synchronous_dispatch + +/* + * void begin_sdei_synchronous_dispatch(jmp_buf *buffer); + * + * Begin SDEI dispatch synchronously by setting up a jump point, and exiting + * EL3. This jump point is jumped to by the dispatcher after the event is + * completed by the client. + */ +func begin_sdei_synchronous_dispatch + stp x30, xzr, [sp, #-16]! + bl setjmp + cbz x0, 1f + ldp x30, xzr, [sp], #16 + ret +1: + b el3_exit +endfunc begin_sdei_synchronous_dispatch diff --git a/services/std_svc/sdei/sdei_event.c b/services/std_svc/sdei/sdei_event.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e0c7971 --- /dev/null +++ b/services/std_svc/sdei/sdei_event.c @@ -0,0 +1,122 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2017-2022, Arm Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +#include <assert.h> + +#include <lib/utils.h> + +#include "sdei_private.h" + +#define MAP_OFF(_map, _mapping) ((_map) - (_mapping)->map) + +/* + * Get SDEI entry with the given mapping: on success, returns pointer to SDEI + * entry. On error, returns NULL. + * + * Both shared and private maps are stored in single-dimensional array. Private + * event entries are kept for each PE forming a 2D array. + */ +sdei_entry_t *get_event_entry(sdei_ev_map_t *map) +{ + const sdei_mapping_t *mapping; + sdei_entry_t *cpu_priv_base; + unsigned int base_idx; + long int idx; + + if (is_event_private(map)) { + /* + * For a private map, find the index of the mapping in the + * array. + */ + mapping = SDEI_PRIVATE_MAPPING(); + idx = MAP_OFF(map, mapping); + + /* Base of private mappings for this CPU */ + base_idx = plat_my_core_pos() * ((unsigned int) mapping->num_maps); + cpu_priv_base = &sdei_private_event_table[base_idx]; + + /* + * Return the address of the entry at the same index in the + * per-CPU event entry. + */ + return &cpu_priv_base[idx]; + } else { + mapping = SDEI_SHARED_MAPPING(); + idx = MAP_OFF(map, mapping); + + return &sdei_shared_event_table[idx]; + } +} + +/* + * Find event mapping for a given interrupt number: On success, returns pointer + * to the event mapping. On error, returns NULL. + */ +sdei_ev_map_t *find_event_map_by_intr(unsigned int intr_num, bool shared) +{ + const sdei_mapping_t *mapping; + sdei_ev_map_t *map; + unsigned int i; + + /* + * Look for a match in private and shared mappings, as requested. This + * is a linear search. However, if the mappings are required to be + * sorted, for large maps, we could consider binary search. + */ + mapping = shared ? SDEI_SHARED_MAPPING() : SDEI_PRIVATE_MAPPING(); + iterate_mapping(mapping, i, map) { + if (map->intr == intr_num) + return map; + } + + return NULL; +} + +/* + * Find event mapping for a given event number: On success returns pointer to + * the event mapping. On error, returns NULL. + */ +sdei_ev_map_t *find_event_map(int ev_num) +{ + const sdei_mapping_t *mapping; + sdei_ev_map_t *map; + unsigned int i, j; + + /* + * Iterate through mappings to find a match. This is a linear search. + * However, if the mappings are required to be sorted, for large maps, + * we could consider binary search. + */ + for_each_mapping_type(i, mapping) { + iterate_mapping(mapping, j, map) { + if (map->ev_num == ev_num) + return map; + } + } + + return NULL; +} + +/* + * Return the total number of currently registered SDEI events. + */ +int sdei_get_registered_event_count(void) +{ + const sdei_mapping_t *mapping; + sdei_ev_map_t *map; + unsigned int i; + unsigned int j; + int count = 0; + + /* Add up reg counts for each mapping. */ + for_each_mapping_type(i, mapping) { + iterate_mapping(mapping, j, map) { + count += map->reg_count; + } + } + + return count; +} diff --git a/services/std_svc/sdei/sdei_intr_mgmt.c b/services/std_svc/sdei/sdei_intr_mgmt.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3bdf4a2 --- /dev/null +++ b/services/std_svc/sdei/sdei_intr_mgmt.c @@ -0,0 +1,774 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2017-2021, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +#include <assert.h> +#include <inttypes.h> +#include <stdint.h> +#include <string.h> + +#include <arch_helpers.h> +#include <arch_features.h> +#include <bl31/ehf.h> +#include <bl31/interrupt_mgmt.h> +#include <common/bl_common.h> +#include <common/debug.h> +#include <common/runtime_svc.h> +#include <lib/cassert.h> +#include <services/sdei.h> + +#include "sdei_private.h" + +/* x0-x17 GPREGS context */ +#define SDEI_SAVED_GPREGS 18U + +/* Maximum preemption nesting levels: Critical priority and Normal priority */ +#define MAX_EVENT_NESTING 2U + +/* Per-CPU SDEI state access macro */ +#define sdei_get_this_pe_state() (&cpu_state[plat_my_core_pos()]) + +/* Structure to store information about an outstanding dispatch */ +typedef struct sdei_dispatch_context { + sdei_ev_map_t *map; + uint64_t x[SDEI_SAVED_GPREGS]; + jmp_buf *dispatch_jmp; + + /* Exception state registers */ + uint64_t elr_el3; + uint64_t spsr_el3; + +#if DYNAMIC_WORKAROUND_CVE_2018_3639 + /* CVE-2018-3639 mitigation state */ + uint64_t disable_cve_2018_3639; +#endif +} sdei_dispatch_context_t; + +/* Per-CPU SDEI state data */ +typedef struct sdei_cpu_state { + sdei_dispatch_context_t dispatch_stack[MAX_EVENT_NESTING]; + unsigned short stack_top; /* Empty ascending */ + bool pe_masked; + bool pending_enables; +} sdei_cpu_state_t; + +/* SDEI states for all cores in the system */ +static sdei_cpu_state_t cpu_state[PLATFORM_CORE_COUNT]; + +int64_t sdei_pe_mask(void) +{ + int64_t ret = 0; + sdei_cpu_state_t *state = sdei_get_this_pe_state(); + + /* + * Return value indicates whether this call had any effect in the mask + * status of this PE. + */ + if (!state->pe_masked) { + state->pe_masked = true; + ret = 1; + } + + return ret; +} + +void sdei_pe_unmask(void) +{ + unsigned int i; + sdei_ev_map_t *map; + sdei_entry_t *se; + sdei_cpu_state_t *state = sdei_get_this_pe_state(); + uint64_t my_mpidr = read_mpidr_el1() & MPIDR_AFFINITY_MASK; + + /* + * If there are pending enables, iterate through the private mappings + * and enable those bound maps that are in enabled state. Also, iterate + * through shared mappings and enable interrupts of events that are + * targeted to this PE. + */ + if (state->pending_enables) { + for_each_private_map(i, map) { + se = get_event_entry(map); + if (is_map_bound(map) && GET_EV_STATE(se, ENABLED)) + plat_ic_enable_interrupt(map->intr); + } + + for_each_shared_map(i, map) { + se = get_event_entry(map); + + sdei_map_lock(map); + if (is_map_bound(map) && GET_EV_STATE(se, ENABLED) && + (se->reg_flags == SDEI_REGF_RM_PE) && + (se->affinity == my_mpidr)) { + plat_ic_enable_interrupt(map->intr); + } + sdei_map_unlock(map); + } + } + + state->pending_enables = false; + state->pe_masked = false; +} + +/* Push a dispatch context to the dispatch stack */ +static sdei_dispatch_context_t *push_dispatch(void) +{ + sdei_cpu_state_t *state = sdei_get_this_pe_state(); + sdei_dispatch_context_t *disp_ctx; + + /* Cannot have more than max events */ + assert(state->stack_top < MAX_EVENT_NESTING); + + disp_ctx = &state->dispatch_stack[state->stack_top]; + state->stack_top++; + + return disp_ctx; +} + +/* Pop a dispatch context to the dispatch stack */ +static sdei_dispatch_context_t *pop_dispatch(void) +{ + sdei_cpu_state_t *state = sdei_get_this_pe_state(); + + if (state->stack_top == 0U) + return NULL; + + assert(state->stack_top <= MAX_EVENT_NESTING); + + state->stack_top--; + + return &state->dispatch_stack[state->stack_top]; +} + +/* Retrieve the context at the top of dispatch stack */ +static sdei_dispatch_context_t *get_outstanding_dispatch(void) +{ + sdei_cpu_state_t *state = sdei_get_this_pe_state(); + + if (state->stack_top == 0U) + return NULL; + + assert(state->stack_top <= MAX_EVENT_NESTING); + + return &state->dispatch_stack[state->stack_top - 1U]; +} + +static sdei_dispatch_context_t *save_event_ctx(sdei_ev_map_t *map, + void *tgt_ctx) +{ + sdei_dispatch_context_t *disp_ctx; + const gp_regs_t *tgt_gpregs; + const el3_state_t *tgt_el3; + + assert(tgt_ctx != NULL); + tgt_gpregs = get_gpregs_ctx(tgt_ctx); + tgt_el3 = get_el3state_ctx(tgt_ctx); + + disp_ctx = push_dispatch(); + assert(disp_ctx != NULL); + disp_ctx->map = map; + + /* Save general purpose and exception registers */ + memcpy(disp_ctx->x, tgt_gpregs, sizeof(disp_ctx->x)); + disp_ctx->spsr_el3 = read_ctx_reg(tgt_el3, CTX_SPSR_EL3); + disp_ctx->elr_el3 = read_ctx_reg(tgt_el3, CTX_ELR_EL3); + + return disp_ctx; +} + +static void restore_event_ctx(const sdei_dispatch_context_t *disp_ctx, void *tgt_ctx) +{ + gp_regs_t *tgt_gpregs; + el3_state_t *tgt_el3; + + assert(tgt_ctx != NULL); + tgt_gpregs = get_gpregs_ctx(tgt_ctx); + tgt_el3 = get_el3state_ctx(tgt_ctx); + + CASSERT(sizeof(disp_ctx->x) == (SDEI_SAVED_GPREGS * sizeof(uint64_t)), + foo); + + /* Restore general purpose and exception registers */ + memcpy(tgt_gpregs, disp_ctx->x, sizeof(disp_ctx->x)); + write_ctx_reg(tgt_el3, CTX_SPSR_EL3, disp_ctx->spsr_el3); + write_ctx_reg(tgt_el3, CTX_ELR_EL3, disp_ctx->elr_el3); + +#if DYNAMIC_WORKAROUND_CVE_2018_3639 + cve_2018_3639_t *tgt_cve_2018_3639; + tgt_cve_2018_3639 = get_cve_2018_3639_ctx(tgt_ctx); + + /* Restore CVE-2018-3639 mitigation state */ + write_ctx_reg(tgt_cve_2018_3639, CTX_CVE_2018_3639_DISABLE, + disp_ctx->disable_cve_2018_3639); +#endif +} + +static void save_secure_context(void) +{ + cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(SECURE); +} + +/* Restore Secure context and arrange to resume it at the next ERET */ +static void restore_and_resume_secure_context(void) +{ + cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(SECURE); + cm_set_next_eret_context(SECURE); +} + +/* + * Restore Non-secure context and arrange to resume it at the next ERET. Return + * pointer to the Non-secure context. + */ +static cpu_context_t *restore_and_resume_ns_context(void) +{ + cpu_context_t *ns_ctx; + + cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(NON_SECURE); + cm_set_next_eret_context(NON_SECURE); + + ns_ctx = cm_get_context(NON_SECURE); + assert(ns_ctx != NULL); + + return ns_ctx; +} + +/* + * Prepare for ERET: + * - Set the ELR to the registered handler address + * - Set the SPSR register as described in the SDEI documentation and + * the AArch64.TakeException() pseudocode function in + * ARM DDI 0487F.c page J1-7635 + */ + +static void sdei_set_elr_spsr(sdei_entry_t *se, sdei_dispatch_context_t *disp_ctx) +{ + unsigned int client_el = sdei_client_el(); + u_register_t sdei_spsr = SPSR_64(client_el, MODE_SP_ELX, + DISABLE_ALL_EXCEPTIONS); + + u_register_t interrupted_pstate = disp_ctx->spsr_el3; + + /* Check the SPAN bit in the client el SCTLR */ + u_register_t client_el_sctlr; + + if (client_el == MODE_EL2) { + client_el_sctlr = read_sctlr_el2(); + } else { + client_el_sctlr = read_sctlr_el1(); + } + + /* + * Check whether to force the PAN bit or use the value in the + * interrupted EL according to the check described in + * TakeException. Since the client can only be Non-Secure + * EL2 or El1 some of the conditions in ElIsInHost() we know + * will always be True. + * When the client_el is EL2 we know that there will be a SPAN + * bit in SCTLR_EL2 as we have already checked for the condition + * HCR_EL2.E2H = 1 and HCR_EL2.TGE = 1 + */ + u_register_t hcr_el2 = read_hcr(); + bool el_is_in_host = (read_feat_vhe_id_field() != 0U) && + (hcr_el2 & HCR_TGE_BIT) && + (hcr_el2 & HCR_E2H_BIT); + + if (is_feat_pan_supported() && + ((client_el == MODE_EL1) || + (client_el == MODE_EL2 && el_is_in_host)) && + ((client_el_sctlr & SCTLR_SPAN_BIT) == 0U)) { + sdei_spsr |= SPSR_PAN_BIT; + } else { + sdei_spsr |= (interrupted_pstate & SPSR_PAN_BIT); + } + + /* If SSBS is implemented, take the value from the client el SCTLR */ + u_register_t ssbs_enabled = (read_id_aa64pfr1_el1() + >> ID_AA64PFR1_EL1_SSBS_SHIFT) + & ID_AA64PFR1_EL1_SSBS_MASK; + if (ssbs_enabled != SSBS_UNAVAILABLE) { + u_register_t ssbs_bit = ((client_el_sctlr & SCTLR_DSSBS_BIT) + >> SCTLR_DSSBS_SHIFT) + << SPSR_SSBS_SHIFT_AARCH64; + sdei_spsr |= ssbs_bit; + } + + /* If MTE is implemented in the client el set the TCO bit */ + if (get_armv8_5_mte_support() >= MTE_IMPLEMENTED_ELX) { + sdei_spsr |= SPSR_TCO_BIT_AARCH64; + } + + /* Take the DIT field from the pstate of the interrupted el */ + sdei_spsr |= (interrupted_pstate & SPSR_DIT_BIT); + + cm_set_elr_spsr_el3(NON_SECURE, (uintptr_t) se->ep, sdei_spsr); +} + +/* + * Populate the Non-secure context so that the next ERET will dispatch to the + * SDEI client. + */ +static void setup_ns_dispatch(sdei_ev_map_t *map, sdei_entry_t *se, + cpu_context_t *ctx, jmp_buf *dispatch_jmp) +{ + sdei_dispatch_context_t *disp_ctx; + + /* Push the event and context */ + disp_ctx = save_event_ctx(map, ctx); + + /* + * Setup handler arguments: + * + * - x0: Event number + * - x1: Handler argument supplied at the time of event registration + * - x2: Interrupted PC + * - x3: Interrupted SPSR + */ + SMC_SET_GP(ctx, CTX_GPREG_X0, (uint64_t) map->ev_num); + SMC_SET_GP(ctx, CTX_GPREG_X1, se->arg); + SMC_SET_GP(ctx, CTX_GPREG_X2, disp_ctx->elr_el3); + SMC_SET_GP(ctx, CTX_GPREG_X3, disp_ctx->spsr_el3); + + /* Setup the elr and spsr register to prepare for ERET */ + sdei_set_elr_spsr(se, disp_ctx); + +#if DYNAMIC_WORKAROUND_CVE_2018_3639 + cve_2018_3639_t *tgt_cve_2018_3639; + tgt_cve_2018_3639 = get_cve_2018_3639_ctx(ctx); + + /* Save CVE-2018-3639 mitigation state */ + disp_ctx->disable_cve_2018_3639 = read_ctx_reg(tgt_cve_2018_3639, + CTX_CVE_2018_3639_DISABLE); + + /* Force SDEI handler to execute with mitigation enabled by default */ + write_ctx_reg(tgt_cve_2018_3639, CTX_CVE_2018_3639_DISABLE, 0); +#endif + + disp_ctx->dispatch_jmp = dispatch_jmp; +} + +/* Handle a triggered SDEI interrupt while events were masked on this PE */ +static void handle_masked_trigger(sdei_ev_map_t *map, sdei_entry_t *se, + sdei_cpu_state_t *state, unsigned int intr_raw) +{ + uint64_t my_mpidr __unused = (read_mpidr_el1() & MPIDR_AFFINITY_MASK); + bool disable = false; + + /* Nothing to do for event 0 */ + if (map->ev_num == SDEI_EVENT_0) + return; + + /* + * For a private event, or for a shared event specifically routed to + * this CPU, we disable interrupt, leave the interrupt pending, and do + * EOI. + */ + if (is_event_private(map) || (se->reg_flags == SDEI_REGF_RM_PE)) + disable = true; + + if (se->reg_flags == SDEI_REGF_RM_PE) + assert(se->affinity == my_mpidr); + + if (disable) { + plat_ic_disable_interrupt(map->intr); + plat_ic_set_interrupt_pending(map->intr); + plat_ic_end_of_interrupt(intr_raw); + state->pending_enables = true; + + return; + } + + /* + * We just received a shared event with routing set to ANY PE. The + * interrupt can't be delegated on this PE as SDEI events are masked. + * However, because its routing mode is ANY, it is possible that the + * event can be delegated on any other PE that hasn't masked events. + * Therefore, we set the interrupt back pending so as to give other + * suitable PEs a chance of handling it. + */ + assert(plat_ic_is_spi(map->intr) != 0); + plat_ic_set_interrupt_pending(map->intr); + + /* + * Leaving the same interrupt pending also means that the same interrupt + * can target this PE again as soon as this PE leaves EL3. Whether and + * how often that happens depends on the implementation of GIC. + * + * We therefore call a platform handler to resolve this situation. + */ + plat_sdei_handle_masked_trigger(my_mpidr, map->intr); + + /* This PE is masked. We EOI the interrupt, as it can't be delegated */ + plat_ic_end_of_interrupt(intr_raw); +} + +/* SDEI main interrupt handler */ +int sdei_intr_handler(uint32_t intr_raw, uint32_t flags, void *handle, + void *cookie) +{ + sdei_entry_t *se; + cpu_context_t *ctx; + sdei_ev_map_t *map; + const sdei_dispatch_context_t *disp_ctx; + unsigned int sec_state; + sdei_cpu_state_t *state; + uint32_t intr; + jmp_buf dispatch_jmp; + const uint64_t mpidr = read_mpidr_el1(); + + /* + * To handle an event, the following conditions must be true: + * + * 1. Event must be signalled + * 2. Event must be enabled + * 3. This PE must be a target PE for the event + * 4. PE must be unmasked for SDEI + * 5. If this is a normal event, no event must be running + * 6. If this is a critical event, no critical event must be running + * + * (1) and (2) are true when this function is running + * (3) is enforced in GIC by selecting the appropriate routing option + * (4) is satisfied by client calling PE_UNMASK + * (5) and (6) is enforced using interrupt priority, the RPR, in GIC: + * - Normal SDEI events belong to Normal SDE priority class + * - Critical SDEI events belong to Critical CSDE priority class + * + * The interrupt has already been acknowledged, and therefore is active, + * so no other PE can handle this event while we are at it. + * + * Find if this is an SDEI interrupt. There must be an event mapped to + * this interrupt + */ + intr = plat_ic_get_interrupt_id(intr_raw); + map = find_event_map_by_intr(intr, (plat_ic_is_spi(intr) != 0)); + if (map == NULL) { + ERROR("No SDEI map for interrupt %u\n", intr); + panic(); + } + + /* + * Received interrupt number must either correspond to event 0, or must + * be bound interrupt. + */ + assert((map->ev_num == SDEI_EVENT_0) || is_map_bound(map)); + + se = get_event_entry(map); + state = sdei_get_this_pe_state(); + + if (state->pe_masked) { + /* + * Interrupts received while this PE was masked can't be + * dispatched. + */ + SDEI_LOG("interrupt %u on %" PRIx64 " while PE masked\n", + map->intr, mpidr); + if (is_event_shared(map)) + sdei_map_lock(map); + + handle_masked_trigger(map, se, state, intr_raw); + + if (is_event_shared(map)) + sdei_map_unlock(map); + + return 0; + } + + /* Insert load barrier for signalled SDEI event */ + if (map->ev_num == SDEI_EVENT_0) + dmbld(); + + if (is_event_shared(map)) + sdei_map_lock(map); + + /* Assert shared event routed to this PE had been configured so */ + if (is_event_shared(map) && (se->reg_flags == SDEI_REGF_RM_PE)) { + assert(se->affinity == (mpidr & MPIDR_AFFINITY_MASK)); + } + + if (!can_sdei_state_trans(se, DO_DISPATCH)) { + SDEI_LOG("SDEI event 0x%x can't be dispatched; state=0x%x\n", + map->ev_num, se->state); + + /* + * If the event is registered, leave the interrupt pending so + * that it's delivered when the event is enabled. + */ + if (GET_EV_STATE(se, REGISTERED)) + plat_ic_set_interrupt_pending(map->intr); + + /* + * The interrupt was disabled or unregistered after the handler + * started to execute, which means now the interrupt is already + * disabled and we just need to EOI the interrupt. + */ + plat_ic_end_of_interrupt(intr_raw); + + if (is_event_shared(map)) + sdei_map_unlock(map); + + return 0; + } + + disp_ctx = get_outstanding_dispatch(); + if (is_event_critical(map)) { + /* + * If this event is Critical, and if there's an outstanding + * dispatch, assert the latter is a Normal dispatch. Critical + * events can preempt an outstanding Normal event dispatch. + */ + if (disp_ctx != NULL) + assert(is_event_normal(disp_ctx->map)); + } else { + /* + * If this event is Normal, assert that there are no outstanding + * dispatches. Normal events can't preempt any outstanding event + * dispatches. + */ + assert(disp_ctx == NULL); + } + + sec_state = get_interrupt_src_ss(flags); + + if (is_event_shared(map)) + sdei_map_unlock(map); + + SDEI_LOG("ACK %" PRIx64 ", ev:0x%x ss:%d spsr:%lx ELR:%lx\n", + mpidr, map->ev_num, sec_state, read_spsr_el3(), read_elr_el3()); + + ctx = handle; + + /* + * Check if we interrupted secure state. Perform a context switch so + * that we can delegate to NS. + */ + if (sec_state == SECURE) { + save_secure_context(); + ctx = restore_and_resume_ns_context(); + } + + /* Synchronously dispatch event */ + setup_ns_dispatch(map, se, ctx, &dispatch_jmp); + begin_sdei_synchronous_dispatch(&dispatch_jmp); + + /* + * We reach here when client completes the event. + * + * If the cause of dispatch originally interrupted the Secure world, + * resume Secure. + * + * No need to save the Non-secure context ahead of a world switch: the + * Non-secure context was fully saved before dispatch, and has been + * returned to its pre-dispatch state. + */ + if (sec_state == SECURE) + restore_and_resume_secure_context(); + + /* + * The event was dispatched after receiving SDEI interrupt. With + * the event handling completed, EOI the corresponding + * interrupt. + */ + if ((map->ev_num != SDEI_EVENT_0) && !is_map_bound(map)) { + ERROR("Invalid SDEI mapping: ev=0x%x\n", map->ev_num); + panic(); + } + plat_ic_end_of_interrupt(intr_raw); + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Explicitly dispatch the given SDEI event. + * + * When calling this API, the caller must be prepared for the SDEI dispatcher to + * restore and make Non-secure context as active. This call returns only after + * the client has completed the dispatch. Then, the Non-secure context will be + * active, and the following ERET will return to Non-secure. + * + * Should the caller require re-entry to Secure, it must restore the Secure + * context and program registers for ERET. + */ +int sdei_dispatch_event(int ev_num) +{ + sdei_entry_t *se; + sdei_ev_map_t *map; + cpu_context_t *ns_ctx; + sdei_dispatch_context_t *disp_ctx; + sdei_cpu_state_t *state; + jmp_buf dispatch_jmp; + + /* Can't dispatch if events are masked on this PE */ + state = sdei_get_this_pe_state(); + if (state->pe_masked) + return -1; + + /* Event 0 can't be dispatched */ + if (ev_num == SDEI_EVENT_0) + return -1; + + /* Locate mapping corresponding to this event */ + map = find_event_map(ev_num); + if (map == NULL) + return -1; + + /* Only explicit events can be dispatched */ + if (!is_map_explicit(map)) + return -1; + + /* Examine state of dispatch stack */ + disp_ctx = get_outstanding_dispatch(); + if (disp_ctx != NULL) { + /* + * There's an outstanding dispatch. If the outstanding dispatch + * is critical, no more dispatches are possible. + */ + if (is_event_critical(disp_ctx->map)) + return -1; + + /* + * If the outstanding dispatch is Normal, only critical events + * can be dispatched. + */ + if (is_event_normal(map)) + return -1; + } + + se = get_event_entry(map); + if (!can_sdei_state_trans(se, DO_DISPATCH)) + return -1; + + /* + * Prepare for NS dispatch by restoring the Non-secure context and + * marking that as active. + */ + ns_ctx = restore_and_resume_ns_context(); + + /* Activate the priority corresponding to the event being dispatched */ + ehf_activate_priority(sdei_event_priority(map)); + + /* Dispatch event synchronously */ + setup_ns_dispatch(map, se, ns_ctx, &dispatch_jmp); + begin_sdei_synchronous_dispatch(&dispatch_jmp); + + /* + * We reach here when client completes the event. + * + * Deactivate the priority level that was activated at the time of + * explicit dispatch. + */ + ehf_deactivate_priority(sdei_event_priority(map)); + + return 0; +} + +static void end_sdei_synchronous_dispatch(jmp_buf *buffer) +{ + longjmp(*buffer, 1); +} + +int sdei_event_complete(bool resume, uint64_t pc) +{ + sdei_dispatch_context_t *disp_ctx; + sdei_entry_t *se; + sdei_ev_map_t *map; + cpu_context_t *ctx; + sdei_action_t act; + unsigned int client_el = sdei_client_el(); + + /* Return error if called without an active event */ + disp_ctx = get_outstanding_dispatch(); + if (disp_ctx == NULL) + return SDEI_EDENY; + + /* Validate resumption point */ + if (resume && (plat_sdei_validate_entry_point(pc, client_el) != 0)) + return SDEI_EDENY; + + map = disp_ctx->map; + assert(map != NULL); + se = get_event_entry(map); + + if (is_event_shared(map)) + sdei_map_lock(map); + + act = resume ? DO_COMPLETE_RESUME : DO_COMPLETE; + if (!can_sdei_state_trans(se, act)) { + if (is_event_shared(map)) + sdei_map_unlock(map); + return SDEI_EDENY; + } + + if (is_event_shared(map)) + sdei_map_unlock(map); + + /* Having done sanity checks, pop dispatch */ + (void) pop_dispatch(); + + SDEI_LOG("EOI:%lx, %d spsr:%lx elr:%lx\n", read_mpidr_el1(), + map->ev_num, read_spsr_el3(), read_elr_el3()); + + /* + * Restore Non-secure to how it was originally interrupted. Once done, + * it's up-to-date with the saved copy. + */ + ctx = cm_get_context(NON_SECURE); + restore_event_ctx(disp_ctx, ctx); + + if (resume) { + /* + * Complete-and-resume call. Prepare the Non-secure context + * (currently active) for complete and resume. + */ + cm_set_elr_spsr_el3(NON_SECURE, pc, SPSR_64(client_el, + MODE_SP_ELX, DISABLE_ALL_EXCEPTIONS)); + + /* + * Make it look as if a synchronous exception were taken at the + * supplied Non-secure resumption point. Populate SPSR and + * ELR_ELx so that an ERET from there works as expected. + * + * The assumption is that the client, if necessary, would have + * saved any live content in these registers before making this + * call. + */ + if (client_el == MODE_EL2) { + write_elr_el2(disp_ctx->elr_el3); + write_spsr_el2(disp_ctx->spsr_el3); + } else { + /* EL1 */ + write_elr_el1(disp_ctx->elr_el3); + write_spsr_el1(disp_ctx->spsr_el3); + } + } + + /* End the outstanding dispatch */ + end_sdei_synchronous_dispatch(disp_ctx->dispatch_jmp); + + return 0; +} + +int64_t sdei_event_context(void *handle, unsigned int param) +{ + sdei_dispatch_context_t *disp_ctx; + + if (param >= SDEI_SAVED_GPREGS) + return SDEI_EINVAL; + + /* Get outstanding dispatch on this CPU */ + disp_ctx = get_outstanding_dispatch(); + if (disp_ctx == NULL) + return SDEI_EDENY; + + assert(disp_ctx->map != NULL); + + if (!can_sdei_state_trans(get_event_entry(disp_ctx->map), DO_CONTEXT)) + return SDEI_EDENY; + + /* + * No locking is required for the Running status as this is the only CPU + * which can complete the event + */ + + return (int64_t) disp_ctx->x[param]; +} diff --git a/services/std_svc/sdei/sdei_main.c b/services/std_svc/sdei/sdei_main.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..59a1673 --- /dev/null +++ b/services/std_svc/sdei/sdei_main.c @@ -0,0 +1,1112 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2017-2020, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +#include <arch_helpers.h> +#include <assert.h> +#include <inttypes.h> +#include <stddef.h> +#include <stdint.h> +#include <string.h> + +#include <bl31/bl31.h> +#include <bl31/ehf.h> +#include <bl31/interrupt_mgmt.h> +#include <common/bl_common.h> +#include <common/debug.h> +#include <common/runtime_svc.h> +#include <context.h> +#include <lib/cassert.h> +#include <lib/el3_runtime/pubsub.h> +#include <lib/utils.h> +#include <plat/common/platform.h> +#include <services/sdei.h> + +#include "sdei_private.h" + +#define MAJOR_VERSION 1ULL +#define MINOR_VERSION 0ULL +#define VENDOR_VERSION 0ULL + +#define MAKE_SDEI_VERSION(_major, _minor, _vendor) \ + ((((_major)) << 48ULL) | (((_minor)) << 32ULL) | (_vendor)) + +#define LOWEST_INTR_PRIORITY 0xff + +CASSERT(PLAT_SDEI_CRITICAL_PRI < PLAT_SDEI_NORMAL_PRI, + sdei_critical_must_have_higher_priority); + +static unsigned int num_dyn_priv_slots, num_dyn_shrd_slots; + +/* Initialise SDEI map entries */ +static void init_map(sdei_ev_map_t *map) +{ + map->reg_count = 0; +} + +/* Convert mapping to SDEI class */ +static sdei_class_t map_to_class(sdei_ev_map_t *map) +{ + return is_event_critical(map) ? SDEI_CRITICAL : SDEI_NORMAL; +} + +/* Clear SDEI event entries except state */ +static void clear_event_entries(sdei_entry_t *se) +{ + se->ep = 0; + se->arg = 0; + se->affinity = 0; + se->reg_flags = 0; +} + +/* Perform CPU-specific state initialisation */ +static void *sdei_cpu_on_init(const void *arg) +{ + unsigned int i; + sdei_ev_map_t *map; + sdei_entry_t *se; + + /* Initialize private mappings on this CPU */ + for_each_private_map(i, map) { + se = get_event_entry(map); + clear_event_entries(se); + se->state = 0; + } + + SDEI_LOG("Private events initialized on %lx\n", read_mpidr_el1()); + + /* All PEs start with SDEI events masked */ + (void) sdei_pe_mask(); + + return NULL; +} + +/* CPU initialisation after wakeup from suspend */ +static void *sdei_cpu_wakeup_init(const void *arg) +{ + SDEI_LOG("Events masked on %lx\n", read_mpidr_el1()); + + /* All PEs wake up with SDEI events masked */ + sdei_pe_mask(); + + return 0; +} + +/* Initialise an SDEI class */ +static void sdei_class_init(sdei_class_t class) +{ + unsigned int i; + bool zero_found __unused = false; + int ev_num_so_far __unused; + sdei_ev_map_t *map; + + /* Sanity check and configuration of shared events */ + ev_num_so_far = -1; + for_each_shared_map(i, map) { +#if ENABLE_ASSERTIONS + /* Ensure mappings are sorted */ + assert((ev_num_so_far < 0) || (map->ev_num > ev_num_so_far)); + + ev_num_so_far = map->ev_num; + + /* Event 0 must not be shared */ + assert(map->ev_num != SDEI_EVENT_0); + + /* Check for valid event */ + assert(map->ev_num >= 0); + + /* Make sure it's a shared event */ + assert(is_event_shared(map)); + + /* No shared mapping should have signalable property */ + assert(!is_event_signalable(map)); + + /* Shared mappings can't be explicit */ + assert(!is_map_explicit(map)); +#endif + + /* Skip initializing the wrong priority */ + if (map_to_class(map) != class) + continue; + + /* Platform events are always bound, so set the bound flag */ + if (is_map_dynamic(map)) { + assert(map->intr == SDEI_DYN_IRQ); + assert(is_event_normal(map)); + num_dyn_shrd_slots++; + } else { + /* Shared mappings must be bound to shared interrupt */ + assert(plat_ic_is_spi(map->intr) != 0); + set_map_bound(map); + } + + init_map(map); + } + + /* Sanity check and configuration of private events for this CPU */ + ev_num_so_far = -1; + for_each_private_map(i, map) { +#if ENABLE_ASSERTIONS + /* Ensure mappings are sorted */ + assert((ev_num_so_far < 0) || (map->ev_num > ev_num_so_far)); + + ev_num_so_far = map->ev_num; + + if (map->ev_num == SDEI_EVENT_0) { + zero_found = true; + + /* Event 0 must be a Secure SGI */ + assert(is_secure_sgi(map->intr)); + + /* + * Event 0 can have only have signalable flag (apart + * from being private + */ + assert(map->map_flags == (SDEI_MAPF_SIGNALABLE | + SDEI_MAPF_PRIVATE)); + } else { + /* No other mapping should have signalable property */ + assert(!is_event_signalable(map)); + } + + /* Check for valid event */ + assert(map->ev_num >= 0); + + /* Make sure it's a private event */ + assert(is_event_private(map)); + + /* + * Other than priority, explicit events can only have explicit + * and private flags set. + */ + if (is_map_explicit(map)) { + assert((map->map_flags | SDEI_MAPF_CRITICAL) == + (SDEI_MAPF_EXPLICIT | SDEI_MAPF_PRIVATE + | SDEI_MAPF_CRITICAL)); + } +#endif + + /* Skip initializing the wrong priority */ + if (map_to_class(map) != class) + continue; + + /* Platform events are always bound, so set the bound flag */ + if (map->ev_num != SDEI_EVENT_0) { + if (is_map_dynamic(map)) { + assert(map->intr == SDEI_DYN_IRQ); + assert(is_event_normal(map)); + num_dyn_priv_slots++; + } else if (is_map_explicit(map)) { + /* + * Explicit mappings don't have a backing + * SDEI interrupt, but verify that anyway. + */ + assert(map->intr == SDEI_DYN_IRQ); + } else { + /* + * Private mappings must be bound to private + * interrupt. + */ + assert(plat_ic_is_ppi((unsigned) map->intr) != 0); + set_map_bound(map); + } + } + + init_map(map); + } + + /* Ensure event 0 is in the mapping */ + assert(zero_found); + + (void) sdei_cpu_on_init(NULL); +} + +/* SDEI dispatcher initialisation */ +void sdei_init(void) +{ + plat_sdei_setup(); + sdei_class_init(SDEI_CRITICAL); + sdei_class_init(SDEI_NORMAL); + + /* Register priority level handlers */ + ehf_register_priority_handler(PLAT_SDEI_CRITICAL_PRI, + sdei_intr_handler); + ehf_register_priority_handler(PLAT_SDEI_NORMAL_PRI, + sdei_intr_handler); +} + +/* Populate SDEI event entry */ +static void set_sdei_entry(sdei_entry_t *se, uint64_t ep, uint64_t arg, + unsigned int flags, uint64_t affinity) +{ + assert(se != NULL); + + se->ep = ep; + se->arg = arg; + se->affinity = (affinity & MPIDR_AFFINITY_MASK); + se->reg_flags = flags; +} + +static uint64_t sdei_version(void) +{ + return MAKE_SDEI_VERSION(MAJOR_VERSION, MINOR_VERSION, VENDOR_VERSION); +} + +/* Validate flags and MPIDR values for REGISTER and ROUTING_SET calls */ +static int validate_flags(uint64_t flags, uint64_t mpidr) +{ + /* Validate flags */ + switch (flags) { + case SDEI_REGF_RM_PE: + if (!is_valid_mpidr(mpidr)) + return SDEI_EINVAL; + break; + case SDEI_REGF_RM_ANY: + break; + default: + /* Unknown flags */ + return SDEI_EINVAL; + } + + return 0; +} + +/* Set routing of an SDEI event */ +static int sdei_event_routing_set(int ev_num, uint64_t flags, uint64_t mpidr) +{ + int ret; + unsigned int routing; + sdei_ev_map_t *map; + sdei_entry_t *se; + + ret = validate_flags(flags, mpidr); + if (ret != 0) + return ret; + + /* Check if valid event number */ + map = find_event_map(ev_num); + if (map == NULL) + return SDEI_EINVAL; + + /* The event must not be private */ + if (is_event_private(map)) + return SDEI_EINVAL; + + se = get_event_entry(map); + + sdei_map_lock(map); + + if (!is_map_bound(map) || is_event_private(map)) { + ret = SDEI_EINVAL; + goto finish; + } + + if (!can_sdei_state_trans(se, DO_ROUTING)) { + ret = SDEI_EDENY; + goto finish; + } + + /* Choose appropriate routing */ + routing = (unsigned int) ((flags == SDEI_REGF_RM_ANY) ? + INTR_ROUTING_MODE_ANY : INTR_ROUTING_MODE_PE); + + /* Update event registration flag */ + se->reg_flags = (unsigned int) flags; + if (flags == SDEI_REGF_RM_PE) { + se->affinity = (mpidr & MPIDR_AFFINITY_MASK); + } + + /* + * ROUTING_SET is permissible only when event composite state is + * 'registered, disabled, and not running'. This means that the + * interrupt is currently disabled, and not active. + */ + plat_ic_set_spi_routing(map->intr, routing, (u_register_t) mpidr); + +finish: + sdei_map_unlock(map); + + return ret; +} + +/* Register handler and argument for an SDEI event */ +static int64_t sdei_event_register(int ev_num, + uint64_t ep, + uint64_t arg, + uint64_t flags, + uint64_t mpidr) +{ + int ret; + unsigned int routing; + sdei_entry_t *se; + sdei_ev_map_t *map; + sdei_state_t backup_state; + + if ((ep == 0U) || (plat_sdei_validate_entry_point( + ep, sdei_client_el()) != 0)) { + return SDEI_EINVAL; + } + + ret = validate_flags(flags, mpidr); + if (ret != 0) + return ret; + + /* Check if valid event number */ + map = find_event_map(ev_num); + if (map == NULL) + return SDEI_EINVAL; + + /* Private events always target the PE */ + if (is_event_private(map)) { + /* + * SDEI internally handles private events in the same manner + * as public events with routing mode=RM_PE, since the routing + * mode flag and affinity fields are not used when registering + * a private event, set them here. + */ + flags = SDEI_REGF_RM_PE; + /* + * Kernel may pass 0 as mpidr, as we set flags to + * SDEI_REGF_RM_PE, so set mpidr also. + */ + mpidr = read_mpidr_el1(); + } + + se = get_event_entry(map); + + /* + * Even though register operation is per-event (additionally for private + * events, registration is required individually), it has to be + * serialised with respect to bind/release, which are global operations. + * So we hold the lock throughout, unconditionally. + */ + sdei_map_lock(map); + + backup_state = se->state; + if (!can_sdei_state_trans(se, DO_REGISTER)) + goto fallback; + + /* + * When registering for dynamic events, make sure it's been bound + * already. This has to be the case as, without binding, the client + * can't know about the event number to register for. + */ + if (is_map_dynamic(map) && !is_map_bound(map)) + goto fallback; + + if (is_event_private(map)) { + /* Multiple calls to register are possible for private events */ + assert(map->reg_count >= 0); + } else { + /* Only single call to register is possible for shared events */ + assert(map->reg_count == 0); + } + + if (is_map_bound(map)) { + /* Meanwhile, did any PE ACK the interrupt? */ + if (plat_ic_get_interrupt_active(map->intr) != 0U) + goto fallback; + + /* The interrupt must currently owned by Non-secure */ + if (plat_ic_get_interrupt_type(map->intr) != INTR_TYPE_NS) + goto fallback; + + /* + * Disable forwarding of new interrupt triggers to CPU + * interface. + */ + plat_ic_disable_interrupt(map->intr); + + /* + * Any events that are triggered after register and before + * enable should remain pending. Clear any previous interrupt + * triggers which are pending (except for SGIs). This has no + * affect on level-triggered interrupts. + */ + if (ev_num != SDEI_EVENT_0) + plat_ic_clear_interrupt_pending(map->intr); + + /* Map interrupt to EL3 and program the correct priority */ + plat_ic_set_interrupt_type(map->intr, INTR_TYPE_EL3); + + /* Program the appropriate interrupt priority */ + plat_ic_set_interrupt_priority(map->intr, sdei_event_priority(map)); + + /* + * Set the routing mode for shared event as requested. We + * already ensure that shared events get bound to SPIs. + */ + if (is_event_shared(map)) { + routing = (unsigned int) ((flags == SDEI_REGF_RM_ANY) ? + INTR_ROUTING_MODE_ANY : INTR_ROUTING_MODE_PE); + plat_ic_set_spi_routing(map->intr, routing, + (u_register_t) mpidr); + } + } + + /* Populate event entries */ + set_sdei_entry(se, ep, arg, (unsigned int) flags, mpidr); + + /* Increment register count */ + map->reg_count++; + + sdei_map_unlock(map); + + return 0; + +fallback: + /* Reinstate previous state */ + se->state = backup_state; + + sdei_map_unlock(map); + + return SDEI_EDENY; +} + +/* Enable SDEI event */ +static int64_t sdei_event_enable(int ev_num) +{ + sdei_ev_map_t *map; + sdei_entry_t *se; + int ret; + bool before, after; + + /* Check if valid event number */ + map = find_event_map(ev_num); + if (map == NULL) + return SDEI_EINVAL; + + se = get_event_entry(map); + ret = SDEI_EDENY; + + if (is_event_shared(map)) + sdei_map_lock(map); + + before = GET_EV_STATE(se, ENABLED); + if (!can_sdei_state_trans(se, DO_ENABLE)) + goto finish; + after = GET_EV_STATE(se, ENABLED); + + /* + * Enable interrupt for bound events only if there's a change in enabled + * state. + */ + if (is_map_bound(map) && (!before && after)) + plat_ic_enable_interrupt(map->intr); + + ret = 0; + +finish: + if (is_event_shared(map)) + sdei_map_unlock(map); + + return ret; +} + +/* Disable SDEI event */ +static int sdei_event_disable(int ev_num) +{ + sdei_ev_map_t *map; + sdei_entry_t *se; + int ret; + bool before, after; + + /* Check if valid event number */ + map = find_event_map(ev_num); + if (map == NULL) + return SDEI_EINVAL; + + se = get_event_entry(map); + ret = SDEI_EDENY; + + if (is_event_shared(map)) + sdei_map_lock(map); + + before = GET_EV_STATE(se, ENABLED); + if (!can_sdei_state_trans(se, DO_DISABLE)) + goto finish; + after = GET_EV_STATE(se, ENABLED); + + /* + * Disable interrupt for bound events only if there's a change in + * enabled state. + */ + if (is_map_bound(map) && (before && !after)) + plat_ic_disable_interrupt(map->intr); + + ret = 0; + +finish: + if (is_event_shared(map)) + sdei_map_unlock(map); + + return ret; +} + +/* Query SDEI event information */ +static int64_t sdei_event_get_info(int ev_num, int info) +{ + sdei_entry_t *se; + sdei_ev_map_t *map; + + uint64_t flags; + bool registered; + uint64_t affinity; + + /* Check if valid event number */ + map = find_event_map(ev_num); + if (map == NULL) + return SDEI_EINVAL; + + se = get_event_entry(map); + + if (is_event_shared(map)) + sdei_map_lock(map); + + /* Sample state under lock */ + registered = GET_EV_STATE(se, REGISTERED); + flags = se->reg_flags; + affinity = se->affinity; + + if (is_event_shared(map)) + sdei_map_unlock(map); + + switch (info) { + case SDEI_INFO_EV_TYPE: + return is_event_shared(map); + + case SDEI_INFO_EV_NOT_SIGNALED: + return !is_event_signalable(map); + + case SDEI_INFO_EV_PRIORITY: + return is_event_critical(map); + + case SDEI_INFO_EV_ROUTING_MODE: + if (!is_event_shared(map)) + return SDEI_EINVAL; + if (!registered) + return SDEI_EDENY; + return (flags == SDEI_REGF_RM_PE); + + case SDEI_INFO_EV_ROUTING_AFF: + if (!is_event_shared(map)) + return SDEI_EINVAL; + if (!registered) + return SDEI_EDENY; + if (flags != SDEI_REGF_RM_PE) + return SDEI_EINVAL; + return affinity; + + default: + return SDEI_EINVAL; + } +} + +/* Unregister an SDEI event */ +static int sdei_event_unregister(int ev_num) +{ + int ret = 0; + sdei_entry_t *se; + sdei_ev_map_t *map; + + /* Check if valid event number */ + map = find_event_map(ev_num); + if (map == NULL) + return SDEI_EINVAL; + + se = get_event_entry(map); + + /* + * Even though unregister operation is per-event (additionally for + * private events, unregistration is required individually), it has to + * be serialised with respect to bind/release, which are global + * operations. So we hold the lock throughout, unconditionally. + */ + sdei_map_lock(map); + + if (!can_sdei_state_trans(se, DO_UNREGISTER)) { + /* + * Even if the call is invalid, and the handler is running (for + * example, having unregistered from a running handler earlier), + * return pending error code; otherwise, return deny. + */ + ret = GET_EV_STATE(se, RUNNING) ? SDEI_EPEND : SDEI_EDENY; + + goto finish; + } + + map->reg_count--; + if (is_event_private(map)) { + /* Multiple calls to register are possible for private events */ + assert(map->reg_count >= 0); + } else { + /* Only single call to register is possible for shared events */ + assert(map->reg_count == 0); + } + + if (is_map_bound(map)) { + plat_ic_disable_interrupt(map->intr); + + /* + * Clear pending interrupt. Skip for SGIs as they may not be + * cleared on interrupt controllers. + */ + if (ev_num != SDEI_EVENT_0) + plat_ic_clear_interrupt_pending(map->intr); + + assert(plat_ic_get_interrupt_type(map->intr) == INTR_TYPE_EL3); + plat_ic_set_interrupt_type(map->intr, INTR_TYPE_NS); + plat_ic_set_interrupt_priority(map->intr, LOWEST_INTR_PRIORITY); + } + + clear_event_entries(se); + + /* + * If the handler is running at the time of unregister, return the + * pending error code. + */ + if (GET_EV_STATE(se, RUNNING)) + ret = SDEI_EPEND; + +finish: + sdei_map_unlock(map); + + return ret; +} + +/* Query status of an SDEI event */ +static int sdei_event_status(int ev_num) +{ + sdei_ev_map_t *map; + sdei_entry_t *se; + sdei_state_t state; + + /* Check if valid event number */ + map = find_event_map(ev_num); + if (map == NULL) + return SDEI_EINVAL; + + se = get_event_entry(map); + + if (is_event_shared(map)) + sdei_map_lock(map); + + /* State value directly maps to the expected return format */ + state = se->state; + + if (is_event_shared(map)) + sdei_map_unlock(map); + + return (int) state; +} + +/* Bind an SDEI event to an interrupt */ +static int sdei_interrupt_bind(unsigned int intr_num) +{ + sdei_ev_map_t *map; + bool retry = true, shared_mapping; + + /* Interrupt must be either PPI or SPI */ + if (!(plat_ic_is_ppi(intr_num) || plat_ic_is_spi(intr_num))) + return SDEI_EINVAL; + + shared_mapping = (plat_ic_is_spi(intr_num) != 0); + do { + /* + * Bail out if there is already an event for this interrupt, + * either platform-defined or dynamic. + */ + map = find_event_map_by_intr(intr_num, shared_mapping); + if (map != NULL) { + if (is_map_dynamic(map)) { + if (is_map_bound(map)) { + /* + * Dynamic event, already bound. Return + * event number. + */ + return map->ev_num; + } + } else { + /* Binding non-dynamic event */ + return SDEI_EINVAL; + } + } + + /* + * The interrupt is not bound yet. Try to find a free slot to + * bind it. Free dynamic mappings have their interrupt set as + * SDEI_DYN_IRQ. + */ + map = find_event_map_by_intr(SDEI_DYN_IRQ, shared_mapping); + if (map == NULL) + return SDEI_ENOMEM; + + /* The returned mapping must be dynamic */ + assert(is_map_dynamic(map)); + + /* + * We cannot assert for bound maps here, as we might be racing + * with another bind. + */ + + /* The requested interrupt must already belong to NS */ + if (plat_ic_get_interrupt_type(intr_num) != INTR_TYPE_NS) + return SDEI_EDENY; + + /* + * Interrupt programming and ownership transfer are deferred + * until register. + */ + + sdei_map_lock(map); + if (!is_map_bound(map)) { + map->intr = intr_num; + set_map_bound(map); + retry = false; + } + sdei_map_unlock(map); + } while (retry); + + return map->ev_num; +} + +/* Release a bound SDEI event previously to an interrupt */ +static int sdei_interrupt_release(int ev_num) +{ + int ret = 0; + sdei_ev_map_t *map; + sdei_entry_t *se; + + /* Check if valid event number */ + map = find_event_map(ev_num); + if (map == NULL) + return SDEI_EINVAL; + + if (!is_map_dynamic(map)) + return SDEI_EINVAL; + + se = get_event_entry(map); + + sdei_map_lock(map); + + /* Event must have been unregistered before release */ + if (map->reg_count != 0) { + ret = SDEI_EDENY; + goto finish; + } + + /* + * Interrupt release never causes the state to change. We only check + * whether it's permissible or not. + */ + if (!can_sdei_state_trans(se, DO_RELEASE)) { + ret = SDEI_EDENY; + goto finish; + } + + if (is_map_bound(map)) { + /* + * Deny release if the interrupt is active, which means it's + * probably being acknowledged and handled elsewhere. + */ + if (plat_ic_get_interrupt_active(map->intr) != 0U) { + ret = SDEI_EDENY; + goto finish; + } + + /* + * Interrupt programming and ownership transfer are already done + * during unregister. + */ + + map->intr = SDEI_DYN_IRQ; + clr_map_bound(map); + } else { + SDEI_LOG("Error release bound:%d cnt:%d\n", is_map_bound(map), + map->reg_count); + ret = SDEI_EINVAL; + } + +finish: + sdei_map_unlock(map); + + return ret; +} + +/* Perform reset of private SDEI events */ +static int sdei_private_reset(void) +{ + sdei_ev_map_t *map; + int ret = 0, final_ret = 0; + unsigned int i; + + /* Unregister all private events */ + for_each_private_map(i, map) { + /* + * The unregister can fail if the event is not registered, which + * is allowed, and a deny will be returned. But if the event is + * running or unregister pending, the call fails. + */ + ret = sdei_event_unregister(map->ev_num); + if ((ret == SDEI_EPEND) && (final_ret == 0)) + final_ret = SDEI_EDENY; + } + + return final_ret; +} + +/* Perform reset of shared SDEI events */ +static int sdei_shared_reset(void) +{ + const sdei_mapping_t *mapping; + sdei_ev_map_t *map; + int ret = 0, final_ret = 0; + unsigned int i, j; + + /* Unregister all shared events */ + for_each_shared_map(i, map) { + /* + * The unregister can fail if the event is not registered, which + * is allowed, and a deny will be returned. But if the event is + * running or unregister pending, the call fails. + */ + ret = sdei_event_unregister(map->ev_num); + if ((ret == SDEI_EPEND) && (final_ret == 0)) + final_ret = SDEI_EDENY; + } + + if (final_ret != 0) + return final_ret; + + /* + * Loop through both private and shared mappings, and release all + * bindings. + */ + for_each_mapping_type(i, mapping) { + iterate_mapping(mapping, j, map) { + /* + * Release bindings for mappings that are dynamic and + * bound. + */ + if (is_map_dynamic(map) && is_map_bound(map)) { + /* + * Any failure to release would mean there is at + * least a PE registered for the event. + */ + ret = sdei_interrupt_release(map->ev_num); + if ((ret != 0) && (final_ret == 0)) + final_ret = ret; + } + } + } + + return final_ret; +} + +/* Send a signal to another SDEI client PE */ +static int sdei_signal(int ev_num, uint64_t target_pe) +{ + sdei_ev_map_t *map; + + /* Only event 0 can be signalled */ + if (ev_num != SDEI_EVENT_0) + return SDEI_EINVAL; + + /* Find mapping for event 0 */ + map = find_event_map(SDEI_EVENT_0); + if (map == NULL) + return SDEI_EINVAL; + + /* The event must be signalable */ + if (!is_event_signalable(map)) + return SDEI_EINVAL; + + /* Validate target */ + if (!is_valid_mpidr(target_pe)) + return SDEI_EINVAL; + + /* Raise SGI. Platform will validate target_pe */ + plat_ic_raise_el3_sgi((int) map->intr, (u_register_t) target_pe); + + return 0; +} + +/* Query SDEI dispatcher features */ +static uint64_t sdei_features(unsigned int feature) +{ + if (feature == SDEI_FEATURE_BIND_SLOTS) { + return FEATURE_BIND_SLOTS(num_dyn_priv_slots, + num_dyn_shrd_slots); + } + + return (uint64_t) SDEI_EINVAL; +} + +/* SDEI top level handler for servicing SMCs */ +uint64_t sdei_smc_handler(uint32_t smc_fid, + uint64_t x1, + uint64_t x2, + uint64_t x3, + uint64_t x4, + void *cookie, + void *handle, + uint64_t flags) +{ + + uint64_t x5; + unsigned int ss = (unsigned int) get_interrupt_src_ss(flags); + int64_t ret; + bool resume = false; + cpu_context_t *ctx = handle; + int ev_num = (int) x1; + + if (ss != NON_SECURE) + SMC_RET1(ctx, SMC_UNK); + + /* Verify the caller EL */ + if (GET_EL(read_spsr_el3()) != sdei_client_el()) + SMC_RET1(ctx, SMC_UNK); + + switch (smc_fid) { + case SDEI_VERSION: + SDEI_LOG("> VER\n"); + ret = (int64_t) sdei_version(); + SDEI_LOG("< VER:%" PRIx64 "\n", ret); + SMC_RET1(ctx, ret); + + case SDEI_EVENT_REGISTER: + x5 = SMC_GET_GP(ctx, CTX_GPREG_X5); + SDEI_LOG("> REG(n:%d e:%" PRIx64 " a:%" PRIx64 " f:%x m:%" PRIx64 "\n", ev_num, + x2, x3, (int) x4, x5); + ret = sdei_event_register(ev_num, x2, x3, x4, x5); + SDEI_LOG("< REG:%" PRId64 "\n", ret); + SMC_RET1(ctx, ret); + + case SDEI_EVENT_ENABLE: + SDEI_LOG("> ENABLE(n:%d)\n", (int) x1); + ret = sdei_event_enable(ev_num); + SDEI_LOG("< ENABLE:%" PRId64 "\n", ret); + SMC_RET1(ctx, ret); + + case SDEI_EVENT_DISABLE: + SDEI_LOG("> DISABLE(n:0x%x)\n", ev_num); + ret = sdei_event_disable(ev_num); + SDEI_LOG("< DISABLE:%" PRId64 "\n", ret); + SMC_RET1(ctx, ret); + + case SDEI_EVENT_CONTEXT: + SDEI_LOG("> CTX(p:%d):%lx\n", (int) x1, read_mpidr_el1()); + ret = sdei_event_context(ctx, (unsigned int) x1); + SDEI_LOG("< CTX:%" PRId64 "\n", ret); + SMC_RET1(ctx, ret); + + case SDEI_EVENT_COMPLETE_AND_RESUME: + resume = true; + /* Fallthrough */ + + case SDEI_EVENT_COMPLETE: + SDEI_LOG("> COMPLETE(r:%u sta/ep:%" PRIx64 "):%lx\n", + (unsigned int) resume, x1, read_mpidr_el1()); + ret = sdei_event_complete(resume, x1); + SDEI_LOG("< COMPLETE:%" PRIx64 "\n", ret); + + /* + * Set error code only if the call failed. If the call + * succeeded, we discard the dispatched context, and restore the + * interrupted context to a pristine condition, and therefore + * shouldn't be modified. We don't return to the caller in this + * case anyway. + */ + if (ret != 0) + SMC_RET1(ctx, ret); + + SMC_RET0(ctx); + + case SDEI_EVENT_STATUS: + SDEI_LOG("> STAT(n:0x%x)\n", ev_num); + ret = sdei_event_status(ev_num); + SDEI_LOG("< STAT:%" PRId64 "\n", ret); + SMC_RET1(ctx, ret); + + case SDEI_EVENT_GET_INFO: + SDEI_LOG("> INFO(n:0x%x, %d)\n", ev_num, (int) x2); + ret = sdei_event_get_info(ev_num, (int) x2); + SDEI_LOG("< INFO:%" PRId64 "\n", ret); + SMC_RET1(ctx, ret); + + case SDEI_EVENT_UNREGISTER: + SDEI_LOG("> UNREG(n:0x%x)\n", ev_num); + ret = sdei_event_unregister(ev_num); + SDEI_LOG("< UNREG:%" PRId64 "\n", ret); + SMC_RET1(ctx, ret); + + case SDEI_PE_UNMASK: + SDEI_LOG("> UNMASK:%lx\n", read_mpidr_el1()); + sdei_pe_unmask(); + SDEI_LOG("< UNMASK:%d\n", 0); + SMC_RET1(ctx, 0); + + case SDEI_PE_MASK: + SDEI_LOG("> MASK:%lx\n", read_mpidr_el1()); + ret = sdei_pe_mask(); + SDEI_LOG("< MASK:%" PRId64 "\n", ret); + SMC_RET1(ctx, ret); + + case SDEI_INTERRUPT_BIND: + SDEI_LOG("> BIND(%d)\n", (int) x1); + ret = sdei_interrupt_bind((unsigned int) x1); + SDEI_LOG("< BIND:%" PRId64 "\n", ret); + SMC_RET1(ctx, ret); + + case SDEI_INTERRUPT_RELEASE: + SDEI_LOG("> REL(0x%x)\n", ev_num); + ret = sdei_interrupt_release(ev_num); + SDEI_LOG("< REL:%" PRId64 "\n", ret); + SMC_RET1(ctx, ret); + + case SDEI_SHARED_RESET: + SDEI_LOG("> S_RESET():%lx\n", read_mpidr_el1()); + ret = sdei_shared_reset(); + SDEI_LOG("< S_RESET:%" PRId64 "\n", ret); + SMC_RET1(ctx, ret); + + case SDEI_PRIVATE_RESET: + SDEI_LOG("> P_RESET():%lx\n", read_mpidr_el1()); + ret = sdei_private_reset(); + SDEI_LOG("< P_RESET:%" PRId64 "\n", ret); + SMC_RET1(ctx, ret); + + case SDEI_EVENT_ROUTING_SET: + SDEI_LOG("> ROUTE_SET(n:%d f:%" PRIx64 " aff:%" PRIx64 ")\n", ev_num, x2, x3); + ret = sdei_event_routing_set(ev_num, x2, x3); + SDEI_LOG("< ROUTE_SET:%" PRId64 "\n", ret); + SMC_RET1(ctx, ret); + + case SDEI_FEATURES: + SDEI_LOG("> FTRS(f:%" PRIx64 ")\n", x1); + ret = (int64_t) sdei_features((unsigned int) x1); + SDEI_LOG("< FTRS:%" PRIx64 "\n", ret); + SMC_RET1(ctx, ret); + + case SDEI_EVENT_SIGNAL: + SDEI_LOG("> SIGNAL(e:%d t:%" PRIx64 ")\n", ev_num, x2); + ret = sdei_signal(ev_num, x2); + SDEI_LOG("< SIGNAL:%" PRId64 "\n", ret); + SMC_RET1(ctx, ret); + + default: + /* Do nothing in default case */ + break; + } + + WARN("Unimplemented SDEI Call: 0x%x\n", smc_fid); + SMC_RET1(ctx, SMC_UNK); +} + +/* Subscribe to PSCI CPU on to initialize per-CPU SDEI configuration */ +SUBSCRIBE_TO_EVENT(psci_cpu_on_finish, sdei_cpu_on_init); + +/* Subscribe to PSCI CPU suspend finisher for per-CPU configuration */ +SUBSCRIBE_TO_EVENT(psci_suspend_pwrdown_finish, sdei_cpu_wakeup_init); diff --git a/services/std_svc/sdei/sdei_private.h b/services/std_svc/sdei/sdei_private.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..44a7301 --- /dev/null +++ b/services/std_svc/sdei/sdei_private.h @@ -0,0 +1,248 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2017-2019, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +#ifndef SDEI_PRIVATE_H +#define SDEI_PRIVATE_H + +#include <errno.h> +#include <stdbool.h> +#include <stdint.h> + +#include <arch_helpers.h> +#include <bl31/interrupt_mgmt.h> +#include <common/debug.h> +#include <context.h> +#include <lib/el3_runtime/context_mgmt.h> +#include <lib/spinlock.h> +#include <lib/utils_def.h> +#include <plat/common/platform.h> +#include <services/sdei.h> +#include <setjmp.h> + +#ifndef __aarch64__ +# error SDEI is implemented only for AArch64 systems +#endif + +#ifndef PLAT_SDEI_CRITICAL_PRI +# error Platform must define SDEI critical priority value +#endif + +#ifndef PLAT_SDEI_NORMAL_PRI +# error Platform must define SDEI normal priority value +#endif + +/* Output SDEI logs as verbose */ +#define SDEI_LOG(...) VERBOSE("SDEI: " __VA_ARGS__) + +/* SDEI handler unregistered state. This is the default state. */ +#define SDEI_STATE_UNREGISTERED 0U + +/* SDE event status values in bit position */ +#define SDEI_STATF_REGISTERED 0U +#define SDEI_STATF_ENABLED 1U +#define SDEI_STATF_RUNNING 2U + +/* SDEI SMC error codes */ +#define SDEI_EINVAL (-2) +#define SDEI_EDENY (-3) +#define SDEI_EPEND (-5) +#define SDEI_ENOMEM (-10) + +/* + * 'info' parameter to SDEI_EVENT_GET_INFO SMC. + * + * Note that the SDEI v1.0 specification mistakenly enumerates the + * SDEI_INFO_EV_SIGNALED as SDEI_INFO_SIGNALED. This will be corrected in a + * future version. + */ +#define SDEI_INFO_EV_TYPE 0 +#define SDEI_INFO_EV_NOT_SIGNALED 1 +#define SDEI_INFO_EV_PRIORITY 2 +#define SDEI_INFO_EV_ROUTING_MODE 3 +#define SDEI_INFO_EV_ROUTING_AFF 4 + +#define SDEI_PRIVATE_MAPPING() (&sdei_global_mappings[SDEI_MAP_IDX_PRIV_]) +#define SDEI_SHARED_MAPPING() (&sdei_global_mappings[SDEI_MAP_IDX_SHRD_]) + +#define for_each_mapping_type(_i, _mapping) \ + for ((_i) = 0, (_mapping) = &sdei_global_mappings[(_i)]; \ + (_i) < SDEI_MAP_IDX_MAX_; \ + (_i)++, (_mapping) = &sdei_global_mappings[(_i)]) + +#define iterate_mapping(_mapping, _i, _map) \ + for ((_map) = (_mapping)->map, (_i) = 0; \ + (_i) < (_mapping)->num_maps; \ + (_i)++, (_map)++) + +#define for_each_private_map(_i, _map) \ + iterate_mapping(SDEI_PRIVATE_MAPPING(), _i, _map) + +#define for_each_shared_map(_i, _map) \ + iterate_mapping(SDEI_SHARED_MAPPING(), _i, _map) + +/* SDEI_FEATURES */ +#define SDEI_FEATURE_BIND_SLOTS 0U +#define BIND_SLOTS_MASK 0xffffU +#define FEATURES_SHARED_SLOTS_SHIFT 16U +#define FEATURES_PRIVATE_SLOTS_SHIFT 0U +#define FEATURE_BIND_SLOTS(_priv, _shrd) \ + (((((uint64_t) (_priv)) & BIND_SLOTS_MASK) << FEATURES_PRIVATE_SLOTS_SHIFT) | \ + ((((uint64_t) (_shrd)) & BIND_SLOTS_MASK) << FEATURES_SHARED_SLOTS_SHIFT)) + +#define GET_EV_STATE(_e, _s) get_ev_state_bit(_e, SDEI_STATF_##_s) +#define SET_EV_STATE(_e, _s) clr_ev_state_bit(_e->state, SDEI_STATF_##_s) + +static inline bool is_event_private(sdei_ev_map_t *map) +{ + return ((map->map_flags & BIT_32(SDEI_MAPF_PRIVATE_SHIFT_)) != 0U); +} + +static inline bool is_event_shared(sdei_ev_map_t *map) +{ + return !is_event_private(map); +} + +static inline bool is_event_critical(sdei_ev_map_t *map) +{ + return ((map->map_flags & BIT_32(SDEI_MAPF_CRITICAL_SHIFT_)) != 0U); +} + +static inline bool is_event_normal(sdei_ev_map_t *map) +{ + return !is_event_critical(map); +} + +static inline bool is_event_signalable(sdei_ev_map_t *map) +{ + return ((map->map_flags & BIT_32(SDEI_MAPF_SIGNALABLE_SHIFT_)) != 0U); +} + +static inline bool is_map_dynamic(sdei_ev_map_t *map) +{ + return ((map->map_flags & BIT_32(SDEI_MAPF_DYNAMIC_SHIFT_)) != 0U); +} + +/* + * Checks whether an event is associated with an interrupt. Static events always + * return true, and dynamic events return whether SDEI_INTERRUPT_BIND had been + * called on them. This can be used on both static or dynamic events to check + * for an associated interrupt. + */ +static inline bool is_map_bound(sdei_ev_map_t *map) +{ + return ((map->map_flags & BIT_32(SDEI_MAPF_BOUND_SHIFT_)) != 0U); +} + +static inline void set_map_bound(sdei_ev_map_t *map) +{ + map->map_flags |= BIT_32(SDEI_MAPF_BOUND_SHIFT_); +} + +static inline bool is_map_explicit(sdei_ev_map_t *map) +{ + return ((map->map_flags & BIT_32(SDEI_MAPF_EXPLICIT_SHIFT_)) != 0U); +} + +static inline void clr_map_bound(sdei_ev_map_t *map) +{ + map->map_flags &= ~BIT_32(SDEI_MAPF_BOUND_SHIFT_); +} + +static inline bool is_secure_sgi(unsigned int intr) +{ + return ((plat_ic_is_sgi(intr) != 0) && + (plat_ic_get_interrupt_type(intr) == INTR_TYPE_EL3)); +} + +/* + * Determine EL of the client. If EL2 is implemented (hence the enabled HCE + * bit), deem EL2; otherwise, deem EL1. + */ +static inline unsigned int sdei_client_el(void) +{ + cpu_context_t *ns_ctx = cm_get_context(NON_SECURE); + el3_state_t *el3_ctx = get_el3state_ctx(ns_ctx); + + return ((read_ctx_reg(el3_ctx, CTX_SCR_EL3) & SCR_HCE_BIT) != 0U) ? + MODE_EL2 : MODE_EL1; +} + +static inline unsigned int sdei_event_priority(sdei_ev_map_t *map) +{ + return (unsigned int) (is_event_critical(map) ? PLAT_SDEI_CRITICAL_PRI : + PLAT_SDEI_NORMAL_PRI); +} + +static inline bool get_ev_state_bit(sdei_entry_t *se, unsigned int bit_no) +{ + return ((se->state & BIT_32(bit_no)) != 0U); +} + +static inline void clr_ev_state_bit(sdei_entry_t *se, unsigned int bit_no) +{ + se->state &= ~BIT_32(bit_no); +} + +/* SDEI actions for state transition */ +typedef enum { + /* + * Actions resulting from client requests. These directly map to SMC + * calls. Note that the state table columns are listed in this order + * too. + */ + DO_REGISTER = 0, + DO_RELEASE = 1, + DO_ENABLE = 2, + DO_DISABLE = 3, + DO_UNREGISTER = 4, + DO_ROUTING = 5, + DO_CONTEXT = 6, + DO_COMPLETE = 7, + DO_COMPLETE_RESUME = 8, + + /* Action for event dispatch */ + DO_DISPATCH = 9, + + DO_MAX, +} sdei_action_t; + +typedef enum { + SDEI_NORMAL, + SDEI_CRITICAL +} sdei_class_t; + +static inline void sdei_map_lock(sdei_ev_map_t *map) +{ + spin_lock(&map->lock); +} + +static inline void sdei_map_unlock(sdei_ev_map_t *map) +{ + spin_unlock(&map->lock); +} + +extern const sdei_mapping_t sdei_global_mappings[]; +extern sdei_entry_t sdei_private_event_table[]; +extern sdei_entry_t sdei_shared_event_table[]; + +void init_sdei_state(void); + +sdei_ev_map_t *find_event_map_by_intr(unsigned int intr_num, bool shared); +sdei_ev_map_t *find_event_map(int ev_num); +sdei_entry_t *get_event_entry(sdei_ev_map_t *map); + +int64_t sdei_event_context(void *handle, unsigned int param); +int sdei_event_complete(bool resume, uint64_t pc); + +void sdei_pe_unmask(void); +int64_t sdei_pe_mask(void); + +int sdei_intr_handler(uint32_t intr_raw, uint32_t flags, void *handle, + void *cookie); +bool can_sdei_state_trans(sdei_entry_t *se, sdei_action_t act); +void begin_sdei_synchronous_dispatch(jmp_buf *buffer); + +#endif /* SDEI_PRIVATE_H */ diff --git a/services/std_svc/sdei/sdei_state.c b/services/std_svc/sdei/sdei_state.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1b448e6 --- /dev/null +++ b/services/std_svc/sdei/sdei_state.c @@ -0,0 +1,150 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2017-2018, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +#include <assert.h> +#include <stdbool.h> + +#include <lib/cassert.h> + +#include "sdei_private.h" + +/* Aliases for SDEI handler states: 'R'unning, 'E'nabled, and re'G'istered */ +#define r_ 0U +#define R_ (1u << SDEI_STATF_RUNNING) + +#define e_ 0U +#define E_ (1u << SDEI_STATF_ENABLED) + +#define g_ 0U +#define G_ (1u << SDEI_STATF_REGISTERED) + +/* All possible composite handler states */ +#define reg_ (r_ | e_ | g_) +#define reG_ (r_ | e_ | G_) +#define rEg_ (r_ | E_ | g_) +#define rEG_ (r_ | E_ | G_) +#define Reg_ (R_ | e_ | g_) +#define ReG_ (R_ | e_ | G_) +#define REg_ (R_ | E_ | g_) +#define REG_ (R_ | E_ | G_) + +#define MAX_STATES (REG_ + 1u) + +/* Invalid state */ +#define SDEI_STATE_INVALID ((sdei_state_t) (-1)) + +/* No change in state */ +#define SDEI_STATE_NOP ((sdei_state_t) (-2)) + +#define X___ SDEI_STATE_INVALID +#define NOP_ SDEI_STATE_NOP + +/* Ensure special states don't overlap with valid ones */ +CASSERT(X___ > REG_, sdei_state_overlap_invalid); +CASSERT(NOP_ > REG_, sdei_state_overlap_nop); + +/* + * SDEI handler state machine: refer to sections 6.1 and 6.1.2 of the SDEI v1.0 + * specification (ARM DEN0054A). + * + * Not all calls contribute to handler state transition. This table is also used + * to validate whether a call is permissible at a given handler state: + * + * - X___ denotes a forbidden transition; + * - NOP_ denotes a permitted transition, but there's no change in state; + * - Otherwise, XXX_ gives the new state. + * + * DISP[atch] is a transition added for the implementation, but is not mentioned + * in the spec. + * + * Those calls that the spec mentions as can be made any time don't picture in + * this table. + */ + +static const sdei_state_t sdei_state_table[MAX_STATES][DO_MAX] = { +/* + * Action: REG REL ENA DISA UREG ROUT CTX COMP COMPR DISP + * Notes: [3] [1] [3] [3][4] [2] + */ + /* Handler unregistered, disabled, and not running. This is the default state. */ +/* 0 */ [reg_] = { reG_, NOP_, X___, X___, X___, X___, X___, X___, X___, X___, }, + + /* Handler unregistered and running */ +/* 4 */ [Reg_] = { X___, X___, X___, X___, X___, X___, NOP_, reg_, reg_, X___, }, + + /* Handler registered */ +/* 1 */ [reG_] = { X___, X___, rEG_, NOP_, reg_, NOP_, X___, X___, X___, X___, }, + + /* Handler registered and running */ +/* 5 */ [ReG_] = { X___, X___, REG_, NOP_, Reg_, X___, NOP_, reG_, reG_, X___, }, + + /* Handler registered and enabled */ +/* 3 */ [rEG_] = { X___, X___, NOP_, reG_, reg_, X___, X___, X___, X___, REG_, }, + + /* Handler registered, enabled, and running */ +/* 7 */ [REG_] = { X___, X___, NOP_, ReG_, Reg_, X___, NOP_, rEG_, rEG_, X___, }, + + /* + * Invalid states: no valid transition would leave the handler in these + * states; and no transition from these states is possible either. + */ + + /* + * Handler can't be enabled without being registered. I.e., XEg is + * impossible. + */ +/* 2 */ [rEg_] = { X___, X___, X___, X___, X___, X___, X___, X___, X___, X___, }, +/* 6 */ [REg_] = { X___, X___, X___, X___, X___, X___, X___, X___, X___, X___, }, +}; + +/* + * [1] Unregister will always also disable the event, so the new state will have + * Xeg. + * [2] Event is considered for dispatch only when it's both registered and + * enabled. + * [3] Never causes change in state. + * [4] Only allowed when running. + */ + +/* + * Given an action, transition the state of an event by looking up the state + * table above: + * + * - Return false for invalid transition; + * - Return true for valid transition that causes no change in state; + * - Otherwise, update state and return true. + * + * This function assumes that the caller holds necessary locks. If the + * transition has constrains other than the state table describes, the caller is + * expected to restore the previous state. See sdei_event_register() for + * example. + */ +bool can_sdei_state_trans(sdei_entry_t *se, sdei_action_t act) +{ + sdei_state_t next; + + assert(act < DO_MAX); + if (se->state >= MAX_STATES) { + WARN(" event state invalid: %x\n", se->state); + return false; + } + + next = sdei_state_table[se->state][act]; + switch (next) { + case SDEI_STATE_INVALID: + return false; + + case SDEI_STATE_NOP: + return true; + + default: + /* Valid transition. Update state. */ + SDEI_LOG(" event state 0x%x => 0x%x\n", se->state, next); + se->state = next; + + return true; + } +} diff --git a/services/std_svc/spm/common/aarch64/spm_helpers.S b/services/std_svc/spm/common/aarch64/spm_helpers.S new file mode 100644 index 0000000..95e69fb --- /dev/null +++ b/services/std_svc/spm/common/aarch64/spm_helpers.S @@ -0,0 +1,74 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2017-2022, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +#include <asm_macros.S> +#include "spm_common.h" + + .global spm_secure_partition_enter + .global spm_secure_partition_exit + + /* --------------------------------------------------------------------- + * This function is called with SP_EL0 as stack. Here we stash our EL3 + * callee-saved registers on to the stack as a part of saving the C + * runtime and enter the secure payload. + * 'x0' contains a pointer to the memory where the address of the C + * runtime context is to be saved. + * --------------------------------------------------------------------- + */ +func spm_secure_partition_enter + /* Make space for the registers that we're going to save */ + mov x3, sp + str x3, [x0, #0] + sub sp, sp, #SP_C_RT_CTX_SIZE + + /* Save callee-saved registers on to the stack */ + stp x19, x20, [sp, #SP_C_RT_CTX_X19] + stp x21, x22, [sp, #SP_C_RT_CTX_X21] + stp x23, x24, [sp, #SP_C_RT_CTX_X23] + stp x25, x26, [sp, #SP_C_RT_CTX_X25] + stp x27, x28, [sp, #SP_C_RT_CTX_X27] + stp x29, x30, [sp, #SP_C_RT_CTX_X29] + + /* --------------------------------------------------------------------- + * Everything is setup now. el3_exit() will use the secure context to + * restore to the general purpose and EL3 system registers to ERET + * into the secure payload. + * --------------------------------------------------------------------- + */ + b el3_exit +endfunc spm_secure_partition_enter + + /* --------------------------------------------------------------------- + * This function is called with 'x0' pointing to a C runtime context + * saved in spm_secure_partition_enter(). + * It restores the saved registers and jumps to that runtime with 'x0' + * as the new SP register. This destroys the C runtime context that had + * been built on the stack below the saved context by the caller. Later + * the second parameter 'x1' is passed as a return value to the caller. + * --------------------------------------------------------------------- + */ +func spm_secure_partition_exit + /* Restore the previous stack */ + mov sp, x0 + + /* Restore callee-saved registers on to the stack */ + ldp x19, x20, [x0, #(SP_C_RT_CTX_X19 - SP_C_RT_CTX_SIZE)] + ldp x21, x22, [x0, #(SP_C_RT_CTX_X21 - SP_C_RT_CTX_SIZE)] + ldp x23, x24, [x0, #(SP_C_RT_CTX_X23 - SP_C_RT_CTX_SIZE)] + ldp x25, x26, [x0, #(SP_C_RT_CTX_X25 - SP_C_RT_CTX_SIZE)] + ldp x27, x28, [x0, #(SP_C_RT_CTX_X27 - SP_C_RT_CTX_SIZE)] + ldp x29, x30, [x0, #(SP_C_RT_CTX_X29 - SP_C_RT_CTX_SIZE)] + + /* --------------------------------------------------------------------- + * This should take us back to the instruction after the call to the + * last spm_secure_partition_enter().* Place the second parameter to x0 + * so that the caller will see it as a return value from the original + * entry call. + * --------------------------------------------------------------------- + */ + mov x0, x1 + ret +endfunc spm_secure_partition_exit diff --git a/services/std_svc/spm/common/aarch64/spm_shim_exceptions.S b/services/std_svc/spm/common/aarch64/spm_shim_exceptions.S new file mode 100644 index 0000000..836f75c --- /dev/null +++ b/services/std_svc/spm/common/aarch64/spm_shim_exceptions.S @@ -0,0 +1,128 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2017-2022, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +#include <arch.h> +#include <asm_macros.S> +#include <common/bl_common.h> +#include <context.h> + +/* ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- + * Very simple stackless exception handlers used by the spm shim layer. + * ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- + */ + .globl spm_shim_exceptions_ptr + +vector_base spm_shim_exceptions_ptr, .spm_shim_exceptions + + /* ----------------------------------------------------- + * Current EL with SP0 : 0x0 - 0x200 + * ----------------------------------------------------- + */ +vector_entry SynchronousExceptionSP0, .spm_shim_exceptions + b . +end_vector_entry SynchronousExceptionSP0 + +vector_entry IrqSP0, .spm_shim_exceptions + b . +end_vector_entry IrqSP0 + +vector_entry FiqSP0, .spm_shim_exceptions + b . +end_vector_entry FiqSP0 + +vector_entry SErrorSP0, .spm_shim_exceptions + b . +end_vector_entry SErrorSP0 + + /* ----------------------------------------------------- + * Current EL with SPx: 0x200 - 0x400 + * ----------------------------------------------------- + */ +vector_entry SynchronousExceptionSPx, .spm_shim_exceptions + b . +end_vector_entry SynchronousExceptionSPx + +vector_entry IrqSPx, .spm_shim_exceptions + b . +end_vector_entry IrqSPx + +vector_entry FiqSPx, .spm_shim_exceptions + b . +end_vector_entry FiqSPx + +vector_entry SErrorSPx, .spm_shim_exceptions + b . +end_vector_entry SErrorSPx + + /* ----------------------------------------------------- + * Lower EL using AArch64 : 0x400 - 0x600. No exceptions + * are handled since secure_partition does not implement + * a lower EL + * ----------------------------------------------------- + */ +vector_entry SynchronousExceptionA64, .spm_shim_exceptions + msr tpidr_el1, x30 + mrs x30, esr_el1 + ubfx x30, x30, #ESR_EC_SHIFT, #ESR_EC_LENGTH + + cmp x30, #EC_AARCH64_SVC + b.eq do_smc + + cmp x30, #EC_AARCH32_SVC + b.eq do_smc + + cmp x30, #EC_AARCH64_SYS + b.eq handle_sys_trap + + /* Fail in all the other cases */ + b panic + + /* --------------------------------------------- + * Tell SPM that we are done initialising + * --------------------------------------------- + */ +do_smc: + mrs x30, tpidr_el1 + smc #0 + exception_return + + /* AArch64 system instructions trap are handled as a panic for now */ +handle_sys_trap: +panic: + b panic +end_vector_entry SynchronousExceptionA64 + +vector_entry IrqA64, .spm_shim_exceptions + b . +end_vector_entry IrqA64 + +vector_entry FiqA64, .spm_shim_exceptions + b . +end_vector_entry FiqA64 + +vector_entry SErrorA64, .spm_shim_exceptions + b . +end_vector_entry SErrorA64 + + /* ----------------------------------------------------- + * Lower EL using AArch32 : 0x600 - 0x800 + * ----------------------------------------------------- + */ +vector_entry SynchronousExceptionA32, .spm_shim_exceptions + b . +end_vector_entry SynchronousExceptionA32 + +vector_entry IrqA32, .spm_shim_exceptions + b . +end_vector_entry IrqA32 + +vector_entry FiqA32, .spm_shim_exceptions + b . +end_vector_entry FiqA32 + +vector_entry SErrorA32, .spm_shim_exceptions + b . +end_vector_entry SErrorA32 diff --git a/services/std_svc/spm/common/include/spm_common.h b/services/std_svc/spm/common/include/spm_common.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c736919 --- /dev/null +++ b/services/std_svc/spm/common/include/spm_common.h @@ -0,0 +1,46 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2017-2023, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +#ifndef SPM_COMMON_H +#define SPM_COMMON_H + +#include <context.h> + +/******************************************************************************* + * Constants that allow assembler code to preserve callee-saved registers of the + * C runtime context while performing a security state switch. + ******************************************************************************/ +#define SP_C_RT_CTX_X19 0x0 +#define SP_C_RT_CTX_X20 0x8 +#define SP_C_RT_CTX_X21 0x10 +#define SP_C_RT_CTX_X22 0x18 +#define SP_C_RT_CTX_X23 0x20 +#define SP_C_RT_CTX_X24 0x28 +#define SP_C_RT_CTX_X25 0x30 +#define SP_C_RT_CTX_X26 0x38 +#define SP_C_RT_CTX_X27 0x40 +#define SP_C_RT_CTX_X28 0x48 +#define SP_C_RT_CTX_X29 0x50 +#define SP_C_RT_CTX_X30 0x58 + +#define SP_C_RT_CTX_SIZE 0x60 +#define SP_C_RT_CTX_ENTRIES (SP_C_RT_CTX_SIZE >> DWORD_SHIFT) + +#ifndef __ASSEMBLER__ + +#include <stdint.h> +#include <lib/xlat_tables/xlat_tables_v2.h> + +/* Assembly helpers */ +uint64_t spm_secure_partition_enter(uint64_t *c_rt_ctx); +void __dead2 spm_secure_partition_exit(uint64_t c_rt_ctx, uint64_t ret); + +/* Helper to obtain a reference to the SP's translation table context */ +xlat_ctx_t *spm_get_sp_xlat_context(void); + +#endif /* __ASSEMBLER__ */ + +#endif /* SPM_COMMON_H */ diff --git a/services/std_svc/spm/common/include/spm_shim_private.h b/services/std_svc/spm/common/include/spm_shim_private.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..bcb1147 --- /dev/null +++ b/services/std_svc/spm/common/include/spm_shim_private.h @@ -0,0 +1,26 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2017-2023, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +#ifndef SPM_SHIM_PRIVATE_H +#define SPM_SHIM_PRIVATE_H + +#include <stdint.h> + +#include <lib/utils_def.h> + +/* Assembly source */ +IMPORT_SYM(uintptr_t, spm_shim_exceptions_ptr, SPM_SHIM_EXCEPTIONS_PTR); + +/* Linker symbols */ +IMPORT_SYM(uintptr_t, __SPM_SHIM_EXCEPTIONS_START__, SPM_SHIM_EXCEPTIONS_START); +IMPORT_SYM(uintptr_t, __SPM_SHIM_EXCEPTIONS_END__, SPM_SHIM_EXCEPTIONS_END); + +/* Definitions */ + +#define SPM_SHIM_EXCEPTIONS_SIZE \ + (SPM_SHIM_EXCEPTIONS_END - SPM_SHIM_EXCEPTIONS_START) + +#endif /* SPM_SHIM_PRIVATE_H */ diff --git a/services/std_svc/spm/common/spm.mk b/services/std_svc/spm/common/spm.mk new file mode 100644 index 0000000..65fd72a --- /dev/null +++ b/services/std_svc/spm/common/spm.mk @@ -0,0 +1,23 @@ +# +# Copyright (c) 2022-2023, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. +# +# SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause +# + +ifneq (${ARCH},aarch64) + $(error "Error: SPM is only supported on aarch64.") +endif + +INCLUDES += -Iservices/std_svc/spm/common/include + +SPM_SOURCES := $(addprefix services/std_svc/spm/common/, \ + ${ARCH}/spm_helpers.S \ + ${ARCH}/spm_shim_exceptions.S) + +ifeq (1, $(filter 1, ${SPM_MM} ${SPMC_AT_EL3_SEL0_SP})) +SPM_SOURCES += $(addprefix services/std_svc/spm/common/, \ + spm_xlat_common.c) +endif + +# Let the top-level Makefile know that we intend to include a BL32 image +NEED_BL32 := yes diff --git a/services/std_svc/spm/common/spm_xlat_common.c b/services/std_svc/spm/common/spm_xlat_common.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a463c8b --- /dev/null +++ b/services/std_svc/spm/common/spm_xlat_common.c @@ -0,0 +1,30 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2023, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +#include <lib/xlat_tables/xlat_tables_v2.h> +#include <platform_def.h> + +/* Place translation tables by default along with the ones used by BL31. */ +#ifndef PLAT_SP_IMAGE_XLAT_SECTION_NAME +#define PLAT_SP_IMAGE_XLAT_SECTION_NAME ".xlat_table" +#endif +#ifndef PLAT_SP_IMAGE_BASE_XLAT_SECTION_NAME +#define PLAT_SP_IMAGE_BASE_XLAT_SECTION_NAME ".bss" +#endif + +/* Allocate and initialise the translation context for the secure partitions. */ +REGISTER_XLAT_CONTEXT2(sp, + PLAT_SP_IMAGE_MMAP_REGIONS, + PLAT_SP_IMAGE_MAX_XLAT_TABLES, + PLAT_VIRT_ADDR_SPACE_SIZE, PLAT_PHY_ADDR_SPACE_SIZE, + EL1_EL0_REGIME, PLAT_SP_IMAGE_XLAT_SECTION_NAME, + PLAT_SP_IMAGE_BASE_XLAT_SECTION_NAME); + +/* Get handle of Secure Partition translation context */ +xlat_ctx_t *spm_get_sp_xlat_context(void) +{ + return &sp_xlat_ctx; +}; diff --git a/services/std_svc/spm/el3_spmc/logical_sp.c b/services/std_svc/spm/el3_spmc/logical_sp.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e080832 --- /dev/null +++ b/services/std_svc/spm/el3_spmc/logical_sp.c @@ -0,0 +1,107 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2022, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +#include <assert.h> +#include <errno.h> +#include <string.h> + +#include <common/debug.h> +#include <services/el3_spmc_logical_sp.h> +#include <services/ffa_svc.h> +#include "spmc.h" + +/******************************************************************************* + * Validate any logical partition descriptors before we initialise. + * Initialization of said partitions will be taken care of during SPMC boot. + ******************************************************************************/ +int el3_sp_desc_validate(void) +{ + struct el3_lp_desc *lp_array; + + /* + * Assert the number of descriptors is less than maximum allowed. + * This constant should be define on a per platform basis. + */ + assert(EL3_LP_DESCS_COUNT <= MAX_EL3_LP_DESCS_COUNT); + + /* Check the array bounds are valid. */ + assert(EL3_LP_DESCS_END >= EL3_LP_DESCS_START); + + /* If no logical partitions are implemented then simply bail out. */ + if (EL3_LP_DESCS_COUNT == 0U) { + return 0; + } + + lp_array = get_el3_lp_array(); + + for (unsigned int index = 0; index < EL3_LP_DESCS_COUNT; index++) { + struct el3_lp_desc *lp_desc = &lp_array[index]; + + /* Validate our logical partition descriptors. */ + if (lp_desc == NULL) { + ERROR("Invalid Logical SP Descriptor\n"); + return -EINVAL; + } + + /* + * Ensure the ID follows the convention to indidate it resides + * in the secure world. + */ + if (!ffa_is_secure_world_id(lp_desc->sp_id)) { + ERROR("Invalid Logical SP ID (0x%x)\n", + lp_desc->sp_id); + return -EINVAL; + } + + /* Ensure we don't conflict with the SPMC partition ID. */ + if (lp_desc->sp_id == FFA_SPMC_ID) { + ERROR("Logical SP ID clashes with SPMC ID(0x%x)\n", + lp_desc->sp_id); + return -EINVAL; + } + + /* Ensure the UUID is not the NULL UUID. */ + if (lp_desc->uuid[0] == 0 && lp_desc->uuid[1] == 0 && + lp_desc->uuid[2] == 0 && lp_desc->uuid[3] == 0) { + ERROR("Invalid UUID for Logical SP (0x%x)\n", + lp_desc->sp_id); + return -EINVAL; + } + + /* Ensure init function callback is registered. */ + if (lp_desc->init == NULL) { + ERROR("Missing init function for Logical SP(0x%x)\n", + lp_desc->sp_id); + return -EINVAL; + } + + /* Ensure that LP only supports receiving direct requests. */ + if (lp_desc->properties & + ~(FFA_PARTITION_DIRECT_REQ_RECV)) { + ERROR("Invalid partition properties (0x%x)\n", + lp_desc->properties); + return -EINVAL; + } + + /* Ensure direct request function callback is registered. */ + if (lp_desc->direct_req == NULL) { + ERROR("No Direct Req handler for Logical SP (0x%x)\n", + lp_desc->sp_id); + return -EINVAL; + } + + /* Ensure that all partition IDs are unique. */ + for (unsigned int inner_idx = index + 1; + inner_idx < EL3_LP_DESCS_COUNT; inner_idx++) { + if (lp_desc->sp_id == lp_array[inner_idx].sp_id) { + ERROR("Duplicate SP ID Detected (0x%x)\n", + lp_desc->sp_id); + return -EINVAL; + } + } + } + return 0; +} diff --git a/services/std_svc/spm/el3_spmc/spmc.h b/services/std_svc/spm/el3_spmc/spmc.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..48644ac --- /dev/null +++ b/services/std_svc/spm/el3_spmc/spmc.h @@ -0,0 +1,281 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2022, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +#ifndef SPMC_H +#define SPMC_H + +#include <stdint.h> + +#include <common/bl_common.h> +#include <lib/psci/psci.h> +#include <lib/spinlock.h> +#include <services/el3_spmc_logical_sp.h> +#include "spm_common.h" + +/* + * Ranges of FF-A IDs for Normal world and Secure world components. The + * convention matches that used by other SPMCs i.e. Hafnium and OP-TEE. + */ +#define FFA_NWD_ID_BASE 0x0 +#define FFA_NWD_ID_LIMIT 0x7FFF +#define FFA_SWD_ID_BASE 0x8000 +#define FFA_SWD_ID_LIMIT SPMD_DIRECT_MSG_ENDPOINT_ID - 1 +#define FFA_SWD_ID_MASK 0x8000 + +/* ID 0 is reserved for the normal world entity, (Hypervisor or OS Kernel). */ +#define FFA_NWD_ID U(0) +/* First ID is reserved for the SPMC */ +#define FFA_SPMC_ID U(FFA_SWD_ID_BASE) +/* SP IDs are allocated after the SPMC ID */ +#define FFA_SP_ID_BASE (FFA_SPMC_ID + 1) +/* Align with Hafnium implementation */ +#define INV_SP_ID 0x7FFF + +/* FF-A Related helper macros. */ +#define FFA_ID_MASK U(0xFFFF) +#define FFA_PARTITION_ID_SHIFT U(16) +#define FFA_FEATURES_BIT31_MASK U(0x1u << 31) +#define FFA_FEATURES_RET_REQ_NS_BIT U(0x1 << 1) + +#define FFA_RUN_EP_ID(ep_vcpu_ids) \ + ((ep_vcpu_ids >> FFA_PARTITION_ID_SHIFT) & FFA_ID_MASK) +#define FFA_RUN_VCPU_ID(ep_vcpu_ids) \ + (ep_vcpu_ids & FFA_ID_MASK) + +#define FFA_PAGE_SIZE (4096) +#define FFA_RXTX_PAGE_COUNT_MASK 0x1F + +/* Ensure that the page size used by TF-A is 4k aligned. */ +CASSERT((PAGE_SIZE % FFA_PAGE_SIZE) == 0, assert_aligned_page_size); + +/* + * Defines to allow an SP to subscribe for power management messages + */ +#define FFA_PM_MSG_SUB_CPU_OFF U(1 << 0) +#define FFA_PM_MSG_SUB_CPU_SUSPEND U(1 << 1) +#define FFA_PM_MSG_SUB_CPU_SUSPEND_RESUME U(1 << 2) + +/* + * Runtime states of an execution context as per the FF-A v1.1 specification. + */ +enum sp_runtime_states { + RT_STATE_WAITING, + RT_STATE_RUNNING, + RT_STATE_PREEMPTED, + RT_STATE_BLOCKED +}; + +/* + * Runtime model of an execution context as per the FF-A v1.1 specification. Its + * value is valid only if the execution context is not in the waiting state. + */ +enum sp_runtime_model { + RT_MODEL_DIR_REQ, + RT_MODEL_RUN, + RT_MODEL_INIT, + RT_MODEL_INTR +}; + +enum sp_runtime_el { + EL1 = 0, + S_EL0, + S_EL1 +}; + +enum sp_execution_state { + SP_STATE_AARCH64 = 0, + SP_STATE_AARCH32 +}; + +enum mailbox_state { + /* There is no message in the mailbox. */ + MAILBOX_STATE_EMPTY, + + /* There is a message that has been populated in the mailbox. */ + MAILBOX_STATE_FULL, +}; + +struct mailbox { + enum mailbox_state state; + + /* RX/TX Buffers. */ + void *rx_buffer; + const void *tx_buffer; + + /* Size of RX/TX Buffer. */ + uint32_t rxtx_page_count; + + /* Lock access to mailbox. */ + spinlock_t lock; +}; + +/* + * Execution context members for an SP. This is a bit like struct + * vcpu in a hypervisor. + */ +struct sp_exec_ctx { + /* + * Store the stack address to restore C runtime context from after + * returning from a synchronous entry into the SP. + */ + uint64_t c_rt_ctx; + + /* Space to maintain the architectural state of an SP. */ + cpu_context_t cpu_ctx; + + /* Track the current runtime state of the SP. */ + enum sp_runtime_states rt_state; + + /* Track the current runtime model of the SP. */ + enum sp_runtime_model rt_model; + + /* Track the source partition ID to validate a direct response. */ + uint16_t dir_req_origin_id; +}; + +/* + * Structure to describe the cumulative properties of an SP. + */ +struct secure_partition_desc { + /* + * Execution contexts allocated to this endpoint. Ideally, + * we need as many contexts as there are physical cpus only + * for a S-EL1 SP which is MP-pinned. + */ + struct sp_exec_ctx ec[PLATFORM_CORE_COUNT]; + + /* ID of the Secure Partition. */ + uint16_t sp_id; + + /* Runtime EL. */ + enum sp_runtime_el runtime_el; + + /* Partition UUID. */ + uint32_t uuid[4]; + + /* Partition Properties. */ + uint32_t properties; + + /* Supported FF-A Version. */ + uint32_t ffa_version; + + /* Execution State. */ + enum sp_execution_state execution_state; + + /* Mailbox tracking. */ + struct mailbox mailbox; + + /* Secondary entrypoint. Only valid for a S-EL1 SP. */ + uintptr_t secondary_ep; + + /* + * Store whether the SP has subscribed to any power management messages. + */ + uint16_t pwr_mgmt_msgs; + + /* + * Store whether the SP has requested the use of the NS bit for memory + * management transactions if it is using FF-A v1.0. + */ + bool ns_bit_requested; +}; + +/* + * This define identifies the only SP that will be initialised and participate + * in FF-A communication. The implementation leaves the door open for more SPs + * to be managed in future but for now it is reasonable to assume that either a + * single S-EL0 or a single S-EL1 SP will be supported. This define will be used + * to identify which SP descriptor to initialise and manage during SP runtime. + */ +#define ACTIVE_SP_DESC_INDEX 0 + +/* + * Structure to describe the cumulative properties of the Hypervisor and + * NS-Endpoints. + */ +struct ns_endpoint_desc { + /* + * ID of the NS-Endpoint or Hypervisor. + */ + uint16_t ns_ep_id; + + /* + * Mailbox tracking. + */ + struct mailbox mailbox; + + /* + * Supported FF-A Version + */ + uint32_t ffa_version; +}; + +/* Reference to power management hooks */ +extern const spd_pm_ops_t spmc_pm; + +/* Setup Function for different SP types. */ +void spmc_sp_common_setup(struct secure_partition_desc *sp, + entry_point_info_t *ep_info, + int32_t boot_info_reg); +void spmc_el1_sp_setup(struct secure_partition_desc *sp, + entry_point_info_t *ep_info); +void spmc_sp_common_ep_commit(struct secure_partition_desc *sp, + entry_point_info_t *ep_info); + +/* + * Helper function to perform a synchronous entry into a SP. + */ +uint64_t spmc_sp_synchronous_entry(struct sp_exec_ctx *ec); + +/* + * Helper function to obtain the descriptor of the current SP on a physical cpu. + */ +struct secure_partition_desc *spmc_get_current_sp_ctx(void); + +/* + * Helper function to obtain the execution context of an SP on a + * physical cpu. + */ +struct sp_exec_ctx *spmc_get_sp_ec(struct secure_partition_desc *sp); + +/* + * Helper function to obtain the index of the execution context of an SP on a + * physical cpu. + */ +unsigned int get_ec_index(struct secure_partition_desc *sp); + +uint64_t spmc_ffa_error_return(void *handle, int error_code); + +/* + * Ensure a partition ID does not clash and follows the secure world convention. + */ +bool is_ffa_secure_id_valid(uint16_t partition_id); + +/* + * Helper function to obtain the array storing the EL3 + * Logical Partition descriptors. + */ +struct el3_lp_desc *get_el3_lp_array(void); + +/* + * Helper function to obtain the RX/TX buffer pair descriptor of the Hypervisor + * or OS kernel in the normal world or the last SP that was run. + */ +struct mailbox *spmc_get_mbox_desc(bool secure_origin); + +/* + * Helper function to obtain the context of an SP with a given partition ID. + */ +struct secure_partition_desc *spmc_get_sp_ctx(uint16_t id); + +/* + * Add helper function to obtain the FF-A version of the calling + * partition. + */ +uint32_t get_partition_ffa_version(bool secure_origin); + + +#endif /* SPMC_H */ diff --git a/services/std_svc/spm/el3_spmc/spmc.mk b/services/std_svc/spm/el3_spmc/spmc.mk new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6442af0 --- /dev/null +++ b/services/std_svc/spm/el3_spmc/spmc.mk @@ -0,0 +1,46 @@ +# +# Copyright (c) 2022, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. +# +# SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause +# + +ifneq (${ARCH},aarch64) + $(error "Error: SPMC is only supported on aarch64.") +endif + +SPMC_SOURCES := $(addprefix services/std_svc/spm/el3_spmc/, \ + spmc_main.c \ + spmc_setup.c \ + logical_sp.c \ + spmc_pm.c \ + spmc_shared_mem.c) + +# Specify platform specific logical partition implementation. +SPMC_LP_SOURCES := $(addprefix ${PLAT_DIR}/, \ + ${PLAT}_el3_spmc_logical_sp.c) + + +ifneq ($(wildcard $(SPMC_LP_SOURCES)),) +SPMC_SOURCES += $(SPMC_LP_SOURCES) +endif + +# Let the top-level Makefile know that we intend to include a BL32 image +NEED_BL32 := yes + +ifndef BL32 +# The SPMC is paired with a Test Secure Payload source and we intend to +# build the Test Secure Payload if no other image has been provided +# for BL32. +# +# In cases where an associated Secure Payload lies outside this build +# system/source tree, the dispatcher Makefile can either invoke an external +# build command or assume it is pre-built. + +BL32_ROOT := bl32/tsp + +# Conditionally include SP's Makefile. The assumption is that the TSP's build +# system is compatible with that of Trusted Firmware, and it'll add and populate +# necessary build targets and variables. + +include ${BL32_ROOT}/tsp.mk +endif diff --git a/services/std_svc/spm/el3_spmc/spmc_main.c b/services/std_svc/spm/el3_spmc/spmc_main.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ada6f45 --- /dev/null +++ b/services/std_svc/spm/el3_spmc/spmc_main.c @@ -0,0 +1,2112 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2022, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +#include <assert.h> +#include <errno.h> + +#include <arch_helpers.h> +#include <bl31/bl31.h> +#include <bl31/ehf.h> +#include <bl31/interrupt_mgmt.h> +#include <common/debug.h> +#include <common/fdt_wrappers.h> +#include <common/runtime_svc.h> +#include <common/uuid.h> +#include <lib/el3_runtime/context_mgmt.h> +#include <lib/smccc.h> +#include <lib/utils.h> +#include <lib/xlat_tables/xlat_tables_v2.h> +#include <libfdt.h> +#include <plat/common/platform.h> +#include <services/el3_spmc_logical_sp.h> +#include <services/ffa_svc.h> +#include <services/spmc_svc.h> +#include <services/spmd_svc.h> +#include "spmc.h" +#include "spmc_shared_mem.h" + +#include <platform_def.h> + +/* Declare the maximum number of SPs and El3 LPs. */ +#define MAX_SP_LP_PARTITIONS SECURE_PARTITION_COUNT + MAX_EL3_LP_DESCS_COUNT + +/* + * Allocate a secure partition descriptor to describe each SP in the system that + * does not reside at EL3. + */ +static struct secure_partition_desc sp_desc[SECURE_PARTITION_COUNT]; + +/* + * Allocate an NS endpoint descriptor to describe each VM and the Hypervisor in + * the system that interacts with a SP. It is used to track the Hypervisor + * buffer pair, version and ID for now. It could be extended to track VM + * properties when the SPMC supports indirect messaging. + */ +static struct ns_endpoint_desc ns_ep_desc[NS_PARTITION_COUNT]; + +static uint64_t spmc_sp_interrupt_handler(uint32_t id, + uint32_t flags, + void *handle, + void *cookie); + +/* + * Helper function to obtain the array storing the EL3 + * Logical Partition descriptors. + */ +struct el3_lp_desc *get_el3_lp_array(void) +{ + return (struct el3_lp_desc *) EL3_LP_DESCS_START; +} + +/* + * Helper function to obtain the descriptor of the last SP to whom control was + * handed to on this physical cpu. Currently, we assume there is only one SP. + * TODO: Expand to track multiple partitions when required. + */ +struct secure_partition_desc *spmc_get_current_sp_ctx(void) +{ + return &(sp_desc[ACTIVE_SP_DESC_INDEX]); +} + +/* + * Helper function to obtain the execution context of an SP on the + * current physical cpu. + */ +struct sp_exec_ctx *spmc_get_sp_ec(struct secure_partition_desc *sp) +{ + return &(sp->ec[get_ec_index(sp)]); +} + +/* Helper function to get pointer to SP context from its ID. */ +struct secure_partition_desc *spmc_get_sp_ctx(uint16_t id) +{ + /* Check for Secure World Partitions. */ + for (unsigned int i = 0U; i < SECURE_PARTITION_COUNT; i++) { + if (sp_desc[i].sp_id == id) { + return &(sp_desc[i]); + } + } + return NULL; +} + +/* + * Helper function to obtain the descriptor of the Hypervisor or OS kernel. + * We assume that the first descriptor is reserved for this entity. + */ +struct ns_endpoint_desc *spmc_get_hyp_ctx(void) +{ + return &(ns_ep_desc[0]); +} + +/* + * Helper function to obtain the RX/TX buffer pair descriptor of the Hypervisor + * or OS kernel in the normal world or the last SP that was run. + */ +struct mailbox *spmc_get_mbox_desc(bool secure_origin) +{ + /* Obtain the RX/TX buffer pair descriptor. */ + if (secure_origin) { + return &(spmc_get_current_sp_ctx()->mailbox); + } else { + return &(spmc_get_hyp_ctx()->mailbox); + } +} + +/****************************************************************************** + * This function returns to the place where spmc_sp_synchronous_entry() was + * called originally. + ******************************************************************************/ +__dead2 void spmc_sp_synchronous_exit(struct sp_exec_ctx *ec, uint64_t rc) +{ + /* + * The SPM must have initiated the original request through a + * synchronous entry into the secure partition. Jump back to the + * original C runtime context with the value of rc in x0; + */ + spm_secure_partition_exit(ec->c_rt_ctx, rc); + + panic(); +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * Return FFA_ERROR with specified error code. + ******************************************************************************/ +uint64_t spmc_ffa_error_return(void *handle, int error_code) +{ + SMC_RET8(handle, FFA_ERROR, + FFA_TARGET_INFO_MBZ, error_code, + FFA_PARAM_MBZ, FFA_PARAM_MBZ, FFA_PARAM_MBZ, + FFA_PARAM_MBZ, FFA_PARAM_MBZ); +} + +/****************************************************************************** + * Helper function to validate a secure partition ID to ensure it does not + * conflict with any other FF-A component and follows the convention to + * indicate it resides within the secure world. + ******************************************************************************/ +bool is_ffa_secure_id_valid(uint16_t partition_id) +{ + struct el3_lp_desc *el3_lp_descs = get_el3_lp_array(); + + /* Ensure the ID is not the invalid partition ID. */ + if (partition_id == INV_SP_ID) { + return false; + } + + /* Ensure the ID is not the SPMD ID. */ + if (partition_id == SPMD_DIRECT_MSG_ENDPOINT_ID) { + return false; + } + + /* + * Ensure the ID follows the convention to indicate it resides + * in the secure world. + */ + if (!ffa_is_secure_world_id(partition_id)) { + return false; + } + + /* Ensure we don't conflict with the SPMC partition ID. */ + if (partition_id == FFA_SPMC_ID) { + return false; + } + + /* Ensure we do not already have an SP context with this ID. */ + if (spmc_get_sp_ctx(partition_id)) { + return false; + } + + /* Ensure we don't clash with any Logical SP's. */ + for (unsigned int i = 0U; i < EL3_LP_DESCS_COUNT; i++) { + if (el3_lp_descs[i].sp_id == partition_id) { + return false; + } + } + + return true; +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * This function either forwards the request to the other world or returns + * with an ERET depending on the source of the call. + * We can assume that the destination is for an entity at a lower exception + * level as any messages destined for a logical SP resident in EL3 will have + * already been taken care of by the SPMC before entering this function. + ******************************************************************************/ +static uint64_t spmc_smc_return(uint32_t smc_fid, + bool secure_origin, + uint64_t x1, + uint64_t x2, + uint64_t x3, + uint64_t x4, + void *handle, + void *cookie, + uint64_t flags, + uint16_t dst_id) +{ + /* If the destination is in the normal world always go via the SPMD. */ + if (ffa_is_normal_world_id(dst_id)) { + return spmd_smc_handler(smc_fid, x1, x2, x3, x4, + cookie, handle, flags); + } + /* + * If the caller is secure and we want to return to the secure world, + * ERET directly. + */ + else if (secure_origin && ffa_is_secure_world_id(dst_id)) { + SMC_RET5(handle, smc_fid, x1, x2, x3, x4); + } + /* If we originated in the normal world then switch contexts. */ + else if (!secure_origin && ffa_is_secure_world_id(dst_id)) { + return spmd_smc_switch_state(smc_fid, secure_origin, x1, x2, + x3, x4, handle); + } else { + /* Unknown State. */ + panic(); + } + + /* Shouldn't be Reached. */ + return 0; +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * FF-A ABI Handlers. + ******************************************************************************/ + +/******************************************************************************* + * Helper function to validate arg2 as part of a direct message. + ******************************************************************************/ +static inline bool direct_msg_validate_arg2(uint64_t x2) +{ + /* Check message type. */ + if (x2 & FFA_FWK_MSG_BIT) { + /* We have a framework message, ensure it is a known message. */ + if (x2 & ~(FFA_FWK_MSG_MASK | FFA_FWK_MSG_BIT)) { + VERBOSE("Invalid message format 0x%lx.\n", x2); + return false; + } + } else { + /* We have a partition messages, ensure x2 is not set. */ + if (x2 != (uint64_t) 0) { + VERBOSE("Arg2 MBZ for partition messages. (0x%lx).\n", + x2); + return false; + } + } + return true; +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * Helper function to validate the destination ID of a direct response. + ******************************************************************************/ +static bool direct_msg_validate_dst_id(uint16_t dst_id) +{ + struct secure_partition_desc *sp; + + /* Check if we're targeting a normal world partition. */ + if (ffa_is_normal_world_id(dst_id)) { + return true; + } + + /* Or directed to the SPMC itself.*/ + if (dst_id == FFA_SPMC_ID) { + return true; + } + + /* Otherwise ensure the SP exists. */ + sp = spmc_get_sp_ctx(dst_id); + if (sp != NULL) { + return true; + } + + return false; +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * Helper function to validate the response from a Logical Partition. + ******************************************************************************/ +static bool direct_msg_validate_lp_resp(uint16_t origin_id, uint16_t lp_id, + void *handle) +{ + /* Retrieve populated Direct Response Arguments. */ + uint64_t x1 = SMC_GET_GP(handle, CTX_GPREG_X1); + uint64_t x2 = SMC_GET_GP(handle, CTX_GPREG_X2); + uint16_t src_id = ffa_endpoint_source(x1); + uint16_t dst_id = ffa_endpoint_destination(x1); + + if (src_id != lp_id) { + ERROR("Invalid EL3 LP source ID (0x%x).\n", src_id); + return false; + } + + /* + * Check the destination ID is valid and ensure the LP is responding to + * the original request. + */ + if ((!direct_msg_validate_dst_id(dst_id)) || (dst_id != origin_id)) { + ERROR("Invalid EL3 LP destination ID (0x%x).\n", dst_id); + return false; + } + + if (!direct_msg_validate_arg2(x2)) { + ERROR("Invalid EL3 LP message encoding.\n"); + return false; + } + return true; +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * Handle direct request messages and route to the appropriate destination. + ******************************************************************************/ +static uint64_t direct_req_smc_handler(uint32_t smc_fid, + bool secure_origin, + uint64_t x1, + uint64_t x2, + uint64_t x3, + uint64_t x4, + void *cookie, + void *handle, + uint64_t flags) +{ + uint16_t src_id = ffa_endpoint_source(x1); + uint16_t dst_id = ffa_endpoint_destination(x1); + struct el3_lp_desc *el3_lp_descs; + struct secure_partition_desc *sp; + unsigned int idx; + + /* Check if arg2 has been populated correctly based on message type. */ + if (!direct_msg_validate_arg2(x2)) { + return spmc_ffa_error_return(handle, + FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER); + } + + /* Validate Sender is either the current SP or from the normal world. */ + if ((secure_origin && src_id != spmc_get_current_sp_ctx()->sp_id) || + (!secure_origin && !ffa_is_normal_world_id(src_id))) { + ERROR("Invalid direct request source ID (0x%x).\n", src_id); + return spmc_ffa_error_return(handle, + FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER); + } + + el3_lp_descs = get_el3_lp_array(); + + /* Check if the request is destined for a Logical Partition. */ + for (unsigned int i = 0U; i < MAX_EL3_LP_DESCS_COUNT; i++) { + if (el3_lp_descs[i].sp_id == dst_id) { + uint64_t ret = el3_lp_descs[i].direct_req( + smc_fid, secure_origin, x1, x2, + x3, x4, cookie, handle, flags); + if (!direct_msg_validate_lp_resp(src_id, dst_id, + handle)) { + panic(); + } + + /* Message checks out. */ + return ret; + } + } + + /* + * If the request was not targeted to a LSP and from the secure world + * then it is invalid since a SP cannot call into the Normal world and + * there is no other SP to call into. If there are other SPs in future + * then the partition runtime model would need to be validated as well. + */ + if (secure_origin) { + VERBOSE("Direct request not supported to the Normal World.\n"); + return spmc_ffa_error_return(handle, + FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER); + } + + /* Check if the SP ID is valid. */ + sp = spmc_get_sp_ctx(dst_id); + if (sp == NULL) { + VERBOSE("Direct request to unknown partition ID (0x%x).\n", + dst_id); + return spmc_ffa_error_return(handle, + FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER); + } + + /* + * Check that the target execution context is in a waiting state before + * forwarding the direct request to it. + */ + idx = get_ec_index(sp); + if (sp->ec[idx].rt_state != RT_STATE_WAITING) { + VERBOSE("SP context on core%u is not waiting (%u).\n", + idx, sp->ec[idx].rt_model); + return spmc_ffa_error_return(handle, FFA_ERROR_BUSY); + } + + /* + * Everything checks out so forward the request to the SP after updating + * its state and runtime model. + */ + sp->ec[idx].rt_state = RT_STATE_RUNNING; + sp->ec[idx].rt_model = RT_MODEL_DIR_REQ; + sp->ec[idx].dir_req_origin_id = src_id; + return spmc_smc_return(smc_fid, secure_origin, x1, x2, x3, x4, + handle, cookie, flags, dst_id); +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * Handle direct response messages and route to the appropriate destination. + ******************************************************************************/ +static uint64_t direct_resp_smc_handler(uint32_t smc_fid, + bool secure_origin, + uint64_t x1, + uint64_t x2, + uint64_t x3, + uint64_t x4, + void *cookie, + void *handle, + uint64_t flags) +{ + uint16_t dst_id = ffa_endpoint_destination(x1); + struct secure_partition_desc *sp; + unsigned int idx; + + /* Check if arg2 has been populated correctly based on message type. */ + if (!direct_msg_validate_arg2(x2)) { + return spmc_ffa_error_return(handle, + FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER); + } + + /* Check that the response did not originate from the Normal world. */ + if (!secure_origin) { + VERBOSE("Direct Response not supported from Normal World.\n"); + return spmc_ffa_error_return(handle, + FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER); + } + + /* + * Check that the response is either targeted to the Normal world or the + * SPMC e.g. a PM response. + */ + if (!direct_msg_validate_dst_id(dst_id)) { + VERBOSE("Direct response to invalid partition ID (0x%x).\n", + dst_id); + return spmc_ffa_error_return(handle, + FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER); + } + + /* Obtain the SP descriptor and update its runtime state. */ + sp = spmc_get_sp_ctx(ffa_endpoint_source(x1)); + if (sp == NULL) { + VERBOSE("Direct response to unknown partition ID (0x%x).\n", + dst_id); + return spmc_ffa_error_return(handle, + FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER); + } + + /* Sanity check state is being tracked correctly in the SPMC. */ + idx = get_ec_index(sp); + assert(sp->ec[idx].rt_state == RT_STATE_RUNNING); + + /* Ensure SP execution context was in the right runtime model. */ + if (sp->ec[idx].rt_model != RT_MODEL_DIR_REQ) { + VERBOSE("SP context on core%u not handling direct req (%u).\n", + idx, sp->ec[idx].rt_model); + return spmc_ffa_error_return(handle, FFA_ERROR_DENIED); + } + + if (sp->ec[idx].dir_req_origin_id != dst_id) { + WARN("Invalid direct resp partition ID 0x%x != 0x%x on core%u.\n", + dst_id, sp->ec[idx].dir_req_origin_id, idx); + return spmc_ffa_error_return(handle, FFA_ERROR_DENIED); + } + + /* Update the state of the SP execution context. */ + sp->ec[idx].rt_state = RT_STATE_WAITING; + + /* Clear the ongoing direct request ID. */ + sp->ec[idx].dir_req_origin_id = INV_SP_ID; + + /* + * If the receiver is not the SPMC then forward the response to the + * Normal world. + */ + if (dst_id == FFA_SPMC_ID) { + spmc_sp_synchronous_exit(&sp->ec[idx], x4); + /* Should not get here. */ + panic(); + } + + return spmc_smc_return(smc_fid, secure_origin, x1, x2, x3, x4, + handle, cookie, flags, dst_id); +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * This function handles the FFA_MSG_WAIT SMC to allow an SP to relinquish its + * cycles. + ******************************************************************************/ +static uint64_t msg_wait_handler(uint32_t smc_fid, + bool secure_origin, + uint64_t x1, + uint64_t x2, + uint64_t x3, + uint64_t x4, + void *cookie, + void *handle, + uint64_t flags) +{ + struct secure_partition_desc *sp; + unsigned int idx; + + /* + * Check that the response did not originate from the Normal world as + * only the secure world can call this ABI. + */ + if (!secure_origin) { + VERBOSE("Normal world cannot call FFA_MSG_WAIT.\n"); + return spmc_ffa_error_return(handle, FFA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED); + } + + /* Get the descriptor of the SP that invoked FFA_MSG_WAIT. */ + sp = spmc_get_current_sp_ctx(); + if (sp == NULL) { + return spmc_ffa_error_return(handle, + FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER); + } + + /* + * Get the execution context of the SP that invoked FFA_MSG_WAIT. + */ + idx = get_ec_index(sp); + + /* Ensure SP execution context was in the right runtime model. */ + if (sp->ec[idx].rt_model == RT_MODEL_DIR_REQ) { + return spmc_ffa_error_return(handle, FFA_ERROR_DENIED); + } + + /* Sanity check the state is being tracked correctly in the SPMC. */ + assert(sp->ec[idx].rt_state == RT_STATE_RUNNING); + + /* + * Perform a synchronous exit if the partition was initialising. The + * state is updated after the exit. + */ + if (sp->ec[idx].rt_model == RT_MODEL_INIT) { + spmc_sp_synchronous_exit(&sp->ec[idx], x4); + /* Should not get here */ + panic(); + } + + /* Update the state of the SP execution context. */ + sp->ec[idx].rt_state = RT_STATE_WAITING; + + /* Resume normal world if a secure interrupt was handled. */ + if (sp->ec[idx].rt_model == RT_MODEL_INTR) { + /* FFA_MSG_WAIT can only be called from the secure world. */ + unsigned int secure_state_in = SECURE; + unsigned int secure_state_out = NON_SECURE; + + cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(secure_state_in); + cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(secure_state_out); + cm_set_next_eret_context(secure_state_out); + SMC_RET0(cm_get_context(secure_state_out)); + } + + /* Forward the response to the Normal world. */ + return spmc_smc_return(smc_fid, secure_origin, x1, x2, x3, x4, + handle, cookie, flags, FFA_NWD_ID); +} + +static uint64_t ffa_error_handler(uint32_t smc_fid, + bool secure_origin, + uint64_t x1, + uint64_t x2, + uint64_t x3, + uint64_t x4, + void *cookie, + void *handle, + uint64_t flags) +{ + struct secure_partition_desc *sp; + unsigned int idx; + + /* Check that the response did not originate from the Normal world. */ + if (!secure_origin) { + return spmc_ffa_error_return(handle, FFA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED); + } + + /* Get the descriptor of the SP that invoked FFA_ERROR. */ + sp = spmc_get_current_sp_ctx(); + if (sp == NULL) { + return spmc_ffa_error_return(handle, + FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER); + } + + /* Get the execution context of the SP that invoked FFA_ERROR. */ + idx = get_ec_index(sp); + + /* + * We only expect FFA_ERROR to be received during SP initialisation + * otherwise this is an invalid call. + */ + if (sp->ec[idx].rt_model == RT_MODEL_INIT) { + ERROR("SP 0x%x failed to initialize.\n", sp->sp_id); + spmc_sp_synchronous_exit(&sp->ec[idx], x2); + /* Should not get here. */ + panic(); + } + + return spmc_ffa_error_return(handle, FFA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED); +} + +static uint64_t ffa_version_handler(uint32_t smc_fid, + bool secure_origin, + uint64_t x1, + uint64_t x2, + uint64_t x3, + uint64_t x4, + void *cookie, + void *handle, + uint64_t flags) +{ + uint32_t requested_version = x1 & FFA_VERSION_MASK; + + if (requested_version & FFA_VERSION_BIT31_MASK) { + /* Invalid encoding, return an error. */ + SMC_RET1(handle, FFA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED); + /* Execution stops here. */ + } + + /* Determine the caller to store the requested version. */ + if (secure_origin) { + /* + * Ensure that the SP is reporting the same version as + * specified in its manifest. If these do not match there is + * something wrong with the SP. + * TODO: Should we abort the SP? For now assert this is not + * case. + */ + assert(requested_version == + spmc_get_current_sp_ctx()->ffa_version); + } else { + /* + * If this is called by the normal world, record this + * information in its descriptor. + */ + spmc_get_hyp_ctx()->ffa_version = requested_version; + } + + SMC_RET1(handle, MAKE_FFA_VERSION(FFA_VERSION_MAJOR, + FFA_VERSION_MINOR)); +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * Helper function to obtain the FF-A version of the calling partition. + ******************************************************************************/ +uint32_t get_partition_ffa_version(bool secure_origin) +{ + if (secure_origin) { + return spmc_get_current_sp_ctx()->ffa_version; + } else { + return spmc_get_hyp_ctx()->ffa_version; + } +} + +static uint64_t rxtx_map_handler(uint32_t smc_fid, + bool secure_origin, + uint64_t x1, + uint64_t x2, + uint64_t x3, + uint64_t x4, + void *cookie, + void *handle, + uint64_t flags) +{ + int ret; + uint32_t error_code; + uint32_t mem_atts = secure_origin ? MT_SECURE : MT_NS; + struct mailbox *mbox; + uintptr_t tx_address = x1; + uintptr_t rx_address = x2; + uint32_t page_count = x3 & FFA_RXTX_PAGE_COUNT_MASK; /* Bits [5:0] */ + uint32_t buf_size = page_count * FFA_PAGE_SIZE; + + /* + * The SPMC does not support mapping of VM RX/TX pairs to facilitate + * indirect messaging with SPs. Check if the Hypervisor has invoked this + * ABI on behalf of a VM and reject it if this is the case. + */ + if (tx_address == 0 || rx_address == 0) { + WARN("Mapping RX/TX Buffers on behalf of VM not supported.\n"); + return spmc_ffa_error_return(handle, + FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER); + } + + /* Ensure the specified buffers are not the same. */ + if (tx_address == rx_address) { + WARN("TX Buffer must not be the same as RX Buffer.\n"); + return spmc_ffa_error_return(handle, + FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER); + } + + /* Ensure the buffer size is not 0. */ + if (buf_size == 0U) { + WARN("Buffer size must not be 0\n"); + return spmc_ffa_error_return(handle, + FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER); + } + + /* + * Ensure the buffer size is a multiple of the translation granule size + * in TF-A. + */ + if (buf_size % PAGE_SIZE != 0U) { + WARN("Buffer size must be aligned to translation granule.\n"); + return spmc_ffa_error_return(handle, + FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER); + } + + /* Obtain the RX/TX buffer pair descriptor. */ + mbox = spmc_get_mbox_desc(secure_origin); + + spin_lock(&mbox->lock); + + /* Check if buffers have already been mapped. */ + if (mbox->rx_buffer != 0 || mbox->tx_buffer != 0) { + WARN("RX/TX Buffers already mapped (%p/%p)\n", + (void *) mbox->rx_buffer, (void *)mbox->tx_buffer); + error_code = FFA_ERROR_DENIED; + goto err; + } + + /* memmap the TX buffer as read only. */ + ret = mmap_add_dynamic_region(tx_address, /* PA */ + tx_address, /* VA */ + buf_size, /* size */ + mem_atts | MT_RO_DATA); /* attrs */ + if (ret != 0) { + /* Return the correct error code. */ + error_code = (ret == -ENOMEM) ? FFA_ERROR_NO_MEMORY : + FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER; + WARN("Unable to map TX buffer: %d\n", error_code); + goto err; + } + + /* memmap the RX buffer as read write. */ + ret = mmap_add_dynamic_region(rx_address, /* PA */ + rx_address, /* VA */ + buf_size, /* size */ + mem_atts | MT_RW_DATA); /* attrs */ + + if (ret != 0) { + error_code = (ret == -ENOMEM) ? FFA_ERROR_NO_MEMORY : + FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER; + WARN("Unable to map RX buffer: %d\n", error_code); + /* Unmap the TX buffer again. */ + mmap_remove_dynamic_region(tx_address, buf_size); + goto err; + } + + mbox->tx_buffer = (void *) tx_address; + mbox->rx_buffer = (void *) rx_address; + mbox->rxtx_page_count = page_count; + spin_unlock(&mbox->lock); + + SMC_RET1(handle, FFA_SUCCESS_SMC32); + /* Execution stops here. */ +err: + spin_unlock(&mbox->lock); + return spmc_ffa_error_return(handle, error_code); +} + +static uint64_t rxtx_unmap_handler(uint32_t smc_fid, + bool secure_origin, + uint64_t x1, + uint64_t x2, + uint64_t x3, + uint64_t x4, + void *cookie, + void *handle, + uint64_t flags) +{ + struct mailbox *mbox = spmc_get_mbox_desc(secure_origin); + uint32_t buf_size = mbox->rxtx_page_count * FFA_PAGE_SIZE; + + /* + * The SPMC does not support mapping of VM RX/TX pairs to facilitate + * indirect messaging with SPs. Check if the Hypervisor has invoked this + * ABI on behalf of a VM and reject it if this is the case. + */ + if (x1 != 0UL) { + return spmc_ffa_error_return(handle, + FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER); + } + + spin_lock(&mbox->lock); + + /* Check if buffers are currently mapped. */ + if (mbox->rx_buffer == 0 || mbox->tx_buffer == 0) { + spin_unlock(&mbox->lock); + return spmc_ffa_error_return(handle, + FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER); + } + + /* Unmap RX Buffer */ + if (mmap_remove_dynamic_region((uintptr_t) mbox->rx_buffer, + buf_size) != 0) { + WARN("Unable to unmap RX buffer!\n"); + } + + mbox->rx_buffer = 0; + + /* Unmap TX Buffer */ + if (mmap_remove_dynamic_region((uintptr_t) mbox->tx_buffer, + buf_size) != 0) { + WARN("Unable to unmap TX buffer!\n"); + } + + mbox->tx_buffer = 0; + mbox->rxtx_page_count = 0; + + spin_unlock(&mbox->lock); + SMC_RET1(handle, FFA_SUCCESS_SMC32); +} + +/* + * Helper function to populate the properties field of a Partition Info Get + * descriptor. + */ +static uint32_t +partition_info_get_populate_properties(uint32_t sp_properties, + enum sp_execution_state sp_ec_state) +{ + uint32_t properties = sp_properties; + uint32_t ec_state; + + /* Determine the execution state of the SP. */ + ec_state = sp_ec_state == SP_STATE_AARCH64 ? + FFA_PARTITION_INFO_GET_AARCH64_STATE : + FFA_PARTITION_INFO_GET_AARCH32_STATE; + + properties |= ec_state << FFA_PARTITION_INFO_GET_EXEC_STATE_SHIFT; + + return properties; +} + +/* + * Collate the partition information in a v1.1 partition information + * descriptor format, this will be converter later if required. + */ +static int partition_info_get_handler_v1_1(uint32_t *uuid, + struct ffa_partition_info_v1_1 + *partitions, + uint32_t max_partitions, + uint32_t *partition_count) +{ + uint32_t index; + struct ffa_partition_info_v1_1 *desc; + bool null_uuid = is_null_uuid(uuid); + struct el3_lp_desc *el3_lp_descs = get_el3_lp_array(); + + /* Deal with Logical Partitions. */ + for (index = 0U; index < EL3_LP_DESCS_COUNT; index++) { + if (null_uuid || uuid_match(uuid, el3_lp_descs[index].uuid)) { + /* Found a matching UUID, populate appropriately. */ + if (*partition_count >= max_partitions) { + return FFA_ERROR_NO_MEMORY; + } + + desc = &partitions[*partition_count]; + desc->ep_id = el3_lp_descs[index].sp_id; + desc->execution_ctx_count = PLATFORM_CORE_COUNT; + /* LSPs must be AArch64. */ + desc->properties = + partition_info_get_populate_properties( + el3_lp_descs[index].properties, + SP_STATE_AARCH64); + + if (null_uuid) { + copy_uuid(desc->uuid, el3_lp_descs[index].uuid); + } + (*partition_count)++; + } + } + + /* Deal with physical SP's. */ + for (index = 0U; index < SECURE_PARTITION_COUNT; index++) { + if (null_uuid || uuid_match(uuid, sp_desc[index].uuid)) { + /* Found a matching UUID, populate appropriately. */ + if (*partition_count >= max_partitions) { + return FFA_ERROR_NO_MEMORY; + } + + desc = &partitions[*partition_count]; + desc->ep_id = sp_desc[index].sp_id; + /* + * Execution context count must match No. cores for + * S-EL1 SPs. + */ + desc->execution_ctx_count = PLATFORM_CORE_COUNT; + desc->properties = + partition_info_get_populate_properties( + sp_desc[index].properties, + sp_desc[index].execution_state); + + if (null_uuid) { + copy_uuid(desc->uuid, sp_desc[index].uuid); + } + (*partition_count)++; + } + } + return 0; +} + +/* + * Handle the case where that caller only wants the count of partitions + * matching a given UUID and does not want the corresponding descriptors + * populated. + */ +static uint32_t partition_info_get_handler_count_only(uint32_t *uuid) +{ + uint32_t index = 0; + uint32_t partition_count = 0; + bool null_uuid = is_null_uuid(uuid); + struct el3_lp_desc *el3_lp_descs = get_el3_lp_array(); + + /* Deal with Logical Partitions. */ + for (index = 0U; index < EL3_LP_DESCS_COUNT; index++) { + if (null_uuid || + uuid_match(uuid, el3_lp_descs[index].uuid)) { + (partition_count)++; + } + } + + /* Deal with physical SP's. */ + for (index = 0U; index < SECURE_PARTITION_COUNT; index++) { + if (null_uuid || uuid_match(uuid, sp_desc[index].uuid)) { + (partition_count)++; + } + } + return partition_count; +} + +/* + * If the caller of the PARTITION_INFO_GET ABI was a v1.0 caller, populate + * the corresponding descriptor format from the v1.1 descriptor array. + */ +static uint64_t partition_info_populate_v1_0(struct ffa_partition_info_v1_1 + *partitions, + struct mailbox *mbox, + int partition_count) +{ + uint32_t index; + uint32_t buf_size; + uint32_t descriptor_size; + struct ffa_partition_info_v1_0 *v1_0_partitions = + (struct ffa_partition_info_v1_0 *) mbox->rx_buffer; + + buf_size = mbox->rxtx_page_count * FFA_PAGE_SIZE; + descriptor_size = partition_count * + sizeof(struct ffa_partition_info_v1_0); + + if (descriptor_size > buf_size) { + return FFA_ERROR_NO_MEMORY; + } + + for (index = 0U; index < partition_count; index++) { + v1_0_partitions[index].ep_id = partitions[index].ep_id; + v1_0_partitions[index].execution_ctx_count = + partitions[index].execution_ctx_count; + /* Only report v1.0 properties. */ + v1_0_partitions[index].properties = + (partitions[index].properties & + FFA_PARTITION_INFO_GET_PROPERTIES_V1_0_MASK); + } + return 0; +} + +/* + * Main handler for FFA_PARTITION_INFO_GET which supports both FF-A v1.1 and + * v1.0 implementations. + */ +static uint64_t partition_info_get_handler(uint32_t smc_fid, + bool secure_origin, + uint64_t x1, + uint64_t x2, + uint64_t x3, + uint64_t x4, + void *cookie, + void *handle, + uint64_t flags) +{ + int ret; + uint32_t partition_count = 0; + uint32_t size = 0; + uint32_t ffa_version = get_partition_ffa_version(secure_origin); + struct mailbox *mbox; + uint64_t info_get_flags; + bool count_only; + uint32_t uuid[4]; + + uuid[0] = x1; + uuid[1] = x2; + uuid[2] = x3; + uuid[3] = x4; + + /* Determine if the Partition descriptors should be populated. */ + info_get_flags = SMC_GET_GP(handle, CTX_GPREG_X5); + count_only = (info_get_flags & FFA_PARTITION_INFO_GET_COUNT_FLAG_MASK); + + /* Handle the case where we don't need to populate the descriptors. */ + if (count_only) { + partition_count = partition_info_get_handler_count_only(uuid); + if (partition_count == 0) { + return spmc_ffa_error_return(handle, + FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER); + } + } else { + struct ffa_partition_info_v1_1 partitions[MAX_SP_LP_PARTITIONS]; + + /* + * Handle the case where the partition descriptors are required, + * check we have the buffers available and populate the + * appropriate structure version. + */ + + /* Obtain the v1.1 format of the descriptors. */ + ret = partition_info_get_handler_v1_1(uuid, partitions, + MAX_SP_LP_PARTITIONS, + &partition_count); + + /* Check if an error occurred during discovery. */ + if (ret != 0) { + goto err; + } + + /* If we didn't find any matches the UUID is unknown. */ + if (partition_count == 0) { + ret = FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER; + goto err; + } + + /* Obtain the partition mailbox RX/TX buffer pair descriptor. */ + mbox = spmc_get_mbox_desc(secure_origin); + + /* + * If the caller has not bothered registering its RX/TX pair + * then return an error code. + */ + spin_lock(&mbox->lock); + if (mbox->rx_buffer == NULL) { + ret = FFA_ERROR_BUSY; + goto err_unlock; + } + + /* Ensure the RX buffer is currently free. */ + if (mbox->state != MAILBOX_STATE_EMPTY) { + ret = FFA_ERROR_BUSY; + goto err_unlock; + } + + /* Zero the RX buffer before populating. */ + (void)memset(mbox->rx_buffer, 0, + mbox->rxtx_page_count * FFA_PAGE_SIZE); + + /* + * Depending on the FF-A version of the requesting partition + * we may need to convert to a v1.0 format otherwise we can copy + * directly. + */ + if (ffa_version == MAKE_FFA_VERSION(U(1), U(0))) { + ret = partition_info_populate_v1_0(partitions, + mbox, + partition_count); + if (ret != 0) { + goto err_unlock; + } + } else { + uint32_t buf_size = mbox->rxtx_page_count * + FFA_PAGE_SIZE; + + /* Ensure the descriptor will fit in the buffer. */ + size = sizeof(struct ffa_partition_info_v1_1); + if (partition_count * size > buf_size) { + ret = FFA_ERROR_NO_MEMORY; + goto err_unlock; + } + memcpy(mbox->rx_buffer, partitions, + partition_count * size); + } + + mbox->state = MAILBOX_STATE_FULL; + spin_unlock(&mbox->lock); + } + SMC_RET4(handle, FFA_SUCCESS_SMC32, 0, partition_count, size); + +err_unlock: + spin_unlock(&mbox->lock); +err: + return spmc_ffa_error_return(handle, ret); +} + +static uint64_t ffa_feature_success(void *handle, uint32_t arg2) +{ + SMC_RET3(handle, FFA_SUCCESS_SMC32, 0, arg2); +} + +static uint64_t ffa_features_retrieve_request(bool secure_origin, + uint32_t input_properties, + void *handle) +{ + /* + * If we're called by the normal world we don't support any + * additional features. + */ + if (!secure_origin) { + if ((input_properties & FFA_FEATURES_RET_REQ_NS_BIT) != 0U) { + return spmc_ffa_error_return(handle, + FFA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED); + } + + } else { + struct secure_partition_desc *sp = spmc_get_current_sp_ctx(); + /* + * If v1.1 the NS bit must be set otherwise it is an invalid + * call. If v1.0 check and store whether the SP has requested + * the use of the NS bit. + */ + if (sp->ffa_version == MAKE_FFA_VERSION(1, 1)) { + if ((input_properties & + FFA_FEATURES_RET_REQ_NS_BIT) == 0U) { + return spmc_ffa_error_return(handle, + FFA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED); + } + return ffa_feature_success(handle, + FFA_FEATURES_RET_REQ_NS_BIT); + } else { + sp->ns_bit_requested = (input_properties & + FFA_FEATURES_RET_REQ_NS_BIT) != + 0U; + } + if (sp->ns_bit_requested) { + return ffa_feature_success(handle, + FFA_FEATURES_RET_REQ_NS_BIT); + } + } + SMC_RET1(handle, FFA_SUCCESS_SMC32); +} + +static uint64_t ffa_features_handler(uint32_t smc_fid, + bool secure_origin, + uint64_t x1, + uint64_t x2, + uint64_t x3, + uint64_t x4, + void *cookie, + void *handle, + uint64_t flags) +{ + uint32_t function_id = (uint32_t) x1; + uint32_t input_properties = (uint32_t) x2; + + /* Check if a Feature ID was requested. */ + if ((function_id & FFA_FEATURES_BIT31_MASK) == 0U) { + /* We currently don't support any additional features. */ + return spmc_ffa_error_return(handle, FFA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED); + } + + /* + * Handle the cases where we have separate handlers due to additional + * properties. + */ + switch (function_id) { + case FFA_MEM_RETRIEVE_REQ_SMC32: + case FFA_MEM_RETRIEVE_REQ_SMC64: + return ffa_features_retrieve_request(secure_origin, + input_properties, + handle); + } + + /* + * We don't currently support additional input properties for these + * other ABIs therefore ensure this value is set to 0. + */ + if (input_properties != 0U) { + return spmc_ffa_error_return(handle, + FFA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED); + } + + /* Report if any other FF-A ABI is supported. */ + switch (function_id) { + /* Supported features from both worlds. */ + case FFA_ERROR: + case FFA_SUCCESS_SMC32: + case FFA_INTERRUPT: + case FFA_SPM_ID_GET: + case FFA_ID_GET: + case FFA_FEATURES: + case FFA_VERSION: + case FFA_RX_RELEASE: + case FFA_MSG_SEND_DIRECT_REQ_SMC32: + case FFA_MSG_SEND_DIRECT_REQ_SMC64: + case FFA_PARTITION_INFO_GET: + case FFA_RXTX_MAP_SMC32: + case FFA_RXTX_MAP_SMC64: + case FFA_RXTX_UNMAP: + case FFA_MEM_FRAG_TX: + case FFA_MSG_RUN: + + /* + * We are relying on the fact that the other registers + * will be set to 0 as these values align with the + * currently implemented features of the SPMC. If this + * changes this function must be extended to handle + * reporting the additional functionality. + */ + + SMC_RET1(handle, FFA_SUCCESS_SMC32); + /* Execution stops here. */ + + /* Supported ABIs only from the secure world. */ + case FFA_SECONDARY_EP_REGISTER_SMC64: + case FFA_MSG_SEND_DIRECT_RESP_SMC32: + case FFA_MSG_SEND_DIRECT_RESP_SMC64: + case FFA_MEM_RELINQUISH: + case FFA_MSG_WAIT: + + if (!secure_origin) { + return spmc_ffa_error_return(handle, + FFA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED); + } + SMC_RET1(handle, FFA_SUCCESS_SMC32); + /* Execution stops here. */ + + /* Supported features only from the normal world. */ + case FFA_MEM_SHARE_SMC32: + case FFA_MEM_SHARE_SMC64: + case FFA_MEM_LEND_SMC32: + case FFA_MEM_LEND_SMC64: + case FFA_MEM_RECLAIM: + case FFA_MEM_FRAG_RX: + + if (secure_origin) { + return spmc_ffa_error_return(handle, + FFA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED); + } + SMC_RET1(handle, FFA_SUCCESS_SMC32); + /* Execution stops here. */ + + default: + return spmc_ffa_error_return(handle, + FFA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED); + } +} + +static uint64_t ffa_id_get_handler(uint32_t smc_fid, + bool secure_origin, + uint64_t x1, + uint64_t x2, + uint64_t x3, + uint64_t x4, + void *cookie, + void *handle, + uint64_t flags) +{ + if (secure_origin) { + SMC_RET3(handle, FFA_SUCCESS_SMC32, 0x0, + spmc_get_current_sp_ctx()->sp_id); + } else { + SMC_RET3(handle, FFA_SUCCESS_SMC32, 0x0, + spmc_get_hyp_ctx()->ns_ep_id); + } +} + +/* + * Enable an SP to query the ID assigned to the SPMC. + */ +static uint64_t ffa_spm_id_get_handler(uint32_t smc_fid, + bool secure_origin, + uint64_t x1, + uint64_t x2, + uint64_t x3, + uint64_t x4, + void *cookie, + void *handle, + uint64_t flags) +{ + assert(x1 == 0UL); + assert(x2 == 0UL); + assert(x3 == 0UL); + assert(x4 == 0UL); + assert(SMC_GET_GP(handle, CTX_GPREG_X5) == 0UL); + assert(SMC_GET_GP(handle, CTX_GPREG_X6) == 0UL); + assert(SMC_GET_GP(handle, CTX_GPREG_X7) == 0UL); + + SMC_RET3(handle, FFA_SUCCESS_SMC32, 0x0, FFA_SPMC_ID); +} + +static uint64_t ffa_run_handler(uint32_t smc_fid, + bool secure_origin, + uint64_t x1, + uint64_t x2, + uint64_t x3, + uint64_t x4, + void *cookie, + void *handle, + uint64_t flags) +{ + struct secure_partition_desc *sp; + uint16_t target_id = FFA_RUN_EP_ID(x1); + uint16_t vcpu_id = FFA_RUN_VCPU_ID(x1); + unsigned int idx; + unsigned int *rt_state; + unsigned int *rt_model; + + /* Can only be called from the normal world. */ + if (secure_origin) { + ERROR("FFA_RUN can only be called from NWd.\n"); + return spmc_ffa_error_return(handle, + FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER); + } + + /* Cannot run a Normal world partition. */ + if (ffa_is_normal_world_id(target_id)) { + ERROR("Cannot run a NWd partition (0x%x).\n", target_id); + return spmc_ffa_error_return(handle, + FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER); + } + + /* Check that the target SP exists. */ + sp = spmc_get_sp_ctx(target_id); + ERROR("Unknown partition ID (0x%x).\n", target_id); + if (sp == NULL) { + return spmc_ffa_error_return(handle, + FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER); + } + + idx = get_ec_index(sp); + if (idx != vcpu_id) { + ERROR("Cannot run vcpu %d != %d.\n", idx, vcpu_id); + return spmc_ffa_error_return(handle, + FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER); + } + rt_state = &((sp->ec[idx]).rt_state); + rt_model = &((sp->ec[idx]).rt_model); + if (*rt_state == RT_STATE_RUNNING) { + ERROR("Partition (0x%x) is already running.\n", target_id); + return spmc_ffa_error_return(handle, FFA_ERROR_BUSY); + } + + /* + * Sanity check that if the execution context was not waiting then it + * was either in the direct request or the run partition runtime model. + */ + if (*rt_state == RT_STATE_PREEMPTED || *rt_state == RT_STATE_BLOCKED) { + assert(*rt_model == RT_MODEL_RUN || + *rt_model == RT_MODEL_DIR_REQ); + } + + /* + * If the context was waiting then update the partition runtime model. + */ + if (*rt_state == RT_STATE_WAITING) { + *rt_model = RT_MODEL_RUN; + } + + /* + * Forward the request to the correct SP vCPU after updating + * its state. + */ + *rt_state = RT_STATE_RUNNING; + + return spmc_smc_return(smc_fid, secure_origin, x1, 0, 0, 0, + handle, cookie, flags, target_id); +} + +static uint64_t rx_release_handler(uint32_t smc_fid, + bool secure_origin, + uint64_t x1, + uint64_t x2, + uint64_t x3, + uint64_t x4, + void *cookie, + void *handle, + uint64_t flags) +{ + struct mailbox *mbox = spmc_get_mbox_desc(secure_origin); + + spin_lock(&mbox->lock); + + if (mbox->state != MAILBOX_STATE_FULL) { + spin_unlock(&mbox->lock); + return spmc_ffa_error_return(handle, FFA_ERROR_DENIED); + } + + mbox->state = MAILBOX_STATE_EMPTY; + spin_unlock(&mbox->lock); + + SMC_RET1(handle, FFA_SUCCESS_SMC32); +} + +/* + * Perform initial validation on the provided secondary entry point. + * For now ensure it does not lie within the BL31 Image or the SP's + * RX/TX buffers as these are mapped within EL3. + * TODO: perform validation for additional invalid memory regions. + */ +static int validate_secondary_ep(uintptr_t ep, struct secure_partition_desc *sp) +{ + struct mailbox *mb; + uintptr_t buffer_size; + uintptr_t sp_rx_buffer; + uintptr_t sp_tx_buffer; + uintptr_t sp_rx_buffer_limit; + uintptr_t sp_tx_buffer_limit; + + mb = &sp->mailbox; + buffer_size = (uintptr_t) (mb->rxtx_page_count * FFA_PAGE_SIZE); + sp_rx_buffer = (uintptr_t) mb->rx_buffer; + sp_tx_buffer = (uintptr_t) mb->tx_buffer; + sp_rx_buffer_limit = sp_rx_buffer + buffer_size; + sp_tx_buffer_limit = sp_tx_buffer + buffer_size; + + /* + * Check if the entry point lies within BL31, or the + * SP's RX or TX buffer. + */ + if ((ep >= BL31_BASE && ep < BL31_LIMIT) || + (ep >= sp_rx_buffer && ep < sp_rx_buffer_limit) || + (ep >= sp_tx_buffer && ep < sp_tx_buffer_limit)) { + return -EINVAL; + } + return 0; +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * This function handles the FFA_SECONDARY_EP_REGISTER SMC to allow an SP to + * register an entry point for initialization during a secondary cold boot. + ******************************************************************************/ +static uint64_t ffa_sec_ep_register_handler(uint32_t smc_fid, + bool secure_origin, + uint64_t x1, + uint64_t x2, + uint64_t x3, + uint64_t x4, + void *cookie, + void *handle, + uint64_t flags) +{ + struct secure_partition_desc *sp; + struct sp_exec_ctx *sp_ctx; + + /* This request cannot originate from the Normal world. */ + if (!secure_origin) { + WARN("%s: Can only be called from SWd.\n", __func__); + return spmc_ffa_error_return(handle, FFA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED); + } + + /* Get the context of the current SP. */ + sp = spmc_get_current_sp_ctx(); + if (sp == NULL) { + WARN("%s: Cannot find SP context.\n", __func__); + return spmc_ffa_error_return(handle, + FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER); + } + + /* Only an S-EL1 SP should be invoking this ABI. */ + if (sp->runtime_el != S_EL1) { + WARN("%s: Can only be called for a S-EL1 SP.\n", __func__); + return spmc_ffa_error_return(handle, FFA_ERROR_DENIED); + } + + /* Ensure the SP is in its initialization state. */ + sp_ctx = spmc_get_sp_ec(sp); + if (sp_ctx->rt_model != RT_MODEL_INIT) { + WARN("%s: Can only be called during SP initialization.\n", + __func__); + return spmc_ffa_error_return(handle, FFA_ERROR_DENIED); + } + + /* Perform initial validation of the secondary entry point. */ + if (validate_secondary_ep(x1, sp)) { + WARN("%s: Invalid entry point provided (0x%lx).\n", + __func__, x1); + return spmc_ffa_error_return(handle, + FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER); + } + + /* + * Update the secondary entrypoint in SP context. + * We don't need a lock here as during partition initialization there + * will only be a single core online. + */ + sp->secondary_ep = x1; + VERBOSE("%s: 0x%lx\n", __func__, sp->secondary_ep); + + SMC_RET1(handle, FFA_SUCCESS_SMC32); +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * This function will parse the Secure Partition Manifest. From manifest, it + * will fetch details for preparing Secure partition image context and secure + * partition image boot arguments if any. + ******************************************************************************/ +static int sp_manifest_parse(void *sp_manifest, int offset, + struct secure_partition_desc *sp, + entry_point_info_t *ep_info, + int32_t *boot_info_reg) +{ + int32_t ret, node; + uint32_t config_32; + + /* + * Look for the mandatory fields that are expected to be present in + * the SP manifests. + */ + node = fdt_path_offset(sp_manifest, "/"); + if (node < 0) { + ERROR("Did not find root node.\n"); + return node; + } + + ret = fdt_read_uint32_array(sp_manifest, node, "uuid", + ARRAY_SIZE(sp->uuid), sp->uuid); + if (ret != 0) { + ERROR("Missing Secure Partition UUID.\n"); + return ret; + } + + ret = fdt_read_uint32(sp_manifest, node, "exception-level", &config_32); + if (ret != 0) { + ERROR("Missing SP Exception Level information.\n"); + return ret; + } + + sp->runtime_el = config_32; + + ret = fdt_read_uint32(sp_manifest, node, "ffa-version", &config_32); + if (ret != 0) { + ERROR("Missing Secure Partition FF-A Version.\n"); + return ret; + } + + sp->ffa_version = config_32; + + ret = fdt_read_uint32(sp_manifest, node, "execution-state", &config_32); + if (ret != 0) { + ERROR("Missing Secure Partition Execution State.\n"); + return ret; + } + + sp->execution_state = config_32; + + ret = fdt_read_uint32(sp_manifest, node, + "messaging-method", &config_32); + if (ret != 0) { + ERROR("Missing Secure Partition messaging method.\n"); + return ret; + } + + /* Validate this entry, we currently only support direct messaging. */ + if ((config_32 & ~(FFA_PARTITION_DIRECT_REQ_RECV | + FFA_PARTITION_DIRECT_REQ_SEND)) != 0U) { + WARN("Invalid Secure Partition messaging method (0x%x)\n", + config_32); + return -EINVAL; + } + + sp->properties = config_32; + + ret = fdt_read_uint32(sp_manifest, node, + "execution-ctx-count", &config_32); + + if (ret != 0) { + ERROR("Missing SP Execution Context Count.\n"); + return ret; + } + + /* + * Ensure this field is set correctly in the manifest however + * since this is currently a hardcoded value for S-EL1 partitions + * we don't need to save it here, just validate. + */ + if (config_32 != PLATFORM_CORE_COUNT) { + ERROR("SP Execution Context Count (%u) must be %u.\n", + config_32, PLATFORM_CORE_COUNT); + return -EINVAL; + } + + /* + * Look for the optional fields that are expected to be present in + * an SP manifest. + */ + ret = fdt_read_uint32(sp_manifest, node, "id", &config_32); + if (ret != 0) { + WARN("Missing Secure Partition ID.\n"); + } else { + if (!is_ffa_secure_id_valid(config_32)) { + ERROR("Invalid Secure Partition ID (0x%x).\n", + config_32); + return -EINVAL; + } + sp->sp_id = config_32; + } + + ret = fdt_read_uint32(sp_manifest, node, + "power-management-messages", &config_32); + if (ret != 0) { + WARN("Missing Power Management Messages entry.\n"); + } else { + /* + * Ensure only the currently supported power messages have + * been requested. + */ + if (config_32 & ~(FFA_PM_MSG_SUB_CPU_OFF | + FFA_PM_MSG_SUB_CPU_SUSPEND | + FFA_PM_MSG_SUB_CPU_SUSPEND_RESUME)) { + ERROR("Requested unsupported PM messages (%x)\n", + config_32); + return -EINVAL; + } + sp->pwr_mgmt_msgs = config_32; + } + + ret = fdt_read_uint32(sp_manifest, node, + "gp-register-num", &config_32); + if (ret != 0) { + WARN("Missing boot information register.\n"); + } else { + /* Check if a register number between 0-3 is specified. */ + if (config_32 < 4) { + *boot_info_reg = config_32; + } else { + WARN("Incorrect boot information register (%u).\n", + config_32); + } + } + + return 0; +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * This function gets the Secure Partition Manifest base and maps the manifest + * region. + * Currently only one Secure Partition manifest is considered which is used to + * prepare the context for the single Secure Partition. + ******************************************************************************/ +static int find_and_prepare_sp_context(void) +{ + void *sp_manifest; + uintptr_t manifest_base; + uintptr_t manifest_base_align; + entry_point_info_t *next_image_ep_info; + int32_t ret, boot_info_reg = -1; + struct secure_partition_desc *sp; + + next_image_ep_info = bl31_plat_get_next_image_ep_info(SECURE); + if (next_image_ep_info == NULL) { + WARN("No Secure Partition image provided by BL2.\n"); + return -ENOENT; + } + + sp_manifest = (void *)next_image_ep_info->args.arg0; + if (sp_manifest == NULL) { + WARN("Secure Partition manifest absent.\n"); + return -ENOENT; + } + + manifest_base = (uintptr_t)sp_manifest; + manifest_base_align = page_align(manifest_base, DOWN); + + /* + * Map the secure partition manifest region in the EL3 translation + * regime. + * Map an area equal to (2 * PAGE_SIZE) for now. During manifest base + * alignment the region of 1 PAGE_SIZE from manifest align base may + * not completely accommodate the secure partition manifest region. + */ + ret = mmap_add_dynamic_region((unsigned long long)manifest_base_align, + manifest_base_align, + PAGE_SIZE * 2, + MT_RO_DATA); + if (ret != 0) { + ERROR("Error while mapping SP manifest (%d).\n", ret); + return ret; + } + + ret = fdt_node_offset_by_compatible(sp_manifest, -1, + "arm,ffa-manifest-1.0"); + if (ret < 0) { + ERROR("Error happened in SP manifest reading.\n"); + return -EINVAL; + } + + /* + * Store the size of the manifest so that it can be used later to pass + * the manifest as boot information later. + */ + next_image_ep_info->args.arg1 = fdt_totalsize(sp_manifest); + INFO("Manifest size = %lu bytes.\n", next_image_ep_info->args.arg1); + + /* + * Select an SP descriptor for initialising the partition's execution + * context on the primary CPU. + */ + sp = spmc_get_current_sp_ctx(); + + /* Initialize entry point information for the SP */ + SET_PARAM_HEAD(next_image_ep_info, PARAM_EP, VERSION_1, + SECURE | EP_ST_ENABLE); + + /* Parse the SP manifest. */ + ret = sp_manifest_parse(sp_manifest, ret, sp, next_image_ep_info, + &boot_info_reg); + if (ret != 0) { + ERROR("Error in Secure Partition manifest parsing.\n"); + return ret; + } + + /* Check that the runtime EL in the manifest was correct. */ + if (sp->runtime_el != S_EL1) { + ERROR("Unexpected runtime EL: %d\n", sp->runtime_el); + return -EINVAL; + } + + /* Perform any common initialisation. */ + spmc_sp_common_setup(sp, next_image_ep_info, boot_info_reg); + + /* Perform any initialisation specific to S-EL1 SPs. */ + spmc_el1_sp_setup(sp, next_image_ep_info); + + /* Initialize the SP context with the required ep info. */ + spmc_sp_common_ep_commit(sp, next_image_ep_info); + + return 0; +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * This function takes an SP context pointer and performs a synchronous entry + * into it. + ******************************************************************************/ +static int32_t logical_sp_init(void) +{ + int32_t rc = 0; + struct el3_lp_desc *el3_lp_descs; + + /* Perform initial validation of the Logical Partitions. */ + rc = el3_sp_desc_validate(); + if (rc != 0) { + ERROR("Logical Partition validation failed!\n"); + return rc; + } + + el3_lp_descs = get_el3_lp_array(); + + INFO("Logical Secure Partition init start.\n"); + for (unsigned int i = 0U; i < EL3_LP_DESCS_COUNT; i++) { + rc = el3_lp_descs[i].init(); + if (rc != 0) { + ERROR("Logical SP (0x%x) Failed to Initialize\n", + el3_lp_descs[i].sp_id); + return rc; + } + VERBOSE("Logical SP (0x%x) Initialized\n", + el3_lp_descs[i].sp_id); + } + + INFO("Logical Secure Partition init completed.\n"); + + return rc; +} + +uint64_t spmc_sp_synchronous_entry(struct sp_exec_ctx *ec) +{ + uint64_t rc; + + assert(ec != NULL); + + /* Assign the context of the SP to this CPU */ + cm_set_context(&(ec->cpu_ctx), SECURE); + + /* Restore the context assigned above */ + cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(SECURE); + cm_set_next_eret_context(SECURE); + + /* Invalidate TLBs at EL1. */ + tlbivmalle1(); + dsbish(); + + /* Enter Secure Partition */ + rc = spm_secure_partition_enter(&ec->c_rt_ctx); + + /* Save secure state */ + cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(SECURE); + + return rc; +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * SPMC Helper Functions. + ******************************************************************************/ +static int32_t sp_init(void) +{ + uint64_t rc; + struct secure_partition_desc *sp; + struct sp_exec_ctx *ec; + + sp = spmc_get_current_sp_ctx(); + ec = spmc_get_sp_ec(sp); + ec->rt_model = RT_MODEL_INIT; + ec->rt_state = RT_STATE_RUNNING; + + INFO("Secure Partition (0x%x) init start.\n", sp->sp_id); + + rc = spmc_sp_synchronous_entry(ec); + if (rc != 0) { + /* Indicate SP init was not successful. */ + ERROR("SP (0x%x) failed to initialize (%lu).\n", + sp->sp_id, rc); + return 0; + } + + ec->rt_state = RT_STATE_WAITING; + INFO("Secure Partition initialized.\n"); + + return 1; +} + +static void initalize_sp_descs(void) +{ + struct secure_partition_desc *sp; + + for (unsigned int i = 0U; i < SECURE_PARTITION_COUNT; i++) { + sp = &sp_desc[i]; + sp->sp_id = INV_SP_ID; + sp->mailbox.rx_buffer = NULL; + sp->mailbox.tx_buffer = NULL; + sp->mailbox.state = MAILBOX_STATE_EMPTY; + sp->secondary_ep = 0; + } +} + +static void initalize_ns_ep_descs(void) +{ + struct ns_endpoint_desc *ns_ep; + + for (unsigned int i = 0U; i < NS_PARTITION_COUNT; i++) { + ns_ep = &ns_ep_desc[i]; + /* + * Clashes with the Hypervisor ID but will not be a + * problem in practice. + */ + ns_ep->ns_ep_id = 0; + ns_ep->ffa_version = 0; + ns_ep->mailbox.rx_buffer = NULL; + ns_ep->mailbox.tx_buffer = NULL; + ns_ep->mailbox.state = MAILBOX_STATE_EMPTY; + } +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * Initialize SPMC attributes for the SPMD. + ******************************************************************************/ +void spmc_populate_attrs(spmc_manifest_attribute_t *spmc_attrs) +{ + spmc_attrs->major_version = FFA_VERSION_MAJOR; + spmc_attrs->minor_version = FFA_VERSION_MINOR; + spmc_attrs->exec_state = MODE_RW_64; + spmc_attrs->spmc_id = FFA_SPMC_ID; +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * Initialize contexts of all Secure Partitions. + ******************************************************************************/ +int32_t spmc_setup(void) +{ + int32_t ret; + uint32_t flags; + + /* Initialize endpoint descriptors */ + initalize_sp_descs(); + initalize_ns_ep_descs(); + + /* + * Retrieve the information of the datastore for tracking shared memory + * requests allocated by platform code and zero the region if available. + */ + ret = plat_spmc_shmem_datastore_get(&spmc_shmem_obj_state.data, + &spmc_shmem_obj_state.data_size); + if (ret != 0) { + ERROR("Failed to obtain memory descriptor backing store!\n"); + return ret; + } + memset(spmc_shmem_obj_state.data, 0, spmc_shmem_obj_state.data_size); + + /* Setup logical SPs. */ + ret = logical_sp_init(); + if (ret != 0) { + ERROR("Failed to initialize Logical Partitions.\n"); + return ret; + } + + /* Perform physical SP setup. */ + + /* Disable MMU at EL1 (initialized by BL2) */ + disable_mmu_icache_el1(); + + /* Initialize context of the SP */ + INFO("Secure Partition context setup start.\n"); + + ret = find_and_prepare_sp_context(); + if (ret != 0) { + ERROR("Error in SP finding and context preparation.\n"); + return ret; + } + + /* Register power management hooks with PSCI */ + psci_register_spd_pm_hook(&spmc_pm); + + /* + * Register an interrupt handler for S-EL1 interrupts + * when generated during code executing in the + * non-secure state. + */ + flags = 0; + set_interrupt_rm_flag(flags, NON_SECURE); + ret = register_interrupt_type_handler(INTR_TYPE_S_EL1, + spmc_sp_interrupt_handler, + flags); + if (ret != 0) { + ERROR("Failed to register interrupt handler! (%d)\n", ret); + panic(); + } + + /* Register init function for deferred init. */ + bl31_register_bl32_init(&sp_init); + + INFO("Secure Partition setup done.\n"); + + return 0; +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * Secure Partition Manager SMC handler. + ******************************************************************************/ +uint64_t spmc_smc_handler(uint32_t smc_fid, + bool secure_origin, + uint64_t x1, + uint64_t x2, + uint64_t x3, + uint64_t x4, + void *cookie, + void *handle, + uint64_t flags) +{ + switch (smc_fid) { + + case FFA_VERSION: + return ffa_version_handler(smc_fid, secure_origin, x1, x2, x3, + x4, cookie, handle, flags); + + case FFA_SPM_ID_GET: + return ffa_spm_id_get_handler(smc_fid, secure_origin, x1, x2, + x3, x4, cookie, handle, flags); + + case FFA_ID_GET: + return ffa_id_get_handler(smc_fid, secure_origin, x1, x2, x3, + x4, cookie, handle, flags); + + case FFA_FEATURES: + return ffa_features_handler(smc_fid, secure_origin, x1, x2, x3, + x4, cookie, handle, flags); + + case FFA_SECONDARY_EP_REGISTER_SMC64: + return ffa_sec_ep_register_handler(smc_fid, secure_origin, x1, + x2, x3, x4, cookie, handle, + flags); + + case FFA_MSG_SEND_DIRECT_REQ_SMC32: + case FFA_MSG_SEND_DIRECT_REQ_SMC64: + return direct_req_smc_handler(smc_fid, secure_origin, x1, x2, + x3, x4, cookie, handle, flags); + + case FFA_MSG_SEND_DIRECT_RESP_SMC32: + case FFA_MSG_SEND_DIRECT_RESP_SMC64: + return direct_resp_smc_handler(smc_fid, secure_origin, x1, x2, + x3, x4, cookie, handle, flags); + + case FFA_RXTX_MAP_SMC32: + case FFA_RXTX_MAP_SMC64: + return rxtx_map_handler(smc_fid, secure_origin, x1, x2, x3, x4, + cookie, handle, flags); + + case FFA_RXTX_UNMAP: + return rxtx_unmap_handler(smc_fid, secure_origin, x1, x2, x3, + x4, cookie, handle, flags); + + case FFA_PARTITION_INFO_GET: + return partition_info_get_handler(smc_fid, secure_origin, x1, + x2, x3, x4, cookie, handle, + flags); + + case FFA_RX_RELEASE: + return rx_release_handler(smc_fid, secure_origin, x1, x2, x3, + x4, cookie, handle, flags); + + case FFA_MSG_WAIT: + return msg_wait_handler(smc_fid, secure_origin, x1, x2, x3, x4, + cookie, handle, flags); + + case FFA_ERROR: + return ffa_error_handler(smc_fid, secure_origin, x1, x2, x3, x4, + cookie, handle, flags); + + case FFA_MSG_RUN: + return ffa_run_handler(smc_fid, secure_origin, x1, x2, x3, x4, + cookie, handle, flags); + + case FFA_MEM_SHARE_SMC32: + case FFA_MEM_SHARE_SMC64: + case FFA_MEM_LEND_SMC32: + case FFA_MEM_LEND_SMC64: + return spmc_ffa_mem_send(smc_fid, secure_origin, x1, x2, x3, x4, + cookie, handle, flags); + + case FFA_MEM_FRAG_TX: + return spmc_ffa_mem_frag_tx(smc_fid, secure_origin, x1, x2, x3, + x4, cookie, handle, flags); + + case FFA_MEM_FRAG_RX: + return spmc_ffa_mem_frag_rx(smc_fid, secure_origin, x1, x2, x3, + x4, cookie, handle, flags); + + case FFA_MEM_RETRIEVE_REQ_SMC32: + case FFA_MEM_RETRIEVE_REQ_SMC64: + return spmc_ffa_mem_retrieve_req(smc_fid, secure_origin, x1, x2, + x3, x4, cookie, handle, flags); + + case FFA_MEM_RELINQUISH: + return spmc_ffa_mem_relinquish(smc_fid, secure_origin, x1, x2, + x3, x4, cookie, handle, flags); + + case FFA_MEM_RECLAIM: + return spmc_ffa_mem_reclaim(smc_fid, secure_origin, x1, x2, x3, + x4, cookie, handle, flags); + + default: + WARN("Unsupported FF-A call 0x%08x.\n", smc_fid); + break; + } + return spmc_ffa_error_return(handle, FFA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED); +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * This function is the handler registered for S-EL1 interrupts by the SPMC. It + * validates the interrupt and upon success arranges entry into the SP for + * handling the interrupt. + ******************************************************************************/ +static uint64_t spmc_sp_interrupt_handler(uint32_t id, + uint32_t flags, + void *handle, + void *cookie) +{ + struct secure_partition_desc *sp = spmc_get_current_sp_ctx(); + struct sp_exec_ctx *ec; + uint32_t linear_id = plat_my_core_pos(); + + /* Sanity check for a NULL pointer dereference. */ + assert(sp != NULL); + + /* Check the security state when the exception was generated. */ + assert(get_interrupt_src_ss(flags) == NON_SECURE); + + /* Panic if not an S-EL1 Partition. */ + if (sp->runtime_el != S_EL1) { + ERROR("Interrupt received for a non S-EL1 SP on core%u.\n", + linear_id); + panic(); + } + + /* Obtain a reference to the SP execution context. */ + ec = spmc_get_sp_ec(sp); + + /* Ensure that the execution context is in waiting state else panic. */ + if (ec->rt_state != RT_STATE_WAITING) { + ERROR("SP EC on core%u is not waiting (%u), it is (%u).\n", + linear_id, RT_STATE_WAITING, ec->rt_state); + panic(); + } + + /* Update the runtime model and state of the partition. */ + ec->rt_model = RT_MODEL_INTR; + ec->rt_state = RT_STATE_RUNNING; + + VERBOSE("SP (0x%x) interrupt start on core%u.\n", sp->sp_id, linear_id); + + /* + * Forward the interrupt to the S-EL1 SP. The interrupt ID is not + * populated as the SP can determine this by itself. + */ + return spmd_smc_switch_state(FFA_INTERRUPT, false, + FFA_PARAM_MBZ, FFA_PARAM_MBZ, + FFA_PARAM_MBZ, FFA_PARAM_MBZ, + handle); +} diff --git a/services/std_svc/spm/el3_spmc/spmc_pm.c b/services/std_svc/spm/el3_spmc/spmc_pm.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c7e864f --- /dev/null +++ b/services/std_svc/spm/el3_spmc/spmc_pm.c @@ -0,0 +1,285 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2022, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +#include <assert.h> +#include <errno.h> + +#include <lib/el3_runtime/context_mgmt.h> +#include <lib/spinlock.h> +#include <plat/common/common_def.h> +#include <plat/common/platform.h> +#include <services/ffa_svc.h> +#include "spmc.h" + +#include <platform_def.h> + +/******************************************************************************* + * spmc_build_pm_message + * + * Builds an SPMC to SP direct message request. + ******************************************************************************/ +static void spmc_build_pm_message(gp_regs_t *gpregs, + unsigned long long message, + uint8_t pm_msg_type, + uint16_t sp_id) +{ + write_ctx_reg(gpregs, CTX_GPREG_X0, FFA_MSG_SEND_DIRECT_REQ_SMC32); + write_ctx_reg(gpregs, CTX_GPREG_X1, + (FFA_SPMC_ID << FFA_DIRECT_MSG_SOURCE_SHIFT) | + sp_id); + write_ctx_reg(gpregs, CTX_GPREG_X2, FFA_FWK_MSG_BIT | + (pm_msg_type & FFA_FWK_MSG_MASK)); + write_ctx_reg(gpregs, CTX_GPREG_X3, message); +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * This CPU has been turned on. Enter the SP to initialise S-EL1. + ******************************************************************************/ +static void spmc_cpu_on_finish_handler(u_register_t unused) +{ + struct secure_partition_desc *sp = spmc_get_current_sp_ctx(); + struct sp_exec_ctx *ec; + unsigned int linear_id = plat_my_core_pos(); + entry_point_info_t sec_ec_ep_info = {0}; + uint64_t rc; + + /* Sanity check for a NULL pointer dereference. */ + assert(sp != NULL); + + /* Initialize entry point information for the SP. */ + SET_PARAM_HEAD(&sec_ec_ep_info, PARAM_EP, VERSION_1, + SECURE | EP_ST_ENABLE); + + /* + * Check if the primary execution context registered an entry point else + * bail out early. + * TODO: Add support for boot reason in manifest to allow jumping to + * entrypoint into the primary execution context. + */ + if (sp->secondary_ep == 0) { + WARN("%s: No secondary ep on core%u\n", __func__, linear_id); + return; + } + + sec_ec_ep_info.pc = sp->secondary_ep; + + /* + * Setup and initialise the SP execution context on this physical cpu. + */ + spmc_el1_sp_setup(sp, &sec_ec_ep_info); + spmc_sp_common_ep_commit(sp, &sec_ec_ep_info); + + /* Obtain a reference to the SP execution context. */ + ec = spmc_get_sp_ec(sp); + + /* + * TODO: Should we do some PM related state tracking of the SP execution + * context here? + */ + + /* Update the runtime model and state of the partition. */ + ec->rt_model = RT_MODEL_INIT; + ec->rt_state = RT_STATE_RUNNING; + ec->dir_req_origin_id = INV_SP_ID; + + INFO("SP (0x%x) init start on core%u.\n", sp->sp_id, linear_id); + + rc = spmc_sp_synchronous_entry(ec); + if (rc != 0ULL) { + ERROR("%s failed (%lu) on CPU%u\n", __func__, rc, linear_id); + } + + /* Update the runtime state of the partition. */ + ec->rt_state = RT_STATE_WAITING; + + VERBOSE("CPU %u on!\n", linear_id); +} +/******************************************************************************* + * Helper function to send a FF-A power management message to an SP. + ******************************************************************************/ +static int32_t spmc_send_pm_msg(uint8_t pm_msg_type, + unsigned long long psci_event) +{ + struct secure_partition_desc *sp = spmc_get_current_sp_ctx(); + struct sp_exec_ctx *ec; + gp_regs_t *gpregs_ctx; + unsigned int linear_id = plat_my_core_pos(); + u_register_t resp; + uint64_t rc; + + /* Obtain a reference to the SP execution context. */ + ec = spmc_get_sp_ec(sp); + + /* + * TODO: Should we do some PM related state tracking of the SP execution + * context here? + */ + + /* + * Build an SPMC to SP direct message request. + * Note that x4-x6 should be populated with the original PSCI arguments. + */ + spmc_build_pm_message(get_gpregs_ctx(&ec->cpu_ctx), + psci_event, + pm_msg_type, + sp->sp_id); + + /* Sanity check partition state. */ + assert(ec->rt_state == RT_STATE_WAITING); + + /* Update the runtime model and state of the partition. */ + ec->rt_model = RT_MODEL_DIR_REQ; + ec->rt_state = RT_STATE_RUNNING; + ec->dir_req_origin_id = FFA_SPMC_ID; + + rc = spmc_sp_synchronous_entry(ec); + if (rc != 0ULL) { + ERROR("%s failed (%lu) on CPU%u.\n", __func__, rc, linear_id); + assert(false); + return -EINVAL; + } + + /* + * Validate we receive an expected response from the SP. + * TODO: We don't currently support aborting an SP in the scenario + * where it is misbehaving so assert these conditions are not + * met for now. + */ + gpregs_ctx = get_gpregs_ctx(&ec->cpu_ctx); + + /* Expect a direct message response from the SP. */ + resp = read_ctx_reg(gpregs_ctx, CTX_GPREG_X0); + if (resp != FFA_MSG_SEND_DIRECT_RESP_SMC32) { + ERROR("%s invalid SP response (%lx).\n", __func__, resp); + assert(false); + return -EINVAL; + } + + /* Ensure the sender and receiver are populated correctly. */ + resp = read_ctx_reg(gpregs_ctx, CTX_GPREG_X1); + if (!(ffa_endpoint_source(resp) == sp->sp_id && + ffa_endpoint_destination(resp) == FFA_SPMC_ID)) { + ERROR("%s invalid src/dst response (%lx).\n", __func__, resp); + assert(false); + return -EINVAL; + } + + /* Expect a PM message response from the SP. */ + resp = read_ctx_reg(gpregs_ctx, CTX_GPREG_X2); + if ((resp & FFA_FWK_MSG_BIT) == 0U || + ((resp & FFA_FWK_MSG_MASK) != FFA_PM_MSG_PM_RESP)) { + ERROR("%s invalid PM response (%lx).\n", __func__, resp); + assert(false); + return -EINVAL; + } + + /* Update the runtime state of the partition. */ + ec->rt_state = RT_STATE_WAITING; + + /* Return the status code returned by the SP */ + return read_ctx_reg(gpregs_ctx, CTX_GPREG_X3); +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * spmc_cpu_suspend_finish_handler + ******************************************************************************/ +static void spmc_cpu_suspend_finish_handler(u_register_t unused) +{ + struct secure_partition_desc *sp = spmc_get_current_sp_ctx(); + unsigned int linear_id = plat_my_core_pos(); + int32_t rc; + + /* Sanity check for a NULL pointer dereference. */ + assert(sp != NULL); + + /* + * Check if the SP has subscribed for this power management message. + * If not then we don't have anything else to do here. + */ + if ((sp->pwr_mgmt_msgs & FFA_PM_MSG_SUB_CPU_SUSPEND_RESUME) == 0U) { + goto exit; + } + + rc = spmc_send_pm_msg(FFA_PM_MSG_WB_REQ, FFA_WB_TYPE_NOTS2RAM); + if (rc < 0) { + ERROR("%s failed (%d) on CPU%u\n", __func__, rc, linear_id); + return; + } + +exit: + VERBOSE("CPU %u resumed!\n", linear_id); +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * spmc_cpu_suspend_handler + ******************************************************************************/ +static void spmc_cpu_suspend_handler(u_register_t unused) +{ + struct secure_partition_desc *sp = spmc_get_current_sp_ctx(); + unsigned int linear_id = plat_my_core_pos(); + int32_t rc; + + /* Sanity check for a NULL pointer dereference. */ + assert(sp != NULL); + + /* + * Check if the SP has subscribed for this power management message. + * If not then we don't have anything else to do here. + */ + if ((sp->pwr_mgmt_msgs & FFA_PM_MSG_SUB_CPU_SUSPEND) == 0U) { + goto exit; + } + + rc = spmc_send_pm_msg(FFA_FWK_MSG_PSCI, PSCI_CPU_SUSPEND_AARCH64); + if (rc < 0) { + ERROR("%s failed (%d) on CPU%u\n", __func__, rc, linear_id); + return; + } +exit: + VERBOSE("CPU %u suspend!\n", linear_id); +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * spmc_cpu_off_handler + ******************************************************************************/ +static int32_t spmc_cpu_off_handler(u_register_t unused) +{ + struct secure_partition_desc *sp = spmc_get_current_sp_ctx(); + unsigned int linear_id = plat_my_core_pos(); + int32_t ret = 0; + + /* Sanity check for a NULL pointer dereference. */ + assert(sp != NULL); + + /* + * Check if the SP has subscribed for this power management message. + * If not then we don't have anything else to do here. + */ + if ((sp->pwr_mgmt_msgs & FFA_PM_MSG_SUB_CPU_OFF) == 0U) { + goto exit; + } + + ret = spmc_send_pm_msg(FFA_FWK_MSG_PSCI, PSCI_CPU_OFF); + if (ret < 0) { + ERROR("%s failed (%d) on CPU%u\n", __func__, ret, linear_id); + return ret; + } + +exit: + VERBOSE("CPU %u off!\n", linear_id); + return ret; +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * Structure populated by the SPM Core to perform any bookkeeping before + * PSCI executes a power mgmt. operation. + ******************************************************************************/ +const spd_pm_ops_t spmc_pm = { + .svc_on_finish = spmc_cpu_on_finish_handler, + .svc_off = spmc_cpu_off_handler, + .svc_suspend = spmc_cpu_suspend_handler, + .svc_suspend_finish = spmc_cpu_suspend_finish_handler +}; diff --git a/services/std_svc/spm/el3_spmc/spmc_setup.c b/services/std_svc/spm/el3_spmc/spmc_setup.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6de25f6 --- /dev/null +++ b/services/std_svc/spm/el3_spmc/spmc_setup.c @@ -0,0 +1,278 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2022, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +#include <assert.h> +#include <string.h> + +#include <arch.h> +#include <arch_helpers.h> +#include <common/debug.h> +#include <common/fdt_wrappers.h> +#include <context.h> +#include <lib/el3_runtime/context_mgmt.h> +#include <lib/utils.h> +#include <lib/xlat_tables/xlat_tables_v2.h> +#include <libfdt.h> +#include <plat/common/common_def.h> +#include <plat/common/platform.h> +#include <services/ffa_svc.h> +#include "spm_common.h" +#include "spmc.h" +#include <tools_share/firmware_image_package.h> + +#include <platform_def.h> + +/* + * Statically allocate a page of memory for passing boot information to an SP. + */ +static uint8_t ffa_boot_info_mem[PAGE_SIZE] __aligned(PAGE_SIZE); + +/* + * This function creates a initialization descriptor in the memory reserved + * for passing boot information to an SP. It then copies the partition manifest + * into this region and ensures that its reference in the initialization + * descriptor is updated. + */ +static void spmc_create_boot_info(entry_point_info_t *ep_info, + struct secure_partition_desc *sp) +{ + struct ffa_boot_info_header *boot_header; + struct ffa_boot_info_desc *boot_descriptor; + uintptr_t manifest_addr; + + /* + * Calculate the maximum size of the manifest that can be accommodated + * in the boot information memory region. + */ + const unsigned int + max_manifest_sz = sizeof(ffa_boot_info_mem) - + (sizeof(struct ffa_boot_info_header) + + sizeof(struct ffa_boot_info_desc)); + + /* + * The current implementation only supports the FF-A v1.1 + * implementation of the boot protocol, therefore check + * that a v1.0 SP has not requested use of the protocol. + */ + if (sp->ffa_version == MAKE_FFA_VERSION(1, 0)) { + ERROR("FF-A boot protocol not supported for v1.0 clients\n"); + return; + } + + /* + * Check if the manifest will fit into the boot info memory region else + * bail. + */ + if (ep_info->args.arg1 > max_manifest_sz) { + WARN("Unable to copy manifest into boot information. "); + WARN("Max sz = %u bytes. Manifest sz = %lu bytes\n", + max_manifest_sz, ep_info->args.arg1); + return; + } + + /* Zero the memory region before populating. */ + memset(ffa_boot_info_mem, 0, PAGE_SIZE); + + /* + * Populate the ffa_boot_info_header at the start of the boot info + * region. + */ + boot_header = (struct ffa_boot_info_header *) ffa_boot_info_mem; + + /* Position the ffa_boot_info_desc after the ffa_boot_info_header. */ + boot_header->offset_boot_info_desc = + sizeof(struct ffa_boot_info_header); + boot_descriptor = (struct ffa_boot_info_desc *) + (ffa_boot_info_mem + + boot_header->offset_boot_info_desc); + + /* + * We must use the FF-A version corresponding to the version implemented + * by the SP. Currently this can only be v1.1. + */ + boot_header->version = sp->ffa_version; + + /* Populate the boot information header. */ + boot_header->size_boot_info_desc = sizeof(struct ffa_boot_info_desc); + + /* Set the signature "0xFFA". */ + boot_header->signature = FFA_INIT_DESC_SIGNATURE; + + /* Set the count. Currently 1 since only the manifest is specified. */ + boot_header->count_boot_info_desc = 1; + + /* Populate the boot information descriptor for the manifest. */ + boot_descriptor->type = + FFA_BOOT_INFO_TYPE(FFA_BOOT_INFO_TYPE_STD) | + FFA_BOOT_INFO_TYPE_ID(FFA_BOOT_INFO_TYPE_ID_FDT); + + boot_descriptor->flags = + FFA_BOOT_INFO_FLAG_NAME(FFA_BOOT_INFO_FLAG_NAME_UUID) | + FFA_BOOT_INFO_FLAG_CONTENT(FFA_BOOT_INFO_FLAG_CONTENT_ADR); + + /* + * Copy the manifest into boot info region after the boot information + * descriptor. + */ + boot_descriptor->size_boot_info = (uint32_t) ep_info->args.arg1; + + manifest_addr = (uintptr_t) (ffa_boot_info_mem + + boot_header->offset_boot_info_desc + + boot_header->size_boot_info_desc); + + memcpy((void *) manifest_addr, (void *) ep_info->args.arg0, + boot_descriptor->size_boot_info); + + boot_descriptor->content = manifest_addr; + + /* Calculate the size of the total boot info blob. */ + boot_header->size_boot_info_blob = boot_header->offset_boot_info_desc + + boot_descriptor->size_boot_info + + (boot_header->count_boot_info_desc * + boot_header->size_boot_info_desc); + + INFO("SP boot info @ 0x%lx, size: %u bytes.\n", + (uintptr_t) ffa_boot_info_mem, + boot_header->size_boot_info_blob); + INFO("SP manifest @ 0x%lx, size: %u bytes.\n", + boot_descriptor->content, + boot_descriptor->size_boot_info); +} + +/* + * We are assuming that the index of the execution + * context used is the linear index of the current physical cpu. + */ +unsigned int get_ec_index(struct secure_partition_desc *sp) +{ + return plat_my_core_pos(); +} + +/* S-EL1 partition specific initialisation. */ +void spmc_el1_sp_setup(struct secure_partition_desc *sp, + entry_point_info_t *ep_info) +{ + /* Sanity check input arguments. */ + assert(sp != NULL); + assert(ep_info != NULL); + + /* Initialise the SPSR for S-EL1 SPs. */ + ep_info->spsr = SPSR_64(MODE_EL1, MODE_SP_ELX, + DISABLE_ALL_EXCEPTIONS); + + /* + * TF-A Implementation defined behaviour to provide the linear + * core ID in the x4 register. + */ + ep_info->args.arg4 = (uintptr_t) plat_my_core_pos(); + + /* + * Check whether setup is being performed for the primary or a secondary + * execution context. In the latter case, indicate to the SP that this + * is a warm boot. + * TODO: This check would need to be reworked if the same entry point is + * used for both primary and secondary initialisation. + */ + if (sp->secondary_ep != 0U) { + /* + * Sanity check that the secondary entry point is still what was + * originally set. + */ + assert(sp->secondary_ep == ep_info->pc); + ep_info->args.arg0 = FFA_WB_TYPE_S2RAM; + } +} + +/* Common initialisation for all SPs. */ +void spmc_sp_common_setup(struct secure_partition_desc *sp, + entry_point_info_t *ep_info, + int32_t boot_info_reg) +{ + uint16_t sp_id; + + /* Assign FF-A Partition ID if not already assigned. */ + if (sp->sp_id == INV_SP_ID) { + sp_id = FFA_SP_ID_BASE + ACTIVE_SP_DESC_INDEX; + /* + * Ensure we don't clash with previously assigned partition + * IDs. + */ + while (!is_ffa_secure_id_valid(sp_id)) { + sp_id++; + + if (sp_id == FFA_SWD_ID_LIMIT) { + ERROR("Unable to determine valid SP ID.\n"); + panic(); + } + } + sp->sp_id = sp_id; + } + + /* + * We currently only support S-EL1 partitions so ensure this is the + * case. + */ + assert(sp->runtime_el == S_EL1); + + /* Check if the SP wants to use the FF-A boot protocol. */ + if (boot_info_reg >= 0) { + /* + * Create a boot information descriptor and copy the partition + * manifest into the reserved memory region for consumption by + * the SP. + */ + spmc_create_boot_info(ep_info, sp); + + /* + * We have consumed what we need from ep args so we can now + * zero them before we start populating with new information + * specifically for the SP. + */ + zeromem(&ep_info->args, sizeof(ep_info->args)); + + /* + * Pass the address of the boot information in the + * boot_info_reg. + */ + switch (boot_info_reg) { + case 0: + ep_info->args.arg0 = (uintptr_t) ffa_boot_info_mem; + break; + case 1: + ep_info->args.arg1 = (uintptr_t) ffa_boot_info_mem; + break; + case 2: + ep_info->args.arg2 = (uintptr_t) ffa_boot_info_mem; + break; + case 3: + ep_info->args.arg3 = (uintptr_t) ffa_boot_info_mem; + break; + default: + ERROR("Invalid value for \"gp-register-num\" %d.\n", + boot_info_reg); + } + } else { + /* + * We don't need any of the information that was populated + * in ep_args so we can clear them. + */ + zeromem(&ep_info->args, sizeof(ep_info->args)); + } +} + +/* + * Initialise the SP context now we have populated the common and EL specific + * entrypoint information. + */ +void spmc_sp_common_ep_commit(struct secure_partition_desc *sp, + entry_point_info_t *ep_info) +{ + cpu_context_t *cpu_ctx; + + cpu_ctx = &(spmc_get_sp_ec(sp)->cpu_ctx); + print_entry_point_info(ep_info); + cm_setup_context(cpu_ctx, ep_info); +} diff --git a/services/std_svc/spm/el3_spmc/spmc_shared_mem.c b/services/std_svc/spm/el3_spmc/spmc_shared_mem.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5263c04 --- /dev/null +++ b/services/std_svc/spm/el3_spmc/spmc_shared_mem.c @@ -0,0 +1,1934 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2022-2023, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ +#include <assert.h> +#include <errno.h> +#include <inttypes.h> + +#include <common/debug.h> +#include <common/runtime_svc.h> +#include <lib/object_pool.h> +#include <lib/spinlock.h> +#include <lib/xlat_tables/xlat_tables_v2.h> +#include <services/ffa_svc.h> +#include "spmc.h" +#include "spmc_shared_mem.h" + +#include <platform_def.h> + +/** + * struct spmc_shmem_obj - Shared memory object. + * @desc_size: Size of @desc. + * @desc_filled: Size of @desc already received. + * @in_use: Number of clients that have called ffa_mem_retrieve_req + * without a matching ffa_mem_relinquish call. + * @desc: FF-A memory region descriptor passed in ffa_mem_share. + */ +struct spmc_shmem_obj { + size_t desc_size; + size_t desc_filled; + size_t in_use; + struct ffa_mtd desc; +}; + +/* + * Declare our data structure to store the metadata of memory share requests. + * The main datastore is allocated on a per platform basis to ensure enough + * storage can be made available. + * The address of the data store will be populated by the SPMC during its + * initialization. + */ + +struct spmc_shmem_obj_state spmc_shmem_obj_state = { + /* Set start value for handle so top 32 bits are needed quickly. */ + .next_handle = 0xffffffc0U, +}; + +/** + * spmc_shmem_obj_size - Convert from descriptor size to object size. + * @desc_size: Size of struct ffa_memory_region_descriptor object. + * + * Return: Size of struct spmc_shmem_obj object. + */ +static size_t spmc_shmem_obj_size(size_t desc_size) +{ + return desc_size + offsetof(struct spmc_shmem_obj, desc); +} + +/** + * spmc_shmem_obj_alloc - Allocate struct spmc_shmem_obj. + * @state: Global state. + * @desc_size: Size of struct ffa_memory_region_descriptor object that + * allocated object will hold. + * + * Return: Pointer to newly allocated object, or %NULL if there not enough space + * left. The returned pointer is only valid while @state is locked, to + * used it again after unlocking @state, spmc_shmem_obj_lookup must be + * called. + */ +static struct spmc_shmem_obj * +spmc_shmem_obj_alloc(struct spmc_shmem_obj_state *state, size_t desc_size) +{ + struct spmc_shmem_obj *obj; + size_t free = state->data_size - state->allocated; + size_t obj_size; + + if (state->data == NULL) { + ERROR("Missing shmem datastore!\n"); + return NULL; + } + + /* Ensure that descriptor size is aligned */ + if (!is_aligned(desc_size, 16)) { + WARN("%s(0x%zx) desc_size not 16-byte aligned\n", + __func__, desc_size); + return NULL; + } + + obj_size = spmc_shmem_obj_size(desc_size); + + /* Ensure the obj size has not overflowed. */ + if (obj_size < desc_size) { + WARN("%s(0x%zx) desc_size overflow\n", + __func__, desc_size); + return NULL; + } + + if (obj_size > free) { + WARN("%s(0x%zx) failed, free 0x%zx\n", + __func__, desc_size, free); + return NULL; + } + obj = (struct spmc_shmem_obj *)(state->data + state->allocated); + obj->desc = (struct ffa_mtd) {0}; + obj->desc_size = desc_size; + obj->desc_filled = 0; + obj->in_use = 0; + state->allocated += obj_size; + return obj; +} + +/** + * spmc_shmem_obj_free - Free struct spmc_shmem_obj. + * @state: Global state. + * @obj: Object to free. + * + * Release memory used by @obj. Other objects may move, so on return all + * pointers to struct spmc_shmem_obj object should be considered invalid, not + * just @obj. + * + * The current implementation always compacts the remaining objects to simplify + * the allocator and to avoid fragmentation. + */ + +static void spmc_shmem_obj_free(struct spmc_shmem_obj_state *state, + struct spmc_shmem_obj *obj) +{ + size_t free_size = spmc_shmem_obj_size(obj->desc_size); + uint8_t *shift_dest = (uint8_t *)obj; + uint8_t *shift_src = shift_dest + free_size; + size_t shift_size = state->allocated - (shift_src - state->data); + + if (shift_size != 0U) { + memmove(shift_dest, shift_src, shift_size); + } + state->allocated -= free_size; +} + +/** + * spmc_shmem_obj_lookup - Lookup struct spmc_shmem_obj by handle. + * @state: Global state. + * @handle: Unique handle of object to return. + * + * Return: struct spmc_shmem_obj_state object with handle matching @handle. + * %NULL, if not object in @state->data has a matching handle. + */ +static struct spmc_shmem_obj * +spmc_shmem_obj_lookup(struct spmc_shmem_obj_state *state, uint64_t handle) +{ + uint8_t *curr = state->data; + + while (curr - state->data < state->allocated) { + struct spmc_shmem_obj *obj = (struct spmc_shmem_obj *)curr; + + if (obj->desc.handle == handle) { + return obj; + } + curr += spmc_shmem_obj_size(obj->desc_size); + } + return NULL; +} + +/** + * spmc_shmem_obj_get_next - Get the next memory object from an offset. + * @offset: Offset used to track which objects have previously been + * returned. + * + * Return: the next struct spmc_shmem_obj_state object from the provided + * offset. + * %NULL, if there are no more objects. + */ +static struct spmc_shmem_obj * +spmc_shmem_obj_get_next(struct spmc_shmem_obj_state *state, size_t *offset) +{ + uint8_t *curr = state->data + *offset; + + if (curr - state->data < state->allocated) { + struct spmc_shmem_obj *obj = (struct spmc_shmem_obj *)curr; + + *offset += spmc_shmem_obj_size(obj->desc_size); + + return obj; + } + return NULL; +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * FF-A memory descriptor helper functions. + ******************************************************************************/ +/** + * spmc_shmem_obj_get_emad - Get the emad from a given index depending on the + * clients FF-A version. + * @desc: The memory transaction descriptor. + * @index: The index of the emad element to be accessed. + * @ffa_version: FF-A version of the provided structure. + * @emad_size: Will be populated with the size of the returned emad + * descriptor. + * Return: A pointer to the requested emad structure. + */ +static void * +spmc_shmem_obj_get_emad(const struct ffa_mtd *desc, uint32_t index, + uint32_t ffa_version, size_t *emad_size) +{ + uint8_t *emad; + + assert(index < desc->emad_count); + + /* + * If the caller is using FF-A v1.0 interpret the descriptor as a v1.0 + * format, otherwise assume it is a v1.1 format. + */ + if (ffa_version == MAKE_FFA_VERSION(1, 0)) { + emad = (uint8_t *)desc + offsetof(struct ffa_mtd_v1_0, emad); + *emad_size = sizeof(struct ffa_emad_v1_0); + } else { + assert(is_aligned(desc->emad_offset, 16)); + emad = ((uint8_t *) desc + desc->emad_offset); + *emad_size = desc->emad_size; + } + + assert(((uint64_t)index * (uint64_t)*emad_size) <= UINT32_MAX); + return (emad + (*emad_size * index)); +} + +/** + * spmc_shmem_obj_get_comp_mrd - Get comp_mrd from a mtd struct based on the + * FF-A version of the descriptor. + * @obj: Object containing ffa_memory_region_descriptor. + * + * Return: struct ffa_comp_mrd object corresponding to the composite memory + * region descriptor. + */ +static struct ffa_comp_mrd * +spmc_shmem_obj_get_comp_mrd(struct spmc_shmem_obj *obj, uint32_t ffa_version) +{ + size_t emad_size; + /* + * The comp_mrd_offset field of the emad descriptor remains consistent + * between FF-A versions therefore we can use the v1.0 descriptor here + * in all cases. + */ + struct ffa_emad_v1_0 *emad = spmc_shmem_obj_get_emad(&obj->desc, 0, + ffa_version, + &emad_size); + + /* Ensure the composite descriptor offset is aligned. */ + if (!is_aligned(emad->comp_mrd_offset, 8)) { + WARN("Unaligned composite memory region descriptor offset.\n"); + return NULL; + } + + return (struct ffa_comp_mrd *) + ((uint8_t *)(&obj->desc) + emad->comp_mrd_offset); +} + +/** + * spmc_shmem_obj_validate_id - Validate a partition ID is participating in + * a given memory transaction. + * @sp_id: Partition ID to validate. + * @obj: The shared memory object containing the descriptor + * of the memory transaction. + * Return: true if ID is valid, else false. + */ +bool spmc_shmem_obj_validate_id(struct spmc_shmem_obj *obj, uint16_t sp_id) +{ + bool found = false; + struct ffa_mtd *desc = &obj->desc; + size_t desc_size = obj->desc_size; + + /* Validate the partition is a valid participant. */ + for (unsigned int i = 0U; i < desc->emad_count; i++) { + size_t emad_size; + struct ffa_emad_v1_0 *emad; + + emad = spmc_shmem_obj_get_emad(desc, i, + MAKE_FFA_VERSION(1, 1), + &emad_size); + /* + * Validate the calculated emad address resides within the + * descriptor. + */ + if ((emad == NULL) || (uintptr_t) emad >= + (uintptr_t)((uint8_t *) desc + desc_size)) { + VERBOSE("Invalid emad.\n"); + break; + } + if (sp_id == emad->mapd.endpoint_id) { + found = true; + break; + } + } + return found; +} + +/* + * Compare two memory regions to determine if any range overlaps with another + * ongoing memory transaction. + */ +static bool +overlapping_memory_regions(struct ffa_comp_mrd *region1, + struct ffa_comp_mrd *region2) +{ + uint64_t region1_start; + uint64_t region1_size; + uint64_t region1_end; + uint64_t region2_start; + uint64_t region2_size; + uint64_t region2_end; + + assert(region1 != NULL); + assert(region2 != NULL); + + if (region1 == region2) { + return true; + } + + /* + * Check each memory region in the request against existing + * transactions. + */ + for (size_t i = 0; i < region1->address_range_count; i++) { + + region1_start = region1->address_range_array[i].address; + region1_size = + region1->address_range_array[i].page_count * + PAGE_SIZE_4KB; + region1_end = region1_start + region1_size; + + for (size_t j = 0; j < region2->address_range_count; j++) { + + region2_start = region2->address_range_array[j].address; + region2_size = + region2->address_range_array[j].page_count * + PAGE_SIZE_4KB; + region2_end = region2_start + region2_size; + + /* Check if regions are not overlapping. */ + if (!((region2_end <= region1_start) || + (region1_end <= region2_start))) { + WARN("Overlapping mem regions 0x%lx-0x%lx & 0x%lx-0x%lx\n", + region1_start, region1_end, + region2_start, region2_end); + return true; + } + } + } + return false; +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * FF-A v1.0 Memory Descriptor Conversion Helpers. + ******************************************************************************/ +/** + * spmc_shm_get_v1_1_descriptor_size - Calculate the required size for a v1.1 + * converted descriptor. + * @orig: The original v1.0 memory transaction descriptor. + * @desc_size: The size of the original v1.0 memory transaction descriptor. + * + * Return: the size required to store the descriptor store in the v1.1 format. + */ +static uint64_t +spmc_shm_get_v1_1_descriptor_size(struct ffa_mtd_v1_0 *orig, size_t desc_size) +{ + uint64_t size = 0; + struct ffa_comp_mrd *mrd; + struct ffa_emad_v1_0 *emad_array = orig->emad; + + /* Get the size of the v1.1 descriptor. */ + size += sizeof(struct ffa_mtd); + + /* Add the size of the emad descriptors. */ + size += orig->emad_count * sizeof(struct ffa_emad_v1_0); + + /* Add the size of the composite mrds. */ + size += sizeof(struct ffa_comp_mrd); + + /* Add the size of the constituent mrds. */ + mrd = (struct ffa_comp_mrd *) ((uint8_t *) orig + + emad_array[0].comp_mrd_offset); + + /* Add the size of the memory region descriptors. */ + size += mrd->address_range_count * sizeof(struct ffa_cons_mrd); + + return size; +} + +/** + * spmc_shm_get_v1_0_descriptor_size - Calculate the required size for a v1.0 + * converted descriptor. + * @orig: The original v1.1 memory transaction descriptor. + * @desc_size: The size of the original v1.1 memory transaction descriptor. + * + * Return: the size required to store the descriptor store in the v1.0 format. + */ +static size_t +spmc_shm_get_v1_0_descriptor_size(struct ffa_mtd *orig, size_t desc_size) +{ + size_t size = 0; + struct ffa_comp_mrd *mrd; + struct ffa_emad_v1_0 *emad_array = (struct ffa_emad_v1_0 *) + ((uint8_t *) orig + + orig->emad_offset); + + /* Get the size of the v1.0 descriptor. */ + size += sizeof(struct ffa_mtd_v1_0); + + /* Add the size of the v1.0 emad descriptors. */ + size += orig->emad_count * sizeof(struct ffa_emad_v1_0); + + /* Add the size of the composite mrds. */ + size += sizeof(struct ffa_comp_mrd); + + /* Add the size of the constituent mrds. */ + mrd = (struct ffa_comp_mrd *) ((uint8_t *) orig + + emad_array[0].comp_mrd_offset); + + /* Check the calculated address is within the memory descriptor. */ + if (((uintptr_t) mrd + sizeof(struct ffa_comp_mrd)) > + (uintptr_t)((uint8_t *) orig + desc_size)) { + return 0; + } + size += mrd->address_range_count * sizeof(struct ffa_cons_mrd); + + return size; +} + +/** + * spmc_shm_convert_shmem_obj_from_v1_0 - Converts a given v1.0 memory object. + * @out_obj: The shared memory object to populate the converted descriptor. + * @orig: The shared memory object containing the v1.0 descriptor. + * + * Return: true if the conversion is successful else false. + */ +static bool +spmc_shm_convert_shmem_obj_from_v1_0(struct spmc_shmem_obj *out_obj, + struct spmc_shmem_obj *orig) +{ + struct ffa_mtd_v1_0 *mtd_orig = (struct ffa_mtd_v1_0 *) &orig->desc; + struct ffa_mtd *out = &out_obj->desc; + struct ffa_emad_v1_0 *emad_array_in; + struct ffa_emad_v1_0 *emad_array_out; + struct ffa_comp_mrd *mrd_in; + struct ffa_comp_mrd *mrd_out; + + size_t mrd_in_offset; + size_t mrd_out_offset; + size_t mrd_size = 0; + + /* Populate the new descriptor format from the v1.0 struct. */ + out->sender_id = mtd_orig->sender_id; + out->memory_region_attributes = mtd_orig->memory_region_attributes; + out->flags = mtd_orig->flags; + out->handle = mtd_orig->handle; + out->tag = mtd_orig->tag; + out->emad_count = mtd_orig->emad_count; + out->emad_size = sizeof(struct ffa_emad_v1_0); + + /* + * We will locate the emad descriptors directly after the ffa_mtd + * struct. This will be 8-byte aligned. + */ + out->emad_offset = sizeof(struct ffa_mtd); + + emad_array_in = mtd_orig->emad; + emad_array_out = (struct ffa_emad_v1_0 *) + ((uint8_t *) out + out->emad_offset); + + /* Copy across the emad structs. */ + for (unsigned int i = 0U; i < out->emad_count; i++) { + /* Bound check for emad array. */ + if (((uint8_t *)emad_array_in + sizeof(struct ffa_emad_v1_0)) > + ((uint8_t *) mtd_orig + orig->desc_size)) { + VERBOSE("%s: Invalid mtd structure.\n", __func__); + return false; + } + memcpy(&emad_array_out[i], &emad_array_in[i], + sizeof(struct ffa_emad_v1_0)); + } + + /* Place the mrd descriptors after the end of the emad descriptors.*/ + mrd_in_offset = emad_array_in->comp_mrd_offset; + mrd_out_offset = out->emad_offset + (out->emad_size * out->emad_count); + mrd_out = (struct ffa_comp_mrd *) ((uint8_t *) out + mrd_out_offset); + + /* Add the size of the composite memory region descriptor. */ + mrd_size += sizeof(struct ffa_comp_mrd); + + /* Find the mrd descriptor. */ + mrd_in = (struct ffa_comp_mrd *) ((uint8_t *) mtd_orig + mrd_in_offset); + + /* Add the size of the constituent memory region descriptors. */ + mrd_size += mrd_in->address_range_count * sizeof(struct ffa_cons_mrd); + + /* + * Update the offset in the emads by the delta between the input and + * output addresses. + */ + for (unsigned int i = 0U; i < out->emad_count; i++) { + emad_array_out[i].comp_mrd_offset = + emad_array_in[i].comp_mrd_offset + + (mrd_out_offset - mrd_in_offset); + } + + /* Verify that we stay within bound of the memory descriptors. */ + if ((uintptr_t)((uint8_t *) mrd_in + mrd_size) > + (uintptr_t)((uint8_t *) mtd_orig + orig->desc_size) || + ((uintptr_t)((uint8_t *) mrd_out + mrd_size) > + (uintptr_t)((uint8_t *) out + out_obj->desc_size))) { + ERROR("%s: Invalid mrd structure.\n", __func__); + return false; + } + + /* Copy the mrd descriptors directly. */ + memcpy(mrd_out, mrd_in, mrd_size); + + return true; +} + +/** + * spmc_shm_convert_mtd_to_v1_0 - Converts a given v1.1 memory object to + * v1.0 memory object. + * @out_obj: The shared memory object to populate the v1.0 descriptor. + * @orig: The shared memory object containing the v1.1 descriptor. + * + * Return: true if the conversion is successful else false. + */ +static bool +spmc_shm_convert_mtd_to_v1_0(struct spmc_shmem_obj *out_obj, + struct spmc_shmem_obj *orig) +{ + struct ffa_mtd *mtd_orig = &orig->desc; + struct ffa_mtd_v1_0 *out = (struct ffa_mtd_v1_0 *) &out_obj->desc; + struct ffa_emad_v1_0 *emad_in; + struct ffa_emad_v1_0 *emad_array_in; + struct ffa_emad_v1_0 *emad_array_out; + struct ffa_comp_mrd *mrd_in; + struct ffa_comp_mrd *mrd_out; + + size_t mrd_in_offset; + size_t mrd_out_offset; + size_t emad_out_array_size; + size_t mrd_size = 0; + size_t orig_desc_size = orig->desc_size; + + /* Populate the v1.0 descriptor format from the v1.1 struct. */ + out->sender_id = mtd_orig->sender_id; + out->memory_region_attributes = mtd_orig->memory_region_attributes; + out->flags = mtd_orig->flags; + out->handle = mtd_orig->handle; + out->tag = mtd_orig->tag; + out->emad_count = mtd_orig->emad_count; + + /* Determine the location of the emad array in both descriptors. */ + emad_array_in = (struct ffa_emad_v1_0 *) + ((uint8_t *) mtd_orig + mtd_orig->emad_offset); + emad_array_out = out->emad; + + /* Copy across the emad structs. */ + emad_in = emad_array_in; + for (unsigned int i = 0U; i < out->emad_count; i++) { + /* Bound check for emad array. */ + if (((uint8_t *)emad_in + sizeof(struct ffa_emad_v1_0)) > + ((uint8_t *) mtd_orig + orig_desc_size)) { + VERBOSE("%s: Invalid mtd structure.\n", __func__); + return false; + } + memcpy(&emad_array_out[i], emad_in, + sizeof(struct ffa_emad_v1_0)); + + emad_in += mtd_orig->emad_size; + } + + /* Place the mrd descriptors after the end of the emad descriptors. */ + emad_out_array_size = sizeof(struct ffa_emad_v1_0) * out->emad_count; + + mrd_out_offset = (uint8_t *) out->emad - (uint8_t *) out + + emad_out_array_size; + + mrd_out = (struct ffa_comp_mrd *) ((uint8_t *) out + mrd_out_offset); + + mrd_in_offset = mtd_orig->emad_offset + + (mtd_orig->emad_size * mtd_orig->emad_count); + + /* Add the size of the composite memory region descriptor. */ + mrd_size += sizeof(struct ffa_comp_mrd); + + /* Find the mrd descriptor. */ + mrd_in = (struct ffa_comp_mrd *) ((uint8_t *) mtd_orig + mrd_in_offset); + + /* Add the size of the constituent memory region descriptors. */ + mrd_size += mrd_in->address_range_count * sizeof(struct ffa_cons_mrd); + + /* + * Update the offset in the emads by the delta between the input and + * output addresses. + */ + emad_in = emad_array_in; + + for (unsigned int i = 0U; i < out->emad_count; i++) { + emad_array_out[i].comp_mrd_offset = emad_in->comp_mrd_offset + + (mrd_out_offset - + mrd_in_offset); + emad_in += mtd_orig->emad_size; + } + + /* Verify that we stay within bound of the memory descriptors. */ + if ((uintptr_t)((uint8_t *) mrd_in + mrd_size) > + (uintptr_t)((uint8_t *) mtd_orig + orig->desc_size) || + ((uintptr_t)((uint8_t *) mrd_out + mrd_size) > + (uintptr_t)((uint8_t *) out + out_obj->desc_size))) { + ERROR("%s: Invalid mrd structure.\n", __func__); + return false; + } + + /* Copy the mrd descriptors directly. */ + memcpy(mrd_out, mrd_in, mrd_size); + + return true; +} + +/** + * spmc_populate_ffa_v1_0_descriptor - Converts a given v1.1 memory object to + * the v1.0 format and populates the + * provided buffer. + * @dst: Buffer to populate v1.0 ffa_memory_region_descriptor. + * @orig_obj: Object containing v1.1 ffa_memory_region_descriptor. + * @buf_size: Size of the buffer to populate. + * @offset: The offset of the converted descriptor to copy. + * @copy_size: Will be populated with the number of bytes copied. + * @out_desc_size: Will be populated with the total size of the v1.0 + * descriptor. + * + * Return: 0 if conversion and population succeeded. + * Note: This function invalidates the reference to @orig therefore + * `spmc_shmem_obj_lookup` must be called if further usage is required. + */ +static uint32_t +spmc_populate_ffa_v1_0_descriptor(void *dst, struct spmc_shmem_obj *orig_obj, + size_t buf_size, size_t offset, + size_t *copy_size, size_t *v1_0_desc_size) +{ + struct spmc_shmem_obj *v1_0_obj; + + /* Calculate the size that the v1.0 descriptor will require. */ + *v1_0_desc_size = spmc_shm_get_v1_0_descriptor_size( + &orig_obj->desc, orig_obj->desc_size); + + if (*v1_0_desc_size == 0) { + ERROR("%s: cannot determine size of descriptor.\n", + __func__); + return FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER; + } + + /* Get a new obj to store the v1.0 descriptor. */ + v1_0_obj = spmc_shmem_obj_alloc(&spmc_shmem_obj_state, + *v1_0_desc_size); + + if (!v1_0_obj) { + return FFA_ERROR_NO_MEMORY; + } + + /* Perform the conversion from v1.1 to v1.0. */ + if (!spmc_shm_convert_mtd_to_v1_0(v1_0_obj, orig_obj)) { + spmc_shmem_obj_free(&spmc_shmem_obj_state, v1_0_obj); + return FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER; + } + + *copy_size = MIN(v1_0_obj->desc_size - offset, buf_size); + memcpy(dst, (uint8_t *) &v1_0_obj->desc + offset, *copy_size); + + /* + * We're finished with the v1.0 descriptor for now so free it. + * Note that this will invalidate any references to the v1.1 + * descriptor. + */ + spmc_shmem_obj_free(&spmc_shmem_obj_state, v1_0_obj); + + return 0; +} + +static int +spmc_validate_mtd_start(struct ffa_mtd *desc, uint32_t ffa_version, + size_t fragment_length, size_t total_length) +{ + unsigned long long emad_end; + unsigned long long emad_size; + unsigned long long emad_offset; + unsigned int min_desc_size; + + /* Determine the appropriate minimum descriptor size. */ + if (ffa_version == MAKE_FFA_VERSION(1, 0)) { + min_desc_size = sizeof(struct ffa_mtd_v1_0); + } else if (ffa_version == MAKE_FFA_VERSION(1, 1)) { + min_desc_size = sizeof(struct ffa_mtd); + } else { + return FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER; + } + if (fragment_length < min_desc_size) { + WARN("%s: invalid length %zu < %u\n", __func__, fragment_length, + min_desc_size); + return FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER; + } + + if (desc->emad_count == 0U) { + WARN("%s: unsupported attribute desc count %u.\n", + __func__, desc->emad_count); + return FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER; + } + + /* + * If the caller is using FF-A v1.0 interpret the descriptor as a v1.0 + * format, otherwise assume it is a v1.1 format. + */ + if (ffa_version == MAKE_FFA_VERSION(1, 0)) { + emad_offset = emad_size = sizeof(struct ffa_emad_v1_0); + } else { + if (!is_aligned(desc->emad_offset, 16)) { + WARN("%s: Emad offset %" PRIx32 " is not 16-byte aligned.\n", + __func__, desc->emad_offset); + return FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER; + } + if (desc->emad_offset < sizeof(struct ffa_mtd)) { + WARN("%s: Emad offset too small: 0x%" PRIx32 " < 0x%zx.\n", + __func__, desc->emad_offset, + sizeof(struct ffa_mtd)); + return FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER; + } + emad_offset = desc->emad_offset; + if (desc->emad_size < sizeof(struct ffa_emad_v1_0)) { + WARN("%s: Bad emad size (%" PRIu32 " < %zu).\n", __func__, + desc->emad_size, sizeof(struct ffa_emad_v1_0)); + return FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER; + } + if (!is_aligned(desc->emad_size, 16)) { + WARN("%s: Emad size 0x%" PRIx32 " is not 16-byte aligned.\n", + __func__, desc->emad_size); + return FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER; + } + emad_size = desc->emad_size; + } + + /* + * Overflow is impossible: the arithmetic happens in at least 64-bit + * precision, but all of the operands are bounded by UINT32_MAX, and + * ((2^32 - 1) * (2^32 - 1) + (2^32 - 1) + (2^32 - 1)) + * = ((2^32 - 1) * ((2^32 - 1) + 1 + 1)) + * = ((2^32 - 1) * (2^32 + 1)) + * = (2^64 - 1). + */ + CASSERT(sizeof(desc->emad_count) == 4, assert_emad_count_max_too_large); + emad_end = (desc->emad_count * (unsigned long long)emad_size) + + (unsigned long long)sizeof(struct ffa_comp_mrd) + + (unsigned long long)emad_offset; + + if (emad_end > total_length) { + WARN("%s: Composite memory region extends beyond descriptor: 0x%llx > 0x%zx\n", + __func__, emad_end, total_length); + return FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER; + } + + return 0; +} + +static inline const struct ffa_emad_v1_0 * +emad_advance(const struct ffa_emad_v1_0 *emad, size_t offset) +{ + return (const struct ffa_emad_v1_0 *)((const uint8_t *)emad + offset); +} + +/** + * spmc_shmem_check_obj - Check that counts in descriptor match overall size. + * @obj: Object containing ffa_memory_region_descriptor. + * @ffa_version: FF-A version of the provided descriptor. + * + * Return: 0 if object is valid, FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER if + * constituent_memory_region_descriptor offset or count is invalid. + */ +static int spmc_shmem_check_obj(struct spmc_shmem_obj *obj, + uint32_t ffa_version) +{ + unsigned long long total_page_count; + const struct ffa_emad_v1_0 *first_emad; + const struct ffa_emad_v1_0 *end_emad; + size_t emad_size; + uint32_t comp_mrd_offset; + size_t header_emad_size; + size_t size; + size_t count; + size_t expected_size; + const struct ffa_comp_mrd *comp; + + if (obj->desc_filled != obj->desc_size) { + ERROR("BUG: %s called on incomplete object (%zu != %zu)\n", + __func__, obj->desc_filled, obj->desc_size); + panic(); + } + + if (spmc_validate_mtd_start(&obj->desc, ffa_version, + obj->desc_filled, obj->desc_size)) { + ERROR("BUG: %s called on object with corrupt memory region descriptor\n", + __func__); + panic(); + } + + first_emad = spmc_shmem_obj_get_emad(&obj->desc, 0, + ffa_version, &emad_size); + end_emad = emad_advance(first_emad, obj->desc.emad_count * emad_size); + comp_mrd_offset = first_emad->comp_mrd_offset; + + /* Loop through the endpoint descriptors, validating each of them. */ + for (const struct ffa_emad_v1_0 *emad = first_emad; emad < end_emad;) { + ffa_endpoint_id16_t ep_id; + + /* + * If a partition ID resides in the secure world validate that + * the partition ID is for a known partition. Ignore any + * partition ID belonging to the normal world as it is assumed + * the Hypervisor will have validated these. + */ + ep_id = emad->mapd.endpoint_id; + if (ffa_is_secure_world_id(ep_id)) { + if (spmc_get_sp_ctx(ep_id) == NULL) { + WARN("%s: Invalid receiver id 0x%x\n", + __func__, ep_id); + return FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER; + } + } + + /* + * The offset provided to the composite memory region descriptor + * should be consistent across endpoint descriptors. + */ + if (comp_mrd_offset != emad->comp_mrd_offset) { + ERROR("%s: mismatching offsets provided, %u != %u\n", + __func__, emad->comp_mrd_offset, comp_mrd_offset); + return FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER; + } + + /* Advance to the next endpoint descriptor */ + emad = emad_advance(emad, emad_size); + + /* + * Ensure neither this emad nor any subsequent emads have + * the same partition ID as the previous emad. + */ + for (const struct ffa_emad_v1_0 *other_emad = emad; + other_emad < end_emad; + other_emad = emad_advance(other_emad, emad_size)) { + if (ep_id == other_emad->mapd.endpoint_id) { + WARN("%s: Duplicated endpoint id 0x%x\n", + __func__, emad->mapd.endpoint_id); + return FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER; + } + } + } + + header_emad_size = (size_t)((const uint8_t *)end_emad - + (const uint8_t *)&obj->desc); + + /* + * Check that the composite descriptor + * is after the endpoint descriptors. + */ + if (comp_mrd_offset < header_emad_size) { + WARN("%s: invalid object, offset %u < header + emad %zu\n", + __func__, comp_mrd_offset, header_emad_size); + return FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER; + } + + /* Ensure the composite descriptor offset is aligned. */ + if (!is_aligned(comp_mrd_offset, 16)) { + WARN("%s: invalid object, unaligned composite memory " + "region descriptor offset %u.\n", + __func__, comp_mrd_offset); + return FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER; + } + + size = obj->desc_size; + + /* Check that the composite descriptor is in bounds. */ + if (comp_mrd_offset > size) { + WARN("%s: invalid object, offset %u > total size %zu\n", + __func__, comp_mrd_offset, obj->desc_size); + return FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER; + } + size -= comp_mrd_offset; + + /* Check that there is enough space for the composite descriptor. */ + if (size < sizeof(struct ffa_comp_mrd)) { + WARN("%s: invalid object, offset %u, total size %zu, no header space.\n", + __func__, comp_mrd_offset, obj->desc_size); + return FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER; + } + size -= sizeof(*comp); + + count = size / sizeof(struct ffa_cons_mrd); + + comp = (const struct ffa_comp_mrd *) + ((const uint8_t *)(&obj->desc) + comp_mrd_offset); + + if (comp->address_range_count != count) { + WARN("%s: invalid object, desc count %u != %zu\n", + __func__, comp->address_range_count, count); + return FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER; + } + + /* Ensure that the expected and actual sizes are equal. */ + expected_size = comp_mrd_offset + sizeof(*comp) + + count * sizeof(struct ffa_cons_mrd); + + if (expected_size != obj->desc_size) { + WARN("%s: invalid object, computed size %zu != size %zu\n", + __func__, expected_size, obj->desc_size); + return FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER; + } + + total_page_count = 0; + + /* + * comp->address_range_count is 32-bit, so 'count' must fit in a + * uint32_t at this point. + */ + for (size_t i = 0; i < count; i++) { + const struct ffa_cons_mrd *mrd = comp->address_range_array + i; + + if (!is_aligned(mrd->address, PAGE_SIZE)) { + WARN("%s: invalid object, address in region descriptor " + "%zu not 4K aligned (got 0x%016llx)", + __func__, i, (unsigned long long)mrd->address); + } + + /* + * No overflow possible: total_page_count can hold at + * least 2^64 - 1, but will be have at most 2^32 - 1. + * values added to it, each of which cannot exceed 2^32 - 1. + */ + total_page_count += mrd->page_count; + } + + if (comp->total_page_count != total_page_count) { + WARN("%s: invalid object, desc total_page_count %u != %llu\n", + __func__, comp->total_page_count, total_page_count); + return FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER; + } + + return 0; +} + +/** + * spmc_shmem_check_state_obj - Check if the descriptor describes memory + * regions that are currently involved with an + * existing memory transactions. This implies that + * the memory is not in a valid state for lending. + * @obj: Object containing ffa_memory_region_descriptor. + * + * Return: 0 if object is valid, FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER if invalid memory + * state. + */ +static int spmc_shmem_check_state_obj(struct spmc_shmem_obj *obj, + uint32_t ffa_version) +{ + size_t obj_offset = 0; + struct spmc_shmem_obj *inflight_obj; + + struct ffa_comp_mrd *other_mrd; + struct ffa_comp_mrd *requested_mrd = spmc_shmem_obj_get_comp_mrd(obj, + ffa_version); + + if (requested_mrd == NULL) { + return FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER; + } + + inflight_obj = spmc_shmem_obj_get_next(&spmc_shmem_obj_state, + &obj_offset); + + while (inflight_obj != NULL) { + /* + * Don't compare the transaction to itself or to partially + * transmitted descriptors. + */ + if ((obj->desc.handle != inflight_obj->desc.handle) && + (obj->desc_size == obj->desc_filled)) { + other_mrd = spmc_shmem_obj_get_comp_mrd(inflight_obj, + FFA_VERSION_COMPILED); + if (other_mrd == NULL) { + return FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER; + } + if (overlapping_memory_regions(requested_mrd, + other_mrd)) { + return FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER; + } + } + + inflight_obj = spmc_shmem_obj_get_next(&spmc_shmem_obj_state, + &obj_offset); + } + return 0; +} + +static long spmc_ffa_fill_desc(struct mailbox *mbox, + struct spmc_shmem_obj *obj, + uint32_t fragment_length, + ffa_mtd_flag32_t mtd_flag, + uint32_t ffa_version, + void *smc_handle) +{ + int ret; + uint32_t handle_low; + uint32_t handle_high; + + if (mbox->rxtx_page_count == 0U) { + WARN("%s: buffer pair not registered.\n", __func__); + ret = FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER; + goto err_arg; + } + + CASSERT(sizeof(mbox->rxtx_page_count) == 4, assert_bogus_page_count); + if (fragment_length > (uint64_t)mbox->rxtx_page_count * PAGE_SIZE_4KB) { + WARN("%s: bad fragment size %u > %" PRIu64 " buffer size\n", __func__, + fragment_length, (uint64_t)mbox->rxtx_page_count * PAGE_SIZE_4KB); + ret = FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER; + goto err_arg; + } + + if (fragment_length > obj->desc_size - obj->desc_filled) { + WARN("%s: bad fragment size %u > %zu remaining\n", __func__, + fragment_length, obj->desc_size - obj->desc_filled); + ret = FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER; + goto err_arg; + } + + memcpy((uint8_t *)&obj->desc + obj->desc_filled, + (uint8_t *) mbox->tx_buffer, fragment_length); + + /* Ensure that the sender ID resides in the normal world. */ + if (ffa_is_secure_world_id(obj->desc.sender_id)) { + WARN("%s: Invalid sender ID 0x%x.\n", + __func__, obj->desc.sender_id); + ret = FFA_ERROR_DENIED; + goto err_arg; + } + + /* Ensure the NS bit is set to 0. */ + if ((obj->desc.memory_region_attributes & FFA_MEM_ATTR_NS_BIT) != 0U) { + WARN("%s: NS mem attributes flags MBZ.\n", __func__); + ret = FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER; + goto err_arg; + } + + /* + * We don't currently support any optional flags so ensure none are + * requested. + */ + if (obj->desc.flags != 0U && mtd_flag != 0U && + (obj->desc.flags != mtd_flag)) { + WARN("%s: invalid memory transaction flags %u != %u\n", + __func__, obj->desc.flags, mtd_flag); + ret = FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER; + goto err_arg; + } + + if (obj->desc_filled == 0U) { + /* First fragment, descriptor header has been copied */ + ret = spmc_validate_mtd_start(&obj->desc, ffa_version, + fragment_length, obj->desc_size); + if (ret != 0) { + goto err_bad_desc; + } + + obj->desc.handle = spmc_shmem_obj_state.next_handle++; + obj->desc.flags |= mtd_flag; + } + + obj->desc_filled += fragment_length; + + handle_low = (uint32_t)obj->desc.handle; + handle_high = obj->desc.handle >> 32; + + if (obj->desc_filled != obj->desc_size) { + SMC_RET8(smc_handle, FFA_MEM_FRAG_RX, handle_low, + handle_high, obj->desc_filled, + (uint32_t)obj->desc.sender_id << 16, 0, 0, 0); + } + + /* The full descriptor has been received, perform any final checks. */ + + ret = spmc_shmem_check_obj(obj, ffa_version); + if (ret != 0) { + goto err_bad_desc; + } + + ret = spmc_shmem_check_state_obj(obj, ffa_version); + if (ret) { + ERROR("%s: invalid memory region descriptor.\n", __func__); + goto err_bad_desc; + } + + /* + * Everything checks out, if the sender was using FF-A v1.0, convert + * the descriptor format to use the v1.1 structures. + */ + if (ffa_version == MAKE_FFA_VERSION(1, 0)) { + struct spmc_shmem_obj *v1_1_obj; + uint64_t mem_handle; + + /* Calculate the size that the v1.1 descriptor will required. */ + uint64_t v1_1_desc_size = + spmc_shm_get_v1_1_descriptor_size((void *) &obj->desc, + obj->desc_size); + + if (v1_1_desc_size > UINT32_MAX) { + ret = FFA_ERROR_NO_MEMORY; + goto err_arg; + } + + /* Get a new obj to store the v1.1 descriptor. */ + v1_1_obj = + spmc_shmem_obj_alloc(&spmc_shmem_obj_state, (size_t)v1_1_desc_size); + + if (!v1_1_obj) { + ret = FFA_ERROR_NO_MEMORY; + goto err_arg; + } + + /* Perform the conversion from v1.0 to v1.1. */ + v1_1_obj->desc_size = (uint32_t)v1_1_desc_size; + v1_1_obj->desc_filled = (uint32_t)v1_1_desc_size; + if (!spmc_shm_convert_shmem_obj_from_v1_0(v1_1_obj, obj)) { + ERROR("%s: Could not convert mtd!\n", __func__); + spmc_shmem_obj_free(&spmc_shmem_obj_state, v1_1_obj); + goto err_arg; + } + + /* + * We're finished with the v1.0 descriptor so free it + * and continue our checks with the new v1.1 descriptor. + */ + mem_handle = obj->desc.handle; + spmc_shmem_obj_free(&spmc_shmem_obj_state, obj); + obj = spmc_shmem_obj_lookup(&spmc_shmem_obj_state, mem_handle); + if (obj == NULL) { + ERROR("%s: Failed to find converted descriptor.\n", + __func__); + ret = FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER; + return spmc_ffa_error_return(smc_handle, ret); + } + } + + /* Allow for platform specific operations to be performed. */ + ret = plat_spmc_shmem_begin(&obj->desc); + if (ret != 0) { + goto err_arg; + } + + SMC_RET8(smc_handle, FFA_SUCCESS_SMC32, 0, handle_low, handle_high, 0, + 0, 0, 0); + +err_bad_desc: +err_arg: + spmc_shmem_obj_free(&spmc_shmem_obj_state, obj); + return spmc_ffa_error_return(smc_handle, ret); +} + +/** + * spmc_ffa_mem_send - FFA_MEM_SHARE/LEND implementation. + * @client: Client state. + * @total_length: Total length of shared memory descriptor. + * @fragment_length: Length of fragment of shared memory descriptor passed in + * this call. + * @address: Not supported, must be 0. + * @page_count: Not supported, must be 0. + * @smc_handle: Handle passed to smc call. Used to return + * FFA_MEM_FRAG_RX or SMC_FC_FFA_SUCCESS. + * + * Implements a subset of the FF-A FFA_MEM_SHARE and FFA_MEM_LEND calls needed + * to share or lend memory from non-secure os to secure os (with no stream + * endpoints). + * + * Return: 0 on success, error code on failure. + */ +long spmc_ffa_mem_send(uint32_t smc_fid, + bool secure_origin, + uint64_t total_length, + uint32_t fragment_length, + uint64_t address, + uint32_t page_count, + void *cookie, + void *handle, + uint64_t flags) + +{ + long ret; + struct spmc_shmem_obj *obj; + struct mailbox *mbox = spmc_get_mbox_desc(secure_origin); + ffa_mtd_flag32_t mtd_flag; + uint32_t ffa_version = get_partition_ffa_version(secure_origin); + size_t min_desc_size; + + if (address != 0U || page_count != 0U) { + WARN("%s: custom memory region for message not supported.\n", + __func__); + return spmc_ffa_error_return(handle, + FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER); + } + + if (secure_origin) { + WARN("%s: unsupported share direction.\n", __func__); + return spmc_ffa_error_return(handle, + FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER); + } + + if (ffa_version == MAKE_FFA_VERSION(1, 0)) { + min_desc_size = sizeof(struct ffa_mtd_v1_0); + } else if (ffa_version == MAKE_FFA_VERSION(1, 1)) { + min_desc_size = sizeof(struct ffa_mtd); + } else { + WARN("%s: bad FF-A version.\n", __func__); + return spmc_ffa_error_return(handle, + FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER); + } + + /* Check if the descriptor is too small for the FF-A version. */ + if (fragment_length < min_desc_size) { + WARN("%s: bad first fragment size %u < %zu\n", + __func__, fragment_length, sizeof(struct ffa_mtd_v1_0)); + return spmc_ffa_error_return(handle, + FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER); + } + + if ((smc_fid & FUNCID_NUM_MASK) == FFA_FNUM_MEM_SHARE) { + mtd_flag = FFA_MTD_FLAG_TYPE_SHARE_MEMORY; + } else if ((smc_fid & FUNCID_NUM_MASK) == FFA_FNUM_MEM_LEND) { + mtd_flag = FFA_MTD_FLAG_TYPE_LEND_MEMORY; + } else { + WARN("%s: invalid memory management operation.\n", __func__); + return spmc_ffa_error_return(handle, + FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER); + } + + spin_lock(&spmc_shmem_obj_state.lock); + obj = spmc_shmem_obj_alloc(&spmc_shmem_obj_state, total_length); + if (obj == NULL) { + ret = FFA_ERROR_NO_MEMORY; + goto err_unlock; + } + + spin_lock(&mbox->lock); + ret = spmc_ffa_fill_desc(mbox, obj, fragment_length, mtd_flag, + ffa_version, handle); + spin_unlock(&mbox->lock); + + spin_unlock(&spmc_shmem_obj_state.lock); + return ret; + +err_unlock: + spin_unlock(&spmc_shmem_obj_state.lock); + return spmc_ffa_error_return(handle, ret); +} + +/** + * spmc_ffa_mem_frag_tx - FFA_MEM_FRAG_TX implementation. + * @client: Client state. + * @handle_low: Handle_low value returned from FFA_MEM_FRAG_RX. + * @handle_high: Handle_high value returned from FFA_MEM_FRAG_RX. + * @fragment_length: Length of fragments transmitted. + * @sender_id: Vmid of sender in bits [31:16] + * @smc_handle: Handle passed to smc call. Used to return + * FFA_MEM_FRAG_RX or SMC_FC_FFA_SUCCESS. + * + * Return: @smc_handle on success, error code on failure. + */ +long spmc_ffa_mem_frag_tx(uint32_t smc_fid, + bool secure_origin, + uint64_t handle_low, + uint64_t handle_high, + uint32_t fragment_length, + uint32_t sender_id, + void *cookie, + void *handle, + uint64_t flags) +{ + long ret; + uint32_t desc_sender_id; + uint32_t ffa_version = get_partition_ffa_version(secure_origin); + struct mailbox *mbox = spmc_get_mbox_desc(secure_origin); + + struct spmc_shmem_obj *obj; + uint64_t mem_handle = handle_low | (((uint64_t)handle_high) << 32); + + spin_lock(&spmc_shmem_obj_state.lock); + + obj = spmc_shmem_obj_lookup(&spmc_shmem_obj_state, mem_handle); + if (obj == NULL) { + WARN("%s: invalid handle, 0x%lx, not a valid handle.\n", + __func__, mem_handle); + ret = FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER; + goto err_unlock; + } + + desc_sender_id = (uint32_t)obj->desc.sender_id << 16; + if (sender_id != desc_sender_id) { + WARN("%s: invalid sender_id 0x%x != 0x%x\n", __func__, + sender_id, desc_sender_id); + ret = FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER; + goto err_unlock; + } + + if (obj->desc_filled == obj->desc_size) { + WARN("%s: object desc already filled, %zu\n", __func__, + obj->desc_filled); + ret = FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER; + goto err_unlock; + } + + spin_lock(&mbox->lock); + ret = spmc_ffa_fill_desc(mbox, obj, fragment_length, 0, ffa_version, + handle); + spin_unlock(&mbox->lock); + + spin_unlock(&spmc_shmem_obj_state.lock); + return ret; + +err_unlock: + spin_unlock(&spmc_shmem_obj_state.lock); + return spmc_ffa_error_return(handle, ret); +} + +/** + * spmc_ffa_mem_retrieve_set_ns_bit - Set the NS bit in the response descriptor + * if the caller implements a version greater + * than FF-A 1.0 or if they have requested + * the functionality. + * TODO: We are assuming that the caller is + * an SP. To support retrieval from the + * normal world this function will need to be + * expanded accordingly. + * @resp: Descriptor populated in callers RX buffer. + * @sp_ctx: Context of the calling SP. + */ +void spmc_ffa_mem_retrieve_set_ns_bit(struct ffa_mtd *resp, + struct secure_partition_desc *sp_ctx) +{ + if (sp_ctx->ffa_version > MAKE_FFA_VERSION(1, 0) || + sp_ctx->ns_bit_requested) { + /* + * Currently memory senders must reside in the normal + * world, and we do not have the functionlaity to change + * the state of memory dynamically. Therefore we can always set + * the NS bit to 1. + */ + resp->memory_region_attributes |= FFA_MEM_ATTR_NS_BIT; + } +} + +/** + * spmc_ffa_mem_retrieve_req - FFA_MEM_RETRIEVE_REQ implementation. + * @smc_fid: FID of SMC + * @total_length: Total length of retrieve request descriptor if this is + * the first call. Otherwise (unsupported) must be 0. + * @fragment_length: Length of fragment of retrieve request descriptor passed + * in this call. Only @fragment_length == @length is + * supported by this implementation. + * @address: Not supported, must be 0. + * @page_count: Not supported, must be 0. + * @smc_handle: Handle passed to smc call. Used to return + * FFA_MEM_RETRIEVE_RESP. + * + * Implements a subset of the FF-A FFA_MEM_RETRIEVE_REQ call. + * Used by secure os to retrieve memory already shared by non-secure os. + * If the data does not fit in a single FFA_MEM_RETRIEVE_RESP message, + * the client must call FFA_MEM_FRAG_RX until the full response has been + * received. + * + * Return: @handle on success, error code on failure. + */ +long +spmc_ffa_mem_retrieve_req(uint32_t smc_fid, + bool secure_origin, + uint32_t total_length, + uint32_t fragment_length, + uint64_t address, + uint32_t page_count, + void *cookie, + void *handle, + uint64_t flags) +{ + int ret; + size_t buf_size; + size_t copy_size = 0; + size_t min_desc_size; + size_t out_desc_size = 0; + + /* + * Currently we are only accessing fields that are the same in both the + * v1.0 and v1.1 mtd struct therefore we can use a v1.1 struct directly + * here. We only need validate against the appropriate struct size. + */ + struct ffa_mtd *resp; + const struct ffa_mtd *req; + struct spmc_shmem_obj *obj = NULL; + struct mailbox *mbox = spmc_get_mbox_desc(secure_origin); + uint32_t ffa_version = get_partition_ffa_version(secure_origin); + struct secure_partition_desc *sp_ctx = spmc_get_current_sp_ctx(); + + if (!secure_origin) { + WARN("%s: unsupported retrieve req direction.\n", __func__); + return spmc_ffa_error_return(handle, + FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER); + } + + if (address != 0U || page_count != 0U) { + WARN("%s: custom memory region not supported.\n", __func__); + return spmc_ffa_error_return(handle, + FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER); + } + + spin_lock(&mbox->lock); + + req = mbox->tx_buffer; + resp = mbox->rx_buffer; + buf_size = mbox->rxtx_page_count * FFA_PAGE_SIZE; + + if (mbox->rxtx_page_count == 0U) { + WARN("%s: buffer pair not registered.\n", __func__); + ret = FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER; + goto err_unlock_mailbox; + } + + if (mbox->state != MAILBOX_STATE_EMPTY) { + WARN("%s: RX Buffer is full! %d\n", __func__, mbox->state); + ret = FFA_ERROR_DENIED; + goto err_unlock_mailbox; + } + + if (fragment_length != total_length) { + WARN("%s: fragmented retrieve request not supported.\n", + __func__); + ret = FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER; + goto err_unlock_mailbox; + } + + if (req->emad_count == 0U) { + WARN("%s: unsupported attribute desc count %u.\n", + __func__, obj->desc.emad_count); + ret = FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER; + goto err_unlock_mailbox; + } + + /* Determine the appropriate minimum descriptor size. */ + if (ffa_version == MAKE_FFA_VERSION(1, 0)) { + min_desc_size = sizeof(struct ffa_mtd_v1_0); + } else { + min_desc_size = sizeof(struct ffa_mtd); + } + if (total_length < min_desc_size) { + WARN("%s: invalid length %u < %zu\n", __func__, total_length, + min_desc_size); + ret = FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER; + goto err_unlock_mailbox; + } + + spin_lock(&spmc_shmem_obj_state.lock); + + obj = spmc_shmem_obj_lookup(&spmc_shmem_obj_state, req->handle); + if (obj == NULL) { + ret = FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER; + goto err_unlock_all; + } + + if (obj->desc_filled != obj->desc_size) { + WARN("%s: incomplete object desc filled %zu < size %zu\n", + __func__, obj->desc_filled, obj->desc_size); + ret = FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER; + goto err_unlock_all; + } + + if (req->emad_count != 0U && req->sender_id != obj->desc.sender_id) { + WARN("%s: wrong sender id 0x%x != 0x%x\n", + __func__, req->sender_id, obj->desc.sender_id); + ret = FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER; + goto err_unlock_all; + } + + if (req->emad_count != 0U && req->tag != obj->desc.tag) { + WARN("%s: wrong tag 0x%lx != 0x%lx\n", + __func__, req->tag, obj->desc.tag); + ret = FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER; + goto err_unlock_all; + } + + if (req->emad_count != 0U && req->emad_count != obj->desc.emad_count) { + WARN("%s: mistmatch of endpoint counts %u != %u\n", + __func__, req->emad_count, obj->desc.emad_count); + ret = FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER; + goto err_unlock_all; + } + + /* Ensure the NS bit is set to 0 in the request. */ + if ((req->memory_region_attributes & FFA_MEM_ATTR_NS_BIT) != 0U) { + WARN("%s: NS mem attributes flags MBZ.\n", __func__); + ret = FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER; + goto err_unlock_all; + } + + if (req->flags != 0U) { + if ((req->flags & FFA_MTD_FLAG_TYPE_MASK) != + (obj->desc.flags & FFA_MTD_FLAG_TYPE_MASK)) { + /* + * If the retrieve request specifies the memory + * transaction ensure it matches what we expect. + */ + WARN("%s: wrong mem transaction flags %x != %x\n", + __func__, req->flags, obj->desc.flags); + ret = FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER; + goto err_unlock_all; + } + + if (req->flags != FFA_MTD_FLAG_TYPE_SHARE_MEMORY && + req->flags != FFA_MTD_FLAG_TYPE_LEND_MEMORY) { + /* + * Current implementation does not support donate and + * it supports no other flags. + */ + WARN("%s: invalid flags 0x%x\n", __func__, req->flags); + ret = FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER; + goto err_unlock_all; + } + } + + /* Validate the caller is a valid participant. */ + if (!spmc_shmem_obj_validate_id(obj, sp_ctx->sp_id)) { + WARN("%s: Invalid endpoint ID (0x%x).\n", + __func__, sp_ctx->sp_id); + ret = FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER; + goto err_unlock_all; + } + + /* Validate that the provided emad offset and structure is valid.*/ + for (size_t i = 0; i < req->emad_count; i++) { + size_t emad_size; + struct ffa_emad_v1_0 *emad; + + emad = spmc_shmem_obj_get_emad(req, i, ffa_version, + &emad_size); + + if ((uintptr_t) emad >= (uintptr_t) + ((uint8_t *) req + total_length)) { + WARN("Invalid emad access.\n"); + ret = FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER; + goto err_unlock_all; + } + } + + /* + * Validate all the endpoints match in the case of multiple + * borrowers. We don't mandate that the order of the borrowers + * must match in the descriptors therefore check to see if the + * endpoints match in any order. + */ + for (size_t i = 0; i < req->emad_count; i++) { + bool found = false; + size_t emad_size; + struct ffa_emad_v1_0 *emad; + struct ffa_emad_v1_0 *other_emad; + + emad = spmc_shmem_obj_get_emad(req, i, ffa_version, + &emad_size); + + for (size_t j = 0; j < obj->desc.emad_count; j++) { + other_emad = spmc_shmem_obj_get_emad( + &obj->desc, j, MAKE_FFA_VERSION(1, 1), + &emad_size); + + if (req->emad_count && + emad->mapd.endpoint_id == + other_emad->mapd.endpoint_id) { + found = true; + break; + } + } + + if (!found) { + WARN("%s: invalid receiver id (0x%x).\n", + __func__, emad->mapd.endpoint_id); + ret = FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER; + goto err_unlock_all; + } + } + + mbox->state = MAILBOX_STATE_FULL; + + if (req->emad_count != 0U) { + obj->in_use++; + } + + /* + * If the caller is v1.0 convert the descriptor, otherwise copy + * directly. + */ + if (ffa_version == MAKE_FFA_VERSION(1, 0)) { + ret = spmc_populate_ffa_v1_0_descriptor(resp, obj, buf_size, 0, + ©_size, + &out_desc_size); + if (ret != 0U) { + ERROR("%s: Failed to process descriptor.\n", __func__); + goto err_unlock_all; + } + } else { + copy_size = MIN(obj->desc_size, buf_size); + out_desc_size = obj->desc_size; + + memcpy(resp, &obj->desc, copy_size); + } + + /* Set the NS bit in the response if applicable. */ + spmc_ffa_mem_retrieve_set_ns_bit(resp, sp_ctx); + + spin_unlock(&spmc_shmem_obj_state.lock); + spin_unlock(&mbox->lock); + + SMC_RET8(handle, FFA_MEM_RETRIEVE_RESP, out_desc_size, + copy_size, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0); + +err_unlock_all: + spin_unlock(&spmc_shmem_obj_state.lock); +err_unlock_mailbox: + spin_unlock(&mbox->lock); + return spmc_ffa_error_return(handle, ret); +} + +/** + * spmc_ffa_mem_frag_rx - FFA_MEM_FRAG_RX implementation. + * @client: Client state. + * @handle_low: Handle passed to &FFA_MEM_RETRIEVE_REQ. Bit[31:0]. + * @handle_high: Handle passed to &FFA_MEM_RETRIEVE_REQ. Bit[63:32]. + * @fragment_offset: Byte offset in descriptor to resume at. + * @sender_id: Bit[31:16]: Endpoint id of sender if client is a + * hypervisor. 0 otherwise. + * @smc_handle: Handle passed to smc call. Used to return + * FFA_MEM_FRAG_TX. + * + * Return: @smc_handle on success, error code on failure. + */ +long spmc_ffa_mem_frag_rx(uint32_t smc_fid, + bool secure_origin, + uint32_t handle_low, + uint32_t handle_high, + uint32_t fragment_offset, + uint32_t sender_id, + void *cookie, + void *handle, + uint64_t flags) +{ + int ret; + void *src; + size_t buf_size; + size_t copy_size; + size_t full_copy_size; + uint32_t desc_sender_id; + struct mailbox *mbox = spmc_get_mbox_desc(secure_origin); + uint64_t mem_handle = handle_low | (((uint64_t)handle_high) << 32); + struct spmc_shmem_obj *obj; + uint32_t ffa_version = get_partition_ffa_version(secure_origin); + + if (!secure_origin) { + WARN("%s: can only be called from swld.\n", + __func__); + return spmc_ffa_error_return(handle, + FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER); + } + + spin_lock(&spmc_shmem_obj_state.lock); + + obj = spmc_shmem_obj_lookup(&spmc_shmem_obj_state, mem_handle); + if (obj == NULL) { + WARN("%s: invalid handle, 0x%lx, not a valid handle.\n", + __func__, mem_handle); + ret = FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER; + goto err_unlock_shmem; + } + + desc_sender_id = (uint32_t)obj->desc.sender_id << 16; + if (sender_id != 0U && sender_id != desc_sender_id) { + WARN("%s: invalid sender_id 0x%x != 0x%x\n", __func__, + sender_id, desc_sender_id); + ret = FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER; + goto err_unlock_shmem; + } + + if (fragment_offset >= obj->desc_size) { + WARN("%s: invalid fragment_offset 0x%x >= 0x%zx\n", + __func__, fragment_offset, obj->desc_size); + ret = FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER; + goto err_unlock_shmem; + } + + spin_lock(&mbox->lock); + + if (mbox->rxtx_page_count == 0U) { + WARN("%s: buffer pair not registered.\n", __func__); + ret = FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER; + goto err_unlock_all; + } + + if (mbox->state != MAILBOX_STATE_EMPTY) { + WARN("%s: RX Buffer is full!\n", __func__); + ret = FFA_ERROR_DENIED; + goto err_unlock_all; + } + + buf_size = mbox->rxtx_page_count * FFA_PAGE_SIZE; + + mbox->state = MAILBOX_STATE_FULL; + + /* + * If the caller is v1.0 convert the descriptor, otherwise copy + * directly. + */ + if (ffa_version == MAKE_FFA_VERSION(1, 0)) { + size_t out_desc_size; + + ret = spmc_populate_ffa_v1_0_descriptor(mbox->rx_buffer, obj, + buf_size, + fragment_offset, + ©_size, + &out_desc_size); + if (ret != 0U) { + ERROR("%s: Failed to process descriptor.\n", __func__); + goto err_unlock_all; + } + } else { + full_copy_size = obj->desc_size - fragment_offset; + copy_size = MIN(full_copy_size, buf_size); + + src = &obj->desc; + + memcpy(mbox->rx_buffer, src + fragment_offset, copy_size); + } + + spin_unlock(&mbox->lock); + spin_unlock(&spmc_shmem_obj_state.lock); + + SMC_RET8(handle, FFA_MEM_FRAG_TX, handle_low, handle_high, + copy_size, sender_id, 0, 0, 0); + +err_unlock_all: + spin_unlock(&mbox->lock); +err_unlock_shmem: + spin_unlock(&spmc_shmem_obj_state.lock); + return spmc_ffa_error_return(handle, ret); +} + +/** + * spmc_ffa_mem_relinquish - FFA_MEM_RELINQUISH implementation. + * @client: Client state. + * + * Implements a subset of the FF-A FFA_MEM_RELINQUISH call. + * Used by secure os release previously shared memory to non-secure os. + * + * The handle to release must be in the client's (secure os's) transmit buffer. + * + * Return: 0 on success, error code on failure. + */ +int spmc_ffa_mem_relinquish(uint32_t smc_fid, + bool secure_origin, + uint32_t handle_low, + uint32_t handle_high, + uint32_t fragment_offset, + uint32_t sender_id, + void *cookie, + void *handle, + uint64_t flags) +{ + int ret; + struct mailbox *mbox = spmc_get_mbox_desc(secure_origin); + struct spmc_shmem_obj *obj; + const struct ffa_mem_relinquish_descriptor *req; + struct secure_partition_desc *sp_ctx = spmc_get_current_sp_ctx(); + + if (!secure_origin) { + WARN("%s: unsupported relinquish direction.\n", __func__); + return spmc_ffa_error_return(handle, + FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER); + } + + spin_lock(&mbox->lock); + + if (mbox->rxtx_page_count == 0U) { + WARN("%s: buffer pair not registered.\n", __func__); + ret = FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER; + goto err_unlock_mailbox; + } + + req = mbox->tx_buffer; + + if (req->flags != 0U) { + WARN("%s: unsupported flags 0x%x\n", __func__, req->flags); + ret = FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER; + goto err_unlock_mailbox; + } + + if (req->endpoint_count == 0) { + WARN("%s: endpoint count cannot be 0.\n", __func__); + ret = FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER; + goto err_unlock_mailbox; + } + + spin_lock(&spmc_shmem_obj_state.lock); + + obj = spmc_shmem_obj_lookup(&spmc_shmem_obj_state, req->handle); + if (obj == NULL) { + ret = FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER; + goto err_unlock_all; + } + + /* + * Validate the endpoint ID was populated correctly. We don't currently + * support proxy endpoints so the endpoint count should always be 1. + */ + if (req->endpoint_count != 1U) { + WARN("%s: unsupported endpoint count %u != 1\n", __func__, + req->endpoint_count); + ret = FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER; + goto err_unlock_all; + } + + /* Validate provided endpoint ID matches the partition ID. */ + if (req->endpoint_array[0] != sp_ctx->sp_id) { + WARN("%s: invalid endpoint ID %u != %u\n", __func__, + req->endpoint_array[0], sp_ctx->sp_id); + ret = FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER; + goto err_unlock_all; + } + + /* Validate the caller is a valid participant. */ + if (!spmc_shmem_obj_validate_id(obj, sp_ctx->sp_id)) { + WARN("%s: Invalid endpoint ID (0x%x).\n", + __func__, req->endpoint_array[0]); + ret = FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER; + goto err_unlock_all; + } + + if (obj->in_use == 0U) { + ret = FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER; + goto err_unlock_all; + } + obj->in_use--; + + spin_unlock(&spmc_shmem_obj_state.lock); + spin_unlock(&mbox->lock); + + SMC_RET1(handle, FFA_SUCCESS_SMC32); + +err_unlock_all: + spin_unlock(&spmc_shmem_obj_state.lock); +err_unlock_mailbox: + spin_unlock(&mbox->lock); + return spmc_ffa_error_return(handle, ret); +} + +/** + * spmc_ffa_mem_reclaim - FFA_MEM_RECLAIM implementation. + * @client: Client state. + * @handle_low: Unique handle of shared memory object to reclaim. Bit[31:0]. + * @handle_high: Unique handle of shared memory object to reclaim. + * Bit[63:32]. + * @flags: Unsupported, ignored. + * + * Implements a subset of the FF-A FFA_MEM_RECLAIM call. + * Used by non-secure os reclaim memory previously shared with secure os. + * + * Return: 0 on success, error code on failure. + */ +int spmc_ffa_mem_reclaim(uint32_t smc_fid, + bool secure_origin, + uint32_t handle_low, + uint32_t handle_high, + uint32_t mem_flags, + uint64_t x4, + void *cookie, + void *handle, + uint64_t flags) +{ + int ret; + struct spmc_shmem_obj *obj; + uint64_t mem_handle = handle_low | (((uint64_t)handle_high) << 32); + + if (secure_origin) { + WARN("%s: unsupported reclaim direction.\n", __func__); + return spmc_ffa_error_return(handle, + FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER); + } + + if (mem_flags != 0U) { + WARN("%s: unsupported flags 0x%x\n", __func__, mem_flags); + return spmc_ffa_error_return(handle, + FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER); + } + + spin_lock(&spmc_shmem_obj_state.lock); + + obj = spmc_shmem_obj_lookup(&spmc_shmem_obj_state, mem_handle); + if (obj == NULL) { + ret = FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER; + goto err_unlock; + } + if (obj->in_use != 0U) { + ret = FFA_ERROR_DENIED; + goto err_unlock; + } + + if (obj->desc_filled != obj->desc_size) { + WARN("%s: incomplete object desc filled %zu < size %zu\n", + __func__, obj->desc_filled, obj->desc_size); + ret = FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER; + goto err_unlock; + } + + /* Allow for platform specific operations to be performed. */ + ret = plat_spmc_shmem_reclaim(&obj->desc); + if (ret != 0) { + goto err_unlock; + } + + spmc_shmem_obj_free(&spmc_shmem_obj_state, obj); + spin_unlock(&spmc_shmem_obj_state.lock); + + SMC_RET1(handle, FFA_SUCCESS_SMC32); + +err_unlock: + spin_unlock(&spmc_shmem_obj_state.lock); + return spmc_ffa_error_return(handle, ret); +} diff --git a/services/std_svc/spm/el3_spmc/spmc_shared_mem.h b/services/std_svc/spm/el3_spmc/spmc_shared_mem.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..839f7a1 --- /dev/null +++ b/services/std_svc/spm/el3_spmc/spmc_shared_mem.h @@ -0,0 +1,115 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2022, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +#ifndef SPMC_SHARED_MEM_H +#define SPMC_SHARED_MEM_H + +#include <services/el3_spmc_ffa_memory.h> + +/** + * struct ffa_mem_relinquish_descriptor - Relinquish request descriptor. + * @handle: + * Id of shared memory object to relinquish. + * @flags: + * If bit 0 is set clear memory after unmapping from borrower. Must be 0 + * for share. Bit[1]: Time slicing. Not supported, must be 0. All other + * bits are reserved 0. + * @endpoint_count: + * Number of entries in @endpoint_array. + * @endpoint_array: + * Array of endpoint ids. + */ +struct ffa_mem_relinquish_descriptor { + uint64_t handle; + uint32_t flags; + uint32_t endpoint_count; + ffa_endpoint_id16_t endpoint_array[]; +}; +CASSERT(sizeof(struct ffa_mem_relinquish_descriptor) == 16, + assert_ffa_mem_relinquish_descriptor_size_mismatch); + +/** + * struct spmc_shmem_obj_state - Global state. + * @data: Backing store for spmc_shmem_obj objects. + * @data_size: The size allocated for the backing store. + * @allocated: Number of bytes allocated in @data. + * @next_handle: Handle used for next allocated object. + * @lock: Lock protecting all state in this file. + */ +struct spmc_shmem_obj_state { + uint8_t *data; + size_t data_size; + size_t allocated; + uint64_t next_handle; + spinlock_t lock; +}; + +extern struct spmc_shmem_obj_state spmc_shmem_obj_state; +extern int plat_spmc_shmem_begin(struct ffa_mtd *desc); +extern int plat_spmc_shmem_reclaim(struct ffa_mtd *desc); + +long spmc_ffa_mem_send(uint32_t smc_fid, + bool secure_origin, + uint64_t total_length, + uint32_t fragment_length, + uint64_t address, + uint32_t page_count, + void *cookie, + void *handle, + uint64_t flags); + +long spmc_ffa_mem_frag_tx(uint32_t smc_fid, + bool secure_origin, + uint64_t handle_low, + uint64_t handle_high, + uint32_t fragment_length, + uint32_t sender_id, + void *cookie, + void *handle, + uint64_t flags); + +long spmc_ffa_mem_retrieve_req(uint32_t smc_fid, + bool secure_origin, + uint32_t total_length, + uint32_t fragment_length, + uint64_t address, + uint32_t page_count, + void *cookie, + void *handle, + uint64_t flags); + +long spmc_ffa_mem_frag_rx(uint32_t smc_fid, + bool secure_origin, + uint32_t handle_low, + uint32_t handle_high, + uint32_t fragment_offset, + uint32_t sender_id, + void *cookie, + void *handle, + uint64_t flags); + + +int spmc_ffa_mem_relinquish(uint32_t smc_fid, + bool secure_origin, + uint32_t handle_low, + uint32_t handle_high, + uint32_t fragment_offset, + uint32_t sender_id, + void *cookie, + void *handle, + uint64_t flags); + +int spmc_ffa_mem_reclaim(uint32_t smc_fid, + bool secure_origin, + uint32_t handle_low, + uint32_t handle_high, + uint32_t mem_flags, + uint64_t x4, + void *cookie, + void *handle, + uint64_t flags); + +#endif /* SPMC_SHARED_MEM_H */ diff --git a/services/std_svc/spm/spm_mm/spm_mm.mk b/services/std_svc/spm/spm_mm/spm_mm.mk new file mode 100644 index 0000000..cbc7940 --- /dev/null +++ b/services/std_svc/spm/spm_mm/spm_mm.mk @@ -0,0 +1,33 @@ +# +# Copyright (c) 2017-2023, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. +# +# SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause +# + +ifneq (${SPD},none) + $(error "Error: SPD and SPM_MM are incompatible build options.") +endif +ifneq (${ARCH},aarch64) + $(error "Error: SPM_MM is only supported on aarch64.") +endif +ifneq (${ENABLE_SVE_FOR_NS},0) + $(error "Error: SPM_MM is not compatible with ENABLE_SVE_FOR_NS") +endif +ifneq (${ENABLE_SME_FOR_NS},0) + $(error "Error: SPM_MM is not compatible with ENABLE_SME_FOR_NS") +endif +ifeq (${CTX_INCLUDE_FPREGS},0) + $(warning "Warning: SPM_MM: CTX_INCLUDE_FPREGS is set to 0") +endif + +SPM_MM_SOURCES := $(addprefix services/std_svc/spm/spm_mm/, \ + spm_mm_main.c \ + spm_mm_setup.c \ + spm_mm_xlat.c) + + +# Let the top-level Makefile know that we intend to include a BL32 image +NEED_BL32 := yes + +# required so that SPM code executing at S-EL0 can access the timer registers +NS_TIMER_SWITCH := 1 diff --git a/services/std_svc/spm/spm_mm/spm_mm_main.c b/services/std_svc/spm/spm_mm/spm_mm_main.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1ff7bb7 --- /dev/null +++ b/services/std_svc/spm/spm_mm/spm_mm_main.c @@ -0,0 +1,370 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2017-2022, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +#include <arch_helpers.h> +#include <assert.h> +#include <errno.h> + +#include <bl31/bl31.h> +#include <bl31/ehf.h> +#include <common/debug.h> +#include <common/runtime_svc.h> +#include <lib/el3_runtime/context_mgmt.h> +#include <lib/smccc.h> +#include <lib/spinlock.h> +#include <lib/utils.h> +#include <lib/xlat_tables/xlat_tables_v2.h> +#include <plat/common/platform.h> +#include <services/spm_mm_partition.h> +#include <services/spm_mm_svc.h> +#include <smccc_helpers.h> + +#include "spm_common.h" +#include "spm_mm_private.h" + +/******************************************************************************* + * Secure Partition context information. + ******************************************************************************/ +static sp_context_t sp_ctx; + +/******************************************************************************* + * Set state of a Secure Partition context. + ******************************************************************************/ +void sp_state_set(sp_context_t *sp_ptr, sp_state_t state) +{ + spin_lock(&(sp_ptr->state_lock)); + sp_ptr->state = state; + spin_unlock(&(sp_ptr->state_lock)); +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * Wait until the state of a Secure Partition is the specified one and change it + * to the desired state. + ******************************************************************************/ +void sp_state_wait_switch(sp_context_t *sp_ptr, sp_state_t from, sp_state_t to) +{ + int success = 0; + + while (success == 0) { + spin_lock(&(sp_ptr->state_lock)); + + if (sp_ptr->state == from) { + sp_ptr->state = to; + + success = 1; + } + + spin_unlock(&(sp_ptr->state_lock)); + } +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * Check if the state of a Secure Partition is the specified one and, if so, + * change it to the desired state. Returns 0 on success, -1 on error. + ******************************************************************************/ +int sp_state_try_switch(sp_context_t *sp_ptr, sp_state_t from, sp_state_t to) +{ + int ret = -1; + + spin_lock(&(sp_ptr->state_lock)); + + if (sp_ptr->state == from) { + sp_ptr->state = to; + + ret = 0; + } + + spin_unlock(&(sp_ptr->state_lock)); + + return ret; +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * This function takes an SP context pointer and performs a synchronous entry + * into it. + ******************************************************************************/ +static uint64_t spm_sp_synchronous_entry(sp_context_t *ctx) +{ + uint64_t rc; + + assert(ctx != NULL); + + /* Assign the context of the SP to this CPU */ + cm_set_context(&(ctx->cpu_ctx), SECURE); + + /* Restore the context assigned above */ + cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(SECURE); + cm_set_next_eret_context(SECURE); + + /* Invalidate TLBs at EL1. */ + tlbivmalle1(); + dsbish(); + + /* Enter Secure Partition */ + rc = spm_secure_partition_enter(&ctx->c_rt_ctx); + + /* Save secure state */ + cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(SECURE); + + return rc; +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * This function returns to the place where spm_sp_synchronous_entry() was + * called originally. + ******************************************************************************/ +__dead2 static void spm_sp_synchronous_exit(uint64_t rc) +{ + sp_context_t *ctx = &sp_ctx; + + /* + * The SPM must have initiated the original request through a + * synchronous entry into the secure partition. Jump back to the + * original C runtime context with the value of rc in x0; + */ + spm_secure_partition_exit(ctx->c_rt_ctx, rc); + + panic(); +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * Jump to each Secure Partition for the first time. + ******************************************************************************/ +static int32_t spm_init(void) +{ + uint64_t rc; + sp_context_t *ctx; + + INFO("Secure Partition init...\n"); + + ctx = &sp_ctx; + + ctx->state = SP_STATE_RESET; + + rc = spm_sp_synchronous_entry(ctx); + assert(rc == 0); + + ctx->state = SP_STATE_IDLE; + + INFO("Secure Partition initialized.\n"); + + return !rc; +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * Initialize contexts of all Secure Partitions. + ******************************************************************************/ +int32_t spm_mm_setup(void) +{ + sp_context_t *ctx; + + /* Disable MMU at EL1 (initialized by BL2) */ + disable_mmu_icache_el1(); + + /* Initialize context of the SP */ + INFO("Secure Partition context setup start...\n"); + + ctx = &sp_ctx; + + /* Assign translation tables context. */ + ctx->xlat_ctx_handle = spm_get_sp_xlat_context(); + + spm_sp_setup(ctx); + + /* Register init function for deferred init. */ + bl31_register_bl32_init(&spm_init); + + INFO("Secure Partition setup done.\n"); + + return 0; +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * Function to perform a call to a Secure Partition. + ******************************************************************************/ +uint64_t spm_mm_sp_call(uint32_t smc_fid, uint64_t x1, uint64_t x2, uint64_t x3) +{ + uint64_t rc; + sp_context_t *sp_ptr = &sp_ctx; + +#if CTX_INCLUDE_FPREGS + /* + * SP runs to completion, no need to restore FP registers of secure context. + * Save FP registers only for non secure context. + */ + fpregs_context_save(get_fpregs_ctx(cm_get_context(NON_SECURE))); +#endif + + /* Wait until the Secure Partition is idle and set it to busy. */ + sp_state_wait_switch(sp_ptr, SP_STATE_IDLE, SP_STATE_BUSY); + + /* Set values for registers on SP entry */ + cpu_context_t *cpu_ctx = &(sp_ptr->cpu_ctx); + + write_ctx_reg(get_gpregs_ctx(cpu_ctx), CTX_GPREG_X0, smc_fid); + write_ctx_reg(get_gpregs_ctx(cpu_ctx), CTX_GPREG_X1, x1); + write_ctx_reg(get_gpregs_ctx(cpu_ctx), CTX_GPREG_X2, x2); + write_ctx_reg(get_gpregs_ctx(cpu_ctx), CTX_GPREG_X3, x3); + + /* Jump to the Secure Partition. */ + rc = spm_sp_synchronous_entry(sp_ptr); + + /* Flag Secure Partition as idle. */ + assert(sp_ptr->state == SP_STATE_BUSY); + sp_state_set(sp_ptr, SP_STATE_IDLE); + +#if CTX_INCLUDE_FPREGS + /* + * SP runs to completion, no need to save FP registers of secure context. + * Restore only non secure world FP registers. + */ + fpregs_context_restore(get_fpregs_ctx(cm_get_context(NON_SECURE))); +#endif + + return rc; +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * MM_COMMUNICATE handler + ******************************************************************************/ +static uint64_t mm_communicate(uint32_t smc_fid, uint64_t mm_cookie, + uint64_t comm_buffer_address, + uint64_t comm_size_address, void *handle) +{ + uint64_t rc; + + /* Cookie. Reserved for future use. It must be zero. */ + if (mm_cookie != 0U) { + ERROR("MM_COMMUNICATE: cookie is not zero\n"); + SMC_RET1(handle, SPM_MM_INVALID_PARAMETER); + } + + if (comm_buffer_address == 0U) { + ERROR("MM_COMMUNICATE: comm_buffer_address is zero\n"); + SMC_RET1(handle, SPM_MM_INVALID_PARAMETER); + } + + if (comm_size_address != 0U) { + VERBOSE("MM_COMMUNICATE: comm_size_address is not 0 as recommended.\n"); + } + + /* + * The current secure partition design mandates + * - at any point, only a single core can be + * executing in the secure partition. + * - a core cannot be preempted by an interrupt + * while executing in secure partition. + * Raise the running priority of the core to the + * interrupt level configured for secure partition + * so as to block any interrupt from preempting this + * core. + */ + ehf_activate_priority(PLAT_SP_PRI); + + /* Save the Normal world context */ + cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(NON_SECURE); + + rc = spm_mm_sp_call(smc_fid, comm_buffer_address, comm_size_address, + plat_my_core_pos()); + + /* Restore non-secure state */ + cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(NON_SECURE); + cm_set_next_eret_context(NON_SECURE); + + /* + * Exited from secure partition. This core can take + * interrupts now. + */ + ehf_deactivate_priority(PLAT_SP_PRI); + + SMC_RET1(handle, rc); +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * Secure Partition Manager SMC handler. + ******************************************************************************/ +uint64_t spm_mm_smc_handler(uint32_t smc_fid, + uint64_t x1, + uint64_t x2, + uint64_t x3, + uint64_t x4, + void *cookie, + void *handle, + uint64_t flags) +{ + unsigned int ns; + + /* Determine which security state this SMC originated from */ + ns = is_caller_non_secure(flags); + + if (ns == SMC_FROM_SECURE) { + + /* Handle SMCs from Secure world. */ + + assert(handle == cm_get_context(SECURE)); + + /* Make next ERET jump to S-EL0 instead of S-EL1. */ + cm_set_elr_spsr_el3(SECURE, read_elr_el1(), read_spsr_el1()); + + switch (smc_fid) { + + case SPM_MM_VERSION_AARCH32: + SMC_RET1(handle, SPM_MM_VERSION_COMPILED); + + case MM_SP_EVENT_COMPLETE_AARCH64: + spm_sp_synchronous_exit(x1); + + case MM_SP_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_GET_AARCH64: + INFO("Received MM_SP_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_GET_AARCH64 SMC\n"); + + if (sp_ctx.state != SP_STATE_RESET) { + WARN("MM_SP_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_GET_AARCH64 is available at boot time only\n"); + SMC_RET1(handle, SPM_MM_NOT_SUPPORTED); + } + SMC_RET1(handle, + spm_memory_attributes_get_smc_handler( + &sp_ctx, x1)); + + case MM_SP_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_SET_AARCH64: + INFO("Received MM_SP_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_SET_AARCH64 SMC\n"); + + if (sp_ctx.state != SP_STATE_RESET) { + WARN("MM_SP_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_SET_AARCH64 is available at boot time only\n"); + SMC_RET1(handle, SPM_MM_NOT_SUPPORTED); + } + SMC_RET1(handle, + spm_memory_attributes_set_smc_handler( + &sp_ctx, x1, x2, x3)); + default: + break; + } + } else { + + /* Handle SMCs from Non-secure world. */ + + assert(handle == cm_get_context(NON_SECURE)); + + switch (smc_fid) { + + case MM_VERSION_AARCH32: + SMC_RET1(handle, MM_VERSION_COMPILED); + + case MM_COMMUNICATE_AARCH32: + case MM_COMMUNICATE_AARCH64: + return mm_communicate(smc_fid, x1, x2, x3, handle); + + case MM_SP_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_GET_AARCH64: + case MM_SP_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_SET_AARCH64: + /* SMC interfaces reserved for secure callers. */ + SMC_RET1(handle, SPM_MM_NOT_SUPPORTED); + + default: + break; + } + } + + SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK); +} diff --git a/services/std_svc/spm/spm_mm/spm_mm_private.h b/services/std_svc/spm/spm_mm/spm_mm_private.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3a52a3e --- /dev/null +++ b/services/std_svc/spm/spm_mm/spm_mm_private.h @@ -0,0 +1,67 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2017-2023, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +#ifndef SPM_MM_PRIVATE_H +#define SPM_MM_PRIVATE_H + +#include <context.h> +#include "spm_common.h" + +/******************************************************************************* + * Constants that allow assembler code to preserve callee-saved registers of the + * C runtime context while performing a security state switch. + ******************************************************************************/ +#define SP_C_RT_CTX_X19 0x0 +#define SP_C_RT_CTX_X20 0x8 +#define SP_C_RT_CTX_X21 0x10 +#define SP_C_RT_CTX_X22 0x18 +#define SP_C_RT_CTX_X23 0x20 +#define SP_C_RT_CTX_X24 0x28 +#define SP_C_RT_CTX_X25 0x30 +#define SP_C_RT_CTX_X26 0x38 +#define SP_C_RT_CTX_X27 0x40 +#define SP_C_RT_CTX_X28 0x48 +#define SP_C_RT_CTX_X29 0x50 +#define SP_C_RT_CTX_X30 0x58 + +#define SP_C_RT_CTX_SIZE 0x60 +#define SP_C_RT_CTX_ENTRIES (SP_C_RT_CTX_SIZE >> DWORD_SHIFT) + +#ifndef __ASSEMBLER__ + +#include <stdint.h> + +#include <lib/spinlock.h> +#include <lib/xlat_tables/xlat_tables_v2.h> + +typedef enum sp_state { + SP_STATE_RESET = 0, + SP_STATE_IDLE, + SP_STATE_BUSY +} sp_state_t; + +typedef struct sp_context { + uint64_t c_rt_ctx; + cpu_context_t cpu_ctx; + xlat_ctx_t *xlat_ctx_handle; + + sp_state_t state; + spinlock_t state_lock; +} sp_context_t; + + +void spm_sp_setup(sp_context_t *sp_ctx); + +int32_t spm_memory_attributes_get_smc_handler(sp_context_t *sp_ctx, + uintptr_t base_va); +int spm_memory_attributes_set_smc_handler(sp_context_t *sp_ctx, + u_register_t page_address, + u_register_t pages_count, + u_register_t smc_attributes); + +#endif /* __ASSEMBLER__ */ + +#endif /* SPM_MM_PRIVATE_H */ diff --git a/services/std_svc/spm/spm_mm/spm_mm_setup.c b/services/std_svc/spm/spm_mm/spm_mm_setup.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4e65c9c --- /dev/null +++ b/services/std_svc/spm/spm_mm/spm_mm_setup.c @@ -0,0 +1,260 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2017-2023, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 2021, NVIDIA Corporation. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +#include <assert.h> +#include <string.h> + +#include <arch.h> +#include <arch_helpers.h> +#include <context.h> +#include <common/debug.h> +#include <lib/el3_runtime/context_mgmt.h> +#include <lib/xlat_tables/xlat_tables_v2.h> +#include <platform_def.h> +#include <plat/common/common_def.h> +#include <plat/common/platform.h> +#include <services/spm_mm_partition.h> + +#include "spm_common.h" +#include "spm_mm_private.h" +#include "spm_shim_private.h" + +/* Setup context of the Secure Partition */ +void spm_sp_setup(sp_context_t *sp_ctx) +{ + cpu_context_t *ctx = &(sp_ctx->cpu_ctx); + + /* Pointer to the MP information from the platform port. */ + const spm_mm_boot_info_t *sp_boot_info = + plat_get_secure_partition_boot_info(NULL); + + /* + * Initialize CPU context + * ---------------------- + */ + + entry_point_info_t ep_info = {0}; + + SET_PARAM_HEAD(&ep_info, PARAM_EP, VERSION_1, SECURE | EP_ST_ENABLE); + + /* Setup entrypoint and SPSR */ + ep_info.pc = sp_boot_info->sp_image_base; + ep_info.spsr = SPSR_64(MODE_EL0, MODE_SP_EL0, DISABLE_ALL_EXCEPTIONS); + + /* + * X0: Virtual address of a buffer shared between EL3 and Secure EL0. + * The buffer will be mapped in the Secure EL1 translation regime + * with Normal IS WBWA attributes and RO data and Execute Never + * instruction access permissions. + * + * X1: Size of the buffer in bytes + * + * X2: cookie value (Implementation Defined) + * + * X3: cookie value (Implementation Defined) + * + * X4 to X7 = 0 + */ + ep_info.args.arg0 = sp_boot_info->sp_shared_buf_base; + ep_info.args.arg1 = sp_boot_info->sp_shared_buf_size; + ep_info.args.arg2 = PLAT_SPM_COOKIE_0; + ep_info.args.arg3 = PLAT_SPM_COOKIE_1; + + cm_setup_context(ctx, &ep_info); + + /* + * SP_EL0: A non-zero value will indicate to the SP that the SPM has + * initialized the stack pointer for the current CPU through + * implementation defined means. The value will be 0 otherwise. + */ + write_ctx_reg(get_gpregs_ctx(ctx), CTX_GPREG_SP_EL0, + sp_boot_info->sp_stack_base + sp_boot_info->sp_pcpu_stack_size); + + /* + * Setup translation tables + * ------------------------ + */ + +#if ENABLE_ASSERTIONS + + /* Get max granularity supported by the platform. */ + unsigned int max_granule = xlat_arch_get_max_supported_granule_size(); + + VERBOSE("Max translation granule size supported: %u KiB\n", + max_granule / 1024U); + + unsigned int max_granule_mask = max_granule - 1U; + + /* Base must be aligned to the max granularity */ + assert((sp_boot_info->sp_ns_comm_buf_base & max_granule_mask) == 0); + + /* Size must be a multiple of the max granularity */ + assert((sp_boot_info->sp_ns_comm_buf_size & max_granule_mask) == 0); + +#endif /* ENABLE_ASSERTIONS */ + + /* This region contains the exception vectors used at S-EL1. */ + const mmap_region_t sel1_exception_vectors = + MAP_REGION_FLAT(SPM_SHIM_EXCEPTIONS_START, + SPM_SHIM_EXCEPTIONS_SIZE, + MT_CODE | MT_SECURE | MT_PRIVILEGED); + mmap_add_region_ctx(sp_ctx->xlat_ctx_handle, + &sel1_exception_vectors); + + mmap_add_ctx(sp_ctx->xlat_ctx_handle, + plat_get_secure_partition_mmap(NULL)); + + init_xlat_tables_ctx(sp_ctx->xlat_ctx_handle); + + /* + * MMU-related registers + * --------------------- + */ + xlat_ctx_t *xlat_ctx = sp_ctx->xlat_ctx_handle; + + uint64_t mmu_cfg_params[MMU_CFG_PARAM_MAX]; + + setup_mmu_cfg((uint64_t *)&mmu_cfg_params, 0, xlat_ctx->base_table, + xlat_ctx->pa_max_address, xlat_ctx->va_max_address, + EL1_EL0_REGIME); + + write_ctx_reg(get_el1_sysregs_ctx(ctx), CTX_MAIR_EL1, + mmu_cfg_params[MMU_CFG_MAIR]); + + write_ctx_reg(get_el1_sysregs_ctx(ctx), CTX_TCR_EL1, + mmu_cfg_params[MMU_CFG_TCR]); + + write_ctx_reg(get_el1_sysregs_ctx(ctx), CTX_TTBR0_EL1, + mmu_cfg_params[MMU_CFG_TTBR0]); + + /* Setup SCTLR_EL1 */ + u_register_t sctlr_el1 = read_ctx_reg(get_el1_sysregs_ctx(ctx), CTX_SCTLR_EL1); + + sctlr_el1 |= + /*SCTLR_EL1_RES1 |*/ + /* Don't trap DC CVAU, DC CIVAC, DC CVAC, DC CVAP, or IC IVAU */ + SCTLR_UCI_BIT | + /* RW regions at xlat regime EL1&0 are forced to be XN. */ + SCTLR_WXN_BIT | + /* Don't trap to EL1 execution of WFI or WFE at EL0. */ + SCTLR_NTWI_BIT | SCTLR_NTWE_BIT | + /* Don't trap to EL1 accesses to CTR_EL0 from EL0. */ + SCTLR_UCT_BIT | + /* Don't trap to EL1 execution of DZ ZVA at EL0. */ + SCTLR_DZE_BIT | + /* Enable SP Alignment check for EL0 */ + SCTLR_SA0_BIT | + /* Don't change PSTATE.PAN on taking an exception to EL1 */ + SCTLR_SPAN_BIT | + /* Allow cacheable data and instr. accesses to normal memory. */ + SCTLR_C_BIT | SCTLR_I_BIT | + /* Enable MMU. */ + SCTLR_M_BIT + ; + + sctlr_el1 &= ~( + /* Explicit data accesses at EL0 are little-endian. */ + SCTLR_E0E_BIT | + /* + * Alignment fault checking disabled when at EL1 and EL0 as + * the UEFI spec permits unaligned accesses. + */ + SCTLR_A_BIT | + /* Accesses to DAIF from EL0 are trapped to EL1. */ + SCTLR_UMA_BIT + ); + + write_ctx_reg(get_el1_sysregs_ctx(ctx), CTX_SCTLR_EL1, sctlr_el1); + + /* + * Setup other system registers + * ---------------------------- + */ + + /* Shim Exception Vector Base Address */ + write_ctx_reg(get_el1_sysregs_ctx(ctx), CTX_VBAR_EL1, + SPM_SHIM_EXCEPTIONS_PTR); + + write_ctx_reg(get_el1_sysregs_ctx(ctx), CTX_CNTKCTL_EL1, + EL0PTEN_BIT | EL0VTEN_BIT | EL0PCTEN_BIT | EL0VCTEN_BIT); + + /* + * FPEN: Allow the Secure Partition to access FP/SIMD registers. + * Note that SPM will not do any saving/restoring of these registers on + * behalf of the SP. This falls under the SP's responsibility. + * TTA: Enable access to trace registers. + * ZEN (v8.2): Trap SVE instructions and access to SVE registers. + */ + write_ctx_reg(get_el1_sysregs_ctx(ctx), CTX_CPACR_EL1, + CPACR_EL1_FPEN(CPACR_EL1_FP_TRAP_NONE)); + + /* + * Prepare information in buffer shared between EL3 and S-EL0 + * ---------------------------------------------------------- + */ + + void *shared_buf_ptr = (void *) sp_boot_info->sp_shared_buf_base; + + /* Copy the boot information into the shared buffer with the SP. */ + assert((uintptr_t)shared_buf_ptr + sizeof(spm_mm_boot_info_t) + <= (sp_boot_info->sp_shared_buf_base + sp_boot_info->sp_shared_buf_size)); + + assert(sp_boot_info->sp_shared_buf_base <= + (UINTPTR_MAX - sp_boot_info->sp_shared_buf_size + 1)); + + assert(sp_boot_info != NULL); + + memcpy((void *) shared_buf_ptr, (const void *) sp_boot_info, + sizeof(spm_mm_boot_info_t)); + + /* Pointer to the MP information from the platform port. */ + spm_mm_mp_info_t *sp_mp_info = + ((spm_mm_boot_info_t *) shared_buf_ptr)->mp_info; + + assert(sp_mp_info != NULL); + + /* + * Point the shared buffer MP information pointer to where the info will + * be populated, just after the boot info. + */ + ((spm_mm_boot_info_t *) shared_buf_ptr)->mp_info = + (spm_mm_mp_info_t *) ((uintptr_t)shared_buf_ptr + + sizeof(spm_mm_boot_info_t)); + + /* + * Update the shared buffer pointer to where the MP information for the + * payload will be populated + */ + shared_buf_ptr = ((spm_mm_boot_info_t *) shared_buf_ptr)->mp_info; + + /* + * Copy the cpu information into the shared buffer area after the boot + * information. + */ + assert(sp_boot_info->num_cpus <= PLATFORM_CORE_COUNT); + + assert((uintptr_t)shared_buf_ptr + <= (sp_boot_info->sp_shared_buf_base + sp_boot_info->sp_shared_buf_size - + (sp_boot_info->num_cpus * sizeof(*sp_mp_info)))); + + memcpy(shared_buf_ptr, (const void *) sp_mp_info, + sp_boot_info->num_cpus * sizeof(*sp_mp_info)); + + /* + * Calculate the linear indices of cores in boot information for the + * secure partition and flag the primary CPU + */ + sp_mp_info = (spm_mm_mp_info_t *) shared_buf_ptr; + + for (unsigned int index = 0; index < sp_boot_info->num_cpus; index++) { + u_register_t mpidr = sp_mp_info[index].mpidr; + + sp_mp_info[index].linear_id = plat_core_pos_by_mpidr(mpidr); + if (plat_my_core_pos() == sp_mp_info[index].linear_id) + sp_mp_info[index].flags |= MP_INFO_FLAG_PRIMARY_CPU; + } +} diff --git a/services/std_svc/spm/spm_mm/spm_mm_xlat.c b/services/std_svc/spm/spm_mm/spm_mm_xlat.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..01d95c7 --- /dev/null +++ b/services/std_svc/spm/spm_mm/spm_mm_xlat.c @@ -0,0 +1,137 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2018-2023, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +#include <arch.h> +#include <arch_helpers.h> +#include <assert.h> +#include <errno.h> +#include <lib/xlat_tables/xlat_tables_v2.h> +#include <platform_def.h> +#include <plat/common/platform.h> +#include <services/spm_mm_partition.h> +#include <services/spm_mm_svc.h> + +#include "spm_mm_private.h" +#include "spm_shim_private.h" + +/* Lock used for SP_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_GET and SP_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_SET */ +static spinlock_t mem_attr_smc_lock; + +/* + * Attributes are encoded using a different format in the SMC interface than in + * the Trusted Firmware, where the mmap_attr_t enum type is used. This function + * converts an attributes value from the SMC format to the mmap_attr_t format by + * setting MT_RW/MT_RO, MT_USER/MT_PRIVILEGED and MT_EXECUTE/MT_EXECUTE_NEVER. + * The other fields are left as 0 because they are ignored by the function + * xlat_change_mem_attributes_ctx(). + */ +static unsigned int smc_attr_to_mmap_attr(unsigned int attributes) +{ + unsigned int tf_attr = 0U; + + unsigned int access = (attributes & MM_SP_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_ACCESS_MASK) + >> MM_SP_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_ACCESS_SHIFT; + + if (access == MM_SP_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_ACCESS_RW) { + tf_attr |= MT_RW | MT_USER; + } else if (access == MM_SP_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_ACCESS_RO) { + tf_attr |= MT_RO | MT_USER; + } else { + /* Other values are reserved. */ + assert(access == MM_SP_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_ACCESS_NOACCESS); + /* The only requirement is that there's no access from EL0 */ + tf_attr |= MT_RO | MT_PRIVILEGED; + } + + if ((attributes & MM_SP_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_NON_EXEC) == 0) { + tf_attr |= MT_EXECUTE; + } else { + tf_attr |= MT_EXECUTE_NEVER; + } + + return tf_attr; +} + +/* + * This function converts attributes from the Trusted Firmware format into the + * SMC interface format. + */ +static unsigned int smc_mmap_to_smc_attr(unsigned int attr) +{ + unsigned int smc_attr = 0U; + + unsigned int data_access; + + if ((attr & MT_USER) == 0) { + /* No access from EL0. */ + data_access = MM_SP_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_ACCESS_NOACCESS; + } else { + if ((attr & MT_RW) != 0) { + assert(MT_TYPE(attr) != MT_DEVICE); + data_access = MM_SP_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_ACCESS_RW; + } else { + data_access = MM_SP_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_ACCESS_RO; + } + } + + smc_attr |= (data_access & MM_SP_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_ACCESS_MASK) + << MM_SP_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_ACCESS_SHIFT; + + if ((attr & MT_EXECUTE_NEVER) != 0U) { + smc_attr |= MM_SP_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_NON_EXEC; + } + + return smc_attr; +} + +int32_t spm_memory_attributes_get_smc_handler(sp_context_t *sp_ctx, + uintptr_t base_va) +{ + uint32_t attributes; + + spin_lock(&mem_attr_smc_lock); + + int rc = xlat_get_mem_attributes_ctx(sp_ctx->xlat_ctx_handle, + base_va, &attributes); + + spin_unlock(&mem_attr_smc_lock); + + /* Convert error codes of xlat_get_mem_attributes_ctx() into SPM. */ + assert((rc == 0) || (rc == -EINVAL)); + + if (rc == 0) { + return (int32_t) smc_mmap_to_smc_attr(attributes); + } else { + return SPM_MM_INVALID_PARAMETER; + } +} + +int spm_memory_attributes_set_smc_handler(sp_context_t *sp_ctx, + u_register_t page_address, + u_register_t pages_count, + u_register_t smc_attributes) +{ + uintptr_t base_va = (uintptr_t) page_address; + size_t size = (size_t) (pages_count * PAGE_SIZE); + uint32_t attributes = (uint32_t) smc_attributes; + + INFO(" Start address : 0x%lx\n", base_va); + INFO(" Number of pages: %i (%zi bytes)\n", (int) pages_count, size); + INFO(" Attributes : 0x%x\n", attributes); + + spin_lock(&mem_attr_smc_lock); + + int ret = xlat_change_mem_attributes_ctx(sp_ctx->xlat_ctx_handle, + base_va, size, + smc_attr_to_mmap_attr(attributes)); + + spin_unlock(&mem_attr_smc_lock); + + /* Convert error codes of xlat_change_mem_attributes_ctx() into SPM. */ + assert((ret == 0) || (ret == -EINVAL)); + + return (ret == 0) ? SPM_MM_SUCCESS : SPM_MM_INVALID_PARAMETER; +} diff --git a/services/std_svc/spmd/aarch64/spmd_helpers.S b/services/std_svc/spmd/aarch64/spmd_helpers.S new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d7bffca --- /dev/null +++ b/services/std_svc/spmd/aarch64/spmd_helpers.S @@ -0,0 +1,73 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2020, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +#include <asm_macros.S> +#include "../spmd_private.h" + + .global spmd_spm_core_enter + .global spmd_spm_core_exit + + /* --------------------------------------------------------------------- + * This function is called with SP_EL0 as stack. Here we stash our EL3 + * callee-saved registers on to the stack as a part of saving the C + * runtime and enter the secure payload. + * 'x0' contains a pointer to the memory where the address of the C + * runtime context is to be saved. + * --------------------------------------------------------------------- + */ +func spmd_spm_core_enter + /* Make space for the registers that we're going to save */ + mov x3, sp + str x3, [x0, #0] + sub sp, sp, #SPMD_C_RT_CTX_SIZE + + /* Save callee-saved registers on to the stack */ + stp x19, x20, [sp, #SPMD_C_RT_CTX_X19] + stp x21, x22, [sp, #SPMD_C_RT_CTX_X21] + stp x23, x24, [sp, #SPMD_C_RT_CTX_X23] + stp x25, x26, [sp, #SPMD_C_RT_CTX_X25] + stp x27, x28, [sp, #SPMD_C_RT_CTX_X27] + stp x29, x30, [sp, #SPMD_C_RT_CTX_X29] + + /* --------------------------------------------------------------------- + * Everything is setup now. el3_exit() will use the secure context to + * restore to the general purpose and EL3 system registers to ERET + * into the secure payload. + * --------------------------------------------------------------------- + */ + b el3_exit +endfunc spmd_spm_core_enter + + /* --------------------------------------------------------------------- + * This function is called with 'x0' pointing to a C runtime context. + * It restores the saved registers and jumps to that runtime with 'x0' + * as the new SP register. This destroys the C runtime context that had + * been built on the stack below the saved context by the caller. Later + * the second parameter 'x1' is passed as a return value to the caller. + * --------------------------------------------------------------------- + */ +func spmd_spm_core_exit + /* Restore the previous stack */ + mov sp, x0 + + /* Restore callee-saved registers on to the stack */ + ldp x19, x20, [x0, #(SPMD_C_RT_CTX_X19 - SPMD_C_RT_CTX_SIZE)] + ldp x21, x22, [x0, #(SPMD_C_RT_CTX_X21 - SPMD_C_RT_CTX_SIZE)] + ldp x23, x24, [x0, #(SPMD_C_RT_CTX_X23 - SPMD_C_RT_CTX_SIZE)] + ldp x25, x26, [x0, #(SPMD_C_RT_CTX_X25 - SPMD_C_RT_CTX_SIZE)] + ldp x27, x28, [x0, #(SPMD_C_RT_CTX_X27 - SPMD_C_RT_CTX_SIZE)] + ldp x29, x30, [x0, #(SPMD_C_RT_CTX_X29 - SPMD_C_RT_CTX_SIZE)] + + /* --------------------------------------------------------------------- + * This should take us back to the instruction after the call to the + * last spm_secure_partition_enter().* Place the second parameter to x0 + * so that the caller will see it as a return value from the original + * entry call. + * --------------------------------------------------------------------- + */ + mov x0, x1 + ret +endfunc spmd_spm_core_exit diff --git a/services/std_svc/spmd/spmd.mk b/services/std_svc/spmd/spmd.mk new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e567b53 --- /dev/null +++ b/services/std_svc/spmd/spmd.mk @@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ +# +# Copyright (c) 2021-2023, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. +# +# SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause +# + +SPMD_SOURCES += $(addprefix services/std_svc/spmd/, \ + ${ARCH}/spmd_helpers.S \ + spmd_pm.c \ + spmd_main.c \ + spmd_logical_sp.c) + +# Specify platform specific SPMD logical partition implementation. +SPMD_LP_SOURCES := $(wildcard $(addprefix ${PLAT_DIR}/, \ + ${PLAT}_spmd_logical_sp*.c)) + +ifeq (${ENABLE_SPMD_LP}, 1) +ifneq ($(wildcard $(SPMD_LP_SOURCES)),) +SPMD_SOURCES += $(SPMD_LP_SOURCES) +endif +endif + +# Let the top-level Makefile know that we intend to include a BL32 image +NEED_BL32 := yes + +# Enable dynamic memory mapping +# The SPMD component maps the SPMC DTB within BL31 virtual space. +PLAT_XLAT_TABLES_DYNAMIC := 1 +$(eval $(call add_define,PLAT_XLAT_TABLES_DYNAMIC)) diff --git a/services/std_svc/spmd/spmd_logical_sp.c b/services/std_svc/spmd/spmd_logical_sp.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d992187 --- /dev/null +++ b/services/std_svc/spmd/spmd_logical_sp.c @@ -0,0 +1,742 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2023, Arm Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +#include <assert.h> +#include <errno.h> +#include <string.h> +#include "spmd_private.h" + +#include <common/debug.h> +#include <common/uuid.h> +#include <lib/el3_runtime/context_mgmt.h> +#include <services/el3_spmd_logical_sp.h> +#include <services/spmc_svc.h> +#include <smccc_helpers.h> + + +/* + * Maximum ffa_partition_info entries that can be returned by an invocation + * of FFA_PARTITION_INFO_GET_REGS_64 is size in bytes, of available + * registers/args in struct ffa_value divided by size of struct + * ffa_partition_info. For this ABI, arg3-arg17 in ffa_value can be used, i.e. + * 15 uint64_t fields. For FF-A v1.1, this value should be 5. + */ +#define MAX_INFO_REGS_ENTRIES_PER_CALL \ + (uint8_t)((15 * sizeof(uint64_t)) / \ + sizeof(struct ffa_partition_info_v1_1)) +CASSERT(MAX_INFO_REGS_ENTRIES_PER_CALL == 5, assert_too_many_info_reg_entries); + +#if ENABLE_SPMD_LP +static bool is_spmd_lp_inited; +static bool is_spmc_inited; + +/* + * Helper function to obtain the array storing the EL3 + * SPMD Logical Partition descriptors. + */ +static struct spmd_lp_desc *get_spmd_el3_lp_array(void) +{ + return (struct spmd_lp_desc *) SPMD_LP_DESCS_START; +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * Validate any logical partition descriptors before we initialize. + * Initialization of said partitions will be taken care of during SPMD boot. + ******************************************************************************/ +static int el3_spmd_sp_desc_validate(struct spmd_lp_desc *lp_array) +{ + /* Check the array bounds are valid. */ + assert(SPMD_LP_DESCS_END > SPMD_LP_DESCS_START); + + /* + * No support for SPMD logical partitions when SPMC is at EL3. + */ + assert(!is_spmc_at_el3()); + + /* If no SPMD logical partitions are implemented then simply bail out. */ + if (SPMD_LP_DESCS_COUNT == 0U) { + return -1; + } + + for (uint32_t index = 0U; index < SPMD_LP_DESCS_COUNT; index++) { + struct spmd_lp_desc *lp_desc = &lp_array[index]; + + /* Validate our logical partition descriptors. */ + if (lp_desc == NULL) { + ERROR("Invalid SPMD Logical SP Descriptor\n"); + return -EINVAL; + } + + /* + * Ensure the ID follows the convention to indicate it resides + * in the secure world. + */ + if (!ffa_is_secure_world_id(lp_desc->sp_id)) { + ERROR("Invalid SPMD Logical SP ID (0x%x)\n", + lp_desc->sp_id); + return -EINVAL; + } + + /* Ensure SPMD logical partition is in valid range. */ + if (!is_spmd_lp_id(lp_desc->sp_id)) { + ERROR("Invalid SPMD Logical Partition ID (0x%x)\n", + lp_desc->sp_id); + return -EINVAL; + } + + /* Ensure the UUID is not the NULL UUID. */ + if (lp_desc->uuid[0] == 0 && lp_desc->uuid[1] == 0 && + lp_desc->uuid[2] == 0 && lp_desc->uuid[3] == 0) { + ERROR("Invalid UUID for SPMD Logical SP (0x%x)\n", + lp_desc->sp_id); + return -EINVAL; + } + + /* Ensure init function callback is registered. */ + if (lp_desc->init == NULL) { + ERROR("Missing init function for Logical SP(0x%x)\n", + lp_desc->sp_id); + return -EINVAL; + } + + /* Ensure that SPMD LP only supports sending direct requests. */ + if (lp_desc->properties != FFA_PARTITION_DIRECT_REQ_SEND) { + ERROR("Invalid SPMD logical partition properties (0x%x)\n", + lp_desc->properties); + return -EINVAL; + } + + /* Ensure that all partition IDs are unique. */ + for (uint32_t inner_idx = index + 1; + inner_idx < SPMD_LP_DESCS_COUNT; inner_idx++) { + if (lp_desc->sp_id == lp_array[inner_idx].sp_id) { + ERROR("Duplicate SPMD logical SP ID Detected (0x%x)\n", + lp_desc->sp_id); + return -EINVAL; + } + } + } + return 0; +} + +static void spmd_encode_ffa_error(struct ffa_value *retval, int32_t error_code) +{ + retval->func = FFA_ERROR; + retval->arg1 = FFA_TARGET_INFO_MBZ; + retval->arg2 = (uint32_t)error_code; + retval->arg3 = FFA_TARGET_INFO_MBZ; + retval->arg4 = FFA_TARGET_INFO_MBZ; + retval->arg5 = FFA_TARGET_INFO_MBZ; + retval->arg6 = FFA_TARGET_INFO_MBZ; + retval->arg7 = FFA_TARGET_INFO_MBZ; +} + +static void spmd_build_direct_message_req(spmd_spm_core_context_t *ctx, + uint64_t x1, uint64_t x2, + uint64_t x3, uint64_t x4) +{ + gp_regs_t *gpregs = get_gpregs_ctx(&ctx->cpu_ctx); + + write_ctx_reg(gpregs, CTX_GPREG_X0, FFA_MSG_SEND_DIRECT_REQ_SMC32); + write_ctx_reg(gpregs, CTX_GPREG_X1, x1); + write_ctx_reg(gpregs, CTX_GPREG_X2, x2); + write_ctx_reg(gpregs, CTX_GPREG_X3, x3); + write_ctx_reg(gpregs, CTX_GPREG_X4, x4); + write_ctx_reg(gpregs, CTX_GPREG_X5, 0U); + write_ctx_reg(gpregs, CTX_GPREG_X6, 0U); + write_ctx_reg(gpregs, CTX_GPREG_X7, 0U); +} + +static void spmd_encode_ctx_to_ffa_value(spmd_spm_core_context_t *ctx, + struct ffa_value *retval) +{ + gp_regs_t *gpregs = get_gpregs_ctx(&ctx->cpu_ctx); + + retval->func = read_ctx_reg(gpregs, CTX_GPREG_X0); + retval->arg1 = read_ctx_reg(gpregs, CTX_GPREG_X1); + retval->arg2 = read_ctx_reg(gpregs, CTX_GPREG_X2); + retval->arg3 = read_ctx_reg(gpregs, CTX_GPREG_X3); + retval->arg4 = read_ctx_reg(gpregs, CTX_GPREG_X4); + retval->arg5 = read_ctx_reg(gpregs, CTX_GPREG_X5); + retval->arg6 = read_ctx_reg(gpregs, CTX_GPREG_X6); + retval->arg7 = read_ctx_reg(gpregs, CTX_GPREG_X7); + retval->arg8 = read_ctx_reg(gpregs, CTX_GPREG_X8); + retval->arg9 = read_ctx_reg(gpregs, CTX_GPREG_X9); + retval->arg10 = read_ctx_reg(gpregs, CTX_GPREG_X10); + retval->arg11 = read_ctx_reg(gpregs, CTX_GPREG_X11); + retval->arg12 = read_ctx_reg(gpregs, CTX_GPREG_X12); + retval->arg13 = read_ctx_reg(gpregs, CTX_GPREG_X13); + retval->arg14 = read_ctx_reg(gpregs, CTX_GPREG_X14); + retval->arg15 = read_ctx_reg(gpregs, CTX_GPREG_X15); + retval->arg16 = read_ctx_reg(gpregs, CTX_GPREG_X16); + retval->arg17 = read_ctx_reg(gpregs, CTX_GPREG_X17); +} + +static void spmd_logical_sp_set_dir_req_ongoing(spmd_spm_core_context_t *ctx) +{ + ctx->spmd_lp_sync_req_ongoing |= SPMD_LP_FFA_DIR_REQ_ONGOING; +} + +static void spmd_logical_sp_reset_dir_req_ongoing(spmd_spm_core_context_t *ctx) +{ + ctx->spmd_lp_sync_req_ongoing &= ~SPMD_LP_FFA_DIR_REQ_ONGOING; +} + +static void spmd_build_ffa_info_get_regs(spmd_spm_core_context_t *ctx, + const uint32_t uuid[4], + const uint16_t start_index, + const uint16_t tag) +{ + gp_regs_t *gpregs = get_gpregs_ctx(&ctx->cpu_ctx); + + uint64_t arg1 = (uint64_t)uuid[1] << 32 | uuid[0]; + uint64_t arg2 = (uint64_t)uuid[3] << 32 | uuid[2]; + uint64_t arg3 = start_index | (uint64_t)tag << 16; + + write_ctx_reg(gpregs, CTX_GPREG_X0, FFA_PARTITION_INFO_GET_REGS_SMC64); + write_ctx_reg(gpregs, CTX_GPREG_X1, arg1); + write_ctx_reg(gpregs, CTX_GPREG_X2, arg2); + write_ctx_reg(gpregs, CTX_GPREG_X3, arg3); + write_ctx_reg(gpregs, CTX_GPREG_X4, 0U); + write_ctx_reg(gpregs, CTX_GPREG_X5, 0U); + write_ctx_reg(gpregs, CTX_GPREG_X6, 0U); + write_ctx_reg(gpregs, CTX_GPREG_X7, 0U); + write_ctx_reg(gpregs, CTX_GPREG_X8, 0U); + write_ctx_reg(gpregs, CTX_GPREG_X9, 0U); + write_ctx_reg(gpregs, CTX_GPREG_X10, 0U); + write_ctx_reg(gpregs, CTX_GPREG_X11, 0U); + write_ctx_reg(gpregs, CTX_GPREG_X12, 0U); + write_ctx_reg(gpregs, CTX_GPREG_X13, 0U); + write_ctx_reg(gpregs, CTX_GPREG_X14, 0U); + write_ctx_reg(gpregs, CTX_GPREG_X15, 0U); + write_ctx_reg(gpregs, CTX_GPREG_X16, 0U); + write_ctx_reg(gpregs, CTX_GPREG_X17, 0U); +} + +static void spmd_logical_sp_set_info_regs_ongoing(spmd_spm_core_context_t *ctx) +{ + ctx->spmd_lp_sync_req_ongoing |= SPMD_LP_FFA_INFO_GET_REG_ONGOING; +} + +static void spmd_logical_sp_reset_info_regs_ongoing( + spmd_spm_core_context_t *ctx) +{ + ctx->spmd_lp_sync_req_ongoing &= ~SPMD_LP_FFA_INFO_GET_REG_ONGOING; +} + +static void spmd_fill_lp_info_array( + struct ffa_partition_info_v1_1 (*partitions)[EL3_SPMD_MAX_NUM_LP], + uint32_t uuid[4], uint16_t *lp_count_out) +{ + uint16_t lp_count = 0; + struct spmd_lp_desc *lp_array; + bool uuid_is_null = is_null_uuid(uuid); + + if (SPMD_LP_DESCS_COUNT == 0U) { + *lp_count_out = 0; + return; + } + + lp_array = get_spmd_el3_lp_array(); + for (uint16_t index = 0; index < SPMD_LP_DESCS_COUNT; ++index) { + struct spmd_lp_desc *lp = &lp_array[index]; + + if (uuid_is_null || uuid_match(uuid, lp->uuid)) { + uint16_t array_index = lp_count; + + ++lp_count; + + (*partitions)[array_index].ep_id = lp->sp_id; + (*partitions)[array_index].execution_ctx_count = 1; + (*partitions)[array_index].properties = lp->properties; + (*partitions)[array_index].properties |= + (FFA_PARTITION_INFO_GET_AARCH64_STATE << + FFA_PARTITION_INFO_GET_EXEC_STATE_SHIFT); + if (uuid_is_null) { + memcpy(&((*partitions)[array_index].uuid), + &lp->uuid, sizeof(lp->uuid)); + } + } + } + + *lp_count_out = lp_count; +} + +static inline void spmd_pack_lp_count_props( + uint64_t *xn, uint16_t ep_id, uint16_t vcpu_count, + uint32_t properties) +{ + *xn = (uint64_t)ep_id; + *xn |= (uint64_t)vcpu_count << 16; + *xn |= (uint64_t)properties << 32; +} + +static inline void spmd_pack_lp_uuid(uint64_t *xn_1, uint64_t *xn_2, + uint32_t uuid[4]) +{ + *xn_1 = (uint64_t)uuid[0]; + *xn_1 |= (uint64_t)uuid[1] << 32; + *xn_2 = (uint64_t)uuid[2]; + *xn_2 |= (uint64_t)uuid[3] << 32; +} +#endif + +/* + * Initialize SPMD logical partitions. This function assumes that it is called + * only after the SPMC has successfully initialized. + */ +int32_t spmd_logical_sp_init(void) +{ +#if ENABLE_SPMD_LP + int32_t rc = 0; + struct spmd_lp_desc *spmd_lp_descs; + + assert(SPMD_LP_DESCS_COUNT <= EL3_SPMD_MAX_NUM_LP); + + if (is_spmd_lp_inited == true) { + return 0; + } + + if (is_spmc_inited == false) { + return -1; + } + + spmd_lp_descs = get_spmd_el3_lp_array(); + + /* Perform initial validation of the SPMD Logical Partitions. */ + rc = el3_spmd_sp_desc_validate(spmd_lp_descs); + if (rc != 0) { + ERROR("Logical SPMD Partition validation failed!\n"); + return rc; + } + + VERBOSE("SPMD Logical Secure Partition init start.\n"); + for (unsigned int i = 0U; i < SPMD_LP_DESCS_COUNT; i++) { + rc = spmd_lp_descs[i].init(); + if (rc != 0) { + ERROR("SPMD Logical SP (0x%x) failed to initialize\n", + spmd_lp_descs[i].sp_id); + return rc; + } + VERBOSE("SPMD Logical SP (0x%x) Initialized\n", + spmd_lp_descs[i].sp_id); + } + + INFO("SPMD Logical Secure Partition init completed.\n"); + if (rc == 0) { + is_spmd_lp_inited = true; + } + return rc; +#else + return 0; +#endif +} + +void spmd_logical_sp_set_spmc_initialized(void) +{ +#if ENABLE_SPMD_LP + is_spmc_inited = true; +#endif +} + +void spmd_logical_sp_set_spmc_failure(void) +{ +#if ENABLE_SPMD_LP + is_spmc_inited = false; +#endif +} + +/* + * This function takes an ffa_value structure populated with partition + * information from an FFA_PARTITION_INFO_GET_REGS ABI call, extracts + * the values and writes it into a ffa_partition_info_v1_1 structure for + * other code to consume. + */ +bool ffa_partition_info_regs_get_part_info( + struct ffa_value *args, uint8_t idx, + struct ffa_partition_info_v1_1 *partition_info) +{ + uint64_t *arg_ptrs; + uint64_t info, uuid_lo, uuid_high; + + /* + * Each partition information is encoded in 3 registers, so there can be + * a maximum of 5 entries. + */ + if (idx >= 5 || partition_info == NULL) { + return false; + } + + /* + * List of pointers to args in return value. arg0/func encodes ff-a + * function, arg1 is reserved, arg2 encodes indices. arg3 and greater + * values reflect partition properties. + */ + arg_ptrs = (uint64_t *)args + ((idx * 3) + 3); + info = *arg_ptrs; + + arg_ptrs++; + uuid_lo = *arg_ptrs; + + arg_ptrs++; + uuid_high = *arg_ptrs; + + partition_info->ep_id = (uint16_t)(info & 0xFFFFU); + partition_info->execution_ctx_count = (uint16_t)((info >> 16) & 0xFFFFU); + partition_info->properties = (uint32_t)(info >> 32); + partition_info->uuid[0] = (uint32_t)(uuid_lo & 0xFFFFFFFFU); + partition_info->uuid[1] = (uint32_t)((uuid_lo >> 32) & 0xFFFFFFFFU); + partition_info->uuid[2] = (uint32_t)(uuid_high & 0xFFFFFFFFU); + partition_info->uuid[3] = (uint32_t)((uuid_high >> 32) & 0xFFFFFFFFU); + + return true; +} + +/* + * This function is called by the SPMD in response to + * an FFA_PARTITION_INFO_GET_REG ABI invocation by the SPMC. Secure partitions + * are allowed to discover the presence of EL3 SPMD logical partitions by + * invoking the aforementioned ABI and this function populates the required + * information about EL3 SPMD logical partitions. + */ +uint64_t spmd_el3_populate_logical_partition_info(void *handle, uint64_t x1, + uint64_t x2, uint64_t x3) +{ +#if ENABLE_SPMD_LP + uint32_t target_uuid[4] = { 0 }; + uint32_t w0; + uint32_t w1; + uint32_t w2; + uint32_t w3; + uint16_t start_index; + uint16_t tag; + static struct ffa_partition_info_v1_1 partitions[EL3_SPMD_MAX_NUM_LP]; + uint16_t lp_count = 0; + uint16_t max_idx = 0; + uint16_t curr_idx = 0; + uint8_t num_entries_to_ret = 0; + struct ffa_value ret = { 0 }; + uint64_t *arg_ptrs = (uint64_t *)&ret + 3; + + w0 = (uint32_t)(x1 & 0xFFFFFFFFU); + w1 = (uint32_t)(x1 >> 32); + w2 = (uint32_t)(x2 & 0xFFFFFFFFU); + w3 = (uint32_t)(x2 >> 32); + + target_uuid[0] = w0; + target_uuid[1] = w1; + target_uuid[2] = w2; + target_uuid[3] = w3; + + start_index = (uint16_t)(x3 & 0xFFFFU); + tag = (uint16_t)((x3 >> 16) & 0xFFFFU); + + assert(handle == cm_get_context(SECURE)); + + if (tag != 0) { + VERBOSE("Tag is not 0. Cannot return partition info.\n"); + return spmd_ffa_error_return(handle, FFA_ERROR_RETRY); + } + + memset(&partitions, 0, sizeof(partitions)); + + spmd_fill_lp_info_array(&partitions, target_uuid, &lp_count); + + if (lp_count == 0) { + VERBOSE("No SPDM EL3 logical partitions exist.\n"); + return spmd_ffa_error_return(handle, FFA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED); + } + + if (start_index >= lp_count) { + VERBOSE("start_index = %d, lp_count = %d (start index must be" + " less than partition count.\n", + start_index, lp_count); + return spmd_ffa_error_return(handle, + FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER); + } + + max_idx = lp_count - 1; + num_entries_to_ret = (max_idx - start_index) + 1; + num_entries_to_ret = + MIN(num_entries_to_ret, MAX_INFO_REGS_ENTRIES_PER_CALL); + curr_idx = start_index + num_entries_to_ret - 1; + assert(curr_idx <= max_idx); + + ret.func = FFA_SUCCESS_SMC64; + ret.arg2 = (uint64_t)((sizeof(struct ffa_partition_info_v1_1) & 0xFFFFU) << 48); + ret.arg2 |= (uint64_t)(curr_idx << 16); + ret.arg2 |= (uint64_t)max_idx; + + for (uint16_t idx = start_index; idx <= curr_idx; ++idx) { + spmd_pack_lp_count_props(arg_ptrs, partitions[idx].ep_id, + partitions[idx].execution_ctx_count, + partitions[idx].properties); + arg_ptrs++; + if (is_null_uuid(target_uuid)) { + spmd_pack_lp_uuid(arg_ptrs, (arg_ptrs + 1), + partitions[idx].uuid); + } + arg_ptrs += 2; + } + + SMC_RET18(handle, ret.func, ret.arg1, ret.arg2, ret.arg3, ret.arg4, + ret.arg5, ret.arg6, ret.arg7, ret.arg8, ret.arg9, ret.arg10, + ret.arg11, ret.arg12, ret.arg13, ret.arg14, ret.arg15, + ret.arg16, ret.arg17); +#else + return spmd_ffa_error_return(handle, FFA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED); +#endif +} + +/* This function can be used by an SPMD logical partition to invoke the + * FFA_PARTITION_INFO_GET_REGS ABI to the SPMC, to discover the secure + * partitions in the system. The function takes a UUID, start index and + * tag and the partition information are returned in an ffa_value structure + * and can be consumed by using appropriate helper functions. + */ +bool spmd_el3_invoke_partition_info_get( + const uint32_t target_uuid[4], + const uint16_t start_index, + const uint16_t tag, + struct ffa_value *retval) +{ +#if ENABLE_SPMD_LP + uint64_t rc = UINT64_MAX; + spmd_spm_core_context_t *ctx = spmd_get_context(); + + if (retval == NULL) { + return false; + } + + memset(retval, 0, sizeof(*retval)); + + if (!is_spmc_inited) { + VERBOSE("Cannot discover partition before," + " SPMC is initialized.\n"); + spmd_encode_ffa_error(retval, FFA_ERROR_DENIED); + return true; + } + + if (tag != 0) { + VERBOSE("Tag must be zero. other tags unsupported\n"); + spmd_encode_ffa_error(retval, + FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER); + return true; + } + + /* Save the non-secure context before entering SPMC */ + cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(NON_SECURE); +#if SPMD_SPM_AT_SEL2 + cm_el2_sysregs_context_save(NON_SECURE); +#endif + + spmd_build_ffa_info_get_regs(ctx, target_uuid, start_index, tag); + spmd_logical_sp_set_info_regs_ongoing(ctx); + + rc = spmd_spm_core_sync_entry(ctx); + if (rc != 0ULL) { + ERROR("%s failed (%lx) on CPU%u\n", __func__, rc, + plat_my_core_pos()); + panic(); + } + + spmd_logical_sp_reset_info_regs_ongoing(ctx); + spmd_encode_ctx_to_ffa_value(ctx, retval); + + assert(is_ffa_error(retval) || is_ffa_success(retval)); + + cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(NON_SECURE); +#if SPMD_SPM_AT_SEL2 + cm_el2_sysregs_context_restore(NON_SECURE); +#endif + cm_set_next_eret_context(NON_SECURE); + return true; +#else + return false; +#endif +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * This function sends an FF-A Direct Request from a partition in EL3 to a + * partition that may reside under an SPMC (only lower ELs supported). The main + * use of this API is for SPMD logical partitions. + * The API is expected to be used when there are platform specific SMCs that + * need to be routed to a secure partition that is FF-A compliant or when + * there are group 0 interrupts that need to be handled first in EL3 and then + * forwarded to an FF-A compliant secure partition. Therefore, it is expected + * that the handle to the context provided belongs to the non-secure context. + * This also means that interrupts/SMCs that trap to EL3 during secure execution + * cannot use this API. + * x1, x2, x3 and x4 are encoded as specified in the FF-A specification. + * retval is used to pass the direct response values to the caller. + * The function returns true if retval has valid values, and false otherwise. + ******************************************************************************/ +bool spmd_el3_ffa_msg_direct_req(uint64_t x1, + uint64_t x2, + uint64_t x3, + uint64_t x4, + void *handle, + struct ffa_value *retval) +{ +#if ENABLE_SPMD_LP + + uint64_t rc = UINT64_MAX; + spmd_spm_core_context_t *ctx = spmd_get_context(); + + if (retval == NULL) { + return false; + } + + memset(retval, 0, sizeof(*retval)); + + if (!is_spmd_lp_inited || !is_spmc_inited) { + VERBOSE("Cannot send SPMD logical partition direct message," + " Partitions not initialized or SPMC not initialized.\n"); + spmd_encode_ffa_error(retval, FFA_ERROR_DENIED); + return true; + } + + /* + * x2 must be zero, since there is no support for framework message via + * an SPMD logical partition. This is sort of a useless check and it is + * possible to not take parameter. However, as the framework extends it + * may be useful to have x2 and extend this function later with + * functionality based on x2. + */ + if (x2 != 0) { + VERBOSE("x2 must be zero. Cannot send framework message.\n"); + spmd_encode_ffa_error(retval, FFA_ERROR_DENIED); + return true; + } + + /* + * Current context must be non-secure. API is expected to be used + * when entry into EL3 and the SPMD logical partition is via an + * interrupt that occurs when execution is in normal world and + * SMCs from normal world. FF-A compliant SPMCs are expected to + * trap interrupts during secure execution in lower ELs since they + * are usually not re-entrant and SMCs from secure world can be + * handled synchronously. There is no known use case for an SPMD + * logical partition to send a direct message to another partition + * in response to a secure interrupt or SMCs from secure world. + */ + if (handle != cm_get_context(NON_SECURE)) { + VERBOSE("Handle must be for the non-secure context.\n"); + spmd_encode_ffa_error(retval, FFA_ERROR_DENIED); + return true; + } + + if (!is_spmd_lp_id(ffa_endpoint_source(x1))) { + VERBOSE("Source ID must be valid SPMD logical partition" + " ID.\n"); + spmd_encode_ffa_error(retval, + FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER); + return true; + } + + if (is_spmd_lp_id(ffa_endpoint_destination(x1))) { + VERBOSE("Destination ID must not be SPMD logical partition" + " ID.\n"); + spmd_encode_ffa_error(retval, + FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER); + return true; + } + + if (!ffa_is_secure_world_id(ffa_endpoint_destination(x1))) { + VERBOSE("Destination ID must be secure world ID.\n"); + spmd_encode_ffa_error(retval, + FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER); + return true; + } + + if (ffa_endpoint_destination(x1) == SPMD_DIRECT_MSG_ENDPOINT_ID) { + VERBOSE("Destination ID must not be SPMD ID.\n"); + spmd_encode_ffa_error(retval, + FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER); + return true; + } + + if (ffa_endpoint_destination(x1) == spmd_spmc_id_get()) { + VERBOSE("Destination ID must not be SPMC ID.\n"); + spmd_encode_ffa_error(retval, + FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER); + return true; + } + + /* Save the non-secure context before entering SPMC */ + cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(NON_SECURE); +#if SPMD_SPM_AT_SEL2 + cm_el2_sysregs_context_save(NON_SECURE); +#endif + + /* + * Perform synchronous entry into the SPMC. Synchronous entry is + * required because the spec requires that a direct message request + * from an SPMD LP look like a function call from it's perspective. + */ + spmd_build_direct_message_req(ctx, x1, x2, x3, x4); + spmd_logical_sp_set_dir_req_ongoing(ctx); + + rc = spmd_spm_core_sync_entry(ctx); + + spmd_logical_sp_reset_dir_req_ongoing(ctx); + + if (rc != 0ULL) { + ERROR("%s failed (%lx) on CPU%u\n", __func__, rc, + plat_my_core_pos()); + panic(); + } else { + spmd_encode_ctx_to_ffa_value(ctx, retval); + + /* + * Only expect error or direct response, + * spmd_spm_core_sync_exit should not be called on other paths. + * Checks are asserts since the LSP can fail gracefully if the + * source or destination ids are not the same. Panic'ing would + * not provide any benefit. + */ + assert(is_ffa_error(retval) || is_ffa_direct_msg_resp(retval)); + assert(is_ffa_error(retval) || + (ffa_endpoint_destination(retval->arg1) == + ffa_endpoint_source(x1))); + assert(is_ffa_error(retval) || + (ffa_endpoint_source(retval->arg1) == + ffa_endpoint_destination(x1))); + } + + cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(NON_SECURE); +#if SPMD_SPM_AT_SEL2 + cm_el2_sysregs_context_restore(NON_SECURE); +#endif + cm_set_next_eret_context(NON_SECURE); + + return true; +#else + return false; +#endif +} + +bool is_spmd_logical_sp_info_regs_req_in_progress( + spmd_spm_core_context_t *ctx) +{ +#if ENABLE_SPMD_LP + return ((ctx->spmd_lp_sync_req_ongoing & SPMD_LP_FFA_INFO_GET_REG_ONGOING) + == SPMD_LP_FFA_INFO_GET_REG_ONGOING); +#else + return false; +#endif +} + +bool is_spmd_logical_sp_dir_req_in_progress( + spmd_spm_core_context_t *ctx) +{ +#if ENABLE_SPMD_LP + return ((ctx->spmd_lp_sync_req_ongoing & SPMD_LP_FFA_DIR_REQ_ONGOING) + == SPMD_LP_FFA_DIR_REQ_ONGOING); +#else + return false; +#endif +} diff --git a/services/std_svc/spmd/spmd_main.c b/services/std_svc/spmd/spmd_main.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..066571e --- /dev/null +++ b/services/std_svc/spmd/spmd_main.c @@ -0,0 +1,1292 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2020-2023, Arm Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +#include <assert.h> +#include <errno.h> +#include <inttypes.h> +#include <stdint.h> +#include <string.h> + +#include <arch_helpers.h> +#include <arch/aarch64/arch_features.h> +#include <bl31/bl31.h> +#include <bl31/interrupt_mgmt.h> +#include <common/debug.h> +#include <common/runtime_svc.h> +#include <common/tbbr/tbbr_img_def.h> +#include <lib/el3_runtime/context_mgmt.h> +#include <lib/fconf/fconf.h> +#include <lib/fconf/fconf_dyn_cfg_getter.h> +#include <lib/smccc.h> +#include <lib/spinlock.h> +#include <lib/utils.h> +#include <lib/xlat_tables/xlat_tables_v2.h> +#include <plat/common/common_def.h> +#include <plat/common/platform.h> +#include <platform_def.h> +#include <services/el3_spmd_logical_sp.h> +#include <services/ffa_svc.h> +#include <services/spmc_svc.h> +#include <services/spmd_svc.h> +#include <smccc_helpers.h> +#include "spmd_private.h" + +/******************************************************************************* + * SPM Core context information. + ******************************************************************************/ +static spmd_spm_core_context_t spm_core_context[PLATFORM_CORE_COUNT]; + +/******************************************************************************* + * SPM Core attribute information is read from its manifest if the SPMC is not + * at EL3. Else, it is populated from the SPMC directly. + ******************************************************************************/ +static spmc_manifest_attribute_t spmc_attrs; + +/******************************************************************************* + * SPM Core entry point information. Discovered on the primary core and reused + * on secondary cores. + ******************************************************************************/ +static entry_point_info_t *spmc_ep_info; + +/******************************************************************************* + * SPM Core context on CPU based on mpidr. + ******************************************************************************/ +spmd_spm_core_context_t *spmd_get_context_by_mpidr(uint64_t mpidr) +{ + int core_idx = plat_core_pos_by_mpidr(mpidr); + + if (core_idx < 0) { + ERROR("Invalid mpidr: %" PRIx64 ", returned ID: %d\n", mpidr, core_idx); + panic(); + } + + return &spm_core_context[core_idx]; +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * SPM Core context on current CPU get helper. + ******************************************************************************/ +spmd_spm_core_context_t *spmd_get_context(void) +{ + return spmd_get_context_by_mpidr(read_mpidr()); +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * SPM Core ID getter. + ******************************************************************************/ +uint16_t spmd_spmc_id_get(void) +{ + return spmc_attrs.spmc_id; +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * Static function declaration. + ******************************************************************************/ +static int32_t spmd_init(void); +static int spmd_spmc_init(void *pm_addr); + +static uint64_t spmd_smc_forward(uint32_t smc_fid, + bool secure_origin, + uint64_t x1, + uint64_t x2, + uint64_t x3, + uint64_t x4, + void *cookie, + void *handle, + uint64_t flags); + +/****************************************************************************** + * Builds an SPMD to SPMC direct message request. + *****************************************************************************/ +void spmd_build_spmc_message(gp_regs_t *gpregs, uint8_t target_func, + unsigned long long message) +{ + write_ctx_reg(gpregs, CTX_GPREG_X0, FFA_MSG_SEND_DIRECT_REQ_SMC32); + write_ctx_reg(gpregs, CTX_GPREG_X1, + (SPMD_DIRECT_MSG_ENDPOINT_ID << FFA_DIRECT_MSG_SOURCE_SHIFT) | + spmd_spmc_id_get()); + write_ctx_reg(gpregs, CTX_GPREG_X2, BIT(31) | target_func); + write_ctx_reg(gpregs, CTX_GPREG_X3, message); + + /* Zero out x4-x7 for the direct request emitted towards the SPMC. */ + write_ctx_reg(gpregs, CTX_GPREG_X4, 0); + write_ctx_reg(gpregs, CTX_GPREG_X5, 0); + write_ctx_reg(gpregs, CTX_GPREG_X6, 0); + write_ctx_reg(gpregs, CTX_GPREG_X7, 0); +} + + +/******************************************************************************* + * This function takes an SPMC context pointer and performs a synchronous + * SPMC entry. + ******************************************************************************/ +uint64_t spmd_spm_core_sync_entry(spmd_spm_core_context_t *spmc_ctx) +{ + uint64_t rc; + + assert(spmc_ctx != NULL); + + cm_set_context(&(spmc_ctx->cpu_ctx), SECURE); + + /* Restore the context assigned above */ +#if SPMD_SPM_AT_SEL2 + cm_el2_sysregs_context_restore(SECURE); +#else + cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(SECURE); +#endif + cm_set_next_eret_context(SECURE); + + /* Enter SPMC */ + rc = spmd_spm_core_enter(&spmc_ctx->c_rt_ctx); + + /* Save secure state */ +#if SPMD_SPM_AT_SEL2 + cm_el2_sysregs_context_save(SECURE); +#else + cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(SECURE); +#endif + + return rc; +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * This function returns to the place where spmd_spm_core_sync_entry() was + * called originally. + ******************************************************************************/ +__dead2 void spmd_spm_core_sync_exit(uint64_t rc) +{ + spmd_spm_core_context_t *ctx = spmd_get_context(); + + /* Get current CPU context from SPMC context */ + assert(cm_get_context(SECURE) == &(ctx->cpu_ctx)); + + /* + * The SPMD must have initiated the original request through a + * synchronous entry into SPMC. Jump back to the original C runtime + * context with the value of rc in x0; + */ + spmd_spm_core_exit(ctx->c_rt_ctx, rc); + + panic(); +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * Jump to the SPM Core for the first time. + ******************************************************************************/ +static int32_t spmd_init(void) +{ + spmd_spm_core_context_t *ctx = spmd_get_context(); + uint64_t rc; + + VERBOSE("SPM Core init start.\n"); + + /* Primary boot core enters the SPMC for initialization. */ + ctx->state = SPMC_STATE_ON_PENDING; + + rc = spmd_spm_core_sync_entry(ctx); + if (rc != 0ULL) { + ERROR("SPMC initialisation failed 0x%" PRIx64 "\n", rc); + return 0; + } + + ctx->state = SPMC_STATE_ON; + + VERBOSE("SPM Core init end.\n"); + + spmd_logical_sp_set_spmc_initialized(); + rc = spmd_logical_sp_init(); + if (rc != 0) { + WARN("SPMD Logical partitions failed init.\n"); + } + + return 1; +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * spmd_secure_interrupt_handler + * Enter the SPMC for further handling of the secure interrupt by the SPMC + * itself or a Secure Partition. + ******************************************************************************/ +static uint64_t spmd_secure_interrupt_handler(uint32_t id, + uint32_t flags, + void *handle, + void *cookie) +{ + spmd_spm_core_context_t *ctx = spmd_get_context(); + gp_regs_t *gpregs = get_gpregs_ctx(&ctx->cpu_ctx); + unsigned int linear_id = plat_my_core_pos(); + int64_t rc; + + /* Sanity check the security state when the exception was generated */ + assert(get_interrupt_src_ss(flags) == NON_SECURE); + + /* Sanity check the pointer to this cpu's context */ + assert(handle == cm_get_context(NON_SECURE)); + + /* Save the non-secure context before entering SPMC */ + cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(NON_SECURE); +#if SPMD_SPM_AT_SEL2 + cm_el2_sysregs_context_save(NON_SECURE); +#endif + + /* Convey the event to the SPMC through the FFA_INTERRUPT interface. */ + write_ctx_reg(gpregs, CTX_GPREG_X0, FFA_INTERRUPT); + write_ctx_reg(gpregs, CTX_GPREG_X1, 0); + write_ctx_reg(gpregs, CTX_GPREG_X2, 0); + write_ctx_reg(gpregs, CTX_GPREG_X3, 0); + write_ctx_reg(gpregs, CTX_GPREG_X4, 0); + write_ctx_reg(gpregs, CTX_GPREG_X5, 0); + write_ctx_reg(gpregs, CTX_GPREG_X6, 0); + write_ctx_reg(gpregs, CTX_GPREG_X7, 0); + + /* Mark current core as handling a secure interrupt. */ + ctx->secure_interrupt_ongoing = true; + + rc = spmd_spm_core_sync_entry(ctx); + if (rc != 0ULL) { + ERROR("%s failed (%" PRId64 ") on CPU%u\n", __func__, rc, linear_id); + } + + ctx->secure_interrupt_ongoing = false; + + cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(NON_SECURE); +#if SPMD_SPM_AT_SEL2 + cm_el2_sysregs_context_restore(NON_SECURE); +#endif + cm_set_next_eret_context(NON_SECURE); + + SMC_RET0(&ctx->cpu_ctx); +} + +#if (EL3_EXCEPTION_HANDLING == 0) +/******************************************************************************* + * spmd_group0_interrupt_handler_nwd + * Group0 secure interrupt in the normal world are trapped to EL3. Delegate the + * handling of the interrupt to the platform handler, and return only upon + * successfully handling the Group0 interrupt. + ******************************************************************************/ +static uint64_t spmd_group0_interrupt_handler_nwd(uint32_t id, + uint32_t flags, + void *handle, + void *cookie) +{ + uint32_t intid; + + /* Sanity check the security state when the exception was generated. */ + assert(get_interrupt_src_ss(flags) == NON_SECURE); + + /* Sanity check the pointer to this cpu's context. */ + assert(handle == cm_get_context(NON_SECURE)); + + assert(id == INTR_ID_UNAVAILABLE); + + assert(plat_ic_get_pending_interrupt_type() == INTR_TYPE_EL3); + + intid = plat_ic_acknowledge_interrupt(); + + if (plat_spmd_handle_group0_interrupt(intid) < 0) { + ERROR("Group0 interrupt %u not handled\n", intid); + panic(); + } + + /* Deactivate the corresponding Group0 interrupt. */ + plat_ic_end_of_interrupt(intid); + + return 0U; +} +#endif + +/******************************************************************************* + * spmd_handle_group0_intr_swd + * SPMC delegates handling of Group0 secure interrupt to EL3 firmware using + * FFA_EL3_INTR_HANDLE SMC call. Further, SPMD delegates the handling of the + * interrupt to the platform handler, and returns only upon successfully + * handling the Group0 interrupt. + ******************************************************************************/ +static uint64_t spmd_handle_group0_intr_swd(void *handle) +{ + uint32_t intid; + + /* Sanity check the pointer to this cpu's context */ + assert(handle == cm_get_context(SECURE)); + + assert(plat_ic_get_pending_interrupt_type() == INTR_TYPE_EL3); + + intid = plat_ic_acknowledge_interrupt(); + + /* + * TODO: Currently due to a limitation in SPMD implementation, the + * platform handler is expected to not delegate handling to NWd while + * processing Group0 secure interrupt. + */ + if (plat_spmd_handle_group0_interrupt(intid) < 0) { + /* Group0 interrupt was not handled by the platform. */ + ERROR("Group0 interrupt %u not handled\n", intid); + panic(); + } + + /* Deactivate the corresponding Group0 interrupt. */ + plat_ic_end_of_interrupt(intid); + + /* Return success. */ + SMC_RET8(handle, FFA_SUCCESS_SMC32, FFA_PARAM_MBZ, FFA_PARAM_MBZ, + FFA_PARAM_MBZ, FFA_PARAM_MBZ, FFA_PARAM_MBZ, FFA_PARAM_MBZ, + FFA_PARAM_MBZ); +} + +#if ENABLE_RME && SPMD_SPM_AT_SEL2 && !RESET_TO_BL31 +static int spmd_dynamic_map_mem(uintptr_t base_addr, size_t size, + unsigned int attr, uintptr_t *align_addr, + size_t *align_size) +{ + uintptr_t base_addr_align; + size_t mapped_size_align; + int rc; + + /* Page aligned address and size if necessary */ + base_addr_align = page_align(base_addr, DOWN); + mapped_size_align = page_align(size, UP); + + if ((base_addr != base_addr_align) && + (size == mapped_size_align)) { + mapped_size_align += PAGE_SIZE; + } + + /* + * Map dynamically given region with its aligned base address and + * size + */ + rc = mmap_add_dynamic_region((unsigned long long)base_addr_align, + base_addr_align, + mapped_size_align, + attr); + if (rc == 0) { + *align_addr = base_addr_align; + *align_size = mapped_size_align; + } + + return rc; +} + +static void spmd_do_sec_cpy(uintptr_t root_base_addr, uintptr_t sec_base_addr, + size_t size) +{ + uintptr_t root_base_addr_align, sec_base_addr_align; + size_t root_mapped_size_align, sec_mapped_size_align; + int rc; + + assert(root_base_addr != 0UL); + assert(sec_base_addr != 0UL); + assert(size != 0UL); + + /* Map the memory with required attributes */ + rc = spmd_dynamic_map_mem(root_base_addr, size, MT_RO_DATA | MT_ROOT, + &root_base_addr_align, + &root_mapped_size_align); + if (rc != 0) { + ERROR("%s %s %lu (%d)\n", "Error while mapping", "root region", + root_base_addr, rc); + panic(); + } + + rc = spmd_dynamic_map_mem(sec_base_addr, size, MT_RW_DATA | MT_SECURE, + &sec_base_addr_align, &sec_mapped_size_align); + if (rc != 0) { + ERROR("%s %s %lu (%d)\n", "Error while mapping", + "secure region", sec_base_addr, rc); + panic(); + } + + /* Do copy operation */ + (void)memcpy((void *)sec_base_addr, (void *)root_base_addr, size); + + /* Unmap root memory region */ + rc = mmap_remove_dynamic_region(root_base_addr_align, + root_mapped_size_align); + if (rc != 0) { + ERROR("%s %s %lu (%d)\n", "Error while unmapping", + "root region", root_base_addr_align, rc); + panic(); + } + + /* Unmap secure memory region */ + rc = mmap_remove_dynamic_region(sec_base_addr_align, + sec_mapped_size_align); + if (rc != 0) { + ERROR("%s %s %lu (%d)\n", "Error while unmapping", + "secure region", sec_base_addr_align, rc); + panic(); + } +} +#endif /* ENABLE_RME && SPMD_SPM_AT_SEL2 && !RESET_TO_BL31 */ + +/******************************************************************************* + * Loads SPMC manifest and inits SPMC. + ******************************************************************************/ +static int spmd_spmc_init(void *pm_addr) +{ + cpu_context_t *cpu_ctx; + unsigned int core_id; + uint32_t ep_attr, flags; + int rc; + const struct dyn_cfg_dtb_info_t *image_info __unused; + + /* Load the SPM Core manifest */ + rc = plat_spm_core_manifest_load(&spmc_attrs, pm_addr); + if (rc != 0) { + WARN("No or invalid SPM Core manifest image provided by BL2\n"); + return rc; + } + + /* + * Ensure that the SPM Core version is compatible with the SPM + * Dispatcher version. + */ + if ((spmc_attrs.major_version != FFA_VERSION_MAJOR) || + (spmc_attrs.minor_version > FFA_VERSION_MINOR)) { + WARN("Unsupported FFA version (%u.%u)\n", + spmc_attrs.major_version, spmc_attrs.minor_version); + return -EINVAL; + } + + VERBOSE("FFA version (%u.%u)\n", spmc_attrs.major_version, + spmc_attrs.minor_version); + + VERBOSE("SPM Core run time EL%x.\n", + SPMD_SPM_AT_SEL2 ? MODE_EL2 : MODE_EL1); + + /* Validate the SPMC ID, Ensure high bit is set */ + if (((spmc_attrs.spmc_id >> SPMC_SECURE_ID_SHIFT) & + SPMC_SECURE_ID_MASK) == 0U) { + WARN("Invalid ID (0x%x) for SPMC.\n", spmc_attrs.spmc_id); + return -EINVAL; + } + + /* Validate the SPM Core execution state */ + if ((spmc_attrs.exec_state != MODE_RW_64) && + (spmc_attrs.exec_state != MODE_RW_32)) { + WARN("Unsupported %s%x.\n", "SPM Core execution state 0x", + spmc_attrs.exec_state); + return -EINVAL; + } + + VERBOSE("%s%x.\n", "SPM Core execution state 0x", + spmc_attrs.exec_state); + +#if SPMD_SPM_AT_SEL2 + /* Ensure manifest has not requested AArch32 state in S-EL2 */ + if (spmc_attrs.exec_state == MODE_RW_32) { + WARN("AArch32 state at S-EL2 is not supported.\n"); + return -EINVAL; + } + + /* + * Check if S-EL2 is supported on this system if S-EL2 + * is required for SPM + */ + if (!is_feat_sel2_supported()) { + WARN("SPM Core run time S-EL2 is not supported.\n"); + return -EINVAL; + } +#endif /* SPMD_SPM_AT_SEL2 */ + + /* Initialise an entrypoint to set up the CPU context */ + ep_attr = SECURE | EP_ST_ENABLE; + if ((read_sctlr_el3() & SCTLR_EE_BIT) != 0ULL) { + ep_attr |= EP_EE_BIG; + } + + SET_PARAM_HEAD(spmc_ep_info, PARAM_EP, VERSION_1, ep_attr); + + /* + * Populate SPSR for SPM Core based upon validated parameters from the + * manifest. + */ + if (spmc_attrs.exec_state == MODE_RW_32) { + spmc_ep_info->spsr = SPSR_MODE32(MODE32_svc, SPSR_T_ARM, + SPSR_E_LITTLE, + DAIF_FIQ_BIT | + DAIF_IRQ_BIT | + DAIF_ABT_BIT); + } else { + +#if SPMD_SPM_AT_SEL2 + static const uint32_t runtime_el = MODE_EL2; +#else + static const uint32_t runtime_el = MODE_EL1; +#endif + spmc_ep_info->spsr = SPSR_64(runtime_el, + MODE_SP_ELX, + DISABLE_ALL_EXCEPTIONS); + } + +#if ENABLE_RME && SPMD_SPM_AT_SEL2 && !RESET_TO_BL31 + image_info = FCONF_GET_PROPERTY(dyn_cfg, dtb, TOS_FW_CONFIG_ID); + assert(image_info != NULL); + + if ((image_info->config_addr == 0UL) || + (image_info->secondary_config_addr == 0UL) || + (image_info->config_max_size == 0UL)) { + return -EINVAL; + } + + /* Copy manifest from root->secure region */ + spmd_do_sec_cpy(image_info->config_addr, + image_info->secondary_config_addr, + image_info->config_max_size); + + /* Update ep info of BL32 */ + assert(spmc_ep_info != NULL); + spmc_ep_info->args.arg0 = image_info->secondary_config_addr; +#endif /* ENABLE_RME && SPMD_SPM_AT_SEL2 && !RESET_TO_BL31 */ + + /* Set an initial SPMC context state for all cores. */ + for (core_id = 0U; core_id < PLATFORM_CORE_COUNT; core_id++) { + spm_core_context[core_id].state = SPMC_STATE_OFF; + + /* Setup an initial cpu context for the SPMC. */ + cpu_ctx = &spm_core_context[core_id].cpu_ctx; + cm_setup_context(cpu_ctx, spmc_ep_info); + + /* + * Pass the core linear ID to the SPMC through x4. + * (TF-A implementation defined behavior helping + * a legacy TOS migration to adopt FF-A). + */ + write_ctx_reg(get_gpregs_ctx(cpu_ctx), CTX_GPREG_X4, core_id); + } + + /* Register power management hooks with PSCI */ + psci_register_spd_pm_hook(&spmd_pm); + + /* Register init function for deferred init. */ + bl31_register_bl32_init(&spmd_init); + + INFO("SPM Core setup done.\n"); + + /* + * Register an interrupt handler routing secure interrupts to SPMD + * while the NWd is running. + */ + flags = 0; + set_interrupt_rm_flag(flags, NON_SECURE); + rc = register_interrupt_type_handler(INTR_TYPE_S_EL1, + spmd_secure_interrupt_handler, + flags); + if (rc != 0) { + panic(); + } + + /* + * Permit configurations where the SPM resides at S-EL1/2 and upon a + * Group0 interrupt triggering while the normal world runs, the + * interrupt is routed either through the EHF or directly to the SPMD: + * + * EL3_EXCEPTION_HANDLING=0: the Group0 interrupt is routed to the SPMD + * for handling by spmd_group0_interrupt_handler_nwd. + * + * EL3_EXCEPTION_HANDLING=1: the Group0 interrupt is routed to the EHF. + * + */ +#if (EL3_EXCEPTION_HANDLING == 0) + /* + * Register an interrupt handler routing Group0 interrupts to SPMD + * while the NWd is running. + */ + rc = register_interrupt_type_handler(INTR_TYPE_EL3, + spmd_group0_interrupt_handler_nwd, + flags); + if (rc != 0) { + panic(); + } +#endif + + return 0; +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * Initialize context of SPM Core. + ******************************************************************************/ +int spmd_setup(void) +{ + int rc; + void *spmc_manifest; + + /* + * If the SPMC is at EL3, then just initialise it directly. The + * shenanigans of when it is at a lower EL are not needed. + */ + if (is_spmc_at_el3()) { + /* Allow the SPMC to populate its attributes directly. */ + spmc_populate_attrs(&spmc_attrs); + + rc = spmc_setup(); + if (rc != 0) { + WARN("SPMC initialisation failed 0x%x.\n", rc); + } + return 0; + } + + spmc_ep_info = bl31_plat_get_next_image_ep_info(SECURE); + if (spmc_ep_info == NULL) { + WARN("No SPM Core image provided by BL2 boot loader.\n"); + return 0; + } + + /* Under no circumstances will this parameter be 0 */ + assert(spmc_ep_info->pc != 0ULL); + + /* + * Check if BL32 ep_info has a reference to 'tos_fw_config'. This will + * be used as a manifest for the SPM Core at the next lower EL/mode. + */ + spmc_manifest = (void *)spmc_ep_info->args.arg0; + if (spmc_manifest == NULL) { + WARN("Invalid or absent SPM Core manifest.\n"); + return 0; + } + + /* Load manifest, init SPMC */ + rc = spmd_spmc_init(spmc_manifest); + if (rc != 0) { + WARN("Booting device without SPM initialization.\n"); + } + + return 0; +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * Forward FF-A SMCs to the other security state. + ******************************************************************************/ +uint64_t spmd_smc_switch_state(uint32_t smc_fid, + bool secure_origin, + uint64_t x1, + uint64_t x2, + uint64_t x3, + uint64_t x4, + void *handle) +{ + unsigned int secure_state_in = (secure_origin) ? SECURE : NON_SECURE; + unsigned int secure_state_out = (!secure_origin) ? SECURE : NON_SECURE; + + /* Save incoming security state */ +#if SPMD_SPM_AT_SEL2 + if (secure_state_in == NON_SECURE) { + cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(secure_state_in); + } + cm_el2_sysregs_context_save(secure_state_in); +#else + cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(secure_state_in); +#endif + + /* Restore outgoing security state */ +#if SPMD_SPM_AT_SEL2 + if (secure_state_out == NON_SECURE) { + cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(secure_state_out); + } + cm_el2_sysregs_context_restore(secure_state_out); +#else + cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(secure_state_out); +#endif + cm_set_next_eret_context(secure_state_out); + +#if SPMD_SPM_AT_SEL2 + /* + * If SPMC is at SEL2, save additional registers x8-x17, which may + * be used in FF-A calls such as FFA_PARTITION_INFO_GET_REGS. + * Note that technically, all SPMCs can support this, but this code is + * under ifdef to minimize breakage in case other SPMCs do not save + * and restore x8-x17. + * We also need to pass through these registers since not all FF-A ABIs + * modify x8-x17, in which case, SMCCC requires that these registers be + * preserved, so the SPMD passes through these registers and expects the + * SPMC to save and restore (potentially also modify) them. + */ + SMC_RET18(cm_get_context(secure_state_out), smc_fid, x1, x2, x3, x4, + SMC_GET_GP(handle, CTX_GPREG_X5), + SMC_GET_GP(handle, CTX_GPREG_X6), + SMC_GET_GP(handle, CTX_GPREG_X7), + SMC_GET_GP(handle, CTX_GPREG_X8), + SMC_GET_GP(handle, CTX_GPREG_X9), + SMC_GET_GP(handle, CTX_GPREG_X10), + SMC_GET_GP(handle, CTX_GPREG_X11), + SMC_GET_GP(handle, CTX_GPREG_X12), + SMC_GET_GP(handle, CTX_GPREG_X13), + SMC_GET_GP(handle, CTX_GPREG_X14), + SMC_GET_GP(handle, CTX_GPREG_X15), + SMC_GET_GP(handle, CTX_GPREG_X16), + SMC_GET_GP(handle, CTX_GPREG_X17) + ); + +#else + SMC_RET8(cm_get_context(secure_state_out), smc_fid, x1, x2, x3, x4, + SMC_GET_GP(handle, CTX_GPREG_X5), + SMC_GET_GP(handle, CTX_GPREG_X6), + SMC_GET_GP(handle, CTX_GPREG_X7)); +#endif +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * Forward SMCs to the other security state. + ******************************************************************************/ +static uint64_t spmd_smc_forward(uint32_t smc_fid, + bool secure_origin, + uint64_t x1, + uint64_t x2, + uint64_t x3, + uint64_t x4, + void *cookie, + void *handle, + uint64_t flags) +{ + if (is_spmc_at_el3() && !secure_origin) { + return spmc_smc_handler(smc_fid, secure_origin, x1, x2, x3, x4, + cookie, handle, flags); + } + return spmd_smc_switch_state(smc_fid, secure_origin, x1, x2, x3, x4, + handle); + +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * Return FFA_ERROR with specified error code + ******************************************************************************/ +uint64_t spmd_ffa_error_return(void *handle, int error_code) +{ + SMC_RET8(handle, (uint32_t) FFA_ERROR, + FFA_TARGET_INFO_MBZ, (uint32_t)error_code, + FFA_PARAM_MBZ, FFA_PARAM_MBZ, FFA_PARAM_MBZ, + FFA_PARAM_MBZ, FFA_PARAM_MBZ); +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * spmd_check_address_in_binary_image + ******************************************************************************/ +bool spmd_check_address_in_binary_image(uint64_t address) +{ + assert(!check_uptr_overflow(spmc_attrs.load_address, spmc_attrs.binary_size)); + + return ((address >= spmc_attrs.load_address) && + (address < (spmc_attrs.load_address + spmc_attrs.binary_size))); +} + +/****************************************************************************** + * spmd_is_spmc_message + *****************************************************************************/ +static bool spmd_is_spmc_message(unsigned int ep) +{ + if (is_spmc_at_el3()) { + return false; + } + + return ((ffa_endpoint_destination(ep) == SPMD_DIRECT_MSG_ENDPOINT_ID) + && (ffa_endpoint_source(ep) == spmc_attrs.spmc_id)); +} + +/****************************************************************************** + * spmd_handle_spmc_message + *****************************************************************************/ +static int spmd_handle_spmc_message(unsigned long long msg, + unsigned long long parm1, unsigned long long parm2, + unsigned long long parm3, unsigned long long parm4) +{ + VERBOSE("%s %llx %llx %llx %llx %llx\n", __func__, + msg, parm1, parm2, parm3, parm4); + + return -EINVAL; +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * This function forwards FF-A SMCs to either the main SPMD handler or the + * SPMC at EL3, depending on the origin security state, if enabled. + ******************************************************************************/ +uint64_t spmd_ffa_smc_handler(uint32_t smc_fid, + uint64_t x1, + uint64_t x2, + uint64_t x3, + uint64_t x4, + void *cookie, + void *handle, + uint64_t flags) +{ + if (is_spmc_at_el3()) { + /* + * If we have an SPMC at EL3 allow handling of the SMC first. + * The SPMC will call back through to SPMD handler if required. + */ + if (is_caller_secure(flags)) { + return spmc_smc_handler(smc_fid, + is_caller_secure(flags), + x1, x2, x3, x4, cookie, + handle, flags); + } + } + return spmd_smc_handler(smc_fid, x1, x2, x3, x4, cookie, + handle, flags); +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * This function handles all SMCs in the range reserved for FFA. Each call is + * either forwarded to the other security state or handled by the SPM dispatcher + ******************************************************************************/ +uint64_t spmd_smc_handler(uint32_t smc_fid, + uint64_t x1, + uint64_t x2, + uint64_t x3, + uint64_t x4, + void *cookie, + void *handle, + uint64_t flags) +{ + unsigned int linear_id = plat_my_core_pos(); + spmd_spm_core_context_t *ctx = spmd_get_context(); + bool secure_origin; + int32_t ret; + uint32_t input_version; + + /* Determine which security state this SMC originated from */ + secure_origin = is_caller_secure(flags); + + VERBOSE("SPM(%u): 0x%x 0x%" PRIx64 " 0x%" PRIx64 " 0x%" PRIx64 " 0x%" PRIx64 + " 0x%" PRIx64 " 0x%" PRIx64 " 0x%" PRIx64 "\n", + linear_id, smc_fid, x1, x2, x3, x4, + SMC_GET_GP(handle, CTX_GPREG_X5), + SMC_GET_GP(handle, CTX_GPREG_X6), + SMC_GET_GP(handle, CTX_GPREG_X7)); + + /* + * If there is an on-going info regs from EL3 SPMD LP, unconditionally + * return, we don't expect any other FF-A ABIs to be called between + * calls to FFA_PARTITION_INFO_GET_REGS. + */ + if (is_spmd_logical_sp_info_regs_req_in_progress(ctx)) { + assert(secure_origin); + spmd_spm_core_sync_exit(0ULL); + } + + switch (smc_fid) { + case FFA_ERROR: + /* + * Check if this is the first invocation of this interface on + * this CPU. If so, then indicate that the SPM Core initialised + * unsuccessfully. + */ + if (secure_origin && (ctx->state == SPMC_STATE_ON_PENDING)) { + spmd_spm_core_sync_exit(x2); + } + + /* + * If there was an SPMD logical partition direct request on-going, + * return back to the SPMD logical partition so the error can be + * consumed. + */ + if (is_spmd_logical_sp_dir_req_in_progress(ctx)) { + assert(secure_origin); + spmd_spm_core_sync_exit(0ULL); + } + + return spmd_smc_forward(smc_fid, secure_origin, + x1, x2, x3, x4, cookie, + handle, flags); + break; /* not reached */ + + case FFA_VERSION: + input_version = (uint32_t)(0xFFFFFFFF & x1); + /* + * If caller is secure and SPMC was initialized, + * return FFA_VERSION of SPMD. + * If caller is non secure and SPMC was initialized, + * forward to the EL3 SPMC if enabled, otherwise return + * the SPMC version if implemented at a lower EL. + * Sanity check to "input_version". + * If the EL3 SPMC is enabled, ignore the SPMC state as + * this is not used. + */ + if ((input_version & FFA_VERSION_BIT31_MASK) || + (!is_spmc_at_el3() && (ctx->state == SPMC_STATE_RESET))) { + ret = FFA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } else if (!secure_origin) { + if (is_spmc_at_el3()) { + /* + * Forward the call directly to the EL3 SPMC, if + * enabled, as we don't need to wrap the call in + * a direct request. + */ + return spmd_smc_forward(smc_fid, secure_origin, + x1, x2, x3, x4, cookie, + handle, flags); + } + + gp_regs_t *gpregs = get_gpregs_ctx(&ctx->cpu_ctx); + uint64_t rc; + + if (spmc_attrs.major_version == 1 && + spmc_attrs.minor_version == 0) { + ret = MAKE_FFA_VERSION(spmc_attrs.major_version, + spmc_attrs.minor_version); + SMC_RET8(handle, (uint32_t)ret, + FFA_TARGET_INFO_MBZ, + FFA_TARGET_INFO_MBZ, + FFA_PARAM_MBZ, FFA_PARAM_MBZ, + FFA_PARAM_MBZ, FFA_PARAM_MBZ, + FFA_PARAM_MBZ); + break; + } + /* Save non-secure system registers context */ + cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(NON_SECURE); +#if SPMD_SPM_AT_SEL2 + cm_el2_sysregs_context_save(NON_SECURE); +#endif + + /* + * The incoming request has FFA_VERSION as X0 smc_fid + * and requested version in x1. Prepare a direct request + * from SPMD to SPMC with FFA_VERSION framework function + * identifier in X2 and requested version in X3. + */ + spmd_build_spmc_message(gpregs, + SPMD_FWK_MSG_FFA_VERSION_REQ, + input_version); + + /* + * Ensure x8-x17 NS GP register values are untouched when returning + * from the SPMC. + */ + write_ctx_reg(gpregs, CTX_GPREG_X8, SMC_GET_GP(handle, CTX_GPREG_X8)); + write_ctx_reg(gpregs, CTX_GPREG_X9, SMC_GET_GP(handle, CTX_GPREG_X9)); + write_ctx_reg(gpregs, CTX_GPREG_X10, SMC_GET_GP(handle, CTX_GPREG_X10)); + write_ctx_reg(gpregs, CTX_GPREG_X11, SMC_GET_GP(handle, CTX_GPREG_X11)); + write_ctx_reg(gpregs, CTX_GPREG_X12, SMC_GET_GP(handle, CTX_GPREG_X12)); + write_ctx_reg(gpregs, CTX_GPREG_X13, SMC_GET_GP(handle, CTX_GPREG_X13)); + write_ctx_reg(gpregs, CTX_GPREG_X14, SMC_GET_GP(handle, CTX_GPREG_X14)); + write_ctx_reg(gpregs, CTX_GPREG_X15, SMC_GET_GP(handle, CTX_GPREG_X15)); + write_ctx_reg(gpregs, CTX_GPREG_X16, SMC_GET_GP(handle, CTX_GPREG_X16)); + write_ctx_reg(gpregs, CTX_GPREG_X17, SMC_GET_GP(handle, CTX_GPREG_X17)); + + rc = spmd_spm_core_sync_entry(ctx); + + if ((rc != 0ULL) || + (SMC_GET_GP(gpregs, CTX_GPREG_X0) != + FFA_MSG_SEND_DIRECT_RESP_SMC32) || + (SMC_GET_GP(gpregs, CTX_GPREG_X2) != + (FFA_FWK_MSG_BIT | + SPMD_FWK_MSG_FFA_VERSION_RESP))) { + ERROR("Failed to forward FFA_VERSION\n"); + ret = FFA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } else { + ret = SMC_GET_GP(gpregs, CTX_GPREG_X3); + } + + /* + * x0-x4 are updated by spmd_smc_forward below. + * Zero out x5-x7 in the FFA_VERSION response. + */ + write_ctx_reg(gpregs, CTX_GPREG_X5, 0); + write_ctx_reg(gpregs, CTX_GPREG_X6, 0); + write_ctx_reg(gpregs, CTX_GPREG_X7, 0); + + /* + * Return here after SPMC has handled FFA_VERSION. + * The returned SPMC version is held in X3. + * Forward this version in X0 to the non-secure caller. + */ + return spmd_smc_forward(ret, true, FFA_PARAM_MBZ, + FFA_PARAM_MBZ, FFA_PARAM_MBZ, + FFA_PARAM_MBZ, cookie, gpregs, + flags); + } else { + ret = MAKE_FFA_VERSION(FFA_VERSION_MAJOR, + FFA_VERSION_MINOR); + } + + SMC_RET8(handle, (uint32_t)ret, FFA_TARGET_INFO_MBZ, + FFA_TARGET_INFO_MBZ, FFA_PARAM_MBZ, FFA_PARAM_MBZ, + FFA_PARAM_MBZ, FFA_PARAM_MBZ, FFA_PARAM_MBZ); + break; /* not reached */ + + case FFA_FEATURES: + /* + * This is an optional interface. Do the minimal checks and + * forward to SPM Core which will handle it if implemented. + */ + + /* Forward SMC from Normal world to the SPM Core */ + if (!secure_origin) { + return spmd_smc_forward(smc_fid, secure_origin, + x1, x2, x3, x4, cookie, + handle, flags); + } + + /* + * Return success if call was from secure world i.e. all + * FFA functions are supported. This is essentially a + * nop. + */ + SMC_RET8(handle, FFA_SUCCESS_SMC32, x1, x2, x3, x4, + SMC_GET_GP(handle, CTX_GPREG_X5), + SMC_GET_GP(handle, CTX_GPREG_X6), + SMC_GET_GP(handle, CTX_GPREG_X7)); + + break; /* not reached */ + + case FFA_ID_GET: + /* + * Returns the ID of the calling FFA component. + */ + if (!secure_origin) { + SMC_RET8(handle, FFA_SUCCESS_SMC32, + FFA_TARGET_INFO_MBZ, FFA_NS_ENDPOINT_ID, + FFA_PARAM_MBZ, FFA_PARAM_MBZ, + FFA_PARAM_MBZ, FFA_PARAM_MBZ, + FFA_PARAM_MBZ); + } + + SMC_RET8(handle, FFA_SUCCESS_SMC32, + FFA_TARGET_INFO_MBZ, spmc_attrs.spmc_id, + FFA_PARAM_MBZ, FFA_PARAM_MBZ, + FFA_PARAM_MBZ, FFA_PARAM_MBZ, + FFA_PARAM_MBZ); + + break; /* not reached */ + + case FFA_SECONDARY_EP_REGISTER_SMC64: + if (secure_origin) { + ret = spmd_pm_secondary_ep_register(x1); + + if (ret < 0) { + SMC_RET8(handle, FFA_ERROR_SMC64, + FFA_TARGET_INFO_MBZ, ret, + FFA_PARAM_MBZ, FFA_PARAM_MBZ, + FFA_PARAM_MBZ, FFA_PARAM_MBZ, + FFA_PARAM_MBZ); + } else { + SMC_RET8(handle, FFA_SUCCESS_SMC64, + FFA_TARGET_INFO_MBZ, FFA_PARAM_MBZ, + FFA_PARAM_MBZ, FFA_PARAM_MBZ, + FFA_PARAM_MBZ, FFA_PARAM_MBZ, + FFA_PARAM_MBZ); + } + } + + return spmd_ffa_error_return(handle, FFA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED); + break; /* Not reached */ + + case FFA_SPM_ID_GET: + if (MAKE_FFA_VERSION(1, 1) > FFA_VERSION_COMPILED) { + return spmd_ffa_error_return(handle, + FFA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED); + } + /* + * Returns the ID of the SPMC or SPMD depending on the FF-A + * instance where this function is invoked + */ + if (!secure_origin) { + SMC_RET8(handle, FFA_SUCCESS_SMC32, + FFA_TARGET_INFO_MBZ, spmc_attrs.spmc_id, + FFA_PARAM_MBZ, FFA_PARAM_MBZ, + FFA_PARAM_MBZ, FFA_PARAM_MBZ, + FFA_PARAM_MBZ); + } + SMC_RET8(handle, FFA_SUCCESS_SMC32, + FFA_TARGET_INFO_MBZ, SPMD_DIRECT_MSG_ENDPOINT_ID, + FFA_PARAM_MBZ, FFA_PARAM_MBZ, + FFA_PARAM_MBZ, FFA_PARAM_MBZ, + FFA_PARAM_MBZ); + + break; /* not reached */ + + case FFA_MSG_SEND_DIRECT_REQ_SMC32: + case FFA_MSG_SEND_DIRECT_REQ_SMC64: + /* + * Regardless of secure_origin, SPMD logical partitions cannot + * handle direct messages. They can only initiate direct + * messages and consume direct responses or errors. + */ + if (is_spmd_lp_id(ffa_endpoint_source(x1)) || + is_spmd_lp_id(ffa_endpoint_destination(x1))) { + return spmd_ffa_error_return(handle, + FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER + ); + } + + /* + * When there is an ongoing SPMD logical partition direct + * request, there cannot be another direct request. Return + * error in this case. Panic'ing is an option but that does + * not provide the opportunity for caller to abort based on + * error codes. + */ + if (is_spmd_logical_sp_dir_req_in_progress(ctx)) { + assert(secure_origin); + return spmd_ffa_error_return(handle, + FFA_ERROR_DENIED); + } + + if (!secure_origin) { + /* Validate source endpoint is non-secure for non-secure caller. */ + if (ffa_is_secure_world_id(ffa_endpoint_source(x1))) { + return spmd_ffa_error_return(handle, + FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER); + } + } + if (secure_origin && spmd_is_spmc_message(x1)) { + ret = spmd_handle_spmc_message(x3, x4, + SMC_GET_GP(handle, CTX_GPREG_X5), + SMC_GET_GP(handle, CTX_GPREG_X6), + SMC_GET_GP(handle, CTX_GPREG_X7)); + + SMC_RET8(handle, FFA_SUCCESS_SMC32, + FFA_TARGET_INFO_MBZ, ret, + FFA_PARAM_MBZ, FFA_PARAM_MBZ, + FFA_PARAM_MBZ, FFA_PARAM_MBZ, + FFA_PARAM_MBZ); + } else { + /* Forward direct message to the other world */ + return spmd_smc_forward(smc_fid, secure_origin, + x1, x2, x3, x4, cookie, + handle, flags); + } + break; /* Not reached */ + + case FFA_MSG_SEND_DIRECT_RESP_SMC32: + case FFA_MSG_SEND_DIRECT_RESP_SMC64: + if (secure_origin && (spmd_is_spmc_message(x1) || + is_spmd_logical_sp_dir_req_in_progress(ctx))) { + spmd_spm_core_sync_exit(0ULL); + } else { + /* Forward direct message to the other world */ + return spmd_smc_forward(smc_fid, secure_origin, + x1, x2, x3, x4, cookie, + handle, flags); + } + break; /* Not reached */ + + case FFA_RX_RELEASE: + case FFA_RXTX_MAP_SMC32: + case FFA_RXTX_MAP_SMC64: + case FFA_RXTX_UNMAP: + case FFA_PARTITION_INFO_GET: +#if MAKE_FFA_VERSION(1, 1) <= FFA_VERSION_COMPILED + case FFA_NOTIFICATION_BITMAP_CREATE: + case FFA_NOTIFICATION_BITMAP_DESTROY: + case FFA_NOTIFICATION_BIND: + case FFA_NOTIFICATION_UNBIND: + case FFA_NOTIFICATION_SET: + case FFA_NOTIFICATION_GET: + case FFA_NOTIFICATION_INFO_GET: + case FFA_NOTIFICATION_INFO_GET_SMC64: + case FFA_MSG_SEND2: + case FFA_RX_ACQUIRE: +#endif + case FFA_MSG_RUN: + /* + * Above calls should be invoked only by the Normal world and + * must not be forwarded from Secure world to Normal world. + */ + if (secure_origin) { + return spmd_ffa_error_return(handle, + FFA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED); + } + + /* Forward the call to the other world */ + /* fallthrough */ + case FFA_MSG_SEND: + case FFA_MEM_DONATE_SMC32: + case FFA_MEM_DONATE_SMC64: + case FFA_MEM_LEND_SMC32: + case FFA_MEM_LEND_SMC64: + case FFA_MEM_SHARE_SMC32: + case FFA_MEM_SHARE_SMC64: + case FFA_MEM_RETRIEVE_REQ_SMC32: + case FFA_MEM_RETRIEVE_REQ_SMC64: + case FFA_MEM_RETRIEVE_RESP: + case FFA_MEM_RELINQUISH: + case FFA_MEM_RECLAIM: + case FFA_MEM_FRAG_TX: + case FFA_MEM_FRAG_RX: + case FFA_SUCCESS_SMC32: + case FFA_SUCCESS_SMC64: + /* + * If there is an ongoing direct request from an SPMD logical + * partition, return an error. + */ + if (is_spmd_logical_sp_dir_req_in_progress(ctx)) { + assert(secure_origin); + return spmd_ffa_error_return(handle, + FFA_ERROR_DENIED); + } + + return spmd_smc_forward(smc_fid, secure_origin, + x1, x2, x3, x4, cookie, + handle, flags); + break; /* not reached */ + + case FFA_MSG_WAIT: + /* + * Check if this is the first invocation of this interface on + * this CPU from the Secure world. If so, then indicate that the + * SPM Core initialised successfully. + */ + if (secure_origin && (ctx->state == SPMC_STATE_ON_PENDING)) { + spmd_spm_core_sync_exit(0ULL); + } + + /* Forward the call to the other world */ + /* fallthrough */ + case FFA_INTERRUPT: + case FFA_MSG_YIELD: + /* This interface must be invoked only by the Secure world */ + if (!secure_origin) { + return spmd_ffa_error_return(handle, + FFA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED); + } + + if (is_spmd_logical_sp_dir_req_in_progress(ctx)) { + assert(secure_origin); + return spmd_ffa_error_return(handle, + FFA_ERROR_DENIED); + } + + return spmd_smc_forward(smc_fid, secure_origin, + x1, x2, x3, x4, cookie, + handle, flags); + break; /* not reached */ + + case FFA_NORMAL_WORLD_RESUME: + if (secure_origin && ctx->secure_interrupt_ongoing) { + spmd_spm_core_sync_exit(0ULL); + } else { + return spmd_ffa_error_return(handle, FFA_ERROR_DENIED); + } + break; /* Not reached */ +#if MAKE_FFA_VERSION(1, 1) <= FFA_VERSION_COMPILED + case FFA_PARTITION_INFO_GET_REGS_SMC64: + if (secure_origin) { + return spmd_el3_populate_logical_partition_info(handle, x1, + x2, x3); + } + + /* Call only supported with SMCCC 1.2+ */ + if (MAKE_SMCCC_VERSION(SMCCC_MAJOR_VERSION, SMCCC_MINOR_VERSION) < 0x10002) { + return spmd_ffa_error_return(handle, FFA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED); + } + + return spmd_smc_forward(smc_fid, secure_origin, + x1, x2, x3, x4, cookie, + handle, flags); + break; /* Not reached */ +#endif + case FFA_EL3_INTR_HANDLE: + if (secure_origin) { + return spmd_handle_group0_intr_swd(handle); + } else { + return spmd_ffa_error_return(handle, FFA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED); + } + default: + WARN("SPM: Unsupported call 0x%08x\n", smc_fid); + return spmd_ffa_error_return(handle, FFA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED); + } +} diff --git a/services/std_svc/spmd/spmd_pm.c b/services/std_svc/spmd/spmd_pm.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..fd89c81 --- /dev/null +++ b/services/std_svc/spmd/spmd_pm.c @@ -0,0 +1,168 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2020-2022, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +#include <assert.h> +#include <errno.h> +#include <inttypes.h> +#include <stdint.h> + +#include <lib/el3_runtime/context_mgmt.h> +#include <lib/spinlock.h> +#include "spmd_private.h" + +static struct { + bool secondary_ep_locked; + uintptr_t secondary_ep; + spinlock_t lock; +} g_spmd_pm; + +/******************************************************************************* + * spmd_pm_secondary_ep_register + ******************************************************************************/ +int spmd_pm_secondary_ep_register(uintptr_t entry_point) +{ + int ret = FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER; + + spin_lock(&g_spmd_pm.lock); + + if (g_spmd_pm.secondary_ep_locked == true) { + goto out; + } + + /* + * Check entry_point address is a PA within + * load_address <= entry_point < load_address + binary_size + */ + if (!spmd_check_address_in_binary_image(entry_point)) { + ERROR("%s entry point is not within image boundaries\n", + __func__); + goto out; + } + + g_spmd_pm.secondary_ep = entry_point; + g_spmd_pm.secondary_ep_locked = true; + + VERBOSE("%s %lx\n", __func__, entry_point); + + ret = 0; + +out: + spin_unlock(&g_spmd_pm.lock); + + return ret; +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * This CPU has been turned on. Enter SPMC to initialise S-EL1 or S-EL2. As part + * of the SPMC initialization path, they will initialize any SPs that they + * manage. Entry into SPMC is done after initialising minimal architectural + * state that guarantees safe execution. + ******************************************************************************/ +static void spmd_cpu_on_finish_handler(u_register_t unused) +{ + spmd_spm_core_context_t *ctx = spmd_get_context(); + unsigned int linear_id = plat_my_core_pos(); + el3_state_t *el3_state; + uintptr_t entry_point; + uint64_t rc; + + assert(ctx != NULL); + assert(ctx->state != SPMC_STATE_ON); + + spin_lock(&g_spmd_pm.lock); + + /* + * Leave the possibility that the SPMC does not call + * FFA_SECONDARY_EP_REGISTER in which case re-use the + * primary core address for booting secondary cores. + */ + if (g_spmd_pm.secondary_ep_locked == true) { + /* + * The CPU context has already been initialized at boot time + * (in spmd_spmc_init by a call to cm_setup_context). Adjust + * below the target core entry point based on the address + * passed to by FFA_SECONDARY_EP_REGISTER. + */ + entry_point = g_spmd_pm.secondary_ep; + el3_state = get_el3state_ctx(&ctx->cpu_ctx); + write_ctx_reg(el3_state, CTX_ELR_EL3, entry_point); + } + + spin_unlock(&g_spmd_pm.lock); + + /* Mark CPU as initiating ON operation. */ + ctx->state = SPMC_STATE_ON_PENDING; + + rc = spmd_spm_core_sync_entry(ctx); + if (rc != 0ULL) { + ERROR("%s failed (%" PRIu64 ") on CPU%u\n", __func__, rc, + linear_id); + ctx->state = SPMC_STATE_OFF; + return; + } + + ctx->state = SPMC_STATE_ON; + + VERBOSE("CPU %u on!\n", linear_id); +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * spmd_cpu_off_handler + ******************************************************************************/ +static int32_t spmd_cpu_off_handler(u_register_t unused) +{ + spmd_spm_core_context_t *ctx = spmd_get_context(); + unsigned int linear_id = plat_my_core_pos(); + int64_t rc; + + assert(ctx != NULL); + assert(ctx->state != SPMC_STATE_OFF); + + /* Build an SPMD to SPMC direct message request. */ + gp_regs_t *gpregs = get_gpregs_ctx(&ctx->cpu_ctx); + spmd_build_spmc_message(gpregs, FFA_FWK_MSG_PSCI, PSCI_CPU_OFF); + + /* Clear remaining x8 - x17 at EL3/SEL2 or EL3/SEL1 boundary. */ + write_ctx_reg(gpregs, CTX_GPREG_X8, 0); + write_ctx_reg(gpregs, CTX_GPREG_X9, 0); + write_ctx_reg(gpregs, CTX_GPREG_X10, 0); + write_ctx_reg(gpregs, CTX_GPREG_X11, 0); + write_ctx_reg(gpregs, CTX_GPREG_X12, 0); + write_ctx_reg(gpregs, CTX_GPREG_X13, 0); + write_ctx_reg(gpregs, CTX_GPREG_X14, 0); + write_ctx_reg(gpregs, CTX_GPREG_X15, 0); + write_ctx_reg(gpregs, CTX_GPREG_X16, 0); + write_ctx_reg(gpregs, CTX_GPREG_X17, 0); + + rc = spmd_spm_core_sync_entry(ctx); + if (rc != 0ULL) { + ERROR("%s failed (%" PRIu64 ") on CPU%u\n", __func__, rc, linear_id); + } + + /* Expect a direct message response from the SPMC. */ + u_register_t ffa_resp_func = read_ctx_reg(get_gpregs_ctx(&ctx->cpu_ctx), + CTX_GPREG_X0); + if (ffa_resp_func != FFA_MSG_SEND_DIRECT_RESP_SMC32) { + ERROR("%s invalid SPMC response (%lx).\n", + __func__, ffa_resp_func); + return -EINVAL; + } + + ctx->state = SPMC_STATE_OFF; + + VERBOSE("CPU %u off!\n", linear_id); + + return 0; +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * Structure populated by the SPM Dispatcher to perform any bookkeeping before + * PSCI executes a power mgmt. operation. + ******************************************************************************/ +const spd_pm_ops_t spmd_pm = { + .svc_on_finish = spmd_cpu_on_finish_handler, + .svc_off = spmd_cpu_off_handler +}; diff --git a/services/std_svc/spmd/spmd_private.h b/services/std_svc/spmd/spmd_private.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..fef7ef6 --- /dev/null +++ b/services/std_svc/spmd/spmd_private.h @@ -0,0 +1,115 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2019-2023, Arm Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +#ifndef SPMD_PRIVATE_H +#define SPMD_PRIVATE_H + +#include <common/bl_common.h> +#include <context.h> + +/******************************************************************************* + * Constants that allow assembler code to preserve callee-saved registers of the + * C runtime context while performing a security state switch. + ******************************************************************************/ +#define SPMD_C_RT_CTX_X19 0x0 +#define SPMD_C_RT_CTX_X20 0x8 +#define SPMD_C_RT_CTX_X21 0x10 +#define SPMD_C_RT_CTX_X22 0x18 +#define SPMD_C_RT_CTX_X23 0x20 +#define SPMD_C_RT_CTX_X24 0x28 +#define SPMD_C_RT_CTX_X25 0x30 +#define SPMD_C_RT_CTX_X26 0x38 +#define SPMD_C_RT_CTX_X27 0x40 +#define SPMD_C_RT_CTX_X28 0x48 +#define SPMD_C_RT_CTX_X29 0x50 +#define SPMD_C_RT_CTX_X30 0x58 + +#define SPMD_C_RT_CTX_SIZE 0x60 +#define SPMD_C_RT_CTX_ENTRIES (SPMD_C_RT_CTX_SIZE >> DWORD_SHIFT) + +#ifndef __ASSEMBLER__ +#include <stdint.h> +#include <lib/psci/psci_lib.h> +#include <plat/common/platform.h> +#include <services/ffa_svc.h> + +typedef enum spmc_state { + SPMC_STATE_RESET = 0, + SPMC_STATE_OFF, + SPMC_STATE_ON_PENDING, + SPMC_STATE_ON +} spmc_state_t; + +/* + * Data structure used by the SPM dispatcher (SPMD) in EL3 to track context of + * the SPM core (SPMC) at the next lower EL. + */ +typedef struct spmd_spm_core_context { + uint64_t c_rt_ctx; + cpu_context_t cpu_ctx; + spmc_state_t state; + bool secure_interrupt_ongoing; +#if ENABLE_SPMD_LP + uint8_t spmd_lp_sync_req_ongoing; +#endif +} spmd_spm_core_context_t; + +/* Flags to indicate ongoing requests for SPMD EL3 logical partitions */ +#define SPMD_LP_FFA_DIR_REQ_ONGOING U(0x1) +#define SPMD_LP_FFA_INFO_GET_REG_ONGOING U(0x2) + +/* + * Reserve ID for NS physical FFA Endpoint. + */ +#define FFA_NS_ENDPOINT_ID U(0) + +/* Define SPMD target function IDs for framework messages to the SPMC */ +#define SPMD_FWK_MSG_FFA_VERSION_REQ U(0x8) +#define SPMD_FWK_MSG_FFA_VERSION_RESP U(0x9) + +/* Function to build SPMD to SPMC message */ +void spmd_build_spmc_message(gp_regs_t *gpregs, uint8_t target, + unsigned long long message); + +/* Functions used to enter/exit SPMC synchronously */ +uint64_t spmd_spm_core_sync_entry(spmd_spm_core_context_t *ctx); +__dead2 void spmd_spm_core_sync_exit(uint64_t rc); + +/* Assembly helpers */ +uint64_t spmd_spm_core_enter(uint64_t *c_rt_ctx); +void __dead2 spmd_spm_core_exit(uint64_t c_rt_ctx, uint64_t ret); + +/* SPMD SPD power management handlers */ +extern const spd_pm_ops_t spmd_pm; + +/* SPMC entry point information helper */ +entry_point_info_t *spmd_spmc_ep_info_get(void); + +/* SPMC ID getter */ +uint16_t spmd_spmc_id_get(void); + +/* SPMC context on CPU based on mpidr */ +spmd_spm_core_context_t *spmd_get_context_by_mpidr(uint64_t mpidr); + +/* SPMC context on current CPU get helper */ +spmd_spm_core_context_t *spmd_get_context(void); + +int spmd_pm_secondary_ep_register(uintptr_t entry_point); +bool spmd_check_address_in_binary_image(uint64_t address); + +/* + * Platform hook in EL3 firmware to handle for Group0 secure interrupt. + * Return values: + * 0 = success + * otherwise it returns a negative value + */ +int plat_spmd_handle_group0_interrupt(uint32_t id); + +uint64_t spmd_ffa_error_return(void *handle, int error_code); + +#endif /* __ASSEMBLER__ */ + +#endif /* SPMD_PRIVATE_H */ diff --git a/services/std_svc/std_svc_setup.c b/services/std_svc/std_svc_setup.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e782d09 --- /dev/null +++ b/services/std_svc/std_svc_setup.c @@ -0,0 +1,246 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2014-2023, Arm Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +#include <assert.h> +#include <stdint.h> + +#include <common/debug.h> +#include <common/runtime_svc.h> +#include <lib/el3_runtime/cpu_data.h> +#include <lib/pmf/pmf.h> +#include <lib/psci/psci.h> +#include <lib/runtime_instr.h> +#include <services/drtm_svc.h> +#include <services/errata_abi_svc.h> +#include <services/pci_svc.h> +#include <services/rmmd_svc.h> +#include <services/sdei.h> +#include <services/spm_mm_svc.h> +#include <services/spmc_svc.h> +#include <services/spmd_svc.h> +#include <services/std_svc.h> +#include <services/trng_svc.h> +#include <smccc_helpers.h> +#include <tools_share/uuid.h> + +/* Standard Service UUID */ +static uuid_t arm_svc_uid = { + {0x5b, 0x90, 0x8d, 0x10}, + {0x63, 0xf8}, + {0xe8, 0x47}, + 0xae, 0x2d, + {0xc0, 0xfb, 0x56, 0x41, 0xf6, 0xe2} +}; + +/* Setup Standard Services */ +static int32_t std_svc_setup(void) +{ + uintptr_t svc_arg; + int ret = 0; + + svc_arg = get_arm_std_svc_args(PSCI_FID_MASK); + assert(svc_arg); + + /* + * PSCI is one of the specifications implemented as a Standard Service. + * The `psci_setup()` also does EL3 architectural setup. + */ + if (psci_setup((const psci_lib_args_t *)svc_arg) != PSCI_E_SUCCESS) { + ret = 1; + } + +#if SPM_MM + if (spm_mm_setup() != 0) { + ret = 1; + } +#endif + +#if defined(SPD_spmd) + if (spmd_setup() != 0) { + ret = 1; + } +#endif + +#if ENABLE_RME + if (rmmd_setup() != 0) { + ret = 1; + } +#endif + +#if SDEI_SUPPORT + /* SDEI initialisation */ + sdei_init(); +#endif + +#if TRNG_SUPPORT + /* TRNG initialisation */ + trng_setup(); +#endif /* TRNG_SUPPORT */ + +#if DRTM_SUPPORT + if (drtm_setup() != 0) { + ret = 1; + } +#endif /* DRTM_SUPPORT */ + + return ret; +} + +/* + * Top-level Standard Service SMC handler. This handler will in turn dispatch + * calls to PSCI SMC handler + */ +static uintptr_t std_svc_smc_handler(uint32_t smc_fid, + u_register_t x1, + u_register_t x2, + u_register_t x3, + u_register_t x4, + void *cookie, + void *handle, + u_register_t flags) +{ + if (((smc_fid >> FUNCID_CC_SHIFT) & FUNCID_CC_MASK) == SMC_32) { + /* 32-bit SMC function, clear top parameter bits */ + + x1 &= UINT32_MAX; + x2 &= UINT32_MAX; + x3 &= UINT32_MAX; + x4 &= UINT32_MAX; + } + + /* + * Dispatch PSCI calls to PSCI SMC handler and return its return + * value + */ + if (is_psci_fid(smc_fid)) { + uint64_t ret; + +#if ENABLE_RUNTIME_INSTRUMENTATION + + /* + * Flush cache line so that even if CPU power down happens + * the timestamp update is reflected in memory. + */ + PMF_WRITE_TIMESTAMP(rt_instr_svc, + RT_INSTR_ENTER_PSCI, + PMF_CACHE_MAINT, + get_cpu_data(cpu_data_pmf_ts[CPU_DATA_PMF_TS0_IDX])); +#endif + + ret = psci_smc_handler(smc_fid, x1, x2, x3, x4, + cookie, handle, flags); + +#if ENABLE_RUNTIME_INSTRUMENTATION + PMF_CAPTURE_TIMESTAMP(rt_instr_svc, + RT_INSTR_EXIT_PSCI, + PMF_NO_CACHE_MAINT); +#endif + + SMC_RET1(handle, ret); + } + +#if SPM_MM + /* + * Dispatch SPM calls to SPM SMC handler and return its return + * value + */ + if (is_spm_mm_fid(smc_fid)) { + return spm_mm_smc_handler(smc_fid, x1, x2, x3, x4, cookie, + handle, flags); + } +#endif + +#if defined(SPD_spmd) + /* + * Dispatch FFA calls to the FFA SMC handler implemented by the SPM + * dispatcher and return its return value + */ + if (is_ffa_fid(smc_fid)) { + return spmd_ffa_smc_handler(smc_fid, x1, x2, x3, x4, cookie, + handle, flags); + } +#endif + +#if SDEI_SUPPORT + if (is_sdei_fid(smc_fid)) { + return sdei_smc_handler(smc_fid, x1, x2, x3, x4, cookie, handle, + flags); + } +#endif + +#if TRNG_SUPPORT + if (is_trng_fid(smc_fid)) { + return trng_smc_handler(smc_fid, x1, x2, x3, x4, cookie, handle, + flags); + } +#endif /* TRNG_SUPPORT */ + +#if ERRATA_ABI_SUPPORT + if (is_errata_fid(smc_fid)) { + return errata_abi_smc_handler(smc_fid, x1, x2, x3, x4, cookie, + handle, flags); + } +#endif /* ERRATA_ABI_SUPPORT */ + +#if ENABLE_RME + + if (is_rmmd_el3_fid(smc_fid)) { + return rmmd_rmm_el3_handler(smc_fid, x1, x2, x3, x4, cookie, + handle, flags); + } + + if (is_rmi_fid(smc_fid)) { + return rmmd_rmi_handler(smc_fid, x1, x2, x3, x4, cookie, + handle, flags); + } +#endif + +#if SMC_PCI_SUPPORT + if (is_pci_fid(smc_fid)) { + return pci_smc_handler(smc_fid, x1, x2, x3, x4, cookie, handle, + flags); + } +#endif + +#if DRTM_SUPPORT + if (is_drtm_fid(smc_fid)) { + return drtm_smc_handler(smc_fid, x1, x2, x3, x4, cookie, handle, + flags); + } +#endif /* DRTM_SUPPORT */ + + switch (smc_fid) { + case ARM_STD_SVC_CALL_COUNT: + /* + * Return the number of Standard Service Calls. PSCI is the only + * standard service implemented; so return number of PSCI calls + */ + SMC_RET1(handle, PSCI_NUM_CALLS); + + case ARM_STD_SVC_UID: + /* Return UID to the caller */ + SMC_UUID_RET(handle, arm_svc_uid); + + case ARM_STD_SVC_VERSION: + /* Return the version of current implementation */ + SMC_RET2(handle, STD_SVC_VERSION_MAJOR, STD_SVC_VERSION_MINOR); + + default: + VERBOSE("Unimplemented Standard Service Call: 0x%x \n", smc_fid); + SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK); + } +} + +/* Register Standard Service Calls as runtime service */ +DECLARE_RT_SVC( + std_svc, + + OEN_STD_START, + OEN_STD_END, + SMC_TYPE_FAST, + std_svc_setup, + std_svc_smc_handler +); diff --git a/services/std_svc/trng/trng_entropy_pool.c b/services/std_svc/trng/trng_entropy_pool.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..dd08c5e --- /dev/null +++ b/services/std_svc/trng/trng_entropy_pool.c @@ -0,0 +1,236 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2021-2022, ARM Limited. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +#include <assert.h> +#include <stdbool.h> +#include <stdint.h> +#include <lib/spinlock.h> +#include <plat/common/plat_trng.h> + +/* + * # Entropy pool + * Note that the TRNG Firmware interface can request up to 192 bits of entropy + * in a single call or three 64bit words per call. We have 4 words in the pool + * so that when we have 1-63 bits in the pool, and we have a request for + * 192 bits of entropy, we don't have to throw out the leftover 1-63 bits of + * entropy. + */ +#define WORDS_IN_POOL (4) +static uint64_t entropy[WORDS_IN_POOL]; +/* index in bits of the first bit of usable entropy */ +static uint32_t entropy_bit_index; +/* then number of valid bits in the entropy pool */ +static uint32_t entropy_bit_size; + +static spinlock_t trng_pool_lock; + +#define BITS_PER_WORD (sizeof(entropy[0]) * 8) +#define BITS_IN_POOL (WORDS_IN_POOL * BITS_PER_WORD) +#define ENTROPY_MIN_WORD (entropy_bit_index / BITS_PER_WORD) +#define ENTROPY_FREE_BIT (entropy_bit_size + entropy_bit_index) +#define _ENTROPY_FREE_WORD (ENTROPY_FREE_BIT / BITS_PER_WORD) +#define ENTROPY_FREE_INDEX (_ENTROPY_FREE_WORD % WORDS_IN_POOL) +/* ENTROPY_WORD_INDEX(0) includes leftover bits in the lower bits */ +#define ENTROPY_WORD_INDEX(i) ((ENTROPY_MIN_WORD + i) % WORDS_IN_POOL) + +/* + * Fill the entropy pool until we have at least as many bits as requested. + * Returns true after filling the pool, and false if the entropy source is out + * of entropy and the pool could not be filled. + * Assumes locks are taken. + */ +static bool trng_fill_entropy(uint32_t nbits) +{ + while (nbits > entropy_bit_size) { + bool valid = plat_get_entropy(&entropy[ENTROPY_FREE_INDEX]); + + if (valid) { + entropy_bit_size += BITS_PER_WORD; + assert(entropy_bit_size <= BITS_IN_POOL); + } else { + return false; + } + } + return true; +} + +/* + * Pack entropy into the out buffer, filling and taking locks as needed. + * Returns true on success, false on failure. + * + * Note: out must have enough space for nbits of entropy + */ +bool trng_pack_entropy(uint32_t nbits, uint64_t *out) +{ + bool ret = true; + uint32_t bits_to_discard = nbits; + spin_lock(&trng_pool_lock); + + if (!trng_fill_entropy(nbits)) { + ret = false; + goto out; + } + + const unsigned int rshift = entropy_bit_index % BITS_PER_WORD; + const unsigned int lshift = BITS_PER_WORD - rshift; + const int to_fill = ((nbits + BITS_PER_WORD - 1) / BITS_PER_WORD); + int word_i; + + for (word_i = 0; word_i < to_fill; word_i++) { + /* + * Repack the entropy from the pool into the passed in out + * buffer. This takes lesser bits from the valid upper bits + * of word_i and more bits from the lower bits of (word_i + 1). + * + * I found the following diagram useful. note: `e` represents + * valid entropy, ` ` represents invalid bits (not entropy) and + * `x` represents valid entropy that must not end up in the + * packed word. + * + * |---------entropy pool----------| + * C var |--(word_i + 1)-|----word_i-----| + * bit idx |7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0|7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0| + * [x,x,e,e,e,e,e,e|e,e, , , , , , ] + * | [e,e,e,e,e,e,e,e] | + * | |--out[word_i]--| | + * lshift|---| |--rshift---| + * + * ==== Which is implemented as ==== + * + * |---------entropy pool----------| + * C var |--(word_i + 1)-|----word_i-----| + * bit idx |7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0|7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0| + * [x,x,e,e,e,e,e,e|e,e, , , , , , ] + * C expr << lshift >> rshift + * bit idx 5 4 3 2 1 0 7 6 + * [e,e,e,e,e,e,0,0|0,0,0,0,0,0,e,e] + * ==== bit-wise or ==== + * 5 4 3 2 1 0 7 6 + * [e,e,e,e,e,e,e,e] + */ + out[word_i] |= entropy[ENTROPY_WORD_INDEX(word_i)] >> rshift; + + /** + * Discarding the used/packed entropy bits from the respective + * words, (word_i) and (word_i+1) as applicable. + * In each iteration of the loop, we pack 64bits of entropy to + * the output buffer. The bits are picked linearly starting from + * 1st word (entropy[0]) till 4th word (entropy[3]) and then + * rolls back (entropy[0]). Discarding of bits is managed + * similarly. + * + * The following diagram illustrates the logic: + * + * |---------entropy pool----------| + * C var |--(word_i + 1)-|----word_i-----| + * bit idx |7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0|7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0| + * [e,e,e,e,e,e,e,e|e,e,0,0,0,0,0,0] + * | [e,e,e,e,e,e,e,e] | + * | |--out[word_i]--| | + * lshift|---| |--rshift---| + * |e,e|0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0|0,0,0,0,0,0| + * |<== || ==>| + * bits_to_discard (from these bytes) + * + * variable(bits_to_discard): Tracks the amount of bits to be + * discarded and is updated accordingly in each iteration. + * + * It monitors these packed bits from respective word_i and + * word_i+1 and overwrites them with zeros accordingly. + * It discards linearly from the lowest index and moves upwards + * until bits_to_discard variable becomes zero. + * + * In the above diagram,for example, we pack 2bytes(7th and 6th + * from word_i) and 6bytes(0th till 5th from word_i+1), combine + * and pack them as 64bit to output buffer out[i]. + * Depending on the number of bits requested, we discard the + * bits from these packed bytes by overwriting them with zeros. + */ + + /* + * If the bits to be discarded is lesser than the amount of bits + * copied to the output buffer from word_i, we discard that much + * amount of bits only. + */ + if (bits_to_discard < (BITS_PER_WORD - rshift)) { + entropy[ENTROPY_WORD_INDEX(word_i)] &= + (~0ULL << ((bits_to_discard+rshift) % BITS_PER_WORD)); + bits_to_discard = 0; + } else { + /* + * If the bits to be discarded is more than the amount of valid + * upper bits from word_i, which has been copied to the output + * buffer, we just set the entire word_i to 0, as the lower bits + * will be already zeros from previous operations, and the + * bits_to_discard is updated precisely. + */ + entropy[ENTROPY_WORD_INDEX(word_i)] = 0; + bits_to_discard -= (BITS_PER_WORD - rshift); + } + + /* + * Note that a shift of 64 bits is treated as a shift of 0 bits. + * When the shift amount is the same as the BITS_PER_WORD, we + * don't want to include the next word of entropy, so we skip + * the `|=` operation. + */ + if (lshift != BITS_PER_WORD) { + out[word_i] |= entropy[ENTROPY_WORD_INDEX(word_i + 1)] + << lshift; + /** + * Discarding the remaining packed bits from upperword + * (word[i+1]) which was copied to output buffer by + * overwriting with zeros. + * + * If the remaining bits to be discarded is lesser than + * the amount of bits from [word_i+1], which has been + * copied to the output buffer, we overwrite that much + * amount of bits only. + */ + if (bits_to_discard < (BITS_PER_WORD - lshift)) { + entropy[ENTROPY_WORD_INDEX(word_i+1)] &= + (~0ULL << ((bits_to_discard) % BITS_PER_WORD)); + bits_to_discard = 0; + } else { + /* + * If bits to discard is more than the bits from word_i+1 + * which got packed into the output, then we discard all + * those copied bits. + * + * Note: we cannot set the entire word_i+1 to 0, as + * there are still some unused valid entropy bits at the + * upper end for future use. + */ + entropy[ENTROPY_WORD_INDEX(word_i+1)] &= + (~0ULL << ((BITS_PER_WORD - lshift) % BITS_PER_WORD)); + bits_to_discard -= (BITS_PER_WORD - lshift); + } + + } + } + const uint64_t mask = ~0ULL >> (BITS_PER_WORD - (nbits % BITS_PER_WORD)); + + out[to_fill - 1] &= mask; + + entropy_bit_index = (entropy_bit_index + nbits) % BITS_IN_POOL; + entropy_bit_size -= nbits; + +out: + spin_unlock(&trng_pool_lock); + + return ret; +} + +void trng_entropy_pool_setup(void) +{ + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < WORDS_IN_POOL; i++) { + entropy[i] = 0; + } + entropy_bit_index = 0; + entropy_bit_size = 0; +} diff --git a/services/std_svc/trng/trng_entropy_pool.h b/services/std_svc/trng/trng_entropy_pool.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..fab2367 --- /dev/null +++ b/services/std_svc/trng/trng_entropy_pool.h @@ -0,0 +1,16 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2021, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +#ifndef TRNG_ENTROPY_POOL_H +#define TRNG_ENTROPY_POOL_H + +#include <stdbool.h> +#include <stdint.h> + +bool trng_pack_entropy(uint32_t nbits, uint64_t *out); +void trng_entropy_pool_setup(void); + +#endif /* TRNG_ENTROPY_POOL_H */ diff --git a/services/std_svc/trng/trng_main.c b/services/std_svc/trng/trng_main.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..90098a8 --- /dev/null +++ b/services/std_svc/trng/trng_main.c @@ -0,0 +1,146 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2021-2022, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +#include <assert.h> +#include <stdbool.h> +#include <stdint.h> + +#include <arch_features.h> +#include <lib/smccc.h> +#include <services/trng_svc.h> +#include <smccc_helpers.h> + +#include <plat/common/plat_trng.h> + +#include "trng_entropy_pool.h" + +static const uuid_t uuid_null; + +/* handle the RND call in SMC 32 bit mode */ +static uintptr_t trng_rnd32(uint32_t nbits, void *handle) +{ + uint32_t mask = ~0U; + uint64_t ent[2] = {0}; + + if (nbits == 0U || nbits > TRNG_RND32_ENTROPY_MAXBITS) { + SMC_RET1(handle, TRNG_E_INVALID_PARAMS); + } + + if (!trng_pack_entropy(nbits, &ent[0])) { + SMC_RET1(handle, TRNG_E_NO_ENTROPY); + } + + if ((nbits % 32U) != 0U) { + mask >>= 32U - (nbits % 32U); + } + + switch ((nbits - 1U) / 32U) { + case 0: + SMC_RET4(handle, TRNG_E_SUCCESS, 0, 0, ent[0] & mask); + break; /* unreachable */ + case 1: + SMC_RET4(handle, TRNG_E_SUCCESS, 0, (ent[0] >> 32) & mask, + ent[0] & 0xFFFFFFFF); + break; /* unreachable */ + case 2: + SMC_RET4(handle, TRNG_E_SUCCESS, ent[1] & mask, + (ent[0] >> 32) & 0xFFFFFFFF, ent[0] & 0xFFFFFFFF); + break; /* unreachable */ + default: + SMC_RET1(handle, TRNG_E_INVALID_PARAMS); + break; /* unreachable */ + } +} + +/* handle the RND call in SMC 64 bit mode */ +static uintptr_t trng_rnd64(uint32_t nbits, void *handle) +{ + uint64_t mask = ~0ULL; + uint64_t ent[3] = {0}; + + if (nbits == 0U || nbits > TRNG_RND64_ENTROPY_MAXBITS) { + SMC_RET1(handle, TRNG_E_INVALID_PARAMS); + } + + if (!trng_pack_entropy(nbits, &ent[0])) { + SMC_RET1(handle, TRNG_E_NO_ENTROPY); + } + + /* Mask off higher bits if only part of register requested */ + if ((nbits % 64U) != 0U) { + mask >>= 64U - (nbits % 64U); + } + + switch ((nbits - 1U) / 64U) { + case 0: + SMC_RET4(handle, TRNG_E_SUCCESS, 0, 0, ent[0] & mask); + break; /* unreachable */ + case 1: + SMC_RET4(handle, TRNG_E_SUCCESS, 0, ent[1] & mask, ent[0]); + break; /* unreachable */ + case 2: + SMC_RET4(handle, TRNG_E_SUCCESS, ent[2] & mask, ent[1], ent[0]); + break; /* unreachable */ + default: + SMC_RET1(handle, TRNG_E_INVALID_PARAMS); + break; /* unreachable */ + } +} + +void trng_setup(void) +{ + trng_entropy_pool_setup(); + plat_entropy_setup(); +} + +/* Predicate indicating that a function id is part of TRNG */ +bool is_trng_fid(uint32_t smc_fid) +{ + return ((smc_fid == ARM_TRNG_VERSION) || + (smc_fid == ARM_TRNG_FEATURES) || + (smc_fid == ARM_TRNG_GET_UUID) || + (smc_fid == ARM_TRNG_RND32) || + (smc_fid == ARM_TRNG_RND64)); +} + +uintptr_t trng_smc_handler(uint32_t smc_fid, u_register_t x1, u_register_t x2, + u_register_t x3, u_register_t x4, void *cookie, + void *handle, u_register_t flags) +{ + if (!memcmp(&plat_trng_uuid, &uuid_null, sizeof(uuid_t))) { + SMC_RET1(handle, TRNG_E_NOT_IMPLEMENTED); + } + + switch (smc_fid) { + case ARM_TRNG_VERSION: + SMC_RET1(handle, MAKE_SMCCC_VERSION( + TRNG_VERSION_MAJOR, TRNG_VERSION_MINOR)); + break; /* unreachable */ + + case ARM_TRNG_FEATURES: + if (is_trng_fid((uint32_t)x1)) { + SMC_RET1(handle, TRNG_E_SUCCESS); + } else { + SMC_RET1(handle, TRNG_E_NOT_SUPPORTED); + } + break; /* unreachable */ + + case ARM_TRNG_GET_UUID: + SMC_UUID_RET(handle, plat_trng_uuid); + break; /* unreachable */ + + case ARM_TRNG_RND32: + return trng_rnd32((uint32_t)x1, handle); + + case ARM_TRNG_RND64: + return trng_rnd64((uint32_t)x1, handle); + + default: + WARN("Unimplemented TRNG Service Call: 0x%x\n", smc_fid); + SMC_RET1(handle, TRNG_E_NOT_IMPLEMENTED); + break; /* unreachable */ + } +} |