Adding upstream version 6.6.15.upstream/6.6.15

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

1 files changed, 93 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/Documentation/process/security-bugs.rst b/Documentation/process/security-bugs.rst
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+.. _securitybugs:
+
+Security bugs
+=============
+
+Linux kernel developers take security very seriously.  As such, we'd
+like to know when a security bug is found so that it can be fixed and
+disclosed as quickly as possible.  Please report security bugs to the
+Linux kernel security team.
+
+Contact
+-------
+
+The Linux kernel security team can be contacted by email at
+<security@kernel.org>.  This is a private list of security officers
+who will help verify the bug report and develop and release a fix.
+If you already have a fix, please include it with your report, as
+that can speed up the process considerably.  It is possible that the
+security team will bring in extra help from area maintainers to
+understand and fix the security vulnerability.
+
+As it is with any bug, the more information provided the easier it
+will be to diagnose and fix.  Please review the procedure outlined in
+'Documentation/admin-guide/reporting-issues.rst' if you are unclear about what
+information is helpful.  Any exploit code is very helpful and will not
+be released without consent from the reporter unless it has already been
+made public.
+
+Please send plain text emails without attachments where possible.
+It is much harder to have a context-quoted discussion about a complex
+issue if all the details are hidden away in attachments.  Think of it like a
+:doc:`regular patch submission <../process/submitting-patches>`
+(even if you don't have a patch yet): describe the problem and impact, list
+reproduction steps, and follow it with a proposed fix, all in plain text.
+
+Disclosure and embargoed information
+------------------------------------
+
+The security list is not a disclosure channel.  For that, see Coordination
+below.
+
+Once a robust fix has been developed, the release process starts.  Fixes
+for publicly known bugs are released immediately.
+
+Although our preference is to release fixes for publicly undisclosed bugs
+as soon as they become available, this may be postponed at the request of
+the reporter or an affected party for up to 7 calendar days from the start
+of the release process, with an exceptional extension to 14 calendar days
+if it is agreed that the criticality of the bug requires more time.  The
+only valid reason for deferring the publication of a fix is to accommodate
+the logistics of QA and large scale rollouts which require release
+coordination.
+
+While embargoed information may be shared with trusted individuals in
+order to develop a fix, such information will not be published alongside
+the fix or on any other disclosure channel without the permission of the
+reporter.  This includes but is not limited to the original bug report
+and followup discussions (if any), exploits, CVE information or the
+identity of the reporter.
+
+In other words our only interest is in getting bugs fixed.  All other
+information submitted to the security list and any followup discussions
+of the report are treated confidentially even after the embargo has been
+lifted, in perpetuity.
+
+Coordination with other groups
+------------------------------
+
+The kernel security team strongly recommends that reporters of potential
+security issues NEVER contact the "linux-distros" mailing list until
+AFTER discussing it with the kernel security team.  Do not Cc: both
+lists at once.  You may contact the linux-distros mailing list after a
+fix has been agreed on and you fully understand the requirements that
+doing so will impose on you and the kernel community.
+
+The different lists have different goals and the linux-distros rules do
+not contribute to actually fixing any potential security problems.
+
+CVE assignment
+--------------
+
+The security team does not assign CVEs, nor do we require them for
+reports or fixes, as this can needlessly complicate the process and may
+delay the bug handling.  If a reporter wishes to have a CVE identifier
+assigned, they should find one by themselves, for example by contacting
+MITRE directly.  However under no circumstances will a patch inclusion
+be delayed to wait for a CVE identifier to arrive.
+
+Non-disclosure agreements
+-------------------------
+
+The Linux kernel security team is not a formal body and therefore unable
+to enter any non-disclosure agreements.