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authorDaniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>2024-04-16 19:19:13 +0000
committerDaniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>2024-04-16 19:19:13 +0000
commitccd992355df7192993c666236047820244914598 (patch)
treef00fea65147227b7743083c6148396f74cd66935 /src/crypto/x509/root_windows.go
parentInitial commit. (diff)
downloadgolang-1.21-ccd992355df7192993c666236047820244914598.tar.xz
golang-1.21-ccd992355df7192993c666236047820244914598.zip
Adding upstream version 1.21.8.upstream/1.21.8
Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'src/crypto/x509/root_windows.go')
-rw-r--r--src/crypto/x509/root_windows.go277
1 files changed, 277 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/src/crypto/x509/root_windows.go b/src/crypto/x509/root_windows.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..11a4257
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/crypto/x509/root_windows.go
@@ -0,0 +1,277 @@
+// Copyright 2012 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+package x509
+
+import (
+ "bytes"
+ "errors"
+ "strings"
+ "syscall"
+ "unsafe"
+)
+
+func loadSystemRoots() (*CertPool, error) {
+ return &CertPool{systemPool: true}, nil
+}
+
+// Creates a new *syscall.CertContext representing the leaf certificate in an in-memory
+// certificate store containing itself and all of the intermediate certificates specified
+// in the opts.Intermediates CertPool.
+//
+// A pointer to the in-memory store is available in the returned CertContext's Store field.
+// The store is automatically freed when the CertContext is freed using
+// syscall.CertFreeCertificateContext.
+func createStoreContext(leaf *Certificate, opts *VerifyOptions) (*syscall.CertContext, error) {
+ var storeCtx *syscall.CertContext
+
+ leafCtx, err := syscall.CertCreateCertificateContext(syscall.X509_ASN_ENCODING|syscall.PKCS_7_ASN_ENCODING, &leaf.Raw[0], uint32(len(leaf.Raw)))
+ if err != nil {
+ return nil, err
+ }
+ defer syscall.CertFreeCertificateContext(leafCtx)
+
+ handle, err := syscall.CertOpenStore(syscall.CERT_STORE_PROV_MEMORY, 0, 0, syscall.CERT_STORE_DEFER_CLOSE_UNTIL_LAST_FREE_FLAG, 0)
+ if err != nil {
+ return nil, err
+ }
+ defer syscall.CertCloseStore(handle, 0)
+
+ err = syscall.CertAddCertificateContextToStore(handle, leafCtx, syscall.CERT_STORE_ADD_ALWAYS, &storeCtx)
+ if err != nil {
+ return nil, err
+ }
+
+ if opts.Intermediates != nil {
+ for i := 0; i < opts.Intermediates.len(); i++ {
+ intermediate, err := opts.Intermediates.cert(i)
+ if err != nil {
+ return nil, err
+ }
+ ctx, err := syscall.CertCreateCertificateContext(syscall.X509_ASN_ENCODING|syscall.PKCS_7_ASN_ENCODING, &intermediate.Raw[0], uint32(len(intermediate.Raw)))
+ if err != nil {
+ return nil, err
+ }
+
+ err = syscall.CertAddCertificateContextToStore(handle, ctx, syscall.CERT_STORE_ADD_ALWAYS, nil)
+ syscall.CertFreeCertificateContext(ctx)
+ if err != nil {
+ return nil, err
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ return storeCtx, nil
+}
+
+// extractSimpleChain extracts the final certificate chain from a CertSimpleChain.
+func extractSimpleChain(simpleChain **syscall.CertSimpleChain, count int) (chain []*Certificate, err error) {
+ if simpleChain == nil || count == 0 {
+ return nil, errors.New("x509: invalid simple chain")
+ }
+
+ simpleChains := unsafe.Slice(simpleChain, count)
+ lastChain := simpleChains[count-1]
+ elements := unsafe.Slice(lastChain.Elements, lastChain.NumElements)
+ for i := 0; i < int(lastChain.NumElements); i++ {
+ // Copy the buf, since ParseCertificate does not create its own copy.
+ cert := elements[i].CertContext
+ encodedCert := unsafe.Slice(cert.EncodedCert, cert.Length)
+ buf := bytes.Clone(encodedCert)
+ parsedCert, err := ParseCertificate(buf)
+ if err != nil {
+ return nil, err
+ }
+ chain = append(chain, parsedCert)
+ }
+
+ return chain, nil
+}
+
+// checkChainTrustStatus checks the trust status of the certificate chain, translating
+// any errors it finds into Go errors in the process.
+func checkChainTrustStatus(c *Certificate, chainCtx *syscall.CertChainContext) error {
+ if chainCtx.TrustStatus.ErrorStatus != syscall.CERT_TRUST_NO_ERROR {
+ status := chainCtx.TrustStatus.ErrorStatus
+ switch status {
+ case syscall.CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_TIME_VALID:
+ return CertificateInvalidError{c, Expired, ""}
+ case syscall.CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_VALID_FOR_USAGE:
+ return CertificateInvalidError{c, IncompatibleUsage, ""}
+ // TODO(filippo): surface more error statuses.
+ default:
+ return UnknownAuthorityError{c, nil, nil}
+ }
+ }
+ return nil
+}
+
+// checkChainSSLServerPolicy checks that the certificate chain in chainCtx is valid for
+// use as a certificate chain for a SSL/TLS server.
+func checkChainSSLServerPolicy(c *Certificate, chainCtx *syscall.CertChainContext, opts *VerifyOptions) error {
+ servernamep, err := syscall.UTF16PtrFromString(strings.TrimSuffix(opts.DNSName, "."))
+ if err != nil {
+ return err
+ }
+ sslPara := &syscall.SSLExtraCertChainPolicyPara{
+ AuthType: syscall.AUTHTYPE_SERVER,
+ ServerName: servernamep,
+ }
+ sslPara.Size = uint32(unsafe.Sizeof(*sslPara))
+
+ para := &syscall.CertChainPolicyPara{
+ ExtraPolicyPara: (syscall.Pointer)(unsafe.Pointer(sslPara)),
+ }
+ para.Size = uint32(unsafe.Sizeof(*para))
+
+ status := syscall.CertChainPolicyStatus{}
+ err = syscall.CertVerifyCertificateChainPolicy(syscall.CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_SSL, chainCtx, para, &status)
+ if err != nil {
+ return err
+ }
+
+ // TODO(mkrautz): use the lChainIndex and lElementIndex fields
+ // of the CertChainPolicyStatus to provide proper context, instead
+ // using c.
+ if status.Error != 0 {
+ switch status.Error {
+ case syscall.CERT_E_EXPIRED:
+ return CertificateInvalidError{c, Expired, ""}
+ case syscall.CERT_E_CN_NO_MATCH:
+ return HostnameError{c, opts.DNSName}
+ case syscall.CERT_E_UNTRUSTEDROOT:
+ return UnknownAuthorityError{c, nil, nil}
+ default:
+ return UnknownAuthorityError{c, nil, nil}
+ }
+ }
+
+ return nil
+}
+
+// windowsExtKeyUsageOIDs are the C NUL-terminated string representations of the
+// OIDs for use with the Windows API.
+var windowsExtKeyUsageOIDs = make(map[ExtKeyUsage][]byte, len(extKeyUsageOIDs))
+
+func init() {
+ for _, eku := range extKeyUsageOIDs {
+ windowsExtKeyUsageOIDs[eku.extKeyUsage] = []byte(eku.oid.String() + "\x00")
+ }
+}
+
+func verifyChain(c *Certificate, chainCtx *syscall.CertChainContext, opts *VerifyOptions) (chain []*Certificate, err error) {
+ err = checkChainTrustStatus(c, chainCtx)
+ if err != nil {
+ return nil, err
+ }
+
+ if opts != nil && len(opts.DNSName) > 0 {
+ err = checkChainSSLServerPolicy(c, chainCtx, opts)
+ if err != nil {
+ return nil, err
+ }
+ }
+
+ chain, err = extractSimpleChain(chainCtx.Chains, int(chainCtx.ChainCount))
+ if err != nil {
+ return nil, err
+ }
+ if len(chain) == 0 {
+ return nil, errors.New("x509: internal error: system verifier returned an empty chain")
+ }
+
+ // Mitigate CVE-2020-0601, where the Windows system verifier might be
+ // tricked into using custom curve parameters for a trusted root, by
+ // double-checking all ECDSA signatures. If the system was tricked into
+ // using spoofed parameters, the signature will be invalid for the correct
+ // ones we parsed. (We don't support custom curves ourselves.)
+ for i, parent := range chain[1:] {
+ if parent.PublicKeyAlgorithm != ECDSA {
+ continue
+ }
+ if err := parent.CheckSignature(chain[i].SignatureAlgorithm,
+ chain[i].RawTBSCertificate, chain[i].Signature); err != nil {
+ return nil, err
+ }
+ }
+ return chain, nil
+}
+
+// systemVerify is like Verify, except that it uses CryptoAPI calls
+// to build certificate chains and verify them.
+func (c *Certificate) systemVerify(opts *VerifyOptions) (chains [][]*Certificate, err error) {
+ storeCtx, err := createStoreContext(c, opts)
+ if err != nil {
+ return nil, err
+ }
+ defer syscall.CertFreeCertificateContext(storeCtx)
+
+ para := new(syscall.CertChainPara)
+ para.Size = uint32(unsafe.Sizeof(*para))
+
+ keyUsages := opts.KeyUsages
+ if len(keyUsages) == 0 {
+ keyUsages = []ExtKeyUsage{ExtKeyUsageServerAuth}
+ }
+ oids := make([]*byte, 0, len(keyUsages))
+ for _, eku := range keyUsages {
+ if eku == ExtKeyUsageAny {
+ oids = nil
+ break
+ }
+ if oid, ok := windowsExtKeyUsageOIDs[eku]; ok {
+ oids = append(oids, &oid[0])
+ }
+ }
+ if oids != nil {
+ para.RequestedUsage.Type = syscall.USAGE_MATCH_TYPE_OR
+ para.RequestedUsage.Usage.Length = uint32(len(oids))
+ para.RequestedUsage.Usage.UsageIdentifiers = &oids[0]
+ } else {
+ para.RequestedUsage.Type = syscall.USAGE_MATCH_TYPE_AND
+ para.RequestedUsage.Usage.Length = 0
+ para.RequestedUsage.Usage.UsageIdentifiers = nil
+ }
+
+ var verifyTime *syscall.Filetime
+ if opts != nil && !opts.CurrentTime.IsZero() {
+ ft := syscall.NsecToFiletime(opts.CurrentTime.UnixNano())
+ verifyTime = &ft
+ }
+
+ // The default is to return only the highest quality chain,
+ // setting this flag will add additional lower quality contexts.
+ // These are returned in the LowerQualityChains field.
+ const CERT_CHAIN_RETURN_LOWER_QUALITY_CONTEXTS = 0x00000080
+
+ // CertGetCertificateChain will traverse Windows's root stores in an attempt to build a verified certificate chain
+ var topCtx *syscall.CertChainContext
+ err = syscall.CertGetCertificateChain(syscall.Handle(0), storeCtx, verifyTime, storeCtx.Store, para, CERT_CHAIN_RETURN_LOWER_QUALITY_CONTEXTS, 0, &topCtx)
+ if err != nil {
+ return nil, err
+ }
+ defer syscall.CertFreeCertificateChain(topCtx)
+
+ chain, topErr := verifyChain(c, topCtx, opts)
+ if topErr == nil {
+ chains = append(chains, chain)
+ }
+
+ if lqCtxCount := topCtx.LowerQualityChainCount; lqCtxCount > 0 {
+ lqCtxs := unsafe.Slice(topCtx.LowerQualityChains, lqCtxCount)
+ for _, ctx := range lqCtxs {
+ chain, err := verifyChain(c, ctx, opts)
+ if err == nil {
+ chains = append(chains, chain)
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if len(chains) == 0 {
+ // Return the error from the highest quality context.
+ return nil, topErr
+ }
+
+ return chains, nil
+}