Adding upstream version 1.20.14.upstream/1.20.14upstream

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

13 files changed, 3501 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/src/crypto/rsa/boring.go b/src/crypto/rsa/boring.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b9f9d31
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/crypto/rsa/boring.go
@@ -0,0 +1,130 @@
+// Copyright 2017 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+//go:build boringcrypto
+
+package rsa
+
+import (
+	"crypto/internal/boring"
+	"crypto/internal/boring/bbig"
+	"crypto/internal/boring/bcache"
+	"math/big"
+)
+
+// Cached conversions from Go PublicKey/PrivateKey to BoringCrypto.
+//
+// The first operation on a PublicKey or PrivateKey makes a parallel
+// BoringCrypto key and saves it in pubCache or privCache.
+//
+// We could just assume that once used in a sign/verify/encrypt/decrypt operation,
+// a particular key is never again modified, but that has not been a
+// stated assumption before. Just in case there is any existing code that
+// does modify the key between operations, we save the original values
+// alongside the cached BoringCrypto key and check that the real key
+// still matches before using the cached key. The theory is that the real
+// operations are significantly more expensive than the comparison.
+
+type boringPub struct {
+	key  *boring.PublicKeyRSA
+	orig PublicKey
+}
+
+var pubCache bcache.Cache[PublicKey, boringPub]
+var privCache bcache.Cache[PrivateKey, boringPriv]
+
+func init() {
+	pubCache.Register()
+	privCache.Register()
+}
+
+func boringPublicKey(pub *PublicKey) (*boring.PublicKeyRSA, error) {
+	b := pubCache.Get(pub)
+	if b != nil && publicKeyEqual(&b.orig, pub) {
+		return b.key, nil
+	}
+
+	b = new(boringPub)
+	b.orig = copyPublicKey(pub)
+	key, err := boring.NewPublicKeyRSA(bbig.Enc(b.orig.N), bbig.Enc(big.NewInt(int64(b.orig.E))))
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	b.key = key
+	pubCache.Put(pub, b)
+	return key, nil
+}
+
+type boringPriv struct {
+	key  *boring.PrivateKeyRSA
+	orig PrivateKey
+}
+
+func boringPrivateKey(priv *PrivateKey) (*boring.PrivateKeyRSA, error) {
+	b := privCache.Get(priv)
+	if b != nil && privateKeyEqual(&b.orig, priv) {
+		return b.key, nil
+	}
+
+	b = new(boringPriv)
+	b.orig = copyPrivateKey(priv)
+
+	var N, E, D, P, Q, Dp, Dq, Qinv *big.Int
+	N = b.orig.N
+	E = big.NewInt(int64(b.orig.E))
+	D = b.orig.D
+	if len(b.orig.Primes) == 2 {
+		P = b.orig.Primes[0]
+		Q = b.orig.Primes[1]
+		Dp = b.orig.Precomputed.Dp
+		Dq = b.orig.Precomputed.Dq
+		Qinv = b.orig.Precomputed.Qinv
+	}
+	key, err := boring.NewPrivateKeyRSA(bbig.Enc(N), bbig.Enc(E), bbig.Enc(D), bbig.Enc(P), bbig.Enc(Q), bbig.Enc(Dp), bbig.Enc(Dq), bbig.Enc(Qinv))
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	b.key = key
+	privCache.Put(priv, b)
+	return key, nil
+}
+
+func publicKeyEqual(k1, k2 *PublicKey) bool {
+	return k1.N != nil &&
+		k1.N.Cmp(k2.N) == 0 &&
+		k1.E == k2.E
+}
+
+func copyPublicKey(k *PublicKey) PublicKey {
+	return PublicKey{
+		N: new(big.Int).Set(k.N),
+		E: k.E,
+	}
+}
+
+func privateKeyEqual(k1, k2 *PrivateKey) bool {
+	return publicKeyEqual(&k1.PublicKey, &k2.PublicKey) &&
+		k1.D.Cmp(k2.D) == 0
+}
+
+func copyPrivateKey(k *PrivateKey) PrivateKey {
+	dst := PrivateKey{
+		PublicKey: copyPublicKey(&k.PublicKey),
+		D:         new(big.Int).Set(k.D),
+	}
+	dst.Primes = make([]*big.Int, len(k.Primes))
+	for i, p := range k.Primes {
+		dst.Primes[i] = new(big.Int).Set(p)
+	}
+	if x := k.Precomputed.Dp; x != nil {
+		dst.Precomputed.Dp = new(big.Int).Set(x)
+	}
+	if x := k.Precomputed.Dq; x != nil {
+		dst.Precomputed.Dq = new(big.Int).Set(x)
+	}
+	if x := k.Precomputed.Qinv; x != nil {
+		dst.Precomputed.Qinv = new(big.Int).Set(x)
+	}
+	return dst
+}
diff --git a/src/crypto/rsa/boring_test.go b/src/crypto/rsa/boring_test.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2234d07
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/crypto/rsa/boring_test.go
@@ -0,0 +1,148 @@
+// Copyright 2017 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+//go:build boringcrypto
+
+// Note: Can run these tests against the non-BoringCrypto
+// version of the code by using "CGO_ENABLED=0 go test".
+
+package rsa
+
+import (
+	"crypto"
+	"crypto/rand"
+	"encoding/asn1"
+	"encoding/hex"
+	"math/big"
+	"runtime"
+	"runtime/debug"
+	"sync"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+func TestBoringASN1Marshal(t *testing.T) {
+	k, err := GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 128)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	_, err = asn1.Marshal(k.PublicKey)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestBoringVerify(t *testing.T) {
+	// Check that signatures that lack leading zeroes don't verify.
+	key := &PublicKey{
+		N: bigFromHex("c4fdf7b40a5477f206e6ee278eaef888ca73bf9128a9eef9f2f1ddb8b7b71a4c07cfa241f028a04edb405e4d916c61d6beabc333813dc7b484d2b3c52ee233c6a79b1eea4e9cc51596ba9cd5ac5aeb9df62d86ea051055b79d03f8a4fa9f38386f5bd17529138f3325d46801514ea9047977e0829ed728e68636802796801be1"),
+		E: 65537,
+	}
+
+	hash := fromHex("019c5571724fb5d0e47a4260c940e9803ba05a44")
+	paddedHash := fromHex("3021300906052b0e03021a05000414019c5571724fb5d0e47a4260c940e9803ba05a44")
+
+	// signature is one byte shorter than key.N.
+	sig := fromHex("5edfbeb6a73e7225ad3cc52724e2872e04260d7daf0d693c170d8c4b243b8767bc7785763533febc62ec2600c30603c433c095453ede59ff2fcabeb84ce32e0ed9d5cf15ffcbc816202b64370d4d77c1e9077d74e94a16fb4fa2e5bec23a56d7a73cf275f91691ae1801a976fcde09e981a2f6327ac27ea1fecf3185df0d56")
+
+	err := VerifyPKCS1v15(key, 0, paddedHash, sig)
+	if err == nil {
+		t.Errorf("raw: expected verification error")
+	}
+
+	err = VerifyPKCS1v15(key, crypto.SHA1, hash, sig)
+	if err == nil {
+		t.Errorf("sha1: expected verification error")
+	}
+}
+
+func BenchmarkBoringVerify(b *testing.B) {
+	// Check that signatures that lack leading zeroes don't verify.
+	key := &PublicKey{
+		N: bigFromHex("c4fdf7b40a5477f206e6ee278eaef888ca73bf9128a9eef9f2f1ddb8b7b71a4c07cfa241f028a04edb405e4d916c61d6beabc333813dc7b484d2b3c52ee233c6a79b1eea4e9cc51596ba9cd5ac5aeb9df62d86ea051055b79d03f8a4fa9f38386f5bd17529138f3325d46801514ea9047977e0829ed728e68636802796801be1"),
+		E: 65537,
+	}
+
+	hash := fromHex("019c5571724fb5d0e47a4260c940e9803ba05a44")
+
+	// signature is one byte shorter than key.N.
+	sig := fromHex("5edfbeb6a73e7225ad3cc52724e2872e04260d7daf0d693c170d8c4b243b8767bc7785763533febc62ec2600c30603c433c095453ede59ff2fcabeb84ce32e0ed9d5cf15ffcbc816202b64370d4d77c1e9077d74e94a16fb4fa2e5bec23a56d7a73cf275f91691ae1801a976fcde09e981a2f6327ac27ea1fecf3185df0d56")
+
+	b.ReportAllocs()
+
+	for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
+		err := VerifyPKCS1v15(key, crypto.SHA1, hash, sig)
+		if err == nil {
+			b.Fatalf("sha1: expected verification error")
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestBoringGenerateKey(t *testing.T) {
+	k, err := GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 2048) // 2048 is smallest size BoringCrypto might kick in for
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+
+	// Non-Boring GenerateKey always sets CRTValues to a non-nil (possibly empty) slice.
+	if k.Precomputed.CRTValues == nil {
+		t.Fatalf("GenerateKey: Precomputed.CRTValues = nil")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestBoringFinalizers(t *testing.T) {
+	if runtime.GOOS == "nacl" || runtime.GOOS == "js" {
+		// Times out on nacl and js/wasm (without BoringCrypto)
+		// but not clear why - probably consuming rand.Reader too quickly
+		// and being throttled. Also doesn't really matter.
+		t.Skipf("skipping on %s/%s", runtime.GOOS, runtime.GOARCH)
+	}
+
+	k, err := GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 2048)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+
+	// Run test with GOGC=10, to make bug more likely.
+	// Without the KeepAlives, the loop usually dies after
+	// about 30 iterations.
+	defer debug.SetGCPercent(debug.SetGCPercent(10))
+	for n := 0; n < 200; n++ {
+		// Clear the underlying BoringCrypto object cache.
+		privCache.Clear()
+
+		// Race to create the underlying BoringCrypto object.
+		// The ones that lose the race are prime candidates for
+		// being GC'ed too early if the finalizers are not being
+		// used correctly.
+		var wg sync.WaitGroup
+		for i := 0; i < 10; i++ {
+			wg.Add(1)
+			go func() {
+				defer wg.Done()
+				sum := make([]byte, 32)
+				_, err := SignPKCS1v15(rand.Reader, k, crypto.SHA256, sum)
+				if err != nil {
+					panic(err) // usually caused by memory corruption, so hard stop
+				}
+			}()
+		}
+		wg.Wait()
+	}
+}
+
+func bigFromHex(hex string) *big.Int {
+	n, ok := new(big.Int).SetString(hex, 16)
+	if !ok {
+		panic("bad hex: " + hex)
+	}
+	return n
+}
+
+func fromHex(hexStr string) []byte {
+	s, err := hex.DecodeString(hexStr)
+	if err != nil {
+		panic(err)
+	}
+	return s
+}
diff --git a/src/crypto/rsa/equal_test.go b/src/crypto/rsa/equal_test.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..90f4bf9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/crypto/rsa/equal_test.go
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+// Copyright 2020 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+package rsa_test
+
+import (
+	"crypto"
+	"crypto/rand"
+	"crypto/rsa"
+	"crypto/x509"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+func TestEqual(t *testing.T) {
+	private, _ := rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 512)
+	public := &private.PublicKey
+
+	if !public.Equal(public) {
+		t.Errorf("public key is not equal to itself: %v", public)
+	}
+	if !public.Equal(crypto.Signer(private).Public().(*rsa.PublicKey)) {
+		t.Errorf("private.Public() is not Equal to public: %q", public)
+	}
+	if !private.Equal(private) {
+		t.Errorf("private key is not equal to itself: %v", private)
+	}
+
+	enc, err := x509.MarshalPKCS8PrivateKey(private)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	decoded, err := x509.ParsePKCS8PrivateKey(enc)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if !public.Equal(decoded.(crypto.Signer).Public()) {
+		t.Errorf("public key is not equal to itself after decoding: %v", public)
+	}
+	if !private.Equal(decoded) {
+		t.Errorf("private key is not equal to itself after decoding: %v", private)
+	}
+
+	other, _ := rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 512)
+	if public.Equal(other.Public()) {
+		t.Errorf("different public keys are Equal")
+	}
+	if private.Equal(other) {
+		t.Errorf("different private keys are Equal")
+	}
+}
diff --git a/src/crypto/rsa/example_test.go b/src/crypto/rsa/example_test.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d07ee7d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/crypto/rsa/example_test.go
@@ -0,0 +1,157 @@
+// Copyright 2016 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+package rsa_test
+
+import (
+	"crypto"
+	"crypto/aes"
+	"crypto/cipher"
+	"crypto/rand"
+	"crypto/rsa"
+	"crypto/sha256"
+	"encoding/hex"
+	"fmt"
+	"os"
+)
+
+// RSA is able to encrypt only a very limited amount of data. In order
+// to encrypt reasonable amounts of data a hybrid scheme is commonly
+// used: RSA is used to encrypt a key for a symmetric primitive like
+// AES-GCM.
+//
+// Before encrypting, data is “padded” by embedding it in a known
+// structure. This is done for a number of reasons, but the most
+// obvious is to ensure that the value is large enough that the
+// exponentiation is larger than the modulus. (Otherwise it could be
+// decrypted with a square-root.)
+//
+// In these designs, when using PKCS #1 v1.5, it's vitally important to
+// avoid disclosing whether the received RSA message was well-formed
+// (that is, whether the result of decrypting is a correctly padded
+// message) because this leaks secret information.
+// DecryptPKCS1v15SessionKey is designed for this situation and copies
+// the decrypted, symmetric key (if well-formed) in constant-time over
+// a buffer that contains a random key. Thus, if the RSA result isn't
+// well-formed, the implementation uses a random key in constant time.
+func ExampleDecryptPKCS1v15SessionKey() {
+	// The hybrid scheme should use at least a 16-byte symmetric key. Here
+	// we read the random key that will be used if the RSA decryption isn't
+	// well-formed.
+	key := make([]byte, 32)
+	if _, err := rand.Read(key); err != nil {
+		panic("RNG failure")
+	}
+
+	rsaCiphertext, _ := hex.DecodeString("aabbccddeeff")
+
+	if err := rsa.DecryptPKCS1v15SessionKey(nil, rsaPrivateKey, rsaCiphertext, key); err != nil {
+		// Any errors that result will be “public” – meaning that they
+		// can be determined without any secret information. (For
+		// instance, if the length of key is impossible given the RSA
+		// public key.)
+		fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "Error from RSA decryption: %s\n", err)
+		return
+	}
+
+	// Given the resulting key, a symmetric scheme can be used to decrypt a
+	// larger ciphertext.
+	block, err := aes.NewCipher(key)
+	if err != nil {
+		panic("aes.NewCipher failed: " + err.Error())
+	}
+
+	// Since the key is random, using a fixed nonce is acceptable as the
+	// (key, nonce) pair will still be unique, as required.
+	var zeroNonce [12]byte
+	aead, err := cipher.NewGCM(block)
+	if err != nil {
+		panic("cipher.NewGCM failed: " + err.Error())
+	}
+	ciphertext, _ := hex.DecodeString("00112233445566")
+	plaintext, err := aead.Open(nil, zeroNonce[:], ciphertext, nil)
+	if err != nil {
+		// The RSA ciphertext was badly formed; the decryption will
+		// fail here because the AES-GCM key will be incorrect.
+		fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "Error decrypting: %s\n", err)
+		return
+	}
+
+	fmt.Printf("Plaintext: %s\n", string(plaintext))
+}
+
+func ExampleSignPKCS1v15() {
+	message := []byte("message to be signed")
+
+	// Only small messages can be signed directly; thus the hash of a
+	// message, rather than the message itself, is signed. This requires
+	// that the hash function be collision resistant. SHA-256 is the
+	// least-strong hash function that should be used for this at the time
+	// of writing (2016).
+	hashed := sha256.Sum256(message)
+
+	signature, err := rsa.SignPKCS1v15(nil, rsaPrivateKey, crypto.SHA256, hashed[:])
+	if err != nil {
+		fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "Error from signing: %s\n", err)
+		return
+	}
+
+	fmt.Printf("Signature: %x\n", signature)
+}
+
+func ExampleVerifyPKCS1v15() {
+	message := []byte("message to be signed")
+	signature, _ := hex.DecodeString("ad2766728615cc7a746cc553916380ca7bfa4f8983b990913bc69eb0556539a350ff0f8fe65ddfd3ebe91fe1c299c2fac135bc8c61e26be44ee259f2f80c1530")
+
+	// Only small messages can be signed directly; thus the hash of a
+	// message, rather than the message itself, is signed. This requires
+	// that the hash function be collision resistant. SHA-256 is the
+	// least-strong hash function that should be used for this at the time
+	// of writing (2016).
+	hashed := sha256.Sum256(message)
+
+	err := rsa.VerifyPKCS1v15(&rsaPrivateKey.PublicKey, crypto.SHA256, hashed[:], signature)
+	if err != nil {
+		fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "Error from verification: %s\n", err)
+		return
+	}
+
+	// signature is a valid signature of message from the public key.
+}
+
+func ExampleEncryptOAEP() {
+	secretMessage := []byte("send reinforcements, we're going to advance")
+	label := []byte("orders")
+
+	// crypto/rand.Reader is a good source of entropy for randomizing the
+	// encryption function.
+	rng := rand.Reader
+
+	ciphertext, err := rsa.EncryptOAEP(sha256.New(), rng, &test2048Key.PublicKey, secretMessage, label)
+	if err != nil {
+		fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "Error from encryption: %s\n", err)
+		return
+	}
+
+	// Since encryption is a randomized function, ciphertext will be
+	// different each time.
+	fmt.Printf("Ciphertext: %x\n", ciphertext)
+}
+
+func ExampleDecryptOAEP() {
+	ciphertext, _ := hex.DecodeString("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")
+	label := []byte("orders")
+
+	plaintext, err := rsa.DecryptOAEP(sha256.New(), nil, test2048Key, ciphertext, label)
+	if err != nil {
+		fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "Error from decryption: %s\n", err)
+		return
+	}
+
+	fmt.Printf("Plaintext: %s\n", string(plaintext))
+
+	// Remember that encryption only provides confidentiality. The
+	// ciphertext should be signed before authenticity is assumed and, even
+	// then, consider that messages might be reordered.
+}
diff --git a/src/crypto/rsa/notboring.go b/src/crypto/rsa/notboring.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2abc043
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/crypto/rsa/notboring.go
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+// Copyright 2022 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+//go:build !boringcrypto
+
+package rsa
+
+import "crypto/internal/boring"
+
+func boringPublicKey(*PublicKey) (*boring.PublicKeyRSA, error) {
+	panic("boringcrypto: not available")
+}
+func boringPrivateKey(*PrivateKey) (*boring.PrivateKeyRSA, error) {
+	panic("boringcrypto: not available")
+}
diff --git a/src/crypto/rsa/pkcs1v15.go b/src/crypto/rsa/pkcs1v15.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e51b9d2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/crypto/rsa/pkcs1v15.go
@@ -0,0 +1,375 @@
+// Copyright 2009 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+package rsa
+
+import (
+	"crypto"
+	"crypto/internal/boring"
+	"crypto/internal/randutil"
+	"crypto/subtle"
+	"errors"
+	"io"
+)
+
+// This file implements encryption and decryption using PKCS #1 v1.5 padding.
+
+// PKCS1v15DecryptOptions is for passing options to PKCS #1 v1.5 decryption using
+// the crypto.Decrypter interface.
+type PKCS1v15DecryptOptions struct {
+	// SessionKeyLen is the length of the session key that is being
+	// decrypted. If not zero, then a padding error during decryption will
+	// cause a random plaintext of this length to be returned rather than
+	// an error. These alternatives happen in constant time.
+	SessionKeyLen int
+}
+
+// EncryptPKCS1v15 encrypts the given message with RSA and the padding
+// scheme from PKCS #1 v1.5.  The message must be no longer than the
+// length of the public modulus minus 11 bytes.
+//
+// The random parameter is used as a source of entropy to ensure that
+// encrypting the same message twice doesn't result in the same
+// ciphertext.
+//
+// WARNING: use of this function to encrypt plaintexts other than
+// session keys is dangerous. Use RSA OAEP in new protocols.
+func EncryptPKCS1v15(random io.Reader, pub *PublicKey, msg []byte) ([]byte, error) {
+	randutil.MaybeReadByte(random)
+
+	if err := checkPub(pub); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	k := pub.Size()
+	if len(msg) > k-11 {
+		return nil, ErrMessageTooLong
+	}
+
+	if boring.Enabled && random == boring.RandReader {
+		bkey, err := boringPublicKey(pub)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+		return boring.EncryptRSAPKCS1(bkey, msg)
+	}
+	boring.UnreachableExceptTests()
+
+	// EM = 0x00 || 0x02 || PS || 0x00 || M
+	em := make([]byte, k)
+	em[1] = 2
+	ps, mm := em[2:len(em)-len(msg)-1], em[len(em)-len(msg):]
+	err := nonZeroRandomBytes(ps, random)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	em[len(em)-len(msg)-1] = 0
+	copy(mm, msg)
+
+	if boring.Enabled {
+		var bkey *boring.PublicKeyRSA
+		bkey, err = boringPublicKey(pub)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+		return boring.EncryptRSANoPadding(bkey, em)
+	}
+
+	return encrypt(pub, em)
+}
+
+// DecryptPKCS1v15 decrypts a plaintext using RSA and the padding scheme from PKCS #1 v1.5.
+// The random parameter is legacy and ignored, and it can be as nil.
+//
+// Note that whether this function returns an error or not discloses secret
+// information. If an attacker can cause this function to run repeatedly and
+// learn whether each instance returned an error then they can decrypt and
+// forge signatures as if they had the private key. See
+// DecryptPKCS1v15SessionKey for a way of solving this problem.
+func DecryptPKCS1v15(random io.Reader, priv *PrivateKey, ciphertext []byte) ([]byte, error) {
+	if err := checkPub(&priv.PublicKey); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	if boring.Enabled {
+		bkey, err := boringPrivateKey(priv)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+		out, err := boring.DecryptRSAPKCS1(bkey, ciphertext)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, ErrDecryption
+		}
+		return out, nil
+	}
+
+	valid, out, index, err := decryptPKCS1v15(priv, ciphertext)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	if valid == 0 {
+		return nil, ErrDecryption
+	}
+	return out[index:], nil
+}
+
+// DecryptPKCS1v15SessionKey decrypts a session key using RSA and the padding scheme from PKCS #1 v1.5.
+// The random parameter is legacy and ignored, and it can be as nil.
+// It returns an error if the ciphertext is the wrong length or if the
+// ciphertext is greater than the public modulus. Otherwise, no error is
+// returned. If the padding is valid, the resulting plaintext message is copied
+// into key. Otherwise, key is unchanged. These alternatives occur in constant
+// time. It is intended that the user of this function generate a random
+// session key beforehand and continue the protocol with the resulting value.
+// This will remove any possibility that an attacker can learn any information
+// about the plaintext.
+// See “Chosen Ciphertext Attacks Against Protocols Based on the RSA
+// Encryption Standard PKCS #1”, Daniel Bleichenbacher, Advances in Cryptology
+// (Crypto '98).
+//
+// Note that if the session key is too small then it may be possible for an
+// attacker to brute-force it. If they can do that then they can learn whether
+// a random value was used (because it'll be different for the same ciphertext)
+// and thus whether the padding was correct. This defeats the point of this
+// function. Using at least a 16-byte key will protect against this attack.
+func DecryptPKCS1v15SessionKey(random io.Reader, priv *PrivateKey, ciphertext []byte, key []byte) error {
+	if err := checkPub(&priv.PublicKey); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	k := priv.Size()
+	if k-(len(key)+3+8) < 0 {
+		return ErrDecryption
+	}
+
+	valid, em, index, err := decryptPKCS1v15(priv, ciphertext)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	if len(em) != k {
+		// This should be impossible because decryptPKCS1v15 always
+		// returns the full slice.
+		return ErrDecryption
+	}
+
+	valid &= subtle.ConstantTimeEq(int32(len(em)-index), int32(len(key)))
+	subtle.ConstantTimeCopy(valid, key, em[len(em)-len(key):])
+	return nil
+}
+
+// decryptPKCS1v15 decrypts ciphertext using priv. It returns one or zero in
+// valid that indicates whether the plaintext was correctly structured.
+// In either case, the plaintext is returned in em so that it may be read
+// independently of whether it was valid in order to maintain constant memory
+// access patterns. If the plaintext was valid then index contains the index of
+// the original message in em, to allow constant time padding removal.
+func decryptPKCS1v15(priv *PrivateKey, ciphertext []byte) (valid int, em []byte, index int, err error) {
+	k := priv.Size()
+	if k < 11 {
+		err = ErrDecryption
+		return
+	}
+
+	if boring.Enabled {
+		var bkey *boring.PrivateKeyRSA
+		bkey, err = boringPrivateKey(priv)
+		if err != nil {
+			return
+		}
+		em, err = boring.DecryptRSANoPadding(bkey, ciphertext)
+		if err != nil {
+			return
+		}
+	} else {
+		em, err = decrypt(priv, ciphertext, noCheck)
+		if err != nil {
+			return
+		}
+	}
+
+	firstByteIsZero := subtle.ConstantTimeByteEq(em[0], 0)
+	secondByteIsTwo := subtle.ConstantTimeByteEq(em[1], 2)
+
+	// The remainder of the plaintext must be a string of non-zero random
+	// octets, followed by a 0, followed by the message.
+	//   lookingForIndex: 1 iff we are still looking for the zero.
+	//   index: the offset of the first zero byte.
+	lookingForIndex := 1
+
+	for i := 2; i < len(em); i++ {
+		equals0 := subtle.ConstantTimeByteEq(em[i], 0)
+		index = subtle.ConstantTimeSelect(lookingForIndex&equals0, i, index)
+		lookingForIndex = subtle.ConstantTimeSelect(equals0, 0, lookingForIndex)
+	}
+
+	// The PS padding must be at least 8 bytes long, and it starts two
+	// bytes into em.
+	validPS := subtle.ConstantTimeLessOrEq(2+8, index)
+
+	valid = firstByteIsZero & secondByteIsTwo & (^lookingForIndex & 1) & validPS
+	index = subtle.ConstantTimeSelect(valid, index+1, 0)
+	return valid, em, index, nil
+}
+
+// nonZeroRandomBytes fills the given slice with non-zero random octets.
+func nonZeroRandomBytes(s []byte, random io.Reader) (err error) {
+	_, err = io.ReadFull(random, s)
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+
+	for i := 0; i < len(s); i++ {
+		for s[i] == 0 {
+			_, err = io.ReadFull(random, s[i:i+1])
+			if err != nil {
+				return
+			}
+			// In tests, the PRNG may return all zeros so we do
+			// this to break the loop.
+			s[i] ^= 0x42
+		}
+	}
+
+	return
+}
+
+// These are ASN1 DER structures:
+//
+//	DigestInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
+//	  digestAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
+//	  digest OCTET STRING
+//	}
+//
+// For performance, we don't use the generic ASN1 encoder. Rather, we
+// precompute a prefix of the digest value that makes a valid ASN1 DER string
+// with the correct contents.
+var hashPrefixes = map[crypto.Hash][]byte{
+	crypto.MD5:       {0x30, 0x20, 0x30, 0x0c, 0x06, 0x08, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x02, 0x05, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x10},
+	crypto.SHA1:      {0x30, 0x21, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x05, 0x2b, 0x0e, 0x03, 0x02, 0x1a, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x14},
+	crypto.SHA224:    {0x30, 0x2d, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x04, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x1c},
+	crypto.SHA256:    {0x30, 0x31, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x01, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x20},
+	crypto.SHA384:    {0x30, 0x41, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x02, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x30},
+	crypto.SHA512:    {0x30, 0x51, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x03, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x40},
+	crypto.MD5SHA1:   {}, // A special TLS case which doesn't use an ASN1 prefix.
+	crypto.RIPEMD160: {0x30, 0x20, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x28, 0xcf, 0x06, 0x03, 0x00, 0x31, 0x04, 0x14},
+}
+
+// SignPKCS1v15 calculates the signature of hashed using
+// RSASSA-PKCS1-V1_5-SIGN from RSA PKCS #1 v1.5.  Note that hashed must
+// be the result of hashing the input message using the given hash
+// function. If hash is zero, hashed is signed directly. This isn't
+// advisable except for interoperability.
+//
+// The random parameter is legacy and ignored, and it can be as nil.
+//
+// This function is deterministic. Thus, if the set of possible
+// messages is small, an attacker may be able to build a map from
+// messages to signatures and identify the signed messages. As ever,
+// signatures provide authenticity, not confidentiality.
+func SignPKCS1v15(random io.Reader, priv *PrivateKey, hash crypto.Hash, hashed []byte) ([]byte, error) {
+	hashLen, prefix, err := pkcs1v15HashInfo(hash, len(hashed))
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	tLen := len(prefix) + hashLen
+	k := priv.Size()
+	if k < tLen+11 {
+		return nil, ErrMessageTooLong
+	}
+
+	if boring.Enabled {
+		bkey, err := boringPrivateKey(priv)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+		return boring.SignRSAPKCS1v15(bkey, hash, hashed)
+	}
+
+	// EM = 0x00 || 0x01 || PS || 0x00 || T
+	em := make([]byte, k)
+	em[1] = 1
+	for i := 2; i < k-tLen-1; i++ {
+		em[i] = 0xff
+	}
+	copy(em[k-tLen:k-hashLen], prefix)
+	copy(em[k-hashLen:k], hashed)
+
+	return decrypt(priv, em, withCheck)
+}
+
+// VerifyPKCS1v15 verifies an RSA PKCS #1 v1.5 signature.
+// hashed is the result of hashing the input message using the given hash
+// function and sig is the signature. A valid signature is indicated by
+// returning a nil error. If hash is zero then hashed is used directly. This
+// isn't advisable except for interoperability.
+func VerifyPKCS1v15(pub *PublicKey, hash crypto.Hash, hashed []byte, sig []byte) error {
+	if boring.Enabled {
+		bkey, err := boringPublicKey(pub)
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		if err := boring.VerifyRSAPKCS1v15(bkey, hash, hashed, sig); err != nil {
+			return ErrVerification
+		}
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	hashLen, prefix, err := pkcs1v15HashInfo(hash, len(hashed))
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	tLen := len(prefix) + hashLen
+	k := pub.Size()
+	if k < tLen+11 {
+		return ErrVerification
+	}
+
+	// RFC 8017 Section 8.2.2: If the length of the signature S is not k
+	// octets (where k is the length in octets of the RSA modulus n), output
+	// "invalid signature" and stop.
+	if k != len(sig) {
+		return ErrVerification
+	}
+
+	em, err := encrypt(pub, sig)
+	if err != nil {
+		return ErrVerification
+	}
+	// EM = 0x00 || 0x01 || PS || 0x00 || T
+
+	ok := subtle.ConstantTimeByteEq(em[0], 0)
+	ok &= subtle.ConstantTimeByteEq(em[1], 1)
+	ok &= subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(em[k-hashLen:k], hashed)
+	ok &= subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(em[k-tLen:k-hashLen], prefix)
+	ok &= subtle.ConstantTimeByteEq(em[k-tLen-1], 0)
+
+	for i := 2; i < k-tLen-1; i++ {
+		ok &= subtle.ConstantTimeByteEq(em[i], 0xff)
+	}
+
+	if ok != 1 {
+		return ErrVerification
+	}
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+func pkcs1v15HashInfo(hash crypto.Hash, inLen int) (hashLen int, prefix []byte, err error) {
+	// Special case: crypto.Hash(0) is used to indicate that the data is
+	// signed directly.
+	if hash == 0 {
+		return inLen, nil, nil
+	}
+
+	hashLen = hash.Size()
+	if inLen != hashLen {
+		return 0, nil, errors.New("crypto/rsa: input must be hashed message")
+	}
+	prefix, ok := hashPrefixes[hash]
+	if !ok {
+		return 0, nil, errors.New("crypto/rsa: unsupported hash function")
+	}
+	return
+}
diff --git a/src/crypto/rsa/pkcs1v15_test.go b/src/crypto/rsa/pkcs1v15_test.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..dfa1edd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/crypto/rsa/pkcs1v15_test.go
@@ -0,0 +1,315 @@
+// Copyright 2009 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+package rsa_test
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"crypto"
+	"crypto/rand"
+	. "crypto/rsa"
+	"crypto/sha1"
+	"crypto/sha256"
+	"crypto/x509"
+	"encoding/base64"
+	"encoding/hex"
+	"encoding/pem"
+	"io"
+	"testing"
+	"testing/quick"
+)
+
+func decodeBase64(in string) []byte {
+	out := make([]byte, base64.StdEncoding.DecodedLen(len(in)))
+	n, err := base64.StdEncoding.Decode(out, []byte(in))
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil
+	}
+	return out[0:n]
+}
+
+type DecryptPKCS1v15Test struct {
+	in, out string
+}
+
+// These test vectors were generated with `openssl rsautl -pkcs -encrypt`
+var decryptPKCS1v15Tests = []DecryptPKCS1v15Test{
+	{
+		"gIcUIoVkD6ATMBk/u/nlCZCCWRKdkfjCgFdo35VpRXLduiKXhNz1XupLLzTXAybEq15juc+EgY5o0DHv/nt3yg==",
+		"x",
+	},
+	{
+		"Y7TOCSqofGhkRb+jaVRLzK8xw2cSo1IVES19utzv6hwvx+M8kFsoWQm5DzBeJCZTCVDPkTpavUuEbgp8hnUGDw==",
+		"testing.",
+	},
+	{
+		"arReP9DJtEVyV2Dg3dDp4c/PSk1O6lxkoJ8HcFupoRorBZG+7+1fDAwT1olNddFnQMjmkb8vxwmNMoTAT/BFjQ==",
+		"testing.\n",
+	},
+	{
+		"WtaBXIoGC54+vH0NH0CHHE+dRDOsMc/6BrfFu2lEqcKL9+uDuWaf+Xj9mrbQCjjZcpQuX733zyok/jsnqe/Ftw==",
+		"01234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012",
+	},
+}
+
+func TestDecryptPKCS1v15(t *testing.T) {
+	decryptionFuncs := []func([]byte) ([]byte, error){
+		func(ciphertext []byte) (plaintext []byte, err error) {
+			return DecryptPKCS1v15(nil, rsaPrivateKey, ciphertext)
+		},
+		func(ciphertext []byte) (plaintext []byte, err error) {
+			return rsaPrivateKey.Decrypt(nil, ciphertext, nil)
+		},
+	}
+
+	for _, decryptFunc := range decryptionFuncs {
+		for i, test := range decryptPKCS1v15Tests {
+			out, err := decryptFunc(decodeBase64(test.in))
+			if err != nil {
+				t.Errorf("#%d error decrypting: %v", i, err)
+			}
+			want := []byte(test.out)
+			if !bytes.Equal(out, want) {
+				t.Errorf("#%d got:%#v want:%#v", i, out, want)
+			}
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestEncryptPKCS1v15(t *testing.T) {
+	random := rand.Reader
+	k := (rsaPrivateKey.N.BitLen() + 7) / 8
+
+	tryEncryptDecrypt := func(in []byte, blind bool) bool {
+		if len(in) > k-11 {
+			in = in[0 : k-11]
+		}
+
+		ciphertext, err := EncryptPKCS1v15(random, &rsaPrivateKey.PublicKey, in)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Errorf("error encrypting: %s", err)
+			return false
+		}
+
+		var rand io.Reader
+		if !blind {
+			rand = nil
+		} else {
+			rand = random
+		}
+		plaintext, err := DecryptPKCS1v15(rand, rsaPrivateKey, ciphertext)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Errorf("error decrypting: %s", err)
+			return false
+		}
+
+		if !bytes.Equal(plaintext, in) {
+			t.Errorf("output mismatch: %#v %#v", plaintext, in)
+			return false
+		}
+		return true
+	}
+
+	config := new(quick.Config)
+	if testing.Short() {
+		config.MaxCount = 10
+	}
+	quick.Check(tryEncryptDecrypt, config)
+}
+
+// These test vectors were generated with `openssl rsautl -pkcs -encrypt`
+var decryptPKCS1v15SessionKeyTests = []DecryptPKCS1v15Test{
+	{
+		"e6ukkae6Gykq0fKzYwULpZehX+UPXYzMoB5mHQUDEiclRbOTqas4Y0E6nwns1BBpdvEJcilhl5zsox/6DtGsYg==",
+		"1234",
+	},
+	{
+		"Dtis4uk/q/LQGGqGk97P59K03hkCIVFMEFZRgVWOAAhxgYpCRG0MX2adptt92l67IqMki6iVQyyt0TtX3IdtEw==",
+		"FAIL",
+	},
+	{
+		"LIyFyCYCptPxrvTxpol8F3M7ZivlMsf53zs0vHRAv+rDIh2YsHS69ePMoPMe3TkOMZ3NupiL3takPxIs1sK+dw==",
+		"abcd",
+	},
+	{
+		"bafnobel46bKy76JzqU/RIVOH0uAYvzUtauKmIidKgM0sMlvobYVAVQPeUQ/oTGjbIZ1v/6Gyi5AO4DtHruGdw==",
+		"FAIL",
+	},
+}
+
+func TestEncryptPKCS1v15SessionKey(t *testing.T) {
+	for i, test := range decryptPKCS1v15SessionKeyTests {
+		key := []byte("FAIL")
+		err := DecryptPKCS1v15SessionKey(nil, rsaPrivateKey, decodeBase64(test.in), key)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Errorf("#%d error decrypting", i)
+		}
+		want := []byte(test.out)
+		if !bytes.Equal(key, want) {
+			t.Errorf("#%d got:%#v want:%#v", i, key, want)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestEncryptPKCS1v15DecrypterSessionKey(t *testing.T) {
+	for i, test := range decryptPKCS1v15SessionKeyTests {
+		plaintext, err := rsaPrivateKey.Decrypt(rand.Reader, decodeBase64(test.in), &PKCS1v15DecryptOptions{SessionKeyLen: 4})
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("#%d: error decrypting: %s", i, err)
+		}
+		if len(plaintext) != 4 {
+			t.Fatalf("#%d: incorrect length plaintext: got %d, want 4", i, len(plaintext))
+		}
+
+		if test.out != "FAIL" && !bytes.Equal(plaintext, []byte(test.out)) {
+			t.Errorf("#%d: incorrect plaintext: got %x, want %x", i, plaintext, test.out)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestNonZeroRandomBytes(t *testing.T) {
+	random := rand.Reader
+
+	b := make([]byte, 512)
+	err := NonZeroRandomBytes(b, random)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Errorf("returned error: %s", err)
+	}
+	for _, b := range b {
+		if b == 0 {
+			t.Errorf("Zero octet found")
+			return
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+type signPKCS1v15Test struct {
+	in, out string
+}
+
+// These vectors have been tested with
+//
+//	`openssl rsautl -verify -inkey pk -in signature | hexdump -C`
+var signPKCS1v15Tests = []signPKCS1v15Test{
+	{"Test.\n", "a4f3fa6ea93bcdd0c57be020c1193ecbfd6f200a3d95c409769b029578fa0e336ad9a347600e40d3ae823b8c7e6bad88cc07c1d54c3a1523cbbb6d58efc362ae"},
+}
+
+func TestSignPKCS1v15(t *testing.T) {
+	for i, test := range signPKCS1v15Tests {
+		h := sha1.New()
+		h.Write([]byte(test.in))
+		digest := h.Sum(nil)
+
+		s, err := SignPKCS1v15(nil, rsaPrivateKey, crypto.SHA1, digest)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Errorf("#%d %s", i, err)
+		}
+
+		expected, _ := hex.DecodeString(test.out)
+		if !bytes.Equal(s, expected) {
+			t.Errorf("#%d got: %x want: %x", i, s, expected)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestVerifyPKCS1v15(t *testing.T) {
+	for i, test := range signPKCS1v15Tests {
+		h := sha1.New()
+		h.Write([]byte(test.in))
+		digest := h.Sum(nil)
+
+		sig, _ := hex.DecodeString(test.out)
+
+		err := VerifyPKCS1v15(&rsaPrivateKey.PublicKey, crypto.SHA1, digest, sig)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Errorf("#%d %s", i, err)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestOverlongMessagePKCS1v15(t *testing.T) {
+	ciphertext := decodeBase64("fjOVdirUzFoLlukv80dBllMLjXythIf22feqPrNo0YoIjzyzyoMFiLjAc/Y4krkeZ11XFThIrEvw\nkRiZcCq5ng==")
+	_, err := DecryptPKCS1v15(nil, rsaPrivateKey, ciphertext)
+	if err == nil {
+		t.Error("RSA decrypted a message that was too long.")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestUnpaddedSignature(t *testing.T) {
+	msg := []byte("Thu Dec 19 18:06:16 EST 2013\n")
+	// This base64 value was generated with:
+	// % echo Thu Dec 19 18:06:16 EST 2013 > /tmp/msg
+	// % openssl rsautl -sign -inkey key -out /tmp/sig -in /tmp/msg
+	//
+	// Where "key" contains the RSA private key given at the bottom of this
+	// file.
+	expectedSig := decodeBase64("pX4DR8azytjdQ1rtUiC040FjkepuQut5q2ZFX1pTjBrOVKNjgsCDyiJDGZTCNoh9qpXYbhl7iEym30BWWwuiZg==")
+
+	sig, err := SignPKCS1v15(nil, rsaPrivateKey, crypto.Hash(0), msg)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("SignPKCS1v15 failed: %s", err)
+	}
+	if !bytes.Equal(sig, expectedSig) {
+		t.Fatalf("signature is not expected value: got %x, want %x", sig, expectedSig)
+	}
+	if err := VerifyPKCS1v15(&rsaPrivateKey.PublicKey, crypto.Hash(0), msg, sig); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("signature failed to verify: %s", err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestShortSessionKey(t *testing.T) {
+	// This tests that attempting to decrypt a session key where the
+	// ciphertext is too small doesn't run outside the array bounds.
+	ciphertext, err := EncryptPKCS1v15(rand.Reader, &rsaPrivateKey.PublicKey, []byte{1})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("Failed to encrypt short message: %s", err)
+	}
+
+	var key [32]byte
+	if err := DecryptPKCS1v15SessionKey(nil, rsaPrivateKey, ciphertext, key[:]); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("Failed to decrypt short message: %s", err)
+	}
+
+	for _, v := range key {
+		if v != 0 {
+			t.Fatal("key was modified when ciphertext was invalid")
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+var rsaPrivateKey = parseKey(testingKey(`-----BEGIN RSA TESTING KEY-----
+MIIBOgIBAAJBALKZD0nEffqM1ACuak0bijtqE2QrI/KLADv7l3kK3ppMyCuLKoF0
+fd7Ai2KW5ToIwzFofvJcS/STa6HA5gQenRUCAwEAAQJBAIq9amn00aS0h/CrjXqu
+/ThglAXJmZhOMPVn4eiu7/ROixi9sex436MaVeMqSNf7Ex9a8fRNfWss7Sqd9eWu
+RTUCIQDasvGASLqmjeffBNLTXV2A5g4t+kLVCpsEIZAycV5GswIhANEPLmax0ME/
+EO+ZJ79TJKN5yiGBRsv5yvx5UiHxajEXAiAhAol5N4EUyq6I9w1rYdhPMGpLfk7A
+IU2snfRJ6Nq2CQIgFrPsWRCkV+gOYcajD17rEqmuLrdIRexpg8N1DOSXoJ8CIGlS
+tAboUGBxTDq3ZroNism3DaMIbKPyYrAqhKov1h5V
+-----END RSA TESTING KEY-----`))
+
+func parsePublicKey(s string) *PublicKey {
+	p, _ := pem.Decode([]byte(s))
+	k, err := x509.ParsePKCS1PublicKey(p.Bytes)
+	if err != nil {
+		panic(err)
+	}
+	return k
+}
+
+func TestShortPKCS1v15Signature(t *testing.T) {
+	pub := parsePublicKey(`-----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----
+MEgCQQCd9BVzo775lkohasxjnefF1nCMcNoibqIWEVDe/K7M2GSoO4zlSQB+gkix
+O3AnTcdHB51iaZpWfxPSnew8yfulAgMBAAE=
+-----END RSA PUBLIC KEY-----`)
+	sig, err := hex.DecodeString("193a310d0dcf64094c6e3a00c8219b80ded70535473acff72c08e1222974bb24a93a535b1dc4c59fc0e65775df7ba2007dd20e9193f4c4025a18a7070aee93")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("failed to decode signature: %s", err)
+	}
+
+	h := sha256.Sum256([]byte("hello"))
+	err = VerifyPKCS1v15(pub, crypto.SHA256, h[:], sig)
+	if err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("VerifyPKCS1v15 accepted a truncated signature")
+	}
+}
diff --git a/src/crypto/rsa/pss.go b/src/crypto/rsa/pss.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f7d23b5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/crypto/rsa/pss.go
@@ -0,0 +1,372 @@
+// Copyright 2013 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+package rsa
+
+// This file implements the RSASSA-PSS signature scheme according to RFC 8017.
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"crypto"
+	"crypto/internal/boring"
+	"errors"
+	"hash"
+	"io"
+)
+
+// Per RFC 8017, Section 9.1
+//
+//     EM = MGF1 xor DB || H( 8*0x00 || mHash || salt ) || 0xbc
+//
+// where
+//
+//     DB = PS || 0x01 || salt
+//
+// and PS can be empty so
+//
+//     emLen = dbLen + hLen + 1 = psLen + sLen + hLen + 2
+//
+
+func emsaPSSEncode(mHash []byte, emBits int, salt []byte, hash hash.Hash) ([]byte, error) {
+	// See RFC 8017, Section 9.1.1.
+
+	hLen := hash.Size()
+	sLen := len(salt)
+	emLen := (emBits + 7) / 8
+
+	// 1.  If the length of M is greater than the input limitation for the
+	//     hash function (2^61 - 1 octets for SHA-1), output "message too
+	//     long" and stop.
+	//
+	// 2.  Let mHash = Hash(M), an octet string of length hLen.
+
+	if len(mHash) != hLen {
+		return nil, errors.New("crypto/rsa: input must be hashed with given hash")
+	}
+
+	// 3.  If emLen < hLen + sLen + 2, output "encoding error" and stop.
+
+	if emLen < hLen+sLen+2 {
+		return nil, ErrMessageTooLong
+	}
+
+	em := make([]byte, emLen)
+	psLen := emLen - sLen - hLen - 2
+	db := em[:psLen+1+sLen]
+	h := em[psLen+1+sLen : emLen-1]
+
+	// 4.  Generate a random octet string salt of length sLen; if sLen = 0,
+	//     then salt is the empty string.
+	//
+	// 5.  Let
+	//       M' = (0x)00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 || mHash || salt;
+	//
+	//     M' is an octet string of length 8 + hLen + sLen with eight
+	//     initial zero octets.
+	//
+	// 6.  Let H = Hash(M'), an octet string of length hLen.
+
+	var prefix [8]byte
+
+	hash.Write(prefix[:])
+	hash.Write(mHash)
+	hash.Write(salt)
+
+	h = hash.Sum(h[:0])
+	hash.Reset()
+
+	// 7.  Generate an octet string PS consisting of emLen - sLen - hLen - 2
+	//     zero octets. The length of PS may be 0.
+	//
+	// 8.  Let DB = PS || 0x01 || salt; DB is an octet string of length
+	//     emLen - hLen - 1.
+
+	db[psLen] = 0x01
+	copy(db[psLen+1:], salt)
+
+	// 9.  Let dbMask = MGF(H, emLen - hLen - 1).
+	//
+	// 10. Let maskedDB = DB \xor dbMask.
+
+	mgf1XOR(db, hash, h)
+
+	// 11. Set the leftmost 8 * emLen - emBits bits of the leftmost octet in
+	//     maskedDB to zero.
+
+	db[0] &= 0xff >> (8*emLen - emBits)
+
+	// 12. Let EM = maskedDB || H || 0xbc.
+	em[emLen-1] = 0xbc
+
+	// 13. Output EM.
+	return em, nil
+}
+
+func emsaPSSVerify(mHash, em []byte, emBits, sLen int, hash hash.Hash) error {
+	// See RFC 8017, Section 9.1.2.
+
+	hLen := hash.Size()
+	if sLen == PSSSaltLengthEqualsHash {
+		sLen = hLen
+	}
+	emLen := (emBits + 7) / 8
+	if emLen != len(em) {
+		return errors.New("rsa: internal error: inconsistent length")
+	}
+
+	// 1.  If the length of M is greater than the input limitation for the
+	//     hash function (2^61 - 1 octets for SHA-1), output "inconsistent"
+	//     and stop.
+	//
+	// 2.  Let mHash = Hash(M), an octet string of length hLen.
+	if hLen != len(mHash) {
+		return ErrVerification
+	}
+
+	// 3.  If emLen < hLen + sLen + 2, output "inconsistent" and stop.
+	if emLen < hLen+sLen+2 {
+		return ErrVerification
+	}
+
+	// 4.  If the rightmost octet of EM does not have hexadecimal value
+	//     0xbc, output "inconsistent" and stop.
+	if em[emLen-1] != 0xbc {
+		return ErrVerification
+	}
+
+	// 5.  Let maskedDB be the leftmost emLen - hLen - 1 octets of EM, and
+	//     let H be the next hLen octets.
+	db := em[:emLen-hLen-1]
+	h := em[emLen-hLen-1 : emLen-1]
+
+	// 6.  If the leftmost 8 * emLen - emBits bits of the leftmost octet in
+	//     maskedDB are not all equal to zero, output "inconsistent" and
+	//     stop.
+	var bitMask byte = 0xff >> (8*emLen - emBits)
+	if em[0] & ^bitMask != 0 {
+		return ErrVerification
+	}
+
+	// 7.  Let dbMask = MGF(H, emLen - hLen - 1).
+	//
+	// 8.  Let DB = maskedDB \xor dbMask.
+	mgf1XOR(db, hash, h)
+
+	// 9.  Set the leftmost 8 * emLen - emBits bits of the leftmost octet in DB
+	//     to zero.
+	db[0] &= bitMask
+
+	// If we don't know the salt length, look for the 0x01 delimiter.
+	if sLen == PSSSaltLengthAuto {
+		psLen := bytes.IndexByte(db, 0x01)
+		if psLen < 0 {
+			return ErrVerification
+		}
+		sLen = len(db) - psLen - 1
+	}
+
+	// 10. If the emLen - hLen - sLen - 2 leftmost octets of DB are not zero
+	//     or if the octet at position emLen - hLen - sLen - 1 (the leftmost
+	//     position is "position 1") does not have hexadecimal value 0x01,
+	//     output "inconsistent" and stop.
+	psLen := emLen - hLen - sLen - 2
+	for _, e := range db[:psLen] {
+		if e != 0x00 {
+			return ErrVerification
+		}
+	}
+	if db[psLen] != 0x01 {
+		return ErrVerification
+	}
+
+	// 11.  Let salt be the last sLen octets of DB.
+	salt := db[len(db)-sLen:]
+
+	// 12.  Let
+	//          M' = (0x)00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 || mHash || salt ;
+	//     M' is an octet string of length 8 + hLen + sLen with eight
+	//     initial zero octets.
+	//
+	// 13. Let H' = Hash(M'), an octet string of length hLen.
+	var prefix [8]byte
+	hash.Write(prefix[:])
+	hash.Write(mHash)
+	hash.Write(salt)
+
+	h0 := hash.Sum(nil)
+
+	// 14. If H = H', output "consistent." Otherwise, output "inconsistent."
+	if !bytes.Equal(h0, h) { // TODO: constant time?
+		return ErrVerification
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// signPSSWithSalt calculates the signature of hashed using PSS with specified salt.
+// Note that hashed must be the result of hashing the input message using the
+// given hash function. salt is a random sequence of bytes whose length will be
+// later used to verify the signature.
+func signPSSWithSalt(priv *PrivateKey, hash crypto.Hash, hashed, salt []byte) ([]byte, error) {
+	emBits := priv.N.BitLen() - 1
+	em, err := emsaPSSEncode(hashed, emBits, salt, hash.New())
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	if boring.Enabled {
+		bkey, err := boringPrivateKey(priv)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+		// Note: BoringCrypto always does decrypt "withCheck".
+		// (It's not just decrypt.)
+		s, err := boring.DecryptRSANoPadding(bkey, em)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+		return s, nil
+	}
+
+	// RFC 8017: "Note that the octet length of EM will be one less than k if
+	// modBits - 1 is divisible by 8 and equal to k otherwise, where k is the
+	// length in octets of the RSA modulus n." 🙄
+	//
+	// This is extremely annoying, as all other encrypt and decrypt inputs are
+	// always the exact same size as the modulus. Since it only happens for
+	// weird modulus sizes, fix it by padding inefficiently.
+	if emLen, k := len(em), priv.Size(); emLen < k {
+		emNew := make([]byte, k)
+		copy(emNew[k-emLen:], em)
+		em = emNew
+	}
+
+	return decrypt(priv, em, withCheck)
+}
+
+const (
+	// PSSSaltLengthAuto causes the salt in a PSS signature to be as large
+	// as possible when signing, and to be auto-detected when verifying.
+	PSSSaltLengthAuto = 0
+	// PSSSaltLengthEqualsHash causes the salt length to equal the length
+	// of the hash used in the signature.
+	PSSSaltLengthEqualsHash = -1
+)
+
+// PSSOptions contains options for creating and verifying PSS signatures.
+type PSSOptions struct {
+	// SaltLength controls the length of the salt used in the PSS signature. It
+	// can either be a positive number of bytes, or one of the special
+	// PSSSaltLength constants.
+	SaltLength int
+
+	// Hash is the hash function used to generate the message digest. If not
+	// zero, it overrides the hash function passed to SignPSS. It's required
+	// when using PrivateKey.Sign.
+	Hash crypto.Hash
+}
+
+// HashFunc returns opts.Hash so that PSSOptions implements crypto.SignerOpts.
+func (opts *PSSOptions) HashFunc() crypto.Hash {
+	return opts.Hash
+}
+
+func (opts *PSSOptions) saltLength() int {
+	if opts == nil {
+		return PSSSaltLengthAuto
+	}
+	return opts.SaltLength
+}
+
+var invalidSaltLenErr = errors.New("crypto/rsa: PSSOptions.SaltLength cannot be negative")
+
+// SignPSS calculates the signature of digest using PSS.
+//
+// digest must be the result of hashing the input message using the given hash
+// function. The opts argument may be nil, in which case sensible defaults are
+// used. If opts.Hash is set, it overrides hash.
+func SignPSS(rand io.Reader, priv *PrivateKey, hash crypto.Hash, digest []byte, opts *PSSOptions) ([]byte, error) {
+	if boring.Enabled && rand == boring.RandReader {
+		bkey, err := boringPrivateKey(priv)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+		return boring.SignRSAPSS(bkey, hash, digest, opts.saltLength())
+	}
+	boring.UnreachableExceptTests()
+
+	if opts != nil && opts.Hash != 0 {
+		hash = opts.Hash
+	}
+
+	saltLength := opts.saltLength()
+	switch saltLength {
+	case PSSSaltLengthAuto:
+		saltLength = (priv.N.BitLen()-1+7)/8 - 2 - hash.Size()
+		if saltLength < 0 {
+			return nil, ErrMessageTooLong
+		}
+	case PSSSaltLengthEqualsHash:
+		saltLength = hash.Size()
+	default:
+		// If we get here saltLength is either > 0 or < -1, in the
+		// latter case we fail out.
+		if saltLength <= 0 {
+			return nil, invalidSaltLenErr
+		}
+	}
+	salt := make([]byte, saltLength)
+	if _, err := io.ReadFull(rand, salt); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	return signPSSWithSalt(priv, hash, digest, salt)
+}
+
+// VerifyPSS verifies a PSS signature.
+//
+// A valid signature is indicated by returning a nil error. digest must be the
+// result of hashing the input message using the given hash function. The opts
+// argument may be nil, in which case sensible defaults are used. opts.Hash is
+// ignored.
+func VerifyPSS(pub *PublicKey, hash crypto.Hash, digest []byte, sig []byte, opts *PSSOptions) error {
+	if boring.Enabled {
+		bkey, err := boringPublicKey(pub)
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		if err := boring.VerifyRSAPSS(bkey, hash, digest, sig, opts.saltLength()); err != nil {
+			return ErrVerification
+		}
+		return nil
+	}
+	if len(sig) != pub.Size() {
+		return ErrVerification
+	}
+	// Salt length must be either one of the special constants (-1 or 0)
+	// or otherwise positive. If it is < PSSSaltLengthEqualsHash (-1)
+	// we return an error.
+	if opts.saltLength() < PSSSaltLengthEqualsHash {
+		return invalidSaltLenErr
+	}
+
+	emBits := pub.N.BitLen() - 1
+	emLen := (emBits + 7) / 8
+	em, err := encrypt(pub, sig)
+	if err != nil {
+		return ErrVerification
+	}
+
+	// Like in signPSSWithSalt, deal with mismatches between emLen and the size
+	// of the modulus. The spec would have us wire emLen into the encoding
+	// function, but we'd rather always encode to the size of the modulus and
+	// then strip leading zeroes if necessary. This only happens for weird
+	// modulus sizes anyway.
+	for len(em) > emLen && len(em) > 0 {
+		if em[0] != 0 {
+			return ErrVerification
+		}
+		em = em[1:]
+	}
+
+	return emsaPSSVerify(digest, em, emBits, opts.saltLength(), hash.New())
+}
diff --git a/src/crypto/rsa/pss_test.go b/src/crypto/rsa/pss_test.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cf03e3c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/crypto/rsa/pss_test.go
@@ -0,0 +1,308 @@
+// Copyright 2013 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+package rsa_test
+
+import (
+	"bufio"
+	"bytes"
+	"compress/bzip2"
+	"crypto"
+	"crypto/rand"
+	. "crypto/rsa"
+	"crypto/sha1"
+	"crypto/sha256"
+	"encoding/hex"
+	"math/big"
+	"os"
+	"strconv"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+func TestEMSAPSS(t *testing.T) {
+	// Test vector in file pss-int.txt from: ftp://ftp.rsasecurity.com/pub/pkcs/pkcs-1/pkcs-1v2-1-vec.zip
+	msg := []byte{
+		0x85, 0x9e, 0xef, 0x2f, 0xd7, 0x8a, 0xca, 0x00, 0x30, 0x8b,
+		0xdc, 0x47, 0x11, 0x93, 0xbf, 0x55, 0xbf, 0x9d, 0x78, 0xdb,
+		0x8f, 0x8a, 0x67, 0x2b, 0x48, 0x46, 0x34, 0xf3, 0xc9, 0xc2,
+		0x6e, 0x64, 0x78, 0xae, 0x10, 0x26, 0x0f, 0xe0, 0xdd, 0x8c,
+		0x08, 0x2e, 0x53, 0xa5, 0x29, 0x3a, 0xf2, 0x17, 0x3c, 0xd5,
+		0x0c, 0x6d, 0x5d, 0x35, 0x4f, 0xeb, 0xf7, 0x8b, 0x26, 0x02,
+		0x1c, 0x25, 0xc0, 0x27, 0x12, 0xe7, 0x8c, 0xd4, 0x69, 0x4c,
+		0x9f, 0x46, 0x97, 0x77, 0xe4, 0x51, 0xe7, 0xf8, 0xe9, 0xe0,
+		0x4c, 0xd3, 0x73, 0x9c, 0x6b, 0xbf, 0xed, 0xae, 0x48, 0x7f,
+		0xb5, 0x56, 0x44, 0xe9, 0xca, 0x74, 0xff, 0x77, 0xa5, 0x3c,
+		0xb7, 0x29, 0x80, 0x2f, 0x6e, 0xd4, 0xa5, 0xff, 0xa8, 0xba,
+		0x15, 0x98, 0x90, 0xfc,
+	}
+	salt := []byte{
+		0xe3, 0xb5, 0xd5, 0xd0, 0x02, 0xc1, 0xbc, 0xe5, 0x0c, 0x2b,
+		0x65, 0xef, 0x88, 0xa1, 0x88, 0xd8, 0x3b, 0xce, 0x7e, 0x61,
+	}
+	expected := []byte{
+		0x66, 0xe4, 0x67, 0x2e, 0x83, 0x6a, 0xd1, 0x21, 0xba, 0x24,
+		0x4b, 0xed, 0x65, 0x76, 0xb8, 0x67, 0xd9, 0xa4, 0x47, 0xc2,
+		0x8a, 0x6e, 0x66, 0xa5, 0xb8, 0x7d, 0xee, 0x7f, 0xbc, 0x7e,
+		0x65, 0xaf, 0x50, 0x57, 0xf8, 0x6f, 0xae, 0x89, 0x84, 0xd9,
+		0xba, 0x7f, 0x96, 0x9a, 0xd6, 0xfe, 0x02, 0xa4, 0xd7, 0x5f,
+		0x74, 0x45, 0xfe, 0xfd, 0xd8, 0x5b, 0x6d, 0x3a, 0x47, 0x7c,
+		0x28, 0xd2, 0x4b, 0xa1, 0xe3, 0x75, 0x6f, 0x79, 0x2d, 0xd1,
+		0xdc, 0xe8, 0xca, 0x94, 0x44, 0x0e, 0xcb, 0x52, 0x79, 0xec,
+		0xd3, 0x18, 0x3a, 0x31, 0x1f, 0xc8, 0x96, 0xda, 0x1c, 0xb3,
+		0x93, 0x11, 0xaf, 0x37, 0xea, 0x4a, 0x75, 0xe2, 0x4b, 0xdb,
+		0xfd, 0x5c, 0x1d, 0xa0, 0xde, 0x7c, 0xec, 0xdf, 0x1a, 0x89,
+		0x6f, 0x9d, 0x8b, 0xc8, 0x16, 0xd9, 0x7c, 0xd7, 0xa2, 0xc4,
+		0x3b, 0xad, 0x54, 0x6f, 0xbe, 0x8c, 0xfe, 0xbc,
+	}
+
+	hash := sha1.New()
+	hash.Write(msg)
+	hashed := hash.Sum(nil)
+
+	encoded, err := EMSAPSSEncode(hashed, 1023, salt, sha1.New())
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Errorf("Error from emsaPSSEncode: %s\n", err)
+	}
+	if !bytes.Equal(encoded, expected) {
+		t.Errorf("Bad encoding. got %x, want %x", encoded, expected)
+	}
+
+	if err = EMSAPSSVerify(hashed, encoded, 1023, len(salt), sha1.New()); err != nil {
+		t.Errorf("Bad verification: %s", err)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestPSSGolden tests all the test vectors in pss-vect.txt from
+// ftp://ftp.rsasecurity.com/pub/pkcs/pkcs-1/pkcs-1v2-1-vec.zip
+func TestPSSGolden(t *testing.T) {
+	inFile, err := os.Open("testdata/pss-vect.txt.bz2")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("Failed to open input file: %s", err)
+	}
+	defer inFile.Close()
+
+	// The pss-vect.txt file contains RSA keys and then a series of
+	// signatures. A goroutine is used to preprocess the input by merging
+	// lines, removing spaces in hex values and identifying the start of
+	// new keys and signature blocks.
+	const newKeyMarker = "START NEW KEY"
+	const newSignatureMarker = "START NEW SIGNATURE"
+
+	values := make(chan string)
+
+	go func() {
+		defer close(values)
+		scanner := bufio.NewScanner(bzip2.NewReader(inFile))
+		var partialValue string
+		lastWasValue := true
+
+		for scanner.Scan() {
+			line := scanner.Text()
+			switch {
+			case len(line) == 0:
+				if len(partialValue) > 0 {
+					values <- strings.ReplaceAll(partialValue, " ", "")
+					partialValue = ""
+					lastWasValue = true
+				}
+				continue
+			case strings.HasPrefix(line, "# ======") && lastWasValue:
+				values <- newKeyMarker
+				lastWasValue = false
+			case strings.HasPrefix(line, "# ------") && lastWasValue:
+				values <- newSignatureMarker
+				lastWasValue = false
+			case strings.HasPrefix(line, "#"):
+				continue
+			default:
+				partialValue += line
+			}
+		}
+		if err := scanner.Err(); err != nil {
+			panic(err)
+		}
+	}()
+
+	var key *PublicKey
+	var hashed []byte
+	hash := crypto.SHA1
+	h := hash.New()
+	opts := &PSSOptions{
+		SaltLength: PSSSaltLengthEqualsHash,
+	}
+
+	for marker := range values {
+		switch marker {
+		case newKeyMarker:
+			key = new(PublicKey)
+			nHex, ok := <-values
+			if !ok {
+				continue
+			}
+			key.N = bigFromHex(nHex)
+			key.E = intFromHex(<-values)
+			// We don't care for d, p, q, dP, dQ or qInv.
+			for i := 0; i < 6; i++ {
+				<-values
+			}
+		case newSignatureMarker:
+			msg := fromHex(<-values)
+			<-values // skip salt
+			sig := fromHex(<-values)
+
+			h.Reset()
+			h.Write(msg)
+			hashed = h.Sum(hashed[:0])
+
+			if err := VerifyPSS(key, hash, hashed, sig, opts); err != nil {
+				t.Error(err)
+			}
+		default:
+			t.Fatalf("unknown marker: " + marker)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// TestPSSOpenSSL ensures that we can verify a PSS signature from OpenSSL with
+// the default options. OpenSSL sets the salt length to be maximal.
+func TestPSSOpenSSL(t *testing.T) {
+	hash := crypto.SHA256
+	h := hash.New()
+	h.Write([]byte("testing"))
+	hashed := h.Sum(nil)
+
+	// Generated with `echo -n testing | openssl dgst -sign key.pem -sigopt rsa_padding_mode:pss -sha256 > sig`
+	sig := []byte{
+		0x95, 0x59, 0x6f, 0xd3, 0x10, 0xa2, 0xe7, 0xa2, 0x92, 0x9d,
+		0x4a, 0x07, 0x2e, 0x2b, 0x27, 0xcc, 0x06, 0xc2, 0x87, 0x2c,
+		0x52, 0xf0, 0x4a, 0xcc, 0x05, 0x94, 0xf2, 0xc3, 0x2e, 0x20,
+		0xd7, 0x3e, 0x66, 0x62, 0xb5, 0x95, 0x2b, 0xa3, 0x93, 0x9a,
+		0x66, 0x64, 0x25, 0xe0, 0x74, 0x66, 0x8c, 0x3e, 0x92, 0xeb,
+		0xc6, 0xe6, 0xc0, 0x44, 0xf3, 0xb4, 0xb4, 0x2e, 0x8c, 0x66,
+		0x0a, 0x37, 0x9c, 0x69,
+	}
+
+	if err := VerifyPSS(&rsaPrivateKey.PublicKey, hash, hashed, sig, nil); err != nil {
+		t.Error(err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestPSSNilOpts(t *testing.T) {
+	hash := crypto.SHA256
+	h := hash.New()
+	h.Write([]byte("testing"))
+	hashed := h.Sum(nil)
+
+	SignPSS(rand.Reader, rsaPrivateKey, hash, hashed, nil)
+}
+
+func TestPSSSigning(t *testing.T) {
+	var saltLengthCombinations = []struct {
+		signSaltLength, verifySaltLength int
+		good                             bool
+	}{
+		{PSSSaltLengthAuto, PSSSaltLengthAuto, true},
+		{PSSSaltLengthEqualsHash, PSSSaltLengthAuto, true},
+		{PSSSaltLengthEqualsHash, PSSSaltLengthEqualsHash, true},
+		{PSSSaltLengthEqualsHash, 8, false},
+		{PSSSaltLengthAuto, PSSSaltLengthEqualsHash, false},
+		{8, 8, true},
+		{PSSSaltLengthAuto, 42, true},
+		{PSSSaltLengthAuto, 20, false},
+		{PSSSaltLengthAuto, -2, false},
+	}
+
+	hash := crypto.SHA1
+	h := hash.New()
+	h.Write([]byte("testing"))
+	hashed := h.Sum(nil)
+	var opts PSSOptions
+
+	for i, test := range saltLengthCombinations {
+		opts.SaltLength = test.signSaltLength
+		sig, err := SignPSS(rand.Reader, rsaPrivateKey, hash, hashed, &opts)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Errorf("#%d: error while signing: %s", i, err)
+			continue
+		}
+
+		opts.SaltLength = test.verifySaltLength
+		err = VerifyPSS(&rsaPrivateKey.PublicKey, hash, hashed, sig, &opts)
+		if (err == nil) != test.good {
+			t.Errorf("#%d: bad result, wanted: %t, got: %s", i, test.good, err)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestPSS513(t *testing.T) {
+	// See Issue 42741, and separately, RFC 8017: "Note that the octet length of
+	// EM will be one less than k if modBits - 1 is divisible by 8 and equal to
+	// k otherwise, where k is the length in octets of the RSA modulus n."
+	key, err := GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 513)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	digest := sha256.Sum256([]byte("message"))
+	signature, err := key.Sign(rand.Reader, digest[:], &PSSOptions{
+		SaltLength: PSSSaltLengthAuto,
+		Hash:       crypto.SHA256,
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	err = VerifyPSS(&key.PublicKey, crypto.SHA256, digest[:], signature, nil)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Error(err)
+	}
+}
+
+func bigFromHex(hex string) *big.Int {
+	n, ok := new(big.Int).SetString(hex, 16)
+	if !ok {
+		panic("bad hex: " + hex)
+	}
+	return n
+}
+
+func intFromHex(hex string) int {
+	i, err := strconv.ParseInt(hex, 16, 32)
+	if err != nil {
+		panic(err)
+	}
+	return int(i)
+}
+
+func fromHex(hexStr string) []byte {
+	s, err := hex.DecodeString(hexStr)
+	if err != nil {
+		panic(err)
+	}
+	return s
+}
+
+func TestInvalidPSSSaltLength(t *testing.T) {
+	key, err := GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 245)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+
+	digest := sha256.Sum256([]byte("message"))
+	// We don't check the exact error matches, because crypto/rsa and crypto/internal/boring
+	// return two different error variables, which have the same content but are not equal.
+	if _, err := SignPSS(rand.Reader, key, crypto.SHA256, digest[:], &PSSOptions{
+		SaltLength: -2,
+		Hash:       crypto.SHA256,
+	}); err.Error() != InvalidSaltLenErr.Error() {
+		t.Fatalf("SignPSS unexpected error: got %v, want %v", err, InvalidSaltLenErr)
+	}
+
+	// We don't check the specific error here, because crypto/rsa and crypto/internal/boring
+	// return different errors, so we just check that _an error_ was returned.
+	if err := VerifyPSS(&key.PublicKey, crypto.SHA256, []byte{1, 2, 3}, make([]byte, 31), &PSSOptions{
+		SaltLength: -2,
+	}); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("VerifyPSS unexpected success")
+	}
+}
diff --git a/src/crypto/rsa/rsa.go b/src/crypto/rsa/rsa.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..63bc8da
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/crypto/rsa/rsa.go
@@ -0,0 +1,737 @@
+// Copyright 2009 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+// Package rsa implements RSA encryption as specified in PKCS #1 and RFC 8017.
+//
+// RSA is a single, fundamental operation that is used in this package to
+// implement either public-key encryption or public-key signatures.
+//
+// The original specification for encryption and signatures with RSA is PKCS #1
+// and the terms "RSA encryption" and "RSA signatures" by default refer to
+// PKCS #1 version 1.5. However, that specification has flaws and new designs
+// should use version 2, usually called by just OAEP and PSS, where
+// possible.
+//
+// Two sets of interfaces are included in this package. When a more abstract
+// interface isn't necessary, there are functions for encrypting/decrypting
+// with v1.5/OAEP and signing/verifying with v1.5/PSS. If one needs to abstract
+// over the public key primitive, the PrivateKey type implements the
+// Decrypter and Signer interfaces from the crypto package.
+//
+// Operations in this package are implemented using constant-time algorithms,
+// except for [GenerateKey], [PrivateKey.Precompute], and [PrivateKey.Validate].
+// Every other operation only leaks the bit size of the involved values, which
+// all depend on the selected key size.
+package rsa
+
+import (
+	"crypto"
+	"crypto/internal/bigmod"
+	"crypto/internal/boring"
+	"crypto/internal/boring/bbig"
+	"crypto/internal/randutil"
+	"crypto/rand"
+	"crypto/subtle"
+	"encoding/binary"
+	"errors"
+	"hash"
+	"io"
+	"math"
+	"math/big"
+)
+
+var bigOne = big.NewInt(1)
+
+// A PublicKey represents the public part of an RSA key.
+type PublicKey struct {
+	N *big.Int // modulus
+	E int      // public exponent
+}
+
+// Any methods implemented on PublicKey might need to also be implemented on
+// PrivateKey, as the latter embeds the former and will expose its methods.
+
+// Size returns the modulus size in bytes. Raw signatures and ciphertexts
+// for or by this public key will have the same size.
+func (pub *PublicKey) Size() int {
+	return (pub.N.BitLen() + 7) / 8
+}
+
+// Equal reports whether pub and x have the same value.
+func (pub *PublicKey) Equal(x crypto.PublicKey) bool {
+	xx, ok := x.(*PublicKey)
+	if !ok {
+		return false
+	}
+	return pub.N.Cmp(xx.N) == 0 && pub.E == xx.E
+}
+
+// OAEPOptions is an interface for passing options to OAEP decryption using the
+// crypto.Decrypter interface.
+type OAEPOptions struct {
+	// Hash is the hash function that will be used when generating the mask.
+	Hash crypto.Hash
+
+	// MGFHash is the hash function used for MGF1.
+	// If zero, Hash is used instead.
+	MGFHash crypto.Hash
+
+	// Label is an arbitrary byte string that must be equal to the value
+	// used when encrypting.
+	Label []byte
+}
+
+var (
+	errPublicModulus       = errors.New("crypto/rsa: missing public modulus")
+	errPublicExponentSmall = errors.New("crypto/rsa: public exponent too small")
+	errPublicExponentLarge = errors.New("crypto/rsa: public exponent too large")
+)
+
+// checkPub sanity checks the public key before we use it.
+// We require pub.E to fit into a 32-bit integer so that we
+// do not have different behavior depending on whether
+// int is 32 or 64 bits. See also
+// https://www.imperialviolet.org/2012/03/16/rsae.html.
+func checkPub(pub *PublicKey) error {
+	if pub.N == nil {
+		return errPublicModulus
+	}
+	if pub.E < 2 {
+		return errPublicExponentSmall
+	}
+	if pub.E > 1<<31-1 {
+		return errPublicExponentLarge
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// A PrivateKey represents an RSA key
+type PrivateKey struct {
+	PublicKey            // public part.
+	D         *big.Int   // private exponent
+	Primes    []*big.Int // prime factors of N, has >= 2 elements.
+
+	// Precomputed contains precomputed values that speed up RSA operations,
+	// if available. It must be generated by calling PrivateKey.Precompute and
+	// must not be modified.
+	Precomputed PrecomputedValues
+}
+
+// Public returns the public key corresponding to priv.
+func (priv *PrivateKey) Public() crypto.PublicKey {
+	return &priv.PublicKey
+}
+
+// Equal reports whether priv and x have equivalent values. It ignores
+// Precomputed values.
+func (priv *PrivateKey) Equal(x crypto.PrivateKey) bool {
+	xx, ok := x.(*PrivateKey)
+	if !ok {
+		return false
+	}
+	if !priv.PublicKey.Equal(&xx.PublicKey) || priv.D.Cmp(xx.D) != 0 {
+		return false
+	}
+	if len(priv.Primes) != len(xx.Primes) {
+		return false
+	}
+	for i := range priv.Primes {
+		if priv.Primes[i].Cmp(xx.Primes[i]) != 0 {
+			return false
+		}
+	}
+	return true
+}
+
+// Sign signs digest with priv, reading randomness from rand. If opts is a
+// *PSSOptions then the PSS algorithm will be used, otherwise PKCS #1 v1.5 will
+// be used. digest must be the result of hashing the input message using
+// opts.HashFunc().
+//
+// This method implements crypto.Signer, which is an interface to support keys
+// where the private part is kept in, for example, a hardware module. Common
+// uses should use the Sign* functions in this package directly.
+func (priv *PrivateKey) Sign(rand io.Reader, digest []byte, opts crypto.SignerOpts) ([]byte, error) {
+	if pssOpts, ok := opts.(*PSSOptions); ok {
+		return SignPSS(rand, priv, pssOpts.Hash, digest, pssOpts)
+	}
+
+	return SignPKCS1v15(rand, priv, opts.HashFunc(), digest)
+}
+
+// Decrypt decrypts ciphertext with priv. If opts is nil or of type
+// *PKCS1v15DecryptOptions then PKCS #1 v1.5 decryption is performed. Otherwise
+// opts must have type *OAEPOptions and OAEP decryption is done.
+func (priv *PrivateKey) Decrypt(rand io.Reader, ciphertext []byte, opts crypto.DecrypterOpts) (plaintext []byte, err error) {
+	if opts == nil {
+		return DecryptPKCS1v15(rand, priv, ciphertext)
+	}
+
+	switch opts := opts.(type) {
+	case *OAEPOptions:
+		if opts.MGFHash == 0 {
+			return decryptOAEP(opts.Hash.New(), opts.Hash.New(), rand, priv, ciphertext, opts.Label)
+		} else {
+			return decryptOAEP(opts.Hash.New(), opts.MGFHash.New(), rand, priv, ciphertext, opts.Label)
+		}
+
+	case *PKCS1v15DecryptOptions:
+		if l := opts.SessionKeyLen; l > 0 {
+			plaintext = make([]byte, l)
+			if _, err := io.ReadFull(rand, plaintext); err != nil {
+				return nil, err
+			}
+			if err := DecryptPKCS1v15SessionKey(rand, priv, ciphertext, plaintext); err != nil {
+				return nil, err
+			}
+			return plaintext, nil
+		} else {
+			return DecryptPKCS1v15(rand, priv, ciphertext)
+		}
+
+	default:
+		return nil, errors.New("crypto/rsa: invalid options for Decrypt")
+	}
+}
+
+type PrecomputedValues struct {
+	Dp, Dq *big.Int // D mod (P-1) (or mod Q-1)
+	Qinv   *big.Int // Q^-1 mod P
+
+	// CRTValues is used for the 3rd and subsequent primes. Due to a
+	// historical accident, the CRT for the first two primes is handled
+	// differently in PKCS #1 and interoperability is sufficiently
+	// important that we mirror this.
+	//
+	// Note: these values are still filled in by Precompute for
+	// backwards compatibility but are not used. Multi-prime RSA is very rare,
+	// and is implemented by this package without CRT optimizations to limit
+	// complexity.
+	CRTValues []CRTValue
+
+	n, p, q *bigmod.Modulus // moduli for CRT with Montgomery precomputed constants
+}
+
+// CRTValue contains the precomputed Chinese remainder theorem values.
+type CRTValue struct {
+	Exp   *big.Int // D mod (prime-1).
+	Coeff *big.Int // R·Coeff ≡ 1 mod Prime.
+	R     *big.Int // product of primes prior to this (inc p and q).
+}
+
+// Validate performs basic sanity checks on the key.
+// It returns nil if the key is valid, or else an error describing a problem.
+func (priv *PrivateKey) Validate() error {
+	if err := checkPub(&priv.PublicKey); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	// Check that Πprimes == n.
+	modulus := new(big.Int).Set(bigOne)
+	for _, prime := range priv.Primes {
+		// Any primes ≤ 1 will cause divide-by-zero panics later.
+		if prime.Cmp(bigOne) <= 0 {
+			return errors.New("crypto/rsa: invalid prime value")
+		}
+		modulus.Mul(modulus, prime)
+	}
+	if modulus.Cmp(priv.N) != 0 {
+		return errors.New("crypto/rsa: invalid modulus")
+	}
+
+	// Check that de ≡ 1 mod p-1, for each prime.
+	// This implies that e is coprime to each p-1 as e has a multiplicative
+	// inverse. Therefore e is coprime to lcm(p-1,q-1,r-1,...) =
+	// exponent(ℤ/nℤ). It also implies that a^de ≡ a mod p as a^(p-1) ≡ 1
+	// mod p. Thus a^de ≡ a mod n for all a coprime to n, as required.
+	congruence := new(big.Int)
+	de := new(big.Int).SetInt64(int64(priv.E))
+	de.Mul(de, priv.D)
+	for _, prime := range priv.Primes {
+		pminus1 := new(big.Int).Sub(prime, bigOne)
+		congruence.Mod(de, pminus1)
+		if congruence.Cmp(bigOne) != 0 {
+			return errors.New("crypto/rsa: invalid exponents")
+		}
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// GenerateKey generates an RSA keypair of the given bit size using the
+// random source random (for example, crypto/rand.Reader).
+func GenerateKey(random io.Reader, bits int) (*PrivateKey, error) {
+	return GenerateMultiPrimeKey(random, 2, bits)
+}
+
+// GenerateMultiPrimeKey generates a multi-prime RSA keypair of the given bit
+// size and the given random source.
+//
+// Table 1 in "[On the Security of Multi-prime RSA]" suggests maximum numbers of
+// primes for a given bit size.
+//
+// Although the public keys are compatible (actually, indistinguishable) from
+// the 2-prime case, the private keys are not. Thus it may not be possible to
+// export multi-prime private keys in certain formats or to subsequently import
+// them into other code.
+//
+// This package does not implement CRT optimizations for multi-prime RSA, so the
+// keys with more than two primes will have worse performance.
+//
+// Note: The use of this function with a number of primes different from
+// two is not recommended for the above security, compatibility, and performance
+// reasons. Use GenerateKey instead.
+//
+// [On the Security of Multi-prime RSA]: http://www.cacr.math.uwaterloo.ca/techreports/2006/cacr2006-16.pdf
+func GenerateMultiPrimeKey(random io.Reader, nprimes int, bits int) (*PrivateKey, error) {
+	randutil.MaybeReadByte(random)
+
+	if boring.Enabled && random == boring.RandReader && nprimes == 2 &&
+		(bits == 2048 || bits == 3072 || bits == 4096) {
+		bN, bE, bD, bP, bQ, bDp, bDq, bQinv, err := boring.GenerateKeyRSA(bits)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+		N := bbig.Dec(bN)
+		E := bbig.Dec(bE)
+		D := bbig.Dec(bD)
+		P := bbig.Dec(bP)
+		Q := bbig.Dec(bQ)
+		Dp := bbig.Dec(bDp)
+		Dq := bbig.Dec(bDq)
+		Qinv := bbig.Dec(bQinv)
+		e64 := E.Int64()
+		if !E.IsInt64() || int64(int(e64)) != e64 {
+			return nil, errors.New("crypto/rsa: generated key exponent too large")
+		}
+		key := &PrivateKey{
+			PublicKey: PublicKey{
+				N: N,
+				E: int(e64),
+			},
+			D:      D,
+			Primes: []*big.Int{P, Q},
+			Precomputed: PrecomputedValues{
+				Dp:        Dp,
+				Dq:        Dq,
+				Qinv:      Qinv,
+				CRTValues: make([]CRTValue, 0), // non-nil, to match Precompute
+				n:         bigmod.NewModulusFromBig(N),
+				p:         bigmod.NewModulusFromBig(P),
+				q:         bigmod.NewModulusFromBig(Q),
+			},
+		}
+		return key, nil
+	}
+
+	priv := new(PrivateKey)
+	priv.E = 65537
+
+	if nprimes < 2 {
+		return nil, errors.New("crypto/rsa: GenerateMultiPrimeKey: nprimes must be >= 2")
+	}
+
+	if bits < 64 {
+		primeLimit := float64(uint64(1) << uint(bits/nprimes))
+		// pi approximates the number of primes less than primeLimit
+		pi := primeLimit / (math.Log(primeLimit) - 1)
+		// Generated primes start with 11 (in binary) so we can only
+		// use a quarter of them.
+		pi /= 4
+		// Use a factor of two to ensure that key generation terminates
+		// in a reasonable amount of time.
+		pi /= 2
+		if pi <= float64(nprimes) {
+			return nil, errors.New("crypto/rsa: too few primes of given length to generate an RSA key")
+		}
+	}
+
+	primes := make([]*big.Int, nprimes)
+
+NextSetOfPrimes:
+	for {
+		todo := bits
+		// crypto/rand should set the top two bits in each prime.
+		// Thus each prime has the form
+		//   p_i = 2^bitlen(p_i) × 0.11... (in base 2).
+		// And the product is:
+		//   P = 2^todo × α
+		// where α is the product of nprimes numbers of the form 0.11...
+		//
+		// If α < 1/2 (which can happen for nprimes > 2), we need to
+		// shift todo to compensate for lost bits: the mean value of 0.11...
+		// is 7/8, so todo + shift - nprimes * log2(7/8) ~= bits - 1/2
+		// will give good results.
+		if nprimes >= 7 {
+			todo += (nprimes - 2) / 5
+		}
+		for i := 0; i < nprimes; i++ {
+			var err error
+			primes[i], err = rand.Prime(random, todo/(nprimes-i))
+			if err != nil {
+				return nil, err
+			}
+			todo -= primes[i].BitLen()
+		}
+
+		// Make sure that primes is pairwise unequal.
+		for i, prime := range primes {
+			for j := 0; j < i; j++ {
+				if prime.Cmp(primes[j]) == 0 {
+					continue NextSetOfPrimes
+				}
+			}
+		}
+
+		n := new(big.Int).Set(bigOne)
+		totient := new(big.Int).Set(bigOne)
+		pminus1 := new(big.Int)
+		for _, prime := range primes {
+			n.Mul(n, prime)
+			pminus1.Sub(prime, bigOne)
+			totient.Mul(totient, pminus1)
+		}
+		if n.BitLen() != bits {
+			// This should never happen for nprimes == 2 because
+			// crypto/rand should set the top two bits in each prime.
+			// For nprimes > 2 we hope it does not happen often.
+			continue NextSetOfPrimes
+		}
+
+		priv.D = new(big.Int)
+		e := big.NewInt(int64(priv.E))
+		ok := priv.D.ModInverse(e, totient)
+
+		if ok != nil {
+			priv.Primes = primes
+			priv.N = n
+			break
+		}
+	}
+
+	priv.Precompute()
+	return priv, nil
+}
+
+// incCounter increments a four byte, big-endian counter.
+func incCounter(c *[4]byte) {
+	if c[3]++; c[3] != 0 {
+		return
+	}
+	if c[2]++; c[2] != 0 {
+		return
+	}
+	if c[1]++; c[1] != 0 {
+		return
+	}
+	c[0]++
+}
+
+// mgf1XOR XORs the bytes in out with a mask generated using the MGF1 function
+// specified in PKCS #1 v2.1.
+func mgf1XOR(out []byte, hash hash.Hash, seed []byte) {
+	var counter [4]byte
+	var digest []byte
+
+	done := 0
+	for done < len(out) {
+		hash.Write(seed)
+		hash.Write(counter[0:4])
+		digest = hash.Sum(digest[:0])
+		hash.Reset()
+
+		for i := 0; i < len(digest) && done < len(out); i++ {
+			out[done] ^= digest[i]
+			done++
+		}
+		incCounter(&counter)
+	}
+}
+
+// ErrMessageTooLong is returned when attempting to encrypt or sign a message
+// which is too large for the size of the key. When using SignPSS, this can also
+// be returned if the size of the salt is too large.
+var ErrMessageTooLong = errors.New("crypto/rsa: message too long for RSA key size")
+
+func encrypt(pub *PublicKey, plaintext []byte) ([]byte, error) {
+	boring.Unreachable()
+
+	N := bigmod.NewModulusFromBig(pub.N)
+	m, err := bigmod.NewNat().SetBytes(plaintext, N)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	e := intToBytes(pub.E)
+
+	return bigmod.NewNat().Exp(m, e, N).Bytes(N), nil
+}
+
+// intToBytes returns i as a big-endian slice of bytes with no leading zeroes,
+// leaking only the bit size of i through timing side-channels.
+func intToBytes(i int) []byte {
+	b := make([]byte, 8)
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(b, uint64(i))
+	for len(b) > 1 && b[0] == 0 {
+		b = b[1:]
+	}
+	return b
+}
+
+// EncryptOAEP encrypts the given message with RSA-OAEP.
+//
+// OAEP is parameterised by a hash function that is used as a random oracle.
+// Encryption and decryption of a given message must use the same hash function
+// and sha256.New() is a reasonable choice.
+//
+// The random parameter is used as a source of entropy to ensure that
+// encrypting the same message twice doesn't result in the same ciphertext.
+//
+// The label parameter may contain arbitrary data that will not be encrypted,
+// but which gives important context to the message. For example, if a given
+// public key is used to encrypt two types of messages then distinct label
+// values could be used to ensure that a ciphertext for one purpose cannot be
+// used for another by an attacker. If not required it can be empty.
+//
+// The message must be no longer than the length of the public modulus minus
+// twice the hash length, minus a further 2.
+func EncryptOAEP(hash hash.Hash, random io.Reader, pub *PublicKey, msg []byte, label []byte) ([]byte, error) {
+	if err := checkPub(pub); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	hash.Reset()
+	k := pub.Size()
+	if len(msg) > k-2*hash.Size()-2 {
+		return nil, ErrMessageTooLong
+	}
+
+	if boring.Enabled && random == boring.RandReader {
+		bkey, err := boringPublicKey(pub)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+		return boring.EncryptRSAOAEP(hash, hash, bkey, msg, label)
+	}
+	boring.UnreachableExceptTests()
+
+	hash.Write(label)
+	lHash := hash.Sum(nil)
+	hash.Reset()
+
+	em := make([]byte, k)
+	seed := em[1 : 1+hash.Size()]
+	db := em[1+hash.Size():]
+
+	copy(db[0:hash.Size()], lHash)
+	db[len(db)-len(msg)-1] = 1
+	copy(db[len(db)-len(msg):], msg)
+
+	_, err := io.ReadFull(random, seed)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	mgf1XOR(db, hash, seed)
+	mgf1XOR(seed, hash, db)
+
+	if boring.Enabled {
+		var bkey *boring.PublicKeyRSA
+		bkey, err = boringPublicKey(pub)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+		return boring.EncryptRSANoPadding(bkey, em)
+	}
+
+	return encrypt(pub, em)
+}
+
+// ErrDecryption represents a failure to decrypt a message.
+// It is deliberately vague to avoid adaptive attacks.
+var ErrDecryption = errors.New("crypto/rsa: decryption error")
+
+// ErrVerification represents a failure to verify a signature.
+// It is deliberately vague to avoid adaptive attacks.
+var ErrVerification = errors.New("crypto/rsa: verification error")
+
+// Precompute performs some calculations that speed up private key operations
+// in the future.
+func (priv *PrivateKey) Precompute() {
+	if priv.Precomputed.n == nil && len(priv.Primes) == 2 {
+		priv.Precomputed.n = bigmod.NewModulusFromBig(priv.N)
+		priv.Precomputed.p = bigmod.NewModulusFromBig(priv.Primes[0])
+		priv.Precomputed.q = bigmod.NewModulusFromBig(priv.Primes[1])
+	}
+
+	// Fill in the backwards-compatibility *big.Int values.
+	if priv.Precomputed.Dp != nil {
+		return
+	}
+
+	priv.Precomputed.Dp = new(big.Int).Sub(priv.Primes[0], bigOne)
+	priv.Precomputed.Dp.Mod(priv.D, priv.Precomputed.Dp)
+
+	priv.Precomputed.Dq = new(big.Int).Sub(priv.Primes[1], bigOne)
+	priv.Precomputed.Dq.Mod(priv.D, priv.Precomputed.Dq)
+
+	priv.Precomputed.Qinv = new(big.Int).ModInverse(priv.Primes[1], priv.Primes[0])
+
+	r := new(big.Int).Mul(priv.Primes[0], priv.Primes[1])
+	priv.Precomputed.CRTValues = make([]CRTValue, len(priv.Primes)-2)
+	for i := 2; i < len(priv.Primes); i++ {
+		prime := priv.Primes[i]
+		values := &priv.Precomputed.CRTValues[i-2]
+
+		values.Exp = new(big.Int).Sub(prime, bigOne)
+		values.Exp.Mod(priv.D, values.Exp)
+
+		values.R = new(big.Int).Set(r)
+		values.Coeff = new(big.Int).ModInverse(r, prime)
+
+		r.Mul(r, prime)
+	}
+}
+
+const withCheck = true
+const noCheck = false
+
+// decrypt performs an RSA decryption of ciphertext into out. If check is true,
+// m^e is calculated and compared with ciphertext, in order to defend against
+// errors in the CRT computation.
+func decrypt(priv *PrivateKey, ciphertext []byte, check bool) ([]byte, error) {
+	if len(priv.Primes) <= 2 {
+		boring.Unreachable()
+	}
+
+	var (
+		err  error
+		m, c *bigmod.Nat
+		N    *bigmod.Modulus
+		t0   = bigmod.NewNat()
+	)
+	if priv.Precomputed.n == nil {
+		N = bigmod.NewModulusFromBig(priv.N)
+		c, err = bigmod.NewNat().SetBytes(ciphertext, N)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, ErrDecryption
+		}
+		m = bigmod.NewNat().Exp(c, priv.D.Bytes(), N)
+	} else {
+		N = priv.Precomputed.n
+		P, Q := priv.Precomputed.p, priv.Precomputed.q
+		Qinv, err := bigmod.NewNat().SetBytes(priv.Precomputed.Qinv.Bytes(), P)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, ErrDecryption
+		}
+		c, err = bigmod.NewNat().SetBytes(ciphertext, N)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, ErrDecryption
+		}
+
+		// m = c ^ Dp mod p
+		m = bigmod.NewNat().Exp(t0.Mod(c, P), priv.Precomputed.Dp.Bytes(), P)
+		// m2 = c ^ Dq mod q
+		m2 := bigmod.NewNat().Exp(t0.Mod(c, Q), priv.Precomputed.Dq.Bytes(), Q)
+		// m = m - m2 mod p
+		m.Sub(t0.Mod(m2, P), P)
+		// m = m * Qinv mod p
+		m.Mul(Qinv, P)
+		// m = m * q mod N
+		m.ExpandFor(N).Mul(t0.Mod(Q.Nat(), N), N)
+		// m = m + m2 mod N
+		m.Add(m2.ExpandFor(N), N)
+	}
+
+	if check {
+		c1 := bigmod.NewNat().Exp(m, intToBytes(priv.E), N)
+		if c1.Equal(c) != 1 {
+			return nil, ErrDecryption
+		}
+	}
+
+	return m.Bytes(N), nil
+}
+
+// DecryptOAEP decrypts ciphertext using RSA-OAEP.
+//
+// OAEP is parameterised by a hash function that is used as a random oracle.
+// Encryption and decryption of a given message must use the same hash function
+// and sha256.New() is a reasonable choice.
+//
+// The random parameter is legacy and ignored, and it can be as nil.
+//
+// The label parameter must match the value given when encrypting. See
+// EncryptOAEP for details.
+func DecryptOAEP(hash hash.Hash, random io.Reader, priv *PrivateKey, ciphertext []byte, label []byte) ([]byte, error) {
+	return decryptOAEP(hash, hash, random, priv, ciphertext, label)
+}
+
+func decryptOAEP(hash, mgfHash hash.Hash, random io.Reader, priv *PrivateKey, ciphertext []byte, label []byte) ([]byte, error) {
+	if err := checkPub(&priv.PublicKey); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	k := priv.Size()
+	if len(ciphertext) > k ||
+		k < hash.Size()*2+2 {
+		return nil, ErrDecryption
+	}
+
+	if boring.Enabled {
+		bkey, err := boringPrivateKey(priv)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+		out, err := boring.DecryptRSAOAEP(hash, mgfHash, bkey, ciphertext, label)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, ErrDecryption
+		}
+		return out, nil
+	}
+
+	em, err := decrypt(priv, ciphertext, noCheck)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	hash.Write(label)
+	lHash := hash.Sum(nil)
+	hash.Reset()
+
+	firstByteIsZero := subtle.ConstantTimeByteEq(em[0], 0)
+
+	seed := em[1 : hash.Size()+1]
+	db := em[hash.Size()+1:]
+
+	mgf1XOR(seed, mgfHash, db)
+	mgf1XOR(db, mgfHash, seed)
+
+	lHash2 := db[0:hash.Size()]
+
+	// We have to validate the plaintext in constant time in order to avoid
+	// attacks like: J. Manger. A Chosen Ciphertext Attack on RSA Optimal
+	// Asymmetric Encryption Padding (OAEP) as Standardized in PKCS #1
+	// v2.0. In J. Kilian, editor, Advances in Cryptology.
+	lHash2Good := subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(lHash, lHash2)
+
+	// The remainder of the plaintext must be zero or more 0x00, followed
+	// by 0x01, followed by the message.
+	//   lookingForIndex: 1 iff we are still looking for the 0x01
+	//   index: the offset of the first 0x01 byte
+	//   invalid: 1 iff we saw a non-zero byte before the 0x01.
+	var lookingForIndex, index, invalid int
+	lookingForIndex = 1
+	rest := db[hash.Size():]
+
+	for i := 0; i < len(rest); i++ {
+		equals0 := subtle.ConstantTimeByteEq(rest[i], 0)
+		equals1 := subtle.ConstantTimeByteEq(rest[i], 1)
+		index = subtle.ConstantTimeSelect(lookingForIndex&equals1, i, index)
+		lookingForIndex = subtle.ConstantTimeSelect(equals1, 0, lookingForIndex)
+		invalid = subtle.ConstantTimeSelect(lookingForIndex&^equals0, 1, invalid)
+	}
+
+	if firstByteIsZero&lHash2Good&^invalid&^lookingForIndex != 1 {
+		return nil, ErrDecryption
+	}
+
+	return rest[index+1:], nil
+}
diff --git a/src/crypto/rsa/rsa_export_test.go b/src/crypto/rsa/rsa_export_test.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..70406de
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/crypto/rsa/rsa_export_test.go
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+// Copyright 2022 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+package rsa
+
+var NonZeroRandomBytes = nonZeroRandomBytes
+var EMSAPSSEncode = emsaPSSEncode
+var EMSAPSSVerify = emsaPSSVerify
+var InvalidSaltLenErr = invalidSaltLenErr
diff --git a/src/crypto/rsa/rsa_test.go b/src/crypto/rsa/rsa_test.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3278a7f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/crypto/rsa/rsa_test.go
@@ -0,0 +1,882 @@
+// Copyright 2009 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+package rsa_test
+
+import (
+	"bufio"
+	"bytes"
+	"crypto"
+	"crypto/internal/boring"
+	"crypto/rand"
+	. "crypto/rsa"
+	"crypto/sha1"
+	"crypto/sha256"
+	"crypto/x509"
+	"encoding/pem"
+	"flag"
+	"fmt"
+	"internal/testenv"
+	"math/big"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+func TestKeyGeneration(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, size := range []int{128, 1024, 2048, 3072} {
+		priv, err := GenerateKey(rand.Reader, size)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Errorf("GenerateKey(%d): %v", size, err)
+		}
+		if bits := priv.N.BitLen(); bits != size {
+			t.Errorf("key too short (%d vs %d)", bits, size)
+		}
+		testKeyBasics(t, priv)
+		if testing.Short() {
+			break
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func Test3PrimeKeyGeneration(t *testing.T) {
+	size := 768
+	if testing.Short() {
+		size = 256
+	}
+
+	priv, err := GenerateMultiPrimeKey(rand.Reader, 3, size)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Errorf("failed to generate key")
+	}
+	testKeyBasics(t, priv)
+}
+
+func Test4PrimeKeyGeneration(t *testing.T) {
+	size := 768
+	if testing.Short() {
+		size = 256
+	}
+
+	priv, err := GenerateMultiPrimeKey(rand.Reader, 4, size)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Errorf("failed to generate key")
+	}
+	testKeyBasics(t, priv)
+}
+
+func TestNPrimeKeyGeneration(t *testing.T) {
+	primeSize := 64
+	maxN := 24
+	if testing.Short() {
+		primeSize = 16
+		maxN = 16
+	}
+	// Test that generation of N-prime keys works for N > 4.
+	for n := 5; n < maxN; n++ {
+		priv, err := GenerateMultiPrimeKey(rand.Reader, n, 64+n*primeSize)
+		if err == nil {
+			testKeyBasics(t, priv)
+		} else {
+			t.Errorf("failed to generate %d-prime key", n)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestImpossibleKeyGeneration(t *testing.T) {
+	// This test ensures that trying to generate toy RSA keys doesn't enter
+	// an infinite loop.
+	for i := 0; i < 32; i++ {
+		GenerateKey(rand.Reader, i)
+		GenerateMultiPrimeKey(rand.Reader, 3, i)
+		GenerateMultiPrimeKey(rand.Reader, 4, i)
+		GenerateMultiPrimeKey(rand.Reader, 5, i)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestGnuTLSKey(t *testing.T) {
+	// This is a key generated by `certtool --generate-privkey --bits 128`.
+	// It's such that de ≢ 1 mod φ(n), but is congruent mod the order of
+	// the group.
+	priv := parseKey(testingKey(`-----BEGIN RSA TESTING KEY-----
+MGECAQACEQDar8EuoZuSosYtE9SeXSyPAgMBAAECEBf7XDET8e6jjTcfO7y/sykC
+CQDozXjCjkBzLQIJAPB6MqNbZaQrAghbZTdQoko5LQIIUp9ZiKDdYjMCCCCpqzmX
+d8Y7
+-----END RSA TESTING KEY-----`))
+	testKeyBasics(t, priv)
+}
+
+func testKeyBasics(t *testing.T, priv *PrivateKey) {
+	if err := priv.Validate(); err != nil {
+		t.Errorf("Validate() failed: %s", err)
+	}
+	if priv.D.Cmp(priv.N) > 0 {
+		t.Errorf("private exponent too large")
+	}
+
+	msg := []byte("hi!")
+	enc, err := EncryptPKCS1v15(rand.Reader, &priv.PublicKey, msg)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Errorf("EncryptPKCS1v15: %v", err)
+		return
+	}
+
+	dec, err := DecryptPKCS1v15(nil, priv, enc)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Errorf("DecryptPKCS1v15: %v", err)
+		return
+	}
+	if !bytes.Equal(dec, msg) {
+		t.Errorf("got:%x want:%x (%+v)", dec, msg, priv)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestAllocations(t *testing.T) {
+	if boring.Enabled {
+		t.Skip("skipping allocations test with BoringCrypto")
+	}
+	testenv.SkipIfOptimizationOff(t)
+
+	m := []byte("Hello Gophers")
+	c, err := EncryptPKCS1v15(rand.Reader, &test2048Key.PublicKey, m)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+
+	if allocs := testing.AllocsPerRun(100, func() {
+		p, err := DecryptPKCS1v15(nil, test2048Key, c)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		if !bytes.Equal(p, m) {
+			t.Fatalf("unexpected output: %q", p)
+		}
+	}); allocs > 10 {
+		t.Errorf("expected less than 10 allocations, got %0.1f", allocs)
+	}
+}
+
+var allFlag = flag.Bool("all", false, "test all key sizes up to 2048")
+
+func TestEverything(t *testing.T) {
+	min := 32
+	max := 560 // any smaller than this and not all tests will run
+	if testing.Short() {
+		min = max
+	}
+	if *allFlag {
+		max = 2048
+	}
+	for size := min; size <= max; size++ {
+		size := size
+		t.Run(fmt.Sprintf("%d", size), func(t *testing.T) {
+			t.Parallel()
+			priv, err := GenerateKey(rand.Reader, size)
+			if err != nil {
+				t.Errorf("GenerateKey(%d): %v", size, err)
+			}
+			if bits := priv.N.BitLen(); bits != size {
+				t.Errorf("key too short (%d vs %d)", bits, size)
+			}
+			testEverything(t, priv)
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func testEverything(t *testing.T, priv *PrivateKey) {
+	if err := priv.Validate(); err != nil {
+		t.Errorf("Validate() failed: %s", err)
+	}
+
+	msg := []byte("test")
+	enc, err := EncryptPKCS1v15(rand.Reader, &priv.PublicKey, msg)
+	if err == ErrMessageTooLong {
+		t.Log("key too small for EncryptPKCS1v15")
+	} else if err != nil {
+		t.Errorf("EncryptPKCS1v15: %v", err)
+	}
+	if err == nil {
+		dec, err := DecryptPKCS1v15(nil, priv, enc)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Errorf("DecryptPKCS1v15: %v", err)
+		}
+		err = DecryptPKCS1v15SessionKey(nil, priv, enc, make([]byte, 4))
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Errorf("DecryptPKCS1v15SessionKey: %v", err)
+		}
+		if !bytes.Equal(dec, msg) {
+			t.Errorf("got:%x want:%x (%+v)", dec, msg, priv)
+		}
+	}
+
+	label := []byte("label")
+	enc, err = EncryptOAEP(sha256.New(), rand.Reader, &priv.PublicKey, msg, label)
+	if err == ErrMessageTooLong {
+		t.Log("key too small for EncryptOAEP")
+	} else if err != nil {
+		t.Errorf("EncryptOAEP: %v", err)
+	}
+	if err == nil {
+		dec, err := DecryptOAEP(sha256.New(), nil, priv, enc, label)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Errorf("DecryptOAEP: %v", err)
+		}
+		if !bytes.Equal(dec, msg) {
+			t.Errorf("got:%x want:%x (%+v)", dec, msg, priv)
+		}
+	}
+
+	hash := sha256.Sum256(msg)
+	sig, err := SignPKCS1v15(nil, priv, crypto.SHA256, hash[:])
+	if err == ErrMessageTooLong {
+		t.Log("key too small for SignPKCS1v15")
+	} else if err != nil {
+		t.Errorf("SignPKCS1v15: %v", err)
+	}
+	if err == nil {
+		err = VerifyPKCS1v15(&priv.PublicKey, crypto.SHA256, hash[:], sig)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Errorf("VerifyPKCS1v15: %v", err)
+		}
+		sig[1] ^= 0x80
+		err = VerifyPKCS1v15(&priv.PublicKey, crypto.SHA256, hash[:], sig)
+		if err == nil {
+			t.Errorf("VerifyPKCS1v15 success for tampered signature")
+		}
+		sig[1] ^= 0x80
+		hash[1] ^= 0x80
+		err = VerifyPKCS1v15(&priv.PublicKey, crypto.SHA256, hash[:], sig)
+		if err == nil {
+			t.Errorf("VerifyPKCS1v15 success for tampered message")
+		}
+		hash[1] ^= 0x80
+	}
+
+	opts := &PSSOptions{SaltLength: PSSSaltLengthAuto}
+	sig, err = SignPSS(rand.Reader, priv, crypto.SHA256, hash[:], opts)
+	if err == ErrMessageTooLong {
+		t.Log("key too small for SignPSS with PSSSaltLengthAuto")
+	} else if err != nil {
+		t.Errorf("SignPSS: %v", err)
+	}
+	if err == nil {
+		err = VerifyPSS(&priv.PublicKey, crypto.SHA256, hash[:], sig, opts)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Errorf("VerifyPSS: %v", err)
+		}
+		sig[1] ^= 0x80
+		err = VerifyPSS(&priv.PublicKey, crypto.SHA256, hash[:], sig, opts)
+		if err == nil {
+			t.Errorf("VerifyPSS success for tampered signature")
+		}
+		sig[1] ^= 0x80
+		hash[1] ^= 0x80
+		err = VerifyPSS(&priv.PublicKey, crypto.SHA256, hash[:], sig, opts)
+		if err == nil {
+			t.Errorf("VerifyPSS success for tampered message")
+		}
+		hash[1] ^= 0x80
+	}
+
+	opts.SaltLength = PSSSaltLengthEqualsHash
+	sig, err = SignPSS(rand.Reader, priv, crypto.SHA256, hash[:], opts)
+	if err == ErrMessageTooLong {
+		t.Log("key too small for SignPSS with PSSSaltLengthEqualsHash")
+	} else if err != nil {
+		t.Errorf("SignPSS: %v", err)
+	}
+	if err == nil {
+		err = VerifyPSS(&priv.PublicKey, crypto.SHA256, hash[:], sig, opts)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Errorf("VerifyPSS: %v", err)
+		}
+		sig[1] ^= 0x80
+		err = VerifyPSS(&priv.PublicKey, crypto.SHA256, hash[:], sig, opts)
+		if err == nil {
+			t.Errorf("VerifyPSS success for tampered signature")
+		}
+		sig[1] ^= 0x80
+		hash[1] ^= 0x80
+		err = VerifyPSS(&priv.PublicKey, crypto.SHA256, hash[:], sig, opts)
+		if err == nil {
+			t.Errorf("VerifyPSS success for tampered message")
+		}
+		hash[1] ^= 0x80
+	}
+
+	// Check that an input bigger than the modulus is handled correctly,
+	// whether it is longer than the byte size of the modulus or not.
+	c := bytes.Repeat([]byte{0xff}, priv.Size())
+	err = VerifyPSS(&priv.PublicKey, crypto.SHA256, hash[:], c, opts)
+	if err == nil {
+		t.Errorf("VerifyPSS accepted a large signature")
+	}
+	_, err = DecryptPKCS1v15(nil, priv, c)
+	if err == nil {
+		t.Errorf("DecryptPKCS1v15 accepted a large ciphertext")
+	}
+	c = append(c, 0xff)
+	err = VerifyPSS(&priv.PublicKey, crypto.SHA256, hash[:], c, opts)
+	if err == nil {
+		t.Errorf("VerifyPSS accepted a long signature")
+	}
+	_, err = DecryptPKCS1v15(nil, priv, c)
+	if err == nil {
+		t.Errorf("DecryptPKCS1v15 accepted a long ciphertext")
+	}
+}
+
+func testingKey(s string) string { return strings.ReplaceAll(s, "TESTING KEY", "PRIVATE KEY") }
+
+func parseKey(s string) *PrivateKey {
+	p, _ := pem.Decode([]byte(s))
+	k, err := x509.ParsePKCS1PrivateKey(p.Bytes)
+	if err != nil {
+		panic(err)
+	}
+	return k
+}
+
+var test2048Key = parseKey(testingKey(`-----BEGIN RSA TESTING KEY-----
+MIIEnwIBAAKCAQBxY8hCshkKiXCUKydkrtQtQSRke28w4JotocDiVqou4k55DEDJ
+akvWbXXDcakV4HA8R2tOGgbxvTjFo8EK470w9O9ipapPUSrRRaBsSOlkaaIs6OYh
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+C4MmA4BPceSfMyAIFjdRLGy/K7gbb2viOYRtAgEDAoIBAEuX2tchZgcGSw1yGkMf
+OB4rbZhSSiCVvB5r1ew5xsnsNFCy1ducMo7zo9ehG2Pq9X2E8jQRWfZ+JdkX1gdC
+fiCjSkHDxt+LceDZFZ2F8O2bwXNF7sFAN0rvEbLNY44MkB7jgv9c/rs8YykLZy/N
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+FJZBmpAvNfCEYJUr1Hg+DpMLqLUg+D6v5vpliburbk9LxcKFZyyZ9QVe7GoqMLBu
+eGsCgYEAummUj4MMKWJC2mv5rj/dt2pj2/B2HtP2RLypai4et1/Ru9nNk8cjMLzC
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+IUJqIv/qBpuOxvQ8UqwIQ3iU69uOk6TIhSaNlqlJwffQJEIgHf7kOdbOjchjMA7l
+yLpmETPzscvUFGcXmwKBgGfP4i1lg283EvBp6Uq4EqQ/ViL6l5zECXce1y8Ady5z
+xhASqiHRS9UpN9cU5qiCoyae3e75nhCGym3+6BE23Nede8UBT8G6HuaZZKOzHSeW
+IVrVW1QLVN6T4DioybaI/gLSX7pjwFBWSJI/dFuNDexoJS1AyUK+NO/2VEMnUMhD
+AoGAOsdn3Prnh/mjC95vraHCLap0bRBSexMdx77ImHgtFUUcSaT8DJHs+NZw1RdM
+SZA0J+zVQ8q7B11jIgz5hMz+chedwoRjTL7a8VRTKHFmmBH0zlEuV7L79w6HkRCQ
+VRg10GUN6heGLv0aOHbPdobcuVDH4sgOqpT1QnOuce34sQs=
+-----END RSA TESTING KEY-----`))
+
+var test3072Key = parseKey(testingKey(`-----BEGIN RSA TESTING KEY-----
+MIIG5AIBAAKCAYEAuvg7HHdVlr2kKZzRw9xs/uZqR6JK21izBdg8D52YPqEdMIhG
+BSuOrejT6HiDaJcyCkeNxj7E2dKWacIV4UytlPvDnSL9dQduytl31YQ01J5i20r3
+Kp1etZDEDltly1eVKcbdQTsr26oSQCojYYiYOj+q8w/rzH3WSEuMs04TMwxCR0CC
+nStVsNWw5zL45n26mxDgDdPK/i3OJTinTvPUDysB/V0c8tRaQ8U6YesmgSYGIMe0
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+VlxJW/nY5hTktIDOZPDaI77jid1iZLID3VXEm6dXY/Hv7DiUORudXAHoy6HZm2Jt
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+3T1ee2QAqM+z+Odgo+1WtnN4/NROAwpNGVbRuqQkSDRhrSQr9s+iHtjpaS2C/b7i
+24FEeLDTSS9edZBwcqvYqWgNdwHqk/FvDs6ASoOewi+3UespIydihqf+6kjppx0M
+zomAh1S5LsMr4ZVBwhQtAtcOQ0a/QIlTpkpdS0OygwSDw45bNE3/2wYTBUl/QCCt
+JLFUKjkGgylkwaJPCDsnl+tb+jfQi87st8yX7/GsxPeCeRzOkQKBwGPcu2OgZfsl
+dMHz0LwKOEattrkDujpIoNxyTrBN4fX0RdhTgfRrqsEkrH/4XG5VTtc7K7sBgx7f
+IwP1uUAx5v16QDA1Z+oFBXwmI7atdKRM34kl1Q0i60z83ahgA/9bAsSpcA23LtM4
+u2PRX3YNXb9kUcSbod2tVfXyiu7wl6NlsYw5PeF8A8m7QicaeXR6t8NB02XqQ4k+
+BoyV2DVuoxSZKOMti0piQIIacSZWEbgyslwNxW99JRVfA2xKJGjUqA==
+-----END RSA TESTING KEY-----`))
+
+var test4096Key = parseKey(testingKey(`-----BEGIN RSA TESTING KEY-----
+MIIJKQIBAAKCAgEAwTmi+2MLTSm6GbsKksOHCMdIRsPwLlPtJQiMEjnKq4YEPSaC
+HXWQTza0KL/PySjhgw3Go5pC7epXlA9o1I+rbx4J3AwxC+xUUJqs3U0AETtzC1JD
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+HiAUyVGKtouRFyOe4gr4xxZpljIEoN4TsBWSbM8GH6n5uFmEKvFnBR5KDRCwFfvI
+JudWm/oWptzQUyqRvzNtv4OgU9YVnx/fY3hyaD5ZnVZjUZzAjo3o8WSwmuTbZbJ1
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+qd9CAwpz7cRe5+g18v5rFTEHESTCCq+rOFI5L59UX4VvE7CGOzcPLLZjlcMCAwEA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-----END RSA TESTING KEY-----`))
+
+func BenchmarkDecryptPKCS1v15(b *testing.B) {
+	b.Run("2048", func(b *testing.B) { benchmarkDecryptPKCS1v15(b, test2048Key) })
+	b.Run("3072", func(b *testing.B) { benchmarkDecryptPKCS1v15(b, test3072Key) })
+	b.Run("4096", func(b *testing.B) { benchmarkDecryptPKCS1v15(b, test4096Key) })
+}
+
+func benchmarkDecryptPKCS1v15(b *testing.B, k *PrivateKey) {
+	r := bufio.NewReaderSize(rand.Reader, 1<<15)
+
+	m := []byte("Hello Gophers")
+	c, err := EncryptPKCS1v15(r, &k.PublicKey, m)
+	if err != nil {
+		b.Fatal(err)
+	}
+
+	b.ResetTimer()
+	var sink byte
+	for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
+		p, err := DecryptPKCS1v15(r, k, c)
+		if err != nil {
+			b.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		if !bytes.Equal(p, m) {
+			b.Fatalf("unexpected output: %q", p)
+		}
+		sink ^= p[0]
+	}
+}
+
+func BenchmarkEncryptPKCS1v15(b *testing.B) {
+	b.Run("2048", func(b *testing.B) {
+		r := bufio.NewReaderSize(rand.Reader, 1<<15)
+		m := []byte("Hello Gophers")
+
+		var sink byte
+		for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
+			c, err := EncryptPKCS1v15(r, &test2048Key.PublicKey, m)
+			if err != nil {
+				b.Fatal(err)
+			}
+			sink ^= c[0]
+		}
+	})
+}
+
+func BenchmarkDecryptOAEP(b *testing.B) {
+	b.Run("2048", func(b *testing.B) {
+		r := bufio.NewReaderSize(rand.Reader, 1<<15)
+
+		m := []byte("Hello Gophers")
+		c, err := EncryptOAEP(sha256.New(), r, &test2048Key.PublicKey, m, nil)
+		if err != nil {
+			b.Fatal(err)
+		}
+
+		b.ResetTimer()
+		var sink byte
+		for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
+			p, err := DecryptOAEP(sha256.New(), r, test2048Key, c, nil)
+			if err != nil {
+				b.Fatal(err)
+			}
+			if !bytes.Equal(p, m) {
+				b.Fatalf("unexpected output: %q", p)
+			}
+			sink ^= p[0]
+		}
+	})
+}
+
+func BenchmarkEncryptOAEP(b *testing.B) {
+	b.Run("2048", func(b *testing.B) {
+		r := bufio.NewReaderSize(rand.Reader, 1<<15)
+		m := []byte("Hello Gophers")
+
+		var sink byte
+		for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
+			c, err := EncryptOAEP(sha256.New(), r, &test2048Key.PublicKey, m, nil)
+			if err != nil {
+				b.Fatal(err)
+			}
+			sink ^= c[0]
+		}
+	})
+}
+
+func BenchmarkSignPKCS1v15(b *testing.B) {
+	b.Run("2048", func(b *testing.B) {
+		hashed := sha256.Sum256([]byte("testing"))
+
+		var sink byte
+		b.ResetTimer()
+		for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
+			s, err := SignPKCS1v15(rand.Reader, test2048Key, crypto.SHA256, hashed[:])
+			if err != nil {
+				b.Fatal(err)
+			}
+			sink ^= s[0]
+		}
+	})
+}
+
+func BenchmarkVerifyPKCS1v15(b *testing.B) {
+	b.Run("2048", func(b *testing.B) {
+		hashed := sha256.Sum256([]byte("testing"))
+		s, err := SignPKCS1v15(rand.Reader, test2048Key, crypto.SHA256, hashed[:])
+		if err != nil {
+			b.Fatal(err)
+		}
+
+		b.ResetTimer()
+		for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
+			err := VerifyPKCS1v15(&test2048Key.PublicKey, crypto.SHA256, hashed[:], s)
+			if err != nil {
+				b.Fatal(err)
+			}
+		}
+	})
+}
+
+func BenchmarkSignPSS(b *testing.B) {
+	b.Run("2048", func(b *testing.B) {
+		hashed := sha256.Sum256([]byte("testing"))
+
+		var sink byte
+		b.ResetTimer()
+		for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
+			s, err := SignPSS(rand.Reader, test2048Key, crypto.SHA256, hashed[:], nil)
+			if err != nil {
+				b.Fatal(err)
+			}
+			sink ^= s[0]
+		}
+	})
+}
+
+func BenchmarkVerifyPSS(b *testing.B) {
+	b.Run("2048", func(b *testing.B) {
+		hashed := sha256.Sum256([]byte("testing"))
+		s, err := SignPSS(rand.Reader, test2048Key, crypto.SHA256, hashed[:], nil)
+		if err != nil {
+			b.Fatal(err)
+		}
+
+		b.ResetTimer()
+		for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
+			err := VerifyPSS(&test2048Key.PublicKey, crypto.SHA256, hashed[:], s, nil)
+			if err != nil {
+				b.Fatal(err)
+			}
+		}
+	})
+}
+
+type testEncryptOAEPMessage struct {
+	in   []byte
+	seed []byte
+	out  []byte
+}
+
+type testEncryptOAEPStruct struct {
+	modulus string
+	e       int
+	d       string
+	msgs    []testEncryptOAEPMessage
+}
+
+func TestEncryptOAEP(t *testing.T) {
+	sha1 := sha1.New()
+	n := new(big.Int)
+	for i, test := range testEncryptOAEPData {
+		n.SetString(test.modulus, 16)
+		public := PublicKey{N: n, E: test.e}
+
+		for j, message := range test.msgs {
+			randomSource := bytes.NewReader(message.seed)
+			out, err := EncryptOAEP(sha1, randomSource, &public, message.in, nil)
+			if err != nil {
+				t.Errorf("#%d,%d error: %s", i, j, err)
+			}
+			if !bytes.Equal(out, message.out) {
+				t.Errorf("#%d,%d bad result: %x (want %x)", i, j, out, message.out)
+			}
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestDecryptOAEP(t *testing.T) {
+	random := rand.Reader
+
+	sha1 := sha1.New()
+	n := new(big.Int)
+	d := new(big.Int)
+	for i, test := range testEncryptOAEPData {
+		n.SetString(test.modulus, 16)
+		d.SetString(test.d, 16)
+		private := new(PrivateKey)
+		private.PublicKey = PublicKey{N: n, E: test.e}
+		private.D = d
+
+		for j, message := range test.msgs {
+			out, err := DecryptOAEP(sha1, nil, private, message.out, nil)
+			if err != nil {
+				t.Errorf("#%d,%d error: %s", i, j, err)
+			} else if !bytes.Equal(out, message.in) {
+				t.Errorf("#%d,%d bad result: %#v (want %#v)", i, j, out, message.in)
+			}
+
+			// Decrypt with blinding.
+			out, err = DecryptOAEP(sha1, random, private, message.out, nil)
+			if err != nil {
+				t.Errorf("#%d,%d (blind) error: %s", i, j, err)
+			} else if !bytes.Equal(out, message.in) {
+				t.Errorf("#%d,%d (blind) bad result: %#v (want %#v)", i, j, out, message.in)
+			}
+		}
+		if testing.Short() {
+			break
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func Test2DecryptOAEP(t *testing.T) {
+	random := rand.Reader
+
+	msg := []byte{0xed, 0x36, 0x90, 0x8d, 0xbe, 0xfc, 0x35, 0x40, 0x70, 0x4f, 0xf5, 0x9d, 0x6e, 0xc2, 0xeb, 0xf5, 0x27, 0xae, 0x65, 0xb0, 0x59, 0x29, 0x45, 0x25, 0x8c, 0xc1, 0x91, 0x22}
+	in := []byte{0x72, 0x26, 0x84, 0xc9, 0xcf, 0xd6, 0xa8, 0x96, 0x04, 0x3e, 0x34, 0x07, 0x2c, 0x4f, 0xe6, 0x52, 0xbe, 0x46, 0x3c, 0xcf, 0x79, 0x21, 0x09, 0x64, 0xe7, 0x33, 0x66, 0x9b, 0xf8, 0x14, 0x22, 0x43, 0xfe, 0x8e, 0x52, 0x8b, 0xe0, 0x5f, 0x98, 0xef, 0x54, 0xac, 0x6b, 0xc6, 0x26, 0xac, 0x5b, 0x1b, 0x4b, 0x7d, 0x2e, 0xd7, 0x69, 0x28, 0x5a, 0x2f, 0x4a, 0x95, 0x89, 0x6c, 0xc7, 0x53, 0x95, 0xc7, 0xd2, 0x89, 0x04, 0x6f, 0x94, 0x74, 0x9b, 0x09, 0x0d, 0xf4, 0x61, 0x2e, 0xab, 0x48, 0x57, 0x4a, 0xbf, 0x95, 0xcb, 0xff, 0x15, 0xe2, 0xa0, 0x66, 0x58, 0xf7, 0x46, 0xf8, 0xc7, 0x0b, 0xb5, 0x1e, 0xa7, 0xba, 0x36, 0xce, 0xdd, 0x36, 0x41, 0x98, 0x6e, 0x10, 0xf9, 0x3b, 0x70, 0xbb, 0xa1, 0xda, 0x00, 0x40, 0xd5, 0xa5, 0x3f, 0x87, 0x64, 0x32, 0x7c, 0xbc, 0x50, 0x52, 0x0e, 0x4f, 0x21, 0xbd}
+
+	n := new(big.Int)
+	d := new(big.Int)
+	n.SetString(testEncryptOAEPData[0].modulus, 16)
+	d.SetString(testEncryptOAEPData[0].d, 16)
+	priv := new(PrivateKey)
+	priv.PublicKey = PublicKey{N: n, E: testEncryptOAEPData[0].e}
+	priv.D = d
+	sha1 := crypto.SHA1
+	sha256 := crypto.SHA256
+
+	out, err := priv.Decrypt(random, in, &OAEPOptions{MGFHash: sha1, Hash: sha256})
+
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Errorf("error: %s", err)
+	} else if !bytes.Equal(out, msg) {
+		t.Errorf("bad result %#v (want %#v)", out, msg)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestEncryptDecryptOAEP(t *testing.T) {
+	sha256 := sha256.New()
+	n := new(big.Int)
+	d := new(big.Int)
+	for i, test := range testEncryptOAEPData {
+		n.SetString(test.modulus, 16)
+		d.SetString(test.d, 16)
+		priv := new(PrivateKey)
+		priv.PublicKey = PublicKey{N: n, E: test.e}
+		priv.D = d
+
+		for j, message := range test.msgs {
+			label := []byte(fmt.Sprintf("hi#%d", j))
+			enc, err := EncryptOAEP(sha256, rand.Reader, &priv.PublicKey, message.in, label)
+			if err != nil {
+				t.Errorf("#%d,%d: EncryptOAEP: %v", i, j, err)
+				continue
+			}
+			dec, err := DecryptOAEP(sha256, rand.Reader, priv, enc, label)
+			if err != nil {
+				t.Errorf("#%d,%d: DecryptOAEP: %v", i, j, err)
+				continue
+			}
+			if !bytes.Equal(dec, message.in) {
+				t.Errorf("#%d,%d: round trip %q -> %q", i, j, message.in, dec)
+			}
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// testEncryptOAEPData contains a subset of the vectors from RSA's "Test vectors for RSA-OAEP".
+var testEncryptOAEPData = []testEncryptOAEPStruct{
+	// Key 1
+	{"a8b3b284af8eb50b387034a860f146c4919f318763cd6c5598c8ae4811a1e0abc4c7e0b082d693a5e7fced675cf4668512772c0cbc64a742c6c630f533c8cc72f62ae833c40bf25842e984bb78bdbf97c0107d55bdb662f5c4e0fab9845cb5148ef7392dd3aaff93ae1e6b667bb3d4247616d4f5ba10d4cfd226de88d39f16fb",
+		65537,
+		"53339cfdb79fc8466a655c7316aca85c55fd8f6dd898fdaf119517ef4f52e8fd8e258df93fee180fa0e4ab29693cd83b152a553d4ac4d1812b8b9fa5af0e7f55fe7304df41570926f3311f15c4d65a732c483116ee3d3d2d0af3549ad9bf7cbfb78ad884f84d5beb04724dc7369b31def37d0cf539e9cfcdd3de653729ead5d1",
+		[]testEncryptOAEPMessage{
+			// Example 1.1
+			{
+				[]byte{0x66, 0x28, 0x19, 0x4e, 0x12, 0x07, 0x3d, 0xb0,
+					0x3b, 0xa9, 0x4c, 0xda, 0x9e, 0xf9, 0x53, 0x23, 0x97,
+					0xd5, 0x0d, 0xba, 0x79, 0xb9, 0x87, 0x00, 0x4a, 0xfe,
+					0xfe, 0x34,
+				},
+				[]byte{0x18, 0xb7, 0x76, 0xea, 0x21, 0x06, 0x9d, 0x69,
+					0x77, 0x6a, 0x33, 0xe9, 0x6b, 0xad, 0x48, 0xe1, 0xdd,
+					0xa0, 0xa5, 0xef,
+				},
+				[]byte{0x35, 0x4f, 0xe6, 0x7b, 0x4a, 0x12, 0x6d, 0x5d,
+					0x35, 0xfe, 0x36, 0xc7, 0x77, 0x79, 0x1a, 0x3f, 0x7b,
+					0xa1, 0x3d, 0xef, 0x48, 0x4e, 0x2d, 0x39, 0x08, 0xaf,
+					0xf7, 0x22, 0xfa, 0xd4, 0x68, 0xfb, 0x21, 0x69, 0x6d,
+					0xe9, 0x5d, 0x0b, 0xe9, 0x11, 0xc2, 0xd3, 0x17, 0x4f,
+					0x8a, 0xfc, 0xc2, 0x01, 0x03, 0x5f, 0x7b, 0x6d, 0x8e,
+					0x69, 0x40, 0x2d, 0xe5, 0x45, 0x16, 0x18, 0xc2, 0x1a,
+					0x53, 0x5f, 0xa9, 0xd7, 0xbf, 0xc5, 0xb8, 0xdd, 0x9f,
+					0xc2, 0x43, 0xf8, 0xcf, 0x92, 0x7d, 0xb3, 0x13, 0x22,
+					0xd6, 0xe8, 0x81, 0xea, 0xa9, 0x1a, 0x99, 0x61, 0x70,
+					0xe6, 0x57, 0xa0, 0x5a, 0x26, 0x64, 0x26, 0xd9, 0x8c,
+					0x88, 0x00, 0x3f, 0x84, 0x77, 0xc1, 0x22, 0x70, 0x94,
+					0xa0, 0xd9, 0xfa, 0x1e, 0x8c, 0x40, 0x24, 0x30, 0x9c,
+					0xe1, 0xec, 0xcc, 0xb5, 0x21, 0x00, 0x35, 0xd4, 0x7a,
+					0xc7, 0x2e, 0x8a,
+				},
+			},
+			// Example 1.2
+			{
+				[]byte{0x75, 0x0c, 0x40, 0x47, 0xf5, 0x47, 0xe8, 0xe4,
+					0x14, 0x11, 0x85, 0x65, 0x23, 0x29, 0x8a, 0xc9, 0xba,
+					0xe2, 0x45, 0xef, 0xaf, 0x13, 0x97, 0xfb, 0xe5, 0x6f,
+					0x9d, 0xd5,
+				},
+				[]byte{0x0c, 0xc7, 0x42, 0xce, 0x4a, 0x9b, 0x7f, 0x32,
+					0xf9, 0x51, 0xbc, 0xb2, 0x51, 0xef, 0xd9, 0x25, 0xfe,
+					0x4f, 0xe3, 0x5f,
+				},
+				[]byte{0x64, 0x0d, 0xb1, 0xac, 0xc5, 0x8e, 0x05, 0x68,
+					0xfe, 0x54, 0x07, 0xe5, 0xf9, 0xb7, 0x01, 0xdf, 0xf8,
+					0xc3, 0xc9, 0x1e, 0x71, 0x6c, 0x53, 0x6f, 0xc7, 0xfc,
+					0xec, 0x6c, 0xb5, 0xb7, 0x1c, 0x11, 0x65, 0x98, 0x8d,
+					0x4a, 0x27, 0x9e, 0x15, 0x77, 0xd7, 0x30, 0xfc, 0x7a,
+					0x29, 0x93, 0x2e, 0x3f, 0x00, 0xc8, 0x15, 0x15, 0x23,
+					0x6d, 0x8d, 0x8e, 0x31, 0x01, 0x7a, 0x7a, 0x09, 0xdf,
+					0x43, 0x52, 0xd9, 0x04, 0xcd, 0xeb, 0x79, 0xaa, 0x58,
+					0x3a, 0xdc, 0xc3, 0x1e, 0xa6, 0x98, 0xa4, 0xc0, 0x52,
+					0x83, 0xda, 0xba, 0x90, 0x89, 0xbe, 0x54, 0x91, 0xf6,
+					0x7c, 0x1a, 0x4e, 0xe4, 0x8d, 0xc7, 0x4b, 0xbb, 0xe6,
+					0x64, 0x3a, 0xef, 0x84, 0x66, 0x79, 0xb4, 0xcb, 0x39,
+					0x5a, 0x35, 0x2d, 0x5e, 0xd1, 0x15, 0x91, 0x2d, 0xf6,
+					0x96, 0xff, 0xe0, 0x70, 0x29, 0x32, 0x94, 0x6d, 0x71,
+					0x49, 0x2b, 0x44,
+				},
+			},
+			// Example 1.3
+			{
+				[]byte{0xd9, 0x4a, 0xe0, 0x83, 0x2e, 0x64, 0x45, 0xce,
+					0x42, 0x33, 0x1c, 0xb0, 0x6d, 0x53, 0x1a, 0x82, 0xb1,
+					0xdb, 0x4b, 0xaa, 0xd3, 0x0f, 0x74, 0x6d, 0xc9, 0x16,
+					0xdf, 0x24, 0xd4, 0xe3, 0xc2, 0x45, 0x1f, 0xff, 0x59,
+					0xa6, 0x42, 0x3e, 0xb0, 0xe1, 0xd0, 0x2d, 0x4f, 0xe6,
+					0x46, 0xcf, 0x69, 0x9d, 0xfd, 0x81, 0x8c, 0x6e, 0x97,
+					0xb0, 0x51,
+				},
+				[]byte{0x25, 0x14, 0xdf, 0x46, 0x95, 0x75, 0x5a, 0x67,
+					0xb2, 0x88, 0xea, 0xf4, 0x90, 0x5c, 0x36, 0xee, 0xc6,
+					0x6f, 0xd2, 0xfd,
+				},
+				[]byte{0x42, 0x37, 0x36, 0xed, 0x03, 0x5f, 0x60, 0x26,
+					0xaf, 0x27, 0x6c, 0x35, 0xc0, 0xb3, 0x74, 0x1b, 0x36,
+					0x5e, 0x5f, 0x76, 0xca, 0x09, 0x1b, 0x4e, 0x8c, 0x29,
+					0xe2, 0xf0, 0xbe, 0xfe, 0xe6, 0x03, 0x59, 0x5a, 0xa8,
+					0x32, 0x2d, 0x60, 0x2d, 0x2e, 0x62, 0x5e, 0x95, 0xeb,
+					0x81, 0xb2, 0xf1, 0xc9, 0x72, 0x4e, 0x82, 0x2e, 0xca,
+					0x76, 0xdb, 0x86, 0x18, 0xcf, 0x09, 0xc5, 0x34, 0x35,
+					0x03, 0xa4, 0x36, 0x08, 0x35, 0xb5, 0x90, 0x3b, 0xc6,
+					0x37, 0xe3, 0x87, 0x9f, 0xb0, 0x5e, 0x0e, 0xf3, 0x26,
+					0x85, 0xd5, 0xae, 0xc5, 0x06, 0x7c, 0xd7, 0xcc, 0x96,
+					0xfe, 0x4b, 0x26, 0x70, 0xb6, 0xea, 0xc3, 0x06, 0x6b,
+					0x1f, 0xcf, 0x56, 0x86, 0xb6, 0x85, 0x89, 0xaa, 0xfb,
+					0x7d, 0x62, 0x9b, 0x02, 0xd8, 0xf8, 0x62, 0x5c, 0xa3,
+					0x83, 0x36, 0x24, 0xd4, 0x80, 0x0f, 0xb0, 0x81, 0xb1,
+					0xcf, 0x94, 0xeb,
+				},
+			},
+		},
+	},
+	// Key 10
+	{"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",
+		65537,
+		"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",
+		[]testEncryptOAEPMessage{
+			// Example 10.1
+			{
+				[]byte{0x8b, 0xba, 0x6b, 0xf8, 0x2a, 0x6c, 0x0f, 0x86,
+					0xd5, 0xf1, 0x75, 0x6e, 0x97, 0x95, 0x68, 0x70, 0xb0,
+					0x89, 0x53, 0xb0, 0x6b, 0x4e, 0xb2, 0x05, 0xbc, 0x16,
+					0x94, 0xee,
+				},
+				[]byte{0x47, 0xe1, 0xab, 0x71, 0x19, 0xfe, 0xe5, 0x6c,
+					0x95, 0xee, 0x5e, 0xaa, 0xd8, 0x6f, 0x40, 0xd0, 0xaa,
+					0x63, 0xbd, 0x33,
+				},
+				[]byte{0x53, 0xea, 0x5d, 0xc0, 0x8c, 0xd2, 0x60, 0xfb,
+					0x3b, 0x85, 0x85, 0x67, 0x28, 0x7f, 0xa9, 0x15, 0x52,
+					0xc3, 0x0b, 0x2f, 0xeb, 0xfb, 0xa2, 0x13, 0xf0, 0xae,
+					0x87, 0x70, 0x2d, 0x06, 0x8d, 0x19, 0xba, 0xb0, 0x7f,
+					0xe5, 0x74, 0x52, 0x3d, 0xfb, 0x42, 0x13, 0x9d, 0x68,
+					0xc3, 0xc5, 0xaf, 0xee, 0xe0, 0xbf, 0xe4, 0xcb, 0x79,
+					0x69, 0xcb, 0xf3, 0x82, 0xb8, 0x04, 0xd6, 0xe6, 0x13,
+					0x96, 0x14, 0x4e, 0x2d, 0x0e, 0x60, 0x74, 0x1f, 0x89,
+					0x93, 0xc3, 0x01, 0x4b, 0x58, 0xb9, 0xb1, 0x95, 0x7a,
+					0x8b, 0xab, 0xcd, 0x23, 0xaf, 0x85, 0x4f, 0x4c, 0x35,
+					0x6f, 0xb1, 0x66, 0x2a, 0xa7, 0x2b, 0xfc, 0xc7, 0xe5,
+					0x86, 0x55, 0x9d, 0xc4, 0x28, 0x0d, 0x16, 0x0c, 0x12,
+					0x67, 0x85, 0xa7, 0x23, 0xeb, 0xee, 0xbe, 0xff, 0x71,
+					0xf1, 0x15, 0x94, 0x44, 0x0a, 0xae, 0xf8, 0x7d, 0x10,
+					0x79, 0x3a, 0x87, 0x74, 0xa2, 0x39, 0xd4, 0xa0, 0x4c,
+					0x87, 0xfe, 0x14, 0x67, 0xb9, 0xda, 0xf8, 0x52, 0x08,
+					0xec, 0x6c, 0x72, 0x55, 0x79, 0x4a, 0x96, 0xcc, 0x29,
+					0x14, 0x2f, 0x9a, 0x8b, 0xd4, 0x18, 0xe3, 0xc1, 0xfd,
+					0x67, 0x34, 0x4b, 0x0c, 0xd0, 0x82, 0x9d, 0xf3, 0xb2,
+					0xbe, 0xc6, 0x02, 0x53, 0x19, 0x62, 0x93, 0xc6, 0xb3,
+					0x4d, 0x3f, 0x75, 0xd3, 0x2f, 0x21, 0x3d, 0xd4, 0x5c,
+					0x62, 0x73, 0xd5, 0x05, 0xad, 0xf4, 0xcc, 0xed, 0x10,
+					0x57, 0xcb, 0x75, 0x8f, 0xc2, 0x6a, 0xee, 0xfa, 0x44,
+					0x12, 0x55, 0xed, 0x4e, 0x64, 0xc1, 0x99, 0xee, 0x07,
+					0x5e, 0x7f, 0x16, 0x64, 0x61, 0x82, 0xfd, 0xb4, 0x64,
+					0x73, 0x9b, 0x68, 0xab, 0x5d, 0xaf, 0xf0, 0xe6, 0x3e,
+					0x95, 0x52, 0x01, 0x68, 0x24, 0xf0, 0x54, 0xbf, 0x4d,
+					0x3c, 0x8c, 0x90, 0xa9, 0x7b, 0xb6, 0xb6, 0x55, 0x32,
+					0x84, 0xeb, 0x42, 0x9f, 0xcc,
+				},
+			},
+		},
+	},
+}
diff --git a/src/crypto/rsa/testdata/pss-vect.txt.bz2 b/src/crypto/rsa/testdata/pss-vect.txt.bz2
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ad3da1a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/crypto/rsa/testdata/pss-vect.txt.bz2