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author | Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org> | 2024-04-19 05:45:02 +0000 |
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committer | Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org> | 2024-04-19 05:45:02 +0000 |
commit | 68a560641f7a38c184fd3346dd8008b86e12d77a (patch) | |
tree | d927b2a890d51e5d9e037c03042fb6fabd689cc0 /src/auth_gss.c | |
parent | Initial commit. (diff) | |
download | libtirpc-68a560641f7a38c184fd3346dd8008b86e12d77a.tar.xz libtirpc-68a560641f7a38c184fd3346dd8008b86e12d77a.zip |
Adding upstream version 1.3.4+ds.upstream/1.3.4+dsupstream
Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'src/auth_gss.c')
-rw-r--r-- | src/auth_gss.c | 992 |
1 files changed, 992 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/src/auth_gss.c b/src/auth_gss.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3127b92 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/auth_gss.c @@ -0,0 +1,992 @@ +/* + auth_gss.c + + RPCSEC_GSS client routines. + + Copyright (c) 2000 The Regents of the University of Michigan. + All rights reserved. + + Copyright (c) 2000 Dug Song <dugsong@UMICH.EDU>. + All rights reserved, all wrongs reversed. + + Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + are met: + + 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its + contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived + from this software without specific prior written permission. + + THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE + DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR + CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF + SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR + BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF + LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING + NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS + SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + +*/ + +#include <stdio.h> +#include <stdlib.h> +#include <unistd.h> +#include <string.h> +#include <errno.h> +#include <rpc/types.h> +#include <rpc/xdr.h> +#include <rpc/auth.h> +#include <rpc/auth_gss.h> +#include <rpc/rpcsec_gss.h> +#include <rpc/clnt.h> +#include <netinet/in.h> +#include <reentrant.h> + +#include "debug.h" + +static void authgss_nextverf(AUTH *); +static bool_t authgss_marshal(AUTH *, XDR *); +static bool_t authgss_refresh(AUTH *, void *); +static bool_t authgss_validate(AUTH *, struct opaque_auth *); +static void authgss_destroy(AUTH *); +static void authgss_destroy_context(AUTH *); +static bool_t authgss_wrap(AUTH *, XDR *, xdrproc_t, caddr_t); +static bool_t authgss_unwrap(AUTH *, XDR *, xdrproc_t, caddr_t); + +void rpc_gss_set_error(int); +void rpc_gss_clear_error(void); +bool_t rpc_gss_oid_to_mech(rpc_gss_OID, char **); + +/* + * from mit-krb5-1.2.1 mechglue/mglueP.h: + * Array of context IDs typed by mechanism OID + */ +typedef struct gss_union_ctx_id_t { + gss_OID mech_type; + gss_ctx_id_t internal_ctx_id; +} gss_union_ctx_id_desc, *gss_union_ctx_id_t; + +static struct auth_ops authgss_ops = { + authgss_nextverf, + authgss_marshal, + authgss_validate, + authgss_refresh, + authgss_destroy, + authgss_wrap, + authgss_unwrap +}; + + +/* useful as i add more mechanisms */ +void +print_rpc_gss_sec(struct rpc_gss_sec *ptr) +{ +int i; +char *p; + + if (libtirpc_debug_level < 4 || log_stderr == 0) + return; + + gss_log_debug("rpc_gss_sec:"); + if(ptr->mech == NULL) + gss_log_debug("NULL gss_OID mech"); + else { + fprintf(stderr, " mechanism_OID: {"); + p = (char *)ptr->mech->elements; + for (i=0; i < ptr->mech->length; i++) + /* First byte of OIDs encoded to save a byte */ + if (i == 0) { + int first, second; + if (*p < 40) { + first = 0; + second = *p; + } + else if (40 <= *p && *p < 80) { + first = 1; + second = *p - 40; + } + else if (80 <= *p && *p < 127) { + first = 2; + second = *p - 80; + } + else { + /* Invalid value! */ + first = -1; + second = -1; + } + fprintf(stderr, " %u %u", first, second); + p++; + } + else { + fprintf(stderr, " %u", (unsigned char)*p++); + } + fprintf(stderr, " }\n"); + } + fprintf(stderr, " qop: %d\n", ptr->qop); + fprintf(stderr, " service: %d\n", ptr->svc); + fprintf(stderr, " cred: %p\n", ptr->cred); +} + +extern pthread_mutex_t auth_ref_lock; + +struct rpc_gss_data { + bool_t established; /* context established */ + gss_buffer_desc gc_wire_verf; /* save GSS_S_COMPLETE NULL RPC verfier + * to process at end of context negotiation*/ + CLIENT *clnt; /* client handle */ + gss_name_t name; /* service name */ + struct rpc_gss_sec sec; /* security tuple */ + gss_ctx_id_t ctx; /* context id */ + struct rpc_gss_cred gc; /* client credentials */ + u_int win; /* sequence window */ + int time_req; /* init_sec_context time_req */ + gss_channel_bindings_t icb; /* input channel bindings */ + int refcnt; /* reference count gss AUTHs */ +}; + +#define AUTH_PRIVATE(auth) ((struct rpc_gss_data *)auth->ah_private) + +static struct timeval AUTH_TIMEOUT = { 25, 0 }; + +static void +authgss_auth_get(AUTH *auth) +{ + struct rpc_gss_data *gd = AUTH_PRIVATE(auth); + + mutex_lock(&auth_ref_lock); + ++gd->refcnt; + mutex_unlock(&auth_ref_lock); +} + +static int +authgss_auth_put(AUTH *auth) +{ + int refcnt; + struct rpc_gss_data *gd = AUTH_PRIVATE(auth); + + mutex_lock(&auth_ref_lock); + refcnt = --gd->refcnt; + mutex_unlock(&auth_ref_lock); + return refcnt; +} + +AUTH * +authgss_create(CLIENT *clnt, gss_name_t name, struct rpc_gss_sec *sec) +{ + AUTH *auth, *save_auth; + struct rpc_gss_data *gd; + OM_uint32 min_stat = 0; + rpc_gss_options_ret_t ret; + + gss_log_debug("in authgss_create()"); + + memset(&rpc_createerr, 0, sizeof(rpc_createerr)); + + if ((auth = calloc(sizeof(*auth), 1)) == NULL) { + rpc_createerr.cf_stat = RPC_SYSTEMERROR; + rpc_createerr.cf_error.re_errno = ENOMEM; + return (NULL); + } + if ((gd = calloc(sizeof(*gd), 1)) == NULL) { + rpc_createerr.cf_stat = RPC_SYSTEMERROR; + rpc_createerr.cf_error.re_errno = ENOMEM; + free(auth); + return (NULL); + } + LIBTIRPC_DEBUG(3, ("authgss_create: name is %p", name)); + if (name != GSS_C_NO_NAME) { + if (gss_duplicate_name(&min_stat, name, &gd->name) + != GSS_S_COMPLETE) { + rpc_createerr.cf_stat = RPC_SYSTEMERROR; + rpc_createerr.cf_error.re_errno = ENOMEM; + free(auth); + free(gd); + return (NULL); + } + } + else + gd->name = name; + + LIBTIRPC_DEBUG(3, ("authgss_create: gd->name is %p", gd->name)); + gd->clnt = clnt; + gd->ctx = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT; + gd->sec = *sec; + + gd->gc.gc_v = RPCSEC_GSS_VERSION; + gd->gc.gc_proc = RPCSEC_GSS_INIT; + gd->gc.gc_svc = gd->sec.svc; + + auth->ah_ops = &authgss_ops; + auth->ah_private = (caddr_t)gd; + + save_auth = clnt->cl_auth; + clnt->cl_auth = auth; + + memset(&ret, 0, sizeof(rpc_gss_options_ret_t)); + if (!authgss_refresh(auth, &ret)) { + auth = NULL; + sec->major_status = ret.major_status; + sec->minor_status = ret.minor_status; + } + else + authgss_auth_get(auth); /* Reference for caller */ + + clnt->cl_auth = save_auth; + + return (auth); +} + +AUTH * +authgss_create_default(CLIENT *clnt, char *service, struct rpc_gss_sec *sec) +{ + AUTH *auth; + OM_uint32 maj_stat = 0, min_stat = 0; + gss_buffer_desc sname; + gss_name_t name = GSS_C_NO_NAME; + + gss_log_debug("in authgss_create_default()"); + + + sname.value = service; + sname.length = strlen(service); + + maj_stat = gss_import_name(&min_stat, &sname, + (gss_OID)GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE, + &name); + + if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE) { + gss_log_status("authgss_create_default: gss_import_name", + maj_stat, min_stat); + rpc_createerr.cf_stat = RPC_AUTHERROR; + return (NULL); + } + + auth = authgss_create(clnt, name, sec); + + if (name != GSS_C_NO_NAME) { + LIBTIRPC_DEBUG(3, ("authgss_create_default: freeing name %p", name)); + gss_release_name(&min_stat, &name); + } + + return (auth); +} + +bool_t +authgss_get_private_data(AUTH *auth, struct authgss_private_data *pd) +{ + struct rpc_gss_data *gd; + + gss_log_debug("in authgss_get_private_data()"); + + if (!auth || !pd) + return (FALSE); + + gd = AUTH_PRIVATE(auth); + + if (!gd || !gd->established) + return (FALSE); + + pd->pd_ctx = gd->ctx; + pd->pd_ctx_hndl = gd->gc.gc_ctx; + pd->pd_seq_win = gd->win; + /* + * We've given this away -- don't try to use it ourself any more + * Caller should call authgss_free_private_data to free data. + * This also ensures that authgss_destroy_context() won't try to + * send an RPCSEC_GSS_DESTROY request which might inappropriately + * destroy the context. + */ + gd->ctx = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT; + gd->gc.gc_ctx.length = 0; + gd->gc.gc_ctx.value = NULL; + + return (TRUE); +} + +bool_t +authgss_free_private_data(struct authgss_private_data *pd) +{ + OM_uint32 min_stat; + gss_log_debug("in authgss_free_private_data()"); + + if (!pd) + return (FALSE); + + if (pd->pd_ctx != GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) + gss_delete_sec_context(&min_stat, &pd->pd_ctx, NULL); + gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &pd->pd_ctx_hndl); + memset(&pd->pd_ctx_hndl, 0, sizeof(pd->pd_ctx_hndl)); + pd->pd_seq_win = 0; + + return (TRUE); +} + +static void +authgss_nextverf(AUTH *auth) +{ + gss_log_debug("in authgss_nextverf()"); + /* no action necessary */ +} + +static bool_t +authgss_marshal(AUTH *auth, XDR *xdrs) +{ + XDR tmpxdrs; + char tmp[MAX_AUTH_BYTES]; + struct rpc_gss_data *gd; + gss_buffer_desc rpcbuf, checksum; + OM_uint32 maj_stat, min_stat; + bool_t xdr_stat; + + gss_log_debug("in authgss_marshal()"); + + gd = AUTH_PRIVATE(auth); + + if (gd->established) + gd->gc.gc_seq++; + + xdrmem_create(&tmpxdrs, tmp, sizeof(tmp), XDR_ENCODE); + + if (!xdr_rpc_gss_cred(&tmpxdrs, &gd->gc)) { + XDR_DESTROY(&tmpxdrs); + return (FALSE); + } + auth->ah_cred.oa_flavor = RPCSEC_GSS; + auth->ah_cred.oa_base = tmp; + auth->ah_cred.oa_length = XDR_GETPOS(&tmpxdrs); + + XDR_DESTROY(&tmpxdrs); + + if (!xdr_opaque_auth(xdrs, &auth->ah_cred)) + return (FALSE); + + if (gd->gc.gc_proc == RPCSEC_GSS_INIT || + gd->gc.gc_proc == RPCSEC_GSS_CONTINUE_INIT) { + return (xdr_opaque_auth(xdrs, &_null_auth)); + } + /* Checksum serialized RPC header, up to and including credential. */ + rpcbuf.length = XDR_GETPOS(xdrs); + XDR_SETPOS(xdrs, 0); + rpcbuf.value = XDR_INLINE(xdrs, rpcbuf.length); + + maj_stat = gss_get_mic(&min_stat, gd->ctx, gd->sec.qop, + &rpcbuf, &checksum); + + if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE) { + gss_log_status("authgss_marshal: gss_get_mic", + maj_stat, min_stat); + if (maj_stat == GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED) { + gd->established = FALSE; + authgss_destroy_context(auth); + } + return (FALSE); + } + auth->ah_verf.oa_flavor = RPCSEC_GSS; + auth->ah_verf.oa_base = checksum.value; + auth->ah_verf.oa_length = checksum.length; + + xdr_stat = xdr_opaque_auth(xdrs, &auth->ah_verf); + gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &checksum); + + return (xdr_stat); +} + +static bool_t +authgss_validate(AUTH *auth, struct opaque_auth *verf) +{ + struct rpc_gss_data *gd; + u_int num, qop_state; + gss_buffer_desc signbuf, checksum; + OM_uint32 maj_stat, min_stat; + + gss_log_debug("in authgss_validate()"); + + gd = AUTH_PRIVATE(auth); + + if (gd->established == FALSE) { + /* would like to do this only on NULL rpc -- + * gc->established is good enough. + * save the on the wire verifier to validate last + * INIT phase packet after decode if the major + * status is GSS_S_COMPLETE + */ + if ((gd->gc_wire_verf.value = + mem_alloc(verf->oa_length)) == NULL) { + fprintf(stderr, "gss_validate: out of memory\n"); + return (FALSE); + } + memcpy(gd->gc_wire_verf.value, verf->oa_base, verf->oa_length); + gd->gc_wire_verf.length = verf->oa_length; + return (TRUE); + } + + if (gd->gc.gc_proc == RPCSEC_GSS_INIT || + gd->gc.gc_proc == RPCSEC_GSS_CONTINUE_INIT) { + num = htonl(gd->win); + } + else num = htonl(gd->gc.gc_seq); + + signbuf.value = # + signbuf.length = sizeof(num); + + checksum.value = verf->oa_base; + checksum.length = verf->oa_length; + + maj_stat = gss_verify_mic(&min_stat, gd->ctx, &signbuf, + &checksum, &qop_state); + + if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE || qop_state != gd->sec.qop) { + gss_log_status("authgss_validate: gss_verify_mic", + maj_stat, min_stat); + if (maj_stat == GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED) { + gd->established = FALSE; + authgss_destroy_context(auth); + } + return (FALSE); + } + return (TRUE); +} + +static bool_t +_rpc_gss_refresh(AUTH *auth, rpc_gss_options_ret_t *options_ret) +{ + struct rpc_gss_data *gd; + struct rpc_gss_init_res gr; + gss_buffer_desc *recv_tokenp, send_token; + OM_uint32 maj_stat, min_stat, call_stat, ret_flags, + time_ret; + gss_OID actual_mech_type; + char *mechanism; + + gss_log_debug("in authgss_refresh()"); + + gd = AUTH_PRIVATE(auth); + + if (gd->established) + return (TRUE); + + /* GSS context establishment loop. */ + memset(&gr, 0, sizeof(gr)); + recv_tokenp = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER; + + print_rpc_gss_sec(&gd->sec); + + for (;;) { + /* print the token we just received */ + if (recv_tokenp != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER) { + gss_log_debug("The token we just received (length %lu):", + recv_tokenp->length); + gss_log_hexdump(recv_tokenp->value, recv_tokenp->length, 0); + } + maj_stat = gss_init_sec_context(&min_stat, + gd->sec.cred, + &gd->ctx, + gd->name, + gd->sec.mech, + gd->sec.req_flags, + gd->time_req, + gd->icb, + recv_tokenp, + &actual_mech_type, + &send_token, + &ret_flags, + &time_ret); + + if (recv_tokenp != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER) { + gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &gr.gr_token); + recv_tokenp = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER; + } + if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE && + maj_stat != GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) { + gss_log_status("gss_init_sec_context", maj_stat, min_stat); + options_ret->major_status = maj_stat; + options_ret->minor_status = min_stat; + break; + } + if (send_token.length != 0) { + memset(&gr, 0, sizeof(gr)); + + /* print the token we are about to send */ + gss_log_debug("The token being sent (length %lu):", + send_token.length); + gss_log_hexdump(send_token.value, send_token.length, 0); + + call_stat = clnt_call(gd->clnt, NULLPROC, + (xdrproc_t)xdr_rpc_gss_init_args, + &send_token, + (xdrproc_t)xdr_rpc_gss_init_res, + (caddr_t)&gr, AUTH_TIMEOUT); + + gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &send_token); + + if (call_stat != RPC_SUCCESS || + (gr.gr_major != GSS_S_COMPLETE && + gr.gr_major != GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED)) { + options_ret->major_status = gr.gr_major; + options_ret->minor_status = gr.gr_minor; + if (call_stat != RPC_SUCCESS) { + struct rpc_err err; + clnt_geterr(gd->clnt, &err); + LIBTIRPC_DEBUG(1, ("authgss_refresh: %s errno: %s", + clnt_sperrno(call_stat), strerror(err.re_errno))); + } else + gss_log_status("authgss_refresh:", + gr.gr_major, gr.gr_minor); + return FALSE; + } + + if (gr.gr_ctx.length != 0) { + if (gd->gc.gc_ctx.value) + gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, + &gd->gc.gc_ctx); + gd->gc.gc_ctx = gr.gr_ctx; + } + if (gr.gr_token.length != 0) { + if (maj_stat != GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) + break; + recv_tokenp = &gr.gr_token; + } + gd->gc.gc_proc = RPCSEC_GSS_CONTINUE_INIT; + } + + /* GSS_S_COMPLETE => check gss header verifier, + * usually checked in gss_validate + */ + if (maj_stat == GSS_S_COMPLETE) { + gss_buffer_desc bufin; + gss_buffer_desc bufout; + u_int seq, qop_state = 0; + + seq = htonl(gr.gr_win); + bufin.value = (unsigned char *)&seq; + bufin.length = sizeof(seq); + bufout.value = (unsigned char *)gd->gc_wire_verf.value; + bufout.length = gd->gc_wire_verf.length; + + maj_stat = gss_verify_mic(&min_stat, gd->ctx, + &bufin, &bufout, &qop_state); + + if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE + || qop_state != gd->sec.qop) { + gss_log_status("authgss_refresh: gss_verify_mic", + maj_stat, min_stat); + if (maj_stat == GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED) { + gd->established = FALSE; + authgss_destroy_context(auth); + } + rpc_gss_set_error(EPERM); + options_ret->major_status = maj_stat; + options_ret->minor_status = min_stat; + return (FALSE); + } + + options_ret->major_status = GSS_S_COMPLETE; + options_ret->minor_status = 0; + options_ret->rpcsec_version = gd->gc.gc_v; + options_ret->ret_flags = ret_flags; + options_ret->time_ret = time_ret; + options_ret->gss_context = gd->ctx; + options_ret->actual_mechanism[0] = '\0'; + if (rpc_gss_oid_to_mech(actual_mech_type, &mechanism)) { + strncpy(options_ret->actual_mechanism, + mechanism, + (sizeof(options_ret->actual_mechanism)-1)); + } + + gd->established = TRUE; + gd->gc.gc_proc = RPCSEC_GSS_DATA; + gd->gc.gc_seq = 0; + gd->win = gr.gr_win; + break; + } + } + /* End context negotiation loop. */ + if (gd->gc.gc_proc != RPCSEC_GSS_DATA) { + if (gr.gr_token.length != 0) + gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &gr.gr_token); + + authgss_destroy(auth); + auth = NULL; + rpc_createerr.cf_stat = RPC_AUTHERROR; + rpc_gss_set_error(EPERM); + + return (FALSE); + } + return (TRUE); +} + +static bool_t +authgss_refresh(AUTH *auth, void *ret) +{ + return _rpc_gss_refresh(auth, (rpc_gss_options_ret_t *)ret); +} + +bool_t +authgss_service(AUTH *auth, int svc) +{ + struct rpc_gss_data *gd; + + gss_log_debug("in authgss_service()"); + + if (!auth) + return(FALSE); + gd = AUTH_PRIVATE(auth); + if (!gd || !gd->established) + return (FALSE); + gd->sec.svc = svc; + gd->gc.gc_svc = svc; + return (TRUE); +} + +static void +authgss_destroy_context(AUTH *auth) +{ + struct rpc_gss_data *gd; + OM_uint32 min_stat; + + gss_log_debug("in authgss_destroy_context()"); + + gd = AUTH_PRIVATE(auth); + + if (gd->gc.gc_ctx.length != 0) { + if (gd->established) { + AUTH *save_auth = NULL; + + /* Make sure we use the right auth_ops */ + if (gd->clnt->cl_auth != auth) { + save_auth = gd->clnt->cl_auth; + gd->clnt->cl_auth = auth; + } + + gd->gc.gc_proc = RPCSEC_GSS_DESTROY; + clnt_call(gd->clnt, NULLPROC, (xdrproc_t)xdr_void, NULL, + (xdrproc_t)xdr_void, NULL, AUTH_TIMEOUT); + + if (save_auth != NULL) + gd->clnt->cl_auth = save_auth; + } + gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &gd->gc.gc_ctx); + /* XXX ANDROS check size of context - should be 8 */ + memset(&gd->gc.gc_ctx, 0, sizeof(gd->gc.gc_ctx)); + } + if (gd->ctx != GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) { + gss_delete_sec_context(&min_stat, &gd->ctx, NULL); + gd->ctx = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT; + } + + /* free saved wire verifier (if any) */ + mem_free(gd->gc_wire_verf.value, gd->gc_wire_verf.length); + gd->gc_wire_verf.value = NULL; + gd->gc_wire_verf.length = 0; + + gd->established = FALSE; +} + +static void +authgss_destroy(AUTH *auth) +{ + if(authgss_auth_put(auth) == 0) + { + struct rpc_gss_data *gd; + OM_uint32 min_stat; + + gss_log_debug("in authgss_destroy()"); + + gd = AUTH_PRIVATE(auth); + + authgss_destroy_context(auth); + + LIBTIRPC_DEBUG(3, ("authgss_destroy: freeing name %p", gd->name)); + if (gd->name != GSS_C_NO_NAME) + gss_release_name(&min_stat, &gd->name); + + free(gd); + free(auth); + } +} + +static bool_t +authgss_wrap(AUTH *auth, XDR *xdrs, xdrproc_t xdr_func, caddr_t xdr_ptr) +{ + struct rpc_gss_data *gd; + + gss_log_debug("in authgss_wrap()"); + + gd = AUTH_PRIVATE(auth); + + if (!gd->established || gd->sec.svc == RPCSEC_GSS_SVC_NONE) { + return ((*xdr_func)(xdrs, xdr_ptr)); + } + return (xdr_rpc_gss_data(xdrs, xdr_func, xdr_ptr, + gd->ctx, gd->sec.qop, + gd->sec.svc, gd->gc.gc_seq)); +} + +static bool_t +authgss_unwrap(AUTH *auth, XDR *xdrs, xdrproc_t xdr_func, caddr_t xdr_ptr) +{ + struct rpc_gss_data *gd; + + gss_log_debug("in authgss_unwrap()"); + + gd = AUTH_PRIVATE(auth); + + if (!gd->established || gd->sec.svc == RPCSEC_GSS_SVC_NONE) { + return ((*xdr_func)(xdrs, xdr_ptr)); + } + return (xdr_rpc_gss_data(xdrs, xdr_func, xdr_ptr, + gd->ctx, gd->sec.qop, + gd->sec.svc, gd->gc.gc_seq)); +} + +static AUTH * +_rpc_gss_seccreate_error(int system_error) +{ + rpc_gss_set_error(system_error); + return NULL; +} + +/* + * External API: Create a GSS security context for this "clnt" + * + * clnt: a valid RPC CLIENT structure + * principal: NUL-terminated C string containing GSS principal + * mechanism: NUL-terminated C string containing GSS mechanism name + * service: GSS security value to use + * qop: NUL-terminated C string containing QOP name + * req: pointer to additional request parameters, or NULL + * ret: pointer to additional results, or NULL + * + * Returns pointer to a filled in RPC AUTH structure or NULL. + * Caller must free returned structure with AUTH_DESTROY. + */ +AUTH * +rpc_gss_seccreate(CLIENT *clnt, char *principal, char *mechanism, + rpc_gss_service_t service, char *qop, + rpc_gss_options_req_t *req, rpc_gss_options_ret_t *ret) +{ + rpc_gss_options_ret_t options_ret; + OM_uint32 maj_stat, min_stat; + struct rpc_gss_sec sec = { + .req_flags = GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG, + .cred = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, + }; + struct rpc_gss_data *gd; + AUTH *auth, *save_auth; + gss_buffer_desc sname; + + if (clnt == NULL || principal == NULL) + return _rpc_gss_seccreate_error(EINVAL); + + if (rpc_gss_mech_to_oid(mechanism, &sec.mech) == FALSE) + return NULL; + + sec.qop = GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT; + if (qop != NULL) { + u_int qop_num; + if (rpc_gss_qop_to_num(qop, mechanism, &qop_num) == FALSE) + return NULL; + sec.qop = qop_num; + } + + switch (service) { + case rpcsec_gss_svc_none: + sec.svc = RPCSEC_GSS_SVC_NONE; + break; + case rpcsec_gss_svc_integrity: + sec.svc = RPCSEC_GSS_SVC_INTEGRITY; + break; + case rpcsec_gss_svc_privacy: + sec.svc = RPCSEC_GSS_SVC_PRIVACY; + break; + case rpcsec_gss_svc_default: + sec.svc = RPCSEC_GSS_SVC_INTEGRITY; + break; + default: + return _rpc_gss_seccreate_error(ENOENT); + } + + if (ret == NULL) + ret = &options_ret; + memset(ret, 0, sizeof(*ret)); + + auth = calloc(1, sizeof(*auth)); + gd = calloc(1, sizeof(*gd)); + if (auth == NULL || gd == NULL) { + free(gd); + free(auth); + return _rpc_gss_seccreate_error(ENOMEM); + } + + sname.value = principal; + sname.length = strlen(principal); + maj_stat = gss_import_name(&min_stat, &sname, + (gss_OID)GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE, + &gd->name); + if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE) { + ret->major_status = maj_stat; + ret->minor_status = min_stat; + free(gd); + free(auth); + return _rpc_gss_seccreate_error(ENOMEM); + } + + gd->clnt = clnt; + gd->ctx = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT; + gd->sec = sec; + + if (req) { + sec.req_flags = req->req_flags; + gd->time_req = req->time_req; + sec.cred = req->my_cred; + gd->icb = req->input_channel_bindings; + } + + gd->gc.gc_v = RPCSEC_GSS_VERSION; + gd->gc.gc_proc = RPCSEC_GSS_INIT; + gd->gc.gc_svc = sec.svc; + + auth->ah_ops = &authgss_ops; + auth->ah_private = (caddr_t)gd; + + save_auth = clnt->cl_auth; + clnt->cl_auth = auth; + + if (_rpc_gss_refresh(auth, ret) == FALSE) { + auth = NULL; + } else { + rpc_gss_clear_error(); + authgss_auth_get(auth); + } + + clnt->cl_auth = save_auth; + + return auth; +} + +/* + * External API: Modify an AUTH's service and QOP settings + * + * auth: a valid RPC AUTH structure + * service: GSS security value to use + * qop: NUL-terminated C string containing QOP name + * + * Returns TRUE if successful, otherwise FALSE is returned. + */ +bool_t +rpc_gss_set_defaults(AUTH *auth, rpc_gss_service_t service, char *qop) +{ + struct rpc_gss_data *gd; + char *mechanism; + u_int qop_num; + + if (auth == NULL) { + rpc_gss_set_error(EINVAL); + return FALSE; + } + + gd = AUTH_PRIVATE(auth); + if (gd == NULL) { + rpc_gss_set_error(EINVAL); + return FALSE; + } + + if (rpc_gss_oid_to_mech(gd->sec.mech, &mechanism) == FALSE) + return FALSE; + + qop_num = GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT; + if (qop != NULL) { + if (rpc_gss_qop_to_num(qop, mechanism, &qop_num) == FALSE) + return FALSE; + } + + switch (service) { + case rpcsec_gss_svc_none: + gd->gc.gc_svc = gd->sec.svc = RPCSEC_GSS_SVC_NONE; + break; + case rpcsec_gss_svc_integrity: + gd->gc.gc_svc = gd->sec.svc = RPCSEC_GSS_SVC_INTEGRITY; + break; + case rpcsec_gss_svc_privacy: + gd->gc.gc_svc = gd->sec.svc = RPCSEC_GSS_SVC_PRIVACY; + break; + case rpcsec_gss_svc_default: + gd->gc.gc_svc = gd->sec.svc = RPCSEC_GSS_SVC_INTEGRITY; + break; + default: + rpc_gss_set_error(ENOENT); + return FALSE; + } + + gd->sec.qop = (gss_qop_t)qop_num; + rpc_gss_clear_error(); + return TRUE; +} + +/* + * External API: Return maximum data size for a security mechanism and transport + * + * auth: a valid RPC AUTH structure + * maxlen: transport's maximum data size, in bytes + * + * Returns maximum data size given transformations done by current + * security setting of "auth", in bytes, or zero if that value + * cannot be determined. + */ +int +rpc_gss_max_data_length(AUTH *auth, int maxlen) +{ + OM_uint32 max_input_size, maj_stat, min_stat; + struct rpc_gss_data *gd; + int conf_req_flag; + int result; + + if (auth == NULL) { + rpc_gss_set_error(EINVAL); + return 0; + } + + gd = AUTH_PRIVATE(auth); + if (gd == NULL) { + rpc_gss_set_error(EINVAL); + return 0; + } + + switch (gd->sec.svc) { + case RPCSEC_GSS_SVC_NONE: + rpc_gss_clear_error(); + return maxlen; + case RPCSEC_GSS_SVC_INTEGRITY: + conf_req_flag = 0; + break; + case RPCSEC_GSS_SVC_PRIVACY: + conf_req_flag = 1; + break; + default: + rpc_gss_set_error(ENOENT); + return 0; + } + + result = 0; + maj_stat = gss_wrap_size_limit(&min_stat, gd->ctx, conf_req_flag, + gd->sec.qop, maxlen, &max_input_size); + if (maj_stat == GSS_S_COMPLETE) + if ((int)max_input_size > 0) + result = (int)max_input_size; + rpc_gss_clear_error(); + return result; +} + +bool_t +is_authgss_client(CLIENT *clnt) +{ + return (clnt->cl_auth->ah_ops == &authgss_ops); +} |