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authorDaniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>2024-04-13 12:18:05 +0000
committerDaniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>2024-04-13 12:18:05 +0000
commitb46aad6df449445a9fc4aa7b32bd40005438e3f7 (patch)
tree751aa858ca01f35de800164516b298887382919d /src/h1.c
parentInitial commit. (diff)
downloadhaproxy-b46aad6df449445a9fc4aa7b32bd40005438e3f7.tar.xz
haproxy-b46aad6df449445a9fc4aa7b32bd40005438e3f7.zip
Adding upstream version 2.9.5.upstream/2.9.5
Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'src/h1.c')
-rw-r--r--src/h1.c1319
1 files changed, 1319 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/src/h1.c b/src/h1.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e251e74
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/h1.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1319 @@
+/*
+ * HTTP/1 protocol analyzer
+ *
+ * Copyright 2000-2017 Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
+ * 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <ctype.h>
+
+#include <import/sha1.h>
+
+#include <haproxy/api.h>
+#include <haproxy/base64.h>
+#include <haproxy/h1.h>
+#include <haproxy/http-hdr.h>
+#include <haproxy/tools.h>
+
+/* Parse the Content-Length header field of an HTTP/1 request. The function
+ * checks all possible occurrences of a comma-delimited value, and verifies
+ * if any of them doesn't match a previous value. It returns <0 if a value
+ * differs, 0 if the whole header can be dropped (i.e. already known), or >0
+ * if the value can be indexed (first one). In the last case, the value might
+ * be adjusted and the caller must only add the updated value.
+ */
+int h1_parse_cont_len_header(struct h1m *h1m, struct ist *value)
+{
+ char *e, *n;
+ long long cl;
+ int not_first = !!(h1m->flags & H1_MF_CLEN);
+ struct ist word;
+
+ word.ptr = value->ptr;
+ e = value->ptr + value->len;
+
+ while (1) {
+ if (word.ptr >= e) {
+ /* empty header or empty value */
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ /* skip leading delimiter and blanks */
+ if (unlikely(HTTP_IS_LWS(*word.ptr))) {
+ word.ptr++;
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /* digits only now */
+ for (cl = 0, n = word.ptr; n < e; n++) {
+ unsigned int c = *n - '0';
+ if (unlikely(c > 9)) {
+ /* non-digit */
+ if (unlikely(n == word.ptr)) // spaces only
+ goto fail;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (unlikely(!cl && n > word.ptr)) {
+ /* There was a leading zero before this digit,
+ * let's trim it.
+ */
+ word.ptr = n;
+ }
+
+ if (unlikely(cl > ULLONG_MAX / 10ULL))
+ goto fail; /* multiply overflow */
+ cl = cl * 10ULL;
+ if (unlikely(cl + c < cl))
+ goto fail; /* addition overflow */
+ cl = cl + c;
+ }
+
+ /* keep a copy of the exact cleaned value */
+ word.len = n - word.ptr;
+
+ /* skip trailing LWS till next comma or EOL */
+ for (; n < e; n++) {
+ if (!HTTP_IS_LWS(*n)) {
+ if (unlikely(*n != ','))
+ goto fail;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* if duplicate, must be equal */
+ if (h1m->flags & H1_MF_CLEN && cl != h1m->body_len)
+ goto fail;
+
+ /* OK, store this result as the one to be indexed */
+ h1m->flags |= H1_MF_CLEN;
+ h1m->curr_len = h1m->body_len = cl;
+ *value = word;
+
+ /* Now either n==e and we're done, or n points to the comma,
+ * and we skip it and continue.
+ */
+ if (n++ == e)
+ break;
+
+ word.ptr = n;
+ }
+ /* here we've reached the end with a single value or a series of
+ * identical values, all matching previous series if any. The last
+ * parsed value was sent back into <value>. We just have to decide
+ * if this occurrence has to be indexed (it's the first one) or
+ * silently skipped (it's not the first one)
+ */
+ return !not_first;
+ fail:
+ return -1;
+}
+
+/* Parse the Transfer-Encoding: header field of an HTTP/1 request, looking for
+ * "chunked" encoding to perform some checks (it must be the last encoding for
+ * the request and must not be performed twice for any message). The
+ * H1_MF_TE_CHUNKED is set if a valid "chunked" encoding is found. The
+ * H1_MF_TE_OTHER flag is set if any other encoding is found. The H1_MF_XFER_ENC
+ * flag is always set. The H1_MF_CHNK is set when "chunked" encoding is the last
+ * one. Note that transfer codings are case-insensitive (cf RFC7230#4). This
+ * function returns <0 if a error is found, 0 if the whole header can be dropped
+ * (not used yet), or >0 if the value can be indexed.
+ */
+int h1_parse_xfer_enc_header(struct h1m *h1m, struct ist value)
+{
+ char *e, *n;
+ struct ist word;
+
+ h1m->flags |= H1_MF_XFER_ENC;
+
+ word.ptr = value.ptr - 1; // -1 for next loop's pre-increment
+ e = istend(value);
+
+ while (++word.ptr < e) {
+ /* skip leading delimiter and blanks */
+ if (HTTP_IS_LWS(*word.ptr))
+ continue;
+
+ n = http_find_hdr_value_end(word.ptr, e); // next comma or end of line
+ word.len = n - word.ptr;
+
+ /* trim trailing blanks */
+ while (word.len && HTTP_IS_LWS(word.ptr[word.len-1]))
+ word.len--;
+
+ h1m->flags &= ~H1_MF_CHNK;
+ if (isteqi(word, ist("chunked"))) {
+ if (h1m->flags & H1_MF_TE_CHUNKED) {
+ /* cf RFC7230#3.3.1 : A sender MUST NOT apply
+ * chunked more than once to a message body
+ * (i.e., chunking an already chunked message is
+ * not allowed)
+ */
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ h1m->flags |= (H1_MF_TE_CHUNKED|H1_MF_CHNK);
+ }
+ else {
+ if ((h1m->flags & (H1_MF_RESP|H1_MF_TE_CHUNKED)) == H1_MF_TE_CHUNKED) {
+ /* cf RFC7230#3.3.1 : If any transfer coding
+ * other than chunked is applied to a request
+ * payload body, the sender MUST apply chunked
+ * as the final transfer coding to ensure that
+ * the message is properly framed.
+ */
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ h1m->flags |= H1_MF_TE_OTHER;
+ }
+
+ word.ptr = n;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+ fail:
+ return -1;
+}
+
+/* Validate the authority and the host header value for CONNECT method. If there
+ * is hast header, its value is normalized. 0 is returned on success, -1 if the
+ * authority is invalid and -2 if the host is invalid.
+ */
+static int h1_validate_connect_authority(struct ist authority, struct ist *host_hdr)
+{
+ struct ist uri_host, uri_port, host, host_port;
+
+ if (!isttest(authority))
+ goto invalid_authority;
+ uri_host = authority;
+ uri_port = http_get_host_port(authority);
+ if (!istlen(uri_port))
+ goto invalid_authority;
+ uri_host.len -= (istlen(uri_port) + 1);
+
+ if (!host_hdr || !isttest(*host_hdr))
+ goto end;
+
+ /* Get the port of the host header value, if any */
+ host = *host_hdr;
+ host_port = http_get_host_port(*host_hdr);
+ if (isttest(host_port))
+ host.len -= (istlen(host_port) + 1);
+
+ if (istlen(host_port)) {
+ if (!isteqi(host, uri_host) || !isteq(host_port, uri_port))
+ goto invalid_host;
+ if (http_is_default_port(IST_NULL, uri_port))
+ *host_hdr = host; /* normalize */
+ }
+ else {
+ if (!http_is_default_port(IST_NULL, uri_port) || !isteqi(host, uri_host))
+ goto invalid_host;
+ }
+
+ end:
+ return 0;
+
+ invalid_authority:
+ return -1;
+
+ invalid_host:
+ return -2;
+}
+
+
+/* Validate the authority and the host header value for non-CONNECT method, when
+ * an absolute-URI is detected but when it does not exactly match the host
+ * value. The idea is to detect default port (http or https). authority and host
+ * are defined here. 0 is returned on success, -1 if the host is does not match
+ * the authority.
+ */
+static int h1_validate_mismatch_authority(struct ist scheme, struct ist authority, struct ist host_hdr)
+{
+ struct ist uri_host, uri_port, host, host_port;
+
+ if (!isttest(scheme))
+ goto mismatch;
+
+ uri_host = authority;
+ uri_port = http_get_host_port(authority);
+ if (isttest(uri_port))
+ uri_host.len -= (istlen(uri_port) + 1);
+
+ host = host_hdr;
+ host_port = http_get_host_port(host_hdr);
+ if (isttest(host_port))
+ host.len -= (istlen(host_port) + 1);
+
+ if (!isttest(uri_port) && !isttest(host_port)) {
+ /* No port on both: we already know the authority does not match
+ * the host value
+ */
+ goto mismatch;
+ }
+ else if (isttest(uri_port) && !http_is_default_port(scheme, uri_port)) {
+ /* here there is no port for the host value and the port for the
+ * authority is not the default one
+ */
+ goto mismatch;
+ }
+ else if (isttest(host_port) && !http_is_default_port(scheme, host_port)) {
+ /* here there is no port for the authority and the port for the
+ * host value is not the default one
+ */
+ goto mismatch;
+ }
+ else {
+ /* the authority or the host value contain a default port and
+ * there is no port on the other value
+ */
+ if (!isteqi(uri_host, host))
+ goto mismatch;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+
+ mismatch:
+ return -1;
+}
+
+
+/* Parse the Connection: header of an HTTP/1 request, looking for "close",
+ * "keep-alive", and "upgrade" values, and updating h1m->flags according to
+ * what was found there. Note that flags are only added, not removed, so the
+ * function is safe for being called multiple times if multiple occurrences
+ * are found. If the flag H1_MF_CLEAN_CONN_HDR, the header value is cleaned
+ * up from "keep-alive" and "close" values. To do so, the header value is
+ * rewritten in place and its length is updated.
+ */
+void h1_parse_connection_header(struct h1m *h1m, struct ist *value)
+{
+ char *e, *n, *p;
+ struct ist word;
+
+ word.ptr = value->ptr - 1; // -1 for next loop's pre-increment
+ p = value->ptr;
+ e = value->ptr + value->len;
+ if (h1m->flags & H1_MF_CLEAN_CONN_HDR)
+ value->len = 0;
+
+ while (++word.ptr < e) {
+ /* skip leading delimiter and blanks */
+ if (HTTP_IS_LWS(*word.ptr))
+ continue;
+
+ n = http_find_hdr_value_end(word.ptr, e); // next comma or end of line
+ word.len = n - word.ptr;
+
+ /* trim trailing blanks */
+ while (word.len && HTTP_IS_LWS(word.ptr[word.len-1]))
+ word.len--;
+
+ if (isteqi(word, ist("keep-alive"))) {
+ h1m->flags |= H1_MF_CONN_KAL;
+ if (h1m->flags & H1_MF_CLEAN_CONN_HDR)
+ goto skip_val;
+ }
+ else if (isteqi(word, ist("close"))) {
+ h1m->flags |= H1_MF_CONN_CLO;
+ if (h1m->flags & H1_MF_CLEAN_CONN_HDR)
+ goto skip_val;
+ }
+ else if (isteqi(word, ist("upgrade")))
+ h1m->flags |= H1_MF_CONN_UPG;
+
+ if (h1m->flags & H1_MF_CLEAN_CONN_HDR) {
+ if (value->ptr + value->len == p) {
+ /* no rewrite done till now */
+ value->len = n - value->ptr;
+ }
+ else {
+ if (value->len)
+ value->ptr[value->len++] = ',';
+ istcat(value, word, e - value->ptr);
+ }
+ }
+
+ skip_val:
+ word.ptr = p = n;
+ }
+}
+
+/* Parse the Upgrade: header of an HTTP/1 request.
+ * If "websocket" is found, set H1_MF_UPG_WEBSOCKET flag
+ */
+void h1_parse_upgrade_header(struct h1m *h1m, struct ist value)
+{
+ char *e, *n;
+ struct ist word;
+
+ h1m->flags &= ~H1_MF_UPG_WEBSOCKET;
+
+ word.ptr = value.ptr - 1; // -1 for next loop's pre-increment
+ e = istend(value);
+
+ while (++word.ptr < e) {
+ /* skip leading delimiter and blanks */
+ if (HTTP_IS_LWS(*word.ptr))
+ continue;
+
+ n = http_find_hdr_value_end(word.ptr, e); // next comma or end of line
+ word.len = n - word.ptr;
+
+ /* trim trailing blanks */
+ while (word.len && HTTP_IS_LWS(word.ptr[word.len-1]))
+ word.len--;
+
+ if (isteqi(word, ist("websocket")))
+ h1m->flags |= H1_MF_UPG_WEBSOCKET;
+
+ word.ptr = n;
+ }
+}
+
+/* Macros used in the HTTP/1 parser, to check for the expected presence of
+ * certain bytes (ef: LF) or to skip to next byte and yield in case of failure.
+ */
+
+/* Expects to find an LF at <ptr>. If not, set <state> to <where> and jump to
+ * <bad>.
+ */
+#define EXPECT_LF_HERE(ptr, bad, state, where) \
+ do { \
+ if (unlikely(*(ptr) != '\n')) { \
+ state = (where); \
+ goto bad; \
+ } \
+ } while (0)
+
+/* Increments pointer <ptr>, continues to label <more> if it's still below
+ * pointer <end>, or goes to <stop> and sets <state> to <where> if the end
+ * of buffer was reached.
+ */
+#define EAT_AND_JUMP_OR_RETURN(ptr, end, more, stop, state, where) \
+ do { \
+ if (likely(++(ptr) < (end))) \
+ goto more; \
+ else { \
+ state = (where); \
+ goto stop; \
+ } \
+ } while (0)
+
+/* This function parses a contiguous HTTP/1 headers block starting at <start>
+ * and ending before <stop>, at once, and converts it a list of (name,value)
+ * pairs representing header fields into the array <hdr> of size <hdr_num>,
+ * whose last entry will have an empty name and an empty value. If <hdr_num> is
+ * too small to represent the whole message, an error is returned. Some
+ * protocol elements such as content-length and transfer-encoding will be
+ * parsed and stored into h1m as well. <hdr> may be null, in which case only
+ * the parsing state will be updated. This may be used to restart the parsing
+ * where it stopped for example.
+ *
+ * For now it's limited to the response. If the header block is incomplete,
+ * 0 is returned, waiting to be called again with more data to try it again.
+ * The caller is responsible for initializing h1m->state to H1_MSG_RPBEFORE,
+ * and h1m->next to zero on the first call, the parser will do the rest. If
+ * an incomplete message is seen, the caller only needs to present h1m->state
+ * and h1m->next again, with an empty header list so that the parser can start
+ * again. In this case, it will detect that it interrupted a previous session
+ * and will first look for the end of the message before reparsing it again and
+ * indexing it at the same time. This ensures that incomplete messages fed 1
+ * character at a time are never processed entirely more than exactly twice,
+ * and that there is no need to store all the internal state and pre-parsed
+ * headers or start line between calls.
+ *
+ * A pointer to a start line descriptor may be passed in <slp>, in which case
+ * the parser will fill it with whatever it found.
+ *
+ * The code derived from the main HTTP/1 parser above but was simplified and
+ * optimized to process responses produced or forwarded by haproxy. The caller
+ * is responsible for ensuring that the message doesn't wrap, and should ensure
+ * it is complete to avoid having to retry the operation after a failed
+ * attempt. The message is not supposed to be invalid, which is why a few
+ * properties such as the character set used in the header field names are not
+ * checked. In case of an unparsable response message, a negative value will be
+ * returned with h1m->err_pos and h1m->err_state matching the location and
+ * state where the error was met. Leading blank likes are tolerated but not
+ * recommended. If flag H1_MF_HDRS_ONLY is set in h1m->flags, only headers are
+ * parsed and the start line is skipped. It is not required to set h1m->state
+ * nor h1m->next in this case.
+ *
+ * This function returns :
+ * -1 in case of error. In this case, h1m->err_state is filled (if h1m is
+ * set) with the state the error occurred in and h1m->err_pos with the
+ * the position relative to <start>
+ * -2 if the output is full (hdr_num reached). err_state and err_pos also
+ * indicate where it failed.
+ * 0 in case of missing data.
+ * > 0 on success, it then corresponds to the number of bytes read since
+ * <start> so that the caller can go on with the payload.
+ */
+int h1_headers_to_hdr_list(char *start, const char *stop,
+ struct http_hdr *hdr, unsigned int hdr_num,
+ struct h1m *h1m, union h1_sl *slp)
+{
+ enum h1m_state state;
+ register char *ptr;
+ register const char *end;
+ unsigned int hdr_count;
+ unsigned int skip; /* number of bytes skipped at the beginning */
+ unsigned int sol; /* start of line */
+ unsigned int col; /* position of the colon */
+ unsigned int eol; /* end of line */
+ unsigned int sov; /* start of value */
+ union h1_sl sl;
+ int skip_update;
+ int restarting;
+ int host_idx;
+ struct ist n, v; /* header name and value during parsing */
+
+ skip = 0; // do it only once to keep track of the leading CRLF.
+
+ try_again:
+ hdr_count = sol = col = eol = sov = 0;
+ sl.st.status = 0;
+ skip_update = restarting = 0;
+ host_idx = -1;
+
+ if (h1m->flags & H1_MF_HDRS_ONLY) {
+ state = H1_MSG_HDR_FIRST;
+ h1m->next = 0;
+ }
+ else {
+ state = h1m->state;
+ if (h1m->state != H1_MSG_RQBEFORE && h1m->state != H1_MSG_RPBEFORE)
+ restarting = 1;
+ }
+
+ ptr = start + h1m->next;
+ end = stop;
+
+ if (unlikely(ptr >= end))
+ goto http_msg_ood;
+
+ /* don't update output if hdr is NULL or if we're restarting */
+ if (!hdr || restarting)
+ skip_update = 1;
+
+ switch (state) {
+ case H1_MSG_RQBEFORE:
+ http_msg_rqbefore:
+ if (likely(HTTP_IS_TOKEN(*ptr))) {
+ /* we have a start of message, we may have skipped some
+ * heading CRLF. Skip them now.
+ */
+ skip += ptr - start;
+ start = ptr;
+
+ sol = 0;
+ sl.rq.m.ptr = ptr;
+ hdr_count = 0;
+ state = H1_MSG_RQMETH;
+ goto http_msg_rqmeth;
+ }
+
+ if (unlikely(!HTTP_IS_CRLF(*ptr))) {
+ state = H1_MSG_RQBEFORE;
+ goto http_msg_invalid;
+ }
+
+ if (unlikely(*ptr == '\n'))
+ EAT_AND_JUMP_OR_RETURN(ptr, end, http_msg_rqbefore, http_msg_ood, state, H1_MSG_RQBEFORE);
+ EAT_AND_JUMP_OR_RETURN(ptr, end, http_msg_rqbefore_cr, http_msg_ood, state, H1_MSG_RQBEFORE_CR);
+ /* stop here */
+
+ case H1_MSG_RQBEFORE_CR:
+ http_msg_rqbefore_cr:
+ EXPECT_LF_HERE(ptr, http_msg_invalid, state, H1_MSG_RQBEFORE_CR);
+ EAT_AND_JUMP_OR_RETURN(ptr, end, http_msg_rqbefore, http_msg_ood, state, H1_MSG_RQBEFORE);
+ /* stop here */
+
+ case H1_MSG_RQMETH:
+ http_msg_rqmeth:
+ if (likely(HTTP_IS_TOKEN(*ptr)))
+ EAT_AND_JUMP_OR_RETURN(ptr, end, http_msg_rqmeth, http_msg_ood, state, H1_MSG_RQMETH);
+
+ if (likely(HTTP_IS_SPHT(*ptr))) {
+ sl.rq.m.len = ptr - sl.rq.m.ptr;
+ sl.rq.meth = find_http_meth(start, sl.rq.m.len);
+ EAT_AND_JUMP_OR_RETURN(ptr, end, http_msg_rqmeth_sp, http_msg_ood, state, H1_MSG_RQMETH_SP);
+ }
+
+ if (likely(HTTP_IS_CRLF(*ptr))) {
+ /* HTTP 0.9 request */
+ sl.rq.m.len = ptr - sl.rq.m.ptr;
+ sl.rq.meth = find_http_meth(sl.rq.m.ptr, sl.rq.m.len);
+ http_msg_req09_uri:
+ sl.rq.u.ptr = ptr;
+ http_msg_req09_uri_e:
+ sl.rq.u.len = ptr - sl.rq.u.ptr;
+ http_msg_req09_ver:
+ sl.rq.v = ist2(ptr, 0);
+ goto http_msg_rqline_eol;
+ }
+ state = H1_MSG_RQMETH;
+ goto http_msg_invalid;
+
+ case H1_MSG_RQMETH_SP:
+ http_msg_rqmeth_sp:
+ if (likely(!HTTP_IS_LWS(*ptr))) {
+ sl.rq.u.ptr = ptr;
+ goto http_msg_rquri;
+ }
+ if (likely(HTTP_IS_SPHT(*ptr)))
+ EAT_AND_JUMP_OR_RETURN(ptr, end, http_msg_rqmeth_sp, http_msg_ood, state, H1_MSG_RQMETH_SP);
+ /* so it's a CR/LF, meaning an HTTP 0.9 request */
+ goto http_msg_req09_uri;
+
+ case H1_MSG_RQURI:
+ http_msg_rquri:
+#ifdef HA_UNALIGNED_LE
+ /* speedup: skip bytes not between 0x24 and 0x7e inclusive */
+ while (ptr <= end - sizeof(int)) {
+ int x = *(int *)ptr - 0x24242424;
+ if (x & 0x80808080)
+ break;
+
+ x -= 0x5b5b5b5b;
+ if (!(x & 0x80808080))
+ break;
+
+ ptr += sizeof(int);
+ }
+#endif
+ if (ptr >= end) {
+ state = H1_MSG_RQURI;
+ goto http_msg_ood;
+ }
+ http_msg_rquri2:
+ if (likely((unsigned char)(*ptr - 33) <= 93)) { /* 33 to 126 included */
+ if (*ptr == '#') {
+ if (h1m->err_pos < -1) /* PR_O2_REQBUG_OK not set */
+ goto invalid_char;
+ if (h1m->err_pos == -1) /* PR_O2_REQBUG_OK set: just log */
+ h1m->err_pos = ptr - start + skip;
+ }
+ EAT_AND_JUMP_OR_RETURN(ptr, end, http_msg_rquri2, http_msg_ood, state, H1_MSG_RQURI);
+ }
+
+ if (likely(HTTP_IS_SPHT(*ptr))) {
+ sl.rq.u.len = ptr - sl.rq.u.ptr;
+ EAT_AND_JUMP_OR_RETURN(ptr, end, http_msg_rquri_sp, http_msg_ood, state, H1_MSG_RQURI_SP);
+ }
+ if (likely((unsigned char)*ptr >= 128)) {
+ /* non-ASCII chars are forbidden unless option
+ * accept-invalid-http-request is enabled in the frontend.
+ * In any case, we capture the faulty char.
+ */
+ if (h1m->err_pos < -1)
+ goto invalid_char;
+ if (h1m->err_pos == -1)
+ h1m->err_pos = ptr - start + skip;
+ EAT_AND_JUMP_OR_RETURN(ptr, end, http_msg_rquri, http_msg_ood, state, H1_MSG_RQURI);
+ }
+
+ if (likely(HTTP_IS_CRLF(*ptr))) {
+ /* so it's a CR/LF, meaning an HTTP 0.9 request */
+ goto http_msg_req09_uri_e;
+ }
+
+ /* OK forbidden chars, 0..31 or 127 */
+ invalid_char:
+ state = H1_MSG_RQURI;
+ goto http_msg_invalid;
+
+ case H1_MSG_RQURI_SP:
+ http_msg_rquri_sp:
+ if (likely(!HTTP_IS_LWS(*ptr))) {
+ sl.rq.v.ptr = ptr;
+ goto http_msg_rqver;
+ }
+ if (likely(HTTP_IS_SPHT(*ptr)))
+ EAT_AND_JUMP_OR_RETURN(ptr, end, http_msg_rquri_sp, http_msg_ood, state, H1_MSG_RQURI_SP);
+ /* so it's a CR/LF, meaning an HTTP 0.9 request */
+ goto http_msg_req09_ver;
+
+
+ case H1_MSG_RQVER:
+ http_msg_rqver:
+ if (likely(HTTP_IS_VER_TOKEN(*ptr)))
+ EAT_AND_JUMP_OR_RETURN(ptr, end, http_msg_rqver, http_msg_ood, state, H1_MSG_RQVER);
+
+ if (likely(HTTP_IS_CRLF(*ptr))) {
+ sl.rq.v.len = ptr - sl.rq.v.ptr;
+ http_msg_rqline_eol:
+ /* We have seen the end of line. Note that we do not
+ * necessarily have the \n yet, but at least we know that we
+ * have EITHER \r OR \n, otherwise the request would not be
+ * complete. We can then record the request length and return
+ * to the caller which will be able to register it.
+ */
+
+ if (likely(!skip_update)) {
+ if ((sl.rq.v.len == 8) &&
+ (*(sl.rq.v.ptr + 5) > '1' ||
+ (*(sl.rq.v.ptr + 5) == '1' && *(sl.rq.v.ptr + 7) >= '1')))
+ h1m->flags |= H1_MF_VER_11;
+
+ if (unlikely(hdr_count >= hdr_num)) {
+ state = H1_MSG_RQVER;
+ goto http_output_full;
+ }
+ if (!(h1m->flags & H1_MF_NO_PHDR))
+ http_set_hdr(&hdr[hdr_count++], ist(":method"), sl.rq.m);
+
+ if (unlikely(hdr_count >= hdr_num)) {
+ state = H1_MSG_RQVER;
+ goto http_output_full;
+ }
+ if (!(h1m->flags & H1_MF_NO_PHDR))
+ http_set_hdr(&hdr[hdr_count++], ist(":path"), sl.rq.u);
+ }
+
+ sol = ptr - start;
+ if (likely(*ptr == '\r'))
+ EAT_AND_JUMP_OR_RETURN(ptr, end, http_msg_rqline_end, http_msg_ood, state, H1_MSG_RQLINE_END);
+ goto http_msg_rqline_end;
+ }
+
+ /* neither an HTTP_VER token nor a CRLF */
+ state = H1_MSG_RQVER;
+ goto http_msg_invalid;
+
+ case H1_MSG_RQLINE_END:
+ http_msg_rqline_end:
+ /* check for HTTP/0.9 request : no version information
+ * available. sol must point to the first of CR or LF. However
+ * since we don't save these elements between calls, if we come
+ * here from a restart, we don't necessarily know. Thus in this
+ * case we simply start over.
+ */
+ if (restarting)
+ goto restart;
+
+ if (unlikely(sl.rq.v.len == 0))
+ goto http_msg_last_lf;
+
+ EXPECT_LF_HERE(ptr, http_msg_invalid, state, H1_MSG_RQLINE_END);
+ EAT_AND_JUMP_OR_RETURN(ptr, end, http_msg_hdr_first, http_msg_ood, state, H1_MSG_HDR_FIRST);
+ /* stop here */
+
+ /*
+ * Common states below
+ */
+ case H1_MSG_RPBEFORE:
+ http_msg_rpbefore:
+ if (likely(HTTP_IS_TOKEN(*ptr))) {
+ /* we have a start of message, we may have skipped some
+ * heading CRLF. Skip them now.
+ */
+ skip += ptr - start;
+ start = ptr;
+
+ sol = 0;
+ sl.st.v.ptr = ptr;
+ hdr_count = 0;
+ state = H1_MSG_RPVER;
+ goto http_msg_rpver;
+ }
+
+ if (unlikely(!HTTP_IS_CRLF(*ptr))) {
+ state = H1_MSG_RPBEFORE;
+ goto http_msg_invalid;
+ }
+
+ if (unlikely(*ptr == '\n'))
+ EAT_AND_JUMP_OR_RETURN(ptr, end, http_msg_rpbefore, http_msg_ood, state, H1_MSG_RPBEFORE);
+ EAT_AND_JUMP_OR_RETURN(ptr, end, http_msg_rpbefore_cr, http_msg_ood, state, H1_MSG_RPBEFORE_CR);
+ /* stop here */
+
+ case H1_MSG_RPBEFORE_CR:
+ http_msg_rpbefore_cr:
+ EXPECT_LF_HERE(ptr, http_msg_invalid, state, H1_MSG_RPBEFORE_CR);
+ EAT_AND_JUMP_OR_RETURN(ptr, end, http_msg_rpbefore, http_msg_ood, state, H1_MSG_RPBEFORE);
+ /* stop here */
+
+ case H1_MSG_RPVER:
+ http_msg_rpver:
+ if (likely(HTTP_IS_VER_TOKEN(*ptr)))
+ EAT_AND_JUMP_OR_RETURN(ptr, end, http_msg_rpver, http_msg_ood, state, H1_MSG_RPVER);
+
+ if (likely(HTTP_IS_SPHT(*ptr))) {
+ sl.st.v.len = ptr - sl.st.v.ptr;
+
+ if ((sl.st.v.len == 8) &&
+ (*(sl.st.v.ptr + 5) > '1' ||
+ (*(sl.st.v.ptr + 5) == '1' && *(sl.st.v.ptr + 7) >= '1')))
+ h1m->flags |= H1_MF_VER_11;
+
+ EAT_AND_JUMP_OR_RETURN(ptr, end, http_msg_rpver_sp, http_msg_ood, state, H1_MSG_RPVER_SP);
+ }
+ state = H1_MSG_RPVER;
+ goto http_msg_invalid;
+
+ case H1_MSG_RPVER_SP:
+ http_msg_rpver_sp:
+ if (likely(!HTTP_IS_LWS(*ptr))) {
+ sl.st.status = 0;
+ sl.st.c.ptr = ptr;
+ goto http_msg_rpcode;
+ }
+ if (likely(HTTP_IS_SPHT(*ptr)))
+ EAT_AND_JUMP_OR_RETURN(ptr, end, http_msg_rpver_sp, http_msg_ood, state, H1_MSG_RPVER_SP);
+ /* so it's a CR/LF, this is invalid */
+ state = H1_MSG_RPVER_SP;
+ goto http_msg_invalid;
+
+ case H1_MSG_RPCODE:
+ http_msg_rpcode:
+ if (likely(HTTP_IS_DIGIT(*ptr))) {
+ sl.st.status = sl.st.status * 10 + *ptr - '0';
+ EAT_AND_JUMP_OR_RETURN(ptr, end, http_msg_rpcode, http_msg_ood, state, H1_MSG_RPCODE);
+ }
+
+ if (unlikely(!HTTP_IS_LWS(*ptr))) {
+ state = H1_MSG_RPCODE;
+ goto http_msg_invalid;
+ }
+
+ if (likely(HTTP_IS_SPHT(*ptr))) {
+ sl.st.c.len = ptr - sl.st.c.ptr;
+ EAT_AND_JUMP_OR_RETURN(ptr, end, http_msg_rpcode_sp, http_msg_ood, state, H1_MSG_RPCODE_SP);
+ }
+
+ /* so it's a CR/LF, so there is no reason phrase */
+ sl.st.c.len = ptr - sl.st.c.ptr;
+
+ http_msg_rsp_reason:
+ sl.st.r = ist2(ptr, 0);
+ goto http_msg_rpline_eol;
+
+ case H1_MSG_RPCODE_SP:
+ http_msg_rpcode_sp:
+ if (likely(!HTTP_IS_LWS(*ptr))) {
+ sl.st.r.ptr = ptr;
+ goto http_msg_rpreason;
+ }
+ if (likely(HTTP_IS_SPHT(*ptr)))
+ EAT_AND_JUMP_OR_RETURN(ptr, end, http_msg_rpcode_sp, http_msg_ood, state, H1_MSG_RPCODE_SP);
+ /* so it's a CR/LF, so there is no reason phrase */
+ goto http_msg_rsp_reason;
+
+ case H1_MSG_RPREASON:
+ http_msg_rpreason:
+ if (likely(!HTTP_IS_CRLF(*ptr)))
+ EAT_AND_JUMP_OR_RETURN(ptr, end, http_msg_rpreason, http_msg_ood, state, H1_MSG_RPREASON);
+ sl.st.r.len = ptr - sl.st.r.ptr;
+ http_msg_rpline_eol:
+ /* We have seen the end of line. Note that we do not
+ * necessarily have the \n yet, but at least we know that we
+ * have EITHER \r OR \n, otherwise the response would not be
+ * complete. We can then record the response length and return
+ * to the caller which will be able to register it.
+ */
+
+ if (likely(!skip_update)) {
+ if (unlikely(hdr_count >= hdr_num)) {
+ state = H1_MSG_RPREASON;
+ goto http_output_full;
+ }
+ if (!(h1m->flags & H1_MF_NO_PHDR))
+ http_set_hdr(&hdr[hdr_count++], ist(":status"), sl.st.c);
+ }
+
+ sol = ptr - start;
+ if (likely(*ptr == '\r'))
+ EAT_AND_JUMP_OR_RETURN(ptr, end, http_msg_rpline_end, http_msg_ood, state, H1_MSG_RPLINE_END);
+ goto http_msg_rpline_end;
+
+ case H1_MSG_RPLINE_END:
+ http_msg_rpline_end:
+ /* sol must point to the first of CR or LF. */
+ EXPECT_LF_HERE(ptr, http_msg_invalid, state, H1_MSG_RPLINE_END);
+ EAT_AND_JUMP_OR_RETURN(ptr, end, http_msg_hdr_first, http_msg_ood, state, H1_MSG_HDR_FIRST);
+ /* stop here */
+
+ case H1_MSG_HDR_FIRST:
+ http_msg_hdr_first:
+ sol = ptr - start;
+ if (likely(!HTTP_IS_CRLF(*ptr))) {
+ goto http_msg_hdr_name;
+ }
+
+ if (likely(*ptr == '\r'))
+ EAT_AND_JUMP_OR_RETURN(ptr, end, http_msg_last_lf, http_msg_ood, state, H1_MSG_LAST_LF);
+ goto http_msg_last_lf;
+
+ case H1_MSG_HDR_NAME:
+ http_msg_hdr_name:
+ /* assumes sol points to the first char */
+ if (likely(HTTP_IS_TOKEN(*ptr))) {
+ if (!skip_update) {
+ /* turn it to lower case if needed */
+ if (isupper((unsigned char)*ptr) && h1m->flags & H1_MF_TOLOWER)
+ *ptr = tolower((unsigned char)*ptr);
+ }
+ EAT_AND_JUMP_OR_RETURN(ptr, end, http_msg_hdr_name, http_msg_ood, state, H1_MSG_HDR_NAME);
+ }
+
+ if (likely(*ptr == ':')) {
+ col = ptr - start;
+ if (col <= sol) {
+ state = H1_MSG_HDR_NAME;
+ goto http_msg_invalid;
+ }
+ EAT_AND_JUMP_OR_RETURN(ptr, end, http_msg_hdr_l1_sp, http_msg_ood, state, H1_MSG_HDR_L1_SP);
+ }
+
+ if (likely(h1m->err_pos < -1) || *ptr == '\n') {
+ state = H1_MSG_HDR_NAME;
+ goto http_msg_invalid;
+ }
+
+ if (h1m->err_pos == -1) /* capture the error pointer */
+ h1m->err_pos = ptr - start + skip; /* >= 0 now */
+
+ /* and we still accept this non-token character */
+ EAT_AND_JUMP_OR_RETURN(ptr, end, http_msg_hdr_name, http_msg_ood, state, H1_MSG_HDR_NAME);
+
+ case H1_MSG_HDR_L1_SP:
+ http_msg_hdr_l1_sp:
+ /* assumes sol points to the first char */
+ if (likely(HTTP_IS_SPHT(*ptr)))
+ EAT_AND_JUMP_OR_RETURN(ptr, end, http_msg_hdr_l1_sp, http_msg_ood, state, H1_MSG_HDR_L1_SP);
+
+ /* header value can be basically anything except CR/LF */
+ sov = ptr - start;
+
+ if (likely(!HTTP_IS_CRLF(*ptr))) {
+ goto http_msg_hdr_val;
+ }
+
+ if (likely(*ptr == '\r'))
+ EAT_AND_JUMP_OR_RETURN(ptr, end, http_msg_hdr_l1_lf, http_msg_ood, state, H1_MSG_HDR_L1_LF);
+ goto http_msg_hdr_l1_lf;
+
+ case H1_MSG_HDR_L1_LF:
+ http_msg_hdr_l1_lf:
+ EXPECT_LF_HERE(ptr, http_msg_invalid, state, H1_MSG_HDR_L1_LF);
+ EAT_AND_JUMP_OR_RETURN(ptr, end, http_msg_hdr_l1_lws, http_msg_ood, state, H1_MSG_HDR_L1_LWS);
+
+ case H1_MSG_HDR_L1_LWS:
+ http_msg_hdr_l1_lws:
+ if (likely(HTTP_IS_SPHT(*ptr))) {
+ if (!skip_update) {
+ /* replace HT,CR,LF with spaces */
+ for (; start + sov < ptr; sov++)
+ start[sov] = ' ';
+ }
+ goto http_msg_hdr_l1_sp;
+ }
+ /* we had a header consisting only in spaces ! */
+ eol = sov;
+ goto http_msg_complete_header;
+
+ case H1_MSG_HDR_VAL:
+ http_msg_hdr_val:
+ /* assumes sol points to the first char, and sov
+ * points to the first character of the value.
+ */
+
+ /* speedup: we'll skip packs of 4 or 8 bytes not containing bytes 0x0D
+ * and lower. In fact since most of the time is spent in the loop, we
+ * also remove the sign bit test so that bytes 0x8e..0x0d break the
+ * loop, but we don't care since they're very rare in header values.
+ */
+#ifdef HA_UNALIGNED_LE64
+ while (ptr <= end - sizeof(long)) {
+ if ((*(long *)ptr - 0x0e0e0e0e0e0e0e0eULL) & 0x8080808080808080ULL)
+ goto http_msg_hdr_val2;
+ ptr += sizeof(long);
+ }
+#endif
+#ifdef HA_UNALIGNED_LE
+ while (ptr <= end - sizeof(int)) {
+ if ((*(int*)ptr - 0x0e0e0e0e) & 0x80808080)
+ goto http_msg_hdr_val2;
+ ptr += sizeof(int);
+ }
+#endif
+ if (ptr >= end) {
+ state = H1_MSG_HDR_VAL;
+ goto http_msg_ood;
+ }
+ http_msg_hdr_val2:
+ if (likely(!*ptr)) {
+ /* RFC9110 clarified that NUL is explicitly forbidden in header values
+ * (like CR and LF).
+ */
+ if (h1m->err_pos < -1) { /* PR_O2_REQBUG_OK not set */
+ state = H1_MSG_HDR_VAL;
+ goto http_msg_invalid;
+ }
+ if (h1m->err_pos == -1) /* PR_O2_REQBUG_OK set: just log */
+ h1m->err_pos = ptr - start + skip;
+ }
+ if (likely(!HTTP_IS_CRLF(*ptr)))
+ EAT_AND_JUMP_OR_RETURN(ptr, end, http_msg_hdr_val2, http_msg_ood, state, H1_MSG_HDR_VAL);
+
+ eol = ptr - start;
+ /* Note: we could also copy eol into ->eoh so that we have the
+ * real header end in case it ends with lots of LWS, but is this
+ * really needed ?
+ */
+ if (likely(*ptr == '\r'))
+ EAT_AND_JUMP_OR_RETURN(ptr, end, http_msg_hdr_l2_lf, http_msg_ood, state, H1_MSG_HDR_L2_LF);
+ goto http_msg_hdr_l2_lf;
+
+ case H1_MSG_HDR_L2_LF:
+ http_msg_hdr_l2_lf:
+ EXPECT_LF_HERE(ptr, http_msg_invalid, state, H1_MSG_HDR_L2_LF);
+ EAT_AND_JUMP_OR_RETURN(ptr, end, http_msg_hdr_l2_lws, http_msg_ood, state, H1_MSG_HDR_L2_LWS);
+
+ case H1_MSG_HDR_L2_LWS:
+ http_msg_hdr_l2_lws:
+ if (unlikely(HTTP_IS_SPHT(*ptr))) {
+ if (!skip_update) {
+ /* LWS: replace HT,CR,LF with spaces */
+ for (; start + eol < ptr; eol++)
+ start[eol] = ' ';
+ }
+ goto http_msg_hdr_val;
+ }
+ http_msg_complete_header:
+ /*
+ * It was a new header, so the last one is finished. Assumes
+ * <sol> points to the first char of the name, <col> to the
+ * colon, <sov> points to the first character of the value and
+ * <eol> to the first CR or LF so we know how the line ends. We
+ * will trim spaces around the value. It's possible to do it by
+ * adjusting <eol> and <sov> which are no more used after this.
+ * We can add the header field to the list.
+ */
+ if (likely(!skip_update)) {
+ while (sov < eol && HTTP_IS_LWS(start[sov]))
+ sov++;
+
+ while (eol - 1 > sov && HTTP_IS_LWS(start[eol - 1]))
+ eol--;
+
+
+ n = ist2(start + sol, col - sol);
+ v = ist2(start + sov, eol - sov);
+
+ do {
+ int ret;
+
+ if (unlikely(hdr_count >= hdr_num)) {
+ state = H1_MSG_HDR_L2_LWS;
+ goto http_output_full;
+ }
+
+ if (isteqi(n, ist("transfer-encoding"))) {
+ ret = h1_parse_xfer_enc_header(h1m, v);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ state = H1_MSG_HDR_L2_LWS;
+ ptr = v.ptr; /* Set ptr on the error */
+ goto http_msg_invalid;
+ }
+ else if (ret == 0) {
+ /* skip it */
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ else if (isteqi(n, ist("content-length"))) {
+ ret = h1_parse_cont_len_header(h1m, &v);
+
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ state = H1_MSG_HDR_L2_LWS;
+ ptr = v.ptr; /* Set ptr on the error */
+ goto http_msg_invalid;
+ }
+ else if (ret == 0) {
+ /* skip it */
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ else if (isteqi(n, ist("connection"))) {
+ h1_parse_connection_header(h1m, &v);
+ if (!v.len) {
+ /* skip it */
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ else if (isteqi(n, ist("upgrade"))) {
+ h1_parse_upgrade_header(h1m, v);
+ }
+ else if (!(h1m->flags & H1_MF_RESP) && isteqi(n, ist("host"))) {
+ if (host_idx == -1)
+ host_idx = hdr_count;
+ else {
+ if (!isteqi(v, hdr[host_idx].v)) {
+ state = H1_MSG_HDR_L2_LWS;
+ ptr = v.ptr; /* Set ptr on the error */
+ goto http_msg_invalid;
+ }
+ /* if the same host, skip it */
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ http_set_hdr(&hdr[hdr_count++], n, v);
+ } while (0);
+ }
+
+ sol = ptr - start;
+
+ if (likely(!HTTP_IS_CRLF(*ptr)))
+ goto http_msg_hdr_name;
+
+ if (likely(*ptr == '\r'))
+ EAT_AND_JUMP_OR_RETURN(ptr, end, http_msg_last_lf, http_msg_ood, state, H1_MSG_LAST_LF);
+ goto http_msg_last_lf;
+
+ case H1_MSG_LAST_LF:
+ http_msg_last_lf:
+ EXPECT_LF_HERE(ptr, http_msg_invalid, state, H1_MSG_LAST_LF);
+ ptr++;
+ /* <ptr> now points to the first byte of payload. If needed sol
+ * still points to the first of either CR or LF of the empty
+ * line ending the headers block.
+ */
+ if (likely(!skip_update)) {
+ if (unlikely(hdr_count >= hdr_num)) {
+ state = H1_MSG_LAST_LF;
+ goto http_output_full;
+ }
+ http_set_hdr(&hdr[hdr_count++], ist2(start+sol, 0), ist(""));
+ }
+
+ /* reaching here we've parsed the whole message. We may detect
+ * that we were already continuing an interrupted parsing pass
+ * so we were silently looking for the end of message not
+ * updating anything before deciding to parse it fully at once.
+ * It's guaranteed that we won't match this test twice in a row
+ * since restarting will turn zero.
+ */
+ if (restarting)
+ goto restart;
+
+
+ if (!(h1m->flags & (H1_MF_HDRS_ONLY|H1_MF_RESP))) {
+ struct http_uri_parser parser = http_uri_parser_init(sl.rq.u);
+ struct ist scheme, authority;
+ int ret;
+
+ scheme = http_parse_scheme(&parser);
+ authority = http_parse_authority(&parser, 1);
+ if (sl.rq.meth == HTTP_METH_CONNECT) {
+ struct ist *host = ((host_idx != -1) ? &hdr[host_idx].v : NULL);
+
+ ret = h1_validate_connect_authority(authority, host);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ if (h1m->err_pos < -1) {
+ state = H1_MSG_LAST_LF;
+ /* WT: gcc seems to see a path where sl.rq.u.ptr was used
+ * uninitialized, but it doesn't know that the function is
+ * called with initial states making this impossible.
+ */
+ ALREADY_CHECKED(sl.rq.u.ptr);
+ ptr = ((ret == -1) ? sl.rq.u.ptr : host->ptr); /* Set ptr on the error */
+ goto http_msg_invalid;
+ }
+ if (h1m->err_pos == -1) /* capture the error pointer */
+ h1m->err_pos = ((ret == -1) ? sl.rq.u.ptr : host->ptr) - start + skip; /* >= 0 now */
+ }
+ }
+ else if (host_idx != -1 && istlen(authority)) {
+ struct ist host = hdr[host_idx].v;
+
+ /* For non-CONNECT method, the authority must match the host header value */
+ if (!isteqi(authority, host)) {
+ ret = h1_validate_mismatch_authority(scheme, authority, host);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ if (h1m->err_pos < -1) {
+ state = H1_MSG_LAST_LF;
+ ptr = host.ptr; /* Set ptr on the error */
+ goto http_msg_invalid;
+ }
+ if (h1m->err_pos == -1) /* capture the error pointer */
+ h1m->err_pos = v.ptr - start + skip; /* >= 0 now */
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ state = H1_MSG_DATA;
+ if (h1m->flags & H1_MF_XFER_ENC) {
+ if (h1m->flags & H1_MF_CLEN) {
+ /* T-E + C-L: force close and remove C-L */
+ h1m->flags |= H1_MF_CONN_CLO;
+ h1m->flags &= ~H1_MF_CLEN;
+ h1m->curr_len = h1m->body_len = 0;
+ hdr_count = http_del_hdr(hdr, ist("content-length"));
+ }
+ else if (!(h1m->flags & H1_MF_VER_11)) {
+ /* T-E + HTTP/1.0: force close */
+ h1m->flags |= H1_MF_CONN_CLO;
+ }
+
+ if (h1m->flags & H1_MF_CHNK)
+ state = H1_MSG_CHUNK_SIZE;
+ else if (!(h1m->flags & H1_MF_RESP)) {
+ /* cf RFC7230#3.3.3 : transfer-encoding in
+ * request without chunked encoding is invalid.
+ */
+ goto http_msg_invalid;
+ }
+ }
+
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ /* impossible states */
+ goto http_msg_invalid;
+ }
+
+ /* Now we've left the headers state and are either in H1_MSG_DATA or
+ * H1_MSG_CHUNK_SIZE.
+ */
+
+ if (slp && !skip_update)
+ *slp = sl;
+
+ h1m->state = state;
+ h1m->next = ptr - start + skip;
+ return h1m->next;
+
+ http_msg_ood:
+ /* out of data at <ptr> during state <state> */
+ if (slp && !skip_update)
+ *slp = sl;
+
+ h1m->state = state;
+ h1m->next = ptr - start + skip;
+ return 0;
+
+ http_msg_invalid:
+ /* invalid message, error at <ptr> */
+ if (slp && !skip_update)
+ *slp = sl;
+
+ h1m->err_state = h1m->state = state;
+ h1m->err_pos = h1m->next = ptr - start + skip;
+ return -1;
+
+ http_output_full:
+ /* no more room to store the current header, error at <ptr> */
+ if (slp && !skip_update)
+ *slp = sl;
+
+ h1m->err_state = h1m->state = state;
+ h1m->err_pos = h1m->next = ptr - start + skip;
+ return -2;
+
+ restart:
+ h1m->flags &= H1_MF_RESTART_MASK;
+ h1m->curr_len = h1m->body_len = h1m->next = 0;
+ if (h1m->flags & H1_MF_RESP)
+ h1m->state = H1_MSG_RPBEFORE;
+ else
+ h1m->state = H1_MSG_RQBEFORE;
+ goto try_again;
+}
+
+/* This function performs a very minimal parsing of the trailers block present
+ * at offset <ofs> in <buf> for up to <max> bytes, and returns the number of
+ * bytes to delete to skip the trailers. It may return 0 if it's missing some
+ * input data, or < 0 in case of parse error (in which case the caller may have
+ * to decide how to proceed, possibly eating everything).
+ */
+int h1_measure_trailers(const struct buffer *buf, unsigned int ofs, unsigned int max)
+{
+ const char *stop = b_peek(buf, ofs + max);
+ int count = ofs;
+
+ while (1) {
+ const char *p1 = NULL, *p2 = NULL;
+ const char *start = b_peek(buf, count);
+ const char *ptr = start;
+
+ /* scan current line and stop at LF or CRLF */
+ while (1) {
+ if (ptr == stop)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (*ptr == '\n') {
+ if (!p1)
+ p1 = ptr;
+ p2 = ptr;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (*ptr == '\r') {
+ if (p1)
+ return -1;
+ p1 = ptr;
+ }
+
+ ptr = b_next(buf, ptr);
+ }
+
+ /* after LF; point to beginning of next line */
+ p2 = b_next(buf, p2);
+ count += b_dist(buf, start, p2);
+
+ /* LF/CRLF at beginning of line => end of trailers at p2.
+ * Everything was scheduled for forwarding, there's nothing left
+ * from this message. */
+ if (p1 == start)
+ break;
+ /* OK, next line then */
+ }
+ return count - ofs;
+}
+
+/* Generate a random key for a WebSocket Handshake in respect with rfc6455
+ * The key is 128-bits long encoded as a base64 string in <key_out> parameter
+ * (25 bytes long).
+ */
+void h1_generate_random_ws_input_key(char key_out[25])
+{
+ /* generate a random websocket key */
+ const uint64_t rand1 = ha_random64(), rand2 = ha_random64();
+ char key[16];
+
+ memcpy(key, &rand1, 8);
+ memcpy(&key[8], &rand2, 8);
+ a2base64(key, 16, key_out, 25);
+}
+
+#define H1_WS_KEY_SUFFIX_GUID "258EAFA5-E914-47DA-95CA-C5AB0DC85B11"
+
+/*
+ * Calculate the WebSocket handshake response key from <key_in>. Following the
+ * rfc6455, <key_in> must be 24 bytes longs. The result is stored in <key_out>
+ * as a 29 bytes long string.
+ */
+void h1_calculate_ws_output_key(const char *key, char *result)
+{
+ blk_SHA_CTX sha1_ctx;
+ char hash_in[60], hash_out[20];
+
+ /* concatenate the key with a fixed suffix */
+ memcpy(hash_in, key, 24);
+ memcpy(&hash_in[24], H1_WS_KEY_SUFFIX_GUID, 36);
+
+ /* sha1 the result */
+ blk_SHA1_Init(&sha1_ctx);
+ blk_SHA1_Update(&sha1_ctx, hash_in, 60);
+ blk_SHA1_Final((unsigned char *)hash_out, &sha1_ctx);
+
+ /* encode in base64 the hash */
+ a2base64(hash_out, 20, result, 29);
+}