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authorDaniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>2024-04-19 00:47:55 +0000
committerDaniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>2024-04-19 00:47:55 +0000
commit26a029d407be480d791972afb5975cf62c9360a6 (patch)
treef435a8308119effd964b339f76abb83a57c29483 /third_party/libwebrtc/rtc_base/openssl_stream_adapter.cc
parentInitial commit. (diff)
downloadfirefox-26a029d407be480d791972afb5975cf62c9360a6.tar.xz
firefox-26a029d407be480d791972afb5975cf62c9360a6.zip
Adding upstream version 124.0.1.upstream/124.0.1
Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'third_party/libwebrtc/rtc_base/openssl_stream_adapter.cc')
-rw-r--r--third_party/libwebrtc/rtc_base/openssl_stream_adapter.cc1305
1 files changed, 1305 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/third_party/libwebrtc/rtc_base/openssl_stream_adapter.cc b/third_party/libwebrtc/rtc_base/openssl_stream_adapter.cc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..353cbbe681
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/libwebrtc/rtc_base/openssl_stream_adapter.cc
@@ -0,0 +1,1305 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2004 The WebRTC Project Authors. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license
+ * that can be found in the LICENSE file in the root of the source
+ * tree. An additional intellectual property rights grant can be found
+ * in the file PATENTS. All contributing project authors may
+ * be found in the AUTHORS file in the root of the source tree.
+ */
+
+#include "rtc_base/openssl_stream_adapter.h"
+
+#include <openssl/bio.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/tls1.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+
+#include "absl/strings/string_view.h"
+#ifndef OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL
+#include <openssl/dtls1.h>
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+#endif
+
+#include <atomic>
+#include <memory>
+#include <utility>
+#include <vector>
+
+#include "api/array_view.h"
+#include "rtc_base/checks.h"
+#include "rtc_base/logging.h"
+#include "rtc_base/numerics/safe_conversions.h"
+#include "rtc_base/openssl.h"
+#include "rtc_base/openssl_adapter.h"
+#include "rtc_base/openssl_digest.h"
+#ifdef OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL
+#include "rtc_base/boringssl_identity.h"
+#else
+#include "rtc_base/openssl_identity.h"
+#endif
+#include "rtc_base/openssl_utility.h"
+#include "rtc_base/ssl_certificate.h"
+#include "rtc_base/stream.h"
+#include "rtc_base/string_encode.h"
+#include "rtc_base/thread.h"
+#include "rtc_base/time_utils.h"
+#include "system_wrappers/include/field_trial.h"
+
+#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L)
+#error "webrtc requires at least OpenSSL version 1.1.0, to support DTLS-SRTP"
+#endif
+
+// Defines for the TLS Cipher Suite Map.
+#define DEFINE_CIPHER_ENTRY_SSL3(name) \
+ { SSL3_CK_##name, "TLS_" #name }
+#define DEFINE_CIPHER_ENTRY_TLS1(name) \
+ { TLS1_CK_##name, "TLS_" #name }
+
+namespace rtc {
+namespace {
+using ::webrtc::SafeTask;
+// SRTP cipher suite table. `internal_name` is used to construct a
+// colon-separated profile strings which is needed by
+// SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_use_srtp().
+struct SrtpCipherMapEntry {
+ const char* internal_name;
+ const int id;
+};
+
+// Cipher name table. Maps internal OpenSSL cipher ids to the RFC name.
+struct SslCipherMapEntry {
+ uint32_t openssl_id;
+ const char* rfc_name;
+};
+
+// This isn't elegant, but it's better than an external reference
+constexpr SrtpCipherMapEntry kSrtpCipherMap[] = {
+ {"SRTP_AES128_CM_SHA1_80", kSrtpAes128CmSha1_80},
+ {"SRTP_AES128_CM_SHA1_32", kSrtpAes128CmSha1_32},
+ {"SRTP_AEAD_AES_128_GCM", kSrtpAeadAes128Gcm},
+ {"SRTP_AEAD_AES_256_GCM", kSrtpAeadAes256Gcm}};
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL
+// The "SSL_CIPHER_standard_name" function is only available in OpenSSL when
+// compiled with tracing, so we need to define the mapping manually here.
+constexpr SslCipherMapEntry kSslCipherMap[] = {
+ // TLS v1.0 ciphersuites from RFC2246.
+ DEFINE_CIPHER_ENTRY_SSL3(RSA_RC4_128_SHA),
+ {SSL3_CK_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA, "TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA"},
+
+ // AES ciphersuites from RFC3268.
+ {TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA"},
+ {TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA"},
+ {TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA"},
+ {TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA"},
+
+ // ECC ciphersuites from RFC4492.
+ DEFINE_CIPHER_ENTRY_TLS1(ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA),
+ {TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA,
+ "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA"},
+ DEFINE_CIPHER_ENTRY_TLS1(ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA),
+ DEFINE_CIPHER_ENTRY_TLS1(ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA),
+
+ DEFINE_CIPHER_ENTRY_TLS1(ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA),
+ {TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA,
+ "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA"},
+ DEFINE_CIPHER_ENTRY_TLS1(ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA),
+ DEFINE_CIPHER_ENTRY_TLS1(ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA),
+
+ // TLS v1.2 ciphersuites.
+ {TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256"},
+ {TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA256, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256"},
+ {TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256,
+ "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256"},
+ {TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA256,
+ "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256"},
+
+ // TLS v1.2 GCM ciphersuites from RFC5288.
+ DEFINE_CIPHER_ENTRY_TLS1(RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256),
+ DEFINE_CIPHER_ENTRY_TLS1(RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384),
+ DEFINE_CIPHER_ENTRY_TLS1(DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256),
+ DEFINE_CIPHER_ENTRY_TLS1(DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384),
+ DEFINE_CIPHER_ENTRY_TLS1(DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256),
+ DEFINE_CIPHER_ENTRY_TLS1(DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384),
+
+ // ECDH HMAC based ciphersuites from RFC5289.
+ {TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256,
+ "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256"},
+ {TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384,
+ "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384"},
+ {TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256,
+ "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256"},
+ {TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384,
+ "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384"},
+
+ // ECDH GCM based ciphersuites from RFC5289.
+ DEFINE_CIPHER_ENTRY_TLS1(ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256),
+ DEFINE_CIPHER_ENTRY_TLS1(ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384),
+ DEFINE_CIPHER_ENTRY_TLS1(ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256),
+ DEFINE_CIPHER_ENTRY_TLS1(ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384),
+
+ {0, nullptr}};
+#endif // #ifndef OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL
+// Enabled by EnableTimeCallbackForTesting. Should never be set in production
+// code.
+bool g_use_time_callback_for_testing = false;
+// Not used in production code. Actual time should be relative to Jan 1, 1970.
+void TimeCallbackForTesting(const SSL* ssl, struct timeval* out_clock) {
+ int64_t time = TimeNanos();
+ out_clock->tv_sec = time / kNumNanosecsPerSec;
+ out_clock->tv_usec = (time % kNumNanosecsPerSec) / kNumNanosecsPerMicrosec;
+}
+#endif
+
+} // namespace
+
+//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+// StreamBIO
+//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+
+static int stream_write(BIO* h, const char* buf, int num);
+static int stream_read(BIO* h, char* buf, int size);
+static int stream_puts(BIO* h, const char* str);
+static long stream_ctrl(BIO* h, int cmd, long arg1, void* arg2);
+static int stream_new(BIO* h);
+static int stream_free(BIO* data);
+
+static BIO_METHOD* BIO_stream_method() {
+ static BIO_METHOD* method = [] {
+ BIO_METHOD* method = BIO_meth_new(BIO_TYPE_BIO, "stream");
+ BIO_meth_set_write(method, stream_write);
+ BIO_meth_set_read(method, stream_read);
+ BIO_meth_set_puts(method, stream_puts);
+ BIO_meth_set_ctrl(method, stream_ctrl);
+ BIO_meth_set_create(method, stream_new);
+ BIO_meth_set_destroy(method, stream_free);
+ return method;
+ }();
+ return method;
+}
+
+static BIO* BIO_new_stream(StreamInterface* stream) {
+ BIO* ret = BIO_new(BIO_stream_method());
+ if (ret == nullptr) {
+ return nullptr;
+ }
+ BIO_set_data(ret, stream);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+// bio methods return 1 (or at least non-zero) on success and 0 on failure.
+
+static int stream_new(BIO* b) {
+ BIO_set_shutdown(b, 0);
+ BIO_set_init(b, 1);
+ BIO_set_data(b, 0);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int stream_free(BIO* b) {
+ if (b == nullptr) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int stream_read(BIO* b, char* out, int outl) {
+ if (!out) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+ StreamInterface* stream = static_cast<StreamInterface*>(BIO_get_data(b));
+ BIO_clear_retry_flags(b);
+ size_t read;
+ int error;
+ StreamResult result = stream->Read(
+ rtc::MakeArrayView(reinterpret_cast<uint8_t*>(out), outl), read, error);
+ if (result == SR_SUCCESS) {
+ return checked_cast<int>(read);
+ } else if (result == SR_BLOCK) {
+ BIO_set_retry_read(b);
+ }
+ return -1;
+}
+
+static int stream_write(BIO* b, const char* in, int inl) {
+ if (!in) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+ StreamInterface* stream = static_cast<StreamInterface*>(BIO_get_data(b));
+ BIO_clear_retry_flags(b);
+ size_t written;
+ int error;
+ StreamResult result = stream->Write(
+ rtc::MakeArrayView(reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(in), inl), written,
+ error);
+ if (result == SR_SUCCESS) {
+ return checked_cast<int>(written);
+ } else if (result == SR_BLOCK) {
+ BIO_set_retry_write(b);
+ }
+ return -1;
+}
+
+static int stream_puts(BIO* b, const char* str) {
+ return stream_write(b, str, checked_cast<int>(strlen(str)));
+}
+
+static long stream_ctrl(BIO* b, int cmd, long num, void* ptr) {
+ switch (cmd) {
+ case BIO_CTRL_RESET:
+ return 0;
+ case BIO_CTRL_EOF: {
+ StreamInterface* stream = static_cast<StreamInterface*>(ptr);
+ // 1 means end-of-stream.
+ return (stream->GetState() == SS_CLOSED) ? 1 : 0;
+ }
+ case BIO_CTRL_WPENDING:
+ case BIO_CTRL_PENDING:
+ return 0;
+ case BIO_CTRL_FLUSH:
+ return 1;
+ case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_QUERY_MTU:
+ // openssl defaults to mtu=256 unless we return something here.
+ // The handshake doesn't actually need to send packets above 1k,
+ // so this seems like a sensible value that should work in most cases.
+ // Webrtc uses the same value for video packets.
+ return 1200;
+ default:
+ return 0;
+ }
+}
+
+/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+// OpenSSLStreamAdapter
+/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+
+static std::atomic<bool> g_use_legacy_tls_protocols_override(false);
+static std::atomic<bool> g_allow_legacy_tls_protocols(false);
+
+void SetAllowLegacyTLSProtocols(const absl::optional<bool>& allow) {
+ g_use_legacy_tls_protocols_override.store(allow.has_value());
+ if (allow.has_value())
+ g_allow_legacy_tls_protocols.store(allow.value());
+}
+
+bool ShouldAllowLegacyTLSProtocols() {
+ return g_use_legacy_tls_protocols_override.load()
+ ? g_allow_legacy_tls_protocols.load()
+ : webrtc::field_trial::IsEnabled("WebRTC-LegacyTlsProtocols");
+}
+
+OpenSSLStreamAdapter::OpenSSLStreamAdapter(
+ std::unique_ptr<StreamInterface> stream,
+ absl::AnyInvocable<void(SSLHandshakeError)> handshake_error)
+ : stream_(std::move(stream)),
+ handshake_error_(std::move(handshake_error)),
+ owner_(rtc::Thread::Current()),
+ state_(SSL_NONE),
+ role_(SSL_CLIENT),
+ ssl_read_needs_write_(false),
+ ssl_write_needs_read_(false),
+ ssl_(nullptr),
+ ssl_ctx_(nullptr),
+ ssl_mode_(SSL_MODE_TLS),
+ ssl_max_version_(SSL_PROTOCOL_TLS_12),
+ // Default is to support legacy TLS protocols.
+ // This will be changed to default non-support in M82 or M83.
+ support_legacy_tls_protocols_flag_(ShouldAllowLegacyTLSProtocols()) {
+ stream_->SignalEvent.connect(this, &OpenSSLStreamAdapter::OnEvent);
+}
+
+OpenSSLStreamAdapter::~OpenSSLStreamAdapter() {
+ timeout_task_.Stop();
+ Cleanup(0);
+}
+
+void OpenSSLStreamAdapter::SetIdentity(std::unique_ptr<SSLIdentity> identity) {
+ RTC_DCHECK(!identity_);
+#ifdef OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL
+ identity_.reset(static_cast<BoringSSLIdentity*>(identity.release()));
+#else
+ identity_.reset(static_cast<OpenSSLIdentity*>(identity.release()));
+#endif
+}
+
+SSLIdentity* OpenSSLStreamAdapter::GetIdentityForTesting() const {
+ return identity_.get();
+}
+
+void OpenSSLStreamAdapter::SetServerRole(SSLRole role) {
+ role_ = role;
+}
+
+bool OpenSSLStreamAdapter::SetPeerCertificateDigest(
+ absl::string_view digest_alg,
+ const unsigned char* digest_val,
+ size_t digest_len,
+ SSLPeerCertificateDigestError* error) {
+ RTC_DCHECK(!peer_certificate_verified_);
+ RTC_DCHECK(!HasPeerCertificateDigest());
+ size_t expected_len;
+ if (error) {
+ *error = SSLPeerCertificateDigestError::NONE;
+ }
+
+ if (!OpenSSLDigest::GetDigestSize(digest_alg, &expected_len)) {
+ RTC_LOG(LS_WARNING) << "Unknown digest algorithm: " << digest_alg;
+ if (error) {
+ *error = SSLPeerCertificateDigestError::UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM;
+ }
+ return false;
+ }
+ if (expected_len != digest_len) {
+ if (error) {
+ *error = SSLPeerCertificateDigestError::INVALID_LENGTH;
+ }
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ peer_certificate_digest_value_.SetData(digest_val, digest_len);
+ peer_certificate_digest_algorithm_ = std::string(digest_alg);
+
+ if (!peer_cert_chain_) {
+ // Normal case, where the digest is set before we obtain the certificate
+ // from the handshake.
+ return true;
+ }
+
+ if (!VerifyPeerCertificate()) {
+ Error("SetPeerCertificateDigest", -1, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE, false);
+ if (error) {
+ *error = SSLPeerCertificateDigestError::VERIFICATION_FAILED;
+ }
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ if (state_ == SSL_CONNECTED) {
+ // Post the event asynchronously to unwind the stack. The caller
+ // of ContinueSSL may be the same object listening for these
+ // events and may not be prepared for reentrancy.
+ PostEvent(SE_OPEN | SE_READ | SE_WRITE, 0);
+ }
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+std::string OpenSSLStreamAdapter::SslCipherSuiteToName(int cipher_suite) {
+#ifdef OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL
+ const SSL_CIPHER* ssl_cipher = SSL_get_cipher_by_value(cipher_suite);
+ if (!ssl_cipher) {
+ return std::string();
+ }
+ return SSL_CIPHER_standard_name(ssl_cipher);
+#else
+ const int openssl_cipher_id = 0x03000000L | cipher_suite;
+ for (const SslCipherMapEntry* entry = kSslCipherMap; entry->rfc_name;
+ ++entry) {
+ if (openssl_cipher_id == static_cast<int>(entry->openssl_id)) {
+ return entry->rfc_name;
+ }
+ }
+ return std::string();
+#endif
+}
+
+bool OpenSSLStreamAdapter::GetSslCipherSuite(int* cipher_suite) {
+ if (state_ != SSL_CONNECTED) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ const SSL_CIPHER* current_cipher = SSL_get_current_cipher(ssl_);
+ if (current_cipher == nullptr) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ *cipher_suite = static_cast<uint16_t>(SSL_CIPHER_get_id(current_cipher));
+ return true;
+}
+
+SSLProtocolVersion OpenSSLStreamAdapter::GetSslVersion() const {
+ if (state_ != SSL_CONNECTED) {
+ return SSL_PROTOCOL_NOT_GIVEN;
+ }
+
+ int ssl_version = SSL_version(ssl_);
+ if (ssl_mode_ == SSL_MODE_DTLS) {
+ if (ssl_version == DTLS1_VERSION) {
+ return SSL_PROTOCOL_DTLS_10;
+ } else if (ssl_version == DTLS1_2_VERSION) {
+ return SSL_PROTOCOL_DTLS_12;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (ssl_version == TLS1_VERSION) {
+ return SSL_PROTOCOL_TLS_10;
+ } else if (ssl_version == TLS1_1_VERSION) {
+ return SSL_PROTOCOL_TLS_11;
+ } else if (ssl_version == TLS1_2_VERSION) {
+ return SSL_PROTOCOL_TLS_12;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return SSL_PROTOCOL_NOT_GIVEN;
+}
+
+bool OpenSSLStreamAdapter::GetSslVersionBytes(int* version) const {
+ if (state_ != SSL_CONNECTED) {
+ return false;
+ }
+ *version = SSL_version(ssl_);
+ return true;
+}
+
+// Key Extractor interface
+bool OpenSSLStreamAdapter::ExportKeyingMaterial(absl::string_view label,
+ const uint8_t* context,
+ size_t context_len,
+ bool use_context,
+ uint8_t* result,
+ size_t result_len) {
+ if (SSL_export_keying_material(ssl_, result, result_len, label.data(),
+ label.length(), context, context_len,
+ use_context) != 1) {
+ return false;
+ }
+ return true;
+}
+
+uint16_t OpenSSLStreamAdapter::GetPeerSignatureAlgorithm() const {
+ if (state_ != SSL_CONNECTED) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+#ifdef OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL
+ return SSL_get_peer_signature_algorithm(ssl_);
+#else
+ return kSslSignatureAlgorithmUnknown;
+#endif
+}
+
+bool OpenSSLStreamAdapter::SetDtlsSrtpCryptoSuites(
+ const std::vector<int>& ciphers) {
+ if (state_ != SSL_NONE) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ std::string internal_ciphers;
+ for (const int cipher : ciphers) {
+ bool found = false;
+ for (const auto& entry : kSrtpCipherMap) {
+ if (cipher == entry.id) {
+ found = true;
+ if (!internal_ciphers.empty()) {
+ internal_ciphers += ":";
+ }
+ internal_ciphers += entry.internal_name;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!found) {
+ RTC_LOG(LS_ERROR) << "Could not find cipher: " << cipher;
+ return false;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (internal_ciphers.empty()) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ srtp_ciphers_ = internal_ciphers;
+ return true;
+}
+
+bool OpenSSLStreamAdapter::GetDtlsSrtpCryptoSuite(int* crypto_suite) {
+ RTC_DCHECK(state_ == SSL_CONNECTED);
+ if (state_ != SSL_CONNECTED) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ const SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE* srtp_profile =
+ SSL_get_selected_srtp_profile(ssl_);
+
+ if (!srtp_profile) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ *crypto_suite = srtp_profile->id;
+ RTC_DCHECK(!SrtpCryptoSuiteToName(*crypto_suite).empty());
+ return true;
+}
+
+bool OpenSSLStreamAdapter::IsTlsConnected() {
+ return state_ == SSL_CONNECTED;
+}
+
+int OpenSSLStreamAdapter::StartSSL() {
+ // Don't allow StartSSL to be called twice.
+ if (state_ != SSL_NONE) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (stream_->GetState() != SS_OPEN) {
+ state_ = SSL_WAIT;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ state_ = SSL_CONNECTING;
+ if (int err = BeginSSL()) {
+ Error("BeginSSL", err, 0, false);
+ return err;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void OpenSSLStreamAdapter::SetMode(SSLMode mode) {
+ RTC_DCHECK(state_ == SSL_NONE);
+ ssl_mode_ = mode;
+}
+
+void OpenSSLStreamAdapter::SetMaxProtocolVersion(SSLProtocolVersion version) {
+ RTC_DCHECK(ssl_ctx_ == nullptr);
+ ssl_max_version_ = version;
+}
+
+void OpenSSLStreamAdapter::SetInitialRetransmissionTimeout(int timeout_ms) {
+ RTC_DCHECK(ssl_ctx_ == nullptr);
+ dtls_handshake_timeout_ms_ = timeout_ms;
+}
+
+//
+// StreamInterface Implementation
+//
+StreamResult OpenSSLStreamAdapter::Write(rtc::ArrayView<const uint8_t> data,
+ size_t& written,
+ int& error) {
+ RTC_DLOG(LS_VERBOSE) << "OpenSSLStreamAdapter::Write(" << data.size() << ")";
+
+ switch (state_) {
+ case SSL_NONE:
+ // pass-through in clear text
+ return stream_->Write(data, written, error);
+
+ case SSL_WAIT:
+ case SSL_CONNECTING:
+ return SR_BLOCK;
+
+ case SSL_CONNECTED:
+ if (WaitingToVerifyPeerCertificate()) {
+ return SR_BLOCK;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_ERROR:
+ case SSL_CLOSED:
+ default:
+ error = ssl_error_code_;
+ return SR_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ // OpenSSL will return an error if we try to write zero bytes
+ if (data.size() == 0) {
+ written = 0;
+ return SR_SUCCESS;
+ }
+
+ ssl_write_needs_read_ = false;
+
+ int code = SSL_write(ssl_, data.data(), checked_cast<int>(data.size()));
+ int ssl_error = SSL_get_error(ssl_, code);
+ switch (ssl_error) {
+ case SSL_ERROR_NONE:
+ RTC_DLOG(LS_VERBOSE) << " -- success";
+ RTC_DCHECK_GT(code, 0);
+ RTC_DCHECK_LE(code, data.size());
+ written = code;
+ return SR_SUCCESS;
+ case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ:
+ RTC_DLOG(LS_VERBOSE) << " -- error want read";
+ ssl_write_needs_read_ = true;
+ return SR_BLOCK;
+ case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE:
+ RTC_DLOG(LS_VERBOSE) << " -- error want write";
+ return SR_BLOCK;
+
+ case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN:
+ default:
+ Error("SSL_write", (ssl_error ? ssl_error : -1), 0, false);
+ error = ssl_error_code_;
+ return SR_ERROR;
+ }
+ // not reached
+}
+
+StreamResult OpenSSLStreamAdapter::Read(rtc::ArrayView<uint8_t> data,
+ size_t& read,
+ int& error) {
+ RTC_DLOG(LS_VERBOSE) << "OpenSSLStreamAdapter::Read(" << data.size() << ")";
+ switch (state_) {
+ case SSL_NONE:
+ // pass-through in clear text
+ return stream_->Read(data, read, error);
+ case SSL_WAIT:
+ case SSL_CONNECTING:
+ return SR_BLOCK;
+ case SSL_CONNECTED:
+ if (WaitingToVerifyPeerCertificate()) {
+ return SR_BLOCK;
+ }
+ break;
+ case SSL_CLOSED:
+ return SR_EOS;
+ case SSL_ERROR:
+ default:
+ error = ssl_error_code_;
+ return SR_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ // Don't trust OpenSSL with zero byte reads
+ if (data.size() == 0) {
+ read = 0;
+ return SR_SUCCESS;
+ }
+
+ ssl_read_needs_write_ = false;
+
+ const int code = SSL_read(ssl_, data.data(), checked_cast<int>(data.size()));
+ const int ssl_error = SSL_get_error(ssl_, code);
+
+ switch (ssl_error) {
+ case SSL_ERROR_NONE:
+ RTC_DLOG(LS_VERBOSE) << " -- success";
+ RTC_DCHECK_GT(code, 0);
+ RTC_DCHECK_LE(code, data.size());
+ read = code;
+
+ if (ssl_mode_ == SSL_MODE_DTLS) {
+ // Enforce atomic reads -- this is a short read
+ unsigned int pending = SSL_pending(ssl_);
+
+ if (pending) {
+ RTC_DLOG(LS_INFO) << " -- short DTLS read. flushing";
+ FlushInput(pending);
+ error = SSE_MSG_TRUNC;
+ return SR_ERROR;
+ }
+ }
+ return SR_SUCCESS;
+ case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ:
+ RTC_DLOG(LS_VERBOSE) << " -- error want read";
+ return SR_BLOCK;
+ case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE:
+ RTC_DLOG(LS_VERBOSE) << " -- error want write";
+ ssl_read_needs_write_ = true;
+ return SR_BLOCK;
+ case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN:
+ RTC_DLOG(LS_VERBOSE) << " -- remote side closed";
+ Close();
+ return SR_EOS;
+ default:
+ Error("SSL_read", (ssl_error ? ssl_error : -1), 0, false);
+ error = ssl_error_code_;
+ return SR_ERROR;
+ }
+ // not reached
+}
+
+void OpenSSLStreamAdapter::FlushInput(unsigned int left) {
+ unsigned char buf[2048];
+
+ while (left) {
+ // This should always succeed
+ const int toread = (sizeof(buf) < left) ? sizeof(buf) : left;
+ const int code = SSL_read(ssl_, buf, toread);
+
+ const int ssl_error = SSL_get_error(ssl_, code);
+ RTC_DCHECK(ssl_error == SSL_ERROR_NONE);
+
+ if (ssl_error != SSL_ERROR_NONE) {
+ RTC_DLOG(LS_VERBOSE) << " -- error " << code;
+ Error("SSL_read", (ssl_error ? ssl_error : -1), 0, false);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ RTC_DLOG(LS_VERBOSE) << " -- flushed " << code << " bytes";
+ left -= code;
+ }
+}
+
+void OpenSSLStreamAdapter::Close() {
+ Cleanup(0);
+ RTC_DCHECK(state_ == SSL_CLOSED || state_ == SSL_ERROR);
+ // When we're closed at SSL layer, also close the stream level which
+ // performs necessary clean up. Otherwise, a new incoming packet after
+ // this could overflow the stream buffer.
+ stream_->Close();
+}
+
+StreamState OpenSSLStreamAdapter::GetState() const {
+ switch (state_) {
+ case SSL_WAIT:
+ case SSL_CONNECTING:
+ return SS_OPENING;
+ case SSL_CONNECTED:
+ if (WaitingToVerifyPeerCertificate()) {
+ return SS_OPENING;
+ }
+ return SS_OPEN;
+ default:
+ return SS_CLOSED;
+ }
+ // not reached
+}
+
+void OpenSSLStreamAdapter::OnEvent(StreamInterface* stream,
+ int events,
+ int err) {
+ int events_to_signal = 0;
+ int signal_error = 0;
+ RTC_DCHECK(stream == stream_.get());
+
+ if ((events & SE_OPEN)) {
+ RTC_DLOG(LS_VERBOSE) << "OpenSSLStreamAdapter::OnEvent SE_OPEN";
+ if (state_ != SSL_WAIT) {
+ RTC_DCHECK(state_ == SSL_NONE);
+ events_to_signal |= SE_OPEN;
+ } else {
+ state_ = SSL_CONNECTING;
+ if (int err = BeginSSL()) {
+ Error("BeginSSL", err, 0, true);
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if ((events & (SE_READ | SE_WRITE))) {
+ RTC_DLOG(LS_VERBOSE) << "OpenSSLStreamAdapter::OnEvent"
+ << ((events & SE_READ) ? " SE_READ" : "")
+ << ((events & SE_WRITE) ? " SE_WRITE" : "");
+ if (state_ == SSL_NONE) {
+ events_to_signal |= events & (SE_READ | SE_WRITE);
+ } else if (state_ == SSL_CONNECTING) {
+ if (int err = ContinueSSL()) {
+ Error("ContinueSSL", err, 0, true);
+ return;
+ }
+ } else if (state_ == SSL_CONNECTED) {
+ if (((events & SE_READ) && ssl_write_needs_read_) ||
+ (events & SE_WRITE)) {
+ RTC_DLOG(LS_VERBOSE) << " -- onStreamWriteable";
+ events_to_signal |= SE_WRITE;
+ }
+ if (((events & SE_WRITE) && ssl_read_needs_write_) ||
+ (events & SE_READ)) {
+ RTC_DLOG(LS_VERBOSE) << " -- onStreamReadable";
+ events_to_signal |= SE_READ;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if ((events & SE_CLOSE)) {
+ RTC_DLOG(LS_VERBOSE) << "OpenSSLStreamAdapter::OnEvent(SE_CLOSE, " << err
+ << ")";
+ Cleanup(0);
+ events_to_signal |= SE_CLOSE;
+ // SE_CLOSE is the only event that uses the final parameter to OnEvent().
+ RTC_DCHECK(signal_error == 0);
+ signal_error = err;
+ }
+
+ if (events_to_signal) {
+ // Note that the adapter presents itself as the origin of the stream events,
+ // since users of the adapter may not recognize the adapted object.
+ SignalEvent(this, events_to_signal, signal_error);
+ }
+}
+
+void OpenSSLStreamAdapter::PostEvent(int events, int err) {
+ owner_->PostTask(SafeTask(task_safety_.flag(), [this, events, err]() {
+ SignalEvent(this, events, err);
+ }));
+}
+
+void OpenSSLStreamAdapter::SetTimeout(int delay_ms) {
+ // We need to accept 0 delay here as well as >0 delay, because
+ // DTLSv1_get_timeout seems to frequently return 0 ms.
+ RTC_DCHECK_GE(delay_ms, 0);
+ RTC_DCHECK(!timeout_task_.Running());
+
+ timeout_task_ = webrtc::RepeatingTaskHandle::DelayedStart(
+ owner_, webrtc::TimeDelta::Millis(delay_ms),
+ [flag = task_safety_.flag(), this]() {
+ if (flag->alive()) {
+ RTC_DLOG(LS_INFO) << "DTLS timeout expired";
+ timeout_task_.Stop();
+ int res = DTLSv1_handle_timeout(ssl_);
+ if (res > 0) {
+ RTC_LOG(LS_INFO) << "DTLS retransmission";
+ } else if (res < 0) {
+ RTC_LOG(LS_INFO) << "DTLSv1_handle_timeout() return -1";
+ Error("DTLSv1_handle_timeout", res, -1, true);
+ return webrtc::TimeDelta::PlusInfinity();
+ }
+ ContinueSSL();
+ } else {
+ RTC_DCHECK_NOTREACHED();
+ }
+ // This callback will never run again (stopped above).
+ return webrtc::TimeDelta::PlusInfinity();
+ });
+}
+
+int OpenSSLStreamAdapter::BeginSSL() {
+ RTC_DCHECK(state_ == SSL_CONNECTING);
+ // The underlying stream has opened.
+ RTC_DLOG(LS_INFO) << "BeginSSL with peer.";
+
+ BIO* bio = nullptr;
+
+ // First set up the context.
+ RTC_DCHECK(ssl_ctx_ == nullptr);
+ ssl_ctx_ = SetupSSLContext();
+ if (!ssl_ctx_) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ bio = BIO_new_stream(stream_.get());
+ if (!bio) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ ssl_ = SSL_new(ssl_ctx_);
+ if (!ssl_) {
+ BIO_free(bio);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ SSL_set_app_data(ssl_, this);
+
+ SSL_set_bio(ssl_, bio, bio); // the SSL object owns the bio now.
+ if (ssl_mode_ == SSL_MODE_DTLS) {
+#ifdef OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL
+ DTLSv1_set_initial_timeout_duration(ssl_, dtls_handshake_timeout_ms_);
+#else
+ // Enable read-ahead for DTLS so whole packets are read from internal BIO
+ // before parsing. This is done internally by BoringSSL for DTLS.
+ SSL_set_read_ahead(ssl_, 1);
+#endif
+ }
+
+ SSL_set_mode(ssl_, SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE |
+ SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER);
+
+ // Do the connect
+ return ContinueSSL();
+}
+
+int OpenSSLStreamAdapter::ContinueSSL() {
+ RTC_DLOG(LS_VERBOSE) << "ContinueSSL";
+ RTC_DCHECK(state_ == SSL_CONNECTING);
+
+ // Clear the DTLS timer
+ timeout_task_.Stop();
+
+ const int code = (role_ == SSL_CLIENT) ? SSL_connect(ssl_) : SSL_accept(ssl_);
+ const int ssl_error = SSL_get_error(ssl_, code);
+
+ switch (ssl_error) {
+ case SSL_ERROR_NONE:
+ RTC_DLOG(LS_VERBOSE) << " -- success";
+ // By this point, OpenSSL should have given us a certificate, or errored
+ // out if one was missing.
+ RTC_DCHECK(peer_cert_chain_ || !GetClientAuthEnabled());
+
+ state_ = SSL_CONNECTED;
+ if (!WaitingToVerifyPeerCertificate()) {
+ // We have everything we need to start the connection, so signal
+ // SE_OPEN. If we need a client certificate fingerprint and don't have
+ // it yet, we'll instead signal SE_OPEN in SetPeerCertificateDigest.
+ //
+ // TODO(deadbeef): Post this event asynchronously to unwind the stack.
+ // The caller of ContinueSSL may be the same object listening for these
+ // events and may not be prepared for reentrancy.
+ // PostEvent(SE_OPEN | SE_READ | SE_WRITE, 0);
+ SignalEvent(this, SE_OPEN | SE_READ | SE_WRITE, 0);
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ: {
+ RTC_DLOG(LS_VERBOSE) << " -- error want read";
+ struct timeval timeout;
+ if (DTLSv1_get_timeout(ssl_, &timeout)) {
+ int delay = timeout.tv_sec * 1000 + timeout.tv_usec / 1000;
+ SetTimeout(delay);
+ }
+ } break;
+
+ case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE:
+ RTC_DLOG(LS_VERBOSE) << " -- error want write";
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN:
+ default:
+ SSLHandshakeError ssl_handshake_err = SSLHandshakeError::UNKNOWN;
+ int err_code = ERR_peek_last_error();
+ if (err_code != 0 && ERR_GET_REASON(err_code) == SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER) {
+ ssl_handshake_err = SSLHandshakeError::INCOMPATIBLE_CIPHERSUITE;
+ }
+ RTC_DLOG(LS_VERBOSE) << " -- error " << code << ", " << err_code << ", "
+ << ERR_GET_REASON(err_code);
+ if (handshake_error_) {
+ handshake_error_(ssl_handshake_err);
+ }
+ return (ssl_error != 0) ? ssl_error : -1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void OpenSSLStreamAdapter::Error(absl::string_view context,
+ int err,
+ uint8_t alert,
+ bool signal) {
+ RTC_LOG(LS_WARNING) << "OpenSSLStreamAdapter::Error(" << context << ", "
+ << err << ", " << static_cast<int>(alert) << ")";
+ state_ = SSL_ERROR;
+ ssl_error_code_ = err;
+ Cleanup(alert);
+ if (signal) {
+ SignalEvent(this, SE_CLOSE, err);
+ }
+}
+
+void OpenSSLStreamAdapter::Cleanup(uint8_t alert) {
+ RTC_DLOG(LS_INFO) << "Cleanup";
+
+ if (state_ != SSL_ERROR) {
+ state_ = SSL_CLOSED;
+ ssl_error_code_ = 0;
+ }
+
+ if (ssl_) {
+ int ret;
+// SSL_send_fatal_alert is only available in BoringSSL.
+#ifdef OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL
+ if (alert) {
+ ret = SSL_send_fatal_alert(ssl_, alert);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ RTC_LOG(LS_WARNING) << "SSL_send_fatal_alert failed, error = "
+ << SSL_get_error(ssl_, ret);
+ }
+ } else {
+#endif
+ ret = SSL_shutdown(ssl_);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ RTC_LOG(LS_WARNING)
+ << "SSL_shutdown failed, error = " << SSL_get_error(ssl_, ret);
+ }
+#ifdef OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL
+ }
+#endif
+ SSL_free(ssl_);
+ ssl_ = nullptr;
+ }
+ if (ssl_ctx_) {
+ SSL_CTX_free(ssl_ctx_);
+ ssl_ctx_ = nullptr;
+ }
+ identity_.reset();
+ peer_cert_chain_.reset();
+
+ // Clear the DTLS timer
+ timeout_task_.Stop();
+}
+
+SSL_CTX* OpenSSLStreamAdapter::SetupSSLContext() {
+#ifdef OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL
+ // If X509 objects aren't used, we can use these methods to avoid
+ // linking the sizable crypto/x509 code, using CRYPTO_BUFFER instead.
+ SSL_CTX* ctx =
+ SSL_CTX_new(ssl_mode_ == SSL_MODE_DTLS ? DTLS_with_buffers_method()
+ : TLS_with_buffers_method());
+#else
+ SSL_CTX* ctx =
+ SSL_CTX_new(ssl_mode_ == SSL_MODE_DTLS ? DTLS_method() : TLS_method());
+#endif
+ if (ctx == nullptr) {
+ return nullptr;
+ }
+
+ if (support_legacy_tls_protocols_flag_) {
+ // TODO(https://bugs.webrtc.org/10261): Completely remove this branch in
+ // M84.
+ SSL_CTX_set_min_proto_version(
+ ctx, ssl_mode_ == SSL_MODE_DTLS ? DTLS1_VERSION : TLS1_VERSION);
+ switch (ssl_max_version_) {
+ case SSL_PROTOCOL_TLS_10:
+ SSL_CTX_set_max_proto_version(
+ ctx, ssl_mode_ == SSL_MODE_DTLS ? DTLS1_VERSION : TLS1_VERSION);
+ break;
+ case SSL_PROTOCOL_TLS_11:
+ SSL_CTX_set_max_proto_version(
+ ctx, ssl_mode_ == SSL_MODE_DTLS ? DTLS1_VERSION : TLS1_1_VERSION);
+ break;
+ case SSL_PROTOCOL_TLS_12:
+ default:
+ SSL_CTX_set_max_proto_version(
+ ctx, ssl_mode_ == SSL_MODE_DTLS ? DTLS1_2_VERSION : TLS1_2_VERSION);
+ break;
+ }
+ } else {
+ // TODO(https://bugs.webrtc.org/10261): Make this the default in M84.
+ SSL_CTX_set_min_proto_version(
+ ctx, ssl_mode_ == SSL_MODE_DTLS ? DTLS1_2_VERSION : TLS1_2_VERSION);
+ SSL_CTX_set_max_proto_version(
+ ctx, ssl_mode_ == SSL_MODE_DTLS ? DTLS1_2_VERSION : TLS1_2_VERSION);
+ }
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL
+ // SSL_CTX_set_current_time_cb is only supported in BoringSSL.
+ if (g_use_time_callback_for_testing) {
+ SSL_CTX_set_current_time_cb(ctx, &TimeCallbackForTesting);
+ }
+ SSL_CTX_set0_buffer_pool(ctx, openssl::GetBufferPool());
+#endif
+
+ if (identity_ && !identity_->ConfigureIdentity(ctx)) {
+ SSL_CTX_free(ctx);
+ return nullptr;
+ }
+
+ SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(ctx, OpenSSLAdapter::SSLInfoCallback);
+
+ int mode = SSL_VERIFY_PEER;
+ if (GetClientAuthEnabled()) {
+ // Require a certificate from the client.
+ // Note: Normally this is always true in production, but it may be disabled
+ // for testing purposes (e.g. SSLAdapter unit tests).
+ mode |= SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT;
+ }
+
+ // Configure a custom certificate verification callback to check the peer
+ // certificate digest.
+#ifdef OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL
+ // Use CRYPTO_BUFFER version of the callback if building with BoringSSL.
+ SSL_CTX_set_custom_verify(ctx, mode, SSLVerifyCallback);
+#else
+ // Note the second argument to SSL_CTX_set_verify is to override individual
+ // errors in the default verification logic, which is not what we want here.
+ SSL_CTX_set_verify(ctx, mode, nullptr);
+ SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(ctx, SSLVerifyCallback, nullptr);
+#endif
+
+ // Select list of available ciphers. Note that !SHA256 and !SHA384 only
+ // remove HMAC-SHA256 and HMAC-SHA384 cipher suites, not GCM cipher suites
+ // with SHA256 or SHA384 as the handshake hash.
+ // This matches the list of SSLClientSocketImpl in Chromium.
+ SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(
+ ctx,
+ "DEFAULT:!NULL:!aNULL:!SHA256:!SHA384:!aECDH:!AESGCM+AES256:!aPSK:!3DES");
+
+ if (!srtp_ciphers_.empty()) {
+ if (SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_use_srtp(ctx, srtp_ciphers_.c_str())) {
+ SSL_CTX_free(ctx);
+ return nullptr;
+ }
+ }
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL
+ SSL_CTX_set_permute_extensions(
+ ctx, webrtc::field_trial::IsEnabled("WebRTC-PermuteTlsClientHello"));
+#endif
+
+ return ctx;
+}
+
+bool OpenSSLStreamAdapter::VerifyPeerCertificate() {
+ if (!HasPeerCertificateDigest() || !peer_cert_chain_ ||
+ !peer_cert_chain_->GetSize()) {
+ RTC_LOG(LS_WARNING) << "Missing digest or peer certificate.";
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ unsigned char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ size_t digest_length;
+ if (!peer_cert_chain_->Get(0).ComputeDigest(
+ peer_certificate_digest_algorithm_, digest, sizeof(digest),
+ &digest_length)) {
+ RTC_LOG(LS_WARNING) << "Failed to compute peer cert digest.";
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ Buffer computed_digest(digest, digest_length);
+ if (computed_digest != peer_certificate_digest_value_) {
+ RTC_LOG(LS_WARNING)
+ << "Rejected peer certificate due to mismatched digest using "
+ << peer_certificate_digest_algorithm_ << ". Expected "
+ << rtc::hex_encode_with_delimiter(peer_certificate_digest_value_, ':')
+ << " got " << rtc::hex_encode_with_delimiter(computed_digest, ':');
+ return false;
+ }
+ // Ignore any verification error if the digest matches, since there is no
+ // value in checking the validity of a self-signed cert issued by untrusted
+ // sources.
+ RTC_DLOG(LS_INFO) << "Accepted peer certificate.";
+ peer_certificate_verified_ = true;
+ return true;
+}
+
+std::unique_ptr<SSLCertChain> OpenSSLStreamAdapter::GetPeerSSLCertChain()
+ const {
+ return peer_cert_chain_ ? peer_cert_chain_->Clone() : nullptr;
+}
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL
+enum ssl_verify_result_t OpenSSLStreamAdapter::SSLVerifyCallback(
+ SSL* ssl,
+ uint8_t* out_alert) {
+ // Get our OpenSSLStreamAdapter from the context.
+ OpenSSLStreamAdapter* stream =
+ reinterpret_cast<OpenSSLStreamAdapter*>(SSL_get_app_data(ssl));
+ const STACK_OF(CRYPTO_BUFFER)* chain = SSL_get0_peer_certificates(ssl);
+ // Creates certificate chain.
+ std::vector<std::unique_ptr<SSLCertificate>> cert_chain;
+ for (CRYPTO_BUFFER* cert : chain) {
+ cert_chain.emplace_back(new BoringSSLCertificate(bssl::UpRef(cert)));
+ }
+ stream->peer_cert_chain_.reset(new SSLCertChain(std::move(cert_chain)));
+
+ // If the peer certificate digest isn't known yet, we'll wait to verify
+ // until it's known, and for now just return a success status.
+ if (stream->peer_certificate_digest_algorithm_.empty()) {
+ RTC_LOG(LS_INFO) << "Waiting to verify certificate until digest is known.";
+ // TODO(deadbeef): Use ssl_verify_retry?
+ return ssl_verify_ok;
+ }
+
+ if (!stream->VerifyPeerCertificate()) {
+ return ssl_verify_invalid;
+ }
+
+ return ssl_verify_ok;
+}
+#else // OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL
+int OpenSSLStreamAdapter::SSLVerifyCallback(X509_STORE_CTX* store, void* arg) {
+ // Get our SSL structure and OpenSSLStreamAdapter from the store.
+ SSL* ssl = reinterpret_cast<SSL*>(
+ X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(store, SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx()));
+ OpenSSLStreamAdapter* stream =
+ reinterpret_cast<OpenSSLStreamAdapter*>(SSL_get_app_data(ssl));
+
+ // Record the peer's certificate.
+ X509* cert = X509_STORE_CTX_get0_cert(store);
+ stream->peer_cert_chain_.reset(
+ new SSLCertChain(std::make_unique<OpenSSLCertificate>(cert)));
+
+ // If the peer certificate digest isn't known yet, we'll wait to verify
+ // until it's known, and for now just return a success status.
+ if (stream->peer_certificate_digest_algorithm_.empty()) {
+ RTC_DLOG(LS_INFO) << "Waiting to verify certificate until digest is known.";
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ if (!stream->VerifyPeerCertificate()) {
+ X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(store, X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+#endif // !OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL
+
+bool OpenSSLStreamAdapter::IsBoringSsl() {
+#ifdef OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL
+ return true;
+#else
+ return false;
+#endif
+}
+
+#define CDEF(X) \
+ { static_cast<uint16_t>(TLS1_CK_##X & 0xffff), "TLS_" #X }
+
+struct cipher_list {
+ uint16_t cipher;
+ const char* cipher_str;
+};
+
+// TODO(torbjorng): Perhaps add more cipher suites to these lists.
+static const cipher_list OK_RSA_ciphers[] = {
+ CDEF(ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA),
+ CDEF(ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA),
+ CDEF(ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256),
+#ifdef TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA256
+ CDEF(ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA256),
+#endif
+#ifdef TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
+ CDEF(ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256),
+#endif
+};
+
+static const cipher_list OK_ECDSA_ciphers[] = {
+ CDEF(ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA),
+ CDEF(ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA),
+ CDEF(ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256),
+#ifdef TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA256
+ CDEF(ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA256),
+#endif
+#ifdef TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
+ CDEF(ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256),
+#endif
+};
+#undef CDEF
+
+bool OpenSSLStreamAdapter::IsAcceptableCipher(int cipher, KeyType key_type) {
+ if (key_type == KT_RSA) {
+ for (const cipher_list& c : OK_RSA_ciphers) {
+ if (cipher == c.cipher) {
+ return true;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (key_type == KT_ECDSA) {
+ for (const cipher_list& c : OK_ECDSA_ciphers) {
+ if (cipher == c.cipher) {
+ return true;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ return false;
+}
+
+bool OpenSSLStreamAdapter::IsAcceptableCipher(absl::string_view cipher,
+ KeyType key_type) {
+ if (key_type == KT_RSA) {
+ for (const cipher_list& c : OK_RSA_ciphers) {
+ if (cipher == c.cipher_str) {
+ return true;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (key_type == KT_ECDSA) {
+ for (const cipher_list& c : OK_ECDSA_ciphers) {
+ if (cipher == c.cipher_str) {
+ return true;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ return false;
+}
+
+void OpenSSLStreamAdapter::EnableTimeCallbackForTesting() {
+#ifdef OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL
+ g_use_time_callback_for_testing = true;
+#endif
+}
+
+} // namespace rtc