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Diffstat (limited to 'src/modules/rlm_eap/types/rlm_eap_peap/peap.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | src/modules/rlm_eap/types/rlm_eap_peap/peap.c | 1316 |
1 files changed, 1316 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/src/modules/rlm_eap/types/rlm_eap_peap/peap.c b/src/modules/rlm_eap/types/rlm_eap_peap/peap.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a8589ae --- /dev/null +++ b/src/modules/rlm_eap/types/rlm_eap_peap/peap.c @@ -0,0 +1,1316 @@ +/* + * peap.c contains the interfaces that are called from eap + * + * Version: $Id$ + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by + * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or + * (at your option) any later version. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software + * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin St, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301, USA + * + * Copyright 2003 Alan DeKok <aland@freeradius.org> + * Copyright 2006 The FreeRADIUS server project + */ + +RCSID("$Id$") +USES_APPLE_DEPRECATED_API /* OpenSSL API has been deprecated by Apple */ + +#include "eap_peap.h" + +static int setup_fake_request(REQUEST *request, REQUEST *fake, peap_tunnel_t *t); + +/* + * Send protected EAP-Failure + * + * Result-TLV = Failure + */ +static int eappeap_failure(eap_handler_t *handler, tls_session_t *tls_session) +{ + uint8_t tlv_packet[11]; + REQUEST *request = handler->request; + + RDEBUG2("FAILURE"); + + tlv_packet[0] = PW_EAP_REQUEST; + tlv_packet[1] = handler->eap_ds->response->id +1; + tlv_packet[2] = 0; + tlv_packet[3] = 11; /* length of this packet */ + tlv_packet[4] = PW_EAP_TLV; + tlv_packet[5] = 0x80; + tlv_packet[6] = EAP_TLV_ACK_RESULT; + tlv_packet[7] = 0; + tlv_packet[8] = 2; /* length of the data portion */ + tlv_packet[9] = 0; + tlv_packet[10] = EAP_TLV_FAILURE; + + (tls_session->record_plus)(&tls_session->clean_in, tlv_packet, 11); + + /* + * FIXME: Check the return code. + */ + tls_handshake_send(request, tls_session); + + return 1; +} + + +/* + * Send protected EAP-Success + * + * Result-TLV = Success + */ +static int eappeap_success(eap_handler_t *handler, tls_session_t *tls_session) +{ + uint8_t tlv_packet[11]; + REQUEST *request = handler->request; + + RDEBUG2("SUCCESS"); + + tlv_packet[0] = PW_EAP_REQUEST; + tlv_packet[1] = handler->eap_ds->response->id +1; + tlv_packet[2] = 0; + tlv_packet[3] = 11; /* length of this packet */ + tlv_packet[4] = PW_EAP_TLV; + tlv_packet[5] = 0x80; /* mandatory AVP */ + tlv_packet[6] = EAP_TLV_ACK_RESULT; + tlv_packet[7] = 0; + tlv_packet[8] = 2; /* length of the data portion */ + tlv_packet[9] = 0; + tlv_packet[10] = EAP_TLV_SUCCESS; + + (tls_session->record_plus)(&tls_session->clean_in, tlv_packet, 11); + + /* + * FIXME: Check the return code. + */ + tls_handshake_send(request, tls_session); + + return 1; +} + + +static int eappeap_identity(eap_handler_t *handler, tls_session_t *tls_session) +{ + eap_packet_raw_t eap_packet; + + eap_packet.code = PW_EAP_REQUEST; + eap_packet.id = handler->eap_ds->response->id + 1; + eap_packet.length[0] = 0; + eap_packet.length[1] = EAP_HEADER_LEN + 1; + eap_packet.data[0] = PW_EAP_IDENTITY; + + (tls_session->record_plus)(&tls_session->clean_in, + &eap_packet, sizeof(eap_packet)); + + tls_handshake_send(handler->request, tls_session); + (tls_session->record_init)(&tls_session->clean_in); + + return 1; +} + +/* + * Send an MS SoH request + */ +static int eappeap_soh(eap_handler_t *handler, tls_session_t *tls_session) +{ + uint8_t tlv_packet[20]; + + tlv_packet[0] = 254; /* extended type */ + + tlv_packet[1] = 0; + tlv_packet[2] = 0x01; /* ms vendor */ + tlv_packet[3] = 0x37; + + tlv_packet[4] = 0; /* ms soh eap */ + tlv_packet[5] = 0; + tlv_packet[6] = 0; + tlv_packet[7] = 0x21; + + tlv_packet[8] = 0; /* vendor-spec tlv */ + tlv_packet[9] = 7; + + tlv_packet[10] = 0; + tlv_packet[11] = 8; /* payload len */ + + tlv_packet[12] = 0; /* ms vendor */ + tlv_packet[13] = 0; + tlv_packet[14] = 0x01; + tlv_packet[15] = 0x37; + + tlv_packet[16] = 0; + tlv_packet[17] = 2; + tlv_packet[18] = 0; + tlv_packet[19] = 0; + + (tls_session->record_plus)(&tls_session->clean_in, tlv_packet, 20); + tls_handshake_send(handler->request, tls_session); + return 1; +} + +static void eapsoh_verify(REQUEST *request, RADIUS_PACKET *packet, + uint8_t const *data, unsigned int data_len) { + + VALUE_PAIR *vp; + uint8_t eap_method_base; + uint32_t eap_vendor; + uint32_t eap_method; + int rv; + + vp = fr_pair_make(packet, &packet->vps, "SoH-Supported", "no", T_OP_EQ); + if (data && data[0] == PW_EAP_NAK) { + RDEBUG("SoH - client NAKed"); + return; + } + + if (!data || data_len < 8) { + RDEBUG("SoH - eap payload too short"); + return; + } + + eap_method_base = *data++; + if (eap_method_base != 254) { + RDEBUG("SoH - response is not extended EAP: %i", eap_method_base); + return; + } + + eap_vendor = soh_pull_be_24(data); data += 3; + if (eap_vendor != 0x137) { + RDEBUG("SoH - extended eap vendor %08x is not Microsoft", eap_vendor); + return; + } + + eap_method = soh_pull_be_32(data); data += 4; + if (eap_method != 0x21) { + RDEBUG("SoH - response eap type %08x is not EAP-SoH", eap_method); + return; + } + + + rv = soh_verify(request, data, data_len - 8); + if (rv<0) { + RDEBUG("SoH - error decoding payload: %s", fr_strerror()); + } else { + vp->vp_integer = 1; + } +} + +/* + * Verify the tunneled EAP message. + */ +static int eapmessage_verify(REQUEST *request, + uint8_t const *data, unsigned int data_len, int peap_version) +{ + eap_packet_raw_t const *eap_packet = (eap_packet_raw_t const *) data; + eap_type_t eap_method; + + /* + * Hack for now. + */ + if (peap_version == 1) return 1; + + /* + * No data, OR only 1 byte of EAP type. + */ + if (!data || (data_len == 0) || + ((data_len <= 1) && (data[0] != PW_EAP_IDENTITY))) { + return 0; + } + + eap_method = *data; + switch (eap_method) { + case PW_EAP_IDENTITY: + if (data_len == 1) { + RDEBUG2("Identity - "); + return 1; + } + RDEBUG2("Identity - %*s", + data_len - 1, data + 1); + return 1; + + /* + * If the first byte of the packet is + * EAP-Response, and the EAP data is a TLV, + * then it looks OK... + */ + case PW_EAP_RESPONSE: + if (eap_packet->data[0] == PW_EAP_TLV) { + RDEBUG2("Received EAP-TLV response"); + return 1; + } + RDEBUG2("Received unexpected EAP-Response, rejecting the session."); + break; + + + /* + * We normally do Microsoft MS-CHAPv2 (26), versus + * Cisco MS-CHAPv2 (29). + */ + case PW_EAP_MSCHAPV2: + default: + RDEBUG2("EAP method %s (%d)", eap_type2name(eap_method), + eap_method); + return 1; + } + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Convert a pseudo-EAP packet to a list of VALUE_PAIR's. + */ +static VALUE_PAIR *eap2vp(UNUSED REQUEST *request, RADIUS_PACKET *packet, + EAP_DS *eap_ds, + uint8_t const *data, size_t data_len, int peap_version) +{ + size_t total; + uint8_t *p; + VALUE_PAIR *vp = NULL, *head = NULL; + vp_cursor_t cursor; + + if (data_len > 65535) return NULL; /* paranoia */ + + vp = fr_pair_afrom_num(packet, PW_EAP_MESSAGE, 0); + if (!vp) { + return NULL; + } + + total = data_len; + if (total > 249) total = 249; + + if (peap_version == 0) { + /* + * Hand-build an EAP packet from the crap in PEAP version 0. + */ + vp->vp_length = EAP_HEADER_LEN + total; + vp->vp_octets = p = talloc_array(vp, uint8_t, vp->vp_length); + + p[0] = PW_EAP_RESPONSE; + p[1] = eap_ds->response->id; + p[2] = (data_len + EAP_HEADER_LEN) >> 8; + p[3] = (data_len + EAP_HEADER_LEN) & 0xff; + + memcpy(p + EAP_HEADER_LEN, data, total); + + } else { /* peapv1 */ + vp->vp_length = total; + vp->vp_octets = p = talloc_array(vp, uint8_t, vp->vp_length); + memcpy(p, data, total); + } + + fr_cursor_init(&cursor, &head); + fr_cursor_insert(&cursor, vp); + while (total < data_len) { + vp = fr_pair_afrom_num(packet, PW_EAP_MESSAGE, 0); + if (!vp) { + fr_pair_list_free(&head); + return NULL; + } + + fr_pair_value_memcpy(vp, data + total, (data_len - total)); + + total += vp->vp_length; + + fr_cursor_insert(&cursor, vp); + } + + return head; +} + + +/* + * Convert a list of VALUE_PAIR's to an EAP packet, through the + * simple expedient of dumping the EAP message + */ +static int vp2eap(REQUEST *request, tls_session_t *tls_session, VALUE_PAIR *vp) +{ + rad_assert(vp != NULL); + VALUE_PAIR *this; + vp_cursor_t cursor; + size_t header = EAP_HEADER_LEN; + + if (tls_session->peap_flag > 0) header = 0; + + /* + * Skip the id, code, and length. Just write the EAP + * type & data to the client. + */ +#ifndef NDEBUG + if ((rad_debug_lvl > 2) && fr_log_fp) { + size_t i, total, start = header; + total = 0; + + for (this = fr_cursor_init(&cursor, &vp); this; this = fr_cursor_next(&cursor)) { + for (i = start; i < vp->vp_length; i++) { + if ((total & 0x0f) == 0) { + fprintf(fr_log_fp, " PEAP tunnel data out %04x: ", (int) total); + } + fprintf(fr_log_fp, "%02x ", vp->vp_octets[i]); + + if ((total & 0x0f) == 0x0f) { + fprintf(fr_log_fp, "\n"); + } + + total++; + } + + start = 0; + } + + if ((total & 0x0f) != 0) { + fprintf(fr_log_fp, "\n"); + } + } +#endif + + /* + * Send the EAP data in the first attribute, WITHOUT the + * header. + */ + (tls_session->record_plus)(&tls_session->clean_in, vp->vp_octets + header, vp->vp_length - header); + + /* + * Send the rest of the EAP data, but skipping the first VP. + */ + fr_cursor_init(&cursor, &vp); + for (this = fr_cursor_next(&cursor); + this; + this = fr_cursor_next(&cursor)) { + (tls_session->record_plus)(&tls_session->clean_in, this->vp_octets, this->vp_length); + } + + tls_handshake_send(request, tls_session); + + return 1; +} + + +/* + * See if there's a TLV in the response. + */ +static int eappeap_check_tlv(REQUEST *request, uint8_t const *data, + size_t data_len) +{ + eap_packet_raw_t const *eap_packet = (eap_packet_raw_t const *) data; + + if (data_len < 11) return 0; + + /* + * Look for success or failure. + */ + if ((eap_packet->code == PW_EAP_RESPONSE) && + (eap_packet->data[0] == PW_EAP_TLV)) { + if (data[10] == EAP_TLV_SUCCESS) { + return 1; + } + + if (data[10] == EAP_TLV_FAILURE) { + RDEBUG2("Client rejected our response. The password is probably incorrect"); + return 0; + } + } + + RDEBUG("Unknown TLV %02x", data[10]); + + return 0; +} + + +/* + * Use a reply packet to determine what to do. + */ +static rlm_rcode_t CC_HINT(nonnull) process_reply(eap_handler_t *handler, tls_session_t *tls_session, + REQUEST *request, RADIUS_PACKET *reply) +{ + rlm_rcode_t rcode = RLM_MODULE_REJECT; + VALUE_PAIR *vp; + peap_tunnel_t *t = tls_session->opaque; + + if ((rad_debug_lvl > 0) && fr_log_fp) { + RDEBUG("Got tunneled reply RADIUS code %d", reply->code); + rdebug_pair_list(L_DBG_LVL_1, request, reply->vps, NULL); + } + + switch (reply->code) { + case PW_CODE_ACCESS_ACCEPT: + RDEBUG2("Tunneled authentication was successful"); + tls_session->authentication_success = true; + t->status = PEAP_STATUS_SENT_TLV_SUCCESS; + eappeap_success(handler, tls_session); + rcode = RLM_MODULE_HANDLED; + + /* + * If we've been told to use the attributes from + * the reply, then do so. + * + * WARNING: This may leak information about the + * tunneled user! + */ + if (t->use_tunneled_reply) { + RDEBUG2("Saving tunneled attributes for later"); + + /* + * Clean up the tunneled reply. + */ + fr_pair_delete_by_num(&reply->vps, PW_PROXY_STATE, 0, TAG_ANY); + fr_pair_delete_by_num(&reply->vps, PW_EAP_MESSAGE, 0, TAG_ANY); + fr_pair_delete_by_num(&reply->vps, PW_MESSAGE_AUTHENTICATOR, 0, TAG_ANY); + + /* + * Delete MPPE keys & encryption policy. We don't + * want these here. + */ + fr_pair_delete_by_num(&reply->vps, 7, VENDORPEC_MICROSOFT, TAG_ANY); + fr_pair_delete_by_num(&reply->vps, 8, VENDORPEC_MICROSOFT, TAG_ANY); + fr_pair_delete_by_num(&reply->vps, 16, VENDORPEC_MICROSOFT, TAG_ANY); + fr_pair_delete_by_num(&reply->vps, 17, VENDORPEC_MICROSOFT, TAG_ANY); + + fr_pair_list_free(&t->accept_vps); /* for proxying MS-CHAP2 */ + fr_pair_list_mcopy_by_num(t, &t->accept_vps, &reply->vps, 0, 0, TAG_ANY); + rad_assert(!reply->vps); + } + break; + + case PW_CODE_ACCESS_REJECT: + RDEBUG2("Tunneled authentication was rejected"); + t->status = PEAP_STATUS_SENT_TLV_FAILURE; + eappeap_failure(handler, tls_session); + rcode = RLM_MODULE_HANDLED; + break; + + case PW_CODE_ACCESS_CHALLENGE: + RDEBUG2("Got tunneled Access-Challenge"); + + /* + * Keep the State attribute, if necessary. + * + * Get rid of the old State, too. + */ + fr_pair_list_free(&t->state); + fr_pair_list_mcopy_by_num(t, &t->state, &reply->vps, PW_STATE, 0, TAG_ANY); + + /* + * PEAP takes only EAP-Message attributes inside + * of the tunnel. Any Reply-Message in the + * Access-Challenge is ignored. + */ + vp = NULL; + fr_pair_list_mcopy_by_num(t, &vp, &reply->vps, PW_EAP_MESSAGE, 0, TAG_ANY); + + /* + * Handle EAP-MSCHAP-V2, where Access-Accept's + * from the home server may contain MS-CHAP2-Success, + * which the module turns into challenges, so that + * the client may respond to the challenge with + * an "ack" packet. + */ + if (t->home_access_accept && t->use_tunneled_reply) { + RDEBUG2("Saving tunneled attributes for later"); + + /* + * Clean up the tunneled reply. + */ + fr_pair_delete_by_num(&reply->vps, PW_PROXY_STATE, 0, TAG_ANY); + fr_pair_delete_by_num(&reply->vps, PW_MESSAGE_AUTHENTICATOR, 0, TAG_ANY); + + rad_assert(!t->accept_vps); + fr_pair_list_mcopy_by_num(t, &t->accept_vps, &reply->vps, 0, 0, TAG_ANY); + rad_assert(!reply->vps); + } + + /* + * Handle the ACK, by tunneling any necessary reply + * VP's back to the client. + */ + if (vp) { + vp2eap(request, tls_session, vp); + fr_pair_list_free(&vp); + } + + rcode = RLM_MODULE_HANDLED; + break; + + default: + RDEBUG2("Unknown RADIUS packet type %d: rejecting tunneled user", reply->code); + rcode = RLM_MODULE_REJECT; + break; + } + + return rcode; +} + +#ifdef WITH_PROXY +/* + * Do post-proxy processing, + */ +static int CC_HINT(nonnull) eappeap_postproxy(eap_handler_t *handler, void *data) +{ + int rcode; + tls_session_t *tls_session = (tls_session_t *) data; + REQUEST *fake, *request = handler->request; + + RDEBUG2("Passing reply from proxy back into the tunnel"); + + /* + * If there was a fake request associated with the proxied + * request, do more processing of it. + */ + fake = (REQUEST *) request_data_get(handler->request, + handler->request->proxy, + REQUEST_DATA_EAP_MSCHAP_TUNNEL_CALLBACK); + + /* + * Do the callback, if it exists, and if it was a success. + */ + if (fake && (handler->request->proxy_reply->code == PW_CODE_ACCESS_ACCEPT)) { + peap_tunnel_t *t = tls_session->opaque; + + t->home_access_accept = true; + + /* + * Terrible hacks. + */ + rad_assert(!fake->packet); + fake->packet = talloc_steal(fake, request->proxy); + fake->packet->src_ipaddr = request->packet->src_ipaddr; + request->proxy = NULL; + + rad_assert(!fake->reply); + fake->reply = talloc_steal(fake, request->proxy_reply); + request->proxy_reply = NULL; + + if ((rad_debug_lvl > 0) && fr_log_fp) { + fprintf(fr_log_fp, "server %s {\n", fake->server); + } + + fake->reply->code = PW_CODE_ACCESS_ACCEPT; + + /* + * Perform a post-auth stage, which will get the EAP + * handler, too... + */ + fake->options &= ~RAD_REQUEST_OPTION_PROXY_EAP; + RDEBUG2("Passing reply back for EAP-MS-CHAP-V2"); + process_post_proxy(0, fake); + + /* + * FIXME: If rcode returns fail, do something + * intelligent... + */ + rcode = rad_postauth(fake); + + if ((rad_debug_lvl > 0) && fr_log_fp) { + fprintf(fr_log_fp, "} # server %s\n", fake->server); + + RDEBUG("Final reply from tunneled session code %d", fake->reply->code); + rdebug_pair_list(L_DBG_LVL_1, request, fake->reply->vps, NULL); + } + + /* + * Terrible hacks. + */ + request->proxy = talloc_steal(request, fake->packet); + fake->packet = NULL; + request->proxy_reply = talloc_steal(request, fake->reply); + fake->reply = NULL; + + /* + * And we're done with this request. + */ + + switch (rcode) { + case RLM_MODULE_FAIL: + talloc_free(fake); + eaptls_fail(handler, 0); + return 0; + + default: /* Don't Do Anything */ + RDEBUG2("Got reply %d", request->proxy_reply->code); + break; + } + } + talloc_free(fake); /* robust if !fake */ + + /* + * If there was no EAP-Message in the reply packet, then + * we know that we're supposed to re-run the "authenticate" + * stage, in order to get the right kind of handling... + */ + + /* + * Process the reply from the home server. + */ + + rcode = process_reply(handler, tls_session, handler->request, + handler->request->proxy_reply); + + /* + * The proxy code uses the reply from the home server as + * the basis for the reply to the NAS. We don't want that, + * so we toss it, after we've had our way with it. + */ + fr_pair_list_free(&handler->request->proxy_reply->vps); + + switch (rcode) { + case RLM_MODULE_REJECT: + RDEBUG2("Reply was rejected"); + eaptls_fail(handler, 0); + return 0; + + case RLM_MODULE_HANDLED: + RDEBUG2("Reply was handled"); + eaptls_request(handler->eap_ds, tls_session); + request->proxy_reply->code = PW_CODE_ACCESS_CHALLENGE; + return 1; + + case RLM_MODULE_OK: + RDEBUG2("Reply was OK"); + + /* + * Success: Automatically return MPPE keys. + */ + return eaptls_success(handler, 0); + + default: + RDEBUG2("Reply was unknown"); + break; + } + + eaptls_fail(handler, 0); + return 0; +} +#endif + + +static char const *peap_state(peap_tunnel_t *t) +{ + switch (t->status) { + case PEAP_STATUS_TUNNEL_ESTABLISHED: + return "TUNNEL ESTABLISHED"; + + case PEAP_STATUS_WAIT_FOR_SOH_RESPONSE: + return "WAITING FOR SOH RESPONSE"; + + case PEAP_STATUS_INNER_IDENTITY_REQ_SENT: + return "WAITING FOR INNER IDENTITY"; + + case PEAP_STATUS_SENT_TLV_SUCCESS: + return "send tlv success"; + + case PEAP_STATUS_SENT_TLV_FAILURE: + return "send tlv failure"; + + case PEAP_STATUS_PHASE2_INIT: + return "phase2_init"; + + case PEAP_STATUS_PHASE2: + return "phase2"; + + default: + break; + } + return "?"; +} + +static void print_tunneled_data(uint8_t const *data, size_t data_len) +{ + size_t i; + + if ((rad_debug_lvl > 2) && fr_log_fp) { + for (i = 0; i < data_len; i++) { + if ((i & 0x0f) == 0) fprintf(fr_log_fp, " PEAP tunnel data in %02x: ", (int) i); + + fprintf(fr_log_fp, "%02x ", data[i]); + + if ((i & 0x0f) == 0x0f) fprintf(fr_log_fp, "\n"); + } + if ((data_len & 0x0f) != 0) fprintf(fr_log_fp, "\n"); + } +} + + +/* + * Process the pseudo-EAP contents of the tunneled data. + */ +rlm_rcode_t eappeap_process(eap_handler_t *handler, tls_session_t *tls_session, int auth_type_eap) +{ + peap_tunnel_t *t = tls_session->opaque; + REQUEST *fake; + VALUE_PAIR *vp; + rlm_rcode_t rcode = RLM_MODULE_REJECT; + uint8_t const *data; + unsigned int data_len; + size_t header = 0; + + REQUEST *request = handler->request; + EAP_DS *eap_ds = handler->eap_ds; + + /* + * Just look at the buffer directly, without doing + * record_minus. This lets us avoid another data copy. + */ + data_len = tls_session->clean_out.used; + tls_session->clean_out.used = 0; + data = tls_session->clean_out.data; + + RDEBUG2("PEAP state %s", peap_state(t)); + + if ((t->status != PEAP_STATUS_TUNNEL_ESTABLISHED) && + !eapmessage_verify(request, data, data_len, tls_session->peap_flag)) { + REDEBUG("Tunneled data is invalid"); + if (rad_debug_lvl > 2) print_tunneled_data(data, data_len); + return RLM_MODULE_REJECT; + } + + if (tls_session->peap_flag > 0) header = EAP_HEADER_LEN; + + switch (t->status) { + case PEAP_STATUS_TUNNEL_ESTABLISHED: + /* FIXME: should be no data in the buffer here, check & assert? */ + + if (SSL_session_reused(tls_session->ssl)) { + RDEBUG2("Skipping Phase2 because of session resumption"); + t->session_resumption_state = PEAP_RESUMPTION_YES; + if (t->soh) { + t->status = PEAP_STATUS_WAIT_FOR_SOH_RESPONSE; + RDEBUG2("Requesting SoH from client"); + eappeap_soh(handler, tls_session); + return RLM_MODULE_HANDLED; + } + /* we're good, send success TLV */ + t->status = PEAP_STATUS_SENT_TLV_SUCCESS; + eappeap_success(handler, tls_session); + + } else { + /* send an identity request */ + t->session_resumption_state = PEAP_RESUMPTION_NO; + t->status = PEAP_STATUS_INNER_IDENTITY_REQ_SENT; + tls_session->session_not_resumed = true; + eappeap_identity(handler, tls_session); + } + return RLM_MODULE_HANDLED; + + case PEAP_STATUS_INNER_IDENTITY_REQ_SENT: + /* we're expecting an identity response */ + if (data[header] != PW_EAP_IDENTITY) { + REDEBUG("Expected EAP-Identity, got something else"); + return RLM_MODULE_REJECT; + } + + /* + * Save it for later. + */ + t->username = fr_pair_make(t, NULL, "User-Name", NULL, T_OP_EQ); + rad_assert(t->username != NULL); + + fr_pair_value_bstrncpy(t->username, data + header + 1, data_len - header - 1); + + RDEBUG("Got inner identity '%s'", t->username->vp_strvalue); + if (t->soh) { + t->status = PEAP_STATUS_WAIT_FOR_SOH_RESPONSE; + RDEBUG2("Requesting SoH from client"); + eappeap_soh(handler, tls_session); + return RLM_MODULE_HANDLED; + } + t->status = PEAP_STATUS_PHASE2_INIT; + break; + + case PEAP_STATUS_WAIT_FOR_SOH_RESPONSE: + fake = request_alloc_fake(request); + rad_assert(!fake->packet->vps); + eapsoh_verify(fake, fake->packet, data + header, data_len - header); + setup_fake_request(request, fake, t); + + if (t->soh_virtual_server) { + fake->server = t->soh_virtual_server; + } + RDEBUG("Sending SoH request to server %s", fake->server ? fake->server : "NULL"); + rad_virtual_server(fake); + + if (fake->reply->code != PW_CODE_ACCESS_ACCEPT) { + RDEBUG2("SoH was rejected"); + talloc_free(fake); + t->status = PEAP_STATUS_SENT_TLV_FAILURE; + eappeap_failure(handler, tls_session); + return RLM_MODULE_HANDLED; + } + + /* save the SoH VPs */ + rad_assert(!t->soh_reply_vps); + fr_pair_list_mcopy_by_num(t, &t->soh_reply_vps, &fake->reply->vps, 0, 0, TAG_ANY); + rad_assert(!fake->reply->vps); + talloc_free(fake); + + if (t->session_resumption_state == PEAP_RESUMPTION_YES) { + /* we're good, send success TLV */ + t->status = PEAP_STATUS_SENT_TLV_SUCCESS; + eappeap_success(handler, tls_session); + return RLM_MODULE_HANDLED; + } + + t->status = PEAP_STATUS_PHASE2_INIT; + break; + + + /* + * If we authenticated the user, then it's OK. + */ + case PEAP_STATUS_SENT_TLV_SUCCESS: + if (eappeap_check_tlv(request, data + header, data_len - header)) { + RDEBUG2("Success"); + return RLM_MODULE_OK; + } + + /* + * Otherwise, the client rejected the session + * resumption. If the session is being re-used, + * we need to do a full authentication. + * + * We do this by sending an EAP-Identity request + * inside of the PEAP tunnel. + */ + if (t->session_resumption_state == PEAP_RESUMPTION_YES) { + RDEBUG2("Client rejected session resumption. Re-starting full authentication"); + + /* + * Mark session resumption status. + */ + t->status = PEAP_STATUS_INNER_IDENTITY_REQ_SENT; + t->session_resumption_state = PEAP_RESUMPTION_NO; + + eappeap_identity(handler, tls_session); + return RLM_MODULE_HANDLED; + } + + REDEBUG("We sent a success, but the client did not agree"); + return RLM_MODULE_REJECT; + + /* + * Supplicant ACKs our failure. + */ + case PEAP_STATUS_SENT_TLV_FAILURE: + RINDENT(); + REDEBUG("The users session was previously rejected: returning reject (again.)"); + RDEBUG("This means you need to read the PREVIOUS messages in the debug output"); + RDEBUG("to find out the reason why the user was rejected"); + RDEBUG("Look for \"reject\" or \"fail\". Those earlier messages will tell you"); + RDEBUG("what went wrong, and how to fix the problem"); + REXDENT(); + + return RLM_MODULE_REJECT; + + case PEAP_STATUS_PHASE2_INIT: + RDEBUG("In state machine in phase2 init?"); + + case PEAP_STATUS_PHASE2: + break; + + default: + REDEBUG("Unhandled state in peap"); + return RLM_MODULE_REJECT; + } + + fake = request_alloc_fake(request); + + rad_assert(!fake->packet->vps); + + switch (t->status) { + /* + * If we're in PHASE2_INIT, the phase2 method hasn't been + * sent an Identity packet yet; do so from the stored + * username and this will kick off the phase2 eap method + */ + + case PEAP_STATUS_PHASE2_INIT: { + size_t len = t->username->vp_length + EAP_HEADER_LEN + 1; + uint8_t *q; + + t->status = PEAP_STATUS_PHASE2; + + vp = fr_pair_afrom_num(fake->packet, PW_EAP_MESSAGE, 0); + vp->vp_length = len; + vp->vp_octets = q = talloc_array(vp, uint8_t, vp->vp_length); + + q[0] = PW_EAP_RESPONSE; + q[1] = eap_ds->response->id; + q[2] = (len >> 8) & 0xff; + q[3] = len & 0xff; + q[4] = PW_EAP_IDENTITY; + + memcpy(q + EAP_HEADER_LEN + 1, + t->username->vp_strvalue, t->username->vp_length); + + fr_pair_add(&fake->packet->vps, vp); + + if (t->default_method != 0) { + RDEBUG2("Setting default EAP type for tunneled EAP session"); + vp = fr_pair_make(fake, &fake->config, "EAP-Type", "0", T_OP_EQ); + vp->vp_integer = t->default_method; + } + break; } + + case PEAP_STATUS_PHASE2: + fake->packet->vps = eap2vp(request, fake->packet, + eap_ds, data, data_len, tls_session->peap_flag); + if (!fake->packet->vps) { + talloc_free(fake); + RDEBUG2("Unable to convert tunneled EAP packet to internal server data structures"); + return RLM_MODULE_REJECT; + } + break; + + default: + REDEBUG("Invalid state change in PEAP"); + return RLM_MODULE_REJECT; + } + + RDEBUG2("Got tunneled request"); + rdebug_pair_list(L_DBG_LVL_2, request, fake->packet->vps, NULL); + + /* + * Update other items in the REQUEST data structure. + */ + if (!t->username) { + /* + * There's no User-Name in the tunneled session, + * so we add one here, by pulling it out of the + * EAP-Identity packet. + */ + if ((data[header] == PW_EAP_IDENTITY) && (data_len > (1 + header))) { + t->username = fr_pair_make(t, NULL, "User-Name", NULL, T_OP_EQ); + rad_assert(t->username != NULL); + + fr_pair_value_bstrncpy(t->username, data + header + 1, data_len - header - 1); + + RDEBUG2("Got tunneled identity of %s", t->username->vp_strvalue); + + /* + * If there's a default EAP type, + * set it here. + */ + if (t->default_method != 0) { + RDEBUG2("Setting default EAP type for tunneled EAP session"); + vp = fr_pair_make(fake, &fake->config, "EAP-Type", "0", T_OP_EQ); + vp->vp_integer = t->default_method; + } + } + } /* else there WAS a t->username */ + + setup_fake_request(request, fake, t); + + if ((vp = fr_pair_find_by_num(request->config, PW_VIRTUAL_SERVER, 0, TAG_ANY)) != NULL) { + fake->server = vp->vp_strvalue; + + } else if (t->virtual_server) { + fake->server = t->virtual_server; + + } /* else fake->server == request->server */ + + if (fake->server) { + RDEBUG2("Sending tunneled request to %s", fake->server); + } else { + RDEBUG2("Sending tunnelled request"); + } + rdebug_pair_list(L_DBG_LVL_2, request, fake->packet->vps, NULL); + + /* + * Call authentication recursively, which will + * do PAP, CHAP, MS-CHAP, etc. + */ + rad_virtual_server(fake); + + /* + * Note that we don't do *anything* with the reply + * attributes. + */ + RDEBUG2("Got tunneled reply code %d", fake->reply->code); + rdebug_pair_list(L_DBG_LVL_2, request, fake->reply->vps, NULL); + + /* + * Decide what to do with the reply. + */ + switch (fake->reply->code) { + case 0: /* No reply code, must be proxied... */ +#ifdef WITH_PROXY + vp = fr_pair_find_by_num(fake->config, PW_PROXY_TO_REALM, 0, TAG_ANY); + + if (vp) { + eap_tunnel_data_t *tunnel; + bool proxy_as_eap = t->proxy_tunneled_request_as_eap; + VALUE_PAIR *flag = fr_pair_find_by_num(fake->config, PW_PROXY_TUNNELED_REQUEST_AS_EAP, 0, TAG_ANY); + + if (flag) proxy_as_eap = flag->vp_integer; + + /* + * The tunneled request was NOT handled, + * it has to be proxied. This means that + * the "authenticate" stage was never + * performed. + * + * If we are told to NOT proxy the + * tunneled request as EAP, then this + * means that we've got to decode it, + * which means that we MUST run the + * "authenticate" portion by hand, here. + * + * Once the tunneled EAP session is ALMOST + * done, THEN we proxy it... + */ + if (!proxy_as_eap) { + fake->options |= RAD_REQUEST_OPTION_PROXY_EAP; + + /* + * Hmm... should we check for + * Auth-Type & EAP-Message here? + */ + + if (!auth_type_eap) { + RERROR("You must set 'inner_eap_module' in the 'peap' configuration"); + RERROR("This is required in order to proxy the inner EAP session."); + rcode = RLM_MODULE_REJECT; + goto done; + } + + /* + * Run the EAP authentication. + */ + RDEBUG2("Calling authenticate in order to initiate tunneled EAP session"); + rcode = process_authenticate(auth_type_eap, fake); + if (rcode == RLM_MODULE_OK) { + /* + * Authentication succeeded! Rah! + */ + fake->reply->code = PW_CODE_ACCESS_ACCEPT; + goto do_process; + } + + if (rcode != RLM_MODULE_HANDLED) { + RDEBUG("Can't handle the return code %d", rcode); + rcode = RLM_MODULE_REJECT; + goto done; + } + + /* + * The module decided it wasn't + * done. Handle it like normal. + */ + if ((fake->options & RAD_REQUEST_OPTION_PROXY_EAP) == 0) { + RDEBUG2("Cancelling proxy to realm %s until the tunneled EAP session " + "has been established", vp->vp_strvalue); + goto do_process; + } + + /* + * The module has decoded the + * EAP-Message into another set + * of attributes. + */ + fr_pair_delete_by_num(&fake->packet->vps, + PW_EAP_MESSAGE, 0, TAG_ANY); + } + + RDEBUG2("Tunnelled authentication will be proxied to %s", vp->vp_strvalue); + + /* + * Tell the original request that it's going + * to be proxied. + */ + fr_pair_list_mcopy_by_num(request, &request->config, + &fake->config, + PW_PROXY_TO_REALM, 0, TAG_ANY); + + /* + * Seed the proxy packet with the + * tunneled request. + */ + rad_assert(!request->proxy); + request->proxy = talloc_steal(request, fake->packet); + memset(&request->proxy->src_ipaddr, 0, + sizeof(request->proxy->src_ipaddr)); + memset(&request->proxy->dst_ipaddr, 0, + sizeof(request->proxy->dst_ipaddr)); + request->proxy->src_port = 0; + request->proxy->dst_port = 0; + fake->packet = NULL; + rad_free(&fake->reply); + fake->reply = NULL; + + /* + * Set up the callbacks for the tunnel + */ + tunnel = talloc_zero(request, eap_tunnel_data_t); + tunnel->tls_session = tls_session; + tunnel->callback = eappeap_postproxy; + + /* + * Associate the callback with the request. + */ + rcode = request_data_add(request, + request->proxy, + REQUEST_DATA_EAP_TUNNEL_CALLBACK, + tunnel, false); + rad_assert(rcode == 0); + + /* + * We're not proxying it as EAP, so we've got + * to do the callback later. + */ + if ((fake->options & RAD_REQUEST_OPTION_PROXY_EAP) != 0) { + RDEBUG2("Remembering to do EAP-MS-CHAP-V2 post-proxy"); + + /* + * rlm_eap.c has taken care of associating + * the handler with the fake request. + * + * So we associate the fake request with + * this request. + */ + rcode = request_data_add(request, request->proxy, + REQUEST_DATA_EAP_MSCHAP_TUNNEL_CALLBACK, + fake, true); + rad_assert(rcode == 0); + + /* + * Do NOT free the fake request! + */ + return RLM_MODULE_UPDATED; + } + + /* + * Didn't authenticate the packet, but + * we're proxying it. + */ + rcode = RLM_MODULE_UPDATED; + + } else +#endif /* WITH_PROXY */ + { + REDEBUG("Unknown RADIUS packet type %d: rejecting tunneled user", fake->reply->code); + rcode = RLM_MODULE_REJECT; + } + break; + + default: +#ifdef WITH_PROXY + do_process: +#endif + rcode = process_reply(handler, tls_session, request, + fake->reply); + break; + } + +#ifdef WITH_PROXY + done: +#endif + talloc_free(fake); + + return rcode; +} + +static int CC_HINT(nonnull) setup_fake_request(REQUEST *request, REQUEST *fake, peap_tunnel_t *t) { + + VALUE_PAIR *vp; + + /* + * Tell the request that it's a fake one. + */ + fr_pair_make(fake->packet, &fake->packet->vps, "Freeradius-Proxied-To", "127.0.0.1", T_OP_EQ); + + if (t->username) { + vp = fr_pair_list_copy(fake->packet, t->username); + fr_pair_add(&fake->packet->vps, vp); + fake->username = vp; + RDEBUG2("Setting User-Name to %s", fake->username->vp_strvalue); + } else { + RDEBUG2("No tunnel username (SSL resumption?)"); + } + + + /* + * Add the State attribute, too, if it exists. + */ + if (t->state) { + vp = fr_pair_list_copy(fake->packet, t->state); + if (vp) fr_pair_add(&fake->packet->vps, vp); + } + + /* + * If this is set, we copy SOME of the request attributes + * from outside of the tunnel to inside of the tunnel. + * + * We copy ONLY those attributes which do NOT already + * exist in the tunneled request. + * + * This code is copied from ../rlm_eap_ttls/ttls.c + */ + if (t->copy_request_to_tunnel) { + VALUE_PAIR *copy; + vp_cursor_t cursor; + + for (vp = fr_cursor_init(&cursor, &request->packet->vps); + vp; + vp = fr_cursor_next(&cursor)) { + /* + * The attribute is a server-side thingy, + * don't copy it. + */ + if ((vp->da->attr > 255) && (((vp->da->attr >> 16) & 0xffff) == 0)) { + continue; + } + + /* + * The outside attribute is already in the + * tunnel, don't copy it. + * + * This works for BOTH attributes which + * are originally in the tunneled request, + * AND attributes which are copied there + * from below. + */ + if (fr_pair_find_by_da(fake->packet->vps, vp->da, TAG_ANY)) continue; + + /* + * Some attributes are handled specially. + */ + if (!vp->da->vendor) switch (vp->da->attr) { + /* + * NEVER copy Message-Authenticator, + * EAP-Message, or State. They're + * only for outside of the tunnel. + */ + case PW_USER_NAME: + case PW_USER_PASSWORD: + case PW_CHAP_PASSWORD: + case PW_CHAP_CHALLENGE: + case PW_PROXY_STATE: + case PW_MESSAGE_AUTHENTICATOR: + case PW_EAP_MESSAGE: + case PW_STATE: + continue; + + /* + * By default, copy it over. + */ + default: + break; + } + + /* + * Don't copy from the head, we've already + * checked it. + */ + copy = fr_pair_list_copy_by_num(fake->packet, vp, vp->da->attr, vp->da->vendor, TAG_ANY); + fr_pair_add(&fake->packet->vps, copy); + } + } + + return 0; +} |