Adding upstream version 124.0.1.upstream/124.0.1

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

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+# Security aspects of the Remote Agent
+
+The Remote Agent is not a web-facing feature and as such has different
+security characteristics than traditional web platform APIs.  The
+primary consumers are out-of-process programs that connect to the
+agent via a remote protocol, but can theoretically be extended to
+facilitate browser-local clients communicating over IPDL.
+
+## Design considerations
+
+The Remote Agent allows consumers to interface with Firefox through
+an assorted set of domains for inspecting the state and controlling
+execution of documents running in web content, injecting arbitrary
+scripts to documents, do browser service instrumentation, simulation
+of user interaction for automation purposes, and for subscribing
+to updates in the browser such as network- and console logs.
+
+The remote interfaces are served over an HTTP wire protocol, by a
+server listener hosted in the Firefox binary.  This can only be
+started by passing the `--remote-debugging-port`
+flag.  Connections are restricted to loopback devices
+(such as localhost and 127.0.0.1).
+
+Since the Remote Agent is not an in-document web feature, the
+security concerns we have for this feature are essentially different
+to other web platform features.  The primary concern is that the
+HTTPD is not spun up without passing one of the command-line flags.
+It is out perception that if a malicious user has the capability
+to execute arbitrary shell commands, there is little we can do to
+prevent the browser being turned into an evil listening device.
+
+## User privacy concerns
+
+There are no user privacy concerns beyond the fact that the offered
+interfaces will give the client access to all browser internals,
+and thereby follows all browser-internal secrets.
+
+## How the Remote Agent works
+
+When the `--remote-debugging-port` flag is used,
+it spins up an HTTPD on the desired port, or defaults to
+localhost:9222.  The HTTPD serves WebSocket connections via
+`nsIWebSocket.createServerWebSocket` that clients connect to in
+order to give the agent remote instructions. Hereby the HTTPD only
+accepts system-local loopback connections from clients:
+
+```javascript
+if (!LOOPBACKS.includes(host)) {
+  throw new Error("Restricted to loopback devices");
+}
+```
+
+The Remote Agent implements a large subset of the Chrome DevTools
+Protocol (CDP).  This protocol allows a client to:
+
+* take control over the user session for automation purposes, for
+  example to simulate user interaction such as clicking and typing;
+
+* instrument the browser for analytical reasons, such as intercepting
+  network traffic;
+
+* and extract information from the user session, including cookies
+  and local storage.
+
+There are no web-exposed features in the Remote Agent whatsoever.
+
+## Security model
+
+It shares the same security model as DevTools and Marionette, in
+that there is no other mechanism for enabling the Remote Agent than
+by passing a command-line flag.
+
+It is our assumption that if an attacker has shell access to the
+user account, there is little we can do to prevent secrets from
+being accessed or leaked.
+
+The Remote Agent is available on all release channels.
+
+## Remote Hosts and Origins
+
+By default RemoteAgent only accepts connections with no `Origin` header and a
+`Host` header set to an IP address or a localhost loopback address.
+
+Other `Host` or `Origin` headers can be allowed by starting Firefox with the
+`--remote-allow-origins` and `--remote-allow-hosts` arguments:
+
+* `--remote-allow-hosts` expects a comma separated list of hostnames
+
+* `--remote-allow-origins` expects a comma separated list of origins
+
+Note: Users are strongly discouraged from using the Remote Agent in a way that
+allows it to be accessed by untrusted hosts e.g. by binding it to a publicly
+routeable interface.
+
+The Remote Agent does not provide message encryption, which means that all
+protocol messages are subject to eavesdropping and tampering. It also does not
+provide any authentication system. This is acceptable in an isolated test
+environment, but not to be used on an untrusted network such as the internet.
+People wishing to provide remote access to Firefox sessions via the Remote Agent
+must provide their own encryption, authentication, and authorization.
+
+## Security reviews
+
+More details can be found in the security reviews conducted for Remote Agent and
+WebDriver BiDi:
+
+* [Remote Agent security review] (November 2019)
+
+* [WebDriver BiDi security review] (April 2022)
+
+[Remote Agent security review]: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1542229
+[WebDriver BiDi security review]: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1753997