1 files changed, 411 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/dom/security/SecFetch.cpp b/dom/security/SecFetch.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..17f4a23e0e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/SecFetch.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,411 @@
+/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
+/* vim: set ts=8 sts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
+/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+
+#include "SecFetch.h"
+#include "nsIHttpChannel.h"
+#include "nsContentUtils.h"
+#include "nsIRedirectHistoryEntry.h"
+#include "nsIReferrerInfo.h"
+#include "mozIThirdPartyUtil.h"
+#include "nsMixedContentBlocker.h"
+#include "nsNetUtil.h"
+#include "mozilla/BasePrincipal.h"
+#include "mozilla/StaticPrefs_dom.h"
+
+// Helper function which maps an internal content policy type
+// to the corresponding destination for the context of SecFetch.
+nsCString MapInternalContentPolicyTypeToDest(nsContentPolicyType aType) {
+  switch (aType) {
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_OTHER:
+      return "empty"_ns;
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_SCRIPT:
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_SCRIPT_PRELOAD:
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_MODULE:
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_MODULE_PRELOAD:
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_WORKER_IMPORT_SCRIPTS:
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_CHROMEUTILS_COMPILED_SCRIPT:
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_FRAME_MESSAGEMANAGER_SCRIPT:
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_SCRIPT:
+      return "script"_ns;
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_WORKER:
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_WORKER_STATIC_MODULE:
+      return "worker"_ns;
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_SHARED_WORKER:
+      return "sharedworker"_ns;
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_SERVICE_WORKER:
+      return "serviceworker"_ns;
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_AUDIOWORKLET:
+      return "audioworklet"_ns;
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_PAINTWORKLET:
+      return "paintworklet"_ns;
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_IMAGESET:
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_IMAGE:
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_IMAGE_PRELOAD:
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_IMAGE_FAVICON:
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_IMAGE:
+      return "image"_ns;
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_STYLESHEET:
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_STYLESHEET:
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_STYLESHEET_PRELOAD:
+      return "style"_ns;
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_OBJECT:
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_OBJECT:
+      return "object"_ns;
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_EMBED:
+      return "embed"_ns;
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT:
+      return "document"_ns;
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_SUBDOCUMENT:
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_IFRAME:
+      return "iframe"_ns;
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_FRAME:
+      return "frame"_ns;
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_PING:
+      return "empty"_ns;
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_XMLHTTPREQUEST:
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_XMLHTTPREQUEST:
+      return "empty"_ns;
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_EVENTSOURCE:
+      return "empty"_ns;
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_OBJECT_SUBREQUEST:
+      return "empty"_ns;
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_DTD:
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_DTD:
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_FORCE_ALLOWED_DTD:
+      return "empty"_ns;
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_FONT:
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_FONT_PRELOAD:
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_UA_FONT:
+      return "font"_ns;
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_MEDIA:
+      return "empty"_ns;
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_AUDIO:
+      return "audio"_ns;
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_VIDEO:
+      return "video"_ns;
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_TRACK:
+      return "track"_ns;
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_WEBSOCKET:
+      return "empty"_ns;
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_CSP_REPORT:
+      return "report"_ns;
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_XSLT:
+      return "xslt"_ns;
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_BEACON:
+      return "empty"_ns;
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_FETCH:
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_FETCH_PRELOAD:
+      return "empty"_ns;
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_WEB_MANIFEST:
+      return "manifest"_ns;
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_SAVEAS_DOWNLOAD:
+      return "empty"_ns;
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_SPECULATIVE:
+      return "empty"_ns;
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_PROXIED_WEBRTC_MEDIA:
+      return "empty"_ns;
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_WEB_IDENTITY:
+      return "webidentity"_ns;
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_WEB_TRANSPORT:
+      return "webtransport"_ns;
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_END:
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INVALID:
+      break;
+      // Do not add default: so that compilers can catch the missing case.
+  }
+
+  MOZ_CRASH("Unhandled nsContentPolicyType value");
+}
+
+// Helper function to determine if a ExpandedPrincipal is of the same-origin as
+// a URI in the sec-fetch context.
+void IsExpandedPrincipalSameOrigin(
+    nsCOMPtr<nsIExpandedPrincipal> aExpandedPrincipal, nsIURI* aURI,
+    bool* aRes) {
+  *aRes = false;
+  for (const auto& principal : aExpandedPrincipal->AllowList()) {
+    // Ignore extension principals to continue treating
+    // "moz-extension:"-requests as not "same-origin".
+    if (!mozilla::BasePrincipal::Cast(principal)->AddonPolicy()) {
+      // A ExpandedPrincipal usually has at most one ContentPrincipal, so we can
+      // check IsSameOrigin on it here and return early.
+      mozilla::BasePrincipal::Cast(principal)->IsSameOrigin(aURI, aRes);
+      return;
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+// Helper function to determine whether a request (including involved
+// redirects) is same-origin in the context of SecFetch.
+bool IsSameOrigin(nsIHttpChannel* aHTTPChannel) {
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> channelURI;
+  NS_GetFinalChannelURI(aHTTPChannel, getter_AddRefs(channelURI));
+
+  nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> loadInfo = aHTTPChannel->LoadInfo();
+
+  if (mozilla::BasePrincipal::Cast(loadInfo->TriggeringPrincipal())
+          ->AddonPolicy()) {
+    // If an extension triggered the load that has access to the URI then the
+    // load is considered as same-origin.
+    return mozilla::BasePrincipal::Cast(loadInfo->TriggeringPrincipal())
+        ->AddonAllowsLoad(channelURI);
+  }
+
+  bool isSameOrigin = false;
+  if (nsContentUtils::IsExpandedPrincipal(loadInfo->TriggeringPrincipal())) {
+    nsCOMPtr<nsIExpandedPrincipal> ep =
+        do_QueryInterface(loadInfo->TriggeringPrincipal());
+    IsExpandedPrincipalSameOrigin(ep, channelURI, &isSameOrigin);
+  } else {
+    isSameOrigin = loadInfo->TriggeringPrincipal()->IsSameOrigin(channelURI);
+  }
+
+  // if the initial request is not same-origin, we can return here
+  // because we already know it's not a same-origin request
+  if (!isSameOrigin) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  // let's further check all the hoops in the redirectChain to
+  // ensure all involved redirects are same-origin
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> redirectPrincipal;
+  for (nsIRedirectHistoryEntry* entry : loadInfo->RedirectChain()) {
+    entry->GetPrincipal(getter_AddRefs(redirectPrincipal));
+    if (redirectPrincipal && !redirectPrincipal->IsSameOrigin(channelURI)) {
+      return false;
+    }
+  }
+
+  // must be a same-origin request
+  return true;
+}
+
+// Helper function to determine whether a request (including involved
+// redirects) is same-site in the context of SecFetch.
+bool IsSameSite(nsIChannel* aHTTPChannel) {
+  nsCOMPtr<mozIThirdPartyUtil> thirdPartyUtil =
+      do_GetService(THIRDPARTYUTIL_CONTRACTID);
+  if (!thirdPartyUtil) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  nsAutoCString hostDomain;
+  nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> loadInfo = aHTTPChannel->LoadInfo();
+  nsresult rv = loadInfo->TriggeringPrincipal()->GetBaseDomain(hostDomain);
+  mozilla::Unused << NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv));
+
+  nsAutoCString channelDomain;
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> channelURI;
+  NS_GetFinalChannelURI(aHTTPChannel, getter_AddRefs(channelURI));
+  rv = thirdPartyUtil->GetBaseDomain(channelURI, channelDomain);
+  mozilla::Unused << NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv));
+
+  // if the initial request is not same-site, or not https, we can
+  // return here because we already know it's not a same-site request
+  if (!hostDomain.Equals(channelDomain) ||
+      (!loadInfo->TriggeringPrincipal()->SchemeIs("https") &&
+       !nsMixedContentBlocker::IsPotentiallyTrustworthyLoopbackHost(
+           hostDomain))) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  // let's further check all the hoops in the redirectChain to
+  // ensure all involved redirects are same-site and https
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> redirectPrincipal;
+  for (nsIRedirectHistoryEntry* entry : loadInfo->RedirectChain()) {
+    entry->GetPrincipal(getter_AddRefs(redirectPrincipal));
+    if (redirectPrincipal) {
+      redirectPrincipal->GetBaseDomain(hostDomain);
+      if (!hostDomain.Equals(channelDomain) ||
+          !redirectPrincipal->SchemeIs("https")) {
+        return false;
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  // must be a same-site request
+  return true;
+}
+
+// Helper function to determine whether a request was triggered
+// by the end user in the context of SecFetch.
+bool IsUserTriggeredForSecFetchSite(nsIHttpChannel* aHTTPChannel) {
+  /*
+   * The goal is to distinguish between "webby" navigations that are controlled
+   * by a given website (e.g. links, the window.location setter,form
+   * submissions, etc.), and those that are not (e.g. user interaction with a
+   * user agent’s address bar, bookmarks, etc).
+   */
+  nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> loadInfo = aHTTPChannel->LoadInfo();
+  ExtContentPolicyType contentType = loadInfo->GetExternalContentPolicyType();
+
+  // A request issued by the browser is always user initiated.
+  if (loadInfo->TriggeringPrincipal()->IsSystemPrincipal() &&
+      contentType == ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_OTHER) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  // only requests wich result in type "document" are subject to
+  // user initiated actions in the context of SecFetch.
+  if (contentType != ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT &&
+      contentType != ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_SUBDOCUMENT) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  // The load is considered user triggered if it was triggered by an external
+  // application.
+  if (loadInfo->GetLoadTriggeredFromExternal()) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  // sec-fetch-site can only be user triggered if the load was user triggered.
+  if (!loadInfo->GetHasValidUserGestureActivation()) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  // We can assert that the navigation must be "webby" if the load was triggered
+  // by a meta refresh. See also Bug 1647128.
+  if (loadInfo->GetIsMetaRefresh()) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  // All web requests have a valid "original" referrer set in the
+  // ReferrerInfo which we can use to determine whether a request
+  // was triggered by a user or not.
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIReferrerInfo> referrerInfo = aHTTPChannel->GetReferrerInfo();
+  if (referrerInfo) {
+    nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> originalReferrer;
+    referrerInfo->GetOriginalReferrer(getter_AddRefs(originalReferrer));
+    if (originalReferrer) {
+      return false;
+    }
+  }
+
+  return true;
+}
+
+void mozilla::dom::SecFetch::AddSecFetchDest(nsIHttpChannel* aHTTPChannel) {
+  nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> loadInfo = aHTTPChannel->LoadInfo();
+  nsContentPolicyType contentType = loadInfo->InternalContentPolicyType();
+  nsCString dest = MapInternalContentPolicyTypeToDest(contentType);
+
+  nsresult rv =
+      aHTTPChannel->SetRequestHeader("Sec-Fetch-Dest"_ns, dest, false);
+  mozilla::Unused << NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv));
+}
+
+void mozilla::dom::SecFetch::AddSecFetchMode(nsIHttpChannel* aHTTPChannel) {
+  nsAutoCString mode("no-cors");
+
+  nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> loadInfo = aHTTPChannel->LoadInfo();
+  uint32_t securityMode = loadInfo->GetSecurityMode();
+  ExtContentPolicyType externalType = loadInfo->GetExternalContentPolicyType();
+
+  if (securityMode ==
+          nsILoadInfo::SEC_REQUIRE_SAME_ORIGIN_INHERITS_SEC_CONTEXT ||
+      securityMode == nsILoadInfo::SEC_REQUIRE_SAME_ORIGIN_DATA_IS_BLOCKED) {
+    mode = "same-origin"_ns;
+  } else if (securityMode ==
+             nsILoadInfo::SEC_REQUIRE_CORS_INHERITS_SEC_CONTEXT) {
+    mode = "cors"_ns;
+  } else {
+    // If it's not one of the security modes above, then we ensure it's
+    // at least one of the others defined in nsILoadInfo
+    MOZ_ASSERT(
+        securityMode ==
+                nsILoadInfo::SEC_ALLOW_CROSS_ORIGIN_INHERITS_SEC_CONTEXT ||
+            securityMode ==
+                nsILoadInfo::SEC_ALLOW_CROSS_ORIGIN_SEC_CONTEXT_IS_NULL,
+        "unhandled security mode");
+  }
+
+  if (externalType == ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT ||
+      externalType == ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_SUBDOCUMENT ||
+      externalType == ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_OBJECT) {
+    mode = "navigate"_ns;
+  } else if (externalType == ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_WEBSOCKET) {
+    mode = "websocket"_ns;
+  }
+
+  nsresult rv =
+      aHTTPChannel->SetRequestHeader("Sec-Fetch-Mode"_ns, mode, false);
+  mozilla::Unused << NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv));
+}
+
+void mozilla::dom::SecFetch::AddSecFetchSite(nsIHttpChannel* aHTTPChannel) {
+  nsAutoCString site("same-origin");
+
+  bool isSameOrigin = IsSameOrigin(aHTTPChannel);
+  if (!isSameOrigin) {
+    bool isSameSite = IsSameSite(aHTTPChannel);
+    if (isSameSite) {
+      site = "same-site"_ns;
+    } else {
+      site = "cross-site"_ns;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (IsUserTriggeredForSecFetchSite(aHTTPChannel)) {
+    site = "none"_ns;
+  }
+
+  nsresult rv =
+      aHTTPChannel->SetRequestHeader("Sec-Fetch-Site"_ns, site, false);
+  mozilla::Unused << NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv));
+}
+
+void mozilla::dom::SecFetch::AddSecFetchUser(nsIHttpChannel* aHTTPChannel) {
+  nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> loadInfo = aHTTPChannel->LoadInfo();
+  ExtContentPolicyType externalType = loadInfo->GetExternalContentPolicyType();
+
+  // sec-fetch-user only applies to loads of type document or subdocument
+  if (externalType != ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT &&
+      externalType != ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_SUBDOCUMENT) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // sec-fetch-user only applies if the request is user triggered.
+  // requests triggered by an external application are considerd user triggered.
+  if (!loadInfo->GetLoadTriggeredFromExternal() &&
+      !loadInfo->GetHasValidUserGestureActivation()) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  nsAutoCString user("?1");
+  nsresult rv =
+      aHTTPChannel->SetRequestHeader("Sec-Fetch-User"_ns, user, false);
+  mozilla::Unused << NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv));
+}
+
+void mozilla::dom::SecFetch::AddSecFetchHeader(nsIHttpChannel* aHTTPChannel) {
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri;
+  nsresult rv = aHTTPChannel->GetURI(getter_AddRefs(uri));
+  if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // if we are not dealing with a potentially trustworthy URL, then
+  // there is nothing to do here
+  if (!nsMixedContentBlocker::IsPotentiallyTrustworthyOrigin(uri)) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // If we're dealing with a system XMLHttpRequest or fetch, don't add
+  // Sec- headers.
+  nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> loadInfo = aHTTPChannel->LoadInfo();
+  if (loadInfo->TriggeringPrincipal()->IsSystemPrincipal()) {
+    ExtContentPolicy extType = loadInfo->GetExternalContentPolicyType();
+    if (extType == ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_FETCH ||
+        extType == ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_XMLHTTPREQUEST) {
+      return;
+    }
+  }
+
+  AddSecFetchDest(aHTTPChannel);
+  AddSecFetchMode(aHTTPChannel);
+  AddSecFetchSite(aHTTPChannel);
+  AddSecFetchUser(aHTTPChannel);
+}