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| author | Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org> | 2024-06-17 09:21:29 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org> | 2024-06-17 09:21:29 +0000 |
| commit | 920a7eed738050b983347797a0d23122cd799699 (patch) | |
| tree | 6254bc8e87d554b832d84d39da16e1d268080487 | |
| parent | Merging upstream version 1:2.45.2. (diff) | |
| download | git-920a7eed738050b983347797a0d23122cd799699.tar.xz git-920a7eed738050b983347797a0d23122cd799699.zip | |
Merging debian version 1:2.45.2-1.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>
11 files changed, 181 insertions, 824 deletions
diff --git a/debian/changelog b/debian/changelog index 1c9a8d7..5e7a213 100644 --- a/debian/changelog +++ b/debian/changelog @@ -1,3 +1,10 @@ +git (1:2.45.2-1) unstable; urgency=low + + * new upstream point release (see RelNotes/2.45.2.txt). + * debian/patches/*: remove; applied upstream. + + -- Jonathan Nieder <jrnieder@gmail.com> Sun, 16 Jun 2024 15:40:09 +0000 + git (1:2.45.1-1~progress7.99u1) graograman-backports; urgency=medium * Uploading to graograman-backports, remaining changes: diff --git a/debian/changelog.upstream b/debian/changelog.upstream index 2342f06..d8b1659 100644 --- a/debian/changelog.upstream +++ b/debian/changelog.upstream @@ -1,3 +1,26 @@ +Version v2.45.2; changes since v2.45.1: +--------------------------------------- + +Jeff King (5): + send-email: drop FakeTerm hack + send-email: avoid creating more than one Term::ReadLine object + ci: drop mention of BREW_INSTALL_PACKAGES variable + ci: avoid bare "gcc" for osx-gcc job + ci: stop installing "gcc-13" for osx-gcc + +Johannes Schindelin (6): + hook: plug a new memory leak + init: use the correct path of the templates directory again + Revert "core.hooksPath: add some protection while cloning" + tests: verify that `clone -c core.hooksPath=/dev/null` works again + clone: drop the protections where hooks aren't run + Revert "Add a helper function to compare file contents" + +Junio C Hamano (2): + Revert "fsck: warn about symlink pointing inside a gitdir" + Git 2.39.5 + + Version v2.45.1; changes since v2.45.0: --------------------------------------- @@ -175,7 +198,7 @@ Yehezkel Bernat (1): t9604: Fix test for musl libc and new Debian -Version v2.45.0-rc0; changes since v2.44.1: +Version v2.45.0-rc0; changes since v2.44.2: ------------------------------------------- Ahelenia Ziemiańska (1): @@ -772,6 +795,29 @@ shejialuo (1): t9117: prefer test_path_* helper functions +Version v2.44.2; changes since v2.44.1: +--------------------------------------- + +Jeff King (5): + send-email: drop FakeTerm hack + send-email: avoid creating more than one Term::ReadLine object + ci: drop mention of BREW_INSTALL_PACKAGES variable + ci: avoid bare "gcc" for osx-gcc job + ci: stop installing "gcc-13" for osx-gcc + +Johannes Schindelin (6): + hook: plug a new memory leak + init: use the correct path of the templates directory again + Revert "core.hooksPath: add some protection while cloning" + tests: verify that `clone -c core.hooksPath=/dev/null` works again + clone: drop the protections where hooks aren't run + Revert "Add a helper function to compare file contents" + +Junio C Hamano (2): + Revert "fsck: warn about symlink pointing inside a gitdir" + Git 2.39.5 + + Version v2.44.1; changes since v2.44.0: --------------------------------------- @@ -966,7 +1012,7 @@ Victoria Dye (1): ref-filter.c: sort formatted dates by byte value -Version v2.44.0-rc0; changes since v2.43.4: +Version v2.44.0-rc0; changes since v2.43.5: ------------------------------------------- Achu Luma (2): @@ -1315,6 +1361,29 @@ Zach FettersMoore (1): subtree: fix split processing with multiple subtrees present +Version v2.43.5; changes since v2.43.4: +--------------------------------------- + +Jeff King (5): + send-email: drop FakeTerm hack + send-email: avoid creating more than one Term::ReadLine object + ci: drop mention of BREW_INSTALL_PACKAGES variable + ci: avoid bare "gcc" for osx-gcc job + ci: stop installing "gcc-13" for osx-gcc + +Johannes Schindelin (6): + hook: plug a new memory leak + init: use the correct path of the templates directory again + Revert "core.hooksPath: add some protection while cloning" + tests: verify that `clone -c core.hooksPath=/dev/null` works again + clone: drop the protections where hooks aren't run + Revert "Add a helper function to compare file contents" + +Junio C Hamano (2): + Revert "fsck: warn about symlink pointing inside a gitdir" + Git 2.39.5 + + Version v2.43.4; changes since v2.43.3: --------------------------------------- @@ -1763,7 +1832,7 @@ brian m. carlson (1): merge-file: add an option to process object IDs -Version v2.43.0-rc0; changes since v2.42.2: +Version v2.43.0-rc0; changes since v2.42.3: ------------------------------------------- Alyssa Ross (1): @@ -2159,6 +2228,29 @@ brian m. carlson (1): doc: correct the 50 characters soft limit (+) +Version v2.42.3; changes since v2.42.2: +--------------------------------------- + +Jeff King (5): + send-email: drop FakeTerm hack + send-email: avoid creating more than one Term::ReadLine object + ci: drop mention of BREW_INSTALL_PACKAGES variable + ci: avoid bare "gcc" for osx-gcc job + ci: stop installing "gcc-13" for osx-gcc + +Johannes Schindelin (6): + hook: plug a new memory leak + init: use the correct path of the templates directory again + Revert "core.hooksPath: add some protection while cloning" + tests: verify that `clone -c core.hooksPath=/dev/null` works again + clone: drop the protections where hooks aren't run + Revert "Add a helper function to compare file contents" + +Junio C Hamano (2): + Revert "fsck: warn about symlink pointing inside a gitdir" + Git 2.39.5 + + Version v2.42.2; changes since v2.42.1: --------------------------------------- @@ -2477,7 +2569,7 @@ brian m. carlson (2): gitignore: ignore clangd .cache directory -Version v2.42.0-rc0; changes since v2.41.1: +Version v2.42.0-rc0; changes since v2.41.2: ------------------------------------------- Alejandro R. Sedeño (1): @@ -2965,6 +3057,29 @@ brian m. carlson (7): var: add config file locations +Version v2.41.2; changes since v2.41.1: +--------------------------------------- + +Jeff King (5): + send-email: drop FakeTerm hack + send-email: avoid creating more than one Term::ReadLine object + ci: drop mention of BREW_INSTALL_PACKAGES variable + ci: avoid bare "gcc" for osx-gcc job + ci: stop installing "gcc-13" for osx-gcc + +Johannes Schindelin (6): + hook: plug a new memory leak + init: use the correct path of the templates directory again + Revert "core.hooksPath: add some protection while cloning" + tests: verify that `clone -c core.hooksPath=/dev/null` works again + clone: drop the protections where hooks aren't run + Revert "Add a helper function to compare file contents" + +Junio C Hamano (2): + Revert "fsck: warn about symlink pointing inside a gitdir" + Git 2.39.5 + + Version v2.41.1; changes since v2.41.0: --------------------------------------- @@ -3113,7 +3228,7 @@ brian m. carlson (1): upload-pack: advertise capabilities when cloning empty repos -Version v2.41.0-rc0; changes since v2.40.2: +Version v2.41.0-rc0; changes since v2.40.3: ------------------------------------------- Adam Johnson (1): @@ -3700,6 +3815,29 @@ ZheNing Hu (2): branch, for-each-ref, tag: add option to omit empty lines +Version v2.40.3; changes since v2.40.2: +--------------------------------------- + +Jeff King (5): + send-email: drop FakeTerm hack + send-email: avoid creating more than one Term::ReadLine object + ci: drop mention of BREW_INSTALL_PACKAGES variable + ci: avoid bare "gcc" for osx-gcc job + ci: stop installing "gcc-13" for osx-gcc + +Johannes Schindelin (6): + hook: plug a new memory leak + init: use the correct path of the templates directory again + Revert "core.hooksPath: add some protection while cloning" + tests: verify that `clone -c core.hooksPath=/dev/null` works again + clone: drop the protections where hooks aren't run + Revert "Add a helper function to compare file contents" + +Junio C Hamano (2): + Revert "fsck: warn about symlink pointing inside a gitdir" + Git 2.39.5 + + Version v2.40.2; changes since v2.40.1: --------------------------------------- @@ -3929,7 +4067,7 @@ idriss fekir (1): trace.c, git.c: remove unnecessary parameter to trace_repo_setup() -Version v2.40.0-rc0; changes since v2.39.4: +Version v2.40.0-rc0; changes since v2.39.5: ------------------------------------------- Adam Szkoda (1): @@ -4337,6 +4475,29 @@ ZheNing Hu (1): date.c: allow ISO 8601 reduced precision times +Version v2.39.5; changes since v2.39.4: +--------------------------------------- + +Jeff King (5): + send-email: drop FakeTerm hack + send-email: avoid creating more than one Term::ReadLine object + ci: drop mention of BREW_INSTALL_PACKAGES variable + ci: avoid bare "gcc" for osx-gcc job + ci: stop installing "gcc-13" for osx-gcc + +Johannes Schindelin (6): + hook: plug a new memory leak + init: use the correct path of the templates directory again + Revert "core.hooksPath: add some protection while cloning" + tests: verify that `clone -c core.hooksPath=/dev/null` works again + clone: drop the protections where hooks aren't run + Revert "Add a helper function to compare file contents" + +Junio C Hamano (2): + Revert "fsck: warn about symlink pointing inside a gitdir" + Git 2.39.5 + + Version v2.39.4; changes since v2.39.3: --------------------------------------- diff --git a/debian/patches/0001-hook-plug-a-new-memory-leak.diff b/debian/patches/0001-hook-plug-a-new-memory-leak.diff deleted file mode 100644 index ab74831..0000000 --- a/debian/patches/0001-hook-plug-a-new-memory-leak.diff +++ /dev/null @@ -1,34 +0,0 @@ -From 94f95a123b10f3837e181ad93b81f1a4f53bb8fc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de> -Date: Sat, 18 May 2024 10:32:39 +0000 -Subject: hook: plug a new memory leak - -commit 2811ce3a79dc8a0105a6defb59718b35f5b397aa upstream. - -In 8db1e8743c0 (clone: prevent hooks from running during a clone, -2024-03-28), I introduced an inadvertent memory leak that was -unfortunately not caught before v2.45.1 was released. Here is a fix. - -Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de> -Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com> -Signed-off-by: Jonathan Nieder <jrnieder@gmail.com> ---- - hook.c | 4 +++- - 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) - -diff --git a/hook.c b/hook.c -index eebc4d44734..8de469b134a 100644 ---- a/hook.c -+++ b/hook.c -@@ -26,8 +26,10 @@ static int identical_to_template_hook(const char *name, const char *path) - found_template_hook = access(template_path.buf, X_OK) >= 0; - } - #endif -- if (!found_template_hook) -+ if (!found_template_hook) { -+ strbuf_release(&template_path); - return 0; -+ } - - ret = do_files_match(template_path.buf, path); - diff --git a/debian/patches/0002-Revert-core.hooksPath-add-some-protection-while-cloni.diff b/debian/patches/0002-Revert-core.hooksPath-add-some-protection-while-cloni.diff deleted file mode 100644 index 8e1c975..0000000 --- a/debian/patches/0002-Revert-core.hooksPath-add-some-protection-while-cloni.diff +++ /dev/null @@ -1,82 +0,0 @@ -From 7db946419c29e185f1cc6e544cfb47b442019ac7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de> -Date: Sat, 18 May 2024 10:32:41 +0000 -Subject: Revert "core.hooksPath: add some protection while cloning" - -commit f13e8e2ea56ceef593311b3cff1ba7ba1a493682 upstream. - -This defense-in-depth was intended to protect the clone operation -against future escalations where bugs in `git clone` would allow -attackers to write arbitrary files in the `.git/` directory would allow -for Remote Code Execution attacks via maliciously-placed hooks. - -However, it turns out that the `core.hooksPath` protection has -unintentional side effects so severe that they do not justify the -benefit of the protections. For example, it has been reported in -https://lore.kernel.org/git/FAFA34CB-9732-4A0A-87FB-BDB272E6AEE8@alchemists.io/ -that the following invocation, which is intended to make `git clone` -safer, is itself broken by that protective measure: - - git clone --config core.hooksPath=/dev/null <url> - -Since it turns out that the benefit does not justify the cost, let's revert -20f3588efc6 (core.hooksPath: add some protection while cloning, -2024-03-30). - -Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de> -Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com> -Signed-off-by: Jonathan Nieder <jrnieder@gmail.com> ---- - config.c | 13 +------------ - t/t1800-hook.sh | 15 --------------- - 2 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 27 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/config.c b/config.c -index 77a0fd2d80e..ae3652b08fa 100644 ---- a/config.c -+++ b/config.c -@@ -1416,19 +1416,8 @@ static int git_default_core_config(const char *var, const char *value, - if (!strcmp(var, "core.attributesfile")) - return git_config_pathname(&git_attributes_file, var, value); - -- if (!strcmp(var, "core.hookspath")) { -- if (ctx->kvi && ctx->kvi->scope == CONFIG_SCOPE_LOCAL && -- git_env_bool("GIT_CLONE_PROTECTION_ACTIVE", 0)) -- die(_("active `core.hooksPath` found in the local " -- "repository config:\n\t%s\nFor security " -- "reasons, this is disallowed by default.\nIf " -- "this is intentional and the hook should " -- "actually be run, please\nrun the command " -- "again with " -- "`GIT_CLONE_PROTECTION_ACTIVE=false`"), -- value); -+ if (!strcmp(var, "core.hookspath")) - return git_config_pathname(&git_hooks_path, var, value); -- } - - if (!strcmp(var, "core.bare")) { - is_bare_repository_cfg = git_config_bool(var, value); -diff --git a/t/t1800-hook.sh b/t/t1800-hook.sh -index 1894ebeb0e8..8b0234cf2d5 100755 ---- a/t/t1800-hook.sh -+++ b/t/t1800-hook.sh -@@ -185,19 +185,4 @@ test_expect_success 'stdin to hooks' ' - test_cmp expect actual - ' - --test_expect_success 'clone protections' ' -- test_config core.hooksPath "$(pwd)/my-hooks" && -- mkdir -p my-hooks && -- write_script my-hooks/test-hook <<-\EOF && -- echo Hook ran $1 -- EOF -- -- git hook run test-hook 2>err && -- test_grep "Hook ran" err && -- test_must_fail env GIT_CLONE_PROTECTION_ACTIVE=true \ -- git hook run test-hook 2>err && -- test_grep "active .core.hooksPath" err && -- test_grep ! "Hook ran" err --' -- - test_done diff --git a/debian/patches/0003-tests-verify-that-clone-c-core.hooksPath-dev-null-wor.diff b/debian/patches/0003-tests-verify-that-clone-c-core.hooksPath-dev-null-wor.diff deleted file mode 100644 index 9a494d9..0000000 --- a/debian/patches/0003-tests-verify-that-clone-c-core.hooksPath-dev-null-wor.diff +++ /dev/null @@ -1,48 +0,0 @@ -From ce34e1b7a072db221190446e79cb373c7f6010a5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de> -Date: Sat, 18 May 2024 10:32:42 +0000 -Subject: tests: verify that `clone -c core.hooksPath=/dev/null` works again - -commit a25a15726f4d1bf1c8362f1b3146096d6a87f965 upstream. - -As part of the protections added in Git v2.45.1 and friends, -repository-local `core.hooksPath` settings are no longer allowed, as a -defense-in-depth mechanism to prevent future Git vulnerabilities to -raise to critical level if those vulnerabilities inadvertently allow the -repository-local config to be written. - -What the added protection did not anticipate is that such a -repository-local `core.hooksPath` can not only be used to point to -maliciously-placed scripts in the current worktree, but also to -_prevent_ hooks from being called altogether. - -We just reverted the `core.hooksPath` protections, based on the Git -maintainer's recommendation in -https://lore.kernel.org/git/xmqq4jaxvm8z.fsf@gitster.g/ to address this -concern as well as related ones. Let's make sure that we won't regress -while trying to protect the clone operation further. - -Reported-by: Brooke Kuhlmann <brooke@alchemists.io> -Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de> -Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com> -Signed-off-by: Jonathan Nieder <jrnieder@gmail.com> ---- - t/t1350-config-hooks-path.sh | 7 +++++++ - 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+) - -diff --git a/t/t1350-config-hooks-path.sh b/t/t1350-config-hooks-path.sh -index f6dc83e2aab..45a04929170 100755 ---- a/t/t1350-config-hooks-path.sh -+++ b/t/t1350-config-hooks-path.sh -@@ -41,4 +41,11 @@ test_expect_success 'git rev-parse --git-path hooks' ' - test .git/custom-hooks/abc = "$(cat actual)" - ' - -+test_expect_success 'core.hooksPath=/dev/null' ' -+ git clone -c core.hooksPath=/dev/null . no-templates && -+ value="$(git -C no-templates config --local core.hooksPath)" && -+ # The Bash used by Git for Windows rewrites `/dev/null` to `nul` -+ { test /dev/null = "$value" || test nul = "$value"; } -+' -+ - test_done diff --git a/debian/patches/0004-hook-clone-protections-add-escape-hatch.diff b/debian/patches/0004-hook-clone-protections-add-escape-hatch.diff deleted file mode 100644 index b2aa135..0000000 --- a/debian/patches/0004-hook-clone-protections-add-escape-hatch.diff +++ /dev/null @@ -1,182 +0,0 @@ -From 1f34eea689413fa10a664f4c154b097be7796b0a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de> -Date: Sat, 18 May 2024 10:32:43 +0000 -Subject: hook(clone protections): add escape hatch - -commit 85811d32aca9f0ba324a04bd8709c315d472efbe upstream. - -As defense-in-depth measures, v2.39.4 and friends leading up to v2.45.1 -introduced code that detects when hooks have been installed during a -`git clone`, which is indicative of a common attack vector with critical -severity that allows Remote Code Execution. - -There are legitimate use cases for such behavior, though, for example -when those hooks stem from Git's own templates, which system -administrators are at liberty to modify to enforce, say, commit message -conventions. The git clone protections specifically add exceptions to -allow for that. - -Another legitimate use case that has been identified too late to be -handled in these security bug-fix versions is Git LFS: It behaves -somewhat similar to common attack vectors by writing a few hooks while -running the `smudge` filter during a regular clone, which means that Git -has no chance to know that the hooks are benign and e.g. the -`post-checkout` hook can be safely executed as part of the clone -operation. - -To help Git LFS, and other tools behaving similarly (if there are any), -let's add a new, multi-valued `safe.hook.sha256` config setting. Like -the already-existing `safe.*` settings, it is ignored in -repository-local configs, and it is interpreted as a list of SHA-256 -checksums of hooks' contents that are safe to execute during a clone -operation. Future Git LFS versions will need to write those entries at -the same time they install the `smudge`/`clean` filters. - -Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de> -Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com> -Signed-off-by: Jonathan Nieder <jrnieder@gmail.com> ---- - Documentation/config/safe.txt | 6 +++ - hook.c | 69 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- - t/t1800-hook.sh | 15 ++++++++ - 3 files changed, 85 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/Documentation/config/safe.txt b/Documentation/config/safe.txt -index 577df40223a..e2eb4992bef 100644 ---- a/Documentation/config/safe.txt -+++ b/Documentation/config/safe.txt -@@ -59,3 +59,9 @@ which id the original user has. - If that is not what you would prefer and want git to only trust - repositories that are owned by root instead, then you can remove - the `SUDO_UID` variable from root's environment before invoking git. -+ -+safe.hook.sha256:: -+ The value is the SHA-256 of hooks that are considered to be safe -+ to run during a clone operation. -++ -+Multiple values can be added via `git config --global --add`. -diff --git a/hook.c b/hook.c -index 8de469b134a..9eca6c0103a 100644 ---- a/hook.c -+++ b/hook.c -@@ -10,6 +10,9 @@ - #include "environment.h" - #include "setup.h" - #include "copy.h" -+#include "strmap.h" -+#include "hash-ll.h" -+#include "hex.h" - - static int identical_to_template_hook(const char *name, const char *path) - { -@@ -37,11 +40,66 @@ static int identical_to_template_hook(const char *name, const char *path) - return ret; - } - -+static struct strset safe_hook_sha256s = STRSET_INIT; -+static int safe_hook_sha256s_initialized; -+ -+static int get_sha256_of_file_contents(const char *path, char *sha256) -+{ -+ struct strbuf sb = STRBUF_INIT; -+ int fd; -+ ssize_t res; -+ -+ git_hash_ctx ctx; -+ const struct git_hash_algo *algo = &hash_algos[GIT_HASH_SHA256]; -+ unsigned char hash[GIT_MAX_RAWSZ]; -+ -+ if ((fd = open(path, O_RDONLY)) < 0) -+ return -1; -+ res = strbuf_read(&sb, fd, 400); -+ close(fd); -+ if (res < 0) -+ return -1; -+ -+ algo->init_fn(&ctx); -+ algo->update_fn(&ctx, sb.buf, sb.len); -+ strbuf_release(&sb); -+ algo->final_fn(hash, &ctx); -+ -+ hash_to_hex_algop_r(sha256, hash, algo); -+ -+ return 0; -+} -+ -+static int safe_hook_cb(const char *key, const char *value, -+ const struct config_context *ctx UNUSED, void *d) -+{ -+ struct strset *set = d; -+ -+ if (value && !strcmp(key, "safe.hook.sha256")) -+ strset_add(set, value); -+ -+ return 0; -+} -+ -+static int is_hook_safe_during_clone(const char *name, const char *path, char *sha256) -+{ -+ if (get_sha256_of_file_contents(path, sha256) < 0) -+ return 0; -+ -+ if (!safe_hook_sha256s_initialized) { -+ safe_hook_sha256s_initialized = 1; -+ git_protected_config(safe_hook_cb, &safe_hook_sha256s); -+ } -+ -+ return strset_contains(&safe_hook_sha256s, sha256); -+} -+ - const char *find_hook(const char *name) - { - static struct strbuf path = STRBUF_INIT; - - int found_hook; -+ char sha256[GIT_SHA256_HEXSZ + 1] = { '\0' }; - - strbuf_reset(&path); - strbuf_git_path(&path, "hooks/%s", name); -@@ -73,13 +131,14 @@ const char *find_hook(const char *name) - return NULL; - } - if (!git_hooks_path && git_env_bool("GIT_CLONE_PROTECTION_ACTIVE", 0) && -- !identical_to_template_hook(name, path.buf)) -+ !identical_to_template_hook(name, path.buf) && -+ !is_hook_safe_during_clone(name, path.buf, sha256)) - die(_("active `%s` hook found during `git clone`:\n\t%s\n" - "For security reasons, this is disallowed by default.\n" -- "If this is intentional and the hook should actually " -- "be run, please\nrun the command again with " -- "`GIT_CLONE_PROTECTION_ACTIVE=false`"), -- name, path.buf); -+ "If this is intentional and the hook is safe to run, " -+ "please run the following command and try again:\n\n" -+ " git config --global --add safe.hook.sha256 %s"), -+ name, path.buf, sha256); - return path.buf; - } - -diff --git a/t/t1800-hook.sh b/t/t1800-hook.sh -index 8b0234cf2d5..cbdf60c451a 100755 ---- a/t/t1800-hook.sh -+++ b/t/t1800-hook.sh -@@ -185,4 +185,19 @@ test_expect_success 'stdin to hooks' ' - test_cmp expect actual - ' - -+test_expect_success '`safe.hook.sha256` and clone protections' ' -+ git init safe-hook && -+ write_script safe-hook/.git/hooks/pre-push <<-\EOF && -+ echo "called hook" >safe-hook.log -+ EOF -+ -+ test_must_fail env GIT_CLONE_PROTECTION_ACTIVE=true \ -+ git -C safe-hook hook run pre-push 2>err && -+ cmd="$(grep "git config --global --add safe.hook.sha256 [0-9a-f]" err)" && -+ eval "$cmd" && -+ GIT_CLONE_PROTECTION_ACTIVE=true \ -+ git -C safe-hook hook run pre-push && -+ test "called hook" = "$(cat safe-hook/safe-hook.log)" -+' -+ - test_done diff --git a/debian/patches/0005-hooks-clone-protections-special-case-current-Git-LFS-.diff b/debian/patches/0005-hooks-clone-protections-special-case-current-Git-LFS-.diff deleted file mode 100644 index bad67cd..0000000 --- a/debian/patches/0005-hooks-clone-protections-special-case-current-Git-LFS-.diff +++ /dev/null @@ -1,82 +0,0 @@ -From 09595d6984b41cbb6f653643f826fe009c56b493 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de> -Date: Sat, 18 May 2024 10:32:44 +0000 -Subject: hooks(clone protections): special-case current Git LFS hooks - -commit c65d0f9ee6894cdf7feeb51639870bfaf826c905 upstream. - -A notable regression in v2.45.1 and friends (all the way down to -v2.39.4) has been that Git LFS-enabled clones error out with a message -indicating that the `post-checkout` hook has been tampered with while -cloning, and as a safety measure it is not executed. - -A generic fix for benign third-party applications wishing to write hooks -during clone operations has been implemented in the parent of this -commit: said applications are expected to add `safe.hook.sha256` values -to a protected config. - -However, the current version of Git LFS, v3.5.1, cannot be adapted -retroactively; Therefore, let's just hard-code the SHA-256 values for -this version. That way, Git LFS usage will no longer be broken, and the -next Git LFS version can be taught to add those `safe.hook.sha256` -entries. - -Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de> -Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com> -Signed-off-by: Jonathan Nieder <jrnieder@gmail.com> ---- - hook.c | 11 +++++++++++ - t/t1800-hook.sh | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++ - 2 files changed, 31 insertions(+) - -diff --git a/hook.c b/hook.c -index 9eca6c0103a..fc0548edb66 100644 ---- a/hook.c -+++ b/hook.c -@@ -88,6 +88,17 @@ static int is_hook_safe_during_clone(const char *name, const char *path, char *s - - if (!safe_hook_sha256s_initialized) { - safe_hook_sha256s_initialized = 1; -+ -+ /* Hard-code known-safe values for Git LFS v3.4.0..v3.5.1 */ -+ /* pre-push */ -+ strset_add(&safe_hook_sha256s, "df5417b2daa3aa144c19681d1e997df7ebfe144fb7e3e05138bd80ae998008e4"); -+ /* post-checkout */ -+ strset_add(&safe_hook_sha256s, "791471b4ff472aab844a4fceaa48bbb0a12193616f971e8e940625498b4938a6"); -+ /* post-commit */ -+ strset_add(&safe_hook_sha256s, "21e961572bb3f43a5f2fbafc1cc764d86046cc2e5f0bbecebfe9684a0b73b664"); -+ /* post-merge */ -+ strset_add(&safe_hook_sha256s, "75da0da66a803b4b030ad50801ba57062c6196105eb1d2251590d100edb9390b"); -+ - git_protected_config(safe_hook_cb, &safe_hook_sha256s); - } - -diff --git a/t/t1800-hook.sh b/t/t1800-hook.sh -index cbdf60c451a..c51be5f7a06 100755 ---- a/t/t1800-hook.sh -+++ b/t/t1800-hook.sh -@@ -200,4 +200,24 @@ test_expect_success '`safe.hook.sha256` and clone protections' ' - test "called hook" = "$(cat safe-hook/safe-hook.log)" - ' - -+write_lfs_pre_push_hook () { -+ write_script "$1" <<-\EOF -+ command -v git-lfs >/dev/null 2>&1 || { echo >&2 "\nThis repository is configured for Git LFS but 'git-lfs' was not found on your path. If you no longer wish to use Git LFS, remove this hook by deleting the 'pre-push' file in the hooks directory (set by 'core.hookspath'; usually '.git/hooks').\n"; exit 2; } -+ git lfs pre-push "$@" -+ EOF -+} -+ -+test_expect_success 'Git LFS special-handling in clone protections' ' -+ git init lfs-hooks && -+ write_lfs_pre_push_hook lfs-hooks/.git/hooks/pre-push && -+ write_script git-lfs <<-\EOF && -+ echo "called $*" >fake-git-lfs.log -+ EOF -+ -+ PATH="$PWD:$PATH" GIT_CLONE_PROTECTION_ACTIVE=true \ -+ git -C lfs-hooks hook run pre-push && -+ test_write_lines "called pre-push" >expect && -+ test_cmp lfs-hooks/fake-git-lfs.log expect -+' -+ - test_done diff --git a/debian/patches/0006-hooks-clone-protections-simplify-templates-hooks-vali.diff b/debian/patches/0006-hooks-clone-protections-simplify-templates-hooks-vali.diff deleted file mode 100644 index a0642e3..0000000 --- a/debian/patches/0006-hooks-clone-protections-simplify-templates-hooks-vali.diff +++ /dev/null @@ -1,198 +0,0 @@ -From 8813bb5f4109991b88c98584a4abbb2d06cfbc28 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de> -Date: Sat, 18 May 2024 10:32:45 +0000 -Subject: hooks(clone protections): simplify templates hooks validation - -commit eff37e9b1dec25a3e1297eb89a36d8e68fe01b40 upstream. - -When an active hook is encountered during a clone operation, to protect -against Remote Code Execution attack vectors, Git checks whether the -hook was copied over from the templates directory. - -When that logic was introduced, there was no other way to check this -than to add a function to compare files. - -In the meantime, we've added code to compute the SHA-256 checksum of a -given hook and compare that checksum against a list of known-safe ones. - -Let's simplify the logic by adding to said list when copying the -templates' hooks. - -We need to be careful to support multi-process operations such as -recursive submodule clones: In such a scenario, the list of SHA-256 -checksums that is kept in memory is not enough, we also have to pass the -information down to child processes via `GIT_CONFIG_PARAMETERS`. - -Extend the regression test in t5601 to ensure that recursive clones are -handled as expected. - -Note: Technically there is no way that the checksums computed while -initializing the submodules' gitdirs can be passed to the process that -performs the checkout: For historical reasons, these operations are -performed in processes spawned in separate loops from the -super-project's `git clone` process. But since the templates from which -the submodules are initialized are the very same as the ones from which -the super-project is initialized, we can get away with using the list of -SHA-256 checksums that is computed when initializing the super-project -and passing that down to the `submodule--helper` processes that perform -the recursive checkout. - -Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de> -Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com> -Signed-off-by: Jonathan Nieder <jrnieder@gmail.com> ---- - hook.c | 43 ++++++++++++++++--------------------------- - hook.h | 10 ++++++++++ - setup.c | 7 +++++++ - t/t5601-clone.sh | 19 +++++++++++++++++++ - 4 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/hook.c b/hook.c -index fc0548edb66..8ac51c9912b 100644 ---- a/hook.c -+++ b/hook.c -@@ -14,32 +14,6 @@ - #include "hash-ll.h" - #include "hex.h" - --static int identical_to_template_hook(const char *name, const char *path) --{ -- const char *env = getenv("GIT_CLONE_TEMPLATE_DIR"); -- const char *template_dir = get_template_dir(env && *env ? env : NULL); -- struct strbuf template_path = STRBUF_INIT; -- int found_template_hook, ret; -- -- strbuf_addf(&template_path, "%s/hooks/%s", template_dir, name); -- found_template_hook = access(template_path.buf, X_OK) >= 0; --#ifdef STRIP_EXTENSION -- if (!found_template_hook) { -- strbuf_addstr(&template_path, STRIP_EXTENSION); -- found_template_hook = access(template_path.buf, X_OK) >= 0; -- } --#endif -- if (!found_template_hook) { -- strbuf_release(&template_path); -- return 0; -- } -- -- ret = do_files_match(template_path.buf, path); -- -- strbuf_release(&template_path); -- return ret; --} -- - static struct strset safe_hook_sha256s = STRSET_INIT; - static int safe_hook_sha256s_initialized; - -@@ -70,6 +44,22 @@ static int get_sha256_of_file_contents(const char *path, char *sha256) - return 0; - } - -+void add_safe_hook(const char *path) -+{ -+ char sha256[GIT_SHA256_HEXSZ + 1] = { '\0' }; -+ -+ if (!get_sha256_of_file_contents(path, sha256)) { -+ char *p; -+ -+ strset_add(&safe_hook_sha256s, sha256); -+ -+ /* support multi-process operations e.g. recursive clones */ -+ p = xstrfmt("safe.hook.sha256=%s", sha256); -+ git_config_push_parameter(p); -+ free(p); -+ } -+} -+ - static int safe_hook_cb(const char *key, const char *value, - const struct config_context *ctx UNUSED, void *d) - { -@@ -142,7 +132,6 @@ const char *find_hook(const char *name) - return NULL; - } - if (!git_hooks_path && git_env_bool("GIT_CLONE_PROTECTION_ACTIVE", 0) && -- !identical_to_template_hook(name, path.buf) && - !is_hook_safe_during_clone(name, path.buf, sha256)) - die(_("active `%s` hook found during `git clone`:\n\t%s\n" - "For security reasons, this is disallowed by default.\n" -diff --git a/hook.h b/hook.h -index 19ab9a5806e..b4770d9bd88 100644 ---- a/hook.h -+++ b/hook.h -@@ -87,4 +87,14 @@ int run_hooks(const char *hook_name); - * hook. This function behaves like the old run_hook_le() API. - */ - int run_hooks_l(const char *hook_name, ...); -+ -+/** -+ * Mark the contents of the provided path as safe to run during a clone -+ * operation. -+ * -+ * This function is mainly used when copying templates to mark the -+ * just-copied hooks as benign. -+ */ -+void add_safe_hook(const char *path); -+ - #endif -diff --git a/setup.c b/setup.c -index 30f243fc32d..25828a85ec3 100644 ---- a/setup.c -+++ b/setup.c -@@ -17,6 +17,8 @@ - #include "trace2.h" - #include "worktree.h" - #include "exec-cmd.h" -+#include "run-command.h" -+#include "hook.h" - - static int inside_git_dir = -1; - static int inside_work_tree = -1; -@@ -1868,6 +1870,7 @@ static void copy_templates_1(struct strbuf *path, struct strbuf *template_path, - size_t path_baselen = path->len; - size_t template_baselen = template_path->len; - struct dirent *de; -+ int is_hooks_dir = ends_with(template_path->buf, "/hooks/"); - - /* Note: if ".git/hooks" file exists in the repository being - * re-initialized, /etc/core-git/templates/hooks/update would -@@ -1920,6 +1923,10 @@ static void copy_templates_1(struct strbuf *path, struct strbuf *template_path, - strbuf_release(&lnk); - } - else if (S_ISREG(st_template.st_mode)) { -+ if (is_hooks_dir && -+ is_executable(template_path->buf)) -+ add_safe_hook(template_path->buf); -+ - if (copy_file(path->buf, template_path->buf, st_template.st_mode)) - die_errno(_("cannot copy '%s' to '%s'"), - template_path->buf, path->buf); -diff --git a/t/t5601-clone.sh b/t/t5601-clone.sh -index deb1c282c71..ca3a8d1ebed 100755 ---- a/t/t5601-clone.sh -+++ b/t/t5601-clone.sh -@@ -836,6 +836,25 @@ test_expect_success 'clone with init.templatedir runs hooks' ' - git config --unset init.templateDir && - test_grep ! "active .* hook found" err && - test_path_is_missing hook-run-local-config/hook.run -+ ) && -+ -+ test_config_global protocol.file.allow always && -+ git -C tmpl/hooks submodule add "$(pwd)/tmpl/hooks" sub && -+ test_tick && -+ git -C tmpl/hooks add .gitmodules sub && -+ git -C tmpl/hooks commit -m submodule && -+ -+ ( -+ sane_unset GIT_TEMPLATE_DIR && -+ NO_SET_GIT_TEMPLATE_DIR=t && -+ export NO_SET_GIT_TEMPLATE_DIR && -+ -+ git -c init.templateDir="$(pwd)/tmpl" \ -+ clone --recurse-submodules \ -+ tmpl/hooks hook-run-submodule 2>err && -+ test_grep ! "active .* hook found" err && -+ test_path_is_file hook-run-submodule/hook.run && -+ test_path_is_file hook-run-submodule/sub/hook.run - ) - ' - diff --git a/debian/patches/0007-Revert-Add-a-helper-function-to-compare-file-contents.diff b/debian/patches/0007-Revert-Add-a-helper-function-to-compare-file-contents.diff deleted file mode 100644 index 6cf2874..0000000 --- a/debian/patches/0007-Revert-Add-a-helper-function-to-compare-file-contents.diff +++ /dev/null @@ -1,185 +0,0 @@ -From 13b17dea6c851b21ceb9ce163cdd7338f1ec4ecf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de> -Date: Sat, 18 May 2024 10:32:46 +0000 -Subject: Revert "Add a helper function to compare file contents" - -commit 851218a8af645b0abd64882d2b88bc984aa762e9 upstream. - -Now that during a `git clone`, the hooks' contents are no longer -compared to the templates' files', the caller for which the -`do_files_match()` function was introduced is gone, and therefore this -function can be retired, too. - -This reverts commit 584de0b4c23 (Add a helper function to compare file -contents, 2024-03-30). - -Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de> -Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com> -Signed-off-by: Jonathan Nieder <jrnieder@gmail.com> ---- - copy.c | 58 -------------------------------------- - copy.h | 14 --------- - t/helper/test-path-utils.c | 10 ------- - t/t0060-path-utils.sh | 41 --------------------------- - 4 files changed, 123 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/copy.c b/copy.c -index 3df156f6cea..d9d20920126 100644 ---- a/copy.c -+++ b/copy.c -@@ -70,61 +70,3 @@ int copy_file_with_time(const char *dst, const char *src, int mode) - return copy_times(dst, src); - return status; - } -- --static int do_symlinks_match(const char *path1, const char *path2) --{ -- struct strbuf buf1 = STRBUF_INIT, buf2 = STRBUF_INIT; -- int ret = 0; -- -- if (!strbuf_readlink(&buf1, path1, 0) && -- !strbuf_readlink(&buf2, path2, 0)) -- ret = !strcmp(buf1.buf, buf2.buf); -- -- strbuf_release(&buf1); -- strbuf_release(&buf2); -- return ret; --} -- --int do_files_match(const char *path1, const char *path2) --{ -- struct stat st1, st2; -- int fd1 = -1, fd2 = -1, ret = 1; -- char buf1[8192], buf2[8192]; -- -- if ((fd1 = open_nofollow(path1, O_RDONLY)) < 0 || -- fstat(fd1, &st1) || !S_ISREG(st1.st_mode)) { -- if (fd1 < 0 && errno == ELOOP) -- /* maybe this is a symbolic link? */ -- return do_symlinks_match(path1, path2); -- ret = 0; -- } else if ((fd2 = open_nofollow(path2, O_RDONLY)) < 0 || -- fstat(fd2, &st2) || !S_ISREG(st2.st_mode)) { -- ret = 0; -- } -- -- if (ret) -- /* to match, neither must be executable, or both */ -- ret = !(st1.st_mode & 0111) == !(st2.st_mode & 0111); -- -- if (ret) -- ret = st1.st_size == st2.st_size; -- -- while (ret) { -- ssize_t len1 = read_in_full(fd1, buf1, sizeof(buf1)); -- ssize_t len2 = read_in_full(fd2, buf2, sizeof(buf2)); -- -- if (len1 < 0 || len2 < 0 || len1 != len2) -- ret = 0; /* read error or different file size */ -- else if (!len1) /* len2 is also 0; hit EOF on both */ -- break; /* ret is still true */ -- else -- ret = !memcmp(buf1, buf2, len1); -- } -- -- if (fd1 >= 0) -- close(fd1); -- if (fd2 >= 0) -- close(fd2); -- -- return ret; --} -diff --git a/copy.h b/copy.h -index 057259a3a7a..2af77cba864 100644 ---- a/copy.h -+++ b/copy.h -@@ -7,18 +7,4 @@ int copy_fd(int ifd, int ofd); - int copy_file(const char *dst, const char *src, int mode); - int copy_file_with_time(const char *dst, const char *src, int mode); - --/* -- * Compare the file mode and contents of two given files. -- * -- * If both files are actually symbolic links, the function returns 1 if the link -- * targets are identical or 0 if they are not. -- * -- * If any of the two files cannot be accessed or in case of read failures, this -- * function returns 0. -- * -- * If the file modes and contents are identical, the function returns 1, -- * otherwise it returns 0. -- */ --int do_files_match(const char *path1, const char *path2); -- - #endif /* COPY_H */ -diff --git a/t/helper/test-path-utils.c b/t/helper/test-path-utils.c -index 023ed2e1a78..bf0e23ed505 100644 ---- a/t/helper/test-path-utils.c -+++ b/t/helper/test-path-utils.c -@@ -501,16 +501,6 @@ int cmd__path_utils(int argc, const char **argv) - return !!res; - } - -- if (argc == 4 && !strcmp(argv[1], "do_files_match")) { -- int ret = do_files_match(argv[2], argv[3]); -- -- if (ret) -- printf("equal\n"); -- else -- printf("different\n"); -- return !ret; -- } -- - fprintf(stderr, "%s: unknown function name: %s\n", argv[0], - argv[1] ? argv[1] : "(there was none)"); - return 1; -diff --git a/t/t0060-path-utils.sh b/t/t0060-path-utils.sh -index 85686ee15da..0afa3d0d312 100755 ---- a/t/t0060-path-utils.sh -+++ b/t/t0060-path-utils.sh -@@ -610,45 +610,4 @@ test_expect_success !VALGRIND,RUNTIME_PREFIX,CAN_EXEC_IN_PWD '%(prefix)/ works' - test_cmp expect actual - ' - --test_expect_success 'do_files_match()' ' -- test_seq 0 10 >0-10.txt && -- test_seq -1 10 >-1-10.txt && -- test_seq 1 10 >1-10.txt && -- test_seq 1 9 >1-9.txt && -- test_seq 0 8 >0-8.txt && -- -- test-tool path-utils do_files_match 0-10.txt 0-10.txt >out && -- -- assert_fails() { -- test_must_fail \ -- test-tool path-utils do_files_match "$1" "$2" >out && -- grep different out -- } && -- -- assert_fails 0-8.txt 1-9.txt && -- assert_fails -1-10.txt 0-10.txt && -- assert_fails 1-10.txt 1-9.txt && -- assert_fails 1-10.txt .git && -- assert_fails does-not-exist 1-10.txt && -- -- if test_have_prereq FILEMODE -- then -- cp 0-10.txt 0-10.x && -- chmod a+x 0-10.x && -- assert_fails 0-10.txt 0-10.x -- fi && -- -- if test_have_prereq SYMLINKS -- then -- ln -sf 0-10.txt symlink && -- ln -s 0-10.txt another-symlink && -- ln -s over-the-ocean yet-another-symlink && -- ln -s "$PWD/0-10.txt" absolute-symlink && -- assert_fails 0-10.txt symlink && -- test-tool path-utils do_files_match symlink another-symlink && -- assert_fails symlink yet-another-symlink && -- assert_fails symlink absolute-symlink -- fi --' -- - test_done diff --git a/debian/patches/series b/debian/patches/series deleted file mode 100644 index 7ff1f37..0000000 --- a/debian/patches/series +++ /dev/null @@ -1,7 +0,0 @@ -0001-hook-plug-a-new-memory-leak.diff -0002-Revert-core.hooksPath-add-some-protection-while-cloni.diff -0003-tests-verify-that-clone-c-core.hooksPath-dev-null-wor.diff -0004-hook-clone-protections-add-escape-hatch.diff -0005-hooks-clone-protections-special-case-current-Git-LFS-.diff -0006-hooks-clone-protections-simplify-templates-hooks-vali.diff -0007-Revert-Add-a-helper-function-to-compare-file-contents.diff diff --git a/debian/versions.upstream b/debian/versions.upstream index 7af7478..6375aef 100644 --- a/debian/versions.upstream +++ b/debian/versions.upstream @@ -832,23 +832,27 @@ v2.39.1 v2.39.2 v2.39.3 v2.39.4 +v2.39.5 v2.40.0-rc0 v2.40.0-rc1 v2.40.0-rc2 v2.40.0 v2.40.1 v2.40.2 +v2.40.3 v2.41.0-rc0 v2.41.0-rc1 v2.41.0-rc2 v2.41.0 v2.41.1 +v2.41.2 v2.42.0-rc0 v2.42.0-rc1 v2.42.0-rc2 v2.42.0 v2.42.1 v2.42.2 +v2.42.3 v2.43.0-rc0 v2.43.0-rc1 v2.43.0-rc2 @@ -857,12 +861,15 @@ v2.43.1 v2.43.2 v2.43.3 v2.43.4 +v2.43.5 v2.44.0-rc0 v2.44.0-rc1 v2.44.0-rc2 v2.44.0 v2.44.1 +v2.44.2 v2.45.0-rc0 v2.45.0-rc1 v2.45.0 v2.45.1 +v2.45.2 |