1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
225
226
227
228
229
230
231
232
233
234
235
236
237
238
239
240
241
242
243
244
245
246
247
248
249
250
251
252
253
254
255
256
257
258
259
260
261
262
263
264
265
266
267
268
269
270
271
272
273
274
275
276
277
278
279
280
281
282
283
284
285
286
287
288
289
290
291
292
293
294
295
296
297
298
299
300
301
302
303
304
305
306
307
308
309
310
311
312
313
314
315
316
317
318
319
320
321
322
323
324
325
326
327
328
329
330
331
332
333
334
335
336
337
338
339
340
341
342
343
344
345
346
347
348
349
350
351
352
353
354
355
356
357
358
359
360
361
362
363
364
365
366
367
368
369
370
371
372
373
374
375
376
377
378
379
380
381
382
383
384
385
386
387
388
389
390
391
392
393
394
395
396
397
398
399
400
401
402
403
404
405
406
407
408
409
410
411
412
413
414
415
416
417
418
419
420
421
422
423
424
425
426
427
428
429
430
431
432
433
434
435
436
437
438
439
440
441
442
443
444
445
446
447
448
449
450
451
452
453
454
455
456
457
458
459
460
461
462
463
464
465
466
467
468
469
470
471
472
473
474
475
476
477
478
479
480
481
482
483
484
485
486
487
488
489
490
491
492
493
494
495
496
497
498
499
500
501
502
503
504
505
506
507
508
|
/*
* Copyright (c) 2015-2023, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
*
* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
*/
/*
* X509 parser based on mbed TLS
*
* This module implements functions to check the integrity of a X509v3
* certificate ASN.1 structure and extract authentication parameters from the
* extensions field, such as an image hash or a public key.
*/
#include <assert.h>
#include <stddef.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <string.h>
/* mbed TLS headers */
#include <mbedtls/asn1.h>
#include <mbedtls/oid.h>
#include <mbedtls/platform.h>
#include <arch_helpers.h>
#include <drivers/auth/img_parser_mod.h>
#include <drivers/auth/mbedtls/mbedtls_common.h>
#include <lib/utils.h>
/* Maximum OID string length ("a.b.c.d.e.f ...") */
#define MAX_OID_STR_LEN 64
#define LIB_NAME "mbed TLS X509v3"
/* Temporary variables to speed up the authentication parameters search. These
* variables are assigned once during the integrity check and used any time an
* authentication parameter is requested, so we do not have to parse the image
* again */
static mbedtls_asn1_buf tbs;
static mbedtls_asn1_buf v3_ext;
static mbedtls_asn1_buf pk;
static mbedtls_asn1_buf sig_alg;
static mbedtls_asn1_buf signature;
/*
* Clear all static temporary variables.
*/
static void clear_temp_vars(void)
{
#define ZERO_AND_CLEAN(x) \
do { \
zeromem(&x, sizeof(x)); \
clean_dcache_range((uintptr_t)&x, sizeof(x)); \
} while (0);
ZERO_AND_CLEAN(tbs)
ZERO_AND_CLEAN(v3_ext);
ZERO_AND_CLEAN(pk);
ZERO_AND_CLEAN(sig_alg);
ZERO_AND_CLEAN(signature);
#undef ZERO_AND_CLEAN
}
/*
* Get X509v3 extension
*
* Global variable 'v3_ext' must point to the extensions region
* in the certificate. OID may be NULL to request that get_ext()
* is only being called for integrity checking.
*/
static int get_ext(const char *oid, void **ext, unsigned int *ext_len)
{
int oid_len, ret, is_critical;
size_t len;
unsigned char *p;
const unsigned char *end;
char oid_str[MAX_OID_STR_LEN];
mbedtls_asn1_buf extn_oid;
p = v3_ext.p;
end = v3_ext.p + v3_ext.len;
/*
* Check extensions integrity. At least one extension is
* required: the ASN.1 specifies a minimum size of 1, and at
* least one extension is needed to authenticate the next stage
* in the boot chain.
*/
do {
unsigned char *end_ext_data;
ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len,
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED |
MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE);
if (ret != 0) {
return IMG_PARSER_ERR_FORMAT;
}
end_ext_data = p + len;
/* Get extension ID */
ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end_ext_data, &extn_oid.len,
MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID);
if (ret != 0) {
return IMG_PARSER_ERR_FORMAT;
}
extn_oid.tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID;
extn_oid.p = p;
p += extn_oid.len;
/* Get optional critical */
ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_bool(&p, end_ext_data, &is_critical);
if ((ret != 0) && (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG)) {
return IMG_PARSER_ERR_FORMAT;
}
/*
* Data should be octet string type and must use all bytes in
* the Extension.
*/
ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end_ext_data, &len,
MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING);
if ((ret != 0) || ((p + len) != end_ext_data)) {
return IMG_PARSER_ERR_FORMAT;
}
/* Detect requested extension */
oid_len = mbedtls_oid_get_numeric_string(oid_str,
MAX_OID_STR_LEN,
&extn_oid);
if ((oid_len == MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_BUF_TOO_SMALL) || (oid_len < 0)) {
return IMG_PARSER_ERR;
}
if ((oid != NULL) &&
((size_t)oid_len == strlen(oid_str)) &&
(strcmp(oid, oid_str) == 0)) {
/* Extension must be ASN.1 DER */
if (len < 2) {
/* too short */
return IMG_PARSER_ERR_FORMAT;
}
if ((p[0] & 0x1F) == 0x1F) {
/* multi-byte ASN.1 DER tag, not allowed */
return IMG_PARSER_ERR_FORMAT;
}
if ((p[0] & 0xDF) == 0) {
/* UNIVERSAL 0 tag, not allowed */
return IMG_PARSER_ERR_FORMAT;
}
*ext = (void *)p;
*ext_len = (unsigned int)len;
/* Advance past the tag byte */
p++;
if (mbedtls_asn1_get_len(&p, end_ext_data, &len)) {
/* not valid DER */
return IMG_PARSER_ERR_FORMAT;
}
if (p + len != end_ext_data) {
/* junk after ASN.1 object */
return IMG_PARSER_ERR_FORMAT;
}
return IMG_PARSER_OK;
}
/* Next */
p = end_ext_data;
} while (p < end);
return (oid == NULL) ? IMG_PARSER_OK : IMG_PARSER_ERR_NOT_FOUND;
}
/*
* Check the integrity of the certificate ASN.1 structure.
*
* Extract the relevant data that will be used later during authentication.
*
* This function doesn't clear the static variables located on the top of this
* file in case of an error. It is only called from check_integrity(), which
* performs the cleanup if necessary.
*/
static int cert_parse(void *img, unsigned int img_len)
{
int ret;
size_t len;
unsigned char *p, *end, *crt_end, *pk_end;
mbedtls_asn1_buf sig_alg1;
/*
* The unique ASN.1 DER encoding of [0] EXPLICIT INTEGER { v3(2} }.
*/
static const char v3[] = {
/* The outer CONTEXT SPECIFIC 0 tag */
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 0,
/* The number bytes used to encode the inner INTEGER */
3,
/* The tag of the inner INTEGER */
MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER,
/* The number of bytes needed to represent 2 */
1,
/* The actual value 2 */
2,
};
p = (unsigned char *)img;
len = img_len;
crt_end = p + len;
end = crt_end;
/*
* Certificate ::= SEQUENCE {
* tbsCertificate TBSCertificate,
* signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
* signatureValue BIT STRING }
*/
ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED |
MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE);
if ((ret != 0) || ((p + len) != end)) {
return IMG_PARSER_ERR_FORMAT;
}
/*
* TBSCertificate ::= SEQUENCE {
*/
tbs.p = p;
ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED |
MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE);
if (ret != 0) {
return IMG_PARSER_ERR_FORMAT;
}
end = p + len;
tbs.len = end - tbs.p;
/*
* Version ::= [0] EXPLICIT INTEGER { v1(0), v2(1), v3(2) }
* -- only v3 accepted
*/
if (((end - p) <= (ptrdiff_t)sizeof(v3)) ||
(memcmp(p, v3, sizeof(v3)) != 0)) {
return IMG_PARSER_ERR_FORMAT;
}
p += sizeof(v3);
/*
* CertificateSerialNumber ::= INTEGER
*/
ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER);
if (ret != 0) {
return IMG_PARSER_ERR_FORMAT;
}
p += len;
/*
* signature AlgorithmIdentifier
*/
sig_alg1.p = p;
ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED |
MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE);
if (ret != 0) {
return IMG_PARSER_ERR_FORMAT;
}
sig_alg1.len = (p + len) - sig_alg1.p;
p += len;
/*
* issuer Name
*/
ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED |
MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE);
if (ret != 0) {
return IMG_PARSER_ERR_FORMAT;
}
p += len;
/*
* Validity ::= SEQUENCE {
* notBefore Time,
* notAfter Time }
*
*/
ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED |
MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE);
if (ret != 0) {
return IMG_PARSER_ERR_FORMAT;
}
p += len;
/*
* subject Name
*/
ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED |
MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE);
if (ret != 0) {
return IMG_PARSER_ERR_FORMAT;
}
p += len;
/*
* SubjectPublicKeyInfo
*/
pk.p = p;
ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED |
MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE);
if (ret != 0) {
return IMG_PARSER_ERR_FORMAT;
}
pk_end = p + len;
pk.len = pk_end - pk.p;
/* algorithm */
ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, pk_end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED |
MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE);
if (ret != 0) {
return IMG_PARSER_ERR_FORMAT;
}
p += len;
/* Key is a BIT STRING and must use all bytes in SubjectPublicKeyInfo */
ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_bitstring_null(&p, pk_end, &len);
if ((ret != 0) || (p + len != pk_end)) {
return IMG_PARSER_ERR_FORMAT;
}
p = pk_end;
/*
* issuerUniqueID [1] IMPLICIT UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL,
* subjectUniqueID [2] IMPLICIT UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL,
* -- technically these contain BIT STRINGs but that is not worth
* -- validating
*/
for (int i = 1; i < 3; i++) {
ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len,
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC |
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | i);
/*
* Unique IDs are obsolete, so MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG
* is the common case.
*/
if (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG) {
if (ret != 0) {
return IMG_PARSER_ERR_FORMAT;
}
p += len;
}
}
/*
* extensions [3] EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL
* }
*
* X.509 and RFC5280 allow omitting the extensions entirely.
* However, in TF-A, a certificate with no extensions would
* always fail later on, as the extensions contain the
* information needed to authenticate the next stage in the
* boot chain. Furthermore, get_ext() assumes that the
* extensions have been parsed into v3_ext, and allowing
* there to be no extensions would pointlessly complicate
* the code. Therefore, just reject certificates without
* extensions. This is also why version 1 and 2 certificates
* are rejected above.
*/
ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len,
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC |
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | 3);
if ((ret != 0) || (len != (size_t)(end - p))) {
return IMG_PARSER_ERR_FORMAT;
}
/*
* Extensions ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF Extension
* -- must use all remaining bytes in TBSCertificate
*/
ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED |
MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE);
if ((ret != 0) || (len != (size_t)(end - p))) {
return IMG_PARSER_ERR_FORMAT;
}
v3_ext.p = p;
v3_ext.len = len;
p += len;
/* Check extensions integrity */
ret = get_ext(NULL, NULL, NULL);
if (ret != IMG_PARSER_OK) {
return ret;
}
end = crt_end;
/*
* }
* -- end of TBSCertificate
*
* signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier
* -- Does not need to be parsed. Ensuring it is bitwise
* -- identical (including the tag!) with the first signature
* -- algorithm is sufficient.
*/
if ((sig_alg1.len >= (size_t)(end - p)) ||
(0 != memcmp(sig_alg1.p, p, sig_alg1.len))) {
return IMG_PARSER_ERR_FORMAT;
}
p += sig_alg1.len;
memcpy(&sig_alg, &sig_alg1, sizeof(sig_alg));
/*
* signatureValue BIT STRING
* } -- must consume all bytes
*/
signature.p = p;
ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_bitstring_null(&p, end, &len);
if ((ret != 0) || ((p + len) != end)) {
return IMG_PARSER_ERR_FORMAT;
}
signature.len = end - signature.p;
return IMG_PARSER_OK;
}
/* Exported functions */
static void init(void)
{
mbedtls_init();
}
/*
* Wrapper for cert_parse() that clears the static variables used by it in case
* of an error.
*/
static int check_integrity(void *img, unsigned int img_len)
{
int rc = cert_parse(img, img_len);
if (rc != IMG_PARSER_OK)
clear_temp_vars();
return rc;
}
/*
* Extract an authentication parameter from an X509v3 certificate
*
* This function returns a pointer to the extracted data and its length.
* Depending on the type of parameter, a pointer to the data stored in the
* certificate may be returned (i.e. an octet string containing a hash). Other
* data may need to be copied and formatted (i.e. integers). In the later case,
* a buffer of the correct type needs to be statically allocated, filled and
* returned.
*/
static int get_auth_param(const auth_param_type_desc_t *type_desc,
void *img, unsigned int img_len,
void **param, unsigned int *param_len)
{
int rc = IMG_PARSER_OK;
/* We do not use img because the check_integrity function has already
* extracted the relevant data (v3_ext, pk, sig_alg, etc) */
switch (type_desc->type) {
case AUTH_PARAM_RAW_DATA:
/* Data to be signed */
*param = (void *)tbs.p;
*param_len = (unsigned int)tbs.len;
break;
case AUTH_PARAM_HASH:
case AUTH_PARAM_NV_CTR:
/* All these parameters are included as X509v3 extensions */
rc = get_ext(type_desc->cookie, param, param_len);
break;
case AUTH_PARAM_PUB_KEY:
if (type_desc->cookie != NULL) {
/* Get public key from extension */
rc = get_ext(type_desc->cookie, param, param_len);
} else {
/* Get the subject public key */
*param = (void *)pk.p;
*param_len = (unsigned int)pk.len;
}
break;
case AUTH_PARAM_SIG_ALG:
/* Get the certificate signature algorithm */
*param = (void *)sig_alg.p;
*param_len = (unsigned int)sig_alg.len;
break;
case AUTH_PARAM_SIG:
/* Get the certificate signature */
*param = (void *)signature.p;
*param_len = (unsigned int)signature.len;
break;
default:
rc = IMG_PARSER_ERR_NOT_FOUND;
break;
}
return rc;
}
REGISTER_IMG_PARSER_LIB(IMG_CERT, LIB_NAME, init,
check_integrity, get_auth_param);
|