Adding upstream version 1.20.14.upstream/1.20.14upstream

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

1 files changed, 1175 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/src/crypto/x509/parser.go b/src/crypto/x509/parser.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6ea3017
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/crypto/x509/parser.go
@@ -0,0 +1,1175 @@
+// Copyright 2021 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+package x509
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"crypto/dsa"
+	"crypto/ecdh"
+	"crypto/ecdsa"
+	"crypto/ed25519"
+	"crypto/elliptic"
+	"crypto/rsa"
+	"crypto/x509/pkix"
+	"encoding/asn1"
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"math/big"
+	"net"
+	"net/url"
+	"strconv"
+	"strings"
+	"time"
+	"unicode/utf16"
+	"unicode/utf8"
+
+	"golang.org/x/crypto/cryptobyte"
+	cryptobyte_asn1 "golang.org/x/crypto/cryptobyte/asn1"
+)
+
+// isPrintable reports whether the given b is in the ASN.1 PrintableString set.
+// This is a simplified version of encoding/asn1.isPrintable.
+func isPrintable(b byte) bool {
+	return 'a' <= b && b <= 'z' ||
+		'A' <= b && b <= 'Z' ||
+		'0' <= b && b <= '9' ||
+		'\'' <= b && b <= ')' ||
+		'+' <= b && b <= '/' ||
+		b == ' ' ||
+		b == ':' ||
+		b == '=' ||
+		b == '?' ||
+		// This is technically not allowed in a PrintableString.
+		// However, x509 certificates with wildcard strings don't
+		// always use the correct string type so we permit it.
+		b == '*' ||
+		// This is not technically allowed either. However, not
+		// only is it relatively common, but there are also a
+		// handful of CA certificates that contain it. At least
+		// one of which will not expire until 2027.
+		b == '&'
+}
+
+// parseASN1String parses the ASN.1 string types T61String, PrintableString,
+// UTF8String, BMPString, IA5String, and NumericString. This is mostly copied
+// from the respective encoding/asn1.parse... methods, rather than just
+// increasing the API surface of that package.
+func parseASN1String(tag cryptobyte_asn1.Tag, value []byte) (string, error) {
+	switch tag {
+	case cryptobyte_asn1.T61String:
+		return string(value), nil
+	case cryptobyte_asn1.PrintableString:
+		for _, b := range value {
+			if !isPrintable(b) {
+				return "", errors.New("invalid PrintableString")
+			}
+		}
+		return string(value), nil
+	case cryptobyte_asn1.UTF8String:
+		if !utf8.Valid(value) {
+			return "", errors.New("invalid UTF-8 string")
+		}
+		return string(value), nil
+	case cryptobyte_asn1.Tag(asn1.TagBMPString):
+		if len(value)%2 != 0 {
+			return "", errors.New("invalid BMPString")
+		}
+
+		// Strip terminator if present.
+		if l := len(value); l >= 2 && value[l-1] == 0 && value[l-2] == 0 {
+			value = value[:l-2]
+		}
+
+		s := make([]uint16, 0, len(value)/2)
+		for len(value) > 0 {
+			s = append(s, uint16(value[0])<<8+uint16(value[1]))
+			value = value[2:]
+		}
+
+		return string(utf16.Decode(s)), nil
+	case cryptobyte_asn1.IA5String:
+		s := string(value)
+		if isIA5String(s) != nil {
+			return "", errors.New("invalid IA5String")
+		}
+		return s, nil
+	case cryptobyte_asn1.Tag(asn1.TagNumericString):
+		for _, b := range value {
+			if !('0' <= b && b <= '9' || b == ' ') {
+				return "", errors.New("invalid NumericString")
+			}
+		}
+		return string(value), nil
+	}
+	return "", fmt.Errorf("unsupported string type: %v", tag)
+}
+
+// parseName parses a DER encoded Name as defined in RFC 5280. We may
+// want to export this function in the future for use in crypto/tls.
+func parseName(raw cryptobyte.String) (*pkix.RDNSequence, error) {
+	if !raw.ReadASN1(&raw, cryptobyte_asn1.SEQUENCE) {
+		return nil, errors.New("x509: invalid RDNSequence")
+	}
+
+	var rdnSeq pkix.RDNSequence
+	for !raw.Empty() {
+		var rdnSet pkix.RelativeDistinguishedNameSET
+		var set cryptobyte.String
+		if !raw.ReadASN1(&set, cryptobyte_asn1.SET) {
+			return nil, errors.New("x509: invalid RDNSequence")
+		}
+		for !set.Empty() {
+			var atav cryptobyte.String
+			if !set.ReadASN1(&atav, cryptobyte_asn1.SEQUENCE) {
+				return nil, errors.New("x509: invalid RDNSequence: invalid attribute")
+			}
+			var attr pkix.AttributeTypeAndValue
+			if !atav.ReadASN1ObjectIdentifier(&attr.Type) {
+				return nil, errors.New("x509: invalid RDNSequence: invalid attribute type")
+			}
+			var rawValue cryptobyte.String
+			var valueTag cryptobyte_asn1.Tag
+			if !atav.ReadAnyASN1(&rawValue, &valueTag) {
+				return nil, errors.New("x509: invalid RDNSequence: invalid attribute value")
+			}
+			var err error
+			attr.Value, err = parseASN1String(valueTag, rawValue)
+			if err != nil {
+				return nil, fmt.Errorf("x509: invalid RDNSequence: invalid attribute value: %s", err)
+			}
+			rdnSet = append(rdnSet, attr)
+		}
+
+		rdnSeq = append(rdnSeq, rdnSet)
+	}
+
+	return &rdnSeq, nil
+}
+
+func parseAI(der cryptobyte.String) (pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier, error) {
+	ai := pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier{}
+	if !der.ReadASN1ObjectIdentifier(&ai.Algorithm) {
+		return ai, errors.New("x509: malformed OID")
+	}
+	if der.Empty() {
+		return ai, nil
+	}
+	var params cryptobyte.String
+	var tag cryptobyte_asn1.Tag
+	if !der.ReadAnyASN1Element(&params, &tag) {
+		return ai, errors.New("x509: malformed parameters")
+	}
+	ai.Parameters.Tag = int(tag)
+	ai.Parameters.FullBytes = params
+	return ai, nil
+}
+
+func parseTime(der *cryptobyte.String) (time.Time, error) {
+	var t time.Time
+	switch {
+	case der.PeekASN1Tag(cryptobyte_asn1.UTCTime):
+		if !der.ReadASN1UTCTime(&t) {
+			return t, errors.New("x509: malformed UTCTime")
+		}
+	case der.PeekASN1Tag(cryptobyte_asn1.GeneralizedTime):
+		if !der.ReadASN1GeneralizedTime(&t) {
+			return t, errors.New("x509: malformed GeneralizedTime")
+		}
+	default:
+		return t, errors.New("x509: unsupported time format")
+	}
+	return t, nil
+}
+
+func parseValidity(der cryptobyte.String) (time.Time, time.Time, error) {
+	notBefore, err := parseTime(&der)
+	if err != nil {
+		return time.Time{}, time.Time{}, err
+	}
+	notAfter, err := parseTime(&der)
+	if err != nil {
+		return time.Time{}, time.Time{}, err
+	}
+
+	return notBefore, notAfter, nil
+}
+
+func parseExtension(der cryptobyte.String) (pkix.Extension, error) {
+	var ext pkix.Extension
+	if !der.ReadASN1ObjectIdentifier(&ext.Id) {
+		return ext, errors.New("x509: malformed extension OID field")
+	}
+	if der.PeekASN1Tag(cryptobyte_asn1.BOOLEAN) {
+		if !der.ReadASN1Boolean(&ext.Critical) {
+			return ext, errors.New("x509: malformed extension critical field")
+		}
+	}
+	var val cryptobyte.String
+	if !der.ReadASN1(&val, cryptobyte_asn1.OCTET_STRING) {
+		return ext, errors.New("x509: malformed extension value field")
+	}
+	ext.Value = val
+	return ext, nil
+}
+
+func parsePublicKey(keyData *publicKeyInfo) (any, error) {
+	oid := keyData.Algorithm.Algorithm
+	params := keyData.Algorithm.Parameters
+	der := cryptobyte.String(keyData.PublicKey.RightAlign())
+	switch {
+	case oid.Equal(oidPublicKeyRSA):
+		// RSA public keys must have a NULL in the parameters.
+		// See RFC 3279, Section 2.3.1.
+		if !bytes.Equal(params.FullBytes, asn1.NullBytes) {
+			return nil, errors.New("x509: RSA key missing NULL parameters")
+		}
+
+		p := &pkcs1PublicKey{N: new(big.Int)}
+		if !der.ReadASN1(&der, cryptobyte_asn1.SEQUENCE) {
+			return nil, errors.New("x509: invalid RSA public key")
+		}
+		if !der.ReadASN1Integer(p.N) {
+			return nil, errors.New("x509: invalid RSA modulus")
+		}
+		if !der.ReadASN1Integer(&p.E) {
+			return nil, errors.New("x509: invalid RSA public exponent")
+		}
+
+		if p.N.Sign() <= 0 {
+			return nil, errors.New("x509: RSA modulus is not a positive number")
+		}
+		if p.E <= 0 {
+			return nil, errors.New("x509: RSA public exponent is not a positive number")
+		}
+
+		pub := &rsa.PublicKey{
+			E: p.E,
+			N: p.N,
+		}
+		return pub, nil
+	case oid.Equal(oidPublicKeyECDSA):
+		paramsDer := cryptobyte.String(params.FullBytes)
+		namedCurveOID := new(asn1.ObjectIdentifier)
+		if !paramsDer.ReadASN1ObjectIdentifier(namedCurveOID) {
+			return nil, errors.New("x509: invalid ECDSA parameters")
+		}
+		namedCurve := namedCurveFromOID(*namedCurveOID)
+		if namedCurve == nil {
+			return nil, errors.New("x509: unsupported elliptic curve")
+		}
+		x, y := elliptic.Unmarshal(namedCurve, der)
+		if x == nil {
+			return nil, errors.New("x509: failed to unmarshal elliptic curve point")
+		}
+		pub := &ecdsa.PublicKey{
+			Curve: namedCurve,
+			X:     x,
+			Y:     y,
+		}
+		return pub, nil
+	case oid.Equal(oidPublicKeyEd25519):
+		// RFC 8410, Section 3
+		// > For all of the OIDs, the parameters MUST be absent.
+		if len(params.FullBytes) != 0 {
+			return nil, errors.New("x509: Ed25519 key encoded with illegal parameters")
+		}
+		if len(der) != ed25519.PublicKeySize {
+			return nil, errors.New("x509: wrong Ed25519 public key size")
+		}
+		return ed25519.PublicKey(der), nil
+	case oid.Equal(oidPublicKeyX25519):
+		// RFC 8410, Section 3
+		// > For all of the OIDs, the parameters MUST be absent.
+		if len(params.FullBytes) != 0 {
+			return nil, errors.New("x509: X25519 key encoded with illegal parameters")
+		}
+		return ecdh.X25519().NewPublicKey(der)
+	case oid.Equal(oidPublicKeyDSA):
+		y := new(big.Int)
+		if !der.ReadASN1Integer(y) {
+			return nil, errors.New("x509: invalid DSA public key")
+		}
+		pub := &dsa.PublicKey{
+			Y: y,
+			Parameters: dsa.Parameters{
+				P: new(big.Int),
+				Q: new(big.Int),
+				G: new(big.Int),
+			},
+		}
+		paramsDer := cryptobyte.String(params.FullBytes)
+		if !paramsDer.ReadASN1(&paramsDer, cryptobyte_asn1.SEQUENCE) ||
+			!paramsDer.ReadASN1Integer(pub.Parameters.P) ||
+			!paramsDer.ReadASN1Integer(pub.Parameters.Q) ||
+			!paramsDer.ReadASN1Integer(pub.Parameters.G) {
+			return nil, errors.New("x509: invalid DSA parameters")
+		}
+		if pub.Y.Sign() <= 0 || pub.Parameters.P.Sign() <= 0 ||
+			pub.Parameters.Q.Sign() <= 0 || pub.Parameters.G.Sign() <= 0 {
+			return nil, errors.New("x509: zero or negative DSA parameter")
+		}
+		return pub, nil
+	default:
+		return nil, errors.New("x509: unknown public key algorithm")
+	}
+}
+
+func parseKeyUsageExtension(der cryptobyte.String) (KeyUsage, error) {
+	var usageBits asn1.BitString
+	if !der.ReadASN1BitString(&usageBits) {
+		return 0, errors.New("x509: invalid key usage")
+	}
+
+	var usage int
+	for i := 0; i < 9; i++ {
+		if usageBits.At(i) != 0 {
+			usage |= 1 << uint(i)
+		}
+	}
+	return KeyUsage(usage), nil
+}
+
+func parseBasicConstraintsExtension(der cryptobyte.String) (bool, int, error) {
+	var isCA bool
+	if !der.ReadASN1(&der, cryptobyte_asn1.SEQUENCE) {
+		return false, 0, errors.New("x509: invalid basic constraints a")
+	}
+	if der.PeekASN1Tag(cryptobyte_asn1.BOOLEAN) {
+		if !der.ReadASN1Boolean(&isCA) {
+			return false, 0, errors.New("x509: invalid basic constraints b")
+		}
+	}
+	maxPathLen := -1
+	if !der.Empty() && der.PeekASN1Tag(cryptobyte_asn1.INTEGER) {
+		if !der.ReadASN1Integer(&maxPathLen) {
+			return false, 0, errors.New("x509: invalid basic constraints c")
+		}
+	}
+
+	// TODO: map out.MaxPathLen to 0 if it has the -1 default value? (Issue 19285)
+	return isCA, maxPathLen, nil
+}
+
+func forEachSAN(der cryptobyte.String, callback func(tag int, data []byte) error) error {
+	if !der.ReadASN1(&der, cryptobyte_asn1.SEQUENCE) {
+		return errors.New("x509: invalid subject alternative names")
+	}
+	for !der.Empty() {
+		var san cryptobyte.String
+		var tag cryptobyte_asn1.Tag
+		if !der.ReadAnyASN1(&san, &tag) {
+			return errors.New("x509: invalid subject alternative name")
+		}
+		if err := callback(int(tag^0x80), san); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+	}
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+func parseSANExtension(der cryptobyte.String) (dnsNames, emailAddresses []string, ipAddresses []net.IP, uris []*url.URL, err error) {
+	err = forEachSAN(der, func(tag int, data []byte) error {
+		switch tag {
+		case nameTypeEmail:
+			email := string(data)
+			if err := isIA5String(email); err != nil {
+				return errors.New("x509: SAN rfc822Name is malformed")
+			}
+			emailAddresses = append(emailAddresses, email)
+		case nameTypeDNS:
+			name := string(data)
+			if err := isIA5String(name); err != nil {
+				return errors.New("x509: SAN dNSName is malformed")
+			}
+			dnsNames = append(dnsNames, string(name))
+		case nameTypeURI:
+			uriStr := string(data)
+			if err := isIA5String(uriStr); err != nil {
+				return errors.New("x509: SAN uniformResourceIdentifier is malformed")
+			}
+			uri, err := url.Parse(uriStr)
+			if err != nil {
+				return fmt.Errorf("x509: cannot parse URI %q: %s", uriStr, err)
+			}
+			if len(uri.Host) > 0 {
+				if _, ok := domainToReverseLabels(uri.Host); !ok {
+					return fmt.Errorf("x509: cannot parse URI %q: invalid domain", uriStr)
+				}
+			}
+			uris = append(uris, uri)
+		case nameTypeIP:
+			switch len(data) {
+			case net.IPv4len, net.IPv6len:
+				ipAddresses = append(ipAddresses, data)
+			default:
+				return errors.New("x509: cannot parse IP address of length " + strconv.Itoa(len(data)))
+			}
+		}
+
+		return nil
+	})
+
+	return
+}
+
+func parseExtKeyUsageExtension(der cryptobyte.String) ([]ExtKeyUsage, []asn1.ObjectIdentifier, error) {
+	var extKeyUsages []ExtKeyUsage
+	var unknownUsages []asn1.ObjectIdentifier
+	if !der.ReadASN1(&der, cryptobyte_asn1.SEQUENCE) {
+		return nil, nil, errors.New("x509: invalid extended key usages")
+	}
+	for !der.Empty() {
+		var eku asn1.ObjectIdentifier
+		if !der.ReadASN1ObjectIdentifier(&eku) {
+			return nil, nil, errors.New("x509: invalid extended key usages")
+		}
+		if extKeyUsage, ok := extKeyUsageFromOID(eku); ok {
+			extKeyUsages = append(extKeyUsages, extKeyUsage)
+		} else {
+			unknownUsages = append(unknownUsages, eku)
+		}
+	}
+	return extKeyUsages, unknownUsages, nil
+}
+
+func parseCertificatePoliciesExtension(der cryptobyte.String) ([]asn1.ObjectIdentifier, error) {
+	var oids []asn1.ObjectIdentifier
+	if !der.ReadASN1(&der, cryptobyte_asn1.SEQUENCE) {
+		return nil, errors.New("x509: invalid certificate policies")
+	}
+	for !der.Empty() {
+		var cp cryptobyte.String
+		if !der.ReadASN1(&cp, cryptobyte_asn1.SEQUENCE) {
+			return nil, errors.New("x509: invalid certificate policies")
+		}
+		var oid asn1.ObjectIdentifier
+		if !cp.ReadASN1ObjectIdentifier(&oid) {
+			return nil, errors.New("x509: invalid certificate policies")
+		}
+		oids = append(oids, oid)
+	}
+
+	return oids, nil
+}
+
+// isValidIPMask reports whether mask consists of zero or more 1 bits, followed by zero bits.
+func isValidIPMask(mask []byte) bool {
+	seenZero := false
+
+	for _, b := range mask {
+		if seenZero {
+			if b != 0 {
+				return false
+			}
+
+			continue
+		}
+
+		switch b {
+		case 0x00, 0x80, 0xc0, 0xe0, 0xf0, 0xf8, 0xfc, 0xfe:
+			seenZero = true
+		case 0xff:
+		default:
+			return false
+		}
+	}
+
+	return true
+}
+
+func parseNameConstraintsExtension(out *Certificate, e pkix.Extension) (unhandled bool, err error) {
+	// RFC 5280, 4.2.1.10
+
+	// NameConstraints ::= SEQUENCE {
+	//      permittedSubtrees       [0]     GeneralSubtrees OPTIONAL,
+	//      excludedSubtrees        [1]     GeneralSubtrees OPTIONAL }
+	//
+	// GeneralSubtrees ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF GeneralSubtree
+	//
+	// GeneralSubtree ::= SEQUENCE {
+	//      base                    GeneralName,
+	//      minimum         [0]     BaseDistance DEFAULT 0,
+	//      maximum         [1]     BaseDistance OPTIONAL }
+	//
+	// BaseDistance ::= INTEGER (0..MAX)
+
+	outer := cryptobyte.String(e.Value)
+	var toplevel, permitted, excluded cryptobyte.String
+	var havePermitted, haveExcluded bool
+	if !outer.ReadASN1(&toplevel, cryptobyte_asn1.SEQUENCE) ||
+		!outer.Empty() ||
+		!toplevel.ReadOptionalASN1(&permitted, &havePermitted, cryptobyte_asn1.Tag(0).ContextSpecific().Constructed()) ||
+		!toplevel.ReadOptionalASN1(&excluded, &haveExcluded, cryptobyte_asn1.Tag(1).ContextSpecific().Constructed()) ||
+		!toplevel.Empty() {
+		return false, errors.New("x509: invalid NameConstraints extension")
+	}
+
+	if !havePermitted && !haveExcluded || len(permitted) == 0 && len(excluded) == 0 {
+		// From RFC 5280, Section 4.2.1.10:
+		//   “either the permittedSubtrees field
+		//   or the excludedSubtrees MUST be
+		//   present”
+		return false, errors.New("x509: empty name constraints extension")
+	}
+
+	getValues := func(subtrees cryptobyte.String) (dnsNames []string, ips []*net.IPNet, emails, uriDomains []string, err error) {
+		for !subtrees.Empty() {
+			var seq, value cryptobyte.String
+			var tag cryptobyte_asn1.Tag
+			if !subtrees.ReadASN1(&seq, cryptobyte_asn1.SEQUENCE) ||
+				!seq.ReadAnyASN1(&value, &tag) {
+				return nil, nil, nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("x509: invalid NameConstraints extension")
+			}
+
+			var (
+				dnsTag   = cryptobyte_asn1.Tag(2).ContextSpecific()
+				emailTag = cryptobyte_asn1.Tag(1).ContextSpecific()
+				ipTag    = cryptobyte_asn1.Tag(7).ContextSpecific()
+				uriTag   = cryptobyte_asn1.Tag(6).ContextSpecific()
+			)
+
+			switch tag {
+			case dnsTag:
+				domain := string(value)
+				if err := isIA5String(domain); err != nil {
+					return nil, nil, nil, nil, errors.New("x509: invalid constraint value: " + err.Error())
+				}
+
+				trimmedDomain := domain
+				if len(trimmedDomain) > 0 && trimmedDomain[0] == '.' {
+					// constraints can have a leading
+					// period to exclude the domain
+					// itself, but that's not valid in a
+					// normal domain name.
+					trimmedDomain = trimmedDomain[1:]
+				}
+				if _, ok := domainToReverseLabels(trimmedDomain); !ok {
+					return nil, nil, nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("x509: failed to parse dnsName constraint %q", domain)
+				}
+				dnsNames = append(dnsNames, domain)
+
+			case ipTag:
+				l := len(value)
+				var ip, mask []byte
+
+				switch l {
+				case 8:
+					ip = value[:4]
+					mask = value[4:]
+
+				case 32:
+					ip = value[:16]
+					mask = value[16:]
+
+				default:
+					return nil, nil, nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("x509: IP constraint contained value of length %d", l)
+				}
+
+				if !isValidIPMask(mask) {
+					return nil, nil, nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("x509: IP constraint contained invalid mask %x", mask)
+				}
+
+				ips = append(ips, &net.IPNet{IP: net.IP(ip), Mask: net.IPMask(mask)})
+
+			case emailTag:
+				constraint := string(value)
+				if err := isIA5String(constraint); err != nil {
+					return nil, nil, nil, nil, errors.New("x509: invalid constraint value: " + err.Error())
+				}
+
+				// If the constraint contains an @ then
+				// it specifies an exact mailbox name.
+				if strings.Contains(constraint, "@") {
+					if _, ok := parseRFC2821Mailbox(constraint); !ok {
+						return nil, nil, nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("x509: failed to parse rfc822Name constraint %q", constraint)
+					}
+				} else {
+					// Otherwise it's a domain name.
+					domain := constraint
+					if len(domain) > 0 && domain[0] == '.' {
+						domain = domain[1:]
+					}
+					if _, ok := domainToReverseLabels(domain); !ok {
+						return nil, nil, nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("x509: failed to parse rfc822Name constraint %q", constraint)
+					}
+				}
+				emails = append(emails, constraint)
+
+			case uriTag:
+				domain := string(value)
+				if err := isIA5String(domain); err != nil {
+					return nil, nil, nil, nil, errors.New("x509: invalid constraint value: " + err.Error())
+				}
+
+				if net.ParseIP(domain) != nil {
+					return nil, nil, nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("x509: failed to parse URI constraint %q: cannot be IP address", domain)
+				}
+
+				trimmedDomain := domain
+				if len(trimmedDomain) > 0 && trimmedDomain[0] == '.' {
+					// constraints can have a leading
+					// period to exclude the domain itself,
+					// but that's not valid in a normal
+					// domain name.
+					trimmedDomain = trimmedDomain[1:]
+				}
+				if _, ok := domainToReverseLabels(trimmedDomain); !ok {
+					return nil, nil, nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("x509: failed to parse URI constraint %q", domain)
+				}
+				uriDomains = append(uriDomains, domain)
+
+			default:
+				unhandled = true
+			}
+		}
+
+		return dnsNames, ips, emails, uriDomains, nil
+	}
+
+	if out.PermittedDNSDomains, out.PermittedIPRanges, out.PermittedEmailAddresses, out.PermittedURIDomains, err = getValues(permitted); err != nil {
+		return false, err
+	}
+	if out.ExcludedDNSDomains, out.ExcludedIPRanges, out.ExcludedEmailAddresses, out.ExcludedURIDomains, err = getValues(excluded); err != nil {
+		return false, err
+	}
+	out.PermittedDNSDomainsCritical = e.Critical
+
+	return unhandled, nil
+}
+
+func processExtensions(out *Certificate) error {
+	var err error
+	for _, e := range out.Extensions {
+		unhandled := false
+
+		if len(e.Id) == 4 && e.Id[0] == 2 && e.Id[1] == 5 && e.Id[2] == 29 {
+			switch e.Id[3] {
+			case 15:
+				out.KeyUsage, err = parseKeyUsageExtension(e.Value)
+				if err != nil {
+					return err
+				}
+			case 19:
+				out.IsCA, out.MaxPathLen, err = parseBasicConstraintsExtension(e.Value)
+				if err != nil {
+					return err
+				}
+				out.BasicConstraintsValid = true
+				out.MaxPathLenZero = out.MaxPathLen == 0
+			case 17:
+				out.DNSNames, out.EmailAddresses, out.IPAddresses, out.URIs, err = parseSANExtension(e.Value)
+				if err != nil {
+					return err
+				}
+
+				if len(out.DNSNames) == 0 && len(out.EmailAddresses) == 0 && len(out.IPAddresses) == 0 && len(out.URIs) == 0 {
+					// If we didn't parse anything then we do the critical check, below.
+					unhandled = true
+				}
+
+			case 30:
+				unhandled, err = parseNameConstraintsExtension(out, e)
+				if err != nil {
+					return err
+				}
+
+			case 31:
+				// RFC 5280, 4.2.1.13
+
+				// CRLDistributionPoints ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF DistributionPoint
+				//
+				// DistributionPoint ::= SEQUENCE {
+				//     distributionPoint       [0]     DistributionPointName OPTIONAL,
+				//     reasons                 [1]     ReasonFlags OPTIONAL,
+				//     cRLIssuer               [2]     GeneralNames OPTIONAL }
+				//
+				// DistributionPointName ::= CHOICE {
+				//     fullName                [0]     GeneralNames,
+				//     nameRelativeToCRLIssuer [1]     RelativeDistinguishedName }
+				val := cryptobyte.String(e.Value)
+				if !val.ReadASN1(&val, cryptobyte_asn1.SEQUENCE) {
+					return errors.New("x509: invalid CRL distribution points")
+				}
+				for !val.Empty() {
+					var dpDER cryptobyte.String
+					if !val.ReadASN1(&dpDER, cryptobyte_asn1.SEQUENCE) {
+						return errors.New("x509: invalid CRL distribution point")
+					}
+					var dpNameDER cryptobyte.String
+					var dpNamePresent bool
+					if !dpDER.ReadOptionalASN1(&dpNameDER, &dpNamePresent, cryptobyte_asn1.Tag(0).Constructed().ContextSpecific()) {
+						return errors.New("x509: invalid CRL distribution point")
+					}
+					if !dpNamePresent {
+						continue
+					}
+					if !dpNameDER.ReadASN1(&dpNameDER, cryptobyte_asn1.Tag(0).Constructed().ContextSpecific()) {
+						return errors.New("x509: invalid CRL distribution point")
+					}
+					for !dpNameDER.Empty() {
+						if !dpNameDER.PeekASN1Tag(cryptobyte_asn1.Tag(6).ContextSpecific()) {
+							break
+						}
+						var uri cryptobyte.String
+						if !dpNameDER.ReadASN1(&uri, cryptobyte_asn1.Tag(6).ContextSpecific()) {
+							return errors.New("x509: invalid CRL distribution point")
+						}
+						out.CRLDistributionPoints = append(out.CRLDistributionPoints, string(uri))
+					}
+				}
+
+			case 35:
+				// RFC 5280, 4.2.1.1
+				val := cryptobyte.String(e.Value)
+				var akid cryptobyte.String
+				if !val.ReadASN1(&akid, cryptobyte_asn1.SEQUENCE) {
+					return errors.New("x509: invalid authority key identifier")
+				}
+				if akid.PeekASN1Tag(cryptobyte_asn1.Tag(0).ContextSpecific()) {
+					if !akid.ReadASN1(&akid, cryptobyte_asn1.Tag(0).ContextSpecific()) {
+						return errors.New("x509: invalid authority key identifier")
+					}
+					out.AuthorityKeyId = akid
+				}
+			case 37:
+				out.ExtKeyUsage, out.UnknownExtKeyUsage, err = parseExtKeyUsageExtension(e.Value)
+				if err != nil {
+					return err
+				}
+			case 14:
+				// RFC 5280, 4.2.1.2
+				val := cryptobyte.String(e.Value)
+				var skid cryptobyte.String
+				if !val.ReadASN1(&skid, cryptobyte_asn1.OCTET_STRING) {
+					return errors.New("x509: invalid subject key identifier")
+				}
+				out.SubjectKeyId = skid
+			case 32:
+				out.PolicyIdentifiers, err = parseCertificatePoliciesExtension(e.Value)
+				if err != nil {
+					return err
+				}
+			default:
+				// Unknown extensions are recorded if critical.
+				unhandled = true
+			}
+		} else if e.Id.Equal(oidExtensionAuthorityInfoAccess) {
+			// RFC 5280 4.2.2.1: Authority Information Access
+			val := cryptobyte.String(e.Value)
+			if !val.ReadASN1(&val, cryptobyte_asn1.SEQUENCE) {
+				return errors.New("x509: invalid authority info access")
+			}
+			for !val.Empty() {
+				var aiaDER cryptobyte.String
+				if !val.ReadASN1(&aiaDER, cryptobyte_asn1.SEQUENCE) {
+					return errors.New("x509: invalid authority info access")
+				}
+				var method asn1.ObjectIdentifier
+				if !aiaDER.ReadASN1ObjectIdentifier(&method) {
+					return errors.New("x509: invalid authority info access")
+				}
+				if !aiaDER.PeekASN1Tag(cryptobyte_asn1.Tag(6).ContextSpecific()) {
+					continue
+				}
+				if !aiaDER.ReadASN1(&aiaDER, cryptobyte_asn1.Tag(6).ContextSpecific()) {
+					return errors.New("x509: invalid authority info access")
+				}
+				switch {
+				case method.Equal(oidAuthorityInfoAccessOcsp):
+					out.OCSPServer = append(out.OCSPServer, string(aiaDER))
+				case method.Equal(oidAuthorityInfoAccessIssuers):
+					out.IssuingCertificateURL = append(out.IssuingCertificateURL, string(aiaDER))
+				}
+			}
+		} else {
+			// Unknown extensions are recorded if critical.
+			unhandled = true
+		}
+
+		if e.Critical && unhandled {
+			out.UnhandledCriticalExtensions = append(out.UnhandledCriticalExtensions, e.Id)
+		}
+	}
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+func parseCertificate(der []byte) (*Certificate, error) {
+	cert := &Certificate{}
+
+	input := cryptobyte.String(der)
+	// we read the SEQUENCE including length and tag bytes so that
+	// we can populate Certificate.Raw, before unwrapping the
+	// SEQUENCE so it can be operated on
+	if !input.ReadASN1Element(&input, cryptobyte_asn1.SEQUENCE) {
+		return nil, errors.New("x509: malformed certificate")
+	}
+	cert.Raw = input
+	if !input.ReadASN1(&input, cryptobyte_asn1.SEQUENCE) {
+		return nil, errors.New("x509: malformed certificate")
+	}
+
+	var tbs cryptobyte.String
+	// do the same trick again as above to extract the raw
+	// bytes for Certificate.RawTBSCertificate
+	if !input.ReadASN1Element(&tbs, cryptobyte_asn1.SEQUENCE) {
+		return nil, errors.New("x509: malformed tbs certificate")
+	}
+	cert.RawTBSCertificate = tbs
+	if !tbs.ReadASN1(&tbs, cryptobyte_asn1.SEQUENCE) {
+		return nil, errors.New("x509: malformed tbs certificate")
+	}
+
+	if !tbs.ReadOptionalASN1Integer(&cert.Version, cryptobyte_asn1.Tag(0).Constructed().ContextSpecific(), 0) {
+		return nil, errors.New("x509: malformed version")
+	}
+	if cert.Version < 0 {
+		return nil, errors.New("x509: malformed version")
+	}
+	// for backwards compat reasons Version is one-indexed,
+	// rather than zero-indexed as defined in 5280
+	cert.Version++
+	if cert.Version > 3 {
+		return nil, errors.New("x509: invalid version")
+	}
+
+	serial := new(big.Int)
+	if !tbs.ReadASN1Integer(serial) {
+		return nil, errors.New("x509: malformed serial number")
+	}
+	// we ignore the presence of negative serial numbers because
+	// of their prevalence, despite them being invalid
+	// TODO(rolandshoemaker): revisit this decision, there are currently
+	// only 10 trusted certificates with negative serial numbers
+	// according to censys.io.
+	cert.SerialNumber = serial
+
+	var sigAISeq cryptobyte.String
+	if !tbs.ReadASN1(&sigAISeq, cryptobyte_asn1.SEQUENCE) {
+		return nil, errors.New("x509: malformed signature algorithm identifier")
+	}
+	// Before parsing the inner algorithm identifier, extract
+	// the outer algorithm identifier and make sure that they
+	// match.
+	var outerSigAISeq cryptobyte.String
+	if !input.ReadASN1(&outerSigAISeq, cryptobyte_asn1.SEQUENCE) {
+		return nil, errors.New("x509: malformed algorithm identifier")
+	}
+	if !bytes.Equal(outerSigAISeq, sigAISeq) {
+		return nil, errors.New("x509: inner and outer signature algorithm identifiers don't match")
+	}
+	sigAI, err := parseAI(sigAISeq)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	cert.SignatureAlgorithm = getSignatureAlgorithmFromAI(sigAI)
+
+	var issuerSeq cryptobyte.String
+	if !tbs.ReadASN1Element(&issuerSeq, cryptobyte_asn1.SEQUENCE) {
+		return nil, errors.New("x509: malformed issuer")
+	}
+	cert.RawIssuer = issuerSeq
+	issuerRDNs, err := parseName(issuerSeq)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	cert.Issuer.FillFromRDNSequence(issuerRDNs)
+
+	var validity cryptobyte.String
+	if !tbs.ReadASN1(&validity, cryptobyte_asn1.SEQUENCE) {
+		return nil, errors.New("x509: malformed validity")
+	}
+	cert.NotBefore, cert.NotAfter, err = parseValidity(validity)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	var subjectSeq cryptobyte.String
+	if !tbs.ReadASN1Element(&subjectSeq, cryptobyte_asn1.SEQUENCE) {
+		return nil, errors.New("x509: malformed issuer")
+	}
+	cert.RawSubject = subjectSeq
+	subjectRDNs, err := parseName(subjectSeq)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	cert.Subject.FillFromRDNSequence(subjectRDNs)
+
+	var spki cryptobyte.String
+	if !tbs.ReadASN1Element(&spki, cryptobyte_asn1.SEQUENCE) {
+		return nil, errors.New("x509: malformed spki")
+	}
+	cert.RawSubjectPublicKeyInfo = spki
+	if !spki.ReadASN1(&spki, cryptobyte_asn1.SEQUENCE) {
+		return nil, errors.New("x509: malformed spki")
+	}
+	var pkAISeq cryptobyte.String
+	if !spki.ReadASN1(&pkAISeq, cryptobyte_asn1.SEQUENCE) {
+		return nil, errors.New("x509: malformed public key algorithm identifier")
+	}
+	pkAI, err := parseAI(pkAISeq)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	cert.PublicKeyAlgorithm = getPublicKeyAlgorithmFromOID(pkAI.Algorithm)
+	var spk asn1.BitString
+	if !spki.ReadASN1BitString(&spk) {
+		return nil, errors.New("x509: malformed subjectPublicKey")
+	}
+	if cert.PublicKeyAlgorithm != UnknownPublicKeyAlgorithm {
+		cert.PublicKey, err = parsePublicKey(&publicKeyInfo{
+			Algorithm: pkAI,
+			PublicKey: spk,
+		})
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+	}
+
+	if cert.Version > 1 {
+		if !tbs.SkipOptionalASN1(cryptobyte_asn1.Tag(1).ContextSpecific()) {
+			return nil, errors.New("x509: malformed issuerUniqueID")
+		}
+		if !tbs.SkipOptionalASN1(cryptobyte_asn1.Tag(2).ContextSpecific()) {
+			return nil, errors.New("x509: malformed subjectUniqueID")
+		}
+		if cert.Version == 3 {
+			var extensions cryptobyte.String
+			var present bool
+			if !tbs.ReadOptionalASN1(&extensions, &present, cryptobyte_asn1.Tag(3).Constructed().ContextSpecific()) {
+				return nil, errors.New("x509: malformed extensions")
+			}
+			if present {
+				seenExts := make(map[string]bool)
+				if !extensions.ReadASN1(&extensions, cryptobyte_asn1.SEQUENCE) {
+					return nil, errors.New("x509: malformed extensions")
+				}
+				for !extensions.Empty() {
+					var extension cryptobyte.String
+					if !extensions.ReadASN1(&extension, cryptobyte_asn1.SEQUENCE) {
+						return nil, errors.New("x509: malformed extension")
+					}
+					ext, err := parseExtension(extension)
+					if err != nil {
+						return nil, err
+					}
+					oidStr := ext.Id.String()
+					if seenExts[oidStr] {
+						return nil, errors.New("x509: certificate contains duplicate extensions")
+					}
+					seenExts[oidStr] = true
+					cert.Extensions = append(cert.Extensions, ext)
+				}
+				err = processExtensions(cert)
+				if err != nil {
+					return nil, err
+				}
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	var signature asn1.BitString
+	if !input.ReadASN1BitString(&signature) {
+		return nil, errors.New("x509: malformed signature")
+	}
+	cert.Signature = signature.RightAlign()
+
+	return cert, nil
+}
+
+// ParseCertificate parses a single certificate from the given ASN.1 DER data.
+func ParseCertificate(der []byte) (*Certificate, error) {
+	cert, err := parseCertificate(der)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	if len(der) != len(cert.Raw) {
+		return nil, errors.New("x509: trailing data")
+	}
+	return cert, err
+}
+
+// ParseCertificates parses one or more certificates from the given ASN.1 DER
+// data. The certificates must be concatenated with no intermediate padding.
+func ParseCertificates(der []byte) ([]*Certificate, error) {
+	var certs []*Certificate
+	for len(der) > 0 {
+		cert, err := parseCertificate(der)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+		certs = append(certs, cert)
+		der = der[len(cert.Raw):]
+	}
+	return certs, nil
+}
+
+// The X.509 standards confusingly 1-indexed the version names, but 0-indexed
+// the actual encoded version, so the version for X.509v2 is 1.
+const x509v2Version = 1
+
+// ParseRevocationList parses a X509 v2 Certificate Revocation List from the given
+// ASN.1 DER data.
+func ParseRevocationList(der []byte) (*RevocationList, error) {
+	rl := &RevocationList{}
+
+	input := cryptobyte.String(der)
+	// we read the SEQUENCE including length and tag bytes so that
+	// we can populate RevocationList.Raw, before unwrapping the
+	// SEQUENCE so it can be operated on
+	if !input.ReadASN1Element(&input, cryptobyte_asn1.SEQUENCE) {
+		return nil, errors.New("x509: malformed crl")
+	}
+	rl.Raw = input
+	if !input.ReadASN1(&input, cryptobyte_asn1.SEQUENCE) {
+		return nil, errors.New("x509: malformed crl")
+	}
+
+	var tbs cryptobyte.String
+	// do the same trick again as above to extract the raw
+	// bytes for Certificate.RawTBSCertificate
+	if !input.ReadASN1Element(&tbs, cryptobyte_asn1.SEQUENCE) {
+		return nil, errors.New("x509: malformed tbs crl")
+	}
+	rl.RawTBSRevocationList = tbs
+	if !tbs.ReadASN1(&tbs, cryptobyte_asn1.SEQUENCE) {
+		return nil, errors.New("x509: malformed tbs crl")
+	}
+
+	var version int
+	if !tbs.PeekASN1Tag(cryptobyte_asn1.INTEGER) {
+		return nil, errors.New("x509: unsupported crl version")
+	}
+	if !tbs.ReadASN1Integer(&version) {
+		return nil, errors.New("x509: malformed crl")
+	}
+	if version != x509v2Version {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("x509: unsupported crl version: %d", version)
+	}
+
+	var sigAISeq cryptobyte.String
+	if !tbs.ReadASN1(&sigAISeq, cryptobyte_asn1.SEQUENCE) {
+		return nil, errors.New("x509: malformed signature algorithm identifier")
+	}
+	// Before parsing the inner algorithm identifier, extract
+	// the outer algorithm identifier and make sure that they
+	// match.
+	var outerSigAISeq cryptobyte.String
+	if !input.ReadASN1(&outerSigAISeq, cryptobyte_asn1.SEQUENCE) {
+		return nil, errors.New("x509: malformed algorithm identifier")
+	}
+	if !bytes.Equal(outerSigAISeq, sigAISeq) {
+		return nil, errors.New("x509: inner and outer signature algorithm identifiers don't match")
+	}
+	sigAI, err := parseAI(sigAISeq)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	rl.SignatureAlgorithm = getSignatureAlgorithmFromAI(sigAI)
+
+	var signature asn1.BitString
+	if !input.ReadASN1BitString(&signature) {
+		return nil, errors.New("x509: malformed signature")
+	}
+	rl.Signature = signature.RightAlign()
+
+	var issuerSeq cryptobyte.String
+	if !tbs.ReadASN1Element(&issuerSeq, cryptobyte_asn1.SEQUENCE) {
+		return nil, errors.New("x509: malformed issuer")
+	}
+	rl.RawIssuer = issuerSeq
+	issuerRDNs, err := parseName(issuerSeq)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	rl.Issuer.FillFromRDNSequence(issuerRDNs)
+
+	rl.ThisUpdate, err = parseTime(&tbs)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	if tbs.PeekASN1Tag(cryptobyte_asn1.GeneralizedTime) || tbs.PeekASN1Tag(cryptobyte_asn1.UTCTime) {
+		rl.NextUpdate, err = parseTime(&tbs)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+	}
+
+	if tbs.PeekASN1Tag(cryptobyte_asn1.SEQUENCE) {
+		var revokedSeq cryptobyte.String
+		if !tbs.ReadASN1(&revokedSeq, cryptobyte_asn1.SEQUENCE) {
+			return nil, errors.New("x509: malformed crl")
+		}
+		for !revokedSeq.Empty() {
+			var certSeq cryptobyte.String
+			if !revokedSeq.ReadASN1(&certSeq, cryptobyte_asn1.SEQUENCE) {
+				return nil, errors.New("x509: malformed crl")
+			}
+			rc := pkix.RevokedCertificate{}
+			rc.SerialNumber = new(big.Int)
+			if !certSeq.ReadASN1Integer(rc.SerialNumber) {
+				return nil, errors.New("x509: malformed serial number")
+			}
+			rc.RevocationTime, err = parseTime(&certSeq)
+			if err != nil {
+				return nil, err
+			}
+			var extensions cryptobyte.String
+			var present bool
+			if !certSeq.ReadOptionalASN1(&extensions, &present, cryptobyte_asn1.SEQUENCE) {
+				return nil, errors.New("x509: malformed extensions")
+			}
+			if present {
+				for !extensions.Empty() {
+					var extension cryptobyte.String
+					if !extensions.ReadASN1(&extension, cryptobyte_asn1.SEQUENCE) {
+						return nil, errors.New("x509: malformed extension")
+					}
+					ext, err := parseExtension(extension)
+					if err != nil {
+						return nil, err
+					}
+					rc.Extensions = append(rc.Extensions, ext)
+				}
+			}
+
+			rl.RevokedCertificates = append(rl.RevokedCertificates, rc)
+		}
+	}
+
+	var extensions cryptobyte.String
+	var present bool
+	if !tbs.ReadOptionalASN1(&extensions, &present, cryptobyte_asn1.Tag(0).Constructed().ContextSpecific()) {
+		return nil, errors.New("x509: malformed extensions")
+	}
+	if present {
+		if !extensions.ReadASN1(&extensions, cryptobyte_asn1.SEQUENCE) {
+			return nil, errors.New("x509: malformed extensions")
+		}
+		for !extensions.Empty() {
+			var extension cryptobyte.String
+			if !extensions.ReadASN1(&extension, cryptobyte_asn1.SEQUENCE) {
+				return nil, errors.New("x509: malformed extension")
+			}
+			ext, err := parseExtension(extension)
+			if err != nil {
+				return nil, err
+			}
+			if ext.Id.Equal(oidExtensionAuthorityKeyId) {
+				rl.AuthorityKeyId = ext.Value
+			} else if ext.Id.Equal(oidExtensionCRLNumber) {
+				value := cryptobyte.String(ext.Value)
+				rl.Number = new(big.Int)
+				if !value.ReadASN1Integer(rl.Number) {
+					return nil, errors.New("x509: malformed crl number")
+				}
+			}
+			rl.Extensions = append(rl.Extensions, ext)
+		}
+	}
+
+	return rl, nil
+}