Adding upstream version 124.0.1.upstream/124.0.1

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

1 files changed, 114 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/security/nss/tests/chains/scenarios/trustanchors.cfg b/security/nss/tests/chains/scenarios/trustanchors.cfg
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+++ b/security/nss/tests/chains/scenarios/trustanchors.cfg
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+# This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+# License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+# file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/.
+
+scenario TrustAnchors
+
+entity RootCA
+  type Root
+
+entity CA1
+  type Intermediate
+  issuer RootCA
+
+entity CA2
+  type Intermediate
+  issuer CA1
+
+entity EE1
+  type EE
+  issuer CA2
+
+entity OtherRoot
+  type Root
+
+entity OtherIntermediate
+  type Intermediate
+  issuer OtherRoot
+
+entity EE2
+  type EE
+  issuer OtherIntermediate
+
+# Scenarios where trust only comes from the DB
+db DBOnly
+
+import RootCA::CT,C,C
+import CA1:RootCA:
+
+# Simple chaining - no trust anchors
+verify EE1:CA2
+  cert CA2:CA1
+  result pass
+
+# Simple trust anchors - ignore the Cert DB
+verify EE1:CA2
+  trust CA2:CA1
+  result pass
+
+# Redundant trust - trust anchor and DB
+verify EE1:CA2
+  cert CA2:CA1
+  trust RootCA
+  result pass
+
+
+# Scenarios where trust only comes from trust anchors
+db TrustOnly
+
+# Simple checking - direct trust anchor
+verify EE1:CA2
+  cert CA2:CA1
+  cert CA1:RootCA:
+  trust RootCA:
+  result pass
+
+# Partial chain (not self-signed), with a trust anchor
+verify EE1:CA2
+  trust CA2:CA1
+  result pass
+
+
+# Scenarios where trust comes from both trust anchors and the DB
+db TrustAndDB
+
+import RootCA::CT,C,C
+import CA1:RootCA:
+
+# Check that trust in the DB works
+verify EE1:CA2
+  cert CA2:CA1
+  result pass
+
+# Check that trust anchors work
+verify EE2:OtherIntermediate
+  cert OtherIntermediate:OtherRoot
+  trust OtherRoot:
+  result pass
+
+# Check that specifying a trust anchor still allows searching the cert DB
+verify EE1:CA2
+  trust_and_db
+  cert CA2:CA1
+  trust OtherIntermediate:OtherRoot
+  trust OtherRoot:
+  result pass
+
+# Scenarios where the trust DB has explicitly distrusted one or more certs,
+# even when the trust anchors indicate trust
+db ExplicitDistrust
+
+import RootCA::CT,C,C
+import CA1:RootCA:p,p,p
+import OtherRoot::p,p,p
+
+# Verify that a distrusted intermediate, but trusted root, is rejected.
+verify EE1:CA2
+  cert CA2:CA1
+  trust CA1:RootCA
+  result fail
+
+# Verify that a trusted intermediate, but distrusted root, is accepted.
+verify EE2:OtherIntermediate
+  trust OtherIntermediate:OtherRoot
+  result pass