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authorDaniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>2024-04-11 08:27:49 +0000
committerDaniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>2024-04-11 08:27:49 +0000
commitace9429bb58fd418f0c81d4c2835699bddf6bde6 (patch)
treeb2d64bc10158fdd5497876388cd68142ca374ed3 /Documentation/virt
parentInitial commit. (diff)
downloadlinux-ace9429bb58fd418f0c81d4c2835699bddf6bde6.tar.xz
linux-ace9429bb58fd418f0c81d4c2835699bddf6bde6.zip
Adding upstream version 6.6.15.upstream/6.6.15
Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'Documentation/virt')
-rw-r--r--Documentation/virt/acrn/cpuid.rst46
-rw-r--r--Documentation/virt/acrn/index.rst12
-rw-r--r--Documentation/virt/acrn/introduction.rst43
-rw-r--r--Documentation/virt/acrn/io-request.rst97
-rw-r--r--Documentation/virt/coco/sev-guest.rst161
-rw-r--r--Documentation/virt/coco/tdx-guest.rst52
-rw-r--r--Documentation/virt/guest-halt-polling.rst84
-rw-r--r--Documentation/virt/hyperv/clocks.rst73
-rw-r--r--Documentation/virt/hyperv/index.rst12
-rw-r--r--Documentation/virt/hyperv/overview.rst207
-rw-r--r--Documentation/virt/hyperv/vmbus.rst303
-rw-r--r--Documentation/virt/index.rst25
-rw-r--r--Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst8535
-rw-r--r--Documentation/virt/kvm/arm/hyp-abi.rst78
-rw-r--r--Documentation/virt/kvm/arm/hypercalls.rst138
-rw-r--r--Documentation/virt/kvm/arm/index.rst13
-rw-r--r--Documentation/virt/kvm/arm/ptp_kvm.rst25
-rw-r--r--Documentation/virt/kvm/arm/pvtime.rst82
-rw-r--r--Documentation/virt/kvm/devices/README1
-rw-r--r--Documentation/virt/kvm/devices/arm-vgic-its.rst212
-rw-r--r--Documentation/virt/kvm/devices/arm-vgic-v3.rst291
-rw-r--r--Documentation/virt/kvm/devices/arm-vgic.rst156
-rw-r--r--Documentation/virt/kvm/devices/index.rst19
-rw-r--r--Documentation/virt/kvm/devices/mpic.rst58
-rw-r--r--Documentation/virt/kvm/devices/s390_flic.rst166
-rw-r--r--Documentation/virt/kvm/devices/vcpu.rst267
-rw-r--r--Documentation/virt/kvm/devices/vfio.rst61
-rw-r--r--Documentation/virt/kvm/devices/vm.rst402
-rw-r--r--Documentation/virt/kvm/devices/xics.rst92
-rw-r--r--Documentation/virt/kvm/devices/xive.rst247
-rw-r--r--Documentation/virt/kvm/halt-polling.rst153
-rw-r--r--Documentation/virt/kvm/index.rst21
-rw-r--r--Documentation/virt/kvm/locking.rst301
-rw-r--r--Documentation/virt/kvm/ppc-pv.rst222
-rw-r--r--Documentation/virt/kvm/review-checklist.rst41
-rw-r--r--Documentation/virt/kvm/s390/index.rst13
-rw-r--r--Documentation/virt/kvm/s390/s390-diag.rst119
-rw-r--r--Documentation/virt/kvm/s390/s390-pv-boot.rst84
-rw-r--r--Documentation/virt/kvm/s390/s390-pv-dump.rst64
-rw-r--r--Documentation/virt/kvm/s390/s390-pv.rst116
-rw-r--r--Documentation/virt/kvm/vcpu-requests.rst294
-rw-r--r--Documentation/virt/kvm/x86/amd-memory-encryption.rst446
-rw-r--r--Documentation/virt/kvm/x86/cpuid.rst124
-rw-r--r--Documentation/virt/kvm/x86/errata.rst50
-rw-r--r--Documentation/virt/kvm/x86/hypercalls.rst192
-rw-r--r--Documentation/virt/kvm/x86/index.rst18
-rw-r--r--Documentation/virt/kvm/x86/mmu.rst484
-rw-r--r--Documentation/virt/kvm/x86/msr.rst391
-rw-r--r--Documentation/virt/kvm/x86/nested-vmx.rst244
-rw-r--r--Documentation/virt/kvm/x86/running-nested-guests.rst278
-rw-r--r--Documentation/virt/kvm/x86/timekeeping.rst645
-rw-r--r--Documentation/virt/ne_overview.rst100
-rw-r--r--Documentation/virt/paravirt_ops.rst35
-rw-r--r--Documentation/virt/uml/user_mode_linux_howto_v2.rst1238
54 files changed, 17631 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/virt/acrn/cpuid.rst b/Documentation/virt/acrn/cpuid.rst
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..65fa4b9c17
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/virt/acrn/cpuid.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+===============
+ACRN CPUID bits
+===============
+
+A guest VM running on an ACRN hypervisor can check some of its features using
+CPUID.
+
+ACRN cpuid functions are:
+
+function: 0x40000000
+
+returns::
+
+ eax = 0x40000010
+ ebx = 0x4e524341
+ ecx = 0x4e524341
+ edx = 0x4e524341
+
+Note that this value in ebx, ecx and edx corresponds to the string
+"ACRNACRNACRN". The value in eax corresponds to the maximum cpuid function
+present in this leaf, and will be updated if more functions are added in the
+future.
+
+function: define ACRN_CPUID_FEATURES (0x40000001)
+
+returns::
+
+ ebx, ecx, edx
+ eax = an OR'ed group of (1 << flag)
+
+where ``flag`` is defined as below:
+
+================================= =========== ================================
+flag value meaning
+================================= =========== ================================
+ACRN_FEATURE_PRIVILEGED_VM 0 guest VM is a privileged VM
+================================= =========== ================================
+
+function: 0x40000010
+
+returns::
+
+ ebx, ecx, edx
+ eax = (Virtual) TSC frequency in kHz.
diff --git a/Documentation/virt/acrn/index.rst b/Documentation/virt/acrn/index.rst
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b5f793e73d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/virt/acrn/index.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+===============
+ACRN Hypervisor
+===============
+
+.. toctree::
+ :maxdepth: 1
+
+ introduction
+ io-request
+ cpuid
diff --git a/Documentation/virt/acrn/introduction.rst b/Documentation/virt/acrn/introduction.rst
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..f8d081bc08
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/virt/acrn/introduction.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+ACRN Hypervisor Introduction
+============================
+
+The ACRN Hypervisor is a Type 1 hypervisor, running directly on bare-metal
+hardware. It has a privileged management VM, called Service VM, to manage User
+VMs and do I/O emulation.
+
+ACRN userspace is an application running in the Service VM that emulates
+devices for a User VM based on command line configurations. ACRN Hypervisor
+Service Module (HSM) is a kernel module in the Service VM which provides
+hypervisor services to the ACRN userspace.
+
+Below figure shows the architecture.
+
+::
+
+ Service VM User VM
+ +----------------------------+ | +------------------+
+ | +--------------+ | | | |
+ | |ACRN userspace| | | | |
+ | +--------------+ | | | |
+ |-----------------ioctl------| | | | ...
+ |kernel space +----------+ | | | |
+ | | HSM | | | | Drivers |
+ | +----------+ | | | |
+ +--------------------|-------+ | +------------------+
+ +---------------------hypercall----------------------------------------+
+ | ACRN Hypervisor |
+ +----------------------------------------------------------------------+
+ | Hardware |
+ +----------------------------------------------------------------------+
+
+ACRN userspace allocates memory for the User VM, configures and initializes the
+devices used by the User VM, loads the virtual bootloader, initializes the
+virtual CPU state and handles I/O request accesses from the User VM. It uses
+ioctls to communicate with the HSM. HSM implements hypervisor services by
+interacting with the ACRN Hypervisor via hypercalls. HSM exports a char device
+interface (/dev/acrn_hsm) to userspace.
+
+The ACRN hypervisor is open for contribution from anyone. The source repo is
+available at https://github.com/projectacrn/acrn-hypervisor.
diff --git a/Documentation/virt/acrn/io-request.rst b/Documentation/virt/acrn/io-request.rst
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..6cc3ea0fa1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/virt/acrn/io-request.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+I/O request handling
+====================
+
+An I/O request of a User VM, which is constructed by the hypervisor, is
+distributed by the ACRN Hypervisor Service Module to an I/O client
+corresponding to the address range of the I/O request. Details of I/O request
+handling are described in the following sections.
+
+1. I/O request
+--------------
+
+For each User VM, there is a shared 4-KByte memory region used for I/O requests
+communication between the hypervisor and Service VM. An I/O request is a
+256-byte structure buffer, which is 'struct acrn_io_request', that is filled by
+an I/O handler of the hypervisor when a trapped I/O access happens in a User
+VM. ACRN userspace in the Service VM first allocates a 4-KByte page and passes
+the GPA (Guest Physical Address) of the buffer to the hypervisor. The buffer is
+used as an array of 16 I/O request slots with each I/O request slot being 256
+bytes. This array is indexed by vCPU ID.
+
+2. I/O clients
+--------------
+
+An I/O client is responsible for handling User VM I/O requests whose accessed
+GPA falls in a certain range. Multiple I/O clients can be associated with each
+User VM. There is a special client associated with each User VM, called the
+default client, that handles all I/O requests that do not fit into the range of
+any other clients. The ACRN userspace acts as the default client for each User
+VM.
+
+Below illustration shows the relationship between I/O requests shared buffer,
+I/O requests and I/O clients.
+
+::
+
+ +------------------------------------------------------+
+ | Service VM |
+ |+--------------------------------------------------+ |
+ || +----------------------------------------+ | |
+ || | shared page ACRN userspace | | |
+ || | +-----------------+ +------------+ | | |
+ || +----+->| acrn_io_request |<-+ default | | | |
+ || | | | +-----------------+ | I/O client | | | |
+ || | | | | ... | +------------+ | | |
+ || | | | +-----------------+ | | |
+ || | +-|--------------------------------------+ | |
+ ||---|----|-----------------------------------------| |
+ || | | kernel | |
+ || | | +----------------------+ | |
+ || | | | +-------------+ HSM | | |
+ || | +--------------+ | | | |
+ || | | | I/O clients | | | |
+ || | | | | | | |
+ || | | +-------------+ | | |
+ || | +----------------------+ | |
+ |+---|----------------------------------------------+ |
+ +----|-------------------------------------------------+
+ |
+ +----|-------------------------------------------------+
+ | +-+-----------+ |
+ | | I/O handler | ACRN Hypervisor |
+ | +-------------+ |
+ +------------------------------------------------------+
+
+3. I/O request state transition
+-------------------------------
+
+The state transitions of an ACRN I/O request are as follows.
+
+::
+
+ FREE -> PENDING -> PROCESSING -> COMPLETE -> FREE -> ...
+
+- FREE: this I/O request slot is empty
+- PENDING: a valid I/O request is pending in this slot
+- PROCESSING: the I/O request is being processed
+- COMPLETE: the I/O request has been processed
+
+An I/O request in COMPLETE or FREE state is owned by the hypervisor. HSM and
+ACRN userspace are in charge of processing the others.
+
+4. Processing flow of I/O requests
+----------------------------------
+
+a. The I/O handler of the hypervisor will fill an I/O request with PENDING
+ state when a trapped I/O access happens in a User VM.
+b. The hypervisor makes an upcall, which is a notification interrupt, to
+ the Service VM.
+c. The upcall handler schedules a worker to dispatch I/O requests.
+d. The worker looks for the PENDING I/O requests, assigns them to different
+ registered clients based on the address of the I/O accesses, updates
+ their state to PROCESSING, and notifies the corresponding client to handle.
+e. The notified client handles the assigned I/O requests.
+f. The HSM updates I/O requests states to COMPLETE and notifies the hypervisor
+ of the completion via hypercalls.
diff --git a/Documentation/virt/coco/sev-guest.rst b/Documentation/virt/coco/sev-guest.rst
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..68b0d2363a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/virt/coco/sev-guest.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,161 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+===================================================================
+The Definitive SEV Guest API Documentation
+===================================================================
+
+1. General description
+======================
+
+The SEV API is a set of ioctls that are used by the guest or hypervisor
+to get or set a certain aspect of the SEV virtual machine. The ioctls belong
+to the following classes:
+
+ - Hypervisor ioctls: These query and set global attributes which affect the
+ whole SEV firmware. These ioctl are used by platform provisioning tools.
+
+ - Guest ioctls: These query and set attributes of the SEV virtual machine.
+
+2. API description
+==================
+
+This section describes ioctls that is used for querying the SEV guest report
+from the SEV firmware. For each ioctl, the following information is provided
+along with a description:
+
+ Technology:
+ which SEV technology provides this ioctl. SEV, SEV-ES, SEV-SNP or all.
+
+ Type:
+ hypervisor or guest. The ioctl can be used inside the guest or the
+ hypervisor.
+
+ Parameters:
+ what parameters are accepted by the ioctl.
+
+ Returns:
+ the return value. General error numbers (-ENOMEM, -EINVAL)
+ are not detailed, but errors with specific meanings are.
+
+The guest ioctl should be issued on a file descriptor of the /dev/sev-guest
+device. The ioctl accepts struct snp_user_guest_request. The input and
+output structure is specified through the req_data and resp_data field
+respectively. If the ioctl fails to execute due to a firmware error, then
+the fw_error code will be set, otherwise fw_error will be set to -1.
+
+The firmware checks that the message sequence counter is one greater than
+the guests message sequence counter. If guest driver fails to increment message
+counter (e.g. counter overflow), then -EIO will be returned.
+
+::
+
+ struct snp_guest_request_ioctl {
+ /* Message version number */
+ __u32 msg_version;
+
+ /* Request and response structure address */
+ __u64 req_data;
+ __u64 resp_data;
+
+ /* bits[63:32]: VMM error code, bits[31:0] firmware error code (see psp-sev.h) */
+ union {
+ __u64 exitinfo2;
+ struct {
+ __u32 fw_error;
+ __u32 vmm_error;
+ };
+ };
+ };
+
+2.1 SNP_GET_REPORT
+------------------
+
+:Technology: sev-snp
+:Type: guest ioctl
+:Parameters (in): struct snp_report_req
+:Returns (out): struct snp_report_resp on success, -negative on error
+
+The SNP_GET_REPORT ioctl can be used to query the attestation report from the
+SEV-SNP firmware. The ioctl uses the SNP_GUEST_REQUEST (MSG_REPORT_REQ) command
+provided by the SEV-SNP firmware to query the attestation report.
+
+On success, the snp_report_resp.data will contains the report. The report
+contain the format described in the SEV-SNP specification. See the SEV-SNP
+specification for further details.
+
+2.2 SNP_GET_DERIVED_KEY
+-----------------------
+:Technology: sev-snp
+:Type: guest ioctl
+:Parameters (in): struct snp_derived_key_req
+:Returns (out): struct snp_derived_key_resp on success, -negative on error
+
+The SNP_GET_DERIVED_KEY ioctl can be used to get a key derive from a root key.
+The derived key can be used by the guest for any purpose, such as sealing keys
+or communicating with external entities.
+
+The ioctl uses the SNP_GUEST_REQUEST (MSG_KEY_REQ) command provided by the
+SEV-SNP firmware to derive the key. See SEV-SNP specification for further details
+on the various fields passed in the key derivation request.
+
+On success, the snp_derived_key_resp.data contains the derived key value. See
+the SEV-SNP specification for further details.
+
+
+2.3 SNP_GET_EXT_REPORT
+----------------------
+:Technology: sev-snp
+:Type: guest ioctl
+:Parameters (in/out): struct snp_ext_report_req
+:Returns (out): struct snp_report_resp on success, -negative on error
+
+The SNP_GET_EXT_REPORT ioctl is similar to the SNP_GET_REPORT. The difference is
+related to the additional certificate data that is returned with the report.
+The certificate data returned is being provided by the hypervisor through the
+SNP_SET_EXT_CONFIG.
+
+The ioctl uses the SNP_GUEST_REQUEST (MSG_REPORT_REQ) command provided by the SEV-SNP
+firmware to get the attestation report.
+
+On success, the snp_ext_report_resp.data will contain the attestation report
+and snp_ext_report_req.certs_address will contain the certificate blob. If the
+length of the blob is smaller than expected then snp_ext_report_req.certs_len will
+be updated with the expected value.
+
+See GHCB specification for further detail on how to parse the certificate blob.
+
+3. SEV-SNP CPUID Enforcement
+============================
+
+SEV-SNP guests can access a special page that contains a table of CPUID values
+that have been validated by the PSP as part of the SNP_LAUNCH_UPDATE firmware
+command. It provides the following assurances regarding the validity of CPUID
+values:
+
+ - Its address is obtained via bootloader/firmware (via CC blob), and those
+ binaries will be measured as part of the SEV-SNP attestation report.
+ - Its initial state will be encrypted/pvalidated, so attempts to modify
+ it during run-time will result in garbage being written, or #VC exceptions
+ being generated due to changes in validation state if the hypervisor tries
+ to swap the backing page.
+ - Attempts to bypass PSP checks by the hypervisor by using a normal page, or
+ a non-CPUID encrypted page will change the measurement provided by the
+ SEV-SNP attestation report.
+ - The CPUID page contents are *not* measured, but attempts to modify the
+ expected contents of a CPUID page as part of guest initialization will be
+ gated by the PSP CPUID enforcement policy checks performed on the page
+ during SNP_LAUNCH_UPDATE, and noticeable later if the guest owner
+ implements their own checks of the CPUID values.
+
+It is important to note that this last assurance is only useful if the kernel
+has taken care to make use of the SEV-SNP CPUID throughout all stages of boot.
+Otherwise, guest owner attestation provides no assurance that the kernel wasn't
+fed incorrect values at some point during boot.
+
+
+Reference
+---------
+
+SEV-SNP and GHCB specification: developer.amd.com/sev
+
+The driver is based on SEV-SNP firmware spec 0.9 and GHCB spec version 2.0.
diff --git a/Documentation/virt/coco/tdx-guest.rst b/Documentation/virt/coco/tdx-guest.rst
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..46e316db6b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/virt/coco/tdx-guest.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+===================================================================
+TDX Guest API Documentation
+===================================================================
+
+1. General description
+======================
+
+The TDX guest driver exposes IOCTL interfaces via the /dev/tdx-guest misc
+device to allow userspace to get certain TDX guest-specific details.
+
+2. API description
+==================
+
+In this section, for each supported IOCTL, the following information is
+provided along with a generic description.
+
+:Input parameters: Parameters passed to the IOCTL and related details.
+:Output: Details about output data and return value (with details about
+ the non common error values).
+
+2.1 TDX_CMD_GET_REPORT0
+-----------------------
+
+:Input parameters: struct tdx_report_req
+:Output: Upon successful execution, TDREPORT data is copied to
+ tdx_report_req.tdreport and return 0. Return -EINVAL for invalid
+ operands, -EIO on TDCALL failure or standard error number on other
+ common failures.
+
+The TDX_CMD_GET_REPORT0 IOCTL can be used by the attestation software to get
+the TDREPORT0 (a.k.a. TDREPORT subtype 0) from the TDX module using
+TDCALL[TDG.MR.REPORT].
+
+A subtype index is added at the end of this IOCTL CMD to uniquely identify the
+subtype-specific TDREPORT request. Although the subtype option is mentioned in
+the TDX Module v1.0 specification, section titled "TDG.MR.REPORT", it is not
+currently used, and it expects this value to be 0. So to keep the IOCTL
+implementation simple, the subtype option was not included as part of the input
+ABI. However, in the future, if the TDX Module supports more than one subtype,
+a new IOCTL CMD will be created to handle it. To keep the IOCTL naming
+consistent, a subtype index is added as part of the IOCTL CMD.
+
+Reference
+---------
+
+TDX reference material is collected here:
+
+https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/technical/intel-trust-domain-extensions.html
+
+The driver is based on TDX module specification v1.0 and TDX GHCI specification v1.0.
diff --git a/Documentation/virt/guest-halt-polling.rst b/Documentation/virt/guest-halt-polling.rst
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..922291ddc4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/virt/guest-halt-polling.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+==================
+Guest halt polling
+==================
+
+The cpuidle_haltpoll driver, with the haltpoll governor, allows
+the guest vcpus to poll for a specified amount of time before
+halting.
+
+This provides the following benefits to host side polling:
+
+ 1) The POLL flag is set while polling is performed, which allows
+ a remote vCPU to avoid sending an IPI (and the associated
+ cost of handling the IPI) when performing a wakeup.
+
+ 2) The VM-exit cost can be avoided.
+
+The downside of guest side polling is that polling is performed
+even with other runnable tasks in the host.
+
+The basic logic as follows: A global value, guest_halt_poll_ns,
+is configured by the user, indicating the maximum amount of
+time polling is allowed. This value is fixed.
+
+Each vcpu has an adjustable guest_halt_poll_ns
+("per-cpu guest_halt_poll_ns"), which is adjusted by the algorithm
+in response to events (explained below).
+
+Module Parameters
+=================
+
+The haltpoll governor has 5 tunable module parameters:
+
+1) guest_halt_poll_ns:
+
+Maximum amount of time, in nanoseconds, that polling is
+performed before halting.
+
+Default: 200000
+
+2) guest_halt_poll_shrink:
+
+Division factor used to shrink per-cpu guest_halt_poll_ns when
+wakeup event occurs after the global guest_halt_poll_ns.
+
+Default: 2
+
+3) guest_halt_poll_grow:
+
+Multiplication factor used to grow per-cpu guest_halt_poll_ns
+when event occurs after per-cpu guest_halt_poll_ns
+but before global guest_halt_poll_ns.
+
+Default: 2
+
+4) guest_halt_poll_grow_start:
+
+The per-cpu guest_halt_poll_ns eventually reaches zero
+in case of an idle system. This value sets the initial
+per-cpu guest_halt_poll_ns when growing. This can
+be increased from 10000, to avoid misses during the initial
+growth stage:
+
+10k, 20k, 40k, ... (example assumes guest_halt_poll_grow=2).
+
+Default: 50000
+
+5) guest_halt_poll_allow_shrink:
+
+Bool parameter which allows shrinking. Set to N
+to avoid it (per-cpu guest_halt_poll_ns will remain
+high once achieves global guest_halt_poll_ns value).
+
+Default: Y
+
+The module parameters can be set from the sysfs files in::
+
+ /sys/module/haltpoll/parameters/
+
+Further Notes
+=============
+
+- Care should be taken when setting the guest_halt_poll_ns parameter as a
+ large value has the potential to drive the cpu usage to 100% on a machine
+ which would be almost entirely idle otherwise.
diff --git a/Documentation/virt/hyperv/clocks.rst b/Documentation/virt/hyperv/clocks.rst
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a56f4837d4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/virt/hyperv/clocks.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+Clocks and Timers
+=================
+
+arm64
+-----
+On arm64, Hyper-V virtualizes the ARMv8 architectural system counter
+and timer. Guest VMs use this virtualized hardware as the Linux
+clocksource and clockevents via the standard arm_arch_timer.c
+driver, just as they would on bare metal. Linux vDSO support for the
+architectural system counter is functional in guest VMs on Hyper-V.
+While Hyper-V also provides a synthetic system clock and four synthetic
+per-CPU timers as described in the TLFS, they are not used by the
+Linux kernel in a Hyper-V guest on arm64. However, older versions
+of Hyper-V for arm64 only partially virtualize the ARMv8
+architectural timer, such that the timer does not generate
+interrupts in the VM. Because of this limitation, running current
+Linux kernel versions on these older Hyper-V versions requires an
+out-of-tree patch to use the Hyper-V synthetic clocks/timers instead.
+
+x86/x64
+-------
+On x86/x64, Hyper-V provides guest VMs with a synthetic system clock
+and four synthetic per-CPU timers as described in the TLFS. Hyper-V
+also provides access to the virtualized TSC via the RDTSC and
+related instructions. These TSC instructions do not trap to
+the hypervisor and so provide excellent performance in a VM.
+Hyper-V performs TSC calibration, and provides the TSC frequency
+to the guest VM via a synthetic MSR. Hyper-V initialization code
+in Linux reads this MSR to get the frequency, so it skips TSC
+calibration and sets tsc_reliable. Hyper-V provides virtualized
+versions of the PIT (in Hyper-V Generation 1 VMs only), local
+APIC timer, and RTC. Hyper-V does not provide a virtualized HPET in
+guest VMs.
+
+The Hyper-V synthetic system clock can be read via a synthetic MSR,
+but this access traps to the hypervisor. As a faster alternative,
+the guest can configure a memory page to be shared between the guest
+and the hypervisor. Hyper-V populates this memory page with a
+64-bit scale value and offset value. To read the synthetic clock
+value, the guest reads the TSC and then applies the scale and offset
+as described in the Hyper-V TLFS. The resulting value advances
+at a constant 10 MHz frequency. In the case of a live migration
+to a host with a different TSC frequency, Hyper-V adjusts the
+scale and offset values in the shared page so that the 10 MHz
+frequency is maintained.
+
+Starting with Windows Server 2022 Hyper-V, Hyper-V uses hardware
+support for TSC frequency scaling to enable live migration of VMs
+across Hyper-V hosts where the TSC frequency may be different.
+When a Linux guest detects that this Hyper-V functionality is
+available, it prefers to use Linux's standard TSC-based clocksource.
+Otherwise, it uses the clocksource for the Hyper-V synthetic system
+clock implemented via the shared page (identified as
+"hyperv_clocksource_tsc_page").
+
+The Hyper-V synthetic system clock is available to user space via
+vDSO, and gettimeofday() and related system calls can execute
+entirely in user space. The vDSO is implemented by mapping the
+shared page with scale and offset values into user space. User
+space code performs the same algorithm of reading the TSC and
+applying the scale and offset to get the constant 10 MHz clock.
+
+Linux clockevents are based on Hyper-V synthetic timer 0. While
+Hyper-V offers 4 synthetic timers for each CPU, Linux only uses
+timer 0. Interrupts from stimer0 are recorded on the "HVS" line in
+/proc/interrupts. Clockevents based on the virtualized PIT and
+local APIC timer also work, but the Hyper-V synthetic timer is
+preferred.
+
+The driver for the Hyper-V synthetic system clock and timers is
+drivers/clocksource/hyperv_timer.c.
diff --git a/Documentation/virt/hyperv/index.rst b/Documentation/virt/hyperv/index.rst
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..4a7a1b738b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/virt/hyperv/index.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+======================
+Hyper-V Enlightenments
+======================
+
+.. toctree::
+ :maxdepth: 1
+
+ overview
+ vmbus
+ clocks
diff --git a/Documentation/virt/hyperv/overview.rst b/Documentation/virt/hyperv/overview.rst
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..cd493332c8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/virt/hyperv/overview.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,207 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+Overview
+========
+The Linux kernel contains a variety of code for running as a fully
+enlightened guest on Microsoft's Hyper-V hypervisor. Hyper-V
+consists primarily of a bare-metal hypervisor plus a virtual machine
+management service running in the parent partition (roughly
+equivalent to KVM and QEMU, for example). Guest VMs run in child
+partitions. In this documentation, references to Hyper-V usually
+encompass both the hypervisor and the VMM service without making a
+distinction about which functionality is provided by which
+component.
+
+Hyper-V runs on x86/x64 and arm64 architectures, and Linux guests
+are supported on both. The functionality and behavior of Hyper-V is
+generally the same on both architectures unless noted otherwise.
+
+Linux Guest Communication with Hyper-V
+--------------------------------------
+Linux guests communicate with Hyper-V in four different ways:
+
+* Implicit traps: As defined by the x86/x64 or arm64 architecture,
+ some guest actions trap to Hyper-V. Hyper-V emulates the action and
+ returns control to the guest. This behavior is generally invisible
+ to the Linux kernel.
+
+* Explicit hypercalls: Linux makes an explicit function call to
+ Hyper-V, passing parameters. Hyper-V performs the requested action
+ and returns control to the caller. Parameters are passed in
+ processor registers or in memory shared between the Linux guest and
+ Hyper-V. On x86/x64, hypercalls use a Hyper-V specific calling
+ sequence. On arm64, hypercalls use the ARM standard SMCCC calling
+ sequence.
+
+* Synthetic register access: Hyper-V implements a variety of
+ synthetic registers. On x86/x64 these registers appear as MSRs in
+ the guest, and the Linux kernel can read or write these MSRs using
+ the normal mechanisms defined by the x86/x64 architecture. On
+ arm64, these synthetic registers must be accessed using explicit
+ hypercalls.
+
+* VMbus: VMbus is a higher-level software construct that is built on
+ the other 3 mechanisms. It is a message passing interface between
+ the Hyper-V host and the Linux guest. It uses memory that is shared
+ between Hyper-V and the guest, along with various signaling
+ mechanisms.
+
+The first three communication mechanisms are documented in the
+`Hyper-V Top Level Functional Spec (TLFS)`_. The TLFS describes
+general Hyper-V functionality and provides details on the hypercalls
+and synthetic registers. The TLFS is currently written for the
+x86/x64 architecture only.
+
+.. _Hyper-V Top Level Functional Spec (TLFS): https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/virtualization/hyper-v-on-windows/tlfs/tlfs
+
+VMbus is not documented. This documentation provides a high-level
+overview of VMbus and how it works, but the details can be discerned
+only from the code.
+
+Sharing Memory
+--------------
+Many aspects are communication between Hyper-V and Linux are based
+on sharing memory. Such sharing is generally accomplished as
+follows:
+
+* Linux allocates memory from its physical address space using
+ standard Linux mechanisms.
+
+* Linux tells Hyper-V the guest physical address (GPA) of the
+ allocated memory. Many shared areas are kept to 1 page so that a
+ single GPA is sufficient. Larger shared areas require a list of
+ GPAs, which usually do not need to be contiguous in the guest
+ physical address space. How Hyper-V is told about the GPA or list
+ of GPAs varies. In some cases, a single GPA is written to a
+ synthetic register. In other cases, a GPA or list of GPAs is sent
+ in a VMbus message.
+
+* Hyper-V translates the GPAs into "real" physical memory addresses,
+ and creates a virtual mapping that it can use to access the memory.
+
+* Linux can later revoke sharing it has previously established by
+ telling Hyper-V to set the shared GPA to zero.
+
+Hyper-V operates with a page size of 4 Kbytes. GPAs communicated to
+Hyper-V may be in the form of page numbers, and always describe a
+range of 4 Kbytes. Since the Linux guest page size on x86/x64 is
+also 4 Kbytes, the mapping from guest page to Hyper-V page is 1-to-1.
+On arm64, Hyper-V supports guests with 4/16/64 Kbyte pages as
+defined by the arm64 architecture. If Linux is using 16 or 64
+Kbyte pages, Linux code must be careful to communicate with Hyper-V
+only in terms of 4 Kbyte pages. HV_HYP_PAGE_SIZE and related macros
+are used in code that communicates with Hyper-V so that it works
+correctly in all configurations.
+
+As described in the TLFS, a few memory pages shared between Hyper-V
+and the Linux guest are "overlay" pages. With overlay pages, Linux
+uses the usual approach of allocating guest memory and telling
+Hyper-V the GPA of the allocated memory. But Hyper-V then replaces
+that physical memory page with a page it has allocated, and the
+original physical memory page is no longer accessible in the guest
+VM. Linux may access the memory normally as if it were the memory
+that it originally allocated. The "overlay" behavior is visible
+only because the contents of the page (as seen by Linux) change at
+the time that Linux originally establishes the sharing and the
+overlay page is inserted. Similarly, the contents change if Linux
+revokes the sharing, in which case Hyper-V removes the overlay page,
+and the guest page originally allocated by Linux becomes visible
+again.
+
+Before Linux does a kexec to a kdump kernel or any other kernel,
+memory shared with Hyper-V should be revoked. Hyper-V could modify
+a shared page or remove an overlay page after the new kernel is
+using the page for a different purpose, corrupting the new kernel.
+Hyper-V does not provide a single "set everything" operation to
+guest VMs, so Linux code must individually revoke all sharing before
+doing kexec. See hv_kexec_handler() and hv_crash_handler(). But
+the crash/panic path still has holes in cleanup because some shared
+pages are set using per-CPU synthetic registers and there's no
+mechanism to revoke the shared pages for CPUs other than the CPU
+running the panic path.
+
+CPU Management
+--------------
+Hyper-V does not have a ability to hot-add or hot-remove a CPU
+from a running VM. However, Windows Server 2019 Hyper-V and
+earlier versions may provide guests with ACPI tables that indicate
+more CPUs than are actually present in the VM. As is normal, Linux
+treats these additional CPUs as potential hot-add CPUs, and reports
+them as such even though Hyper-V will never actually hot-add them.
+Starting in Windows Server 2022 Hyper-V, the ACPI tables reflect
+only the CPUs actually present in the VM, so Linux does not report
+any hot-add CPUs.
+
+A Linux guest CPU may be taken offline using the normal Linux
+mechanisms, provided no VMbus channel interrupts are assigned to
+the CPU. See the section on VMbus Interrupts for more details
+on how VMbus channel interrupts can be re-assigned to permit
+taking a CPU offline.
+
+32-bit and 64-bit
+-----------------
+On x86/x64, Hyper-V supports 32-bit and 64-bit guests, and Linux
+will build and run in either version. While the 32-bit version is
+expected to work, it is used rarely and may suffer from undetected
+regressions.
+
+On arm64, Hyper-V supports only 64-bit guests.
+
+Endian-ness
+-----------
+All communication between Hyper-V and guest VMs uses Little-Endian
+format on both x86/x64 and arm64. Big-endian format on arm64 is not
+supported by Hyper-V, and Linux code does not use endian-ness macros
+when accessing data shared with Hyper-V.
+
+Versioning
+----------
+Current Linux kernels operate correctly with older versions of
+Hyper-V back to Windows Server 2012 Hyper-V. Support for running
+on the original Hyper-V release in Windows Server 2008/2008 R2
+has been removed.
+
+A Linux guest on Hyper-V outputs in dmesg the version of Hyper-V
+it is running on. This version is in the form of a Windows build
+number and is for display purposes only. Linux code does not
+test this version number at runtime to determine available features
+and functionality. Hyper-V indicates feature/function availability
+via flags in synthetic MSRs that Hyper-V provides to the guest,
+and the guest code tests these flags.
+
+VMbus has its own protocol version that is negotiated during the
+initial VMbus connection from the guest to Hyper-V. This version
+number is also output to dmesg during boot. This version number
+is checked in a few places in the code to determine if specific
+functionality is present.
+
+Furthermore, each synthetic device on VMbus also has a protocol
+version that is separate from the VMbus protocol version. Device
+drivers for these synthetic devices typically negotiate the device
+protocol version, and may test that protocol version to determine
+if specific device functionality is present.
+
+Code Packaging
+--------------
+Hyper-V related code appears in the Linux kernel code tree in three
+main areas:
+
+1. drivers/hv
+
+2. arch/x86/hyperv and arch/arm64/hyperv
+
+3. individual device driver areas such as drivers/scsi, drivers/net,
+ drivers/clocksource, etc.
+
+A few miscellaneous files appear elsewhere. See the full list under
+"Hyper-V/Azure CORE AND DRIVERS" and "DRM DRIVER FOR HYPERV
+SYNTHETIC VIDEO DEVICE" in the MAINTAINERS file.
+
+The code in #1 and #2 is built only when CONFIG_HYPERV is set.
+Similarly, the code for most Hyper-V related drivers is built only
+when CONFIG_HYPERV is set.
+
+Most Hyper-V related code in #1 and #3 can be built as a module.
+The architecture specific code in #2 must be built-in. Also,
+drivers/hv/hv_common.c is low-level code that is common across
+architectures and must be built-in.
diff --git a/Documentation/virt/hyperv/vmbus.rst b/Documentation/virt/hyperv/vmbus.rst
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..d2012d9022
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/virt/hyperv/vmbus.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,303 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+VMbus
+=====
+VMbus is a software construct provided by Hyper-V to guest VMs. It
+consists of a control path and common facilities used by synthetic
+devices that Hyper-V presents to guest VMs. The control path is
+used to offer synthetic devices to the guest VM and, in some cases,
+to rescind those devices. The common facilities include software
+channels for communicating between the device driver in the guest VM
+and the synthetic device implementation that is part of Hyper-V, and
+signaling primitives to allow Hyper-V and the guest to interrupt
+each other.
+
+VMbus is modeled in Linux as a bus, with the expected /sys/bus/vmbus
+entry in a running Linux guest. The VMbus driver (drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c)
+establishes the VMbus control path with the Hyper-V host, then
+registers itself as a Linux bus driver. It implements the standard
+bus functions for adding and removing devices to/from the bus.
+
+Most synthetic devices offered by Hyper-V have a corresponding Linux
+device driver. These devices include:
+
+* SCSI controller
+* NIC
+* Graphics frame buffer
+* Keyboard
+* Mouse
+* PCI device pass-thru
+* Heartbeat
+* Time Sync
+* Shutdown
+* Memory balloon
+* Key/Value Pair (KVP) exchange with Hyper-V
+* Hyper-V online backup (a.k.a. VSS)
+
+Guest VMs may have multiple instances of the synthetic SCSI
+controller, synthetic NIC, and PCI pass-thru devices. Other
+synthetic devices are limited to a single instance per VM. Not
+listed above are a small number of synthetic devices offered by
+Hyper-V that are used only by Windows guests and for which Linux
+does not have a driver.
+
+Hyper-V uses the terms "VSP" and "VSC" in describing synthetic
+devices. "VSP" refers to the Hyper-V code that implements a
+particular synthetic device, while "VSC" refers to the driver for
+the device in the guest VM. For example, the Linux driver for the
+synthetic NIC is referred to as "netvsc" and the Linux driver for
+the synthetic SCSI controller is "storvsc". These drivers contain
+functions with names like "storvsc_connect_to_vsp".
+
+VMbus channels
+--------------
+An instance of a synthetic device uses VMbus channels to communicate
+between the VSP and the VSC. Channels are bi-directional and used
+for passing messages. Most synthetic devices use a single channel,
+but the synthetic SCSI controller and synthetic NIC may use multiple
+channels to achieve higher performance and greater parallelism.
+
+Each channel consists of two ring buffers. These are classic ring
+buffers from a university data structures textbook. If the read
+and writes pointers are equal, the ring buffer is considered to be
+empty, so a full ring buffer always has at least one byte unused.
+The "in" ring buffer is for messages from the Hyper-V host to the
+guest, and the "out" ring buffer is for messages from the guest to
+the Hyper-V host. In Linux, the "in" and "out" designations are as
+viewed by the guest side. The ring buffers are memory that is
+shared between the guest and the host, and they follow the standard
+paradigm where the memory is allocated by the guest, with the list
+of GPAs that make up the ring buffer communicated to the host. Each
+ring buffer consists of a header page (4 Kbytes) with the read and
+write indices and some control flags, followed by the memory for the
+actual ring. The size of the ring is determined by the VSC in the
+guest and is specific to each synthetic device. The list of GPAs
+making up the ring is communicated to the Hyper-V host over the
+VMbus control path as a GPA Descriptor List (GPADL). See function
+vmbus_establish_gpadl().
+
+Each ring buffer is mapped into contiguous Linux kernel virtual
+space in three parts: 1) the 4 Kbyte header page, 2) the memory
+that makes up the ring itself, and 3) a second mapping of the memory
+that makes up the ring itself. Because (2) and (3) are contiguous
+in kernel virtual space, the code that copies data to and from the
+ring buffer need not be concerned with ring buffer wrap-around.
+Once a copy operation has completed, the read or write index may
+need to be reset to point back into the first mapping, but the
+actual data copy does not need to be broken into two parts. This
+approach also allows complex data structures to be easily accessed
+directly in the ring without handling wrap-around.
+
+On arm64 with page sizes > 4 Kbytes, the header page must still be
+passed to Hyper-V as a 4 Kbyte area. But the memory for the actual
+ring must be aligned to PAGE_SIZE and have a size that is a multiple
+of PAGE_SIZE so that the duplicate mapping trick can be done. Hence
+a portion of the header page is unused and not communicated to
+Hyper-V. This case is handled by vmbus_establish_gpadl().
+
+Hyper-V enforces a limit on the aggregate amount of guest memory
+that can be shared with the host via GPADLs. This limit ensures
+that a rogue guest can't force the consumption of excessive host
+resources. For Windows Server 2019 and later, this limit is
+approximately 1280 Mbytes. For versions prior to Windows Server
+2019, the limit is approximately 384 Mbytes.
+
+VMbus messages
+--------------
+All VMbus messages have a standard header that includes the message
+length, the offset of the message payload, some flags, and a
+transactionID. The portion of the message after the header is
+unique to each VSP/VSC pair.
+
+Messages follow one of two patterns:
+
+* Unidirectional: Either side sends a message and does not
+ expect a response message
+* Request/response: One side (usually the guest) sends a message
+ and expects a response
+
+The transactionID (a.k.a. "requestID") is for matching requests &
+responses. Some synthetic devices allow multiple requests to be in-
+flight simultaneously, so the guest specifies a transactionID when
+sending a request. Hyper-V sends back the same transactionID in the
+matching response.
+
+Messages passed between the VSP and VSC are control messages. For
+example, a message sent from the storvsc driver might be "execute
+this SCSI command". If a message also implies some data transfer
+between the guest and the Hyper-V host, the actual data to be
+transferred may be embedded with the control message, or it may be
+specified as a separate data buffer that the Hyper-V host will
+access as a DMA operation. The former case is used when the size of
+the data is small and the cost of copying the data to and from the
+ring buffer is minimal. For example, time sync messages from the
+Hyper-V host to the guest contain the actual time value. When the
+data is larger, a separate data buffer is used. In this case, the
+control message contains a list of GPAs that describe the data
+buffer. For example, the storvsc driver uses this approach to
+specify the data buffers to/from which disk I/O is done.
+
+Three functions exist to send VMbus messages:
+
+1. vmbus_sendpacket(): Control-only messages and messages with
+ embedded data -- no GPAs
+2. vmbus_sendpacket_pagebuffer(): Message with list of GPAs
+ identifying data to transfer. An offset and length is
+ associated with each GPA so that multiple discontinuous areas
+ of guest memory can be targeted.
+3. vmbus_sendpacket_mpb_desc(): Message with list of GPAs
+ identifying data to transfer. A single offset and length is
+ associated with a list of GPAs. The GPAs must describe a
+ single logical area of guest memory to be targeted.
+
+Historically, Linux guests have trusted Hyper-V to send well-formed
+and valid messages, and Linux drivers for synthetic devices did not
+fully validate messages. With the introduction of processor
+technologies that fully encrypt guest memory and that allow the
+guest to not trust the hypervisor (AMD SNP-SEV, Intel TDX), trusting
+the Hyper-V host is no longer a valid assumption. The drivers for
+VMbus synthetic devices are being updated to fully validate any
+values read from memory that is shared with Hyper-V, which includes
+messages from VMbus devices. To facilitate such validation,
+messages read by the guest from the "in" ring buffer are copied to a
+temporary buffer that is not shared with Hyper-V. Validation is
+performed in this temporary buffer without the risk of Hyper-V
+maliciously modifying the message after it is validated but before
+it is used.
+
+VMbus interrupts
+----------------
+VMbus provides a mechanism for the guest to interrupt the host when
+the guest has queued new messages in a ring buffer. The host
+expects that the guest will send an interrupt only when an "out"
+ring buffer transitions from empty to non-empty. If the guest sends
+interrupts at other times, the host deems such interrupts to be
+unnecessary. If a guest sends an excessive number of unnecessary
+interrupts, the host may throttle that guest by suspending its
+execution for a few seconds to prevent a denial-of-service attack.
+
+Similarly, the host will interrupt the guest when it sends a new
+message on the VMbus control path, or when a VMbus channel "in" ring
+buffer transitions from empty to non-empty. Each CPU in the guest
+may receive VMbus interrupts, so they are best modeled as per-CPU
+interrupts in Linux. This model works well on arm64 where a single
+per-CPU IRQ is allocated for VMbus. Since x86/x64 lacks support for
+per-CPU IRQs, an x86 interrupt vector is statically allocated (see
+HYPERVISOR_CALLBACK_VECTOR) across all CPUs and explicitly coded to
+call the VMbus interrupt service routine. These interrupts are
+visible in /proc/interrupts on the "HYP" line.
+
+The guest CPU that a VMbus channel will interrupt is selected by the
+guest when the channel is created, and the host is informed of that
+selection. VMbus devices are broadly grouped into two categories:
+
+1. "Slow" devices that need only one VMbus channel. The devices
+ (such as keyboard, mouse, heartbeat, and timesync) generate
+ relatively few interrupts. Their VMbus channels are all
+ assigned to interrupt the VMBUS_CONNECT_CPU, which is always
+ CPU 0.
+
+2. "High speed" devices that may use multiple VMbus channels for
+ higher parallelism and performance. These devices include the
+ synthetic SCSI controller and synthetic NIC. Their VMbus
+ channels interrupts are assigned to CPUs that are spread out
+ among the available CPUs in the VM so that interrupts on
+ multiple channels can be processed in parallel.
+
+The assignment of VMbus channel interrupts to CPUs is done in the
+function init_vp_index(). This assignment is done outside of the
+normal Linux interrupt affinity mechanism, so the interrupts are
+neither "unmanaged" nor "managed" interrupts.
+
+The CPU that a VMbus channel will interrupt can be seen in
+/sys/bus/vmbus/devices/<deviceGUID>/ channels/<channelRelID>/cpu.
+When running on later versions of Hyper-V, the CPU can be changed
+by writing a new value to this sysfs entry. Because the interrupt
+assignment is done outside of the normal Linux affinity mechanism,
+there are no entries in /proc/irq corresponding to individual
+VMbus channel interrupts.
+
+An online CPU in a Linux guest may not be taken offline if it has
+VMbus channel interrupts assigned to it. Any such channel
+interrupts must first be manually reassigned to another CPU as
+described above. When no channel interrupts are assigned to the
+CPU, it can be taken offline.
+
+When a guest CPU receives a VMbus interrupt from the host, the
+function vmbus_isr() handles the interrupt. It first checks for
+channel interrupts by calling vmbus_chan_sched(), which looks at a
+bitmap setup by the host to determine which channels have pending
+interrupts on this CPU. If multiple channels have pending
+interrupts for this CPU, they are processed sequentially. When all
+channel interrupts have been processed, vmbus_isr() checks for and
+processes any message received on the VMbus control path.
+
+The VMbus channel interrupt handling code is designed to work
+correctly even if an interrupt is received on a CPU other than the
+CPU assigned to the channel. Specifically, the code does not use
+CPU-based exclusion for correctness. In normal operation, Hyper-V
+will interrupt the assigned CPU. But when the CPU assigned to a
+channel is being changed via sysfs, the guest doesn't know exactly
+when Hyper-V will make the transition. The code must work correctly
+even if there is a time lag before Hyper-V starts interrupting the
+new CPU. See comments in target_cpu_store().
+
+VMbus device creation/deletion
+------------------------------
+Hyper-V and the Linux guest have a separate message-passing path
+that is used for synthetic device creation and deletion. This
+path does not use a VMbus channel. See vmbus_post_msg() and
+vmbus_on_msg_dpc().
+
+The first step is for the guest to connect to the generic
+Hyper-V VMbus mechanism. As part of establishing this connection,
+the guest and Hyper-V agree on a VMbus protocol version they will
+use. This negotiation allows newer Linux kernels to run on older
+Hyper-V versions, and vice versa.
+
+The guest then tells Hyper-V to "send offers". Hyper-V sends an
+offer message to the guest for each synthetic device that the VM
+is configured to have. Each VMbus device type has a fixed GUID
+known as the "class ID", and each VMbus device instance is also
+identified by a GUID. The offer message from Hyper-V contains
+both GUIDs to uniquely (within the VM) identify the device.
+There is one offer message for each device instance, so a VM with
+two synthetic NICs will get two offers messages with the NIC
+class ID. The ordering of offer messages can vary from boot-to-boot
+and must not be assumed to be consistent in Linux code. Offer
+messages may also arrive long after Linux has initially booted
+because Hyper-V supports adding devices, such as synthetic NICs,
+to running VMs. A new offer message is processed by
+vmbus_process_offer(), which indirectly invokes vmbus_add_channel_work().
+
+Upon receipt of an offer message, the guest identifies the device
+type based on the class ID, and invokes the correct driver to set up
+the device. Driver/device matching is performed using the standard
+Linux mechanism.
+
+The device driver probe function opens the primary VMbus channel to
+the corresponding VSP. It allocates guest memory for the channel
+ring buffers and shares the ring buffer with the Hyper-V host by
+giving the host a list of GPAs for the ring buffer memory. See
+vmbus_establish_gpadl().
+
+Once the ring buffer is set up, the device driver and VSP exchange
+setup messages via the primary channel. These messages may include
+negotiating the device protocol version to be used between the Linux
+VSC and the VSP on the Hyper-V host. The setup messages may also
+include creating additional VMbus channels, which are somewhat
+mis-named as "sub-channels" since they are functionally
+equivalent to the primary channel once they are created.
+
+Finally, the device driver may create entries in /dev as with
+any device driver.
+
+The Hyper-V host can send a "rescind" message to the guest to
+remove a device that was previously offered. Linux drivers must
+handle such a rescind message at any time. Rescinding a device
+invokes the device driver "remove" function to cleanly shut
+down the device and remove it. Once a synthetic device is
+rescinded, neither Hyper-V nor Linux retains any state about
+its previous existence. Such a device might be re-added later,
+in which case it is treated as an entirely new device. See
+vmbus_onoffer_rescind().
diff --git a/Documentation/virt/index.rst b/Documentation/virt/index.rst
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..7fb55ae085
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/virt/index.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+======================
+Virtualization Support
+======================
+
+.. toctree::
+ :maxdepth: 2
+
+ kvm/index
+ uml/user_mode_linux_howto_v2
+ paravirt_ops
+ guest-halt-polling
+ ne_overview
+ acrn/index
+ coco/sev-guest
+ coco/tdx-guest
+ hyperv/index
+
+.. only:: html and subproject
+
+ Indices
+ =======
+
+ * :ref:`genindex`
diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..21a7578142
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,8535 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+===================================================================
+The Definitive KVM (Kernel-based Virtual Machine) API Documentation
+===================================================================
+
+1. General description
+======================
+
+The kvm API is a set of ioctls that are issued to control various aspects
+of a virtual machine. The ioctls belong to the following classes:
+
+ - System ioctls: These query and set global attributes which affect the
+ whole kvm subsystem. In addition a system ioctl is used to create
+ virtual machines.
+
+ - VM ioctls: These query and set attributes that affect an entire virtual
+ machine, for example memory layout. In addition a VM ioctl is used to
+ create virtual cpus (vcpus) and devices.
+
+ VM ioctls must be issued from the same process (address space) that was
+ used to create the VM.
+
+ - vcpu ioctls: These query and set attributes that control the operation
+ of a single virtual cpu.
+
+ vcpu ioctls should be issued from the same thread that was used to create
+ the vcpu, except for asynchronous vcpu ioctl that are marked as such in
+ the documentation. Otherwise, the first ioctl after switching threads
+ could see a performance impact.
+
+ - device ioctls: These query and set attributes that control the operation
+ of a single device.
+
+ device ioctls must be issued from the same process (address space) that
+ was used to create the VM.
+
+2. File descriptors
+===================
+
+The kvm API is centered around file descriptors. An initial
+open("/dev/kvm") obtains a handle to the kvm subsystem; this handle
+can be used to issue system ioctls. A KVM_CREATE_VM ioctl on this
+handle will create a VM file descriptor which can be used to issue VM
+ioctls. A KVM_CREATE_VCPU or KVM_CREATE_DEVICE ioctl on a VM fd will
+create a virtual cpu or device and return a file descriptor pointing to
+the new resource. Finally, ioctls on a vcpu or device fd can be used
+to control the vcpu or device. For vcpus, this includes the important
+task of actually running guest code.
+
+In general file descriptors can be migrated among processes by means
+of fork() and the SCM_RIGHTS facility of unix domain socket. These
+kinds of tricks are explicitly not supported by kvm. While they will
+not cause harm to the host, their actual behavior is not guaranteed by
+the API. See "General description" for details on the ioctl usage
+model that is supported by KVM.
+
+It is important to note that although VM ioctls may only be issued from
+the process that created the VM, a VM's lifecycle is associated with its
+file descriptor, not its creator (process). In other words, the VM and
+its resources, *including the associated address space*, are not freed
+until the last reference to the VM's file descriptor has been released.
+For example, if fork() is issued after ioctl(KVM_CREATE_VM), the VM will
+not be freed until both the parent (original) process and its child have
+put their references to the VM's file descriptor.
+
+Because a VM's resources are not freed until the last reference to its
+file descriptor is released, creating additional references to a VM
+via fork(), dup(), etc... without careful consideration is strongly
+discouraged and may have unwanted side effects, e.g. memory allocated
+by and on behalf of the VM's process may not be freed/unaccounted when
+the VM is shut down.
+
+
+3. Extensions
+=============
+
+As of Linux 2.6.22, the KVM ABI has been stabilized: no backward
+incompatible change are allowed. However, there is an extension
+facility that allows backward-compatible extensions to the API to be
+queried and used.
+
+The extension mechanism is not based on the Linux version number.
+Instead, kvm defines extension identifiers and a facility to query
+whether a particular extension identifier is available. If it is, a
+set of ioctls is available for application use.
+
+
+4. API description
+==================
+
+This section describes ioctls that can be used to control kvm guests.
+For each ioctl, the following information is provided along with a
+description:
+
+ Capability:
+ which KVM extension provides this ioctl. Can be 'basic',
+ which means that is will be provided by any kernel that supports
+ API version 12 (see section 4.1), a KVM_CAP_xyz constant, which
+ means availability needs to be checked with KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION
+ (see section 4.4), or 'none' which means that while not all kernels
+ support this ioctl, there's no capability bit to check its
+ availability: for kernels that don't support the ioctl,
+ the ioctl returns -ENOTTY.
+
+ Architectures:
+ which instruction set architectures provide this ioctl.
+ x86 includes both i386 and x86_64.
+
+ Type:
+ system, vm, or vcpu.
+
+ Parameters:
+ what parameters are accepted by the ioctl.
+
+ Returns:
+ the return value. General error numbers (EBADF, ENOMEM, EINVAL)
+ are not detailed, but errors with specific meanings are.
+
+
+4.1 KVM_GET_API_VERSION
+-----------------------
+
+:Capability: basic
+:Architectures: all
+:Type: system ioctl
+:Parameters: none
+:Returns: the constant KVM_API_VERSION (=12)
+
+This identifies the API version as the stable kvm API. It is not
+expected that this number will change. However, Linux 2.6.20 and
+2.6.21 report earlier versions; these are not documented and not
+supported. Applications should refuse to run if KVM_GET_API_VERSION
+returns a value other than 12. If this check passes, all ioctls
+described as 'basic' will be available.
+
+
+4.2 KVM_CREATE_VM
+-----------------
+
+:Capability: basic
+:Architectures: all
+:Type: system ioctl
+:Parameters: machine type identifier (KVM_VM_*)
+:Returns: a VM fd that can be used to control the new virtual machine.
+
+The new VM has no virtual cpus and no memory.
+You probably want to use 0 as machine type.
+
+In order to create user controlled virtual machines on S390, check
+KVM_CAP_S390_UCONTROL and use the flag KVM_VM_S390_UCONTROL as
+privileged user (CAP_SYS_ADMIN).
+
+On arm64, the physical address size for a VM (IPA Size limit) is limited
+to 40bits by default. The limit can be configured if the host supports the
+extension KVM_CAP_ARM_VM_IPA_SIZE. When supported, use
+KVM_VM_TYPE_ARM_IPA_SIZE(IPA_Bits) to set the size in the machine type
+identifier, where IPA_Bits is the maximum width of any physical
+address used by the VM. The IPA_Bits is encoded in bits[7-0] of the
+machine type identifier.
+
+e.g, to configure a guest to use 48bit physical address size::
+
+ vm_fd = ioctl(dev_fd, KVM_CREATE_VM, KVM_VM_TYPE_ARM_IPA_SIZE(48));
+
+The requested size (IPA_Bits) must be:
+
+ == =========================================================
+ 0 Implies default size, 40bits (for backward compatibility)
+ N Implies N bits, where N is a positive integer such that,
+ 32 <= N <= Host_IPA_Limit
+ == =========================================================
+
+Host_IPA_Limit is the maximum possible value for IPA_Bits on the host and
+is dependent on the CPU capability and the kernel configuration. The limit can
+be retrieved using KVM_CAP_ARM_VM_IPA_SIZE of the KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION
+ioctl() at run-time.
+
+Creation of the VM will fail if the requested IPA size (whether it is
+implicit or explicit) is unsupported on the host.
+
+Please note that configuring the IPA size does not affect the capability
+exposed by the guest CPUs in ID_AA64MMFR0_EL1[PARange]. It only affects
+size of the address translated by the stage2 level (guest physical to
+host physical address translations).
+
+
+4.3 KVM_GET_MSR_INDEX_LIST, KVM_GET_MSR_FEATURE_INDEX_LIST
+----------------------------------------------------------
+
+:Capability: basic, KVM_CAP_GET_MSR_FEATURES for KVM_GET_MSR_FEATURE_INDEX_LIST
+:Architectures: x86
+:Type: system ioctl
+:Parameters: struct kvm_msr_list (in/out)
+:Returns: 0 on success; -1 on error
+
+Errors:
+
+ ====== ============================================================
+ EFAULT the msr index list cannot be read from or written to
+ E2BIG the msr index list is too big to fit in the array specified by
+ the user.
+ ====== ============================================================
+
+::
+
+ struct kvm_msr_list {
+ __u32 nmsrs; /* number of msrs in entries */
+ __u32 indices[0];
+ };
+
+The user fills in the size of the indices array in nmsrs, and in return
+kvm adjusts nmsrs to reflect the actual number of msrs and fills in the
+indices array with their numbers.
+
+KVM_GET_MSR_INDEX_LIST returns the guest msrs that are supported. The list
+varies by kvm version and host processor, but does not change otherwise.
+
+Note: if kvm indicates supports MCE (KVM_CAP_MCE), then the MCE bank MSRs are
+not returned in the MSR list, as different vcpus can have a different number
+of banks, as set via the KVM_X86_SETUP_MCE ioctl.
+
+KVM_GET_MSR_FEATURE_INDEX_LIST returns the list of MSRs that can be passed
+to the KVM_GET_MSRS system ioctl. This lets userspace probe host capabilities
+and processor features that are exposed via MSRs (e.g., VMX capabilities).
+This list also varies by kvm version and host processor, but does not change
+otherwise.
+
+
+4.4 KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION
+-----------------------
+
+:Capability: basic, KVM_CAP_CHECK_EXTENSION_VM for vm ioctl
+:Architectures: all
+:Type: system ioctl, vm ioctl
+:Parameters: extension identifier (KVM_CAP_*)
+:Returns: 0 if unsupported; 1 (or some other positive integer) if supported
+
+The API allows the application to query about extensions to the core
+kvm API. Userspace passes an extension identifier (an integer) and
+receives an integer that describes the extension availability.
+Generally 0 means no and 1 means yes, but some extensions may report
+additional information in the integer return value.
+
+Based on their initialization different VMs may have different capabilities.
+It is thus encouraged to use the vm ioctl to query for capabilities (available
+with KVM_CAP_CHECK_EXTENSION_VM on the vm fd)
+
+4.5 KVM_GET_VCPU_MMAP_SIZE
+--------------------------
+
+:Capability: basic
+:Architectures: all
+:Type: system ioctl
+:Parameters: none
+:Returns: size of vcpu mmap area, in bytes
+
+The KVM_RUN ioctl (cf.) communicates with userspace via a shared
+memory region. This ioctl returns the size of that region. See the
+KVM_RUN documentation for details.
+
+Besides the size of the KVM_RUN communication region, other areas of
+the VCPU file descriptor can be mmap-ed, including:
+
+- if KVM_CAP_COALESCED_MMIO is available, a page at
+ KVM_COALESCED_MMIO_PAGE_OFFSET * PAGE_SIZE; for historical reasons,
+ this page is included in the result of KVM_GET_VCPU_MMAP_SIZE.
+ KVM_CAP_COALESCED_MMIO is not documented yet.
+
+- if KVM_CAP_DIRTY_LOG_RING is available, a number of pages at
+ KVM_DIRTY_LOG_PAGE_OFFSET * PAGE_SIZE. For more information on
+ KVM_CAP_DIRTY_LOG_RING, see section 8.3.
+
+
+4.7 KVM_CREATE_VCPU
+-------------------
+
+:Capability: basic
+:Architectures: all
+:Type: vm ioctl
+:Parameters: vcpu id (apic id on x86)
+:Returns: vcpu fd on success, -1 on error
+
+This API adds a vcpu to a virtual machine. No more than max_vcpus may be added.
+The vcpu id is an integer in the range [0, max_vcpu_id).
+
+The recommended max_vcpus value can be retrieved using the KVM_CAP_NR_VCPUS of
+the KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION ioctl() at run-time.
+The maximum possible value for max_vcpus can be retrieved using the
+KVM_CAP_MAX_VCPUS of the KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION ioctl() at run-time.
+
+If the KVM_CAP_NR_VCPUS does not exist, you should assume that max_vcpus is 4
+cpus max.
+If the KVM_CAP_MAX_VCPUS does not exist, you should assume that max_vcpus is
+same as the value returned from KVM_CAP_NR_VCPUS.
+
+The maximum possible value for max_vcpu_id can be retrieved using the
+KVM_CAP_MAX_VCPU_ID of the KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION ioctl() at run-time.
+
+If the KVM_CAP_MAX_VCPU_ID does not exist, you should assume that max_vcpu_id
+is the same as the value returned from KVM_CAP_MAX_VCPUS.
+
+On powerpc using book3s_hv mode, the vcpus are mapped onto virtual
+threads in one or more virtual CPU cores. (This is because the
+hardware requires all the hardware threads in a CPU core to be in the
+same partition.) The KVM_CAP_PPC_SMT capability indicates the number
+of vcpus per virtual core (vcore). The vcore id is obtained by
+dividing the vcpu id by the number of vcpus per vcore. The vcpus in a
+given vcore will always be in the same physical core as each other
+(though that might be a different physical core from time to time).
+Userspace can control the threading (SMT) mode of the guest by its
+allocation of vcpu ids. For example, if userspace wants
+single-threaded guest vcpus, it should make all vcpu ids be a multiple
+of the number of vcpus per vcore.
+
+For virtual cpus that have been created with S390 user controlled virtual
+machines, the resulting vcpu fd can be memory mapped at page offset
+KVM_S390_SIE_PAGE_OFFSET in order to obtain a memory map of the virtual
+cpu's hardware control block.
+
+
+4.8 KVM_GET_DIRTY_LOG (vm ioctl)
+--------------------------------
+
+:Capability: basic
+:Architectures: all
+:Type: vm ioctl
+:Parameters: struct kvm_dirty_log (in/out)
+:Returns: 0 on success, -1 on error
+
+::
+
+ /* for KVM_GET_DIRTY_LOG */
+ struct kvm_dirty_log {
+ __u32 slot;
+ __u32 padding;
+ union {
+ void __user *dirty_bitmap; /* one bit per page */
+ __u64 padding;
+ };
+ };
+
+Given a memory slot, return a bitmap containing any pages dirtied
+since the last call to this ioctl. Bit 0 is the first page in the
+memory slot. Ensure the entire structure is cleared to avoid padding
+issues.
+
+If KVM_CAP_MULTI_ADDRESS_SPACE is available, bits 16-31 of slot field specifies
+the address space for which you want to return the dirty bitmap. See
+KVM_SET_USER_MEMORY_REGION for details on the usage of slot field.
+
+The bits in the dirty bitmap are cleared before the ioctl returns, unless
+KVM_CAP_MANUAL_DIRTY_LOG_PROTECT2 is enabled. For more information,
+see the description of the capability.
+
+Note that the Xen shared info page, if configured, shall always be assumed
+to be dirty. KVM will not explicitly mark it such.
+
+
+4.10 KVM_RUN
+------------
+
+:Capability: basic
+:Architectures: all
+:Type: vcpu ioctl
+:Parameters: none
+:Returns: 0 on success, -1 on error
+
+Errors:
+
+ ======= ==============================================================
+ EINTR an unmasked signal is pending
+ ENOEXEC the vcpu hasn't been initialized or the guest tried to execute
+ instructions from device memory (arm64)
+ ENOSYS data abort outside memslots with no syndrome info and
+ KVM_CAP_ARM_NISV_TO_USER not enabled (arm64)
+ EPERM SVE feature set but not finalized (arm64)
+ ======= ==============================================================
+
+This ioctl is used to run a guest virtual cpu. While there are no
+explicit parameters, there is an implicit parameter block that can be
+obtained by mmap()ing the vcpu fd at offset 0, with the size given by
+KVM_GET_VCPU_MMAP_SIZE. The parameter block is formatted as a 'struct
+kvm_run' (see below).
+
+
+4.11 KVM_GET_REGS
+-----------------
+
+:Capability: basic
+:Architectures: all except arm64
+:Type: vcpu ioctl
+:Parameters: struct kvm_regs (out)
+:Returns: 0 on success, -1 on error
+
+Reads the general purpose registers from the vcpu.
+
+::
+
+ /* x86 */
+ struct kvm_regs {
+ /* out (KVM_GET_REGS) / in (KVM_SET_REGS) */
+ __u64 rax, rbx, rcx, rdx;
+ __u64 rsi, rdi, rsp, rbp;
+ __u64 r8, r9, r10, r11;
+ __u64 r12, r13, r14, r15;
+ __u64 rip, rflags;
+ };
+
+ /* mips */
+ struct kvm_regs {
+ /* out (KVM_GET_REGS) / in (KVM_SET_REGS) */
+ __u64 gpr[32];
+ __u64 hi;
+ __u64 lo;
+ __u64 pc;
+ };
+
+
+4.12 KVM_SET_REGS
+-----------------
+
+:Capability: basic
+:Architectures: all except arm64
+:Type: vcpu ioctl
+:Parameters: struct kvm_regs (in)
+:Returns: 0 on success, -1 on error
+
+Writes the general purpose registers into the vcpu.
+
+See KVM_GET_REGS for the data structure.
+
+
+4.13 KVM_GET_SREGS
+------------------
+
+:Capability: basic
+:Architectures: x86, ppc
+:Type: vcpu ioctl
+:Parameters: struct kvm_sregs (out)
+:Returns: 0 on success, -1 on error
+
+Reads special registers from the vcpu.
+
+::
+
+ /* x86 */
+ struct kvm_sregs {
+ struct kvm_segment cs, ds, es, fs, gs, ss;
+ struct kvm_segment tr, ldt;
+ struct kvm_dtable gdt, idt;
+ __u64 cr0, cr2, cr3, cr4, cr8;
+ __u64 efer;
+ __u64 apic_base;
+ __u64 interrupt_bitmap[(KVM_NR_INTERRUPTS + 63) / 64];
+ };
+
+ /* ppc -- see arch/powerpc/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h */
+
+interrupt_bitmap is a bitmap of pending external interrupts. At most
+one bit may be set. This interrupt has been acknowledged by the APIC
+but not yet injected into the cpu core.
+
+
+4.14 KVM_SET_SREGS
+------------------
+
+:Capability: basic
+:Architectures: x86, ppc
+:Type: vcpu ioctl
+:Parameters: struct kvm_sregs (in)
+:Returns: 0 on success, -1 on error
+
+Writes special registers into the vcpu. See KVM_GET_SREGS for the
+data structures.
+
+
+4.15 KVM_TRANSLATE
+------------------
+
+:Capability: basic
+:Architectures: x86
+:Type: vcpu ioctl
+:Parameters: struct kvm_translation (in/out)
+:Returns: 0 on success, -1 on error
+
+Translates a virtual address according to the vcpu's current address
+translation mode.
+
+::
+
+ struct kvm_translation {
+ /* in */
+ __u64 linear_address;
+
+ /* out */
+ __u64 physical_address;
+ __u8 valid;
+ __u8 writeable;
+ __u8 usermode;
+ __u8 pad[5];
+ };
+
+
+4.16 KVM_INTERRUPT
+------------------
+
+:Capability: basic
+:Architectures: x86, ppc, mips, riscv
+:Type: vcpu ioctl
+:Parameters: struct kvm_interrupt (in)
+:Returns: 0 on success, negative on failure.
+
+Queues a hardware interrupt vector to be injected.
+
+::
+
+ /* for KVM_INTERRUPT */
+ struct kvm_interrupt {
+ /* in */
+ __u32 irq;
+ };
+
+X86:
+^^^^
+
+:Returns:
+
+ ========= ===================================
+ 0 on success,
+ -EEXIST if an interrupt is already enqueued
+ -EINVAL the irq number is invalid
+ -ENXIO if the PIC is in the kernel
+ -EFAULT if the pointer is invalid
+ ========= ===================================
+
+Note 'irq' is an interrupt vector, not an interrupt pin or line. This
+ioctl is useful if the in-kernel PIC is not used.
+
+PPC:
+^^^^
+
+Queues an external interrupt to be injected. This ioctl is overleaded
+with 3 different irq values:
+
+a) KVM_INTERRUPT_SET
+
+ This injects an edge type external interrupt into the guest once it's ready
+ to receive interrupts. When injected, the interrupt is done.
+
+b) KVM_INTERRUPT_UNSET
+
+ This unsets any pending interrupt.
+
+ Only available with KVM_CAP_PPC_UNSET_IRQ.
+
+c) KVM_INTERRUPT_SET_LEVEL
+
+ This injects a level type external interrupt into the guest context. The
+ interrupt stays pending until a specific ioctl with KVM_INTERRUPT_UNSET
+ is triggered.
+
+ Only available with KVM_CAP_PPC_IRQ_LEVEL.
+
+Note that any value for 'irq' other than the ones stated above is invalid
+and incurs unexpected behavior.
+
+This is an asynchronous vcpu ioctl and can be invoked from any thread.
+
+MIPS:
+^^^^^
+
+Queues an external interrupt to be injected into the virtual CPU. A negative
+interrupt number dequeues the interrupt.
+
+This is an asynchronous vcpu ioctl and can be invoked from any thread.
+
+RISC-V:
+^^^^^^^
+
+Queues an external interrupt to be injected into the virtual CPU. This ioctl
+is overloaded with 2 different irq values:
+
+a) KVM_INTERRUPT_SET
+
+ This sets external interrupt for a virtual CPU and it will receive
+ once it is ready.
+
+b) KVM_INTERRUPT_UNSET
+
+ This clears pending external interrupt for a virtual CPU.
+
+This is an asynchronous vcpu ioctl and can be invoked from any thread.
+
+
+4.17 KVM_DEBUG_GUEST
+--------------------
+
+:Capability: basic
+:Architectures: none
+:Type: vcpu ioctl
+:Parameters: none)
+:Returns: -1 on error
+
+Support for this has been removed. Use KVM_SET_GUEST_DEBUG instead.
+
+
+4.18 KVM_GET_MSRS
+-----------------
+
+:Capability: basic (vcpu), KVM_CAP_GET_MSR_FEATURES (system)
+:Architectures: x86
+:Type: system ioctl, vcpu ioctl
+:Parameters: struct kvm_msrs (in/out)
+:Returns: number of msrs successfully returned;
+ -1 on error
+
+When used as a system ioctl:
+Reads the values of MSR-based features that are available for the VM. This
+is similar to KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID, but it returns MSR indices and values.
+The list of msr-based features can be obtained using KVM_GET_MSR_FEATURE_INDEX_LIST
+in a system ioctl.
+
+When used as a vcpu ioctl:
+Reads model-specific registers from the vcpu. Supported msr indices can
+be obtained using KVM_GET_MSR_INDEX_LIST in a system ioctl.
+
+::
+
+ struct kvm_msrs {
+ __u32 nmsrs; /* number of msrs in entries */
+ __u32 pad;
+
+ struct kvm_msr_entry entries[0];
+ };
+
+ struct kvm_msr_entry {
+ __u32 index;
+ __u32 reserved;
+ __u64 data;
+ };
+
+Application code should set the 'nmsrs' member (which indicates the
+size of the entries array) and the 'index' member of each array entry.
+kvm will fill in the 'data' member.
+
+
+4.19 KVM_SET_MSRS
+-----------------
+
+:Capability: basic
+:Architectures: x86
+:Type: vcpu ioctl
+:Parameters: struct kvm_msrs (in)
+:Returns: number of msrs successfully set (see below), -1 on error
+
+Writes model-specific registers to the vcpu. See KVM_GET_MSRS for the
+data structures.
+
+Application code should set the 'nmsrs' member (which indicates the
+size of the entries array), and the 'index' and 'data' members of each
+array entry.
+
+It tries to set the MSRs in array entries[] one by one. If setting an MSR
+fails, e.g., due to setting reserved bits, the MSR isn't supported/emulated
+by KVM, etc..., it stops processing the MSR list and returns the number of
+MSRs that have been set successfully.
+
+
+4.20 KVM_SET_CPUID
+------------------
+
+:Capability: basic
+:Architectures: x86
+:Type: vcpu ioctl
+:Parameters: struct kvm_cpuid (in)
+:Returns: 0 on success, -1 on error
+
+Defines the vcpu responses to the cpuid instruction. Applications
+should use the KVM_SET_CPUID2 ioctl if available.
+
+Caveat emptor:
+ - If this IOCTL fails, KVM gives no guarantees that previous valid CPUID
+ configuration (if there is) is not corrupted. Userspace can get a copy
+ of the resulting CPUID configuration through KVM_GET_CPUID2 in case.
+ - Using KVM_SET_CPUID{,2} after KVM_RUN, i.e. changing the guest vCPU model
+ after running the guest, may cause guest instability.
+ - Using heterogeneous CPUID configurations, modulo APIC IDs, topology, etc...
+ may cause guest instability.
+
+::
+
+ struct kvm_cpuid_entry {
+ __u32 function;
+ __u32 eax;
+ __u32 ebx;
+ __u32 ecx;
+ __u32 edx;
+ __u32 padding;
+ };
+
+ /* for KVM_SET_CPUID */
+ struct kvm_cpuid {
+ __u32 nent;
+ __u32 padding;
+ struct kvm_cpuid_entry entries[0];
+ };
+
+
+4.21 KVM_SET_SIGNAL_MASK
+------------------------
+
+:Capability: basic
+:Architectures: all
+:Type: vcpu ioctl
+:Parameters: struct kvm_signal_mask (in)
+:Returns: 0 on success, -1 on error
+
+Defines which signals are blocked during execution of KVM_RUN. This
+signal mask temporarily overrides the threads signal mask. Any
+unblocked signal received (except SIGKILL and SIGSTOP, which retain
+their traditional behaviour) will cause KVM_RUN to return with -EINTR.
+
+Note the signal will only be delivered if not blocked by the original
+signal mask.
+
+::
+
+ /* for KVM_SET_SIGNAL_MASK */
+ struct kvm_signal_mask {
+ __u32 len;
+ __u8 sigset[0];
+ };
+
+
+4.22 KVM_GET_FPU
+----------------
+
+:Capability: basic
+:Architectures: x86
+:Type: vcpu ioctl
+:Parameters: struct kvm_fpu (out)
+:Returns: 0 on success, -1 on error
+
+Reads the floating point state from the vcpu.
+
+::
+
+ /* for KVM_GET_FPU and KVM_SET_FPU */
+ struct kvm_fpu {
+ __u8 fpr[8][16];
+ __u16 fcw;
+ __u16 fsw;
+ __u8 ftwx; /* in fxsave format */
+ __u8 pad1;
+ __u16 last_opcode;
+ __u64 last_ip;
+ __u64 last_dp;
+ __u8 xmm[16][16];
+ __u32 mxcsr;
+ __u32 pad2;
+ };
+
+
+4.23 KVM_SET_FPU
+----------------
+
+:Capability: basic
+:Architectures: x86
+:Type: vcpu ioctl
+:Parameters: struct kvm_fpu (in)
+:Returns: 0 on success, -1 on error
+
+Writes the floating point state to the vcpu.
+
+::
+
+ /* for KVM_GET_FPU and KVM_SET_FPU */
+ struct kvm_fpu {
+ __u8 fpr[8][16];
+ __u16 fcw;
+ __u16 fsw;
+ __u8 ftwx; /* in fxsave format */
+ __u8 pad1;
+ __u16 last_opcode;
+ __u64 last_ip;
+ __u64 last_dp;
+ __u8 xmm[16][16];
+ __u32 mxcsr;
+ __u32 pad2;
+ };
+
+
+4.24 KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP
+-----------------------
+
+:Capability: KVM_CAP_IRQCHIP, KVM_CAP_S390_IRQCHIP (s390)
+:Architectures: x86, arm64, s390
+:Type: vm ioctl
+:Parameters: none
+:Returns: 0 on success, -1 on error
+
+Creates an interrupt controller model in the kernel.
+On x86, creates a virtual ioapic, a virtual PIC (two PICs, nested), and sets up
+future vcpus to have a local APIC. IRQ routing for GSIs 0-15 is set to both
+PIC and IOAPIC; GSI 16-23 only go to the IOAPIC.
+On arm64, a GICv2 is created. Any other GIC versions require the usage of
+KVM_CREATE_DEVICE, which also supports creating a GICv2. Using
+KVM_CREATE_DEVICE is preferred over KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP for GICv2.
+On s390, a dummy irq routing table is created.
+
+Note that on s390 the KVM_CAP_S390_IRQCHIP vm capability needs to be enabled
+before KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP can be used.
+
+
+4.25 KVM_IRQ_LINE
+-----------------
+
+:Capability: KVM_CAP_IRQCHIP
+:Architectures: x86, arm64
+:Type: vm ioctl
+:Parameters: struct kvm_irq_level
+:Returns: 0 on success, -1 on error
+
+Sets the level of a GSI input to the interrupt controller model in the kernel.
+On some architectures it is required that an interrupt controller model has
+been previously created with KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP. Note that edge-triggered
+interrupts require the level to be set to 1 and then back to 0.
+
+On real hardware, interrupt pins can be active-low or active-high. This
+does not matter for the level field of struct kvm_irq_level: 1 always
+means active (asserted), 0 means inactive (deasserted).
+
+x86 allows the operating system to program the interrupt polarity
+(active-low/active-high) for level-triggered interrupts, and KVM used
+to consider the polarity. However, due to bitrot in the handling of
+active-low interrupts, the above convention is now valid on x86 too.
+This is signaled by KVM_CAP_X86_IOAPIC_POLARITY_IGNORED. Userspace
+should not present interrupts to the guest as active-low unless this
+capability is present (or unless it is not using the in-kernel irqchip,
+of course).
+
+
+arm64 can signal an interrupt either at the CPU level, or at the
+in-kernel irqchip (GIC), and for in-kernel irqchip can tell the GIC to
+use PPIs designated for specific cpus. The irq field is interpreted
+like this::
+
+ bits: | 31 ... 28 | 27 ... 24 | 23 ... 16 | 15 ... 0 |
+ field: | vcpu2_index | irq_type | vcpu_index | irq_id |
+
+The irq_type field has the following values:
+
+- irq_type[0]:
+ out-of-kernel GIC: irq_id 0 is IRQ, irq_id 1 is FIQ
+- irq_type[1]:
+ in-kernel GIC: SPI, irq_id between 32 and 1019 (incl.)
+ (the vcpu_index field is ignored)
+- irq_type[2]:
+ in-kernel GIC: PPI, irq_id between 16 and 31 (incl.)
+
+(The irq_id field thus corresponds nicely to the IRQ ID in the ARM GIC specs)
+
+In both cases, level is used to assert/deassert the line.
+
+When KVM_CAP_ARM_IRQ_LINE_LAYOUT_2 is supported, the target vcpu is
+identified as (256 * vcpu2_index + vcpu_index). Otherwise, vcpu2_index
+must be zero.
+
+Note that on arm64, the KVM_CAP_IRQCHIP capability only conditions
+injection of interrupts for the in-kernel irqchip. KVM_IRQ_LINE can always
+be used for a userspace interrupt controller.
+
+::
+
+ struct kvm_irq_level {
+ union {
+ __u32 irq; /* GSI */
+ __s32 status; /* not used for KVM_IRQ_LEVEL */
+ };
+ __u32 level; /* 0 or 1 */
+ };
+
+
+4.26 KVM_GET_IRQCHIP
+--------------------
+
+:Capability: KVM_CAP_IRQCHIP
+:Architectures: x86
+:Type: vm ioctl
+:Parameters: struct kvm_irqchip (in/out)
+:Returns: 0 on success, -1 on error
+
+Reads the state of a kernel interrupt controller created with
+KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP into a buffer provided by the caller.
+
+::
+
+ struct kvm_irqchip {
+ __u32 chip_id; /* 0 = PIC1, 1 = PIC2, 2 = IOAPIC */
+ __u32 pad;
+ union {
+ char dummy[512]; /* reserving space */
+ struct kvm_pic_state pic;
+ struct kvm_ioapic_state ioapic;
+ } chip;
+ };
+
+
+4.27 KVM_SET_IRQCHIP
+--------------------
+
+:Capability: KVM_CAP_IRQCHIP
+:Architectures: x86
+:Type: vm ioctl
+:Parameters: struct kvm_irqchip (in)
+:Returns: 0 on success, -1 on error
+
+Sets the state of a kernel interrupt controller created with
+KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP from a buffer provided by the caller.
+
+::
+
+ struct kvm_irqchip {
+ __u32 chip_id; /* 0 = PIC1, 1 = PIC2, 2 = IOAPIC */
+ __u32 pad;
+ union {
+ char dummy[512]; /* reserving space */
+ struct kvm_pic_state pic;
+ struct kvm_ioapic_state ioapic;
+ } chip;
+ };
+
+
+4.28 KVM_XEN_HVM_CONFIG
+-----------------------
+
+:Capability: KVM_CAP_XEN_HVM
+:Architectures: x86
+:Type: vm ioctl
+:Parameters: struct kvm_xen_hvm_config (in)
+:Returns: 0 on success, -1 on error
+
+Sets the MSR that the Xen HVM guest uses to initialize its hypercall
+page, and provides the starting address and size of the hypercall
+blobs in userspace. When the guest writes the MSR, kvm copies one
+page of a blob (32- or 64-bit, depending on the vcpu mode) to guest
+memory.
+
+::
+
+ struct kvm_xen_hvm_config {
+ __u32 flags;
+ __u32 msr;
+ __u64 blob_addr_32;
+ __u64 blob_addr_64;
+ __u8 blob_size_32;
+ __u8 blob_size_64;
+ __u8 pad2[30];
+ };
+
+If certain flags are returned from the KVM_CAP_XEN_HVM check, they may
+be set in the flags field of this ioctl:
+
+The KVM_XEN_HVM_CONFIG_INTERCEPT_HCALL flag requests KVM to generate
+the contents of the hypercall page automatically; hypercalls will be
+intercepted and passed to userspace through KVM_EXIT_XEN. In this
+ase, all of the blob size and address fields must be zero.
+
+The KVM_XEN_HVM_CONFIG_EVTCHN_SEND flag indicates to KVM that userspace
+will always use the KVM_XEN_HVM_EVTCHN_SEND ioctl to deliver event
+channel interrupts rather than manipulating the guest's shared_info
+structures directly. This, in turn, may allow KVM to enable features
+such as intercepting the SCHEDOP_poll hypercall to accelerate PV
+spinlock operation for the guest. Userspace may still use the ioctl
+to deliver events if it was advertised, even if userspace does not
+send this indication that it will always do so
+
+No other flags are currently valid in the struct kvm_xen_hvm_config.
+
+4.29 KVM_GET_CLOCK
+------------------
+
+:Capability: KVM_CAP_ADJUST_CLOCK
+:Architectures: x86
+:Type: vm ioctl
+:Parameters: struct kvm_clock_data (out)
+:Returns: 0 on success, -1 on error
+
+Gets the current timestamp of kvmclock as seen by the current guest. In
+conjunction with KVM_SET_CLOCK, it is used to ensure monotonicity on scenarios
+such as migration.
+
+When KVM_CAP_ADJUST_CLOCK is passed to KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION, it returns the
+set of bits that KVM can return in struct kvm_clock_data's flag member.
+
+The following flags are defined:
+
+KVM_CLOCK_TSC_STABLE
+ If set, the returned value is the exact kvmclock
+ value seen by all VCPUs at the instant when KVM_GET_CLOCK was called.
+ If clear, the returned value is simply CLOCK_MONOTONIC plus a constant
+ offset; the offset can be modified with KVM_SET_CLOCK. KVM will try
+ to make all VCPUs follow this clock, but the exact value read by each
+ VCPU could differ, because the host TSC is not stable.
+
+KVM_CLOCK_REALTIME
+ If set, the `realtime` field in the kvm_clock_data
+ structure is populated with the value of the host's real time
+ clocksource at the instant when KVM_GET_CLOCK was called. If clear,
+ the `realtime` field does not contain a value.
+
+KVM_CLOCK_HOST_TSC
+ If set, the `host_tsc` field in the kvm_clock_data
+ structure is populated with the value of the host's timestamp counter (TSC)
+ at the instant when KVM_GET_CLOCK was called. If clear, the `host_tsc` field
+ does not contain a value.
+
+::
+
+ struct kvm_clock_data {
+ __u64 clock; /* kvmclock current value */
+ __u32 flags;
+ __u32 pad0;
+ __u64 realtime;
+ __u64 host_tsc;
+ __u32 pad[4];
+ };
+
+
+4.30 KVM_SET_CLOCK
+------------------
+
+:Capability: KVM_CAP_ADJUST_CLOCK
+:Architectures: x86
+:Type: vm ioctl
+:Parameters: struct kvm_clock_data (in)
+:Returns: 0 on success, -1 on error
+
+Sets the current timestamp of kvmclock to the value specified in its parameter.
+In conjunction with KVM_GET_CLOCK, it is used to ensure monotonicity on scenarios
+such as migration.
+
+The following flags can be passed:
+
+KVM_CLOCK_REALTIME
+ If set, KVM will compare the value of the `realtime` field
+ with the value of the host's real time clocksource at the instant when
+ KVM_SET_CLOCK was called. The difference in elapsed time is added to the final
+ kvmclock value that will be provided to guests.
+
+Other flags returned by ``KVM_GET_CLOCK`` are accepted but ignored.
+
+::
+
+ struct kvm_clock_data {
+ __u64 clock; /* kvmclock current value */
+ __u32 flags;
+ __u32 pad0;
+ __u64 realtime;
+ __u64 host_tsc;
+ __u32 pad[4];
+ };
+
+
+4.31 KVM_GET_VCPU_EVENTS
+------------------------
+
+:Capability: KVM_CAP_VCPU_EVENTS
+:Extended by: KVM_CAP_INTR_SHADOW
+:Architectures: x86, arm64
+:Type: vcpu ioctl
+:Parameters: struct kvm_vcpu_event (out)
+:Returns: 0 on success, -1 on error
+
+X86:
+^^^^
+
+Gets currently pending exceptions, interrupts, and NMIs as well as related
+states of the vcpu.
+
+::
+
+ struct kvm_vcpu_events {
+ struct {
+ __u8 injected;
+ __u8 nr;
+ __u8 has_error_code;
+ __u8 pending;
+ __u32 error_code;
+ } exception;
+ struct {
+ __u8 injected;
+ __u8 nr;
+ __u8 soft;
+ __u8 shadow;
+ } interrupt;
+ struct {
+ __u8 injected;
+ __u8 pending;
+ __u8 masked;
+ __u8 pad;
+ } nmi;
+ __u32 sipi_vector;
+ __u32 flags;
+ struct {
+ __u8 smm;
+ __u8 pending;
+ __u8 smm_inside_nmi;
+ __u8 latched_init;
+ } smi;
+ __u8 reserved[27];
+ __u8 exception_has_payload;
+ __u64 exception_payload;
+ };
+
+The following bits are defined in the flags field:
+
+- KVM_VCPUEVENT_VALID_SHADOW may be set to signal that
+ interrupt.shadow contains a valid state.
+
+- KVM_VCPUEVENT_VALID_SMM may be set to signal that smi contains a
+ valid state.
+
+- KVM_VCPUEVENT_VALID_PAYLOAD may be set to signal that the
+ exception_has_payload, exception_payload, and exception.pending
+ fields contain a valid state. This bit will be set whenever
+ KVM_CAP_EXCEPTION_PAYLOAD is enabled.
+
+- KVM_VCPUEVENT_VALID_TRIPLE_FAULT may be set to signal that the
+ triple_fault_pending field contains a valid state. This bit will
+ be set whenever KVM_CAP_X86_TRIPLE_FAULT_EVENT is enabled.
+
+ARM64:
+^^^^^^
+
+If the guest accesses a device that is being emulated by the host kernel in
+such a way that a real device would generate a physical SError, KVM may make
+a virtual SError pending for that VCPU. This system error interrupt remains
+pending until the guest takes the exception by unmasking PSTATE.A.
+
+Running the VCPU may cause it to take a pending SError, or make an access that
+causes an SError to become pending. The event's description is only valid while
+the VPCU is not running.
+
+This API provides a way to read and write the pending 'event' state that is not
+visible to the guest. To save, restore or migrate a VCPU the struct representing
+the state can be read then written using this GET/SET API, along with the other
+guest-visible registers. It is not possible to 'cancel' an SError that has been
+made pending.
+
+A device being emulated in user-space may also wish to generate an SError. To do
+this the events structure can be populated by user-space. The current state
+should be read first, to ensure no existing SError is pending. If an existing
+SError is pending, the architecture's 'Multiple SError interrupts' rules should
+be followed. (2.5.3 of DDI0587.a "ARM Reliability, Availability, and
+Serviceability (RAS) Specification").
+
+SError exceptions always have an ESR value. Some CPUs have the ability to
+specify what the virtual SError's ESR value should be. These systems will
+advertise KVM_CAP_ARM_INJECT_SERROR_ESR. In this case exception.has_esr will
+always have a non-zero value when read, and the agent making an SError pending
+should specify the ISS field in the lower 24 bits of exception.serror_esr. If
+the system supports KVM_CAP_ARM_INJECT_SERROR_ESR, but user-space sets the events
+with exception.has_esr as zero, KVM will choose an ESR.
+
+Specifying exception.has_esr on a system that does not support it will return
+-EINVAL. Setting anything other than the lower 24bits of exception.serror_esr
+will return -EINVAL.
+
+It is not possible to read back a pending external abort (injected via
+KVM_SET_VCPU_EVENTS or otherwise) because such an exception is always delivered
+directly to the virtual CPU).
+
+::
+
+ struct kvm_vcpu_events {
+ struct {
+ __u8 serror_pending;
+ __u8 serror_has_esr;
+ __u8 ext_dabt_pending;
+ /* Align it to 8 bytes */
+ __u8 pad[5];
+ __u64 serror_esr;
+ } exception;
+ __u32 reserved[12];
+ };
+
+4.32 KVM_SET_VCPU_EVENTS
+------------------------
+
+:Capability: KVM_CAP_VCPU_EVENTS
+:Extended by: KVM_CAP_INTR_SHADOW
+:Architectures: x86, arm64
+:Type: vcpu ioctl
+:Parameters: struct kvm_vcpu_event (in)
+:Returns: 0 on success, -1 on error
+
+X86:
+^^^^
+
+Set pending exceptions, interrupts, and NMIs as well as related states of the
+vcpu.
+
+See KVM_GET_VCPU_EVENTS for the data structure.
+
+Fields that may be modified asynchronously by running VCPUs can be excluded
+from the update. These fields are nmi.pending, sipi_vector, smi.smm,
+smi.pending. Keep the corresponding bits in the flags field cleared to
+suppress overwriting the current in-kernel state. The bits are:
+
+=============================== ==================================
+KVM_VCPUEVENT_VALID_NMI_PENDING transfer nmi.pending to the kernel
+KVM_VCPUEVENT_VALID_SIPI_VECTOR transfer sipi_vector
+KVM_VCPUEVENT_VALID_SMM transfer the smi sub-struct.
+=============================== ==================================
+
+If KVM_CAP_INTR_SHADOW is available, KVM_VCPUEVENT_VALID_SHADOW can be set in
+the flags field to signal that interrupt.shadow contains a valid state and
+shall be written into the VCPU.
+
+KVM_VCPUEVENT_VALID_SMM can only be set if KVM_CAP_X86_SMM is available.
+
+If KVM_CAP_EXCEPTION_PAYLOAD is enabled, KVM_VCPUEVENT_VALID_PAYLOAD
+can be set in the flags field to signal that the
+exception_has_payload, exception_payload, and exception.pending fields
+contain a valid state and shall be written into the VCPU.
+
+If KVM_CAP_X86_TRIPLE_FAULT_EVENT is enabled, KVM_VCPUEVENT_VALID_TRIPLE_FAULT
+can be set in flags field to signal that the triple_fault field contains
+a valid state and shall be written into the VCPU.
+
+ARM64:
+^^^^^^
+
+User space may need to inject several types of events to the guest.
+
+Set the pending SError exception state for this VCPU. It is not possible to
+'cancel' an Serror that has been made pending.
+
+If the guest performed an access to I/O memory which could not be handled by
+userspace, for example because of missing instruction syndrome decode
+information or because there is no device mapped at the accessed IPA, then
+userspace can ask the kernel to inject an external abort using the address
+from the exiting fault on the VCPU. It is a programming error to set
+ext_dabt_pending after an exit which was not either KVM_EXIT_MMIO or
+KVM_EXIT_ARM_NISV. This feature is only available if the system supports
+KVM_CAP_ARM_INJECT_EXT_DABT. This is a helper which provides commonality in
+how userspace reports accesses for the above cases to guests, across different
+userspace implementations. Nevertheless, userspace can still emulate all Arm
+exceptions by manipulating individual registers using the KVM_SET_ONE_REG API.
+
+See KVM_GET_VCPU_EVENTS for the data structure.
+
+
+4.33 KVM_GET_DEBUGREGS
+----------------------
+
+:Capability: KVM_CAP_DEBUGREGS
+:Architectures: x86
+:Type: vm ioctl
+:Parameters: struct kvm_debugregs (out)
+:Returns: 0 on success, -1 on error
+
+Reads debug registers from the vcpu.
+
+::
+
+ struct kvm_debugregs {
+ __u64 db[4];
+ __u64 dr6;
+ __u64 dr7;
+ __u64 flags;
+ __u64 reserved[9];
+ };
+
+
+4.34 KVM_SET_DEBUGREGS
+----------------------
+
+:Capability: KVM_CAP_DEBUGREGS
+:Architectures: x86
+:Type: vm ioctl
+:Parameters: struct kvm_debugregs (in)
+:Returns: 0 on success, -1 on error
+
+Writes debug registers into the vcpu.
+
+See KVM_GET_DEBUGREGS for the data structure. The flags field is unused
+yet and must be cleared on entry.
+
+
+4.35 KVM_SET_USER_MEMORY_REGION
+-------------------------------
+
+:Capability: KVM_CAP_USER_MEMORY
+:Architectures: all
+:Type: vm ioctl
+:Parameters: struct kvm_userspace_memory_region (in)
+:Returns: 0 on success, -1 on error
+
+::
+
+ struct kvm_userspace_memory_region {
+ __u32 slot;
+ __u32 flags;
+ __u64 guest_phys_addr;
+ __u64 memory_size; /* bytes */
+ __u64 userspace_addr; /* start of the userspace allocated memory */
+ };
+
+ /* for kvm_userspace_memory_region::flags */
+ #define KVM_MEM_LOG_DIRTY_PAGES (1UL << 0)
+ #define KVM_MEM_READONLY (1UL << 1)
+
+This ioctl allows the user to create, modify or delete a guest physical
+memory slot. Bits 0-15 of "slot" specify the slot id and this value
+should be less than the maximum number of user memory slots supported per
+VM. The maximum allowed slots can be queried using KVM_CAP_NR_MEMSLOTS.
+Slots may not overlap in guest physical address space.
+
+If KVM_CAP_MULTI_ADDRESS_SPACE is available, bits 16-31 of "slot"
+specifies the address space which is being modified. They must be
+less than the value that KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION returns for the
+KVM_CAP_MULTI_ADDRESS_SPACE capability. Slots in separate address spaces
+are unrelated; the restriction on overlapping slots only applies within
+each address space.
+
+Deleting a slot is done by passing zero for memory_size. When changing
+an existing slot, it may be moved in the guest physical memory space,
+or its flags may be modified, but it may not be resized.
+
+Memory for the region is taken starting at the address denoted by the
+field userspace_addr, which must point at user addressable memory for
+the entire memory slot size. Any object may back this memory, including
+anonymous memory, ordinary files, and hugetlbfs.
+
+On architectures that support a form of address tagging, userspace_addr must
+be an untagged address.
+
+It is recommended that the lower 21 bits of guest_phys_addr and userspace_addr
+be identical. This allows large pages in the guest to be backed by large
+pages in the host.
+
+The flags field supports two flags: KVM_MEM_LOG_DIRTY_PAGES and
+KVM_MEM_READONLY. The former can be set to instruct KVM to keep track of
+writes to memory within the slot. See KVM_GET_DIRTY_LOG ioctl to know how to
+use it. The latter can be set, if KVM_CAP_READONLY_MEM capability allows it,
+to make a new slot read-only. In this case, writes to this memory will be
+posted to userspace as KVM_EXIT_MMIO exits.
+
+When the KVM_CAP_SYNC_MMU capability is available, changes in the backing of
+the memory region are automatically reflected into the guest. For example, an
+mmap() that affects the region will be made visible immediately. Another
+example is madvise(MADV_DROP).
+
+Note: On arm64, a write generated by the page-table walker (to update
+the Access and Dirty flags, for example) never results in a
+KVM_EXIT_MMIO exit when the slot has the KVM_MEM_READONLY flag. This
+is because KVM cannot provide the data that would be written by the
+page-table walker, making it impossible to emulate the access.
+Instead, an abort (data abort if the cause of the page-table update
+was a load or a store, instruction abort if it was an instruction
+fetch) is injected in the guest.
+
+4.36 KVM_SET_TSS_ADDR
+---------------------
+
+:Capability: KVM_CAP_SET_TSS_ADDR
+:Architectures: x86
+:Type: vm ioctl
+:Parameters: unsigned long tss_address (in)
+:Returns: 0 on success, -1 on error
+
+This ioctl defines the physical address of a three-page region in the guest
+physical address space. The region must be within the first 4GB of the
+guest physical address space and must not conflict with any memory slot
+or any mmio address. The guest may malfunction if it accesses this memory
+region.
+
+This ioctl is required on Intel-based hosts. This is needed on Intel hardware
+because of a quirk in the virtualization implementation (see the internals
+documentation when it pops into existence).
+
+
+4.37 KVM_ENABLE_CAP
+-------------------
+
+:Capability: KVM_CAP_ENABLE_CAP
+:Architectures: mips, ppc, s390, x86
+:Type: vcpu ioctl
+:Parameters: struct kvm_enable_cap (in)
+:Returns: 0 on success; -1 on error
+
+:Capability: KVM_CAP_ENABLE_CAP_VM
+:Architectures: all
+:Type: vm ioctl
+:Parameters: struct kvm_enable_cap (in)
+:Returns: 0 on success; -1 on error
+
+.. note::
+
+ Not all extensions are enabled by default. Using this ioctl the application
+ can enable an extension, making it available to the guest.
+
+On systems that do not support this ioctl, it always fails. On systems that
+do support it, it only works for extensions that are supported for enablement.
+
+To check if a capability can be enabled, the KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION ioctl should
+be used.
+
+::
+
+ struct kvm_enable_cap {
+ /* in */
+ __u32 cap;
+
+The capability that is supposed to get enabled.
+
+::
+
+ __u32 flags;
+
+A bitfield indicating future enhancements. Has to be 0 for now.
+
+::
+
+ __u64 args[4];
+
+Arguments for enabling a feature. If a feature needs initial values to
+function properly, this is the place to put them.
+
+::
+
+ __u8 pad[64];
+ };
+
+The vcpu ioctl should be used for vcpu-specific capabilities, the vm ioctl
+for vm-wide capabilities.
+
+4.38 KVM_GET_MP_STATE
+---------------------
+
+:Capability: KVM_CAP_MP_STATE
+:Architectures: x86, s390, arm64, riscv
+:Type: vcpu ioctl
+:Parameters: struct kvm_mp_state (out)
+:Returns: 0 on success; -1 on error
+
+::
+
+ struct kvm_mp_state {
+ __u32 mp_state;
+ };
+
+Returns the vcpu's current "multiprocessing state" (though also valid on
+uniprocessor guests).
+
+Possible values are:
+
+ ========================== ===============================================
+ KVM_MP_STATE_RUNNABLE the vcpu is currently running
+ [x86,arm64,riscv]
+ KVM_MP_STATE_UNINITIALIZED the vcpu is an application processor (AP)
+ which has not yet received an INIT signal [x86]
+ KVM_MP_STATE_INIT_RECEIVED the vcpu has received an INIT signal, and is
+ now ready for a SIPI [x86]
+ KVM_MP_STATE_HALTED the vcpu has executed a HLT instruction and
+ is waiting for an interrupt [x86]
+ KVM_MP_STATE_SIPI_RECEIVED the vcpu has just received a SIPI (vector
+ accessible via KVM_GET_VCPU_EVENTS) [x86]
+ KVM_MP_STATE_STOPPED the vcpu is stopped [s390,arm64,riscv]
+ KVM_MP_STATE_CHECK_STOP the vcpu is in a special error state [s390]
+ KVM_MP_STATE_OPERATING the vcpu is operating (running or halted)
+ [s390]
+ KVM_MP_STATE_LOAD the vcpu is in a special load/startup state
+ [s390]
+ KVM_MP_STATE_SUSPENDED the vcpu is in a suspend state and is waiting
+ for a wakeup event [arm64]
+ ========================== ===============================================
+
+On x86, this ioctl is only useful after KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP. Without an
+in-kernel irqchip, the multiprocessing state must be maintained by userspace on
+these architectures.
+
+For arm64:
+^^^^^^^^^^
+
+If a vCPU is in the KVM_MP_STATE_SUSPENDED state, KVM will emulate the
+architectural execution of a WFI instruction.
+
+If a wakeup event is recognized, KVM will exit to userspace with a
+KVM_SYSTEM_EVENT exit, where the event type is KVM_SYSTEM_EVENT_WAKEUP. If
+userspace wants to honor the wakeup, it must set the vCPU's MP state to
+KVM_MP_STATE_RUNNABLE. If it does not, KVM will continue to await a wakeup
+event in subsequent calls to KVM_RUN.
+
+.. warning::
+
+ If userspace intends to keep the vCPU in a SUSPENDED state, it is
+ strongly recommended that userspace take action to suppress the
+ wakeup event (such as masking an interrupt). Otherwise, subsequent
+ calls to KVM_RUN will immediately exit with a KVM_SYSTEM_EVENT_WAKEUP
+ event and inadvertently waste CPU cycles.
+
+ Additionally, if userspace takes action to suppress a wakeup event,
+ it is strongly recommended that it also restores the vCPU to its
+ original state when the vCPU is made RUNNABLE again. For example,
+ if userspace masked a pending interrupt to suppress the wakeup,
+ the interrupt should be unmasked before returning control to the
+ guest.
+
+For riscv:
+^^^^^^^^^^
+
+The only states that are valid are KVM_MP_STATE_STOPPED and
+KVM_MP_STATE_RUNNABLE which reflect if the vcpu is paused or not.
+
+4.39 KVM_SET_MP_STATE
+---------------------
+
+:Capability: KVM_CAP_MP_STATE
+:Architectures: x86, s390, arm64, riscv
+:Type: vcpu ioctl
+:Parameters: struct kvm_mp_state (in)
+:Returns: 0 on success; -1 on error
+
+Sets the vcpu's current "multiprocessing state"; see KVM_GET_MP_STATE for
+arguments.
+
+On x86, this ioctl is only useful after KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP. Without an
+in-kernel irqchip, the multiprocessing state must be maintained by userspace on
+these architectures.
+
+For arm64/riscv:
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+The only states that are valid are KVM_MP_STATE_STOPPED and
+KVM_MP_STATE_RUNNABLE which reflect if the vcpu should be paused or not.
+
+4.40 KVM_SET_IDENTITY_MAP_ADDR
+------------------------------
+
+:Capability: KVM_CAP_SET_IDENTITY_MAP_ADDR
+:Architectures: x86
+:Type: vm ioctl
+:Parameters: unsigned long identity (in)
+:Returns: 0 on success, -1 on error
+
+This ioctl defines the physical address of a one-page region in the guest
+physical address space. The region must be within the first 4GB of the
+guest physical address space and must not conflict with any memory slot
+or any mmio address. The guest may malfunction if it accesses this memory
+region.
+
+Setting the address to 0 will result in resetting the address to its default
+(0xfffbc000).
+
+This ioctl is required on Intel-based hosts. This is needed on Intel hardware
+because of a quirk in the virtualization implementation (see the internals
+documentation when it pops into existence).
+
+Fails if any VCPU has already been created.
+
+4.41 KVM_SET_BOOT_CPU_ID
+------------------------
+
+:Capability: KVM_CAP_SET_BOOT_CPU_ID
+:Architectures: x86
+:Type: vm ioctl
+:Parameters: unsigned long vcpu_id
+:Returns: 0 on success, -1 on error
+
+Define which vcpu is the Bootstrap Processor (BSP). Values are the same
+as the vcpu id in KVM_CREATE_VCPU. If this ioctl is not called, the default
+is vcpu 0. This ioctl has to be called before vcpu creation,
+otherwise it will return EBUSY error.
+
+
+4.42 KVM_GET_XSAVE
+------------------
+
+:Capability: KVM_CAP_XSAVE
+:Architectures: x86
+:Type: vcpu ioctl
+:Parameters: struct kvm_xsave (out)
+:Returns: 0 on success, -1 on error
+
+
+::
+
+ struct kvm_xsave {
+ __u32 region[1024];
+ __u32 extra[0];
+ };
+
+This ioctl would copy current vcpu's xsave struct to the userspace.
+
+
+4.43 KVM_SET_XSAVE
+------------------
+
+:Capability: KVM_CAP_XSAVE and KVM_CAP_XSAVE2
+:Architectures: x86
+:Type: vcpu ioctl
+:Parameters: struct kvm_xsave (in)
+:Returns: 0 on success, -1 on error
+
+::
+
+
+ struct kvm_xsave {
+ __u32 region[1024];
+ __u32 extra[0];
+ };
+
+This ioctl would copy userspace's xsave struct to the kernel. It copies
+as many bytes as are returned by KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION(KVM_CAP_XSAVE2),
+when invoked on the vm file descriptor. The size value returned by
+KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION(KVM_CAP_XSAVE2) will always be at least 4096.
+Currently, it is only greater than 4096 if a dynamic feature has been
+enabled with ``arch_prctl()``, but this may change in the future.
+
+The offsets of the state save areas in struct kvm_xsave follow the
+contents of CPUID leaf 0xD on the host.
+
+
+4.44 KVM_GET_XCRS
+-----------------
+
+:Capability: KVM_CAP_XCRS
+:Architectures: x86
+:Type: vcpu ioctl
+:Parameters: struct kvm_xcrs (out)
+:Returns: 0 on success, -1 on error
+
+::
+
+ struct kvm_xcr {
+ __u32 xcr;
+ __u32 reserved;
+ __u64 value;
+ };
+
+ struct kvm_xcrs {
+ __u32 nr_xcrs;
+ __u32 flags;
+ struct kvm_xcr xcrs[KVM_MAX_XCRS];
+ __u64 padding[16];
+ };
+
+This ioctl would copy current vcpu's xcrs to the userspace.
+
+
+4.45 KVM_SET_XCRS
+-----------------
+
+:Capability: KVM_CAP_XCRS
+:Architectures: x86
+:Type: vcpu ioctl
+:Parameters: struct kvm_xcrs (in)
+:Returns: 0 on success, -1 on error
+
+::
+
+ struct kvm_xcr {
+ __u32 xcr;
+ __u32 reserved;
+ __u64 value;
+ };
+
+ struct kvm_xcrs {
+ __u32 nr_xcrs;
+ __u32 flags;
+ struct kvm_xcr xcrs[KVM_MAX_XCRS];
+ __u64 padding[16];
+ };
+
+This ioctl would set vcpu's xcr to the value userspace specified.
+
+
+4.46 KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID
+----------------------------
+
+:Capability: KVM_CAP_EXT_CPUID
+:Architectures: x86
+:Type: system ioctl
+:Parameters: struct kvm_cpuid2 (in/out)
+:Returns: 0 on success, -1 on error
+
+::
+
+ struct kvm_cpuid2 {
+ __u32 nent;
+ __u32 padding;
+ struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 entries[0];
+ };
+
+ #define KVM_CPUID_FLAG_SIGNIFCANT_INDEX BIT(0)
+ #define KVM_CPUID_FLAG_STATEFUL_FUNC BIT(1) /* deprecated */
+ #define KVM_CPUID_FLAG_STATE_READ_NEXT BIT(2) /* deprecated */
+
+ struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 {
+ __u32 function;
+ __u32 index;
+ __u32 flags;
+ __u32 eax;
+ __u32 ebx;
+ __u32 ecx;
+ __u32 edx;
+ __u32 padding[3];
+ };
+
+This ioctl returns x86 cpuid features which are supported by both the
+hardware and kvm in its default configuration. Userspace can use the
+information returned by this ioctl to construct cpuid information (for
+KVM_SET_CPUID2) that is consistent with hardware, kernel, and
+userspace capabilities, and with user requirements (for example, the
+user may wish to constrain cpuid to emulate older hardware, or for
+feature consistency across a cluster).
+
+Dynamically-enabled feature bits need to be requested with
+``arch_prctl()`` before calling this ioctl. Feature bits that have not
+been requested are excluded from the result.
+
+Note that certain capabilities, such as KVM_CAP_X86_DISABLE_EXITS, may
+expose cpuid features (e.g. MONITOR) which are not supported by kvm in
+its default configuration. If userspace enables such capabilities, it
+is responsible for modifying the results of this ioctl appropriately.
+
+Userspace invokes KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID by passing a kvm_cpuid2 structure
+with the 'nent' field indicating the number of entries in the variable-size
+array 'entries'. If the number of entries is too low to describe the cpu
+capabilities, an error (E2BIG) is returned. If the number is too high,
+the 'nent' field is adjusted and an error (ENOMEM) is returned. If the
+number is just right, the 'nent' field is adjusted to the number of valid
+entries in the 'entries' array, which is then filled.
+
+The entries returned are the host cpuid as returned by the cpuid instruction,
+with unknown or unsupported features masked out. Some features (for example,
+x2apic), may not be present in the host cpu, but are exposed by kvm if it can
+emulate them efficiently. The fields in each entry are defined as follows:
+
+ function:
+ the eax value used to obtain the entry
+
+ index:
+ the ecx value used to obtain the entry (for entries that are
+ affected by ecx)
+
+ flags:
+ an OR of zero or more of the following:
+
+ KVM_CPUID_FLAG_SIGNIFCANT_INDEX:
+ if the index field is valid
+
+ eax, ebx, ecx, edx:
+ the values returned by the cpuid instruction for
+ this function/index combination
+
+The TSC deadline timer feature (CPUID leaf 1, ecx[24]) is always returned
+as false, since the feature depends on KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP for local APIC
+support. Instead it is reported via::
+
+ ioctl(KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION, KVM_CAP_TSC_DEADLINE_TIMER)
+
+if that returns true and you use KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP, or if you emulate the
+feature in userspace, then you can enable the feature for KVM_SET_CPUID2.
+
+
+4.47 KVM_PPC_GET_PVINFO
+-----------------------
+
+:Capability: KVM_CAP_PPC_GET_PVINFO
+:Architectures: ppc
+:Type: vm ioctl
+:Parameters: struct kvm_ppc_pvinfo (out)
+:Returns: 0 on success, !0 on error
+
+::
+
+ struct kvm_ppc_pvinfo {
+ __u32 flags;
+ __u32 hcall[4];
+ __u8 pad[108];
+ };
+
+This ioctl fetches PV specific information that need to be passed to the guest
+using the device tree or other means from vm context.
+
+The hcall array defines 4 instructions that make up a hypercall.
+
+If any additional field gets added to this structure later on, a bit for that
+additional piece of information will be set in the flags bitmap.
+
+The flags bitmap is defined as::
+
+ /* the host supports the ePAPR idle hcall
+ #define KVM_PPC_PVINFO_FLAGS_EV_IDLE (1<<0)
+
+4.52 KVM_SET_GSI_ROUTING
+------------------------
+
+:Capability: KVM_CAP_IRQ_ROUTING
+:Architectures: x86 s390 arm64
+:Type: vm ioctl
+:Parameters: struct kvm_irq_routing (in)
+:Returns: 0 on success, -1 on error
+
+Sets the GSI routing table entries, overwriting any previously set entries.
+
+On arm64, GSI routing has the following limitation:
+
+- GSI routing does not apply to KVM_IRQ_LINE but only to KVM_IRQFD.
+
+::
+
+ struct kvm_irq_routing {
+ __u32 nr;
+ __u32 flags;
+ struct kvm_irq_routing_entry entries[0];
+ };
+
+No flags are specified so far, the corresponding field must be set to zero.
+
+::
+
+ struct kvm_irq_routing_entry {
+ __u32 gsi;
+ __u32 type;
+ __u32 flags;
+ __u32 pad;
+ union {
+ struct kvm_irq_routing_irqchip irqchip;
+ struct kvm_irq_routing_msi msi;
+ struct kvm_irq_routing_s390_adapter adapter;
+ struct kvm_irq_routing_hv_sint hv_sint;
+ struct kvm_irq_routing_xen_evtchn xen_evtchn;
+ __u32 pad[8];
+ } u;
+ };
+
+ /* gsi routing entry types */
+ #define KVM_IRQ_ROUTING_IRQCHIP 1
+ #define KVM_IRQ_ROUTING_MSI 2
+ #define KVM_IRQ_ROUTING_S390_ADAPTER 3
+ #define KVM_IRQ_ROUTING_HV_SINT 4
+ #define KVM_IRQ_ROUTING_XEN_EVTCHN 5
+
+flags:
+
+- KVM_MSI_VALID_DEVID: used along with KVM_IRQ_ROUTING_MSI routing entry
+ type, specifies that the devid field contains a valid value. The per-VM
+ KVM_CAP_MSI_DEVID capability advertises the requirement to provide
+ the device ID. If this capability is not available, userspace should
+ never set the KVM_MSI_VALID_DEVID flag as the ioctl might fail.
+- zero otherwise
+
+::
+
+ struct kvm_irq_routing_irqchip {
+ __u32 irqchip;
+ __u32 pin;
+ };
+
+ struct kvm_irq_routing_msi {
+ __u32 address_lo;
+ __u32 address_hi;
+ __u32 data;
+ union {
+ __u32 pad;
+ __u32 devid;
+ };
+ };
+
+If KVM_MSI_VALID_DEVID is set, devid contains a unique device identifier
+for the device that wrote the MSI message. For PCI, this is usually a
+BFD identifier in the lower 16 bits.
+
+On x86, address_hi is ignored unless the KVM_X2APIC_API_USE_32BIT_IDS
+feature of KVM_CAP_X2APIC_API capability is enabled. If it is enabled,
+address_hi bits 31-8 provide bits 31-8 of the destination id. Bits 7-0 of
+address_hi must be zero.
+
+::
+
+ struct kvm_irq_routing_s390_adapter {
+ __u64 ind_addr;
+ __u64 summary_addr;
+ __u64 ind_offset;
+ __u32 summary_offset;
+ __u32 adapter_id;
+ };
+
+ struct kvm_irq_routing_hv_sint {
+ __u32 vcpu;
+ __u32 sint;
+ };
+
+ struct kvm_irq_routing_xen_evtchn {
+ __u32 port;
+ __u32 vcpu;
+ __u32 priority;
+ };
+
+
+When KVM_CAP_XEN_HVM includes the KVM_XEN_HVM_CONFIG_EVTCHN_2LEVEL bit
+in its indication of supported features, routing to Xen event channels
+is supported. Although the priority field is present, only the value
+KVM_XEN_HVM_CONFIG_EVTCHN_2LEVEL is supported, which means delivery by
+2 level event channels. FIFO event channel support may be added in
+the future.
+
+
+4.55 KVM_SET_TSC_KHZ
+--------------------
+
+:Capability: KVM_CAP_TSC_CONTROL / KVM_CAP_VM_TSC_CONTROL
+:Architectures: x86
+:Type: vcpu ioctl / vm ioctl
+:Parameters: virtual tsc_khz
+:Returns: 0 on success, -1 on error
+
+Specifies the tsc frequency for the virtual machine. The unit of the
+frequency is KHz.
+
+If the KVM_CAP_VM_TSC_CONTROL capability is advertised, this can also
+be used as a vm ioctl to set the initial tsc frequency of subsequently
+created vCPUs.
+
+4.56 KVM_GET_TSC_KHZ
+--------------------
+
+:Capability: KVM_CAP_GET_TSC_KHZ / KVM_CAP_VM_TSC_CONTROL
+:Architectures: x86
+:Type: vcpu ioctl / vm ioctl
+:Parameters: none
+:Returns: virtual tsc-khz on success, negative value on error
+
+Returns the tsc frequency of the guest. The unit of the return value is
+KHz. If the host has unstable tsc this ioctl returns -EIO instead as an
+error.
+
+
+4.57 KVM_GET_LAPIC
+------------------
+
+:Capability: KVM_CAP_IRQCHIP
+:Architectures: x86
+:Type: vcpu ioctl
+:Parameters: struct kvm_lapic_state (out)
+:Returns: 0 on success, -1 on error
+
+::
+
+ #define KVM_APIC_REG_SIZE 0x400
+ struct kvm_lapic_state {
+ char regs[KVM_APIC_REG_SIZE];
+ };
+
+Reads the Local APIC registers and copies them into the input argument. The
+data format and layout are the same as documented in the architecture manual.
+
+If KVM_X2APIC_API_USE_32BIT_IDS feature of KVM_CAP_X2APIC_API is
+enabled, then the format of APIC_ID register depends on the APIC mode
+(reported by MSR_IA32_APICBASE) of its VCPU. x2APIC stores APIC ID in
+the APIC_ID register (bytes 32-35). xAPIC only allows an 8-bit APIC ID
+which is stored in bits 31-24 of the APIC register, or equivalently in
+byte 35 of struct kvm_lapic_state's regs field. KVM_GET_LAPIC must then
+be called after MSR_IA32_APICBASE has been set with KVM_SET_MSR.
+
+If KVM_X2APIC_API_USE_32BIT_IDS feature is disabled, struct kvm_lapic_state
+always uses xAPIC format.
+
+
+4.58 KVM_SET_LAPIC
+------------------
+
+:Capability: KVM_CAP_IRQCHIP
+:Architectures: x86
+:Type: vcpu ioctl
+:Parameters: struct kvm_lapic_state (in)
+:Returns: 0 on success, -1 on error
+
+::
+
+ #define KVM_APIC_REG_SIZE 0x400
+ struct kvm_lapic_state {
+ char regs[KVM_APIC_REG_SIZE];
+ };
+
+Copies the input argument into the Local APIC registers. The data format
+and layout are the same as documented in the architecture manual.
+
+The format of the APIC ID register (bytes 32-35 of struct kvm_lapic_state's
+regs field) depends on the state of the KVM_CAP_X2APIC_API capability.
+See the note in KVM_GET_LAPIC.
+
+
+4.59 KVM_IOEVENTFD
+------------------
+
+:Capability: KVM_CAP_IOEVENTFD
+:Architectures: all
+:Type: vm ioctl
+:Parameters: struct kvm_ioeventfd (in)
+:Returns: 0 on success, !0 on error
+
+This ioctl attaches or detaches an ioeventfd to a legal pio/mmio address
+within the guest. A guest write in the registered address will signal the
+provided event instead of triggering an exit.
+
+::
+
+ struct kvm_ioeventfd {
+ __u64 datamatch;
+ __u64 addr; /* legal pio/mmio address */
+ __u32 len; /* 0, 1, 2, 4, or 8 bytes */
+ __s32 fd;
+ __u32 flags;
+ __u8 pad[36];
+ };
+
+For the special case of virtio-ccw devices on s390, the ioevent is matched
+to a subchannel/virtqueue tuple instead.
+
+The following flags are defined::
+
+ #define KVM_IOEVENTFD_FLAG_DATAMATCH (1 << kvm_ioeventfd_flag_nr_datamatch)
+ #define KVM_IOEVENTFD_FLAG_PIO (1 << kvm_ioeventfd_flag_nr_pio)
+ #define KVM_IOEVENTFD_FLAG_DEASSIGN (1 << kvm_ioeventfd_flag_nr_deassign)
+ #define KVM_IOEVENTFD_FLAG_VIRTIO_CCW_NOTIFY \
+ (1 << kvm_ioeventfd_flag_nr_virtio_ccw_notify)
+
+If datamatch flag is set, the event will be signaled only if the written value
+to the registered address is equal to datamatch in struct kvm_ioeventfd.
+
+For virtio-ccw devices, addr contains the subchannel id and datamatch the
+virtqueue index.
+
+With KVM_CAP_IOEVENTFD_ANY_LENGTH, a zero length ioeventfd is allowed, and
+the kernel will ignore the length of guest write and may get a faster vmexit.
+The speedup may only apply to specific architectures, but the ioeventfd will
+work anyway.
+
+4.60 KVM_DIRTY_TLB
+------------------
+
+:Capability: KVM_CAP_SW_TLB
+:Architectures: ppc
+:Type: vcpu ioctl
+:Parameters: struct kvm_dirty_tlb (in)
+:Returns: 0 on success, -1 on error
+
+::
+
+ struct kvm_dirty_tlb {
+ __u64 bitmap;
+ __u32 num_dirty;
+ };
+
+This must be called whenever userspace has changed an entry in the shared
+TLB, prior to calling KVM_RUN on the associated vcpu.
+
+The "bitmap" field is the userspace address of an array. This array
+consists of a number of bits, equal to the total number of TLB entries as
+determined by the last successful call to KVM_CONFIG_TLB, rounded up to the
+nearest multiple of 64.
+
+Each bit corresponds to one TLB entry, ordered the same as in the shared TLB
+array.
+
+The array is little-endian: the bit 0 is the least significant bit of the
+first byte, bit 8 is the least significant bit of the second byte, etc.
+This avoids any complications with differing word sizes.
+
+The "num_dirty" field is a performance hint for KVM to determine whether it
+should skip processing the bitmap and just invalidate everything. It must
+be set to the number of set bits in the bitmap.
+
+
+4.62 KVM_CREATE_SPAPR_TCE
+-------------------------
+
+:Capability: KVM_CAP_SPAPR_TCE
+:Architectures: powerpc
+:Type: vm ioctl
+:Parameters: struct kvm_create_spapr_tce (in)
+:Returns: file descriptor for manipulating the created TCE table
+
+This creates a virtual TCE (translation control entry) table, which
+is an IOMMU for PAPR-style virtual I/O. It is used to translate
+logical addresses used in virtual I/O into guest physical addresses,
+and provides a scatter/gather capability for PAPR virtual I/O.
+
+::
+
+ /* for KVM_CAP_SPAPR_TCE */
+ struct kvm_create_spapr_tce {
+ __u64 liobn;
+ __u32 window_size;
+ };
+
+The liobn field gives the logical IO bus number for which to create a
+TCE table. The window_size field specifies the size of the DMA window
+which this TCE table will translate - the table will contain one 64
+bit TCE entry for every 4kiB of the DMA window.
+
+When the guest issues an H_PUT_TCE hcall on a liobn for which a TCE
+table has been created using this ioctl(), the kernel will handle it
+in real mode, updating the TCE table. H_PUT_TCE calls for other
+liobns will cause a vm exit and must be handled by userspace.
+
+The return value is a file descriptor which can be passed to mmap(2)
+to map the created TCE table into userspace. This lets userspace read
+the entries written by kernel-handled H_PUT_TCE calls, and also lets
+userspace update the TCE table directly which is useful in some
+circumstances.
+
+
+4.63 KVM_ALLOCATE_RMA
+---------------------
+
+:Capability: KVM_CAP_PPC_RMA
+:Architectures: powerpc
+:Type: vm ioctl
+:Parameters: struct kvm_allocate_rma (out)
+:Returns: file descriptor for mapping the allocated RMA
+
+This allocates a Real Mode Area (RMA) from the pool allocated at boot
+time by the kernel. An RMA is a physically-contiguous, aligned region
+of memory used on older POWER processors to provide the memory which
+will be accessed by real-mode (MMU off) accesses in a KVM guest.
+POWER processors support a set of sizes for the RMA that usually
+includes 64MB, 128MB, 256MB and some larger powers of two.
+
+::
+
+ /* for KVM_ALLOCATE_RMA */
+ struct kvm_allocate_rma {
+ __u64 rma_size;
+ };
+
+The return value is a file descriptor which can be passed to mmap(2)
+to map the allocated RMA into userspace. The mapped area can then be
+passed to the KVM_SET_USER_MEMORY_REGION ioctl to establish it as the
+RMA for a virtual machine. The size of the RMA in bytes (which is
+fixed at host kernel boot time) is returned in the rma_size field of
+the argument structure.
+
+The KVM_CAP_PPC_RMA capability is 1 or 2 if the KVM_ALLOCATE_RMA ioctl
+is supported; 2 if the processor requires all virtual machines to have
+an RMA, or 1 if the processor can use an RMA but doesn't require it,
+because it supports the Virtual RMA (VRMA) facility.
+
+
+4.64 KVM_NMI
+------------
+
+:Capability: KVM_CAP_USER_NMI
+:Architectures: x86
+:Type: vcpu ioctl
+:Parameters: none
+:Returns: 0 on success, -1 on error
+
+Queues an NMI on the thread's vcpu. Note this is well defined only
+when KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP has not been called, since this is an interface
+between the virtual cpu core and virtual local APIC. After KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP
+has been called, this interface is completely emulated within the kernel.
+
+To use this to emulate the LINT1 input with KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP, use the
+following algorithm:
+
+ - pause the vcpu
+ - read the local APIC's state (KVM_GET_LAPIC)
+ - check whether changing LINT1 will queue an NMI (see the LVT entry for LINT1)
+ - if so, issue KVM_NMI
+ - resume the vcpu
+
+Some guests configure the LINT1 NMI input to cause a panic, aiding in
+debugging.
+
+
+4.65 KVM_S390_UCAS_MAP
+----------------------
+
+:Capability: KVM_CAP_S390_UCONTROL
+:Architectures: s390
+:Type: vcpu ioctl
+:Parameters: struct kvm_s390_ucas_mapping (in)
+:Returns: 0 in case of success
+
+The parameter is defined like this::
+
+ struct kvm_s390_ucas_mapping {
+ __u64 user_addr;
+ __u64 vcpu_addr;
+ __u64 length;
+ };
+
+This ioctl maps the memory at "user_addr" with the length "length" to
+the vcpu's address space starting at "vcpu_addr". All parameters need to
+be aligned by 1 megabyte.
+
+
+4.66 KVM_S390_UCAS_UNMAP
+------------------------
+
+:Capability: KVM_CAP_S390_UCONTROL
+:Architectures: s390
+:Type: vcpu ioctl
+:Parameters: struct kvm_s390_ucas_mapping (in)
+:Returns: 0 in case of success
+
+The parameter is defined like this::
+
+ struct kvm_s390_ucas_mapping {
+ __u64 user_addr;
+ __u64 vcpu_addr;
+ __u64 length;
+ };
+
+This ioctl unmaps the memory in the vcpu's address space starting at
+"vcpu_addr" with the length "length". The field "user_addr" is ignored.
+All parameters need to be aligned by 1 megabyte.
+
+
+4.67 KVM_S390_VCPU_FAULT
+------------------------
+
+:Capability: KVM_CAP_S390_UCONTROL
+:Architectures: s390
+:Type: vcpu ioctl
+:Parameters: vcpu absolute address (in)
+:Returns: 0 in case of success
+
+This call creates a page table entry on the virtual cpu's address space
+(for user controlled virtual machines) or the virtual machine's address
+space (for regular virtual machines). This only works for minor faults,
+thus it's recommended to access subject memory page via the user page
+table upfront. This is useful to handle validity intercepts for user
+controlled virtual machines to fault in the virtual cpu's lowcore pages
+prior to calling the KVM_RUN ioctl.
+
+
+4.68 KVM_SET_ONE_REG
+--------------------
+
+:Capability: KVM_CAP_ONE_REG
+:Architectures: all
+:Type: vcpu ioctl
+:Parameters: struct kvm_one_reg (in)
+:Returns: 0 on success, negative value on failure
+
+Errors:
+
+ ====== ============================================================
+ ENOENT no such register
+ EINVAL invalid register ID, or no such register or used with VMs in
+ protected virtualization mode on s390
+ EPERM (arm64) register access not allowed before vcpu finalization
+ EBUSY (riscv) changing register value not allowed after the vcpu
+ has run at least once
+ ====== ============================================================
+
+(These error codes are indicative only: do not rely on a specific error
+code being returned in a specific situation.)
+
+::
+
+ struct kvm_one_reg {
+ __u64 id;
+ __u64 addr;
+ };
+
+Using this ioctl, a single vcpu register can be set to a specific value
+defined by user space with the passed in struct kvm_one_reg, where id
+refers to the register identifier as described below and addr is a pointer
+to a variable with the respective size. There can be architecture agnostic
+and architecture specific registers. Each have their own range of operation
+and their own constants and width. To keep track of the implemented
+registers, find a list below:
+
+ ======= =============================== ============
+ Arch Register Width (bits)
+ ======= =============================== ============
+ PPC KVM_REG_PPC_HIOR 64
+ PPC KVM_REG_PPC_IAC1 64
+ PPC KVM_REG_PPC_IAC2 64
+ PPC KVM_REG_PPC_IAC3 64
+ PPC KVM_REG_PPC_IAC4 64
+ PPC KVM_REG_PPC_DAC1 64
+ PPC KVM_REG_PPC_DAC2 64
+ PPC KVM_REG_PPC_DABR 64
+ PPC KVM_REG_PPC_DSCR 64
+ PPC KVM_REG_PPC_PURR 64
+ PPC KVM_REG_PPC_SPURR 64
+ PPC KVM_REG_PPC_DAR 64
+ PPC KVM_REG_PPC_DSISR 32
+ PPC KVM_REG_PPC_AMR 64
+ PPC KVM_REG_PPC_UAMOR 64
+ PPC KVM_REG_PPC_MMCR0 64
+ PPC KVM_REG_PPC_MMCR1 64
+ PPC KVM_REG_PPC_MMCRA 64
+ PPC KVM_REG_PPC_MMCR2 64
+ PPC KVM_REG_PPC_MMCRS 64
+ PPC KVM_REG_PPC_MMCR3 64
+ PPC KVM_REG_PPC_SIAR 64
+ PPC KVM_REG_PPC_SDAR 64
+ PPC KVM_REG_PPC_SIER 64
+ PPC KVM_REG_PPC_SIER2 64
+ PPC KVM_REG_PPC_SIER3 64
+ PPC KVM_REG_PPC_PMC1 32
+ PPC KVM_REG_PPC_PMC2 32
+ PPC KVM_REG_PPC_PMC3 32
+ PPC KVM_REG_PPC_PMC4 32
+ PPC KVM_REG_PPC_PMC5 32
+ PPC KVM_REG_PPC_PMC6 32
+ PPC KVM_REG_PPC_PMC7 32
+ PPC KVM_REG_PPC_PMC8 32
+ PPC KVM_REG_PPC_FPR0 64
+ ...
+ PPC KVM_REG_PPC_FPR31 64
+ PPC KVM_REG_PPC_VR0 128
+ ...
+ PPC KVM_REG_PPC_VR31 128
+ PPC KVM_REG_PPC_VSR0 128
+ ...
+ PPC KVM_REG_PPC_VSR31 128
+ PPC KVM_REG_PPC_FPSCR 64
+ PPC KVM_REG_PPC_VSCR 32
+ PPC KVM_REG_PPC_VPA_ADDR 64
+ PPC KVM_REG_PPC_VPA_SLB 128
+ PPC KVM_REG_PPC_VPA_DTL 128
+ PPC KVM_REG_PPC_EPCR 32
+ PPC KVM_REG_PPC_EPR 32
+ PPC KVM_REG_PPC_TCR 32
+ PPC KVM_REG_PPC_TSR 32
+ PPC KVM_REG_PPC_OR_TSR 32
+ PPC KVM_REG_PPC_CLEAR_TSR 32
+ PPC KVM_REG_PPC_MAS0 32
+ PPC KVM_REG_PPC_MAS1 32
+ PPC KVM_REG_PPC_MAS2 64
+ PPC KVM_REG_PPC_MAS7_3 64
+ PPC KVM_REG_PPC_MAS4 32
+ PPC KVM_REG_PPC_MAS6 32
+ PPC KVM_REG_PPC_MMUCFG 32
+ PPC KVM_REG_PPC_TLB0CFG 32
+ PPC KVM_REG_PPC_TLB1CFG 32
+ PPC KVM_REG_PPC_TLB2CFG 32
+ PPC KVM_REG_PPC_TLB3CFG 32
+ PPC KVM_REG_PPC_TLB0PS 32
+ PPC KVM_REG_PPC_TLB1PS 32
+ PPC KVM_REG_PPC_TLB2PS 32
+ PPC KVM_REG_PPC_TLB3PS 32
+ PPC KVM_REG_PPC_EPTCFG 32
+ PPC KVM_REG_PPC_ICP_STATE 64
+ PPC KVM_REG_PPC_VP_STATE 128
+ PPC KVM_REG_PPC_TB_OFFSET 64
+ PPC KVM_REG_PPC_SPMC1 32
+ PPC KVM_REG_PPC_SPMC2 32
+ PPC KVM_REG_PPC_IAMR 64
+ PPC KVM_REG_PPC_TFHAR 64
+ PPC KVM_REG_PPC_TFIAR 64
+ PPC KVM_REG_PPC_TEXASR 64
+ PPC KVM_REG_PPC_FSCR 64
+ PPC KVM_REG_PPC_PSPB 32
+ PPC KVM_REG_PPC_EBBHR 64
+ PPC KVM_REG_PPC_EBBRR 64
+ PPC KVM_REG_PPC_BESCR 64
+ PPC KVM_REG_PPC_TAR 64
+ PPC KVM_REG_PPC_DPDES 64
+ PPC KVM_REG_PPC_DAWR 64
+ PPC KVM_REG_PPC_DAWRX 64
+ PPC KVM_REG_PPC_CIABR 64
+ PPC KVM_REG_PPC_IC 64
+ PPC KVM_REG_PPC_VTB 64
+ PPC KVM_REG_PPC_CSIGR 64
+ PPC KVM_REG_PPC_TACR 64
+ PPC KVM_REG_PPC_TCSCR 64
+ PPC KVM_REG_PPC_PID 64
+ PPC KVM_REG_PPC_ACOP 64
+ PPC KVM_REG_PPC_VRSAVE 32
+ PPC KVM_REG_PPC_LPCR 32
+ PPC KVM_REG_PPC_LPCR_64 64
+ PPC KVM_REG_PPC_PPR 64
+ PPC KVM_REG_PPC_ARCH_COMPAT 32
+ PPC KVM_REG_PPC_DABRX 32
+ PPC KVM_REG_PPC_WORT 64
+ PPC KVM_REG_PPC_SPRG9 64
+ PPC KVM_REG_PPC_DBSR 32
+ PPC KVM_REG_PPC_TIDR 64
+ PPC KVM_REG_PPC_PSSCR 64
+ PPC KVM_REG_PPC_DEC_EXPIRY 64
+ PPC KVM_REG_PPC_PTCR 64
+ PPC KVM_REG_PPC_DAWR1 64
+ PPC KVM_REG_PPC_DAWRX1 64
+ PPC KVM_REG_PPC_TM_GPR0 64
+ ...
+ PPC KVM_REG_PPC_TM_GPR31 64
+ PPC KVM_REG_PPC_TM_VSR0 128
+ ...
+ PPC KVM_REG_PPC_TM_VSR63 128
+ PPC KVM_REG_PPC_TM_CR 64
+ PPC KVM_REG_PPC_TM_LR 64
+ PPC KVM_REG_PPC_TM_CTR 64
+ PPC KVM_REG_PPC_TM_FPSCR 64
+ PPC KVM_REG_PPC_TM_AMR 64
+ PPC KVM_REG_PPC_TM_PPR 64
+ PPC KVM_REG_PPC_TM_VRSAVE 64
+ PPC KVM_REG_PPC_TM_VSCR 32
+ PPC KVM_REG_PPC_TM_DSCR 64
+ PPC KVM_REG_PPC_TM_TAR 64
+ PPC KVM_REG_PPC_TM_XER 64
+
+ MIPS KVM_REG_MIPS_R0 64
+ ...
+ MIPS KVM_REG_MIPS_R31 64
+ MIPS KVM_REG_MIPS_HI 64
+ MIPS KVM_REG_MIPS_LO 64
+ MIPS KVM_REG_MIPS_PC 64
+ MIPS KVM_REG_MIPS_CP0_INDEX 32
+ MIPS KVM_REG_MIPS_CP0_ENTRYLO0 64
+ MIPS KVM_REG_MIPS_CP0_ENTRYLO1 64
+ MIPS KVM_REG_MIPS_CP0_CONTEXT 64
+ MIPS KVM_REG_MIPS_CP0_CONTEXTCONFIG 32
+ MIPS KVM_REG_MIPS_CP0_USERLOCAL 64
+ MIPS KVM_REG_MIPS_CP0_XCONTEXTCONFIG 64
+ MIPS KVM_REG_MIPS_CP0_PAGEMASK 32
+ MIPS KVM_REG_MIPS_CP0_PAGEGRAIN 32
+ MIPS KVM_REG_MIPS_CP0_SEGCTL0 64
+ MIPS KVM_REG_MIPS_CP0_SEGCTL1 64
+ MIPS KVM_REG_MIPS_CP0_SEGCTL2 64
+ MIPS KVM_REG_MIPS_CP0_PWBASE 64
+ MIPS KVM_REG_MIPS_CP0_PWFIELD 64
+ MIPS KVM_REG_MIPS_CP0_PWSIZE 64
+ MIPS KVM_REG_MIPS_CP0_WIRED 32
+ MIPS KVM_REG_MIPS_CP0_PWCTL 32
+ MIPS KVM_REG_MIPS_CP0_HWRENA 32
+ MIPS KVM_REG_MIPS_CP0_BADVADDR 64
+ MIPS KVM_REG_MIPS_CP0_BADINSTR 32
+ MIPS KVM_REG_MIPS_CP0_BADINSTRP 32
+ MIPS KVM_REG_MIPS_CP0_COUNT 32
+ MIPS KVM_REG_MIPS_CP0_ENTRYHI 64
+ MIPS KVM_REG_MIPS_CP0_COMPARE 32
+ MIPS KVM_REG_MIPS_CP0_STATUS 32
+ MIPS KVM_REG_MIPS_CP0_INTCTL 32
+ MIPS KVM_REG_MIPS_CP0_CAUSE 32
+ MIPS KVM_REG_MIPS_CP0_EPC 64
+ MIPS KVM_REG_MIPS_CP0_PRID 32
+ MIPS KVM_REG_MIPS_CP0_EBASE 64
+ MIPS KVM_REG_MIPS_CP0_CONFIG 32
+ MIPS KVM_REG_MIPS_CP0_CONFIG1 32
+ MIPS KVM_REG_MIPS_CP0_CONFIG2 32
+ MIPS KVM_REG_MIPS_CP0_CONFIG3 32
+ MIPS KVM_REG_MIPS_CP0_CONFIG4 32
+ MIPS KVM_REG_MIPS_CP0_CONFIG5 32
+ MIPS KVM_REG_MIPS_CP0_CONFIG7 32
+ MIPS KVM_REG_MIPS_CP0_XCONTEXT 64
+ MIPS KVM_REG_MIPS_CP0_ERROREPC 64
+ MIPS KVM_REG_MIPS_CP0_KSCRATCH1 64
+ MIPS KVM_REG_MIPS_CP0_KSCRATCH2 64
+ MIPS KVM_REG_MIPS_CP0_KSCRATCH3 64
+ MIPS KVM_REG_MIPS_CP0_KSCRATCH4 64
+ MIPS KVM_REG_MIPS_CP0_KSCRATCH5 64
+ MIPS KVM_REG_MIPS_CP0_KSCRATCH6 64
+ MIPS KVM_REG_MIPS_CP0_MAAR(0..63) 64
+ MIPS KVM_REG_MIPS_COUNT_CTL 64
+ MIPS KVM_REG_MIPS_COUNT_RESUME 64
+ MIPS KVM_REG_MIPS_COUNT_HZ 64
+ MIPS KVM_REG_MIPS_FPR_32(0..31) 32
+ MIPS KVM_REG_MIPS_FPR_64(0..31) 64
+ MIPS KVM_REG_MIPS_VEC_128(0..31) 128
+ MIPS KVM_REG_MIPS_FCR_IR 32
+ MIPS KVM_REG_MIPS_FCR_CSR 32
+ MIPS KVM_REG_MIPS_MSA_IR 32
+ MIPS KVM_REG_MIPS_MSA_CSR 32
+ ======= =============================== ============
+
+ARM registers are mapped using the lower 32 bits. The upper 16 of that
+is the register group type, or coprocessor number:
+
+ARM core registers have the following id bit patterns::
+
+ 0x4020 0000 0010 <index into the kvm_regs struct:16>
+
+ARM 32-bit CP15 registers have the following id bit patterns::
+
+ 0x4020 0000 000F <zero:1> <crn:4> <crm:4> <opc1:4> <opc2:3>
+
+ARM 64-bit CP15 registers have the following id bit patterns::
+
+ 0x4030 0000 000F <zero:1> <zero:4> <crm:4> <opc1:4> <zero:3>
+
+ARM CCSIDR registers are demultiplexed by CSSELR value::
+
+ 0x4020 0000 0011 00 <csselr:8>
+
+ARM 32-bit VFP control registers have the following id bit patterns::
+
+ 0x4020 0000 0012 1 <regno:12>
+
+ARM 64-bit FP registers have the following id bit patterns::
+
+ 0x4030 0000 0012 0 <regno:12>
+
+ARM firmware pseudo-registers have the following bit pattern::
+
+ 0x4030 0000 0014 <regno:16>
+
+
+arm64 registers are mapped using the lower 32 bits. The upper 16 of
+that is the register group type, or coprocessor number:
+
+arm64 core/FP-SIMD registers have the following id bit patterns. Note
+that the size of the access is variable, as the kvm_regs structure
+contains elements ranging from 32 to 128 bits. The index is a 32bit
+value in the kvm_regs structure seen as a 32bit array::
+
+ 0x60x0 0000 0010 <index into the kvm_regs struct:16>
+
+Specifically:
+
+======================= ========= ===== =======================================
+ Encoding Register Bits kvm_regs member
+======================= ========= ===== =======================================
+ 0x6030 0000 0010 0000 X0 64 regs.regs[0]
+ 0x6030 0000 0010 0002 X1 64 regs.regs[1]
+ ...
+ 0x6030 0000 0010 003c X30 64 regs.regs[30]
+ 0x6030 0000 0010 003e SP 64 regs.sp
+ 0x6030 0000 0010 0040 PC 64 regs.pc
+ 0x6030 0000 0010 0042 PSTATE 64 regs.pstate
+ 0x6030 0000 0010 0044 SP_EL1 64 sp_el1
+ 0x6030 0000 0010 0046 ELR_EL1 64 elr_el1
+ 0x6030 0000 0010 0048 SPSR_EL1 64 spsr[KVM_SPSR_EL1] (alias SPSR_SVC)
+ 0x6030 0000 0010 004a SPSR_ABT 64 spsr[KVM_SPSR_ABT]
+ 0x6030 0000 0010 004c SPSR_UND 64 spsr[KVM_SPSR_UND]
+ 0x6030 0000 0010 004e SPSR_IRQ 64 spsr[KVM_SPSR_IRQ]
+ 0x6060 0000 0010 0050 SPSR_FIQ 64 spsr[KVM_SPSR_FIQ]
+ 0x6040 0000 0010 0054 V0 128 fp_regs.vregs[0] [1]_
+ 0x6040 0000 0010 0058 V1 128 fp_regs.vregs[1] [1]_
+ ...
+ 0x6040 0000 0010 00d0 V31 128 fp_regs.vregs[31] [1]_
+ 0x6020 0000 0010 00d4 FPSR 32 fp_regs.fpsr
+ 0x6020 0000 0010 00d5 FPCR 32 fp_regs.fpcr
+======================= ========= ===== =======================================
+
+.. [1] These encodings are not accepted for SVE-enabled vcpus. See
+ KVM_ARM_VCPU_INIT.
+
+ The equivalent register content can be accessed via bits [127:0] of
+ the corresponding SVE Zn registers instead for vcpus that have SVE
+ enabled (see below).
+
+arm64 CCSIDR registers are demultiplexed by CSSELR value::
+
+ 0x6020 0000 0011 00 <csselr:8>
+
+arm64 system registers have the following id bit patterns::
+
+ 0x6030 0000 0013 <op0:2> <op1:3> <crn:4> <crm:4> <op2:3>
+
+.. warning::
+
+ Two system register IDs do not follow the specified pattern. These
+ are KVM_REG_ARM_TIMER_CVAL and KVM_REG_ARM_TIMER_CNT, which map to
+ system registers CNTV_CVAL_EL0 and CNTVCT_EL0 respectively. These
+ two had their values accidentally swapped, which means TIMER_CVAL is
+ derived from the register encoding for CNTVCT_EL0 and TIMER_CNT is
+ derived from the register encoding for CNTV_CVAL_EL0. As this is
+ API, it must remain this way.
+
+arm64 firmware pseudo-registers have the following bit pattern::
+
+ 0x6030 0000 0014 <regno:16>
+
+arm64 SVE registers have the following bit patterns::
+
+ 0x6080 0000 0015 00 <n:5> <slice:5> Zn bits[2048*slice + 2047 : 2048*slice]
+ 0x6050 0000 0015 04 <n:4> <slice:5> Pn bits[256*slice + 255 : 256*slice]
+ 0x6050 0000 0015 060 <slice:5> FFR bits[256*slice + 255 : 256*slice]
+ 0x6060 0000 0015 ffff KVM_REG_ARM64_SVE_VLS pseudo-register
+
+Access to register IDs where 2048 * slice >= 128 * max_vq will fail with
+ENOENT. max_vq is the vcpu's maximum supported vector length in 128-bit
+quadwords: see [2]_ below.
+
+These registers are only accessible on vcpus for which SVE is enabled.
+See KVM_ARM_VCPU_INIT for details.
+
+In addition, except for KVM_REG_ARM64_SVE_VLS, these registers are not
+accessible until the vcpu's SVE configuration has been finalized
+using KVM_ARM_VCPU_FINALIZE(KVM_ARM_VCPU_SVE). See KVM_ARM_VCPU_INIT
+and KVM_ARM_VCPU_FINALIZE for more information about this procedure.
+
+KVM_REG_ARM64_SVE_VLS is a pseudo-register that allows the set of vector
+lengths supported by the vcpu to be discovered and configured by
+userspace. When transferred to or from user memory via KVM_GET_ONE_REG
+or KVM_SET_ONE_REG, the value of this register is of type
+__u64[KVM_ARM64_SVE_VLS_WORDS], and encodes the set of vector lengths as
+follows::
+
+ __u64 vector_lengths[KVM_ARM64_SVE_VLS_WORDS];
+
+ if (vq >= SVE_VQ_MIN && vq <= SVE_VQ_MAX &&
+ ((vector_lengths[(vq - KVM_ARM64_SVE_VQ_MIN) / 64] >>
+ ((vq - KVM_ARM64_SVE_VQ_MIN) % 64)) & 1))
+ /* Vector length vq * 16 bytes supported */
+ else
+ /* Vector length vq * 16 bytes not supported */
+
+.. [2] The maximum value vq for which the above condition is true is
+ max_vq. This is the maximum vector length available to the guest on
+ this vcpu, and determines which register slices are visible through
+ this ioctl interface.
+
+(See Documentation/arch/arm64/sve.rst for an explanation of the "vq"
+nomenclature.)
+
+KVM_REG_ARM64_SVE_VLS is only accessible after KVM_ARM_VCPU_INIT.
+KVM_ARM_VCPU_INIT initialises it to the best set of vector lengths that
+the host supports.
+
+Userspace may subsequently modify it if desired until the vcpu's SVE
+configuration is finalized using KVM_ARM_VCPU_FINALIZE(KVM_ARM_VCPU_SVE).
+
+Apart from simply removing all vector lengths from the host set that
+exceed some value, support for arbitrarily chosen sets of vector lengths
+is hardware-dependent and may not be available. Attempting to configure
+an invalid set of vector lengths via KVM_SET_ONE_REG will fail with
+EINVAL.
+
+After the vcpu's SVE configuration is finalized, further attempts to
+write this register will fail with EPERM.
+
+arm64 bitmap feature firmware pseudo-registers have the following bit pattern::
+
+ 0x6030 0000 0016 <regno:16>
+
+The bitmap feature firmware registers exposes the hypercall services that
+are available for userspace to configure. The set bits corresponds to the
+services that are available for the guests to access. By default, KVM
+sets all the supported bits during VM initialization. The userspace can
+discover the available services via KVM_GET_ONE_REG, and write back the
+bitmap corresponding to the features that it wishes guests to see via
+KVM_SET_ONE_REG.
+
+Note: These registers are immutable once any of the vCPUs of the VM has
+run at least once. A KVM_SET_ONE_REG in such a scenario will return
+a -EBUSY to userspace.
+
+(See Documentation/virt/kvm/arm/hypercalls.rst for more details.)
+
+
+MIPS registers are mapped using the lower 32 bits. The upper 16 of that is
+the register group type:
+
+MIPS core registers (see above) have the following id bit patterns::
+
+ 0x7030 0000 0000 <reg:16>
+
+MIPS CP0 registers (see KVM_REG_MIPS_CP0_* above) have the following id bit
+patterns depending on whether they're 32-bit or 64-bit registers::
+
+ 0x7020 0000 0001 00 <reg:5> <sel:3> (32-bit)
+ 0x7030 0000 0001 00 <reg:5> <sel:3> (64-bit)
+
+Note: KVM_REG_MIPS_CP0_ENTRYLO0 and KVM_REG_MIPS_CP0_ENTRYLO1 are the MIPS64
+versions of the EntryLo registers regardless of the word size of the host
+hardware, host kernel, guest, and whether XPA is present in the guest, i.e.
+with the RI and XI bits (if they exist) in bits 63 and 62 respectively, and
+the PFNX field starting at bit 30.
+
+MIPS MAARs (see KVM_REG_MIPS_CP0_MAAR(*) above) have the following id bit
+patterns::
+
+ 0x7030 0000 0001 01 <reg:8>
+
+MIPS KVM control registers (see above) have the following id bit patterns::
+
+ 0x7030 0000 0002 <reg:16>
+
+MIPS FPU registers (see KVM_REG_MIPS_FPR_{32,64}() above) have the following
+id bit patterns depending on the size of the register being accessed. They are
+always accessed according to the current guest FPU mode (Status.FR and
+Config5.FRE), i.e. as the guest would see them, and they become unpredictable
+if the guest FPU mode is changed. MIPS SIMD Architecture (MSA) vector
+registers (see KVM_REG_MIPS_VEC_128() above) have similar patterns as they
+overlap the FPU registers::
+
+ 0x7020 0000 0003 00 <0:3> <reg:5> (32-bit FPU registers)
+ 0x7030 0000 0003 00 <0:3> <reg:5> (64-bit FPU registers)
+ 0x7040 0000 0003 00 <0:3> <reg:5> (128-bit MSA vector registers)
+
+MIPS FPU control registers (see KVM_REG_MIPS_FCR_{IR,CSR} above) have the
+following id bit patterns::
+
+ 0x7020 0000 0003 01 <0:3> <reg:5>
+
+MIPS MSA control registers (see KVM_REG_MIPS_MSA_{IR,CSR} above) have the
+following id bit patterns::
+
+ 0x7020 0000 0003 02 <0:3> <reg:5>
+
+RISC-V registers are mapped using the lower 32 bits. The upper 8 bits of
+that is the register group type.
+
+RISC-V config registers are meant for configuring a Guest VCPU and it has
+the following id bit patterns::
+
+ 0x8020 0000 01 <index into the kvm_riscv_config struct:24> (32bit Host)
+ 0x8030 0000 01 <index into the kvm_riscv_config struct:24> (64bit Host)
+
+Following are the RISC-V config registers:
+
+======================= ========= =============================================
+ Encoding Register Description
+======================= ========= =============================================
+ 0x80x0 0000 0100 0000 isa ISA feature bitmap of Guest VCPU
+======================= ========= =============================================
+
+The isa config register can be read anytime but can only be written before
+a Guest VCPU runs. It will have ISA feature bits matching underlying host
+set by default.
+
+RISC-V core registers represent the general execution state of a Guest VCPU
+and it has the following id bit patterns::
+
+ 0x8020 0000 02 <index into the kvm_riscv_core struct:24> (32bit Host)
+ 0x8030 0000 02 <index into the kvm_riscv_core struct:24> (64bit Host)
+
+Following are the RISC-V core registers:
+
+======================= ========= =============================================
+ Encoding Register Description
+======================= ========= =============================================
+ 0x80x0 0000 0200 0000 regs.pc Program counter
+ 0x80x0 0000 0200 0001 regs.ra Return address
+ 0x80x0 0000 0200 0002 regs.sp Stack pointer
+ 0x80x0 0000 0200 0003 regs.gp Global pointer
+ 0x80x0 0000 0200 0004 regs.tp Task pointer
+ 0x80x0 0000 0200 0005 regs.t0 Caller saved register 0
+ 0x80x0 0000 0200 0006 regs.t1 Caller saved register 1
+ 0x80x0 0000 0200 0007 regs.t2 Caller saved register 2
+ 0x80x0 0000 0200 0008 regs.s0 Callee saved register 0
+ 0x80x0 0000 0200 0009 regs.s1 Callee saved register 1
+ 0x80x0 0000 0200 000a regs.a0 Function argument (or return value) 0
+ 0x80x0 0000 0200 000b regs.a1 Function argument (or return value) 1
+ 0x80x0 0000 0200 000c regs.a2 Function argument 2
+ 0x80x0 0000 0200 000d regs.a3 Function argument 3
+ 0x80x0 0000 0200 000e regs.a4 Function argument 4
+ 0x80x0 0000 0200 000f regs.a5 Function argument 5
+ 0x80x0 0000 0200 0010 regs.a6 Function argument 6
+ 0x80x0 0000 0200 0011 regs.a7 Function argument 7
+ 0x80x0 0000 0200 0012 regs.s2 Callee saved register 2
+ 0x80x0 0000 0200 0013 regs.s3 Callee saved register 3
+ 0x80x0 0000 0200 0014 regs.s4 Callee saved register 4
+ 0x80x0 0000 0200 0015 regs.s5 Callee saved register 5
+ 0x80x0 0000 0200 0016 regs.s6 Callee saved register 6
+ 0x80x0 0000 0200 0017 regs.s7 Callee saved register 7
+ 0x80x0 0000 0200 0018 regs.s8 Callee saved register 8
+ 0x80x0 0000 0200 0019 regs.s9 Callee saved register 9
+ 0x80x0 0000 0200 001a regs.s10 Callee saved register 10
+ 0x80x0 0000 0200 001b regs.s11 Callee saved register 11
+ 0x80x0 0000 0200 001c regs.t3 Caller saved register 3
+ 0x80x0 0000 0200 001d regs.t4 Caller saved register 4
+ 0x80x0 0000 0200 001e regs.t5 Caller saved register 5
+ 0x80x0 0000 0200 001f regs.t6 Caller saved register 6
+ 0x80x0 0000 0200 0020 mode Privilege mode (1 = S-mode or 0 = U-mode)
+======================= ========= =============================================
+
+RISC-V csr registers represent the supervisor mode control/status registers
+of a Guest VCPU and it has the following id bit patterns::
+
+ 0x8020 0000 03 <index into the kvm_riscv_csr struct:24> (32bit Host)
+ 0x8030 0000 03 <index into the kvm_riscv_csr struct:24> (64bit Host)
+
+Following are the RISC-V csr registers:
+
+======================= ========= =============================================
+ Encoding Register Description
+======================= ========= =============================================
+ 0x80x0 0000 0300 0000 sstatus Supervisor status
+ 0x80x0 0000 0300 0001 sie Supervisor interrupt enable
+ 0x80x0 0000 0300 0002 stvec Supervisor trap vector base
+ 0x80x0 0000 0300 0003 sscratch Supervisor scratch register
+ 0x80x0 0000 0300 0004 sepc Supervisor exception program counter
+ 0x80x0 0000 0300 0005 scause Supervisor trap cause
+ 0x80x0 0000 0300 0006 stval Supervisor bad address or instruction
+ 0x80x0 0000 0300 0007 sip Supervisor interrupt pending
+ 0x80x0 0000 0300 0008 satp Supervisor address translation and protection
+======================= ========= =============================================
+
+RISC-V timer registers represent the timer state of a Guest VCPU and it has
+the following id bit patterns::
+
+ 0x8030 0000 04 <index into the kvm_riscv_timer struct:24>
+
+Following are the RISC-V timer registers:
+
+======================= ========= =============================================
+ Encoding Register Description
+======================= ========= =============================================
+ 0x8030 0000 0400 0000 frequency Time base frequency (read-only)
+ 0x8030 0000 0400 0001 time Time value visible to Guest
+ 0x8030 0000 0400 0002 compare Time compare programmed by Guest
+ 0x8030 0000 0400 0003 state Time compare state (1 = ON or 0 = OFF)
+======================= ========= =============================================
+
+RISC-V F-extension registers represent the single precision floating point
+state of a Guest VCPU and it has the following id bit patterns::
+
+ 0x8020 0000 05 <index into the __riscv_f_ext_state struct:24>
+
+Following are the RISC-V F-extension registers:
+
+======================= ========= =============================================
+ Encoding Register Description
+======================= ========= =============================================
+ 0x8020 0000 0500 0000 f[0] Floating point register 0
+ ...
+ 0x8020 0000 0500 001f f[31] Floating point register 31
+ 0x8020 0000 0500 0020 fcsr Floating point control and status register
+======================= ========= =============================================
+
+RISC-V D-extension registers represent the double precision floating point
+state of a Guest VCPU and it has the following id bit patterns::
+
+ 0x8020 0000 06 <index into the __riscv_d_ext_state struct:24> (fcsr)
+ 0x8030 0000 06 <index into the __riscv_d_ext_state struct:24> (non-fcsr)
+
+Following are the RISC-V D-extension registers:
+
+======================= ========= =============================================
+ Encoding Register Description
+======================= ========= =============================================
+ 0x8030 0000 0600 0000 f[0] Floating point register 0
+ ...
+ 0x8030 0000 0600 001f f[31] Floating point register 31
+ 0x8020 0000 0600 0020 fcsr Floating point control and status register
+======================= ========= =============================================
+
+
+4.69 KVM_GET_ONE_REG
+--------------------
+
+:Capability: KVM_CAP_ONE_REG
+:Architectures: all
+:Type: vcpu ioctl
+:Parameters: struct kvm_one_reg (in and out)
+:Returns: 0 on success, negative value on failure
+
+Errors include:
+
+ ======== ============================================================
+ ENOENT no such register
+ EINVAL invalid register ID, or no such register or used with VMs in
+ protected virtualization mode on s390
+ EPERM (arm64) register access not allowed before vcpu finalization
+ ======== ============================================================
+
+(These error codes are indicative only: do not rely on a specific error
+code being returned in a specific situation.)
+
+This ioctl allows to receive the value of a single register implemented
+in a vcpu. The register to read is indicated by the "id" field of the
+kvm_one_reg struct passed in. On success, the register value can be found
+at the memory location pointed to by "addr".
+
+The list of registers accessible using this interface is identical to the
+list in 4.68.
+
+
+4.70 KVM_KVMCLOCK_CTRL
+----------------------
+
+:Capability: KVM_CAP_KVMCLOCK_CTRL
+:Architectures: Any that implement pvclocks (currently x86 only)
+:Type: vcpu ioctl
+:Parameters: None
+:Returns: 0 on success, -1 on error
+
+This ioctl sets a flag accessible to the guest indicating that the specified
+vCPU has been paused by the host userspace.
+
+The host will set a flag in the pvclock structure that is checked from the
+soft lockup watchdog. The flag is part of the pvclock structure that is
+shared between guest and host, specifically the second bit of the flags
+field of the pvclock_vcpu_time_info structure. It will be set exclusively by
+the host and read/cleared exclusively by the guest. The guest operation of
+checking and clearing the flag must be an atomic operation so
+load-link/store-conditional, or equivalent must be used. There are two cases
+where the guest will clear the flag: when the soft lockup watchdog timer resets
+itself or when a soft lockup is detected. This ioctl can be called any time
+after pausing the vcpu, but before it is resumed.
+
+
+4.71 KVM_SIGNAL_MSI
+-------------------
+
+:Capability: KVM_CAP_SIGNAL_MSI
+:Architectures: x86 arm64
+:Type: vm ioctl
+:Parameters: struct kvm_msi (in)
+:Returns: >0 on delivery, 0 if guest blocked the MSI, and -1 on error
+
+Directly inject a MSI message. Only valid with in-kernel irqchip that handles
+MSI messages.
+
+::
+
+ struct kvm_msi {
+ __u32 address_lo;
+ __u32 address_hi;
+ __u32 data;
+ __u32 flags;
+ __u32 devid;
+ __u8 pad[12];
+ };
+
+flags:
+ KVM_MSI_VALID_DEVID: devid contains a valid value. The per-VM
+ KVM_CAP_MSI_DEVID capability advertises the requirement to provide
+ the device ID. If this capability is not available, userspace
+ should never set the KVM_MSI_VALID_DEVID flag as the ioctl might fail.
+
+If KVM_MSI_VALID_DEVID is set, devid contains a unique device identifier
+for the device that wrote the MSI message. For PCI, this is usually a
+BFD identifier in the lower 16 bits.
+
+On x86, address_hi is ignored unless the KVM_X2APIC_API_USE_32BIT_IDS
+feature of KVM_CAP_X2APIC_API capability is enabled. If it is enabled,
+address_hi bits 31-8 provide bits 31-8 of the destination id. Bits 7-0 of
+address_hi must be zero.
+
+
+4.71 KVM_CREATE_PIT2
+--------------------
+
+:Capability: KVM_CAP_PIT2
+:Architectures: x86
+:Type: vm ioctl
+:Parameters: struct kvm_pit_config (in)
+:Returns: 0 on success, -1 on error
+
+Creates an in-kernel device model for the i8254 PIT. This call is only valid
+after enabling in-kernel irqchip support via KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP. The following
+parameters have to be passed::
+
+ struct kvm_pit_config {
+ __u32 flags;
+ __u32 pad[15];
+ };
+
+Valid flags are::
+
+ #define KVM_PIT_SPEAKER_DUMMY 1 /* emulate speaker port stub */
+
+PIT timer interrupts may use a per-VM kernel thread for injection. If it
+exists, this thread will have a name of the following pattern::
+
+ kvm-pit/<owner-process-pid>
+
+When running a guest with elevated priorities, the scheduling parameters of
+this thread may have to be adjusted accordingly.
+
+This IOCTL replaces the obsolete KVM_CREATE_PIT.
+
+
+4.72 KVM_GET_PIT2
+-----------------
+
+:Capability: KVM_CAP_PIT_STATE2
+:Architectures: x86
+:Type: vm ioctl
+:Parameters: struct kvm_pit_state2 (out)
+:Returns: 0 on success, -1 on error
+
+Retrieves the state of the in-kernel PIT model. Only valid after
+KVM_CREATE_PIT2. The state is returned in the following structure::
+
+ struct kvm_pit_state2 {
+ struct kvm_pit_channel_state channels[3];
+ __u32 flags;
+ __u32 reserved[9];
+ };
+
+Valid flags are::
+
+ /* disable PIT in HPET legacy mode */
+ #define KVM_PIT_FLAGS_HPET_LEGACY 0x00000001
+ /* speaker port data bit enabled */
+ #define KVM_PIT_FLAGS_SPEAKER_DATA_ON 0x00000002
+
+This IOCTL replaces the obsolete KVM_GET_PIT.
+
+
+4.73 KVM_SET_PIT2
+-----------------
+
+:Capability: KVM_CAP_PIT_STATE2
+:Architectures: x86
+:Type: vm ioctl
+:Parameters: struct kvm_pit_state2 (in)
+:Returns: 0 on success, -1 on error
+
+Sets the state of the in-kernel PIT model. Only valid after KVM_CREATE_PIT2.
+See KVM_GET_PIT2 for details on struct kvm_pit_state2.
+
+This IOCTL replaces the obsolete KVM_SET_PIT.
+
+
+4.74 KVM_PPC_GET_SMMU_INFO
+--------------------------
+
+:Capability: KVM_CAP_PPC_GET_SMMU_INFO
+:Architectures: powerpc
+:Type: vm ioctl
+:Parameters: None
+:Returns: 0 on success, -1 on error
+
+This populates and returns a structure describing the features of
+the "Server" class MMU emulation supported by KVM.
+This can in turn be used by userspace to generate the appropriate
+device-tree properties for the guest operating system.
+
+The structure contains some global information, followed by an
+array of supported segment page sizes::
+
+ struct kvm_ppc_smmu_info {
+ __u64 flags;
+ __u32 slb_size;
+ __u32 pad;
+ struct kvm_ppc_one_seg_page_size sps[KVM_PPC_PAGE_SIZES_MAX_SZ];
+ };
+
+The supported flags are:
+
+ - KVM_PPC_PAGE_SIZES_REAL:
+ When that flag is set, guest page sizes must "fit" the backing
+ store page sizes. When not set, any page size in the list can
+ be used regardless of how they are backed by userspace.
+
+ - KVM_PPC_1T_SEGMENTS
+ The emulated MMU supports 1T segments in addition to the
+ standard 256M ones.
+
+ - KVM_PPC_NO_HASH
+ This flag indicates that HPT guests are not supported by KVM,
+ thus all guests must use radix MMU mode.
+
+The "slb_size" field indicates how many SLB entries are supported
+
+The "sps" array contains 8 entries indicating the supported base
+page sizes for a segment in increasing order. Each entry is defined
+as follow::
+
+ struct kvm_ppc_one_seg_page_size {
+ __u32 page_shift; /* Base page shift of segment (or 0) */
+ __u32 slb_enc; /* SLB encoding for BookS */
+ struct kvm_ppc_one_page_size enc[KVM_PPC_PAGE_SIZES_MAX_SZ];
+ };
+
+An entry with a "page_shift" of 0 is unused. Because the array is
+organized in increasing order, a lookup can stop when encoutering
+such an entry.
+
+The "slb_enc" field provides the encoding to use in the SLB for the
+page size. The bits are in positions such as the value can directly
+be OR'ed into the "vsid" argument of the slbmte instruction.
+
+The "enc" array is a list which for each of those segment base page
+size provides the list of supported actual page sizes (which can be
+only larger or equal to the base page size), along with the
+corresponding encoding in the hash PTE. Similarly, the array is
+8 entries sorted by increasing sizes and an entry with a "0" shift
+is an empty entry and a terminator::
+
+ struct kvm_ppc_one_page_size {
+ __u32 page_shift; /* Page shift (or 0) */
+ __u32 pte_enc; /* Encoding in the HPTE (>>12) */
+ };
+
+The "pte_enc" field provides a value that can OR'ed into the hash
+PTE's RPN field (ie, it needs to be shifted left by 12 to OR it
+into the hash PTE second double word).
+
+4.75 KVM_IRQFD
+--------------
+
+:Capability: KVM_CAP_IRQFD
+:Architectures: x86 s390 arm64
+:Type: vm ioctl
+:Parameters: struct kvm_irqfd (in)
+:Returns: 0 on success, -1 on error
+
+Allows setting an eventfd to directly trigger a guest interrupt.
+kvm_irqfd.fd specifies the file descriptor to use as the eventfd and
+kvm_irqfd.gsi specifies the irqchip pin toggled by this event. When
+an event is triggered on the eventfd, an interrupt is injected into
+the guest using the specified gsi pin. The irqfd is removed using
+the KVM_IRQFD_FLAG_DEASSIGN flag, specifying both kvm_irqfd.fd
+and kvm_irqfd.gsi.
+
+With KVM_CAP_IRQFD_RESAMPLE, KVM_IRQFD supports a de-assert and notify
+mechanism allowing emulation of level-triggered, irqfd-based
+interrupts. When KVM_IRQFD_FLAG_RESAMPLE is set the user must pass an
+additional eventfd in the kvm_irqfd.resamplefd field. When operating
+in resample mode, posting of an interrupt through kvm_irq.fd asserts
+the specified gsi in the irqchip. When the irqchip is resampled, such
+as from an EOI, the gsi is de-asserted and the user is notified via
+kvm_irqfd.resamplefd. It is the user's responsibility to re-queue
+the interrupt if the device making use of it still requires service.
+Note that closing the resamplefd is not sufficient to disable the
+irqfd. The KVM_IRQFD_FLAG_RESAMPLE is only necessary on assignment
+and need not be specified with KVM_IRQFD_FLAG_DEASSIGN.
+
+On arm64, gsi routing being supported, the following can happen:
+
+- in case no routing entry is associated to this gsi, injection fails
+- in case the gsi is associated to an irqchip routing entry,
+ irqchip.pin + 32 corresponds to the injected SPI ID.
+- in case the gsi is associated to an MSI routing entry, the MSI
+ message and device ID are translated into an LPI (support restricted
+ to GICv3 ITS in-kernel emulation).
+
+4.76 KVM_PPC_ALLOCATE_HTAB
+--------------------------
+
+:Capability: KVM_CAP_PPC_ALLOC_HTAB
+:Architectures: powerpc
+:Type: vm ioctl
+:Parameters: Pointer to u32 containing hash table order (in/out)
+:Returns: 0 on success, -1 on error
+
+This requests the host kernel to allocate an MMU hash table for a
+guest using the PAPR paravirtualization interface. This only does
+anything if the kernel is configured to use the Book 3S HV style of
+virtualization. Otherwise the capability doesn't exist and the ioctl
+returns an ENOTTY error. The rest of this description assumes Book 3S
+HV.
+
+There must be no vcpus running when this ioctl is called; if there
+are, it will do nothing and return an EBUSY error.
+
+The parameter is a pointer to a 32-bit unsigned integer variable
+containing the order (log base 2) of the desired size of the hash
+table, which must be between 18 and 46. On successful return from the
+ioctl, the value will not be changed by the kernel.
+
+If no hash table has been allocated when any vcpu is asked to run
+(with the KVM_RUN ioctl), the host kernel will allocate a
+default-sized hash table (16 MB).
+
+If this ioctl is called when a hash table has already been allocated,
+with a different order from the existing hash table, the existing hash
+table will be freed and a new one allocated. If this is ioctl is
+called when a hash table has already been allocated of the same order
+as specified, the kernel will clear out the existing hash table (zero
+all HPTEs). In either case, if the guest is using the virtualized
+real-mode area (VRMA) facility, the kernel will re-create the VMRA
+HPTEs on the next KVM_RUN of any vcpu.
+
+4.77 KVM_S390_INTERRUPT
+-----------------------
+
+:Capability: basic
+:Architectures: s390
+:Type: vm ioctl, vcpu ioctl
+:Parameters: struct kvm_s390_interrupt (in)
+:Returns: 0 on success, -1 on error
+
+Allows to inject an interrupt to the guest. Interrupts can be floating
+(vm ioctl) or per cpu (vcpu ioctl), depending on the interrupt type.
+
+Interrupt parameters are passed via kvm_s390_interrupt::
+
+ struct kvm_s390_interrupt {
+ __u32 type;
+ __u32 parm;
+ __u64 parm64;
+ };
+
+type can be one of the following:
+
+KVM_S390_SIGP_STOP (vcpu)
+ - sigp stop; optional flags in parm
+KVM_S390_PROGRAM_INT (vcpu)
+ - program check; code in parm
+KVM_S390_SIGP_SET_PREFIX (vcpu)
+ - sigp set prefix; prefix address in parm
+KVM_S390_RESTART (vcpu)
+ - restart
+KVM_S390_INT_CLOCK_COMP (vcpu)
+ - clock comparator interrupt
+KVM_S390_INT_CPU_TIMER (vcpu)
+ - CPU timer interrupt
+KVM_S390_INT_VIRTIO (vm)
+ - virtio external interrupt; external interrupt
+ parameters in parm and parm64
+KVM_S390_INT_SERVICE (vm)
+ - sclp external interrupt; sclp parameter in parm
+KVM_S390_INT_EMERGENCY (vcpu)
+ - sigp emergency; source cpu in parm
+KVM_S390_INT_EXTERNAL_CALL (vcpu)
+ - sigp external call; source cpu in parm
+KVM_S390_INT_IO(ai,cssid,ssid,schid) (vm)
+ - compound value to indicate an
+ I/O interrupt (ai - adapter interrupt; cssid,ssid,schid - subchannel);
+ I/O interruption parameters in parm (subchannel) and parm64 (intparm,
+ interruption subclass)
+KVM_S390_MCHK (vm, vcpu)
+ - machine check interrupt; cr 14 bits in parm, machine check interrupt
+ code in parm64 (note that machine checks needing further payload are not
+ supported by this ioctl)
+
+This is an asynchronous vcpu ioctl and can be invoked from any thread.
+
+4.78 KVM_PPC_GET_HTAB_FD
+------------------------
+
+:Capability: KVM_CAP_PPC_HTAB_FD
+:Architectures: powerpc
+:Type: vm ioctl
+:Parameters: Pointer to struct kvm_get_htab_fd (in)
+:Returns: file descriptor number (>= 0) on success, -1 on error
+
+This returns a file descriptor that can be used either to read out the
+entries in the guest's hashed page table (HPT), or to write entries to
+initialize the HPT. The returned fd can only be written to if the
+KVM_GET_HTAB_WRITE bit is set in the flags field of the argument, and
+can only be read if that bit is clear. The argument struct looks like
+this::
+
+ /* For KVM_PPC_GET_HTAB_FD */
+ struct kvm_get_htab_fd {
+ __u64 flags;
+ __u64 start_index;
+ __u64 reserved[2];
+ };
+
+ /* Values for kvm_get_htab_fd.flags */
+ #define KVM_GET_HTAB_BOLTED_ONLY ((__u64)0x1)
+ #define KVM_GET_HTAB_WRITE ((__u64)0x2)
+
+The 'start_index' field gives the index in the HPT of the entry at
+which to start reading. It is ignored when writing.
+
+Reads on the fd will initially supply information about all
+"interesting" HPT entries. Interesting entries are those with the
+bolted bit set, if the KVM_GET_HTAB_BOLTED_ONLY bit is set, otherwise
+all entries. When the end of the HPT is reached, the read() will
+return. If read() is called again on the fd, it will start again from
+the beginning of the HPT, but will only return HPT entries that have
+changed since they were last read.
+
+Data read or written is structured as a header (8 bytes) followed by a
+series of valid HPT entries (16 bytes) each. The header indicates how
+many valid HPT entries there are and how many invalid entries follow
+the valid entries. The invalid entries are not represented explicitly
+in the stream. The header format is::
+
+ struct kvm_get_htab_header {
+ __u32 index;
+ __u16 n_valid;
+ __u16 n_invalid;
+ };
+
+Writes to the fd create HPT entries starting at the index given in the
+header; first 'n_valid' valid entries with contents from the data
+written, then 'n_invalid' invalid entries, invalidating any previously
+valid entries found.
+
+4.79 KVM_CREATE_DEVICE
+----------------------
+
+:Capability: KVM_CAP_DEVICE_CTRL
+:Architectures: all
+:Type: vm ioctl
+:Parameters: struct kvm_create_device (in/out)
+:Returns: 0 on success, -1 on error
+
+Errors:
+
+ ====== =======================================================
+ ENODEV The device type is unknown or unsupported
+ EEXIST Device already created, and this type of device may not
+ be instantiated multiple times
+ ====== =======================================================
+
+ Other error conditions may be defined by individual device types or
+ have their standard meanings.
+
+Creates an emulated device in the kernel. The file descriptor returned
+in fd can be used with KVM_SET/GET/HAS_DEVICE_ATTR.
+
+If the KVM_CREATE_DEVICE_TEST flag is set, only test whether the
+device type is supported (not necessarily whether it can be created
+in the current vm).
+
+Individual devices should not define flags. Attributes should be used
+for specifying any behavior that is not implied by the device type
+number.
+
+::
+
+ struct kvm_create_device {
+ __u32 type; /* in: KVM_DEV_TYPE_xxx */
+ __u32 fd; /* out: device handle */
+ __u32 flags; /* in: KVM_CREATE_DEVICE_xxx */
+ };
+
+4.80 KVM_SET_DEVICE_ATTR/KVM_GET_DEVICE_ATTR
+--------------------------------------------
+
+:Capability: KVM_CAP_DEVICE_CTRL, KVM_CAP_VM_ATTRIBUTES for vm device,
+ KVM_CAP_VCPU_ATTRIBUTES for vcpu device
+ KVM_CAP_SYS_ATTRIBUTES for system (/dev/kvm) device (no set)
+:Architectures: x86, arm64, s390
+:Type: device ioctl, vm ioctl, vcpu ioctl
+:Parameters: struct kvm_device_attr
+:Returns: 0 on success, -1 on error
+
+Errors:
+
+ ===== =============================================================
+ ENXIO The group or attribute is unknown/unsupported for this device
+ or hardware support is missing.
+ EPERM The attribute cannot (currently) be accessed this way
+ (e.g. read-only attribute, or attribute that only makes
+ sense when the device is in a different state)
+ ===== =============================================================
+
+ Other error conditions may be defined by individual device types.
+
+Gets/sets a specified piece of device configuration and/or state. The
+semantics are device-specific. See individual device documentation in
+the "devices" directory. As with ONE_REG, the size of the data
+transferred is defined by the particular attribute.
+
+::
+
+ struct kvm_device_attr {
+ __u32 flags; /* no flags currently defined */
+ __u32 group; /* device-defined */
+ __u64 attr; /* group-defined */
+ __u64 addr; /* userspace address of attr data */
+ };
+
+4.81 KVM_HAS_DEVICE_ATTR
+------------------------
+
+:Capability: KVM_CAP_DEVICE_CTRL, KVM_CAP_VM_ATTRIBUTES for vm device,
+ KVM_CAP_VCPU_ATTRIBUTES for vcpu device
+ KVM_CAP_SYS_ATTRIBUTES for system (/dev/kvm) device
+:Type: device ioctl, vm ioctl, vcpu ioctl
+:Parameters: struct kvm_device_attr
+:Returns: 0 on success, -1 on error
+
+Errors:
+
+ ===== =============================================================
+ ENXIO The group or attribute is unknown/unsupported for this device
+ or hardware support is missing.
+ ===== =============================================================
+
+Tests whether a device supports a particular attribute. A successful
+return indicates the attribute is implemented. It does not necessarily
+indicate that the attribute can be read or written in the device's
+current state. "addr" is ignored.
+
+4.82 KVM_ARM_VCPU_INIT
+----------------------
+
+:Capability: basic
+:Architectures: arm64
+:Type: vcpu ioctl
+:Parameters: struct kvm_vcpu_init (in)
+:Returns: 0 on success; -1 on error
+
+Errors:
+
+ ====== =================================================================
+ EINVAL the target is unknown, or the combination of features is invalid.
+ ENOENT a features bit specified is unknown.
+ ====== =================================================================
+
+This tells KVM what type of CPU to present to the guest, and what
+optional features it should have. This will cause a reset of the cpu
+registers to their initial values. If this is not called, KVM_RUN will
+return ENOEXEC for that vcpu.
+
+The initial values are defined as:
+ - Processor state:
+ * AArch64: EL1h, D, A, I and F bits set. All other bits
+ are cleared.
+ * AArch32: SVC, A, I and F bits set. All other bits are
+ cleared.
+ - General Purpose registers, including PC and SP: set to 0
+ - FPSIMD/NEON registers: set to 0
+ - SVE registers: set to 0
+ - System registers: Reset to their architecturally defined
+ values as for a warm reset to EL1 (resp. SVC)
+
+Note that because some registers reflect machine topology, all vcpus
+should be created before this ioctl is invoked.
+
+Userspace can call this function multiple times for a given vcpu, including
+after the vcpu has been run. This will reset the vcpu to its initial
+state. All calls to this function after the initial call must use the same
+target and same set of feature flags, otherwise EINVAL will be returned.
+
+Possible features:
+
+ - KVM_ARM_VCPU_POWER_OFF: Starts the CPU in a power-off state.
+ Depends on KVM_CAP_ARM_PSCI. If not set, the CPU will be powered on
+ and execute guest code when KVM_RUN is called.
+ - KVM_ARM_VCPU_EL1_32BIT: Starts the CPU in a 32bit mode.
+ Depends on KVM_CAP_ARM_EL1_32BIT (arm64 only).
+ - KVM_ARM_VCPU_PSCI_0_2: Emulate PSCI v0.2 (or a future revision
+ backward compatible with v0.2) for the CPU.
+ Depends on KVM_CAP_ARM_PSCI_0_2.
+ - KVM_ARM_VCPU_PMU_V3: Emulate PMUv3 for the CPU.
+ Depends on KVM_CAP_ARM_PMU_V3.
+
+ - KVM_ARM_VCPU_PTRAUTH_ADDRESS: Enables Address Pointer authentication
+ for arm64 only.
+ Depends on KVM_CAP_ARM_PTRAUTH_ADDRESS.
+ If KVM_CAP_ARM_PTRAUTH_ADDRESS and KVM_CAP_ARM_PTRAUTH_GENERIC are
+ both present, then both KVM_ARM_VCPU_PTRAUTH_ADDRESS and
+ KVM_ARM_VCPU_PTRAUTH_GENERIC must be requested or neither must be
+ requested.
+
+ - KVM_ARM_VCPU_PTRAUTH_GENERIC: Enables Generic Pointer authentication
+ for arm64 only.
+ Depends on KVM_CAP_ARM_PTRAUTH_GENERIC.
+ If KVM_CAP_ARM_PTRAUTH_ADDRESS and KVM_CAP_ARM_PTRAUTH_GENERIC are
+ both present, then both KVM_ARM_VCPU_PTRAUTH_ADDRESS and
+ KVM_ARM_VCPU_PTRAUTH_GENERIC must be requested or neither must be
+ requested.
+
+ - KVM_ARM_VCPU_SVE: Enables SVE for the CPU (arm64 only).
+ Depends on KVM_CAP_ARM_SVE.
+ Requires KVM_ARM_VCPU_FINALIZE(KVM_ARM_VCPU_SVE):
+
+ * After KVM_ARM_VCPU_INIT:
+
+ - KVM_REG_ARM64_SVE_VLS may be read using KVM_GET_ONE_REG: the
+ initial value of this pseudo-register indicates the best set of
+ vector lengths possible for a vcpu on this host.
+
+ * Before KVM_ARM_VCPU_FINALIZE(KVM_ARM_VCPU_SVE):
+
+ - KVM_RUN and KVM_GET_REG_LIST are not available;
+
+ - KVM_GET_ONE_REG and KVM_SET_ONE_REG cannot be used to access
+ the scalable archietctural SVE registers
+ KVM_REG_ARM64_SVE_ZREG(), KVM_REG_ARM64_SVE_PREG() or
+ KVM_REG_ARM64_SVE_FFR;
+
+ - KVM_REG_ARM64_SVE_VLS may optionally be written using
+ KVM_SET_ONE_REG, to modify the set of vector lengths available
+ for the vcpu.
+
+ * After KVM_ARM_VCPU_FINALIZE(KVM_ARM_VCPU_SVE):
+
+ - the KVM_REG_ARM64_SVE_VLS pseudo-register is immutable, and can
+ no longer be written using KVM_SET_ONE_REG.
+
+4.83 KVM_ARM_PREFERRED_TARGET
+-----------------------------
+
+:Capability: basic
+:Architectures: arm64
+:Type: vm ioctl
+:Parameters: struct kvm_vcpu_init (out)
+:Returns: 0 on success; -1 on error
+
+Errors:
+
+ ====== ==========================================
+ ENODEV no preferred target available for the host
+ ====== ==========================================
+
+This queries KVM for preferred CPU target type which can be emulated
+by KVM on underlying host.
+
+The ioctl returns struct kvm_vcpu_init instance containing information
+about preferred CPU target type and recommended features for it. The
+kvm_vcpu_init->features bitmap returned will have feature bits set if
+the preferred target recommends setting these features, but this is
+not mandatory.
+
+The information returned by this ioctl can be used to prepare an instance
+of struct kvm_vcpu_init for KVM_ARM_VCPU_INIT ioctl which will result in
+VCPU matching underlying host.
+
+
+4.84 KVM_GET_REG_LIST
+---------------------
+
+:Capability: basic
+:Architectures: arm64, mips, riscv
+:Type: vcpu ioctl
+:Parameters: struct kvm_reg_list (in/out)
+:Returns: 0 on success; -1 on error
+
+Errors:
+
+ ===== ==============================================================
+ E2BIG the reg index list is too big to fit in the array specified by
+ the user (the number required will be written into n).
+ ===== ==============================================================
+
+::
+
+ struct kvm_reg_list {
+ __u64 n; /* number of registers in reg[] */
+ __u64 reg[0];
+ };
+
+This ioctl returns the guest registers that are supported for the
+KVM_GET_ONE_REG/KVM_SET_ONE_REG calls.
+
+
+4.85 KVM_ARM_SET_DEVICE_ADDR (deprecated)
+-----------------------------------------
+
+:Capability: KVM_CAP_ARM_SET_DEVICE_ADDR
+:Architectures: arm64
+:Type: vm ioctl
+:Parameters: struct kvm_arm_device_address (in)
+:Returns: 0 on success, -1 on error
+
+Errors:
+
+ ====== ============================================
+ ENODEV The device id is unknown
+ ENXIO Device not supported on current system
+ EEXIST Address already set
+ E2BIG Address outside guest physical address space
+ EBUSY Address overlaps with other device range
+ ====== ============================================
+
+::
+
+ struct kvm_arm_device_addr {
+ __u64 id;
+ __u64 addr;
+ };
+
+Specify a device address in the guest's physical address space where guests
+can access emulated or directly exposed devices, which the host kernel needs
+to know about. The id field is an architecture specific identifier for a
+specific device.
+
+arm64 divides the id field into two parts, a device id and an
+address type id specific to the individual device::
+
+ bits: | 63 ... 32 | 31 ... 16 | 15 ... 0 |
+ field: | 0x00000000 | device id | addr type id |
+
+arm64 currently only require this when using the in-kernel GIC
+support for the hardware VGIC features, using KVM_ARM_DEVICE_VGIC_V2
+as the device id. When setting the base address for the guest's
+mapping of the VGIC virtual CPU and distributor interface, the ioctl
+must be called after calling KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP, but before calling
+KVM_RUN on any of the VCPUs. Calling this ioctl twice for any of the
+base addresses will return -EEXIST.
+
+Note, this IOCTL is deprecated and the more flexible SET/GET_DEVICE_ATTR API
+should be used instead.
+
+
+4.86 KVM_PPC_RTAS_DEFINE_TOKEN
+------------------------------
+
+:Capability: KVM_CAP_PPC_RTAS
+:Architectures: ppc
+:Type: vm ioctl
+:Parameters: struct kvm_rtas_token_args
+:Returns: 0 on success, -1 on error
+
+Defines a token value for a RTAS (Run Time Abstraction Services)
+service in order to allow it to be handled in the kernel. The
+argument struct gives the name of the service, which must be the name
+of a service that has a kernel-side implementation. If the token
+value is non-zero, it will be associated with that service, and
+subsequent RTAS calls by the guest specifying that token will be
+handled by the kernel. If the token value is 0, then any token
+associated with the service will be forgotten, and subsequent RTAS
+calls by the guest for that service will be passed to userspace to be
+handled.
+
+4.87 KVM_SET_GUEST_DEBUG
+------------------------
+
+:Capability: KVM_CAP_SET_GUEST_DEBUG
+:Architectures: x86, s390, ppc, arm64
+:Type: vcpu ioctl
+:Parameters: struct kvm_guest_debug (in)
+:Returns: 0 on success; -1 on error
+
+::
+
+ struct kvm_guest_debug {
+ __u32 control;
+ __u32 pad;
+ struct kvm_guest_debug_arch arch;
+ };
+
+Set up the processor specific debug registers and configure vcpu for
+handling guest debug events. There are two parts to the structure, the
+first a control bitfield indicates the type of debug events to handle
+when running. Common control bits are:
+
+ - KVM_GUESTDBG_ENABLE: guest debugging is enabled
+ - KVM_GUESTDBG_SINGLESTEP: the next run should single-step
+
+The top 16 bits of the control field are architecture specific control
+flags which can include the following:
+
+ - KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_SW_BP: using software breakpoints [x86, arm64]
+ - KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_HW_BP: using hardware breakpoints [x86, s390]
+ - KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_HW: using hardware debug events [arm64]
+ - KVM_GUESTDBG_INJECT_DB: inject DB type exception [x86]
+ - KVM_GUESTDBG_INJECT_BP: inject BP type exception [x86]
+ - KVM_GUESTDBG_EXIT_PENDING: trigger an immediate guest exit [s390]
+ - KVM_GUESTDBG_BLOCKIRQ: avoid injecting interrupts/NMI/SMI [x86]
+
+For example KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_SW_BP indicates that software breakpoints
+are enabled in memory so we need to ensure breakpoint exceptions are
+correctly trapped and the KVM run loop exits at the breakpoint and not
+running off into the normal guest vector. For KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_HW_BP
+we need to ensure the guest vCPUs architecture specific registers are
+updated to the correct (supplied) values.
+
+The second part of the structure is architecture specific and
+typically contains a set of debug registers.
+
+For arm64 the number of debug registers is implementation defined and
+can be determined by querying the KVM_CAP_GUEST_DEBUG_HW_BPS and
+KVM_CAP_GUEST_DEBUG_HW_WPS capabilities which return a positive number
+indicating the number of supported registers.
+
+For ppc, the KVM_CAP_PPC_GUEST_DEBUG_SSTEP capability indicates whether
+the single-step debug event (KVM_GUESTDBG_SINGLESTEP) is supported.
+
+Also when supported, KVM_CAP_SET_GUEST_DEBUG2 capability indicates the
+supported KVM_GUESTDBG_* bits in the control field.
+
+When debug events exit the main run loop with the reason
+KVM_EXIT_DEBUG with the kvm_debug_exit_arch part of the kvm_run
+structure containing architecture specific debug information.
+
+4.88 KVM_GET_EMULATED_CPUID
+---------------------------
+
+:Capability: KVM_CAP_EXT_EMUL_CPUID
+:Architectures: x86
+:Type: system ioctl
+:Parameters: struct kvm_cpuid2 (in/out)
+:Returns: 0 on success, -1 on error
+
+::
+
+ struct kvm_cpuid2 {
+ __u32 nent;
+ __u32 flags;
+ struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 entries[0];
+ };
+
+The member 'flags' is used for passing flags from userspace.
+
+::
+
+ #define KVM_CPUID_FLAG_SIGNIFCANT_INDEX BIT(0)
+ #define KVM_CPUID_FLAG_STATEFUL_FUNC BIT(1) /* deprecated */
+ #define KVM_CPUID_FLAG_STATE_READ_NEXT BIT(2) /* deprecated */
+
+ struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 {
+ __u32 function;
+ __u32 index;
+ __u32 flags;
+ __u32 eax;
+ __u32 ebx;
+ __u32 ecx;
+ __u32 edx;
+ __u32 padding[3];
+ };
+
+This ioctl returns x86 cpuid features which are emulated by
+kvm.Userspace can use the information returned by this ioctl to query
+which features are emulated by kvm instead of being present natively.
+
+Userspace invokes KVM_GET_EMULATED_CPUID by passing a kvm_cpuid2
+structure with the 'nent' field indicating the number of entries in
+the variable-size array 'entries'. If the number of entries is too low
+to describe the cpu capabilities, an error (E2BIG) is returned. If the
+number is too high, the 'nent' field is adjusted and an error (ENOMEM)
+is returned. If the number is just right, the 'nent' field is adjusted
+to the number of valid entries in the 'entries' array, which is then
+filled.
+
+The entries returned are the set CPUID bits of the respective features
+which kvm emulates, as returned by the CPUID instruction, with unknown
+or unsupported feature bits cleared.
+
+Features like x2apic, for example, may not be present in the host cpu
+but are exposed by kvm in KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID because they can be
+emulated efficiently and thus not included here.
+
+The fields in each entry are defined as follows:
+
+ function:
+ the eax value used to obtain the entry
+ index:
+ the ecx value used to obtain the entry (for entries that are
+ affected by ecx)
+ flags:
+ an OR of zero or more of the following:
+
+ KVM_CPUID_FLAG_SIGNIFCANT_INDEX:
+ if the index field is valid
+
+ eax, ebx, ecx, edx:
+
+ the values returned by the cpuid instruction for
+ this function/index combination
+
+4.89 KVM_S390_MEM_OP
+--------------------
+
+:Capability: KVM_CAP_S390_MEM_OP, KVM_CAP_S390_PROTECTED, KVM_CAP_S390_MEM_OP_EXTENSION
+:Architectures: s390
+:Type: vm ioctl, vcpu ioctl
+:Parameters: struct kvm_s390_mem_op (in)
+:Returns: = 0 on success,
+ < 0 on generic error (e.g. -EFAULT or -ENOMEM),
+ 16 bit program exception code if the access causes such an exception
+
+Read or write data from/to the VM's memory.
+The KVM_CAP_S390_MEM_OP_EXTENSION capability specifies what functionality is
+supported.
+
+Parameters are specified via the following structure::
+
+ struct kvm_s390_mem_op {
+ __u64 gaddr; /* the guest address */
+ __u64 flags; /* flags */
+ __u32 size; /* amount of bytes */
+ __u32 op; /* type of operation */
+ __u64 buf; /* buffer in userspace */
+ union {
+ struct {
+ __u8 ar; /* the access register number */
+ __u8 key; /* access key, ignored if flag unset */
+ __u8 pad1[6]; /* ignored */
+ __u64 old_addr; /* ignored if flag unset */
+ };
+ __u32 sida_offset; /* offset into the sida */
+ __u8 reserved[32]; /* ignored */
+ };
+ };
+
+The start address of the memory region has to be specified in the "gaddr"
+field, and the length of the region in the "size" field (which must not
+be 0). The maximum value for "size" can be obtained by checking the
+KVM_CAP_S390_MEM_OP capability. "buf" is the buffer supplied by the
+userspace application where the read data should be written to for
+a read access, or where the data that should be written is stored for
+a write access. The "reserved" field is meant for future extensions.
+Reserved and unused values are ignored. Future extension that add members must
+introduce new flags.
+
+The type of operation is specified in the "op" field. Flags modifying
+their behavior can be set in the "flags" field. Undefined flag bits must
+be set to 0.
+
+Possible operations are:
+ * ``KVM_S390_MEMOP_LOGICAL_READ``
+ * ``KVM_S390_MEMOP_LOGICAL_WRITE``
+ * ``KVM_S390_MEMOP_ABSOLUTE_READ``
+ * ``KVM_S390_MEMOP_ABSOLUTE_WRITE``
+ * ``KVM_S390_MEMOP_SIDA_READ``
+ * ``KVM_S390_MEMOP_SIDA_WRITE``
+ * ``KVM_S390_MEMOP_ABSOLUTE_CMPXCHG``
+
+Logical read/write:
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+Access logical memory, i.e. translate the given guest address to an absolute
+address given the state of the VCPU and use the absolute address as target of
+the access. "ar" designates the access register number to be used; the valid
+range is 0..15.
+Logical accesses are permitted for the VCPU ioctl only.
+Logical accesses are permitted for non-protected guests only.
+
+Supported flags:
+ * ``KVM_S390_MEMOP_F_CHECK_ONLY``
+ * ``KVM_S390_MEMOP_F_INJECT_EXCEPTION``
+ * ``KVM_S390_MEMOP_F_SKEY_PROTECTION``
+
+The KVM_S390_MEMOP_F_CHECK_ONLY flag can be set to check whether the
+corresponding memory access would cause an access exception; however,
+no actual access to the data in memory at the destination is performed.
+In this case, "buf" is unused and can be NULL.
+
+In case an access exception occurred during the access (or would occur
+in case of KVM_S390_MEMOP_F_CHECK_ONLY), the ioctl returns a positive
+error number indicating the type of exception. This exception is also
+raised directly at the corresponding VCPU if the flag
+KVM_S390_MEMOP_F_INJECT_EXCEPTION is set.
+On protection exceptions, unless specified otherwise, the injected
+translation-exception identifier (TEID) indicates suppression.
+
+If the KVM_S390_MEMOP_F_SKEY_PROTECTION flag is set, storage key
+protection is also in effect and may cause exceptions if accesses are
+prohibited given the access key designated by "key"; the valid range is 0..15.
+KVM_S390_MEMOP_F_SKEY_PROTECTION is available if KVM_CAP_S390_MEM_OP_EXTENSION
+is > 0.
+Since the accessed memory may span multiple pages and those pages might have
+different storage keys, it is possible that a protection exception occurs
+after memory has been modified. In this case, if the exception is injected,
+the TEID does not indicate suppression.
+
+Absolute read/write:
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+Access absolute memory. This operation is intended to be used with the
+KVM_S390_MEMOP_F_SKEY_PROTECTION flag, to allow accessing memory and performing
+the checks required for storage key protection as one operation (as opposed to
+user space getting the storage keys, performing the checks, and accessing
+memory thereafter, which could lead to a delay between check and access).
+Absolute accesses are permitted for the VM ioctl if KVM_CAP_S390_MEM_OP_EXTENSION
+has the KVM_S390_MEMOP_EXTENSION_CAP_BASE bit set.
+Currently absolute accesses are not permitted for VCPU ioctls.
+Absolute accesses are permitted for non-protected guests only.
+
+Supported flags:
+ * ``KVM_S390_MEMOP_F_CHECK_ONLY``
+ * ``KVM_S390_MEMOP_F_SKEY_PROTECTION``
+
+The semantics of the flags common with logical accesses are as for logical
+accesses.
+
+Absolute cmpxchg:
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+Perform cmpxchg on absolute guest memory. Intended for use with the
+KVM_S390_MEMOP_F_SKEY_PROTECTION flag.
+Instead of doing an unconditional write, the access occurs only if the target
+location contains the value pointed to by "old_addr".
+This is performed as an atomic cmpxchg with the length specified by the "size"
+parameter. "size" must be a power of two up to and including 16.
+If the exchange did not take place because the target value doesn't match the
+old value, the value "old_addr" points to is replaced by the target value.
+User space can tell if an exchange took place by checking if this replacement
+occurred. The cmpxchg op is permitted for the VM ioctl if
+KVM_CAP_S390_MEM_OP_EXTENSION has flag KVM_S390_MEMOP_EXTENSION_CAP_CMPXCHG set.
+
+Supported flags:
+ * ``KVM_S390_MEMOP_F_SKEY_PROTECTION``
+
+SIDA read/write:
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+Access the secure instruction data area which contains memory operands necessary
+for instruction emulation for protected guests.
+SIDA accesses are available if the KVM_CAP_S390_PROTECTED capability is available.
+SIDA accesses are permitted for the VCPU ioctl only.
+SIDA accesses are permitted for protected guests only.
+
+No flags are supported.
+
+4.90 KVM_S390_GET_SKEYS
+-----------------------
+
+:Capability: KVM_CAP_S390_SKEYS
+:Architectures: s390
+:Type: vm ioctl
+:Parameters: struct kvm_s390_skeys
+:Returns: 0 on success, KVM_S390_GET_SKEYS_NONE if guest is not using storage
+ keys, negative value on error
+
+This ioctl is used to get guest storage key values on the s390
+architecture. The ioctl takes parameters via the kvm_s390_skeys struct::
+
+ struct kvm_s390_skeys {
+ __u64 start_gfn;
+ __u64 count;
+ __u64 skeydata_addr;
+ __u32 flags;
+ __u32 reserved[9];
+ };
+
+The start_gfn field is the number of the first guest frame whose storage keys
+you want to get.
+
+The count field is the number of consecutive frames (starting from start_gfn)
+whose storage keys to get. The count field must be at least 1 and the maximum
+allowed value is defined as KVM_S390_SKEYS_MAX. Values outside this range
+will cause the ioctl to return -EINVAL.
+
+The skeydata_addr field is the address to a buffer large enough to hold count
+bytes. This buffer will be filled with storage key data by the ioctl.
+
+4.91 KVM_S390_SET_SKEYS
+-----------------------
+
+:Capability: KVM_CAP_S390_SKEYS
+:Architectures: s390
+:Type: vm ioctl
+:Parameters: struct kvm_s390_skeys
+:Returns: 0 on success, negative value on error
+
+This ioctl is used to set guest storage key values on the s390
+architecture. The ioctl takes parameters via the kvm_s390_skeys struct.
+See section on KVM_S390_GET_SKEYS for struct definition.
+
+The start_gfn field is the number of the first guest frame whose storage keys
+you want to set.
+
+The count field is the number of consecutive frames (starting from start_gfn)
+whose storage keys to get. The count field must be at least 1 and the maximum
+allowed value is defined as KVM_S390_SKEYS_MAX. Values outside this range
+will cause the ioctl to return -EINVAL.
+
+The skeydata_addr field is the address to a buffer containing count bytes of
+storage keys. Each byte in the buffer will be set as the storage key for a
+single frame starting at start_gfn for count frames.
+
+Note: If any architecturally invalid key value is found in the given data then
+the ioctl will return -EINVAL.
+
+4.92 KVM_S390_IRQ
+-----------------
+
+:Capability: KVM_CAP_S390_INJECT_IRQ
+:Architectures: s390
+:Type: vcpu ioctl
+:Parameters: struct kvm_s390_irq (in)
+:Returns: 0 on success, -1 on error
+
+Errors:
+
+
+ ====== =================================================================
+ EINVAL interrupt type is invalid
+ type is KVM_S390_SIGP_STOP and flag parameter is invalid value,
+ type is KVM_S390_INT_EXTERNAL_CALL and code is bigger
+ than the maximum of VCPUs
+ EBUSY type is KVM_S390_SIGP_SET_PREFIX and vcpu is not stopped,
+ type is KVM_S390_SIGP_STOP and a stop irq is already pending,
+ type is KVM_S390_INT_EXTERNAL_CALL and an external call interrupt
+ is already pending
+ ====== =================================================================
+
+Allows to inject an interrupt to the guest.
+
+Using struct kvm_s390_irq as a parameter allows
+to inject additional payload which is not
+possible via KVM_S390_INTERRUPT.
+
+Interrupt parameters are passed via kvm_s390_irq::
+
+ struct kvm_s390_irq {
+ __u64 type;
+ union {
+ struct kvm_s390_io_info io;
+ struct kvm_s390_ext_info ext;
+ struct kvm_s390_pgm_info pgm;
+ struct kvm_s390_emerg_info emerg;
+ struct kvm_s390_extcall_info extcall;
+ struct kvm_s390_prefix_info prefix;
+ struct kvm_s390_stop_info stop;
+ struct kvm_s390_mchk_info mchk;
+ char reserved[64];
+ } u;
+ };
+
+type can be one of the following:
+
+- KVM_S390_SIGP_STOP - sigp stop; parameter in .stop
+- KVM_S390_PROGRAM_INT - program check; parameters in .pgm
+- KVM_S390_SIGP_SET_PREFIX - sigp set prefix; parameters in .prefix
+- KVM_S390_RESTART - restart; no parameters
+- KVM_S390_INT_CLOCK_COMP - clock comparator interrupt; no parameters
+- KVM_S390_INT_CPU_TIMER - CPU timer interrupt; no parameters
+- KVM_S390_INT_EMERGENCY - sigp emergency; parameters in .emerg
+- KVM_S390_INT_EXTERNAL_CALL - sigp external call; parameters in .extcall
+- KVM_S390_MCHK - machine check interrupt; parameters in .mchk
+
+This is an asynchronous vcpu ioctl and can be invoked from any thread.
+
+4.94 KVM_S390_GET_IRQ_STATE
+---------------------------
+
+:Capability: KVM_CAP_S390_IRQ_STATE
+:Architectures: s390
+:Type: vcpu ioctl
+:Parameters: struct kvm_s390_irq_state (out)
+:Returns: >= number of bytes copied into buffer,
+ -EINVAL if buffer size is 0,
+ -ENOBUFS if buffer size is too small to fit all pending interrupts,
+ -EFAULT if the buffer address was invalid
+
+This ioctl allows userspace to retrieve the complete state of all currently
+pending interrupts in a single buffer. Use cases include migration
+and introspection. The parameter structure contains the address of a
+userspace buffer and its length::
+
+ struct kvm_s390_irq_state {
+ __u64 buf;
+ __u32 flags; /* will stay unused for compatibility reasons */
+ __u32 len;
+ __u32 reserved[4]; /* will stay unused for compatibility reasons */
+ };
+
+Userspace passes in the above struct and for each pending interrupt a
+struct kvm_s390_irq is copied to the provided buffer.
+
+The structure contains a flags and a reserved field for future extensions. As
+the kernel never checked for flags == 0 and QEMU never pre-zeroed flags and
+reserved, these fields can not be used in the future without breaking
+compatibility.
+
+If -ENOBUFS is returned the buffer provided was too small and userspace
+may retry with a bigger buffer.
+
+4.95 KVM_S390_SET_IRQ_STATE
+---------------------------
+
+:Capability: KVM_CAP_S390_IRQ_STATE
+:Architectures: s390
+:Type: vcpu ioctl
+:Parameters: struct kvm_s390_irq_state (in)
+:Returns: 0 on success,
+ -EFAULT if the buffer address was invalid,
+ -EINVAL for an invalid buffer length (see below),
+ -EBUSY if there were already interrupts pending,
+ errors occurring when actually injecting the
+ interrupt. See KVM_S390_IRQ.
+
+This ioctl allows userspace to set the complete state of all cpu-local
+interrupts currently pending for the vcpu. It is intended for restoring
+interrupt state after a migration. The input parameter is a userspace buffer
+containing a struct kvm_s390_irq_state::
+
+ struct kvm_s390_irq_state {
+ __u64 buf;
+ __u32 flags; /* will stay unused for compatibility reasons */
+ __u32 len;
+ __u32 reserved[4]; /* will stay unused for compatibility reasons */
+ };
+
+The restrictions for flags and reserved apply as well.
+(see KVM_S390_GET_IRQ_STATE)
+
+The userspace memory referenced by buf contains a struct kvm_s390_irq
+for each interrupt to be injected into the guest.
+If one of the interrupts could not be injected for some reason the
+ioctl aborts.
+
+len must be a multiple of sizeof(struct kvm_s390_irq). It must be > 0
+and it must not exceed (max_vcpus + 32) * sizeof(struct kvm_s390_irq),
+which is the maximum number of possibly pending cpu-local interrupts.
+
+4.96 KVM_SMI
+------------
+
+:Capability: KVM_CAP_X86_SMM
+:Architectures: x86
+:Type: vcpu ioctl
+:Parameters: none
+:Returns: 0 on success, -1 on error
+
+Queues an SMI on the thread's vcpu.
+
+4.97 KVM_X86_SET_MSR_FILTER
+----------------------------
+
+:Capability: KVM_CAP_X86_MSR_FILTER
+:Architectures: x86
+:Type: vm ioctl
+:Parameters: struct kvm_msr_filter
+:Returns: 0 on success, < 0 on error
+
+::
+
+ struct kvm_msr_filter_range {
+ #define KVM_MSR_FILTER_READ (1 << 0)
+ #define KVM_MSR_FILTER_WRITE (1 << 1)
+ __u32 flags;
+ __u32 nmsrs; /* number of msrs in bitmap */
+ __u32 base; /* MSR index the bitmap starts at */
+ __u8 *bitmap; /* a 1 bit allows the operations in flags, 0 denies */
+ };
+
+ #define KVM_MSR_FILTER_MAX_RANGES 16
+ struct kvm_msr_filter {
+ #define KVM_MSR_FILTER_DEFAULT_ALLOW (0 << 0)
+ #define KVM_MSR_FILTER_DEFAULT_DENY (1 << 0)
+ __u32 flags;
+ struct kvm_msr_filter_range ranges[KVM_MSR_FILTER_MAX_RANGES];
+ };
+
+flags values for ``struct kvm_msr_filter_range``:
+
+``KVM_MSR_FILTER_READ``
+
+ Filter read accesses to MSRs using the given bitmap. A 0 in the bitmap
+ indicates that read accesses should be denied, while a 1 indicates that
+ a read for a particular MSR should be allowed regardless of the default
+ filter action.
+
+``KVM_MSR_FILTER_WRITE``
+
+ Filter write accesses to MSRs using the given bitmap. A 0 in the bitmap
+ indicates that write accesses should be denied, while a 1 indicates that
+ a write for a particular MSR should be allowed regardless of the default
+ filter action.
+
+flags values for ``struct kvm_msr_filter``:
+
+``KVM_MSR_FILTER_DEFAULT_ALLOW``
+
+ If no filter range matches an MSR index that is getting accessed, KVM will
+ allow accesses to all MSRs by default.
+
+``KVM_MSR_FILTER_DEFAULT_DENY``
+
+ If no filter range matches an MSR index that is getting accessed, KVM will
+ deny accesses to all MSRs by default.
+
+This ioctl allows userspace to define up to 16 bitmaps of MSR ranges to deny
+guest MSR accesses that would normally be allowed by KVM. If an MSR is not
+covered by a specific range, the "default" filtering behavior applies. Each
+bitmap range covers MSRs from [base .. base+nmsrs).
+
+If an MSR access is denied by userspace, the resulting KVM behavior depends on
+whether or not KVM_CAP_X86_USER_SPACE_MSR's KVM_MSR_EXIT_REASON_FILTER is
+enabled. If KVM_MSR_EXIT_REASON_FILTER is enabled, KVM will exit to userspace
+on denied accesses, i.e. userspace effectively intercepts the MSR access. If
+KVM_MSR_EXIT_REASON_FILTER is not enabled, KVM will inject a #GP into the guest
+on denied accesses.
+
+If an MSR access is allowed by userspace, KVM will emulate and/or virtualize
+the access in accordance with the vCPU model. Note, KVM may still ultimately
+inject a #GP if an access is allowed by userspace, e.g. if KVM doesn't support
+the MSR, or to follow architectural behavior for the MSR.
+
+By default, KVM operates in KVM_MSR_FILTER_DEFAULT_ALLOW mode with no MSR range
+filters.
+
+Calling this ioctl with an empty set of ranges (all nmsrs == 0) disables MSR
+filtering. In that mode, ``KVM_MSR_FILTER_DEFAULT_DENY`` is invalid and causes
+an error.
+
+.. warning::
+ MSR accesses as part of nested VM-Enter/VM-Exit are not filtered.
+ This includes both writes to individual VMCS fields and reads/writes
+ through the MSR lists pointed to by the VMCS.
+
+ x2APIC MSR accesses cannot be filtered (KVM silently ignores filters that
+ cover any x2APIC MSRs).
+
+Note, invoking this ioctl while a vCPU is running is inherently racy. However,
+KVM does guarantee that vCPUs will see either the previous filter or the new
+filter, e.g. MSRs with identical settings in both the old and new filter will
+have deterministic behavior.
+
+Similarly, if userspace wishes to intercept on denied accesses,
+KVM_MSR_EXIT_REASON_FILTER must be enabled before activating any filters, and
+left enabled until after all filters are deactivated. Failure to do so may
+result in KVM injecting a #GP instead of exiting to userspace.
+
+4.98 KVM_CREATE_SPAPR_TCE_64
+----------------------------
+
+:Capability: KVM_CAP_SPAPR_TCE_64
+:Architectures: powerpc
+:Type: vm ioctl
+:Parameters: struct kvm_create_spapr_tce_64 (in)
+:Returns: file descriptor for manipulating the created TCE table
+
+This is an extension for KVM_CAP_SPAPR_TCE which only supports 32bit
+windows, described in 4.62 KVM_CREATE_SPAPR_TCE
+
+This capability uses extended struct in ioctl interface::
+
+ /* for KVM_CAP_SPAPR_TCE_64 */
+ struct kvm_create_spapr_tce_64 {
+ __u64 liobn;
+ __u32 page_shift;
+ __u32 flags;
+ __u64 offset; /* in pages */
+ __u64 size; /* in pages */
+ };
+
+The aim of extension is to support an additional bigger DMA window with
+a variable page size.
+KVM_CREATE_SPAPR_TCE_64 receives a 64bit window size, an IOMMU page shift and
+a bus offset of the corresponding DMA window, @size and @offset are numbers
+of IOMMU pages.
+
+@flags are not used at the moment.
+
+The rest of functionality is identical to KVM_CREATE_SPAPR_TCE.
+
+4.99 KVM_REINJECT_CONTROL
+-------------------------
+
+:Capability: KVM_CAP_REINJECT_CONTROL
+:Architectures: x86
+:Type: vm ioctl
+:Parameters: struct kvm_reinject_control (in)
+:Returns: 0 on success,
+ -EFAULT if struct kvm_reinject_control cannot be read,
+ -ENXIO if KVM_CREATE_PIT or KVM_CREATE_PIT2 didn't succeed earlier.
+
+i8254 (PIT) has two modes, reinject and !reinject. The default is reinject,
+where KVM queues elapsed i8254 ticks and monitors completion of interrupt from
+vector(s) that i8254 injects. Reinject mode dequeues a tick and injects its
+interrupt whenever there isn't a pending interrupt from i8254.
+!reinject mode injects an interrupt as soon as a tick arrives.
+
+::
+
+ struct kvm_reinject_control {
+ __u8 pit_reinject;
+ __u8 reserved[31];
+ };
+
+pit_reinject = 0 (!reinject mode) is recommended, unless running an old
+operating system that uses the PIT for timing (e.g. Linux 2.4.x).
+
+4.100 KVM_PPC_CONFIGURE_V3_MMU
+------------------------------
+
+:Capability: KVM_CAP_PPC_RADIX_MMU or KVM_CAP_PPC_HASH_MMU_V3
+:Architectures: ppc
+:Type: vm ioctl
+:Parameters: struct kvm_ppc_mmuv3_cfg (in)
+:Returns: 0 on success,
+ -EFAULT if struct kvm_ppc_mmuv3_cfg cannot be read,
+ -EINVAL if the configuration is invalid
+
+This ioctl controls whether the guest will use radix or HPT (hashed
+page table) translation, and sets the pointer to the process table for
+the guest.
+
+::
+
+ struct kvm_ppc_mmuv3_cfg {
+ __u64 flags;
+ __u64 process_table;
+ };
+
+There are two bits that can be set in flags; KVM_PPC_MMUV3_RADIX and
+KVM_PPC_MMUV3_GTSE. KVM_PPC_MMUV3_RADIX, if set, configures the guest
+to use radix tree translation, and if clear, to use HPT translation.
+KVM_PPC_MMUV3_GTSE, if set and if KVM permits it, configures the guest
+to be able to use the global TLB and SLB invalidation instructions;
+if clear, the guest may not use these instructions.
+
+The process_table field specifies the address and size of the guest
+process table, which is in the guest's space. This field is formatted
+as the second doubleword of the partition table entry, as defined in
+the Power ISA V3.00, Book III section 5.7.6.1.
+
+4.101 KVM_PPC_GET_RMMU_INFO
+---------------------------
+
+:Capability: KVM_CAP_PPC_RADIX_MMU
+:Architectures: ppc
+:Type: vm ioctl
+:Parameters: struct kvm_ppc_rmmu_info (out)
+:Returns: 0 on success,
+ -EFAULT if struct kvm_ppc_rmmu_info cannot be written,
+ -EINVAL if no useful information can be returned
+
+This ioctl returns a structure containing two things: (a) a list
+containing supported radix tree geometries, and (b) a list that maps
+page sizes to put in the "AP" (actual page size) field for the tlbie
+(TLB invalidate entry) instruction.
+
+::
+
+ struct kvm_ppc_rmmu_info {
+ struct kvm_ppc_radix_geom {
+ __u8 page_shift;
+ __u8 level_bits[4];
+ __u8 pad[3];
+ } geometries[8];
+ __u32 ap_encodings[8];
+ };
+
+The geometries[] field gives up to 8 supported geometries for the
+radix page table, in terms of the log base 2 of the smallest page
+size, and the number of bits indexed at each level of the tree, from
+the PTE level up to the PGD level in that order. Any unused entries
+will have 0 in the page_shift field.
+
+The ap_encodings gives the supported page sizes and their AP field
+encodings, encoded with the AP value in the top 3 bits and the log
+base 2 of the page size in the bottom 6 bits.
+
+4.102 KVM_PPC_RESIZE_HPT_PREPARE
+--------------------------------
+
+:Capability: KVM_CAP_SPAPR_RESIZE_HPT
+:Architectures: powerpc
+:Type: vm ioctl
+:Parameters: struct kvm_ppc_resize_hpt (in)
+:Returns: 0 on successful completion,
+ >0 if a new HPT is being prepared, the value is an estimated
+ number of milliseconds until preparation is complete,
+ -EFAULT if struct kvm_reinject_control cannot be read,
+ -EINVAL if the supplied shift or flags are invalid,
+ -ENOMEM if unable to allocate the new HPT,
+
+Used to implement the PAPR extension for runtime resizing of a guest's
+Hashed Page Table (HPT). Specifically this starts, stops or monitors
+the preparation of a new potential HPT for the guest, essentially
+implementing the H_RESIZE_HPT_PREPARE hypercall.
+
+::
+
+ struct kvm_ppc_resize_hpt {
+ __u64 flags;
+ __u32 shift;
+ __u32 pad;
+ };
+
+If called with shift > 0 when there is no pending HPT for the guest,
+this begins preparation of a new pending HPT of size 2^(shift) bytes.
+It then returns a positive integer with the estimated number of
+milliseconds until preparation is complete.
+
+If called when there is a pending HPT whose size does not match that
+requested in the parameters, discards the existing pending HPT and
+creates a new one as above.
+
+If called when there is a pending HPT of the size requested, will:
+
+ * If preparation of the pending HPT is already complete, return 0
+ * If preparation of the pending HPT has failed, return an error
+ code, then discard the pending HPT.
+ * If preparation of the pending HPT is still in progress, return an
+ estimated number of milliseconds until preparation is complete.
+
+If called with shift == 0, discards any currently pending HPT and
+returns 0 (i.e. cancels any in-progress preparation).
+
+flags is reserved for future expansion, currently setting any bits in
+flags will result in an -EINVAL.
+
+Normally this will be called repeatedly with the same parameters until
+it returns <= 0. The first call will initiate preparation, subsequent
+ones will monitor preparation until it completes or fails.
+
+4.103 KVM_PPC_RESIZE_HPT_COMMIT
+-------------------------------
+
+:Capability: KVM_CAP_SPAPR_RESIZE_HPT
+:Architectures: powerpc
+:Type: vm ioctl
+:Parameters: struct kvm_ppc_resize_hpt (in)
+:Returns: 0 on successful completion,
+ -EFAULT if struct kvm_reinject_control cannot be read,
+ -EINVAL if the supplied shift or flags are invalid,
+ -ENXIO is there is no pending HPT, or the pending HPT doesn't
+ have the requested size,
+ -EBUSY if the pending HPT is not fully prepared,
+ -ENOSPC if there was a hash collision when moving existing
+ HPT entries to the new HPT,
+ -EIO on other error conditions
+
+Used to implement the PAPR extension for runtime resizing of a guest's
+Hashed Page Table (HPT). Specifically this requests that the guest be
+transferred to working with the new HPT, essentially implementing the
+H_RESIZE_HPT_COMMIT hypercall.
+
+::
+
+ struct kvm_ppc_resize_hpt {
+ __u64 flags;
+ __u32 shift;
+ __u32 pad;
+ };
+
+This should only be called after KVM_PPC_RESIZE_HPT_PREPARE has
+returned 0 with the same parameters. In other cases
+KVM_PPC_RESIZE_HPT_COMMIT will return an error (usually -ENXIO or
+-EBUSY, though others may be possible if the preparation was started,
+but failed).
+
+This will have undefined effects on the guest if it has not already
+placed itself in a quiescent state where no vcpu will make MMU enabled
+memory accesses.
+
+On succsful completion, the pending HPT will become the guest's active
+HPT and the previous HPT will be discarded.
+
+On failure, the guest will still be operating on its previous HPT.
+
+4.104 KVM_X86_GET_MCE_CAP_SUPPORTED
+-----------------------------------
+
+:Capability: KVM_CAP_MCE
+:Architectures: x86
+:Type: system ioctl
+:Parameters: u64 mce_cap (out)
+:Returns: 0 on success, -1 on error
+
+Returns supported MCE capabilities. The u64 mce_cap parameter
+has the same format as the MSR_IA32_MCG_CAP register. Supported
+capabilities will have the corresponding bits set.
+
+4.105 KVM_X86_SETUP_MCE
+-----------------------
+
+:Capability: KVM_CAP_MCE
+:Architectures: x86
+:Type: vcpu ioctl
+:Parameters: u64 mcg_cap (in)
+:Returns: 0 on success,
+ -EFAULT if u64 mcg_cap cannot be read,
+ -EINVAL if the requested number of banks is invalid,
+ -EINVAL if requested MCE capability is not supported.
+
+Initializes MCE support for use. The u64 mcg_cap parameter
+has the same format as the MSR_IA32_MCG_CAP register and
+specifies which capabilities should be enabled. The maximum
+supported number of error-reporting banks can be retrieved when
+checking for KVM_CAP_MCE. The supported capabilities can be
+retrieved with KVM_X86_GET_MCE_CAP_SUPPORTED.
+
+4.106 KVM_X86_SET_MCE
+---------------------
+
+:Capability: KVM_CAP_MCE
+:Architectures: x86
+:Type: vcpu ioctl
+:Parameters: struct kvm_x86_mce (in)
+:Returns: 0 on success,
+ -EFAULT if struct kvm_x86_mce cannot be read,
+ -EINVAL if the bank number is invalid,
+ -EINVAL if VAL bit is not set in status field.
+
+Inject a machine check error (MCE) into the guest. The input
+parameter is::
+
+ struct kvm_x86_mce {
+ __u64 status;
+ __u64 addr;
+ __u64 misc;
+ __u64 mcg_status;
+ __u8 bank;
+ __u8 pad1[7];
+ __u64 pad2[3];
+ };
+
+If the MCE being reported is an uncorrected error, KVM will
+inject it as an MCE exception into the guest. If the guest
+MCG_STATUS register reports that an MCE is in progress, KVM
+causes an KVM_EXIT_SHUTDOWN vmexit.
+
+Otherwise, if the MCE is a corrected error, KVM will just
+store it in the corresponding bank (provided this bank is
+not holding a previously reported uncorrected error).
+
+4.107 KVM_S390_GET_CMMA_BITS
+----------------------------
+
+:Capability: KVM_CAP_S390_CMMA_MIGRATION
+:Architectures: s390
+:Type: vm ioctl
+:Parameters: struct kvm_s390_cmma_log (in, out)
+:Returns: 0 on success, a negative value on error
+
+Errors:
+
+ ====== =============================================================
+ ENOMEM not enough memory can be allocated to complete the task
+ ENXIO if CMMA is not enabled
+ EINVAL if KVM_S390_CMMA_PEEK is not set but migration mode was not enabled
+ EINVAL if KVM_S390_CMMA_PEEK is not set but dirty tracking has been
+ disabled (and thus migration mode was automatically disabled)
+ EFAULT if the userspace address is invalid or if no page table is
+ present for the addresses (e.g. when using hugepages).
+ ====== =============================================================
+
+This ioctl is used to get the values of the CMMA bits on the s390
+architecture. It is meant to be used in two scenarios:
+
+- During live migration to save the CMMA values. Live migration needs
+ to be enabled via the KVM_REQ_START_MIGRATION VM property.
+- To non-destructively peek at the CMMA values, with the flag
+ KVM_S390_CMMA_PEEK set.
+
+The ioctl takes parameters via the kvm_s390_cmma_log struct. The desired
+values are written to a buffer whose location is indicated via the "values"
+member in the kvm_s390_cmma_log struct. The values in the input struct are
+also updated as needed.
+
+Each CMMA value takes up one byte.
+
+::
+
+ struct kvm_s390_cmma_log {
+ __u64 start_gfn;
+ __u32 count;
+ __u32 flags;
+ union {
+ __u64 remaining;
+ __u64 mask;
+ };
+ __u64 values;
+ };
+
+start_gfn is the number of the first guest frame whose CMMA values are
+to be retrieved,
+
+count is the length of the buffer in bytes,
+
+values points to the buffer where the result will be written to.
+
+If count is greater than KVM_S390_SKEYS_MAX, then it is considered to be
+KVM_S390_SKEYS_MAX. KVM_S390_SKEYS_MAX is re-used for consistency with
+other ioctls.
+
+The result is written in the buffer pointed to by the field values, and
+the values of the input parameter are updated as follows.
+
+Depending on the flags, different actions are performed. The only
+supported flag so far is KVM_S390_CMMA_PEEK.
+
+The default behaviour if KVM_S390_CMMA_PEEK is not set is:
+start_gfn will indicate the first page frame whose CMMA bits were dirty.
+It is not necessarily the same as the one passed as input, as clean pages
+are skipped.
+
+count will indicate the number of bytes actually written in the buffer.
+It can (and very often will) be smaller than the input value, since the
+buffer is only filled until 16 bytes of clean values are found (which
+are then not copied in the buffer). Since a CMMA migration block needs
+the base address and the length, for a total of 16 bytes, we will send
+back some clean data if there is some dirty data afterwards, as long as
+the size of the clean data does not exceed the size of the header. This
+allows to minimize the amount of data to be saved or transferred over
+the network at the expense of more roundtrips to userspace. The next
+invocation of the ioctl will skip over all the clean values, saving
+potentially more than just the 16 bytes we found.
+
+If KVM_S390_CMMA_PEEK is set:
+the existing storage attributes are read even when not in migration
+mode, and no other action is performed;
+
+the output start_gfn will be equal to the input start_gfn,
+
+the output count will be equal to the input count, except if the end of
+memory has been reached.
+
+In both cases:
+the field "remaining" will indicate the total number of dirty CMMA values
+still remaining, or 0 if KVM_S390_CMMA_PEEK is set and migration mode is
+not enabled.
+
+mask is unused.
+
+values points to the userspace buffer where the result will be stored.
+
+4.108 KVM_S390_SET_CMMA_BITS
+----------------------------
+
+:Capability: KVM_CAP_S390_CMMA_MIGRATION
+:Architectures: s390
+:Type: vm ioctl
+:Parameters: struct kvm_s390_cmma_log (in)
+:Returns: 0 on success, a negative value on error
+
+This ioctl is used to set the values of the CMMA bits on the s390
+architecture. It is meant to be used during live migration to restore
+the CMMA values, but there are no restrictions on its use.
+The ioctl takes parameters via the kvm_s390_cmma_values struct.
+Each CMMA value takes up one byte.
+
+::
+
+ struct kvm_s390_cmma_log {
+ __u64 start_gfn;
+ __u32 count;
+ __u32 flags;
+ union {
+ __u64 remaining;
+ __u64 mask;
+ };
+ __u64 values;
+ };
+
+start_gfn indicates the starting guest frame number,
+
+count indicates how many values are to be considered in the buffer,
+
+flags is not used and must be 0.
+
+mask indicates which PGSTE bits are to be considered.
+
+remaining is not used.
+
+values points to the buffer in userspace where to store the values.
+
+This ioctl can fail with -ENOMEM if not enough memory can be allocated to
+complete the task, with -ENXIO if CMMA is not enabled, with -EINVAL if
+the count field is too large (e.g. more than KVM_S390_CMMA_SIZE_MAX) or
+if the flags field was not 0, with -EFAULT if the userspace address is
+invalid, if invalid pages are written to (e.g. after the end of memory)
+or if no page table is present for the addresses (e.g. when using
+hugepages).
+
+4.109 KVM_PPC_GET_CPU_CHAR
+--------------------------
+
+:Capability: KVM_CAP_PPC_GET_CPU_CHAR
+:Architectures: powerpc
+:Type: vm ioctl
+:Parameters: struct kvm_ppc_cpu_char (out)
+:Returns: 0 on successful completion,
+ -EFAULT if struct kvm_ppc_cpu_char cannot be written
+
+This ioctl gives userspace information about certain characteristics
+of the CPU relating to speculative execution of instructions and
+possible information leakage resulting from speculative execution (see
+CVE-2017-5715, CVE-2017-5753 and CVE-2017-5754). The information is
+returned in struct kvm_ppc_cpu_char, which looks like this::
+
+ struct kvm_ppc_cpu_char {
+ __u64 character; /* characteristics of the CPU */
+ __u64 behaviour; /* recommended software behaviour */
+ __u64 character_mask; /* valid bits in character */
+ __u64 behaviour_mask; /* valid bits in behaviour */
+ };
+
+For extensibility, the character_mask and behaviour_mask fields
+indicate which bits of character and behaviour have been filled in by
+the kernel. If the set of defined bits is extended in future then
+userspace will be able to tell whether it is running on a kernel that
+knows about the new bits.
+
+The character field describes attributes of the CPU which can help
+with preventing inadvertent information disclosure - specifically,
+whether there is an instruction to flash-invalidate the L1 data cache
+(ori 30,30,0 or mtspr SPRN_TRIG2,rN), whether the L1 data cache is set
+to a mode where entries can only be used by the thread that created
+them, whether the bcctr[l] instruction prevents speculation, and
+whether a speculation barrier instruction (ori 31,31,0) is provided.
+
+The behaviour field describes actions that software should take to
+prevent inadvertent information disclosure, and thus describes which
+vulnerabilities the hardware is subject to; specifically whether the
+L1 data cache should be flushed when returning to user mode from the
+kernel, and whether a speculation barrier should be placed between an
+array bounds check and the array access.
+
+These fields use the same bit definitions as the new
+H_GET_CPU_CHARACTERISTICS hypercall.
+
+4.110 KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP
+---------------------------
+
+:Capability: basic
+:Architectures: x86
+:Type: vm
+:Parameters: an opaque platform specific structure (in/out)
+:Returns: 0 on success; -1 on error
+
+If the platform supports creating encrypted VMs then this ioctl can be used
+for issuing platform-specific memory encryption commands to manage those
+encrypted VMs.
+
+Currently, this ioctl is used for issuing Secure Encrypted Virtualization
+(SEV) commands on AMD Processors. The SEV commands are defined in
+Documentation/virt/kvm/x86/amd-memory-encryption.rst.
+
+4.111 KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_REG_REGION
+-----------------------------------
+
+:Capability: basic
+:Architectures: x86
+:Type: system
+:Parameters: struct kvm_enc_region (in)
+:Returns: 0 on success; -1 on error
+
+This ioctl can be used to register a guest memory region which may
+contain encrypted data (e.g. guest RAM, SMRAM etc).
+
+It is used in the SEV-enabled guest. When encryption is enabled, a guest
+memory region may contain encrypted data. The SEV memory encryption
+engine uses a tweak such that two identical plaintext pages, each at
+different locations will have differing ciphertexts. So swapping or
+moving ciphertext of those pages will not result in plaintext being
+swapped. So relocating (or migrating) physical backing pages for the SEV
+guest will require some additional steps.
+
+Note: The current SEV key management spec does not provide commands to
+swap or migrate (move) ciphertext pages. Hence, for now we pin the guest
+memory region registered with the ioctl.
+
+4.112 KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_UNREG_REGION
+-------------------------------------
+
+:Capability: basic
+:Architectures: x86
+:Type: system
+:Parameters: struct kvm_enc_region (in)
+:Returns: 0 on success; -1 on error
+
+This ioctl can be used to unregister the guest memory region registered
+with KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_REG_REGION ioctl above.
+
+4.113 KVM_HYPERV_EVENTFD
+------------------------
+
+:Capability: KVM_CAP_HYPERV_EVENTFD
+:Architectures: x86
+:Type: vm ioctl
+:Parameters: struct kvm_hyperv_eventfd (in)
+
+This ioctl (un)registers an eventfd to receive notifications from the guest on
+the specified Hyper-V connection id through the SIGNAL_EVENT hypercall, without
+causing a user exit. SIGNAL_EVENT hypercall with non-zero event flag number
+(bits 24-31) still triggers a KVM_EXIT_HYPERV_HCALL user exit.
+
+::
+
+ struct kvm_hyperv_eventfd {
+ __u32 conn_id;
+ __s32 fd;
+ __u32 flags;
+ __u32 padding[3];
+ };
+
+The conn_id field should fit within 24 bits::
+
+ #define KVM_HYPERV_CONN_ID_MASK 0x00ffffff
+
+The acceptable values for the flags field are::
+
+ #define KVM_HYPERV_EVENTFD_DEASSIGN (1 << 0)
+
+:Returns: 0 on success,
+ -EINVAL if conn_id or flags is outside the allowed range,
+ -ENOENT on deassign if the conn_id isn't registered,
+ -EEXIST on assign if the conn_id is already registered
+
+4.114 KVM_GET_NESTED_STATE
+--------------------------
+
+:Capability: KVM_CAP_NESTED_STATE
+:Architectures: x86
+:Type: vcpu ioctl
+:Parameters: struct kvm_nested_state (in/out)
+:Returns: 0 on success, -1 on error
+
+Errors:
+
+ ===== =============================================================
+ E2BIG the total state size exceeds the value of 'size' specified by
+ the user; the size required will be written into size.
+ ===== =============================================================
+
+::
+
+ struct kvm_nested_state {
+ __u16 flags;
+ __u16 format;
+ __u32 size;
+
+ union {
+ struct kvm_vmx_nested_state_hdr vmx;
+ struct kvm_svm_nested_state_hdr svm;
+
+ /* Pad the header to 128 bytes. */
+ __u8 pad[120];
+ } hdr;
+
+ union {
+ struct kvm_vmx_nested_state_data vmx[0];
+ struct kvm_svm_nested_state_data svm[0];
+ } data;
+ };
+
+ #define KVM_STATE_NESTED_GUEST_MODE 0x00000001
+ #define KVM_STATE_NESTED_RUN_PENDING 0x00000002
+ #define KVM_STATE_NESTED_EVMCS 0x00000004
+
+ #define KVM_STATE_NESTED_FORMAT_VMX 0
+ #define KVM_STATE_NESTED_FORMAT_SVM 1
+
+ #define KVM_STATE_NESTED_VMX_VMCS_SIZE 0x1000
+
+ #define KVM_STATE_NESTED_VMX_SMM_GUEST_MODE 0x00000001
+ #define KVM_STATE_NESTED_VMX_SMM_VMXON 0x00000002
+
+ #define KVM_STATE_VMX_PREEMPTION_TIMER_DEADLINE 0x00000001
+
+ struct kvm_vmx_nested_state_hdr {
+ __u64 vmxon_pa;
+ __u64 vmcs12_pa;
+
+ struct {
+ __u16 flags;
+ } smm;
+
+ __u32 flags;
+ __u64 preemption_timer_deadline;
+ };
+
+ struct kvm_vmx_nested_state_data {
+ __u8 vmcs12[KVM_STATE_NESTED_VMX_VMCS_SIZE];
+ __u8 shadow_vmcs12[KVM_STATE_NESTED_VMX_VMCS_SIZE];
+ };
+
+This ioctl copies the vcpu's nested virtualization state from the kernel to
+userspace.
+
+The maximum size of the state can be retrieved by passing KVM_CAP_NESTED_STATE
+to the KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION ioctl().
+
+4.115 KVM_SET_NESTED_STATE
+--------------------------
+
+:Capability: KVM_CAP_NESTED_STATE
+:Architectures: x86
+:Type: vcpu ioctl
+:Parameters: struct kvm_nested_state (in)
+:Returns: 0 on success, -1 on error
+
+This copies the vcpu's kvm_nested_state struct from userspace to the kernel.
+For the definition of struct kvm_nested_state, see KVM_GET_NESTED_STATE.
+
+4.116 KVM_(UN)REGISTER_COALESCED_MMIO
+-------------------------------------
+
+:Capability: KVM_CAP_COALESCED_MMIO (for coalesced mmio)
+ KVM_CAP_COALESCED_PIO (for coalesced pio)
+:Architectures: all
+:Type: vm ioctl
+:Parameters: struct kvm_coalesced_mmio_zone
+:Returns: 0 on success, < 0 on error
+
+Coalesced I/O is a performance optimization that defers hardware
+register write emulation so that userspace exits are avoided. It is
+typically used to reduce the overhead of emulating frequently accessed
+hardware registers.
+
+When a hardware register is configured for coalesced I/O, write accesses
+do not exit to userspace and their value is recorded in a ring buffer
+that is shared between kernel and userspace.
+
+Coalesced I/O is used if one or more write accesses to a hardware
+register can be deferred until a read or a write to another hardware
+register on the same device. This last access will cause a vmexit and
+userspace will process accesses from the ring buffer before emulating
+it. That will avoid exiting to userspace on repeated writes.
+
+Coalesced pio is based on coalesced mmio. There is little difference
+between coalesced mmio and pio except that coalesced pio records accesses
+to I/O ports.
+
+4.117 KVM_CLEAR_DIRTY_LOG (vm ioctl)
+------------------------------------
+
+:Capability: KVM_CAP_MANUAL_DIRTY_LOG_PROTECT2
+:Architectures: x86, arm64, mips
+:Type: vm ioctl
+:Parameters: struct kvm_clear_dirty_log (in)
+:Returns: 0 on success, -1 on error
+
+::
+
+ /* for KVM_CLEAR_DIRTY_LOG */
+ struct kvm_clear_dirty_log {
+ __u32 slot;
+ __u32 num_pages;
+ __u64 first_page;
+ union {
+ void __user *dirty_bitmap; /* one bit per page */
+ __u64 padding;
+ };
+ };
+
+The ioctl clears the dirty status of pages in a memory slot, according to
+the bitmap that is passed in struct kvm_clear_dirty_log's dirty_bitmap
+field. Bit 0 of the bitmap corresponds to page "first_page" in the
+memory slot, and num_pages is the size in bits of the input bitmap.
+first_page must be a multiple of 64; num_pages must also be a multiple of
+64 unless first_page + num_pages is the size of the memory slot. For each
+bit that is set in the input bitmap, the corresponding page is marked "clean"
+in KVM's dirty bitmap, and dirty tracking is re-enabled for that page
+(for example via write-protection, or by clearing the dirty bit in
+a page table entry).
+
+If KVM_CAP_MULTI_ADDRESS_SPACE is available, bits 16-31 of slot field specifies
+the address space for which you want to clear the dirty status. See
+KVM_SET_USER_MEMORY_REGION for details on the usage of slot field.
+
+This ioctl is mostly useful when KVM_CAP_MANUAL_DIRTY_LOG_PROTECT2
+is enabled; for more information, see the description of the capability.
+However, it can always be used as long as KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION confirms
+that KVM_CAP_MANUAL_DIRTY_LOG_PROTECT2 is present.
+
+4.118 KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_HV_CPUID
+--------------------------------
+
+:Capability: KVM_CAP_HYPERV_CPUID (vcpu), KVM_CAP_SYS_HYPERV_CPUID (system)
+:Architectures: x86
+:Type: system ioctl, vcpu ioctl
+:Parameters: struct kvm_cpuid2 (in/out)
+:Returns: 0 on success, -1 on error
+
+::
+
+ struct kvm_cpuid2 {
+ __u32 nent;
+ __u32 padding;
+ struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 entries[0];
+ };
+
+ struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 {
+ __u32 function;
+ __u32 index;
+ __u32 flags;
+ __u32 eax;
+ __u32 ebx;
+ __u32 ecx;
+ __u32 edx;
+ __u32 padding[3];
+ };
+
+This ioctl returns x86 cpuid features leaves related to Hyper-V emulation in
+KVM. Userspace can use the information returned by this ioctl to construct
+cpuid information presented to guests consuming Hyper-V enlightenments (e.g.
+Windows or Hyper-V guests).
+
+CPUID feature leaves returned by this ioctl are defined by Hyper-V Top Level
+Functional Specification (TLFS). These leaves can't be obtained with
+KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID ioctl because some of them intersect with KVM feature
+leaves (0x40000000, 0x40000001).
+
+Currently, the following list of CPUID leaves are returned:
+
+ - HYPERV_CPUID_VENDOR_AND_MAX_FUNCTIONS
+ - HYPERV_CPUID_INTERFACE
+ - HYPERV_CPUID_VERSION
+ - HYPERV_CPUID_FEATURES
+ - HYPERV_CPUID_ENLIGHTMENT_INFO
+ - HYPERV_CPUID_IMPLEMENT_LIMITS
+ - HYPERV_CPUID_NESTED_FEATURES
+ - HYPERV_CPUID_SYNDBG_VENDOR_AND_MAX_FUNCTIONS
+ - HYPERV_CPUID_SYNDBG_INTERFACE
+ - HYPERV_CPUID_SYNDBG_PLATFORM_CAPABILITIES
+
+Userspace invokes KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_HV_CPUID by passing a kvm_cpuid2 structure
+with the 'nent' field indicating the number of entries in the variable-size
+array 'entries'. If the number of entries is too low to describe all Hyper-V
+feature leaves, an error (E2BIG) is returned. If the number is more or equal
+to the number of Hyper-V feature leaves, the 'nent' field is adjusted to the
+number of valid entries in the 'entries' array, which is then filled.
+
+'index' and 'flags' fields in 'struct kvm_cpuid_entry2' are currently reserved,
+userspace should not expect to get any particular value there.
+
+Note, vcpu version of KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_HV_CPUID is currently deprecated. Unlike
+system ioctl which exposes all supported feature bits unconditionally, vcpu
+version has the following quirks:
+
+- HYPERV_CPUID_NESTED_FEATURES leaf and HV_X64_ENLIGHTENED_VMCS_RECOMMENDED
+ feature bit are only exposed when Enlightened VMCS was previously enabled
+ on the corresponding vCPU (KVM_CAP_HYPERV_ENLIGHTENED_VMCS).
+- HV_STIMER_DIRECT_MODE_AVAILABLE bit is only exposed with in-kernel LAPIC.
+ (presumes KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP has already been called).
+
+4.119 KVM_ARM_VCPU_FINALIZE
+---------------------------
+
+:Architectures: arm64
+:Type: vcpu ioctl
+:Parameters: int feature (in)
+:Returns: 0 on success, -1 on error
+
+Errors:
+
+ ====== ==============================================================
+ EPERM feature not enabled, needs configuration, or already finalized
+ EINVAL feature unknown or not present
+ ====== ==============================================================
+
+Recognised values for feature:
+
+ ===== ===========================================
+ arm64 KVM_ARM_VCPU_SVE (requires KVM_CAP_ARM_SVE)
+ ===== ===========================================
+
+Finalizes the configuration of the specified vcpu feature.
+
+The vcpu must already have been initialised, enabling the affected feature, by
+means of a successful KVM_ARM_VCPU_INIT call with the appropriate flag set in
+features[].
+
+For affected vcpu features, this is a mandatory step that must be performed
+before the vcpu is fully usable.
+
+Between KVM_ARM_VCPU_INIT and KVM_ARM_VCPU_FINALIZE, the feature may be
+configured by use of ioctls such as KVM_SET_ONE_REG. The exact configuration
+that should be performaned and how to do it are feature-dependent.
+
+Other calls that depend on a particular feature being finalized, such as
+KVM_RUN, KVM_GET_REG_LIST, KVM_GET_ONE_REG and KVM_SET_ONE_REG, will fail with
+-EPERM unless the feature has already been finalized by means of a
+KVM_ARM_VCPU_FINALIZE call.
+
+See KVM_ARM_VCPU_INIT for details of vcpu features that require finalization
+using this ioctl.
+
+4.120 KVM_SET_PMU_EVENT_FILTER
+------------------------------
+
+:Capability: KVM_CAP_PMU_EVENT_FILTER
+:Architectures: x86
+:Type: vm ioctl
+:Parameters: struct kvm_pmu_event_filter (in)
+:Returns: 0 on success, -1 on error
+
+Errors:
+
+ ====== ============================================================
+ EFAULT args[0] cannot be accessed
+ EINVAL args[0] contains invalid data in the filter or filter events
+ E2BIG nevents is too large
+ EBUSY not enough memory to allocate the filter
+ ====== ============================================================
+
+::
+
+ struct kvm_pmu_event_filter {
+ __u32 action;
+ __u32 nevents;
+ __u32 fixed_counter_bitmap;
+ __u32 flags;
+ __u32 pad[4];
+ __u64 events[0];
+ };
+
+This ioctl restricts the set of PMU events the guest can program by limiting
+which event select and unit mask combinations are permitted.
+
+The argument holds a list of filter events which will be allowed or denied.
+
+Filter events only control general purpose counters; fixed purpose counters
+are controlled by the fixed_counter_bitmap.
+
+Valid values for 'flags'::
+
+``0``
+
+To use this mode, clear the 'flags' field.
+
+In this mode each event will contain an event select + unit mask.
+
+When the guest attempts to program the PMU the guest's event select +
+unit mask is compared against the filter events to determine whether the
+guest should have access.
+
+``KVM_PMU_EVENT_FLAG_MASKED_EVENTS``
+:Capability: KVM_CAP_PMU_EVENT_MASKED_EVENTS
+
+In this mode each filter event will contain an event select, mask, match, and
+exclude value. To encode a masked event use::
+
+ KVM_PMU_ENCODE_MASKED_ENTRY()
+
+An encoded event will follow this layout::
+
+ Bits Description
+ ---- -----------
+ 7:0 event select (low bits)
+ 15:8 umask match
+ 31:16 unused
+ 35:32 event select (high bits)
+ 36:54 unused
+ 55 exclude bit
+ 63:56 umask mask
+
+When the guest attempts to program the PMU, these steps are followed in
+determining if the guest should have access:
+
+ 1. Match the event select from the guest against the filter events.
+ 2. If a match is found, match the guest's unit mask to the mask and match
+ values of the included filter events.
+ I.e. (unit mask & mask) == match && !exclude.
+ 3. If a match is found, match the guest's unit mask to the mask and match
+ values of the excluded filter events.
+ I.e. (unit mask & mask) == match && exclude.
+ 4.
+ a. If an included match is found and an excluded match is not found, filter
+ the event.
+ b. For everything else, do not filter the event.
+ 5.
+ a. If the event is filtered and it's an allow list, allow the guest to
+ program the event.
+ b. If the event is filtered and it's a deny list, do not allow the guest to
+ program the event.
+
+When setting a new pmu event filter, -EINVAL will be returned if any of the
+unused fields are set or if any of the high bits (35:32) in the event
+select are set when called on Intel.
+
+Valid values for 'action'::
+
+ #define KVM_PMU_EVENT_ALLOW 0
+ #define KVM_PMU_EVENT_DENY 1
+
+4.121 KVM_PPC_SVM_OFF
+---------------------
+
+:Capability: basic
+:Architectures: powerpc
+:Type: vm ioctl
+:Parameters: none
+:Returns: 0 on successful completion,
+
+Errors:
+
+ ====== ================================================================
+ EINVAL if ultravisor failed to terminate the secure guest
+ ENOMEM if hypervisor failed to allocate new radix page tables for guest
+ ====== ================================================================
+
+This ioctl is used to turn off the secure mode of the guest or transition
+the guest from secure mode to normal mode. This is invoked when the guest
+is reset. This has no effect if called for a normal guest.
+
+This ioctl issues an ultravisor call to terminate the secure guest,
+unpins the VPA pages and releases all the device pages that are used to
+track the secure pages by hypervisor.
+
+4.122 KVM_S390_NORMAL_RESET
+---------------------------
+
+:Capability: KVM_CAP_S390_VCPU_RESETS
+:Architectures: s390
+:Type: vcpu ioctl
+:Parameters: none
+:Returns: 0
+
+This ioctl resets VCPU registers and control structures according to
+the cpu reset definition in the POP (Principles Of Operation).
+
+4.123 KVM_S390_INITIAL_RESET
+----------------------------
+
+:Capability: none
+:Architectures: s390
+:Type: vcpu ioctl
+:Parameters: none
+:Returns: 0
+
+This ioctl resets VCPU registers and control structures according to
+the initial cpu reset definition in the POP. However, the cpu is not
+put into ESA mode. This reset is a superset of the normal reset.
+
+4.124 KVM_S390_CLEAR_RESET
+--------------------------
+
+:Capability: KVM_CAP_S390_VCPU_RESETS
+:Architectures: s390
+:Type: vcpu ioctl
+:Parameters: none
+:Returns: 0
+
+This ioctl resets VCPU registers and control structures according to
+the clear cpu reset definition in the POP. However, the cpu is not put
+into ESA mode. This reset is a superset of the initial reset.
+
+
+4.125 KVM_S390_PV_COMMAND
+-------------------------
+
+:Capability: KVM_CAP_S390_PROTECTED
+:Architectures: s390
+:Type: vm ioctl
+:Parameters: struct kvm_pv_cmd
+:Returns: 0 on success, < 0 on error
+
+::
+
+ struct kvm_pv_cmd {
+ __u32 cmd; /* Command to be executed */
+ __u16 rc; /* Ultravisor return code */
+ __u16 rrc; /* Ultravisor return reason code */
+ __u64 data; /* Data or address */
+ __u32 flags; /* flags for future extensions. Must be 0 for now */
+ __u32 reserved[3];
+ };
+
+**Ultravisor return codes**
+The Ultravisor return (reason) codes are provided by the kernel if a
+Ultravisor call has been executed to achieve the results expected by
+the command. Therefore they are independent of the IOCTL return
+code. If KVM changes `rc`, its value will always be greater than 0
+hence setting it to 0 before issuing a PV command is advised to be
+able to detect a change of `rc`.
+
+**cmd values:**
+
+KVM_PV_ENABLE
+ Allocate memory and register the VM with the Ultravisor, thereby
+ donating memory to the Ultravisor that will become inaccessible to
+ KVM. All existing CPUs are converted to protected ones. After this
+ command has succeeded, any CPU added via hotplug will become
+ protected during its creation as well.
+
+ Errors:
+
+ ===== =============================
+ EINTR an unmasked signal is pending
+ ===== =============================
+
+KVM_PV_DISABLE
+ Deregister the VM from the Ultravisor and reclaim the memory that had
+ been donated to the Ultravisor, making it usable by the kernel again.
+ All registered VCPUs are converted back to non-protected ones. If a
+ previous protected VM had been prepared for asynchronous teardown with
+ KVM_PV_ASYNC_CLEANUP_PREPARE and not subsequently torn down with
+ KVM_PV_ASYNC_CLEANUP_PERFORM, it will be torn down in this call
+ together with the current protected VM.
+
+KVM_PV_VM_SET_SEC_PARMS
+ Pass the image header from VM memory to the Ultravisor in
+ preparation of image unpacking and verification.
+
+KVM_PV_VM_UNPACK
+ Unpack (protect and decrypt) a page of the encrypted boot image.
+
+KVM_PV_VM_VERIFY
+ Verify the integrity of the unpacked image. Only if this succeeds,
+ KVM is allowed to start protected VCPUs.
+
+KVM_PV_INFO
+ :Capability: KVM_CAP_S390_PROTECTED_DUMP
+
+ Presents an API that provides Ultravisor related data to userspace
+ via subcommands. len_max is the size of the user space buffer,
+ len_written is KVM's indication of how much bytes of that buffer
+ were actually written to. len_written can be used to determine the
+ valid fields if more response fields are added in the future.
+
+ ::
+
+ enum pv_cmd_info_id {
+ KVM_PV_INFO_VM,
+ KVM_PV_INFO_DUMP,
+ };
+
+ struct kvm_s390_pv_info_header {
+ __u32 id;
+ __u32 len_max;
+ __u32 len_written;
+ __u32 reserved;
+ };
+
+ struct kvm_s390_pv_info {
+ struct kvm_s390_pv_info_header header;
+ struct kvm_s390_pv_info_dump dump;
+ struct kvm_s390_pv_info_vm vm;
+ };
+
+**subcommands:**
+
+ KVM_PV_INFO_VM
+ This subcommand provides basic Ultravisor information for PV
+ hosts. These values are likely also exported as files in the sysfs
+ firmware UV query interface but they are more easily available to
+ programs in this API.
+
+ The installed calls and feature_indication members provide the
+ installed UV calls and the UV's other feature indications.
+
+ The max_* members provide information about the maximum number of PV
+ vcpus, PV guests and PV guest memory size.
+
+ ::
+
+ struct kvm_s390_pv_info_vm {
+ __u64 inst_calls_list[4];
+ __u64 max_cpus;
+ __u64 max_guests;
+ __u64 max_guest_addr;
+ __u64 feature_indication;
+ };
+
+
+ KVM_PV_INFO_DUMP
+ This subcommand provides information related to dumping PV guests.
+
+ ::
+
+ struct kvm_s390_pv_info_dump {
+ __u64 dump_cpu_buffer_len;
+ __u64 dump_config_mem_buffer_per_1m;
+ __u64 dump_config_finalize_len;
+ };
+
+KVM_PV_DUMP
+ :Capability: KVM_CAP_S390_PROTECTED_DUMP
+
+ Presents an API that provides calls which facilitate dumping a
+ protected VM.
+
+ ::
+
+ struct kvm_s390_pv_dmp {
+ __u64 subcmd;
+ __u64 buff_addr;
+ __u64 buff_len;
+ __u64 gaddr; /* For dump storage state */
+ };
+
+ **subcommands:**
+
+ KVM_PV_DUMP_INIT
+ Initializes the dump process of a protected VM. If this call does
+ not succeed all other subcommands will fail with -EINVAL. This
+ subcommand will return -EINVAL if a dump process has not yet been
+ completed.
+
+ Not all PV vms can be dumped, the owner needs to set `dump
+ allowed` PCF bit 34 in the SE header to allow dumping.
+
+ KVM_PV_DUMP_CONFIG_STOR_STATE
+ Stores `buff_len` bytes of tweak component values starting with
+ the 1MB block specified by the absolute guest address
+ (`gaddr`). `buff_len` needs to be `conf_dump_storage_state_len`
+ aligned and at least >= the `conf_dump_storage_state_len` value
+ provided by the dump uv_info data. buff_user might be written to
+ even if an error rc is returned. For instance if we encounter a
+ fault after writing the first page of data.
+
+ KVM_PV_DUMP_COMPLETE
+ If the subcommand succeeds it completes the dump process and lets
+ KVM_PV_DUMP_INIT be called again.
+
+ On success `conf_dump_finalize_len` bytes of completion data will be
+ stored to the `buff_addr`. The completion data contains a key
+ derivation seed, IV, tweak nonce and encryption keys as well as an
+ authentication tag all of which are needed to decrypt the dump at a
+ later time.
+
+KVM_PV_ASYNC_CLEANUP_PREPARE
+ :Capability: KVM_CAP_S390_PROTECTED_ASYNC_DISABLE
+
+ Prepare the current protected VM for asynchronous teardown. Most
+ resources used by the current protected VM will be set aside for a
+ subsequent asynchronous teardown. The current protected VM will then
+ resume execution immediately as non-protected. There can be at most
+ one protected VM prepared for asynchronous teardown at any time. If
+ a protected VM had already been prepared for teardown without
+ subsequently calling KVM_PV_ASYNC_CLEANUP_PERFORM, this call will
+ fail. In that case, the userspace process should issue a normal
+ KVM_PV_DISABLE. The resources set aside with this call will need to
+ be cleaned up with a subsequent call to KVM_PV_ASYNC_CLEANUP_PERFORM
+ or KVM_PV_DISABLE, otherwise they will be cleaned up when KVM
+ terminates. KVM_PV_ASYNC_CLEANUP_PREPARE can be called again as soon
+ as cleanup starts, i.e. before KVM_PV_ASYNC_CLEANUP_PERFORM finishes.
+
+KVM_PV_ASYNC_CLEANUP_PERFORM
+ :Capability: KVM_CAP_S390_PROTECTED_ASYNC_DISABLE
+
+ Tear down the protected VM previously prepared for teardown with
+ KVM_PV_ASYNC_CLEANUP_PREPARE. The resources that had been set aside
+ will be freed during the execution of this command. This PV command
+ should ideally be issued by userspace from a separate thread. If a
+ fatal signal is received (or the process terminates naturally), the
+ command will terminate immediately without completing, and the normal
+ KVM shutdown procedure will take care of cleaning up all remaining
+ protected VMs, including the ones whose teardown was interrupted by
+ process termination.
+
+4.126 KVM_XEN_HVM_SET_ATTR
+--------------------------
+
+:Capability: KVM_CAP_XEN_HVM / KVM_XEN_HVM_CONFIG_SHARED_INFO
+:Architectures: x86
+:Type: vm ioctl
+:Parameters: struct kvm_xen_hvm_attr
+:Returns: 0 on success, < 0 on error
+
+::
+
+ struct kvm_xen_hvm_attr {
+ __u16 type;
+ __u16 pad[3];
+ union {
+ __u8 long_mode;
+ __u8 vector;
+ __u8 runstate_update_flag;
+ struct {
+ __u64 gfn;
+ } shared_info;
+ struct {
+ __u32 send_port;
+ __u32 type; /* EVTCHNSTAT_ipi / EVTCHNSTAT_interdomain */
+ __u32 flags;
+ union {
+ struct {
+ __u32 port;
+ __u32 vcpu;
+ __u32 priority;
+ } port;
+ struct {
+ __u32 port; /* Zero for eventfd */
+ __s32 fd;
+ } eventfd;
+ __u32 padding[4];
+ } deliver;
+ } evtchn;
+ __u32 xen_version;
+ __u64 pad[8];
+ } u;
+ };
+
+type values:
+
+KVM_XEN_ATTR_TYPE_LONG_MODE
+ Sets the ABI mode of the VM to 32-bit or 64-bit (long mode). This
+ determines the layout of the shared info pages exposed to the VM.
+
+KVM_XEN_ATTR_TYPE_SHARED_INFO
+ Sets the guest physical frame number at which the Xen "shared info"
+ page resides. Note that although Xen places vcpu_info for the first
+ 32 vCPUs in the shared_info page, KVM does not automatically do so
+ and instead requires that KVM_XEN_VCPU_ATTR_TYPE_VCPU_INFO be used
+ explicitly even when the vcpu_info for a given vCPU resides at the
+ "default" location in the shared_info page. This is because KVM may
+ not be aware of the Xen CPU id which is used as the index into the
+ vcpu_info[] array, so may know the correct default location.
+
+ Note that the shared info page may be constantly written to by KVM;
+ it contains the event channel bitmap used to deliver interrupts to
+ a Xen guest, amongst other things. It is exempt from dirty tracking
+ mechanisms — KVM will not explicitly mark the page as dirty each
+ time an event channel interrupt is delivered to the guest! Thus,
+ userspace should always assume that the designated GFN is dirty if
+ any vCPU has been running or any event channel interrupts can be
+ routed to the guest.
+
+ Setting the gfn to KVM_XEN_INVALID_GFN will disable the shared info
+ page.
+
+KVM_XEN_ATTR_TYPE_UPCALL_VECTOR
+ Sets the exception vector used to deliver Xen event channel upcalls.
+ This is the HVM-wide vector injected directly by the hypervisor
+ (not through the local APIC), typically configured by a guest via
+ HVM_PARAM_CALLBACK_IRQ. This can be disabled again (e.g. for guest
+ SHUTDOWN_soft_reset) by setting it to zero.
+
+KVM_XEN_ATTR_TYPE_EVTCHN
+ This attribute is available when the KVM_CAP_XEN_HVM ioctl indicates
+ support for KVM_XEN_HVM_CONFIG_EVTCHN_SEND features. It configures
+ an outbound port number for interception of EVTCHNOP_send requests
+ from the guest. A given sending port number may be directed back to
+ a specified vCPU (by APIC ID) / port / priority on the guest, or to
+ trigger events on an eventfd. The vCPU and priority can be changed
+ by setting KVM_XEN_EVTCHN_UPDATE in a subsequent call, but but other
+ fields cannot change for a given sending port. A port mapping is
+ removed by using KVM_XEN_EVTCHN_DEASSIGN in the flags field. Passing
+ KVM_XEN_EVTCHN_RESET in the flags field removes all interception of
+ outbound event channels. The values of the flags field are mutually
+ exclusive and cannot be combined as a bitmask.
+
+KVM_XEN_ATTR_TYPE_XEN_VERSION
+ This attribute is available when the KVM_CAP_XEN_HVM ioctl indicates
+ support for KVM_XEN_HVM_CONFIG_EVTCHN_SEND features. It configures
+ the 32-bit version code returned to the guest when it invokes the
+ XENVER_version call; typically (XEN_MAJOR << 16 | XEN_MINOR). PV
+ Xen guests will often use this to as a dummy hypercall to trigger
+ event channel delivery, so responding within the kernel without
+ exiting to userspace is beneficial.
+
+KVM_XEN_ATTR_TYPE_RUNSTATE_UPDATE_FLAG
+ This attribute is available when the KVM_CAP_XEN_HVM ioctl indicates
+ support for KVM_XEN_HVM_CONFIG_RUNSTATE_UPDATE_FLAG. It enables the
+ XEN_RUNSTATE_UPDATE flag which allows guest vCPUs to safely read
+ other vCPUs' vcpu_runstate_info. Xen guests enable this feature via
+ the VMASST_TYPE_runstate_update_flag of the HYPERVISOR_vm_assist
+ hypercall.
+
+4.127 KVM_XEN_HVM_GET_ATTR
+--------------------------
+
+:Capability: KVM_CAP_XEN_HVM / KVM_XEN_HVM_CONFIG_SHARED_INFO
+:Architectures: x86
+:Type: vm ioctl
+:Parameters: struct kvm_xen_hvm_attr
+:Returns: 0 on success, < 0 on error
+
+Allows Xen VM attributes to be read. For the structure and types,
+see KVM_XEN_HVM_SET_ATTR above. The KVM_XEN_ATTR_TYPE_EVTCHN
+attribute cannot be read.
+
+4.128 KVM_XEN_VCPU_SET_ATTR
+---------------------------
+
+:Capability: KVM_CAP_XEN_HVM / KVM_XEN_HVM_CONFIG_SHARED_INFO
+:Architectures: x86
+:Type: vcpu ioctl
+:Parameters: struct kvm_xen_vcpu_attr
+:Returns: 0 on success, < 0 on error
+
+::
+
+ struct kvm_xen_vcpu_attr {
+ __u16 type;
+ __u16 pad[3];
+ union {
+ __u64 gpa;
+ __u64 pad[4];
+ struct {
+ __u64 state;
+ __u64 state_entry_time;
+ __u64 time_running;
+ __u64 time_runnable;
+ __u64 time_blocked;
+ __u64 time_offline;
+ } runstate;
+ __u32 vcpu_id;
+ struct {
+ __u32 port;
+ __u32 priority;
+ __u64 expires_ns;
+ } timer;
+ __u8 vector;
+ } u;
+ };
+
+type values:
+
+KVM_XEN_VCPU_ATTR_TYPE_VCPU_INFO
+ Sets the guest physical address of the vcpu_info for a given vCPU.
+ As with the shared_info page for the VM, the corresponding page may be
+ dirtied at any time if event channel interrupt delivery is enabled, so
+ userspace should always assume that the page is dirty without relying
+ on dirty logging. Setting the gpa to KVM_XEN_INVALID_GPA will disable
+ the vcpu_info.
+
+KVM_XEN_VCPU_ATTR_TYPE_VCPU_TIME_INFO
+ Sets the guest physical address of an additional pvclock structure
+ for a given vCPU. This is typically used for guest vsyscall support.
+ Setting the gpa to KVM_XEN_INVALID_GPA will disable the structure.
+
+KVM_XEN_VCPU_ATTR_TYPE_RUNSTATE_ADDR
+ Sets the guest physical address of the vcpu_runstate_info for a given
+ vCPU. This is how a Xen guest tracks CPU state such as steal time.
+ Setting the gpa to KVM_XEN_INVALID_GPA will disable the runstate area.
+
+KVM_XEN_VCPU_ATTR_TYPE_RUNSTATE_CURRENT
+ Sets the runstate (RUNSTATE_running/_runnable/_blocked/_offline) of
+ the given vCPU from the .u.runstate.state member of the structure.
+ KVM automatically accounts running and runnable time but blocked
+ and offline states are only entered explicitly.
+
+KVM_XEN_VCPU_ATTR_TYPE_RUNSTATE_DATA
+ Sets all fields of the vCPU runstate data from the .u.runstate member
+ of the structure, including the current runstate. The state_entry_time
+ must equal the sum of the other four times.
+
+KVM_XEN_VCPU_ATTR_TYPE_RUNSTATE_ADJUST
+ This *adds* the contents of the .u.runstate members of the structure
+ to the corresponding members of the given vCPU's runstate data, thus
+ permitting atomic adjustments to the runstate times. The adjustment
+ to the state_entry_time must equal the sum of the adjustments to the
+ other four times. The state field must be set to -1, or to a valid
+ runstate value (RUNSTATE_running, RUNSTATE_runnable, RUNSTATE_blocked
+ or RUNSTATE_offline) to set the current accounted state as of the
+ adjusted state_entry_time.
+
+KVM_XEN_VCPU_ATTR_TYPE_VCPU_ID
+ This attribute is available when the KVM_CAP_XEN_HVM ioctl indicates
+ support for KVM_XEN_HVM_CONFIG_EVTCHN_SEND features. It sets the Xen
+ vCPU ID of the given vCPU, to allow timer-related VCPU operations to
+ be intercepted by KVM.
+
+KVM_XEN_VCPU_ATTR_TYPE_TIMER
+ This attribute is available when the KVM_CAP_XEN_HVM ioctl indicates
+ support for KVM_XEN_HVM_CONFIG_EVTCHN_SEND features. It sets the
+ event channel port/priority for the VIRQ_TIMER of the vCPU, as well
+ as allowing a pending timer to be saved/restored. Setting the timer
+ port to zero disables kernel handling of the singleshot timer.
+
+KVM_XEN_VCPU_ATTR_TYPE_UPCALL_VECTOR
+ This attribute is available when the KVM_CAP_XEN_HVM ioctl indicates
+ support for KVM_XEN_HVM_CONFIG_EVTCHN_SEND features. It sets the
+ per-vCPU local APIC upcall vector, configured by a Xen guest with
+ the HVMOP_set_evtchn_upcall_vector hypercall. This is typically
+ used by Windows guests, and is distinct from the HVM-wide upcall
+ vector configured with HVM_PARAM_CALLBACK_IRQ. It is disabled by
+ setting the vector to zero.
+
+
+4.129 KVM_XEN_VCPU_GET_ATTR
+---------------------------
+
+:Capability: KVM_CAP_XEN_HVM / KVM_XEN_HVM_CONFIG_SHARED_INFO
+:Architectures: x86
+:Type: vcpu ioctl
+:Parameters: struct kvm_xen_vcpu_attr
+:Returns: 0 on success, < 0 on error
+
+Allows Xen vCPU attributes to be read. For the structure and types,
+see KVM_XEN_VCPU_SET_ATTR above.
+
+The KVM_XEN_VCPU_ATTR_TYPE_RUNSTATE_ADJUST type may not be used
+with the KVM_XEN_VCPU_GET_ATTR ioctl.
+
+4.130 KVM_ARM_MTE_COPY_TAGS
+---------------------------
+
+:Capability: KVM_CAP_ARM_MTE
+:Architectures: arm64
+:Type: vm ioctl
+:Parameters: struct kvm_arm_copy_mte_tags
+:Returns: number of bytes copied, < 0 on error (-EINVAL for incorrect
+ arguments, -EFAULT if memory cannot be accessed).
+
+::
+
+ struct kvm_arm_copy_mte_tags {
+ __u64 guest_ipa;
+ __u64 length;
+ void __user *addr;
+ __u64 flags;
+ __u64 reserved[2];
+ };
+
+Copies Memory Tagging Extension (MTE) tags to/from guest tag memory. The
+``guest_ipa`` and ``length`` fields must be ``PAGE_SIZE`` aligned.
+``length`` must not be bigger than 2^31 - PAGE_SIZE bytes. The ``addr``
+field must point to a buffer which the tags will be copied to or from.
+
+``flags`` specifies the direction of copy, either ``KVM_ARM_TAGS_TO_GUEST`` or
+``KVM_ARM_TAGS_FROM_GUEST``.
+
+The size of the buffer to store the tags is ``(length / 16)`` bytes
+(granules in MTE are 16 bytes long). Each byte contains a single tag
+value. This matches the format of ``PTRACE_PEEKMTETAGS`` and
+``PTRACE_POKEMTETAGS``.
+
+If an error occurs before any data is copied then a negative error code is
+returned. If some tags have been copied before an error occurs then the number
+of bytes successfully copied is returned. If the call completes successfully
+then ``length`` is returned.
+
+4.131 KVM_GET_SREGS2
+--------------------
+
+:Capability: KVM_CAP_SREGS2
+:Architectures: x86
+:Type: vcpu ioctl
+:Parameters: struct kvm_sregs2 (out)
+:Returns: 0 on success, -1 on error
+
+Reads special registers from the vcpu.
+This ioctl (when supported) replaces the KVM_GET_SREGS.
+
+::
+
+ struct kvm_sregs2 {
+ /* out (KVM_GET_SREGS2) / in (KVM_SET_SREGS2) */
+ struct kvm_segment cs, ds, es, fs, gs, ss;
+ struct kvm_segment tr, ldt;
+ struct kvm_dtable gdt, idt;
+ __u64 cr0, cr2, cr3, cr4, cr8;
+ __u64 efer;
+ __u64 apic_base;
+ __u64 flags;
+ __u64 pdptrs[4];
+ };
+
+flags values for ``kvm_sregs2``:
+
+``KVM_SREGS2_FLAGS_PDPTRS_VALID``
+
+ Indicates that the struct contains valid PDPTR values.
+
+
+4.132 KVM_SET_SREGS2
+--------------------
+
+:Capability: KVM_CAP_SREGS2
+:Architectures: x86
+:Type: vcpu ioctl
+:Parameters: struct kvm_sregs2 (in)
+:Returns: 0 on success, -1 on error
+
+Writes special registers into the vcpu.
+See KVM_GET_SREGS2 for the data structures.
+This ioctl (when supported) replaces the KVM_SET_SREGS.
+
+4.133 KVM_GET_STATS_FD
+----------------------
+
+:Capability: KVM_CAP_STATS_BINARY_FD
+:Architectures: all
+:Type: vm ioctl, vcpu ioctl
+:Parameters: none
+:Returns: statistics file descriptor on success, < 0 on error
+
+Errors:
+
+ ====== ======================================================
+ ENOMEM if the fd could not be created due to lack of memory
+ EMFILE if the number of opened files exceeds the limit
+ ====== ======================================================
+
+The returned file descriptor can be used to read VM/vCPU statistics data in
+binary format. The data in the file descriptor consists of four blocks
+organized as follows:
+
++-------------+
+| Header |
++-------------+
+| id string |
++-------------+
+| Descriptors |
++-------------+
+| Stats Data |
++-------------+
+
+Apart from the header starting at offset 0, please be aware that it is
+not guaranteed that the four blocks are adjacent or in the above order;
+the offsets of the id, descriptors and data blocks are found in the
+header. However, all four blocks are aligned to 64 bit offsets in the
+file and they do not overlap.
+
+All blocks except the data block are immutable. Userspace can read them
+only one time after retrieving the file descriptor, and then use ``pread`` or
+``lseek`` to read the statistics repeatedly.
+
+All data is in system endianness.
+
+The format of the header is as follows::
+
+ struct kvm_stats_header {
+ __u32 flags;
+ __u32 name_size;
+ __u32 num_desc;
+ __u32 id_offset;
+ __u32 desc_offset;
+ __u32 data_offset;
+ };
+
+The ``flags`` field is not used at the moment. It is always read as 0.
+
+The ``name_size`` field is the size (in byte) of the statistics name string
+(including trailing '\0') which is contained in the "id string" block and
+appended at the end of every descriptor.
+
+The ``num_desc`` field is the number of descriptors that are included in the
+descriptor block. (The actual number of values in the data block may be
+larger, since each descriptor may comprise more than one value).
+
+The ``id_offset`` field is the offset of the id string from the start of the
+file indicated by the file descriptor. It is a multiple of 8.
+
+The ``desc_offset`` field is the offset of the Descriptors block from the start
+of the file indicated by the file descriptor. It is a multiple of 8.
+
+The ``data_offset`` field is the offset of the Stats Data block from the start
+of the file indicated by the file descriptor. It is a multiple of 8.
+
+The id string block contains a string which identifies the file descriptor on
+which KVM_GET_STATS_FD was invoked. The size of the block, including the
+trailing ``'\0'``, is indicated by the ``name_size`` field in the header.
+
+The descriptors block is only needed to be read once for the lifetime of the
+file descriptor contains a sequence of ``struct kvm_stats_desc``, each followed
+by a string of size ``name_size``.
+::
+
+ #define KVM_STATS_TYPE_SHIFT 0
+ #define KVM_STATS_TYPE_MASK (0xF << KVM_STATS_TYPE_SHIFT)
+ #define KVM_STATS_TYPE_CUMULATIVE (0x0 << KVM_STATS_TYPE_SHIFT)
+ #define KVM_STATS_TYPE_INSTANT (0x1 << KVM_STATS_TYPE_SHIFT)
+ #define KVM_STATS_TYPE_PEAK (0x2 << KVM_STATS_TYPE_SHIFT)
+ #define KVM_STATS_TYPE_LINEAR_HIST (0x3 << KVM_STATS_TYPE_SHIFT)
+ #define KVM_STATS_TYPE_LOG_HIST (0x4 << KVM_STATS_TYPE_SHIFT)
+ #define KVM_STATS_TYPE_MAX KVM_STATS_TYPE_LOG_HIST
+
+ #define KVM_STATS_UNIT_SHIFT 4
+ #define KVM_STATS_UNIT_MASK (0xF << KVM_STATS_UNIT_SHIFT)
+ #define KVM_STATS_UNIT_NONE (0x0 << KVM_STATS_UNIT_SHIFT)
+ #define KVM_STATS_UNIT_BYTES (0x1 << KVM_STATS_UNIT_SHIFT)
+ #define KVM_STATS_UNIT_SECONDS (0x2 << KVM_STATS_UNIT_SHIFT)
+ #define KVM_STATS_UNIT_CYCLES (0x3 << KVM_STATS_UNIT_SHIFT)
+ #define KVM_STATS_UNIT_BOOLEAN (0x4 << KVM_STATS_UNIT_SHIFT)
+ #define KVM_STATS_UNIT_MAX KVM_STATS_UNIT_BOOLEAN
+
+ #define KVM_STATS_BASE_SHIFT 8
+ #define KVM_STATS_BASE_MASK (0xF << KVM_STATS_BASE_SHIFT)
+ #define KVM_STATS_BASE_POW10 (0x0 << KVM_STATS_BASE_SHIFT)
+ #define KVM_STATS_BASE_POW2 (0x1 << KVM_STATS_BASE_SHIFT)
+ #define KVM_STATS_BASE_MAX KVM_STATS_BASE_POW2
+
+ struct kvm_stats_desc {
+ __u32 flags;
+ __s16 exponent;
+ __u16 size;
+ __u32 offset;
+ __u32 bucket_size;
+ char name[];
+ };
+
+The ``flags`` field contains the type and unit of the statistics data described
+by this descriptor. Its endianness is CPU native.
+The following flags are supported:
+
+Bits 0-3 of ``flags`` encode the type:
+
+ * ``KVM_STATS_TYPE_CUMULATIVE``
+ The statistics reports a cumulative count. The value of data can only be increased.
+ Most of the counters used in KVM are of this type.
+ The corresponding ``size`` field for this type is always 1.
+ All cumulative statistics data are read/write.
+ * ``KVM_STATS_TYPE_INSTANT``
+ The statistics reports an instantaneous value. Its value can be increased or
+ decreased. This type is usually used as a measurement of some resources,
+ like the number of dirty pages, the number of large pages, etc.
+ All instant statistics are read only.
+ The corresponding ``size`` field for this type is always 1.
+ * ``KVM_STATS_TYPE_PEAK``
+ The statistics data reports a peak value, for example the maximum number
+ of items in a hash table bucket, the longest time waited and so on.
+ The value of data can only be increased.
+ The corresponding ``size`` field for this type is always 1.
+ * ``KVM_STATS_TYPE_LINEAR_HIST``
+ The statistic is reported as a linear histogram. The number of
+ buckets is specified by the ``size`` field. The size of buckets is specified
+ by the ``hist_param`` field. The range of the Nth bucket (1 <= N < ``size``)
+ is [``hist_param``*(N-1), ``hist_param``*N), while the range of the last
+ bucket is [``hist_param``*(``size``-1), +INF). (+INF means positive infinity
+ value.)
+ * ``KVM_STATS_TYPE_LOG_HIST``
+ The statistic is reported as a logarithmic histogram. The number of
+ buckets is specified by the ``size`` field. The range of the first bucket is
+ [0, 1), while the range of the last bucket is [pow(2, ``size``-2), +INF).
+ Otherwise, The Nth bucket (1 < N < ``size``) covers
+ [pow(2, N-2), pow(2, N-1)).
+
+Bits 4-7 of ``flags`` encode the unit:
+
+ * ``KVM_STATS_UNIT_NONE``
+ There is no unit for the value of statistics data. This usually means that
+ the value is a simple counter of an event.
+ * ``KVM_STATS_UNIT_BYTES``
+ It indicates that the statistics data is used to measure memory size, in the
+ unit of Byte, KiByte, MiByte, GiByte, etc. The unit of the data is
+ determined by the ``exponent`` field in the descriptor.
+ * ``KVM_STATS_UNIT_SECONDS``
+ It indicates that the statistics data is used to measure time or latency.
+ * ``KVM_STATS_UNIT_CYCLES``
+ It indicates that the statistics data is used to measure CPU clock cycles.
+ * ``KVM_STATS_UNIT_BOOLEAN``
+ It indicates that the statistic will always be either 0 or 1. Boolean
+ statistics of "peak" type will never go back from 1 to 0. Boolean
+ statistics can be linear histograms (with two buckets) but not logarithmic
+ histograms.
+
+Note that, in the case of histograms, the unit applies to the bucket
+ranges, while the bucket value indicates how many samples fell in the
+bucket's range.
+
+Bits 8-11 of ``flags``, together with ``exponent``, encode the scale of the
+unit:
+
+ * ``KVM_STATS_BASE_POW10``
+ The scale is based on power of 10. It is used for measurement of time and
+ CPU clock cycles. For example, an exponent of -9 can be used with
+ ``KVM_STATS_UNIT_SECONDS`` to express that the unit is nanoseconds.
+ * ``KVM_STATS_BASE_POW2``
+ The scale is based on power of 2. It is used for measurement of memory size.
+ For example, an exponent of 20 can be used with ``KVM_STATS_UNIT_BYTES`` to
+ express that the unit is MiB.
+
+The ``size`` field is the number of values of this statistics data. Its
+value is usually 1 for most of simple statistics. 1 means it contains an
+unsigned 64bit data.
+
+The ``offset`` field is the offset from the start of Data Block to the start of
+the corresponding statistics data.
+
+The ``bucket_size`` field is used as a parameter for histogram statistics data.
+It is only used by linear histogram statistics data, specifying the size of a
+bucket in the unit expressed by bits 4-11 of ``flags`` together with ``exponent``.
+
+The ``name`` field is the name string of the statistics data. The name string
+starts at the end of ``struct kvm_stats_desc``. The maximum length including
+the trailing ``'\0'``, is indicated by ``name_size`` in the header.
+
+The Stats Data block contains an array of 64-bit values in the same order
+as the descriptors in Descriptors block.
+
+4.134 KVM_GET_XSAVE2
+--------------------
+
+:Capability: KVM_CAP_XSAVE2
+:Architectures: x86
+:Type: vcpu ioctl
+:Parameters: struct kvm_xsave (out)
+:Returns: 0 on success, -1 on error
+
+
+::
+
+ struct kvm_xsave {
+ __u32 region[1024];
+ __u32 extra[0];
+ };
+
+This ioctl would copy current vcpu's xsave struct to the userspace. It
+copies as many bytes as are returned by KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION(KVM_CAP_XSAVE2)
+when invoked on the vm file descriptor. The size value returned by
+KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION(KVM_CAP_XSAVE2) will always be at least 4096.
+Currently, it is only greater than 4096 if a dynamic feature has been
+enabled with ``arch_prctl()``, but this may change in the future.
+
+The offsets of the state save areas in struct kvm_xsave follow the contents
+of CPUID leaf 0xD on the host.
+
+4.135 KVM_XEN_HVM_EVTCHN_SEND
+-----------------------------
+
+:Capability: KVM_CAP_XEN_HVM / KVM_XEN_HVM_CONFIG_EVTCHN_SEND
+:Architectures: x86
+:Type: vm ioctl
+:Parameters: struct kvm_irq_routing_xen_evtchn
+:Returns: 0 on success, < 0 on error
+
+
+::
+
+ struct kvm_irq_routing_xen_evtchn {
+ __u32 port;
+ __u32 vcpu;
+ __u32 priority;
+ };
+
+This ioctl injects an event channel interrupt directly to the guest vCPU.
+
+4.136 KVM_S390_PV_CPU_COMMAND
+-----------------------------
+
+:Capability: KVM_CAP_S390_PROTECTED_DUMP
+:Architectures: s390
+:Type: vcpu ioctl
+:Parameters: none
+:Returns: 0 on success, < 0 on error
+
+This ioctl closely mirrors `KVM_S390_PV_COMMAND` but handles requests
+for vcpus. It re-uses the kvm_s390_pv_dmp struct and hence also shares
+the command ids.
+
+**command:**
+
+KVM_PV_DUMP
+ Presents an API that provides calls which facilitate dumping a vcpu
+ of a protected VM.
+
+**subcommand:**
+
+KVM_PV_DUMP_CPU
+ Provides encrypted dump data like register values.
+ The length of the returned data is provided by uv_info.guest_cpu_stor_len.
+
+4.137 KVM_S390_ZPCI_OP
+----------------------
+
+:Capability: KVM_CAP_S390_ZPCI_OP
+:Architectures: s390
+:Type: vm ioctl
+:Parameters: struct kvm_s390_zpci_op (in)
+:Returns: 0 on success, <0 on error
+
+Used to manage hardware-assisted virtualization features for zPCI devices.
+
+Parameters are specified via the following structure::
+
+ struct kvm_s390_zpci_op {
+ /* in */
+ __u32 fh; /* target device */
+ __u8 op; /* operation to perform */
+ __u8 pad[3];
+ union {
+ /* for KVM_S390_ZPCIOP_REG_AEN */
+ struct {
+ __u64 ibv; /* Guest addr of interrupt bit vector */
+ __u64 sb; /* Guest addr of summary bit */
+ __u32 flags;
+ __u32 noi; /* Number of interrupts */
+ __u8 isc; /* Guest interrupt subclass */
+ __u8 sbo; /* Offset of guest summary bit vector */
+ __u16 pad;
+ } reg_aen;
+ __u64 reserved[8];
+ } u;
+ };
+
+The type of operation is specified in the "op" field.
+KVM_S390_ZPCIOP_REG_AEN is used to register the VM for adapter event
+notification interpretation, which will allow firmware delivery of adapter
+events directly to the vm, with KVM providing a backup delivery mechanism;
+KVM_S390_ZPCIOP_DEREG_AEN is used to subsequently disable interpretation of
+adapter event notifications.
+
+The target zPCI function must also be specified via the "fh" field. For the
+KVM_S390_ZPCIOP_REG_AEN operation, additional information to establish firmware
+delivery must be provided via the "reg_aen" struct.
+
+The "pad" and "reserved" fields may be used for future extensions and should be
+set to 0s by userspace.
+
+4.138 KVM_ARM_SET_COUNTER_OFFSET
+--------------------------------
+
+:Capability: KVM_CAP_COUNTER_OFFSET
+:Architectures: arm64
+:Type: vm ioctl
+:Parameters: struct kvm_arm_counter_offset (in)
+:Returns: 0 on success, < 0 on error
+
+This capability indicates that userspace is able to apply a single VM-wide
+offset to both the virtual and physical counters as viewed by the guest
+using the KVM_ARM_SET_CNT_OFFSET ioctl and the following data structure:
+
+::
+
+ struct kvm_arm_counter_offset {
+ __u64 counter_offset;
+ __u64 reserved;
+ };
+
+The offset describes a number of counter cycles that are subtracted from
+both virtual and physical counter views (similar to the effects of the
+CNTVOFF_EL2 and CNTPOFF_EL2 system registers, but only global). The offset
+always applies to all vcpus (already created or created after this ioctl)
+for this VM.
+
+It is userspace's responsibility to compute the offset based, for example,
+on previous values of the guest counters.
+
+Any value other than 0 for the "reserved" field may result in an error
+(-EINVAL) being returned. This ioctl can also return -EBUSY if any vcpu
+ioctl is issued concurrently.
+
+Note that using this ioctl results in KVM ignoring subsequent userspace
+writes to the CNTVCT_EL0 and CNTPCT_EL0 registers using the SET_ONE_REG
+interface. No error will be returned, but the resulting offset will not be
+applied.
+
+5. The kvm_run structure
+========================
+
+Application code obtains a pointer to the kvm_run structure by
+mmap()ing a vcpu fd. From that point, application code can control
+execution by changing fields in kvm_run prior to calling the KVM_RUN
+ioctl, and obtain information about the reason KVM_RUN returned by
+looking up structure members.
+
+::
+
+ struct kvm_run {
+ /* in */
+ __u8 request_interrupt_window;
+
+Request that KVM_RUN return when it becomes possible to inject external
+interrupts into the guest. Useful in conjunction with KVM_INTERRUPT.
+
+::
+
+ __u8 immediate_exit;
+
+This field is polled once when KVM_RUN starts; if non-zero, KVM_RUN
+exits immediately, returning -EINTR. In the common scenario where a
+signal is used to "kick" a VCPU out of KVM_RUN, this field can be used
+to avoid usage of KVM_SET_SIGNAL_MASK, which has worse scalability.
+Rather than blocking the signal outside KVM_RUN, userspace can set up
+a signal handler that sets run->immediate_exit to a non-zero value.
+
+This field is ignored if KVM_CAP_IMMEDIATE_EXIT is not available.
+
+::
+
+ __u8 padding1[6];
+
+ /* out */
+ __u32 exit_reason;
+
+When KVM_RUN has returned successfully (return value 0), this informs
+application code why KVM_RUN has returned. Allowable values for this
+field are detailed below.
+
+::
+
+ __u8 ready_for_interrupt_injection;
+
+If request_interrupt_window has been specified, this field indicates
+an interrupt can be injected now with KVM_INTERRUPT.
+
+::
+
+ __u8 if_flag;
+
+The value of the current interrupt flag. Only valid if in-kernel
+local APIC is not used.
+
+::
+
+ __u16 flags;
+
+More architecture-specific flags detailing state of the VCPU that may
+affect the device's behavior. Current defined flags::
+
+ /* x86, set if the VCPU is in system management mode */
+ #define KVM_RUN_X86_SMM (1 << 0)
+ /* x86, set if bus lock detected in VM */
+ #define KVM_RUN_BUS_LOCK (1 << 1)
+ /* arm64, set for KVM_EXIT_DEBUG */
+ #define KVM_DEBUG_ARCH_HSR_HIGH_VALID (1 << 0)
+
+::
+
+ /* in (pre_kvm_run), out (post_kvm_run) */
+ __u64 cr8;
+
+The value of the cr8 register. Only valid if in-kernel local APIC is
+not used. Both input and output.
+
+::
+
+ __u64 apic_base;
+
+The value of the APIC BASE msr. Only valid if in-kernel local
+APIC is not used. Both input and output.
+
+::
+
+ union {
+ /* KVM_EXIT_UNKNOWN */
+ struct {
+ __u64 hardware_exit_reason;
+ } hw;
+
+If exit_reason is KVM_EXIT_UNKNOWN, the vcpu has exited due to unknown
+reasons. Further architecture-specific information is available in
+hardware_exit_reason.
+
+::
+
+ /* KVM_EXIT_FAIL_ENTRY */
+ struct {
+ __u64 hardware_entry_failure_reason;
+ __u32 cpu; /* if KVM_LAST_CPU */
+ } fail_entry;
+
+If exit_reason is KVM_EXIT_FAIL_ENTRY, the vcpu could not be run due
+to unknown reasons. Further architecture-specific information is
+available in hardware_entry_failure_reason.
+
+::
+
+ /* KVM_EXIT_EXCEPTION */
+ struct {
+ __u32 exception;
+ __u32 error_code;
+ } ex;
+
+Unused.
+
+::
+
+ /* KVM_EXIT_IO */
+ struct {
+ #define KVM_EXIT_IO_IN 0
+ #define KVM_EXIT_IO_OUT 1
+ __u8 direction;
+ __u8 size; /* bytes */
+ __u16 port;
+ __u32 count;
+ __u64 data_offset; /* relative to kvm_run start */
+ } io;
+
+If exit_reason is KVM_EXIT_IO, then the vcpu has
+executed a port I/O instruction which could not be satisfied by kvm.
+data_offset describes where the data is located (KVM_EXIT_IO_OUT) or
+where kvm expects application code to place the data for the next
+KVM_RUN invocation (KVM_EXIT_IO_IN). Data format is a packed array.
+
+::
+
+ /* KVM_EXIT_DEBUG */
+ struct {
+ struct kvm_debug_exit_arch arch;
+ } debug;
+
+If the exit_reason is KVM_EXIT_DEBUG, then a vcpu is processing a debug event
+for which architecture specific information is returned.
+
+::
+
+ /* KVM_EXIT_MMIO */
+ struct {
+ __u64 phys_addr;
+ __u8 data[8];
+ __u32 len;
+ __u8 is_write;
+ } mmio;
+
+If exit_reason is KVM_EXIT_MMIO, then the vcpu has
+executed a memory-mapped I/O instruction which could not be satisfied
+by kvm. The 'data' member contains the written data if 'is_write' is
+true, and should be filled by application code otherwise.
+
+The 'data' member contains, in its first 'len' bytes, the value as it would
+appear if the VCPU performed a load or store of the appropriate width directly
+to the byte array.
+
+.. note::
+
+ For KVM_EXIT_IO, KVM_EXIT_MMIO, KVM_EXIT_OSI, KVM_EXIT_PAPR, KVM_EXIT_XEN,
+ KVM_EXIT_EPR, KVM_EXIT_X86_RDMSR and KVM_EXIT_X86_WRMSR the corresponding
+ operations are complete (and guest state is consistent) only after userspace
+ has re-entered the kernel with KVM_RUN. The kernel side will first finish
+ incomplete operations and then check for pending signals.
+
+ The pending state of the operation is not preserved in state which is
+ visible to userspace, thus userspace should ensure that the operation is
+ completed before performing a live migration. Userspace can re-enter the
+ guest with an unmasked signal pending or with the immediate_exit field set
+ to complete pending operations without allowing any further instructions
+ to be executed.
+
+::
+
+ /* KVM_EXIT_HYPERCALL */
+ struct {
+ __u64 nr;
+ __u64 args[6];
+ __u64 ret;
+ __u64 flags;
+ } hypercall;
+
+
+It is strongly recommended that userspace use ``KVM_EXIT_IO`` (x86) or
+``KVM_EXIT_MMIO`` (all except s390) to implement functionality that
+requires a guest to interact with host userspace.
+
+.. note:: KVM_EXIT_IO is significantly faster than KVM_EXIT_MMIO.
+
+For arm64:
+----------
+
+SMCCC exits can be enabled depending on the configuration of the SMCCC
+filter. See the Documentation/virt/kvm/devices/vm.rst
+``KVM_ARM_SMCCC_FILTER`` for more details.
+
+``nr`` contains the function ID of the guest's SMCCC call. Userspace is
+expected to use the ``KVM_GET_ONE_REG`` ioctl to retrieve the call
+parameters from the vCPU's GPRs.
+
+Definition of ``flags``:
+ - ``KVM_HYPERCALL_EXIT_SMC``: Indicates that the guest used the SMC
+ conduit to initiate the SMCCC call. If this bit is 0 then the guest
+ used the HVC conduit for the SMCCC call.
+
+ - ``KVM_HYPERCALL_EXIT_16BIT``: Indicates that the guest used a 16bit
+ instruction to initiate the SMCCC call. If this bit is 0 then the
+ guest used a 32bit instruction. An AArch64 guest always has this
+ bit set to 0.
+
+At the point of exit, PC points to the instruction immediately following
+the trapping instruction.
+
+::
+
+ /* KVM_EXIT_TPR_ACCESS */
+ struct {
+ __u64 rip;
+ __u32 is_write;
+ __u32 pad;
+ } tpr_access;
+
+To be documented (KVM_TPR_ACCESS_REPORTING).
+
+::
+
+ /* KVM_EXIT_S390_SIEIC */
+ struct {
+ __u8 icptcode;
+ __u64 mask; /* psw upper half */
+ __u64 addr; /* psw lower half */
+ __u16 ipa;
+ __u32 ipb;
+ } s390_sieic;
+
+s390 specific.
+
+::
+
+ /* KVM_EXIT_S390_RESET */
+ #define KVM_S390_RESET_POR 1
+ #define KVM_S390_RESET_CLEAR 2
+ #define KVM_S390_RESET_SUBSYSTEM 4
+ #define KVM_S390_RESET_CPU_INIT 8
+ #define KVM_S390_RESET_IPL 16
+ __u64 s390_reset_flags;
+
+s390 specific.
+
+::
+
+ /* KVM_EXIT_S390_UCONTROL */
+ struct {
+ __u64 trans_exc_code;
+ __u32 pgm_code;
+ } s390_ucontrol;
+
+s390 specific. A page fault has occurred for a user controlled virtual
+machine (KVM_VM_S390_UNCONTROL) on its host page table that cannot be
+resolved by the kernel.
+The program code and the translation exception code that were placed
+in the cpu's lowcore are presented here as defined by the z Architecture
+Principles of Operation Book in the Chapter for Dynamic Address Translation
+(DAT)
+
+::
+
+ /* KVM_EXIT_DCR */
+ struct {
+ __u32 dcrn;
+ __u32 data;
+ __u8 is_write;
+ } dcr;
+
+Deprecated - was used for 440 KVM.
+
+::
+
+ /* KVM_EXIT_OSI */
+ struct {
+ __u64 gprs[32];
+ } osi;
+
+MOL uses a special hypercall interface it calls 'OSI'. To enable it, we catch
+hypercalls and exit with this exit struct that contains all the guest gprs.
+
+If exit_reason is KVM_EXIT_OSI, then the vcpu has triggered such a hypercall.
+Userspace can now handle the hypercall and when it's done modify the gprs as
+necessary. Upon guest entry all guest GPRs will then be replaced by the values
+in this struct.
+
+::
+
+ /* KVM_EXIT_PAPR_HCALL */
+ struct {
+ __u64 nr;
+ __u64 ret;
+ __u64 args[9];
+ } papr_hcall;
+
+This is used on 64-bit PowerPC when emulating a pSeries partition,
+e.g. with the 'pseries' machine type in qemu. It occurs when the
+guest does a hypercall using the 'sc 1' instruction. The 'nr' field
+contains the hypercall number (from the guest R3), and 'args' contains
+the arguments (from the guest R4 - R12). Userspace should put the
+return code in 'ret' and any extra returned values in args[].
+The possible hypercalls are defined in the Power Architecture Platform
+Requirements (PAPR) document available from www.power.org (free
+developer registration required to access it).
+
+::
+
+ /* KVM_EXIT_S390_TSCH */
+ struct {
+ __u16 subchannel_id;
+ __u16 subchannel_nr;
+ __u32 io_int_parm;
+ __u32 io_int_word;
+ __u32 ipb;
+ __u8 dequeued;
+ } s390_tsch;
+
+s390 specific. This exit occurs when KVM_CAP_S390_CSS_SUPPORT has been enabled
+and TEST SUBCHANNEL was intercepted. If dequeued is set, a pending I/O
+interrupt for the target subchannel has been dequeued and subchannel_id,
+subchannel_nr, io_int_parm and io_int_word contain the parameters for that
+interrupt. ipb is needed for instruction parameter decoding.
+
+::
+
+ /* KVM_EXIT_EPR */
+ struct {
+ __u32 epr;
+ } epr;
+
+On FSL BookE PowerPC chips, the interrupt controller has a fast patch
+interrupt acknowledge path to the core. When the core successfully
+delivers an interrupt, it automatically populates the EPR register with
+the interrupt vector number and acknowledges the interrupt inside
+the interrupt controller.
+
+In case the interrupt controller lives in user space, we need to do
+the interrupt acknowledge cycle through it to fetch the next to be
+delivered interrupt vector using this exit.
+
+It gets triggered whenever both KVM_CAP_PPC_EPR are enabled and an
+external interrupt has just been delivered into the guest. User space
+should put the acknowledged interrupt vector into the 'epr' field.
+
+::
+
+ /* KVM_EXIT_SYSTEM_EVENT */
+ struct {
+ #define KVM_SYSTEM_EVENT_SHUTDOWN 1
+ #define KVM_SYSTEM_EVENT_RESET 2
+ #define KVM_SYSTEM_EVENT_CRASH 3
+ #define KVM_SYSTEM_EVENT_WAKEUP 4
+ #define KVM_SYSTEM_EVENT_SUSPEND 5
+ #define KVM_SYSTEM_EVENT_SEV_TERM 6
+ __u32 type;
+ __u32 ndata;
+ __u64 data[16];
+ } system_event;
+
+If exit_reason is KVM_EXIT_SYSTEM_EVENT then the vcpu has triggered
+a system-level event using some architecture specific mechanism (hypercall
+or some special instruction). In case of ARM64, this is triggered using
+HVC instruction based PSCI call from the vcpu.
+
+The 'type' field describes the system-level event type.
+Valid values for 'type' are:
+
+ - KVM_SYSTEM_EVENT_SHUTDOWN -- the guest has requested a shutdown of the
+ VM. Userspace is not obliged to honour this, and if it does honour
+ this does not need to destroy the VM synchronously (ie it may call
+ KVM_RUN again before shutdown finally occurs).
+ - KVM_SYSTEM_EVENT_RESET -- the guest has requested a reset of the VM.
+ As with SHUTDOWN, userspace can choose to ignore the request, or
+ to schedule the reset to occur in the future and may call KVM_RUN again.
+ - KVM_SYSTEM_EVENT_CRASH -- the guest crash occurred and the guest
+ has requested a crash condition maintenance. Userspace can choose
+ to ignore the request, or to gather VM memory core dump and/or
+ reset/shutdown of the VM.
+ - KVM_SYSTEM_EVENT_SEV_TERM -- an AMD SEV guest requested termination.
+ The guest physical address of the guest's GHCB is stored in `data[0]`.
+ - KVM_SYSTEM_EVENT_WAKEUP -- the exiting vCPU is in a suspended state and
+ KVM has recognized a wakeup event. Userspace may honor this event by
+ marking the exiting vCPU as runnable, or deny it and call KVM_RUN again.
+ - KVM_SYSTEM_EVENT_SUSPEND -- the guest has requested a suspension of
+ the VM.
+
+If KVM_CAP_SYSTEM_EVENT_DATA is present, the 'data' field can contain
+architecture specific information for the system-level event. Only
+the first `ndata` items (possibly zero) of the data array are valid.
+
+ - for arm64, data[0] is set to KVM_SYSTEM_EVENT_RESET_FLAG_PSCI_RESET2 if
+ the guest issued a SYSTEM_RESET2 call according to v1.1 of the PSCI
+ specification.
+
+ - for RISC-V, data[0] is set to the value of the second argument of the
+ ``sbi_system_reset`` call.
+
+Previous versions of Linux defined a `flags` member in this struct. The
+field is now aliased to `data[0]`. Userspace can assume that it is only
+written if ndata is greater than 0.
+
+For arm/arm64:
+--------------
+
+KVM_SYSTEM_EVENT_SUSPEND exits are enabled with the
+KVM_CAP_ARM_SYSTEM_SUSPEND VM capability. If a guest invokes the PSCI
+SYSTEM_SUSPEND function, KVM will exit to userspace with this event
+type.
+
+It is the sole responsibility of userspace to implement the PSCI
+SYSTEM_SUSPEND call according to ARM DEN0022D.b 5.19 "SYSTEM_SUSPEND".
+KVM does not change the vCPU's state before exiting to userspace, so
+the call parameters are left in-place in the vCPU registers.
+
+Userspace is _required_ to take action for such an exit. It must
+either:
+
+ - Honor the guest request to suspend the VM. Userspace can request
+ in-kernel emulation of suspension by setting the calling vCPU's
+ state to KVM_MP_STATE_SUSPENDED. Userspace must configure the vCPU's
+ state according to the parameters passed to the PSCI function when
+ the calling vCPU is resumed. See ARM DEN0022D.b 5.19.1 "Intended use"
+ for details on the function parameters.
+
+ - Deny the guest request to suspend the VM. See ARM DEN0022D.b 5.19.2
+ "Caller responsibilities" for possible return values.
+
+::
+
+ /* KVM_EXIT_IOAPIC_EOI */
+ struct {
+ __u8 vector;
+ } eoi;
+
+Indicates that the VCPU's in-kernel local APIC received an EOI for a
+level-triggered IOAPIC interrupt. This exit only triggers when the
+IOAPIC is implemented in userspace (i.e. KVM_CAP_SPLIT_IRQCHIP is enabled);
+the userspace IOAPIC should process the EOI and retrigger the interrupt if
+it is still asserted. Vector is the LAPIC interrupt vector for which the
+EOI was received.
+
+::
+
+ struct kvm_hyperv_exit {
+ #define KVM_EXIT_HYPERV_SYNIC 1
+ #define KVM_EXIT_HYPERV_HCALL 2
+ #define KVM_EXIT_HYPERV_SYNDBG 3
+ __u32 type;
+ __u32 pad1;
+ union {
+ struct {
+ __u32 msr;
+ __u32 pad2;
+ __u64 control;
+ __u64 evt_page;
+ __u64 msg_page;
+ } synic;
+ struct {
+ __u64 input;
+ __u64 result;
+ __u64 params[2];
+ } hcall;
+ struct {
+ __u32 msr;
+ __u32 pad2;
+ __u64 control;
+ __u64 status;
+ __u64 send_page;
+ __u64 recv_page;
+ __u64 pending_page;
+ } syndbg;
+ } u;
+ };
+ /* KVM_EXIT_HYPERV */
+ struct kvm_hyperv_exit hyperv;
+
+Indicates that the VCPU exits into userspace to process some tasks
+related to Hyper-V emulation.
+
+Valid values for 'type' are:
+
+ - KVM_EXIT_HYPERV_SYNIC -- synchronously notify user-space about
+
+Hyper-V SynIC state change. Notification is used to remap SynIC
+event/message pages and to enable/disable SynIC messages/events processing
+in userspace.
+
+ - KVM_EXIT_HYPERV_SYNDBG -- synchronously notify user-space about
+
+Hyper-V Synthetic debugger state change. Notification is used to either update
+the pending_page location or to send a control command (send the buffer located
+in send_page or recv a buffer to recv_page).
+
+::
+
+ /* KVM_EXIT_ARM_NISV */
+ struct {
+ __u64 esr_iss;
+ __u64 fault_ipa;
+ } arm_nisv;
+
+Used on arm64 systems. If a guest accesses memory not in a memslot,
+KVM will typically return to userspace and ask it to do MMIO emulation on its
+behalf. However, for certain classes of instructions, no instruction decode
+(direction, length of memory access) is provided, and fetching and decoding
+the instruction from the VM is overly complicated to live in the kernel.
+
+Historically, when this situation occurred, KVM would print a warning and kill
+the VM. KVM assumed that if the guest accessed non-memslot memory, it was
+trying to do I/O, which just couldn't be emulated, and the warning message was
+phrased accordingly. However, what happened more often was that a guest bug
+caused access outside the guest memory areas which should lead to a more
+meaningful warning message and an external abort in the guest, if the access
+did not fall within an I/O window.
+
+Userspace implementations can query for KVM_CAP_ARM_NISV_TO_USER, and enable
+this capability at VM creation. Once this is done, these types of errors will
+instead return to userspace with KVM_EXIT_ARM_NISV, with the valid bits from
+the ESR_EL2 in the esr_iss field, and the faulting IPA in the fault_ipa field.
+Userspace can either fix up the access if it's actually an I/O access by
+decoding the instruction from guest memory (if it's very brave) and continue
+executing the guest, or it can decide to suspend, dump, or restart the guest.
+
+Note that KVM does not skip the faulting instruction as it does for
+KVM_EXIT_MMIO, but userspace has to emulate any change to the processing state
+if it decides to decode and emulate the instruction.
+
+::
+
+ /* KVM_EXIT_X86_RDMSR / KVM_EXIT_X86_WRMSR */
+ struct {
+ __u8 error; /* user -> kernel */
+ __u8 pad[7];
+ __u32 reason; /* kernel -> user */
+ __u32 index; /* kernel -> user */
+ __u64 data; /* kernel <-> user */
+ } msr;
+
+Used on x86 systems. When the VM capability KVM_CAP_X86_USER_SPACE_MSR is
+enabled, MSR accesses to registers that would invoke a #GP by KVM kernel code
+may instead trigger a KVM_EXIT_X86_RDMSR exit for reads and KVM_EXIT_X86_WRMSR
+exit for writes.
+
+The "reason" field specifies why the MSR interception occurred. Userspace will
+only receive MSR exits when a particular reason was requested during through
+ENABLE_CAP. Currently valid exit reasons are:
+
+============================ ========================================
+ KVM_MSR_EXIT_REASON_UNKNOWN access to MSR that is unknown to KVM
+ KVM_MSR_EXIT_REASON_INVAL access to invalid MSRs or reserved bits
+ KVM_MSR_EXIT_REASON_FILTER access blocked by KVM_X86_SET_MSR_FILTER
+============================ ========================================
+
+For KVM_EXIT_X86_RDMSR, the "index" field tells userspace which MSR the guest
+wants to read. To respond to this request with a successful read, userspace
+writes the respective data into the "data" field and must continue guest
+execution to ensure the read data is transferred into guest register state.
+
+If the RDMSR request was unsuccessful, userspace indicates that with a "1" in
+the "error" field. This will inject a #GP into the guest when the VCPU is
+executed again.
+
+For KVM_EXIT_X86_WRMSR, the "index" field tells userspace which MSR the guest
+wants to write. Once finished processing the event, userspace must continue
+vCPU execution. If the MSR write was unsuccessful, userspace also sets the
+"error" field to "1".
+
+See KVM_X86_SET_MSR_FILTER for details on the interaction with MSR filtering.
+
+::
+
+
+ struct kvm_xen_exit {
+ #define KVM_EXIT_XEN_HCALL 1
+ __u32 type;
+ union {
+ struct {
+ __u32 longmode;
+ __u32 cpl;
+ __u64 input;
+ __u64 result;
+ __u64 params[6];
+ } hcall;
+ } u;
+ };
+ /* KVM_EXIT_XEN */
+ struct kvm_hyperv_exit xen;
+
+Indicates that the VCPU exits into userspace to process some tasks
+related to Xen emulation.
+
+Valid values for 'type' are:
+
+ - KVM_EXIT_XEN_HCALL -- synchronously notify user-space about Xen hypercall.
+ Userspace is expected to place the hypercall result into the appropriate
+ field before invoking KVM_RUN again.
+
+::
+
+ /* KVM_EXIT_RISCV_SBI */
+ struct {
+ unsigned long extension_id;
+ unsigned long function_id;
+ unsigned long args[6];
+ unsigned long ret[2];
+ } riscv_sbi;
+
+If exit reason is KVM_EXIT_RISCV_SBI then it indicates that the VCPU has
+done a SBI call which is not handled by KVM RISC-V kernel module. The details
+of the SBI call are available in 'riscv_sbi' member of kvm_run structure. The
+'extension_id' field of 'riscv_sbi' represents SBI extension ID whereas the
+'function_id' field represents function ID of given SBI extension. The 'args'
+array field of 'riscv_sbi' represents parameters for the SBI call and 'ret'
+array field represents return values. The userspace should update the return
+values of SBI call before resuming the VCPU. For more details on RISC-V SBI
+spec refer, https://github.com/riscv/riscv-sbi-doc.
+
+::
+
+ /* KVM_EXIT_NOTIFY */
+ struct {
+ #define KVM_NOTIFY_CONTEXT_INVALID (1 << 0)
+ __u32 flags;
+ } notify;
+
+Used on x86 systems. When the VM capability KVM_CAP_X86_NOTIFY_VMEXIT is
+enabled, a VM exit generated if no event window occurs in VM non-root mode
+for a specified amount of time. Once KVM_X86_NOTIFY_VMEXIT_USER is set when
+enabling the cap, it would exit to userspace with the exit reason
+KVM_EXIT_NOTIFY for further handling. The "flags" field contains more
+detailed info.
+
+The valid value for 'flags' is:
+
+ - KVM_NOTIFY_CONTEXT_INVALID -- the VM context is corrupted and not valid
+ in VMCS. It would run into unknown result if resume the target VM.
+
+::
+
+ /* Fix the size of the union. */
+ char padding[256];
+ };
+
+ /*
+ * shared registers between kvm and userspace.
+ * kvm_valid_regs specifies the register classes set by the host
+ * kvm_dirty_regs specified the register classes dirtied by userspace
+ * struct kvm_sync_regs is architecture specific, as well as the
+ * bits for kvm_valid_regs and kvm_dirty_regs
+ */
+ __u64 kvm_valid_regs;
+ __u64 kvm_dirty_regs;
+ union {
+ struct kvm_sync_regs regs;
+ char padding[SYNC_REGS_SIZE_BYTES];
+ } s;
+
+If KVM_CAP_SYNC_REGS is defined, these fields allow userspace to access
+certain guest registers without having to call SET/GET_*REGS. Thus we can
+avoid some system call overhead if userspace has to handle the exit.
+Userspace can query the validity of the structure by checking
+kvm_valid_regs for specific bits. These bits are architecture specific
+and usually define the validity of a groups of registers. (e.g. one bit
+for general purpose registers)
+
+Please note that the kernel is allowed to use the kvm_run structure as the
+primary storage for certain register types. Therefore, the kernel may use the
+values in kvm_run even if the corresponding bit in kvm_dirty_regs is not set.
+
+
+6. Capabilities that can be enabled on vCPUs
+============================================
+
+There are certain capabilities that change the behavior of the virtual CPU or
+the virtual machine when enabled. To enable them, please see section 4.37.
+Below you can find a list of capabilities and what their effect on the vCPU or
+the virtual machine is when enabling them.
+
+The following information is provided along with the description:
+
+ Architectures:
+ which instruction set architectures provide this ioctl.
+ x86 includes both i386 and x86_64.
+
+ Target:
+ whether this is a per-vcpu or per-vm capability.
+
+ Parameters:
+ what parameters are accepted by the capability.
+
+ Returns:
+ the return value. General error numbers (EBADF, ENOMEM, EINVAL)
+ are not detailed, but errors with specific meanings are.
+
+
+6.1 KVM_CAP_PPC_OSI
+-------------------
+
+:Architectures: ppc
+:Target: vcpu
+:Parameters: none
+:Returns: 0 on success; -1 on error
+
+This capability enables interception of OSI hypercalls that otherwise would
+be treated as normal system calls to be injected into the guest. OSI hypercalls
+were invented by Mac-on-Linux to have a standardized communication mechanism
+between the guest and the host.
+
+When this capability is enabled, KVM_EXIT_OSI can occur.
+
+
+6.2 KVM_CAP_PPC_PAPR
+--------------------
+
+:Architectures: ppc
+:Target: vcpu
+:Parameters: none
+:Returns: 0 on success; -1 on error
+
+This capability enables interception of PAPR hypercalls. PAPR hypercalls are
+done using the hypercall instruction "sc 1".
+
+It also sets the guest privilege level to "supervisor" mode. Usually the guest
+runs in "hypervisor" privilege mode with a few missing features.
+
+In addition to the above, it changes the semantics of SDR1. In this mode, the
+HTAB address part of SDR1 contains an HVA instead of a GPA, as PAPR keeps the
+HTAB invisible to the guest.
+
+When this capability is enabled, KVM_EXIT_PAPR_HCALL can occur.
+
+
+6.3 KVM_CAP_SW_TLB
+------------------
+
+:Architectures: ppc
+:Target: vcpu
+:Parameters: args[0] is the address of a struct kvm_config_tlb
+:Returns: 0 on success; -1 on error
+
+::
+
+ struct kvm_config_tlb {
+ __u64 params;
+ __u64 array;
+ __u32 mmu_type;
+ __u32 array_len;
+ };
+
+Configures the virtual CPU's TLB array, establishing a shared memory area
+between userspace and KVM. The "params" and "array" fields are userspace
+addresses of mmu-type-specific data structures. The "array_len" field is an
+safety mechanism, and should be set to the size in bytes of the memory that
+userspace has reserved for the array. It must be at least the size dictated
+by "mmu_type" and "params".
+
+While KVM_RUN is active, the shared region is under control of KVM. Its
+contents are undefined, and any modification by userspace results in
+boundedly undefined behavior.
+
+On return from KVM_RUN, the shared region will reflect the current state of
+the guest's TLB. If userspace makes any changes, it must call KVM_DIRTY_TLB
+to tell KVM which entries have been changed, prior to calling KVM_RUN again
+on this vcpu.
+
+For mmu types KVM_MMU_FSL_BOOKE_NOHV and KVM_MMU_FSL_BOOKE_HV:
+
+ - The "params" field is of type "struct kvm_book3e_206_tlb_params".
+ - The "array" field points to an array of type "struct
+ kvm_book3e_206_tlb_entry".
+ - The array consists of all entries in the first TLB, followed by all
+ entries in the second TLB.
+ - Within a TLB, entries are ordered first by increasing set number. Within a
+ set, entries are ordered by way (increasing ESEL).
+ - The hash for determining set number in TLB0 is: (MAS2 >> 12) & (num_sets - 1)
+ where "num_sets" is the tlb_sizes[] value divided by the tlb_ways[] value.
+ - The tsize field of mas1 shall be set to 4K on TLB0, even though the
+ hardware ignores this value for TLB0.
+
+6.4 KVM_CAP_S390_CSS_SUPPORT
+----------------------------
+
+:Architectures: s390
+:Target: vcpu
+:Parameters: none
+:Returns: 0 on success; -1 on error
+
+This capability enables support for handling of channel I/O instructions.
+
+TEST PENDING INTERRUPTION and the interrupt portion of TEST SUBCHANNEL are
+handled in-kernel, while the other I/O instructions are passed to userspace.
+
+When this capability is enabled, KVM_EXIT_S390_TSCH will occur on TEST
+SUBCHANNEL intercepts.
+
+Note that even though this capability is enabled per-vcpu, the complete
+virtual machine is affected.
+
+6.5 KVM_CAP_PPC_EPR
+-------------------
+
+:Architectures: ppc
+:Target: vcpu
+:Parameters: args[0] defines whether the proxy facility is active
+:Returns: 0 on success; -1 on error
+
+This capability enables or disables the delivery of interrupts through the
+external proxy facility.
+
+When enabled (args[0] != 0), every time the guest gets an external interrupt
+delivered, it automatically exits into user space with a KVM_EXIT_EPR exit
+to receive the topmost interrupt vector.
+
+When disabled (args[0] == 0), behavior is as if this facility is unsupported.
+
+When this capability is enabled, KVM_EXIT_EPR can occur.
+
+6.6 KVM_CAP_IRQ_MPIC
+--------------------
+
+:Architectures: ppc
+:Parameters: args[0] is the MPIC device fd;
+ args[1] is the MPIC CPU number for this vcpu
+
+This capability connects the vcpu to an in-kernel MPIC device.
+
+6.7 KVM_CAP_IRQ_XICS
+--------------------
+
+:Architectures: ppc
+:Target: vcpu
+:Parameters: args[0] is the XICS device fd;
+ args[1] is the XICS CPU number (server ID) for this vcpu
+
+This capability connects the vcpu to an in-kernel XICS device.
+
+6.8 KVM_CAP_S390_IRQCHIP
+------------------------
+
+:Architectures: s390
+:Target: vm
+:Parameters: none
+
+This capability enables the in-kernel irqchip for s390. Please refer to
+"4.24 KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP" for details.
+
+6.9 KVM_CAP_MIPS_FPU
+--------------------
+
+:Architectures: mips
+:Target: vcpu
+:Parameters: args[0] is reserved for future use (should be 0).
+
+This capability allows the use of the host Floating Point Unit by the guest. It
+allows the Config1.FP bit to be set to enable the FPU in the guest. Once this is
+done the ``KVM_REG_MIPS_FPR_*`` and ``KVM_REG_MIPS_FCR_*`` registers can be
+accessed (depending on the current guest FPU register mode), and the Status.FR,
+Config5.FRE bits are accessible via the KVM API and also from the guest,
+depending on them being supported by the FPU.
+
+6.10 KVM_CAP_MIPS_MSA
+---------------------
+
+:Architectures: mips
+:Target: vcpu
+:Parameters: args[0] is reserved for future use (should be 0).
+
+This capability allows the use of the MIPS SIMD Architecture (MSA) by the guest.
+It allows the Config3.MSAP bit to be set to enable the use of MSA by the guest.
+Once this is done the ``KVM_REG_MIPS_VEC_*`` and ``KVM_REG_MIPS_MSA_*``
+registers can be accessed, and the Config5.MSAEn bit is accessible via the
+KVM API and also from the guest.
+
+6.74 KVM_CAP_SYNC_REGS
+----------------------
+
+:Architectures: s390, x86
+:Target: s390: always enabled, x86: vcpu
+:Parameters: none
+:Returns: x86: KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION returns a bit-array indicating which register
+ sets are supported
+ (bitfields defined in arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h).
+
+As described above in the kvm_sync_regs struct info in section 5 (kvm_run):
+KVM_CAP_SYNC_REGS "allow[s] userspace to access certain guest registers
+without having to call SET/GET_*REGS". This reduces overhead by eliminating
+repeated ioctl calls for setting and/or getting register values. This is
+particularly important when userspace is making synchronous guest state
+modifications, e.g. when emulating and/or intercepting instructions in
+userspace.
+
+For s390 specifics, please refer to the source code.
+
+For x86:
+
+- the register sets to be copied out to kvm_run are selectable
+ by userspace (rather that all sets being copied out for every exit).
+- vcpu_events are available in addition to regs and sregs.
+
+For x86, the 'kvm_valid_regs' field of struct kvm_run is overloaded to
+function as an input bit-array field set by userspace to indicate the
+specific register sets to be copied out on the next exit.
+
+To indicate when userspace has modified values that should be copied into
+the vCPU, the all architecture bitarray field, 'kvm_dirty_regs' must be set.
+This is done using the same bitflags as for the 'kvm_valid_regs' field.
+If the dirty bit is not set, then the register set values will not be copied
+into the vCPU even if they've been modified.
+
+Unused bitfields in the bitarrays must be set to zero.
+
+::
+
+ struct kvm_sync_regs {
+ struct kvm_regs regs;
+ struct kvm_sregs sregs;
+ struct kvm_vcpu_events events;
+ };
+
+6.75 KVM_CAP_PPC_IRQ_XIVE
+-------------------------
+
+:Architectures: ppc
+:Target: vcpu
+:Parameters: args[0] is the XIVE device fd;
+ args[1] is the XIVE CPU number (server ID) for this vcpu
+
+This capability connects the vcpu to an in-kernel XIVE device.
+
+7. Capabilities that can be enabled on VMs
+==========================================
+
+There are certain capabilities that change the behavior of the virtual
+machine when enabled. To enable them, please see section 4.37. Below
+you can find a list of capabilities and what their effect on the VM
+is when enabling them.
+
+The following information is provided along with the description:
+
+ Architectures:
+ which instruction set architectures provide this ioctl.
+ x86 includes both i386 and x86_64.
+
+ Parameters:
+ what parameters are accepted by the capability.
+
+ Returns:
+ the return value. General error numbers (EBADF, ENOMEM, EINVAL)
+ are not detailed, but errors with specific meanings are.
+
+
+7.1 KVM_CAP_PPC_ENABLE_HCALL
+----------------------------
+
+:Architectures: ppc
+:Parameters: args[0] is the sPAPR hcall number;
+ args[1] is 0 to disable, 1 to enable in-kernel handling
+
+This capability controls whether individual sPAPR hypercalls (hcalls)
+get handled by the kernel or not. Enabling or disabling in-kernel
+handling of an hcall is effective across the VM. On creation, an
+initial set of hcalls are enabled for in-kernel handling, which
+consists of those hcalls for which in-kernel handlers were implemented
+before this capability was implemented. If disabled, the kernel will
+not to attempt to handle the hcall, but will always exit to userspace
+to handle it. Note that it may not make sense to enable some and
+disable others of a group of related hcalls, but KVM does not prevent
+userspace from doing that.
+
+If the hcall number specified is not one that has an in-kernel
+implementation, the KVM_ENABLE_CAP ioctl will fail with an EINVAL
+error.
+
+7.2 KVM_CAP_S390_USER_SIGP
+--------------------------
+
+:Architectures: s390
+:Parameters: none
+
+This capability controls which SIGP orders will be handled completely in user
+space. With this capability enabled, all fast orders will be handled completely
+in the kernel:
+
+- SENSE
+- SENSE RUNNING
+- EXTERNAL CALL
+- EMERGENCY SIGNAL
+- CONDITIONAL EMERGENCY SIGNAL
+
+All other orders will be handled completely in user space.
+
+Only privileged operation exceptions will be checked for in the kernel (or even
+in the hardware prior to interception). If this capability is not enabled, the
+old way of handling SIGP orders is used (partially in kernel and user space).
+
+7.3 KVM_CAP_S390_VECTOR_REGISTERS
+---------------------------------
+
+:Architectures: s390
+:Parameters: none
+:Returns: 0 on success, negative value on error
+
+Allows use of the vector registers introduced with z13 processor, and
+provides for the synchronization between host and user space. Will
+return -EINVAL if the machine does not support vectors.
+
+7.4 KVM_CAP_S390_USER_STSI
+--------------------------
+
+:Architectures: s390
+:Parameters: none
+
+This capability allows post-handlers for the STSI instruction. After
+initial handling in the kernel, KVM exits to user space with
+KVM_EXIT_S390_STSI to allow user space to insert further data.
+
+Before exiting to userspace, kvm handlers should fill in s390_stsi field of
+vcpu->run::
+
+ struct {
+ __u64 addr;
+ __u8 ar;
+ __u8 reserved;
+ __u8 fc;
+ __u8 sel1;
+ __u16 sel2;
+ } s390_stsi;
+
+ @addr - guest address of STSI SYSIB
+ @fc - function code
+ @sel1 - selector 1
+ @sel2 - selector 2
+ @ar - access register number
+
+KVM handlers should exit to userspace with rc = -EREMOTE.
+
+7.5 KVM_CAP_SPLIT_IRQCHIP
+-------------------------
+
+:Architectures: x86
+:Parameters: args[0] - number of routes reserved for userspace IOAPICs
+:Returns: 0 on success, -1 on error
+
+Create a local apic for each processor in the kernel. This can be used
+instead of KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP if the userspace VMM wishes to emulate the
+IOAPIC and PIC (and also the PIT, even though this has to be enabled
+separately).
+
+This capability also enables in kernel routing of interrupt requests;
+when KVM_CAP_SPLIT_IRQCHIP only routes of KVM_IRQ_ROUTING_MSI type are
+used in the IRQ routing table. The first args[0] MSI routes are reserved
+for the IOAPIC pins. Whenever the LAPIC receives an EOI for these routes,
+a KVM_EXIT_IOAPIC_EOI vmexit will be reported to userspace.
+
+Fails if VCPU has already been created, or if the irqchip is already in the
+kernel (i.e. KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP has already been called).
+
+7.6 KVM_CAP_S390_RI
+-------------------
+
+:Architectures: s390
+:Parameters: none
+
+Allows use of runtime-instrumentation introduced with zEC12 processor.
+Will return -EINVAL if the machine does not support runtime-instrumentation.
+Will return -EBUSY if a VCPU has already been created.
+
+7.7 KVM_CAP_X2APIC_API
+----------------------
+
+:Architectures: x86
+:Parameters: args[0] - features that should be enabled
+:Returns: 0 on success, -EINVAL when args[0] contains invalid features
+
+Valid feature flags in args[0] are::
+
+ #define KVM_X2APIC_API_USE_32BIT_IDS (1ULL << 0)
+ #define KVM_X2APIC_API_DISABLE_BROADCAST_QUIRK (1ULL << 1)
+
+Enabling KVM_X2APIC_API_USE_32BIT_IDS changes the behavior of
+KVM_SET_GSI_ROUTING, KVM_SIGNAL_MSI, KVM_SET_LAPIC, and KVM_GET_LAPIC,
+allowing the use of 32-bit APIC IDs. See KVM_CAP_X2APIC_API in their
+respective sections.
+
+KVM_X2APIC_API_DISABLE_BROADCAST_QUIRK must be enabled for x2APIC to work
+in logical mode or with more than 255 VCPUs. Otherwise, KVM treats 0xff
+as a broadcast even in x2APIC mode in order to support physical x2APIC
+without interrupt remapping. This is undesirable in logical mode,
+where 0xff represents CPUs 0-7 in cluster 0.
+
+7.8 KVM_CAP_S390_USER_INSTR0
+----------------------------
+
+:Architectures: s390
+:Parameters: none
+
+With this capability enabled, all illegal instructions 0x0000 (2 bytes) will
+be intercepted and forwarded to user space. User space can use this
+mechanism e.g. to realize 2-byte software breakpoints. The kernel will
+not inject an operating exception for these instructions, user space has
+to take care of that.
+
+This capability can be enabled dynamically even if VCPUs were already
+created and are running.
+
+7.9 KVM_CAP_S390_GS
+-------------------
+
+:Architectures: s390
+:Parameters: none
+:Returns: 0 on success; -EINVAL if the machine does not support
+ guarded storage; -EBUSY if a VCPU has already been created.
+
+Allows use of guarded storage for the KVM guest.
+
+7.10 KVM_CAP_S390_AIS
+---------------------
+
+:Architectures: s390
+:Parameters: none
+
+Allow use of adapter-interruption suppression.
+:Returns: 0 on success; -EBUSY if a VCPU has already been created.
+
+7.11 KVM_CAP_PPC_SMT
+--------------------
+
+:Architectures: ppc
+:Parameters: vsmt_mode, flags
+
+Enabling this capability on a VM provides userspace with a way to set
+the desired virtual SMT mode (i.e. the number of virtual CPUs per
+virtual core). The virtual SMT mode, vsmt_mode, must be a power of 2
+between 1 and 8. On POWER8, vsmt_mode must also be no greater than
+the number of threads per subcore for the host. Currently flags must
+be 0. A successful call to enable this capability will result in
+vsmt_mode being returned when the KVM_CAP_PPC_SMT capability is
+subsequently queried for the VM. This capability is only supported by
+HV KVM, and can only be set before any VCPUs have been created.
+The KVM_CAP_PPC_SMT_POSSIBLE capability indicates which virtual SMT
+modes are available.
+
+7.12 KVM_CAP_PPC_FWNMI
+----------------------
+
+:Architectures: ppc
+:Parameters: none
+
+With this capability a machine check exception in the guest address
+space will cause KVM to exit the guest with NMI exit reason. This
+enables QEMU to build error log and branch to guest kernel registered
+machine check handling routine. Without this capability KVM will
+branch to guests' 0x200 interrupt vector.
+
+7.13 KVM_CAP_X86_DISABLE_EXITS
+------------------------------
+
+:Architectures: x86
+:Parameters: args[0] defines which exits are disabled
+:Returns: 0 on success, -EINVAL when args[0] contains invalid exits
+
+Valid bits in args[0] are::
+
+ #define KVM_X86_DISABLE_EXITS_MWAIT (1 << 0)
+ #define KVM_X86_DISABLE_EXITS_HLT (1 << 1)
+ #define KVM_X86_DISABLE_EXITS_PAUSE (1 << 2)
+ #define KVM_X86_DISABLE_EXITS_CSTATE (1 << 3)
+
+Enabling this capability on a VM provides userspace with a way to no
+longer intercept some instructions for improved latency in some
+workloads, and is suggested when vCPUs are associated to dedicated
+physical CPUs. More bits can be added in the future; userspace can
+just pass the KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION result to KVM_ENABLE_CAP to disable
+all such vmexits.
+
+Do not enable KVM_FEATURE_PV_UNHALT if you disable HLT exits.
+
+7.14 KVM_CAP_S390_HPAGE_1M
+--------------------------
+
+:Architectures: s390
+:Parameters: none
+:Returns: 0 on success, -EINVAL if hpage module parameter was not set
+ or cmma is enabled, or the VM has the KVM_VM_S390_UCONTROL
+ flag set
+
+With this capability the KVM support for memory backing with 1m pages
+through hugetlbfs can be enabled for a VM. After the capability is
+enabled, cmma can't be enabled anymore and pfmfi and the storage key
+interpretation are disabled. If cmma has already been enabled or the
+hpage module parameter is not set to 1, -EINVAL is returned.
+
+While it is generally possible to create a huge page backed VM without
+this capability, the VM will not be able to run.
+
+7.15 KVM_CAP_MSR_PLATFORM_INFO
+------------------------------
+
+:Architectures: x86
+:Parameters: args[0] whether feature should be enabled or not
+
+With this capability, a guest may read the MSR_PLATFORM_INFO MSR. Otherwise,
+a #GP would be raised when the guest tries to access. Currently, this
+capability does not enable write permissions of this MSR for the guest.
+
+7.16 KVM_CAP_PPC_NESTED_HV
+--------------------------
+
+:Architectures: ppc
+:Parameters: none
+:Returns: 0 on success, -EINVAL when the implementation doesn't support
+ nested-HV virtualization.
+
+HV-KVM on POWER9 and later systems allows for "nested-HV"
+virtualization, which provides a way for a guest VM to run guests that
+can run using the CPU's supervisor mode (privileged non-hypervisor
+state). Enabling this capability on a VM depends on the CPU having
+the necessary functionality and on the facility being enabled with a
+kvm-hv module parameter.
+
+7.17 KVM_CAP_EXCEPTION_PAYLOAD
+------------------------------
+
+:Architectures: x86
+:Parameters: args[0] whether feature should be enabled or not
+
+With this capability enabled, CR2 will not be modified prior to the
+emulated VM-exit when L1 intercepts a #PF exception that occurs in
+L2. Similarly, for kvm-intel only, DR6 will not be modified prior to
+the emulated VM-exit when L1 intercepts a #DB exception that occurs in
+L2. As a result, when KVM_GET_VCPU_EVENTS reports a pending #PF (or
+#DB) exception for L2, exception.has_payload will be set and the
+faulting address (or the new DR6 bits*) will be reported in the
+exception_payload field. Similarly, when userspace injects a #PF (or
+#DB) into L2 using KVM_SET_VCPU_EVENTS, it is expected to set
+exception.has_payload and to put the faulting address - or the new DR6
+bits\ [#]_ - in the exception_payload field.
+
+This capability also enables exception.pending in struct
+kvm_vcpu_events, which allows userspace to distinguish between pending
+and injected exceptions.
+
+
+.. [#] For the new DR6 bits, note that bit 16 is set iff the #DB exception
+ will clear DR6.RTM.
+
+7.18 KVM_CAP_MANUAL_DIRTY_LOG_PROTECT2
+--------------------------------------
+
+:Architectures: x86, arm64, mips
+:Parameters: args[0] whether feature should be enabled or not
+
+Valid flags are::
+
+ #define KVM_DIRTY_LOG_MANUAL_PROTECT_ENABLE (1 << 0)
+ #define KVM_DIRTY_LOG_INITIALLY_SET (1 << 1)
+
+With KVM_DIRTY_LOG_MANUAL_PROTECT_ENABLE is set, KVM_GET_DIRTY_LOG will not
+automatically clear and write-protect all pages that are returned as dirty.
+Rather, userspace will have to do this operation separately using
+KVM_CLEAR_DIRTY_LOG.
+
+At the cost of a slightly more complicated operation, this provides better
+scalability and responsiveness for two reasons. First,
+KVM_CLEAR_DIRTY_LOG ioctl can operate on a 64-page granularity rather
+than requiring to sync a full memslot; this ensures that KVM does not
+take spinlocks for an extended period of time. Second, in some cases a
+large amount of time can pass between a call to KVM_GET_DIRTY_LOG and
+userspace actually using the data in the page. Pages can be modified
+during this time, which is inefficient for both the guest and userspace:
+the guest will incur a higher penalty due to write protection faults,
+while userspace can see false reports of dirty pages. Manual reprotection
+helps reducing this time, improving guest performance and reducing the
+number of dirty log false positives.
+
+With KVM_DIRTY_LOG_INITIALLY_SET set, all the bits of the dirty bitmap
+will be initialized to 1 when created. This also improves performance because
+dirty logging can be enabled gradually in small chunks on the first call
+to KVM_CLEAR_DIRTY_LOG. KVM_DIRTY_LOG_INITIALLY_SET depends on
+KVM_DIRTY_LOG_MANUAL_PROTECT_ENABLE (it is also only available on
+x86 and arm64 for now).
+
+KVM_CAP_MANUAL_DIRTY_LOG_PROTECT2 was previously available under the name
+KVM_CAP_MANUAL_DIRTY_LOG_PROTECT, but the implementation had bugs that make
+it hard or impossible to use it correctly. The availability of
+KVM_CAP_MANUAL_DIRTY_LOG_PROTECT2 signals that those bugs are fixed.
+Userspace should not try to use KVM_CAP_MANUAL_DIRTY_LOG_PROTECT.
+
+7.19 KVM_CAP_PPC_SECURE_GUEST
+------------------------------
+
+:Architectures: ppc
+
+This capability indicates that KVM is running on a host that has
+ultravisor firmware and thus can support a secure guest. On such a
+system, a guest can ask the ultravisor to make it a secure guest,
+one whose memory is inaccessible to the host except for pages which
+are explicitly requested to be shared with the host. The ultravisor
+notifies KVM when a guest requests to become a secure guest, and KVM
+has the opportunity to veto the transition.
+
+If present, this capability can be enabled for a VM, meaning that KVM
+will allow the transition to secure guest mode. Otherwise KVM will
+veto the transition.
+
+7.20 KVM_CAP_HALT_POLL
+----------------------
+
+:Architectures: all
+:Target: VM
+:Parameters: args[0] is the maximum poll time in nanoseconds
+:Returns: 0 on success; -1 on error
+
+KVM_CAP_HALT_POLL overrides the kvm.halt_poll_ns module parameter to set the
+maximum halt-polling time for all vCPUs in the target VM. This capability can
+be invoked at any time and any number of times to dynamically change the
+maximum halt-polling time.
+
+See Documentation/virt/kvm/halt-polling.rst for more information on halt
+polling.
+
+7.21 KVM_CAP_X86_USER_SPACE_MSR
+-------------------------------
+
+:Architectures: x86
+:Target: VM
+:Parameters: args[0] contains the mask of KVM_MSR_EXIT_REASON_* events to report
+:Returns: 0 on success; -1 on error
+
+This capability allows userspace to intercept RDMSR and WRMSR instructions if
+access to an MSR is denied. By default, KVM injects #GP on denied accesses.
+
+When a guest requests to read or write an MSR, KVM may not implement all MSRs
+that are relevant to a respective system. It also does not differentiate by
+CPU type.
+
+To allow more fine grained control over MSR handling, userspace may enable
+this capability. With it enabled, MSR accesses that match the mask specified in
+args[0] and would trigger a #GP inside the guest will instead trigger
+KVM_EXIT_X86_RDMSR and KVM_EXIT_X86_WRMSR exit notifications. Userspace
+can then implement model specific MSR handling and/or user notifications
+to inform a user that an MSR was not emulated/virtualized by KVM.
+
+The valid mask flags are:
+
+============================ ===============================================
+ KVM_MSR_EXIT_REASON_UNKNOWN intercept accesses to unknown (to KVM) MSRs
+ KVM_MSR_EXIT_REASON_INVAL intercept accesses that are architecturally
+ invalid according to the vCPU model and/or mode
+ KVM_MSR_EXIT_REASON_FILTER intercept accesses that are denied by userspace
+ via KVM_X86_SET_MSR_FILTER
+============================ ===============================================
+
+7.22 KVM_CAP_X86_BUS_LOCK_EXIT
+-------------------------------
+
+:Architectures: x86
+:Target: VM
+:Parameters: args[0] defines the policy used when bus locks detected in guest
+:Returns: 0 on success, -EINVAL when args[0] contains invalid bits
+
+Valid bits in args[0] are::
+
+ #define KVM_BUS_LOCK_DETECTION_OFF (1 << 0)
+ #define KVM_BUS_LOCK_DETECTION_EXIT (1 << 1)
+
+Enabling this capability on a VM provides userspace with a way to select
+a policy to handle the bus locks detected in guest. Userspace can obtain
+the supported modes from the result of KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION and define it
+through the KVM_ENABLE_CAP.
+
+KVM_BUS_LOCK_DETECTION_OFF and KVM_BUS_LOCK_DETECTION_EXIT are supported
+currently and mutually exclusive with each other. More bits can be added in
+the future.
+
+With KVM_BUS_LOCK_DETECTION_OFF set, bus locks in guest will not cause vm exits
+so that no additional actions are needed. This is the default mode.
+
+With KVM_BUS_LOCK_DETECTION_EXIT set, vm exits happen when bus lock detected
+in VM. KVM just exits to userspace when handling them. Userspace can enforce
+its own throttling or other policy based mitigations.
+
+This capability is aimed to address the thread that VM can exploit bus locks to
+degree the performance of the whole system. Once the userspace enable this
+capability and select the KVM_BUS_LOCK_DETECTION_EXIT mode, KVM will set the
+KVM_RUN_BUS_LOCK flag in vcpu-run->flags field and exit to userspace. Concerning
+the bus lock vm exit can be preempted by a higher priority VM exit, the exit
+notifications to userspace can be KVM_EXIT_BUS_LOCK or other reasons.
+KVM_RUN_BUS_LOCK flag is used to distinguish between them.
+
+7.23 KVM_CAP_PPC_DAWR1
+----------------------
+
+:Architectures: ppc
+:Parameters: none
+:Returns: 0 on success, -EINVAL when CPU doesn't support 2nd DAWR
+
+This capability can be used to check / enable 2nd DAWR feature provided
+by POWER10 processor.
+
+
+7.24 KVM_CAP_VM_COPY_ENC_CONTEXT_FROM
+-------------------------------------
+
+Architectures: x86 SEV enabled
+Type: vm
+Parameters: args[0] is the fd of the source vm
+Returns: 0 on success; ENOTTY on error
+
+This capability enables userspace to copy encryption context from the vm
+indicated by the fd to the vm this is called on.
+
+This is intended to support in-guest workloads scheduled by the host. This
+allows the in-guest workload to maintain its own NPTs and keeps the two vms
+from accidentally clobbering each other with interrupts and the like (separate
+APIC/MSRs/etc).
+
+7.25 KVM_CAP_SGX_ATTRIBUTE
+--------------------------
+
+:Architectures: x86
+:Target: VM
+:Parameters: args[0] is a file handle of a SGX attribute file in securityfs
+:Returns: 0 on success, -EINVAL if the file handle is invalid or if a requested
+ attribute is not supported by KVM.
+
+KVM_CAP_SGX_ATTRIBUTE enables a userspace VMM to grant a VM access to one or
+more privileged enclave attributes. args[0] must hold a file handle to a valid
+SGX attribute file corresponding to an attribute that is supported/restricted
+by KVM (currently only PROVISIONKEY).
+
+The SGX subsystem restricts access to a subset of enclave attributes to provide
+additional security for an uncompromised kernel, e.g. use of the PROVISIONKEY
+is restricted to deter malware from using the PROVISIONKEY to obtain a stable
+system fingerprint. To prevent userspace from circumventing such restrictions
+by running an enclave in a VM, KVM prevents access to privileged attributes by
+default.
+
+See Documentation/arch/x86/sgx.rst for more details.
+
+7.26 KVM_CAP_PPC_RPT_INVALIDATE
+-------------------------------
+
+:Capability: KVM_CAP_PPC_RPT_INVALIDATE
+:Architectures: ppc
+:Type: vm
+
+This capability indicates that the kernel is capable of handling
+H_RPT_INVALIDATE hcall.
+
+In order to enable the use of H_RPT_INVALIDATE in the guest,
+user space might have to advertise it for the guest. For example,
+IBM pSeries (sPAPR) guest starts using it if "hcall-rpt-invalidate" is
+present in the "ibm,hypertas-functions" device-tree property.
+
+This capability is enabled for hypervisors on platforms like POWER9
+that support radix MMU.
+
+7.27 KVM_CAP_EXIT_ON_EMULATION_FAILURE
+--------------------------------------
+
+:Architectures: x86
+:Parameters: args[0] whether the feature should be enabled or not
+
+When this capability is enabled, an emulation failure will result in an exit
+to userspace with KVM_INTERNAL_ERROR (except when the emulator was invoked
+to handle a VMware backdoor instruction). Furthermore, KVM will now provide up
+to 15 instruction bytes for any exit to userspace resulting from an emulation
+failure. When these exits to userspace occur use the emulation_failure struct
+instead of the internal struct. They both have the same layout, but the
+emulation_failure struct matches the content better. It also explicitly
+defines the 'flags' field which is used to describe the fields in the struct
+that are valid (ie: if KVM_INTERNAL_ERROR_EMULATION_FLAG_INSTRUCTION_BYTES is
+set in the 'flags' field then both 'insn_size' and 'insn_bytes' have valid data
+in them.)
+
+7.28 KVM_CAP_ARM_MTE
+--------------------
+
+:Architectures: arm64
+:Parameters: none
+
+This capability indicates that KVM (and the hardware) supports exposing the
+Memory Tagging Extensions (MTE) to the guest. It must also be enabled by the
+VMM before creating any VCPUs to allow the guest access. Note that MTE is only
+available to a guest running in AArch64 mode and enabling this capability will
+cause attempts to create AArch32 VCPUs to fail.
+
+When enabled the guest is able to access tags associated with any memory given
+to the guest. KVM will ensure that the tags are maintained during swap or
+hibernation of the host; however the VMM needs to manually save/restore the
+tags as appropriate if the VM is migrated.
+
+When this capability is enabled all memory in memslots must be mapped as
+``MAP_ANONYMOUS`` or with a RAM-based file mapping (``tmpfs``, ``memfd``),
+attempts to create a memslot with an invalid mmap will result in an
+-EINVAL return.
+
+When enabled the VMM may make use of the ``KVM_ARM_MTE_COPY_TAGS`` ioctl to
+perform a bulk copy of tags to/from the guest.
+
+7.29 KVM_CAP_VM_MOVE_ENC_CONTEXT_FROM
+-------------------------------------
+
+Architectures: x86 SEV enabled
+Type: vm
+Parameters: args[0] is the fd of the source vm
+Returns: 0 on success
+
+This capability enables userspace to migrate the encryption context from the VM
+indicated by the fd to the VM this is called on.
+
+This is intended to support intra-host migration of VMs between userspace VMMs,
+upgrading the VMM process without interrupting the guest.
+
+7.30 KVM_CAP_PPC_AIL_MODE_3
+-------------------------------
+
+:Capability: KVM_CAP_PPC_AIL_MODE_3
+:Architectures: ppc
+:Type: vm
+
+This capability indicates that the kernel supports the mode 3 setting for the
+"Address Translation Mode on Interrupt" aka "Alternate Interrupt Location"
+resource that is controlled with the H_SET_MODE hypercall.
+
+This capability allows a guest kernel to use a better-performance mode for
+handling interrupts and system calls.
+
+7.31 KVM_CAP_DISABLE_QUIRKS2
+----------------------------
+
+:Capability: KVM_CAP_DISABLE_QUIRKS2
+:Parameters: args[0] - set of KVM quirks to disable
+:Architectures: x86
+:Type: vm
+
+This capability, if enabled, will cause KVM to disable some behavior
+quirks.
+
+Calling KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION for this capability returns a bitmask of
+quirks that can be disabled in KVM.
+
+The argument to KVM_ENABLE_CAP for this capability is a bitmask of
+quirks to disable, and must be a subset of the bitmask returned by
+KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION.
+
+The valid bits in cap.args[0] are:
+
+=================================== ============================================
+ KVM_X86_QUIRK_LINT0_REENABLED By default, the reset value for the LVT
+ LINT0 register is 0x700 (APIC_MODE_EXTINT).
+ When this quirk is disabled, the reset value
+ is 0x10000 (APIC_LVT_MASKED).
+
+ KVM_X86_QUIRK_CD_NW_CLEARED By default, KVM clears CR0.CD and CR0.NW.
+ When this quirk is disabled, KVM does not
+ change the value of CR0.CD and CR0.NW.
+
+ KVM_X86_QUIRK_LAPIC_MMIO_HOLE By default, the MMIO LAPIC interface is
+ available even when configured for x2APIC
+ mode. When this quirk is disabled, KVM
+ disables the MMIO LAPIC interface if the
+ LAPIC is in x2APIC mode.
+
+ KVM_X86_QUIRK_OUT_7E_INC_RIP By default, KVM pre-increments %rip before
+ exiting to userspace for an OUT instruction
+ to port 0x7e. When this quirk is disabled,
+ KVM does not pre-increment %rip before
+ exiting to userspace.
+
+ KVM_X86_QUIRK_MISC_ENABLE_NO_MWAIT When this quirk is disabled, KVM sets
+ CPUID.01H:ECX[bit 3] (MONITOR/MWAIT) if
+ IA32_MISC_ENABLE[bit 18] (MWAIT) is set.
+ Additionally, when this quirk is disabled,
+ KVM clears CPUID.01H:ECX[bit 3] if
+ IA32_MISC_ENABLE[bit 18] is cleared.
+
+ KVM_X86_QUIRK_FIX_HYPERCALL_INSN By default, KVM rewrites guest
+ VMMCALL/VMCALL instructions to match the
+ vendor's hypercall instruction for the
+ system. When this quirk is disabled, KVM
+ will no longer rewrite invalid guest
+ hypercall instructions. Executing the
+ incorrect hypercall instruction will
+ generate a #UD within the guest.
+
+KVM_X86_QUIRK_MWAIT_NEVER_UD_FAULTS By default, KVM emulates MONITOR/MWAIT (if
+ they are intercepted) as NOPs regardless of
+ whether or not MONITOR/MWAIT are supported
+ according to guest CPUID. When this quirk
+ is disabled and KVM_X86_DISABLE_EXITS_MWAIT
+ is not set (MONITOR/MWAIT are intercepted),
+ KVM will inject a #UD on MONITOR/MWAIT if
+ they're unsupported per guest CPUID. Note,
+ KVM will modify MONITOR/MWAIT support in
+ guest CPUID on writes to MISC_ENABLE if
+ KVM_X86_QUIRK_MISC_ENABLE_NO_MWAIT is
+ disabled.
+=================================== ============================================
+
+7.32 KVM_CAP_MAX_VCPU_ID
+------------------------
+
+:Architectures: x86
+:Target: VM
+:Parameters: args[0] - maximum APIC ID value set for current VM
+:Returns: 0 on success, -EINVAL if args[0] is beyond KVM_MAX_VCPU_IDS
+ supported in KVM or if it has been set.
+
+This capability allows userspace to specify maximum possible APIC ID
+assigned for current VM session prior to the creation of vCPUs, saving
+memory for data structures indexed by the APIC ID. Userspace is able
+to calculate the limit to APIC ID values from designated
+CPU topology.
+
+The value can be changed only until KVM_ENABLE_CAP is set to a nonzero
+value or until a vCPU is created. Upon creation of the first vCPU,
+if the value was set to zero or KVM_ENABLE_CAP was not invoked, KVM
+uses the return value of KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION(KVM_CAP_MAX_VCPU_ID) as
+the maximum APIC ID.
+
+7.33 KVM_CAP_X86_NOTIFY_VMEXIT
+------------------------------
+
+:Architectures: x86
+:Target: VM
+:Parameters: args[0] is the value of notify window as well as some flags
+:Returns: 0 on success, -EINVAL if args[0] contains invalid flags or notify
+ VM exit is unsupported.
+
+Bits 63:32 of args[0] are used for notify window.
+Bits 31:0 of args[0] are for some flags. Valid bits are::
+
+ #define KVM_X86_NOTIFY_VMEXIT_ENABLED (1 << 0)
+ #define KVM_X86_NOTIFY_VMEXIT_USER (1 << 1)
+
+This capability allows userspace to configure the notify VM exit on/off
+in per-VM scope during VM creation. Notify VM exit is disabled by default.
+When userspace sets KVM_X86_NOTIFY_VMEXIT_ENABLED bit in args[0], VMM will
+enable this feature with the notify window provided, which will generate
+a VM exit if no event window occurs in VM non-root mode for a specified of
+time (notify window).
+
+If KVM_X86_NOTIFY_VMEXIT_USER is set in args[0], upon notify VM exits happen,
+KVM would exit to userspace for handling.
+
+This capability is aimed to mitigate the threat that malicious VMs can
+cause CPU stuck (due to event windows don't open up) and make the CPU
+unavailable to host or other VMs.
+
+8. Other capabilities.
+======================
+
+This section lists capabilities that give information about other
+features of the KVM implementation.
+
+8.1 KVM_CAP_PPC_HWRNG
+---------------------
+
+:Architectures: ppc
+
+This capability, if KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION indicates that it is
+available, means that the kernel has an implementation of the
+H_RANDOM hypercall backed by a hardware random-number generator.
+If present, the kernel H_RANDOM handler can be enabled for guest use
+with the KVM_CAP_PPC_ENABLE_HCALL capability.
+
+8.2 KVM_CAP_HYPERV_SYNIC
+------------------------
+
+:Architectures: x86
+
+This capability, if KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION indicates that it is
+available, means that the kernel has an implementation of the
+Hyper-V Synthetic interrupt controller(SynIC). Hyper-V SynIC is
+used to support Windows Hyper-V based guest paravirt drivers(VMBus).
+
+In order to use SynIC, it has to be activated by setting this
+capability via KVM_ENABLE_CAP ioctl on the vcpu fd. Note that this
+will disable the use of APIC hardware virtualization even if supported
+by the CPU, as it's incompatible with SynIC auto-EOI behavior.
+
+8.3 KVM_CAP_PPC_RADIX_MMU
+-------------------------
+
+:Architectures: ppc
+
+This capability, if KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION indicates that it is
+available, means that the kernel can support guests using the
+radix MMU defined in Power ISA V3.00 (as implemented in the POWER9
+processor).
+
+8.4 KVM_CAP_PPC_HASH_MMU_V3
+---------------------------
+
+:Architectures: ppc
+
+This capability, if KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION indicates that it is
+available, means that the kernel can support guests using the
+hashed page table MMU defined in Power ISA V3.00 (as implemented in
+the POWER9 processor), including in-memory segment tables.
+
+8.5 KVM_CAP_MIPS_VZ
+-------------------
+
+:Architectures: mips
+
+This capability, if KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION on the main kvm handle indicates that
+it is available, means that full hardware assisted virtualization capabilities
+of the hardware are available for use through KVM. An appropriate
+KVM_VM_MIPS_* type must be passed to KVM_CREATE_VM to create a VM which
+utilises it.
+
+If KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION on a kvm VM handle indicates that this capability is
+available, it means that the VM is using full hardware assisted virtualization
+capabilities of the hardware. This is useful to check after creating a VM with
+KVM_VM_MIPS_DEFAULT.
+
+The value returned by KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION should be compared against known
+values (see below). All other values are reserved. This is to allow for the
+possibility of other hardware assisted virtualization implementations which
+may be incompatible with the MIPS VZ ASE.
+
+== ==========================================================================
+ 0 The trap & emulate implementation is in use to run guest code in user
+ mode. Guest virtual memory segments are rearranged to fit the guest in the
+ user mode address space.
+
+ 1 The MIPS VZ ASE is in use, providing full hardware assisted
+ virtualization, including standard guest virtual memory segments.
+== ==========================================================================
+
+8.6 KVM_CAP_MIPS_TE
+-------------------
+
+:Architectures: mips
+
+This capability, if KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION on the main kvm handle indicates that
+it is available, means that the trap & emulate implementation is available to
+run guest code in user mode, even if KVM_CAP_MIPS_VZ indicates that hardware
+assisted virtualisation is also available. KVM_VM_MIPS_TE (0) must be passed
+to KVM_CREATE_VM to create a VM which utilises it.
+
+If KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION on a kvm VM handle indicates that this capability is
+available, it means that the VM is using trap & emulate.
+
+8.7 KVM_CAP_MIPS_64BIT
+----------------------
+
+:Architectures: mips
+
+This capability indicates the supported architecture type of the guest, i.e. the
+supported register and address width.
+
+The values returned when this capability is checked by KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION on a
+kvm VM handle correspond roughly to the CP0_Config.AT register field, and should
+be checked specifically against known values (see below). All other values are
+reserved.
+
+== ========================================================================
+ 0 MIPS32 or microMIPS32.
+ Both registers and addresses are 32-bits wide.
+ It will only be possible to run 32-bit guest code.
+
+ 1 MIPS64 or microMIPS64 with access only to 32-bit compatibility segments.
+ Registers are 64-bits wide, but addresses are 32-bits wide.
+ 64-bit guest code may run but cannot access MIPS64 memory segments.
+ It will also be possible to run 32-bit guest code.
+
+ 2 MIPS64 or microMIPS64 with access to all address segments.
+ Both registers and addresses are 64-bits wide.
+ It will be possible to run 64-bit or 32-bit guest code.
+== ========================================================================
+
+8.9 KVM_CAP_ARM_USER_IRQ
+------------------------
+
+:Architectures: arm64
+
+This capability, if KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION indicates that it is available, means
+that if userspace creates a VM without an in-kernel interrupt controller, it
+will be notified of changes to the output level of in-kernel emulated devices,
+which can generate virtual interrupts, presented to the VM.
+For such VMs, on every return to userspace, the kernel
+updates the vcpu's run->s.regs.device_irq_level field to represent the actual
+output level of the device.
+
+Whenever kvm detects a change in the device output level, kvm guarantees at
+least one return to userspace before running the VM. This exit could either
+be a KVM_EXIT_INTR or any other exit event, like KVM_EXIT_MMIO. This way,
+userspace can always sample the device output level and re-compute the state of
+the userspace interrupt controller. Userspace should always check the state
+of run->s.regs.device_irq_level on every kvm exit.
+The value in run->s.regs.device_irq_level can represent both level and edge
+triggered interrupt signals, depending on the device. Edge triggered interrupt
+signals will exit to userspace with the bit in run->s.regs.device_irq_level
+set exactly once per edge signal.
+
+The field run->s.regs.device_irq_level is available independent of
+run->kvm_valid_regs or run->kvm_dirty_regs bits.
+
+If KVM_CAP_ARM_USER_IRQ is supported, the KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION ioctl returns a
+number larger than 0 indicating the version of this capability is implemented
+and thereby which bits in run->s.regs.device_irq_level can signal values.
+
+Currently the following bits are defined for the device_irq_level bitmap::
+
+ KVM_CAP_ARM_USER_IRQ >= 1:
+
+ KVM_ARM_DEV_EL1_VTIMER - EL1 virtual timer
+ KVM_ARM_DEV_EL1_PTIMER - EL1 physical timer
+ KVM_ARM_DEV_PMU - ARM PMU overflow interrupt signal
+
+Future versions of kvm may implement additional events. These will get
+indicated by returning a higher number from KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION and will be
+listed above.
+
+8.10 KVM_CAP_PPC_SMT_POSSIBLE
+-----------------------------
+
+:Architectures: ppc
+
+Querying this capability returns a bitmap indicating the possible
+virtual SMT modes that can be set using KVM_CAP_PPC_SMT. If bit N
+(counting from the right) is set, then a virtual SMT mode of 2^N is
+available.
+
+8.11 KVM_CAP_HYPERV_SYNIC2
+--------------------------
+
+:Architectures: x86
+
+This capability enables a newer version of Hyper-V Synthetic interrupt
+controller (SynIC). The only difference with KVM_CAP_HYPERV_SYNIC is that KVM
+doesn't clear SynIC message and event flags pages when they are enabled by
+writing to the respective MSRs.
+
+8.12 KVM_CAP_HYPERV_VP_INDEX
+----------------------------
+
+:Architectures: x86
+
+This capability indicates that userspace can load HV_X64_MSR_VP_INDEX msr. Its
+value is used to denote the target vcpu for a SynIC interrupt. For
+compatibility, KVM initializes this msr to KVM's internal vcpu index. When this
+capability is absent, userspace can still query this msr's value.
+
+8.13 KVM_CAP_S390_AIS_MIGRATION
+-------------------------------
+
+:Architectures: s390
+:Parameters: none
+
+This capability indicates if the flic device will be able to get/set the
+AIS states for migration via the KVM_DEV_FLIC_AISM_ALL attribute and allows
+to discover this without having to create a flic device.
+
+8.14 KVM_CAP_S390_PSW
+---------------------
+
+:Architectures: s390
+
+This capability indicates that the PSW is exposed via the kvm_run structure.
+
+8.15 KVM_CAP_S390_GMAP
+----------------------
+
+:Architectures: s390
+
+This capability indicates that the user space memory used as guest mapping can
+be anywhere in the user memory address space, as long as the memory slots are
+aligned and sized to a segment (1MB) boundary.
+
+8.16 KVM_CAP_S390_COW
+---------------------
+
+:Architectures: s390
+
+This capability indicates that the user space memory used as guest mapping can
+use copy-on-write semantics as well as dirty pages tracking via read-only page
+tables.
+
+8.17 KVM_CAP_S390_BPB
+---------------------
+
+:Architectures: s390
+
+This capability indicates that kvm will implement the interfaces to handle
+reset, migration and nested KVM for branch prediction blocking. The stfle
+facility 82 should not be provided to the guest without this capability.
+
+8.18 KVM_CAP_HYPERV_TLBFLUSH
+----------------------------
+
+:Architectures: x86
+
+This capability indicates that KVM supports paravirtualized Hyper-V TLB Flush
+hypercalls:
+HvFlushVirtualAddressSpace, HvFlushVirtualAddressSpaceEx,
+HvFlushVirtualAddressList, HvFlushVirtualAddressListEx.
+
+8.19 KVM_CAP_ARM_INJECT_SERROR_ESR
+----------------------------------
+
+:Architectures: arm64
+
+This capability indicates that userspace can specify (via the
+KVM_SET_VCPU_EVENTS ioctl) the syndrome value reported to the guest when it
+takes a virtual SError interrupt exception.
+If KVM advertises this capability, userspace can only specify the ISS field for
+the ESR syndrome. Other parts of the ESR, such as the EC are generated by the
+CPU when the exception is taken. If this virtual SError is taken to EL1 using
+AArch64, this value will be reported in the ISS field of ESR_ELx.
+
+See KVM_CAP_VCPU_EVENTS for more details.
+
+8.20 KVM_CAP_HYPERV_SEND_IPI
+----------------------------
+
+:Architectures: x86
+
+This capability indicates that KVM supports paravirtualized Hyper-V IPI send
+hypercalls:
+HvCallSendSyntheticClusterIpi, HvCallSendSyntheticClusterIpiEx.
+
+8.21 KVM_CAP_HYPERV_DIRECT_TLBFLUSH
+-----------------------------------
+
+:Architectures: x86
+
+This capability indicates that KVM running on top of Hyper-V hypervisor
+enables Direct TLB flush for its guests meaning that TLB flush
+hypercalls are handled by Level 0 hypervisor (Hyper-V) bypassing KVM.
+Due to the different ABI for hypercall parameters between Hyper-V and
+KVM, enabling this capability effectively disables all hypercall
+handling by KVM (as some KVM hypercall may be mistakenly treated as TLB
+flush hypercalls by Hyper-V) so userspace should disable KVM identification
+in CPUID and only exposes Hyper-V identification. In this case, guest
+thinks it's running on Hyper-V and only use Hyper-V hypercalls.
+
+8.22 KVM_CAP_S390_VCPU_RESETS
+-----------------------------
+
+:Architectures: s390
+
+This capability indicates that the KVM_S390_NORMAL_RESET and
+KVM_S390_CLEAR_RESET ioctls are available.
+
+8.23 KVM_CAP_S390_PROTECTED
+---------------------------
+
+:Architectures: s390
+
+This capability indicates that the Ultravisor has been initialized and
+KVM can therefore start protected VMs.
+This capability governs the KVM_S390_PV_COMMAND ioctl and the
+KVM_MP_STATE_LOAD MP_STATE. KVM_SET_MP_STATE can fail for protected
+guests when the state change is invalid.
+
+8.24 KVM_CAP_STEAL_TIME
+-----------------------
+
+:Architectures: arm64, x86
+
+This capability indicates that KVM supports steal time accounting.
+When steal time accounting is supported it may be enabled with
+architecture-specific interfaces. This capability and the architecture-
+specific interfaces must be consistent, i.e. if one says the feature
+is supported, than the other should as well and vice versa. For arm64
+see Documentation/virt/kvm/devices/vcpu.rst "KVM_ARM_VCPU_PVTIME_CTRL".
+For x86 see Documentation/virt/kvm/x86/msr.rst "MSR_KVM_STEAL_TIME".
+
+8.25 KVM_CAP_S390_DIAG318
+-------------------------
+
+:Architectures: s390
+
+This capability enables a guest to set information about its control program
+(i.e. guest kernel type and version). The information is helpful during
+system/firmware service events, providing additional data about the guest
+environments running on the machine.
+
+The information is associated with the DIAGNOSE 0x318 instruction, which sets
+an 8-byte value consisting of a one-byte Control Program Name Code (CPNC) and
+a 7-byte Control Program Version Code (CPVC). The CPNC determines what
+environment the control program is running in (e.g. Linux, z/VM...), and the
+CPVC is used for information specific to OS (e.g. Linux version, Linux
+distribution...)
+
+If this capability is available, then the CPNC and CPVC can be synchronized
+between KVM and userspace via the sync regs mechanism (KVM_SYNC_DIAG318).
+
+8.26 KVM_CAP_X86_USER_SPACE_MSR
+-------------------------------
+
+:Architectures: x86
+
+This capability indicates that KVM supports deflection of MSR reads and
+writes to user space. It can be enabled on a VM level. If enabled, MSR
+accesses that would usually trigger a #GP by KVM into the guest will
+instead get bounced to user space through the KVM_EXIT_X86_RDMSR and
+KVM_EXIT_X86_WRMSR exit notifications.
+
+8.27 KVM_CAP_X86_MSR_FILTER
+---------------------------
+
+:Architectures: x86
+
+This capability indicates that KVM supports that accesses to user defined MSRs
+may be rejected. With this capability exposed, KVM exports new VM ioctl
+KVM_X86_SET_MSR_FILTER which user space can call to specify bitmaps of MSR
+ranges that KVM should deny access to.
+
+In combination with KVM_CAP_X86_USER_SPACE_MSR, this allows user space to
+trap and emulate MSRs that are outside of the scope of KVM as well as
+limit the attack surface on KVM's MSR emulation code.
+
+8.28 KVM_CAP_ENFORCE_PV_FEATURE_CPUID
+-------------------------------------
+
+Architectures: x86
+
+When enabled, KVM will disable paravirtual features provided to the
+guest according to the bits in the KVM_CPUID_FEATURES CPUID leaf
+(0x40000001). Otherwise, a guest may use the paravirtual features
+regardless of what has actually been exposed through the CPUID leaf.
+
+8.29 KVM_CAP_DIRTY_LOG_RING/KVM_CAP_DIRTY_LOG_RING_ACQ_REL
+----------------------------------------------------------
+
+:Architectures: x86, arm64
+:Parameters: args[0] - size of the dirty log ring
+
+KVM is capable of tracking dirty memory using ring buffers that are
+mmapped into userspace; there is one dirty ring per vcpu.
+
+The dirty ring is available to userspace as an array of
+``struct kvm_dirty_gfn``. Each dirty entry is defined as::
+
+ struct kvm_dirty_gfn {
+ __u32 flags;
+ __u32 slot; /* as_id | slot_id */
+ __u64 offset;
+ };
+
+The following values are defined for the flags field to define the
+current state of the entry::
+
+ #define KVM_DIRTY_GFN_F_DIRTY BIT(0)
+ #define KVM_DIRTY_GFN_F_RESET BIT(1)
+ #define KVM_DIRTY_GFN_F_MASK 0x3
+
+Userspace should call KVM_ENABLE_CAP ioctl right after KVM_CREATE_VM
+ioctl to enable this capability for the new guest and set the size of
+the rings. Enabling the capability is only allowed before creating any
+vCPU, and the size of the ring must be a power of two. The larger the
+ring buffer, the less likely the ring is full and the VM is forced to
+exit to userspace. The optimal size depends on the workload, but it is
+recommended that it be at least 64 KiB (4096 entries).
+
+Just like for dirty page bitmaps, the buffer tracks writes to
+all user memory regions for which the KVM_MEM_LOG_DIRTY_PAGES flag was
+set in KVM_SET_USER_MEMORY_REGION. Once a memory region is registered
+with the flag set, userspace can start harvesting dirty pages from the
+ring buffer.
+
+An entry in the ring buffer can be unused (flag bits ``00``),
+dirty (flag bits ``01``) or harvested (flag bits ``1X``). The
+state machine for the entry is as follows::
+
+ dirtied harvested reset
+ 00 -----------> 01 -------------> 1X -------+
+ ^ |
+ | |
+ +------------------------------------------+
+
+To harvest the dirty pages, userspace accesses the mmapped ring buffer
+to read the dirty GFNs. If the flags has the DIRTY bit set (at this stage
+the RESET bit must be cleared), then it means this GFN is a dirty GFN.
+The userspace should harvest this GFN and mark the flags from state
+``01b`` to ``1Xb`` (bit 0 will be ignored by KVM, but bit 1 must be set
+to show that this GFN is harvested and waiting for a reset), and move
+on to the next GFN. The userspace should continue to do this until the
+flags of a GFN have the DIRTY bit cleared, meaning that it has harvested
+all the dirty GFNs that were available.
+
+Note that on weakly ordered architectures, userspace accesses to the
+ring buffer (and more specifically the 'flags' field) must be ordered,
+using load-acquire/store-release accessors when available, or any
+other memory barrier that will ensure this ordering.
+
+It's not necessary for userspace to harvest the all dirty GFNs at once.
+However it must collect the dirty GFNs in sequence, i.e., the userspace
+program cannot skip one dirty GFN to collect the one next to it.
+
+After processing one or more entries in the ring buffer, userspace
+calls the VM ioctl KVM_RESET_DIRTY_RINGS to notify the kernel about
+it, so that the kernel will reprotect those collected GFNs.
+Therefore, the ioctl must be called *before* reading the content of
+the dirty pages.
+
+The dirty ring can get full. When it happens, the KVM_RUN of the
+vcpu will return with exit reason KVM_EXIT_DIRTY_LOG_FULL.
+
+The dirty ring interface has a major difference comparing to the
+KVM_GET_DIRTY_LOG interface in that, when reading the dirty ring from
+userspace, it's still possible that the kernel has not yet flushed the
+processor's dirty page buffers into the kernel buffer (with dirty bitmaps, the
+flushing is done by the KVM_GET_DIRTY_LOG ioctl). To achieve that, one
+needs to kick the vcpu out of KVM_RUN using a signal. The resulting
+vmexit ensures that all dirty GFNs are flushed to the dirty rings.
+
+NOTE: KVM_CAP_DIRTY_LOG_RING_ACQ_REL is the only capability that
+should be exposed by weakly ordered architecture, in order to indicate
+the additional memory ordering requirements imposed on userspace when
+reading the state of an entry and mutating it from DIRTY to HARVESTED.
+Architecture with TSO-like ordering (such as x86) are allowed to
+expose both KVM_CAP_DIRTY_LOG_RING and KVM_CAP_DIRTY_LOG_RING_ACQ_REL
+to userspace.
+
+After enabling the dirty rings, the userspace needs to detect the
+capability of KVM_CAP_DIRTY_LOG_RING_WITH_BITMAP to see whether the
+ring structures can be backed by per-slot bitmaps. With this capability
+advertised, it means the architecture can dirty guest pages without
+vcpu/ring context, so that some of the dirty information will still be
+maintained in the bitmap structure. KVM_CAP_DIRTY_LOG_RING_WITH_BITMAP
+can't be enabled if the capability of KVM_CAP_DIRTY_LOG_RING_ACQ_REL
+hasn't been enabled, or any memslot has been existing.
+
+Note that the bitmap here is only a backup of the ring structure. The
+use of the ring and bitmap combination is only beneficial if there is
+only a very small amount of memory that is dirtied out of vcpu/ring
+context. Otherwise, the stand-alone per-slot bitmap mechanism needs to
+be considered.
+
+To collect dirty bits in the backup bitmap, userspace can use the same
+KVM_GET_DIRTY_LOG ioctl. KVM_CLEAR_DIRTY_LOG isn't needed as long as all
+the generation of the dirty bits is done in a single pass. Collecting
+the dirty bitmap should be the very last thing that the VMM does before
+considering the state as complete. VMM needs to ensure that the dirty
+state is final and avoid missing dirty pages from another ioctl ordered
+after the bitmap collection.
+
+NOTE: Multiple examples of using the backup bitmap: (1) save vgic/its
+tables through command KVM_DEV_ARM_{VGIC_GRP_CTRL, ITS_SAVE_TABLES} on
+KVM device "kvm-arm-vgic-its". (2) restore vgic/its tables through
+command KVM_DEV_ARM_{VGIC_GRP_CTRL, ITS_RESTORE_TABLES} on KVM device
+"kvm-arm-vgic-its". VGICv3 LPI pending status is restored. (3) save
+vgic3 pending table through KVM_DEV_ARM_VGIC_{GRP_CTRL, SAVE_PENDING_TABLES}
+command on KVM device "kvm-arm-vgic-v3".
+
+8.30 KVM_CAP_XEN_HVM
+--------------------
+
+:Architectures: x86
+
+This capability indicates the features that Xen supports for hosting Xen
+PVHVM guests. Valid flags are::
+
+ #define KVM_XEN_HVM_CONFIG_HYPERCALL_MSR (1 << 0)
+ #define KVM_XEN_HVM_CONFIG_INTERCEPT_HCALL (1 << 1)
+ #define KVM_XEN_HVM_CONFIG_SHARED_INFO (1 << 2)
+ #define KVM_XEN_HVM_CONFIG_RUNSTATE (1 << 3)
+ #define KVM_XEN_HVM_CONFIG_EVTCHN_2LEVEL (1 << 4)
+ #define KVM_XEN_HVM_CONFIG_EVTCHN_SEND (1 << 5)
+ #define KVM_XEN_HVM_CONFIG_RUNSTATE_UPDATE_FLAG (1 << 6)
+
+The KVM_XEN_HVM_CONFIG_HYPERCALL_MSR flag indicates that the KVM_XEN_HVM_CONFIG
+ioctl is available, for the guest to set its hypercall page.
+
+If KVM_XEN_HVM_CONFIG_INTERCEPT_HCALL is also set, the same flag may also be
+provided in the flags to KVM_XEN_HVM_CONFIG, without providing hypercall page
+contents, to request that KVM generate hypercall page content automatically
+and also enable interception of guest hypercalls with KVM_EXIT_XEN.
+
+The KVM_XEN_HVM_CONFIG_SHARED_INFO flag indicates the availability of the
+KVM_XEN_HVM_SET_ATTR, KVM_XEN_HVM_GET_ATTR, KVM_XEN_VCPU_SET_ATTR and
+KVM_XEN_VCPU_GET_ATTR ioctls, as well as the delivery of exception vectors
+for event channel upcalls when the evtchn_upcall_pending field of a vcpu's
+vcpu_info is set.
+
+The KVM_XEN_HVM_CONFIG_RUNSTATE flag indicates that the runstate-related
+features KVM_XEN_VCPU_ATTR_TYPE_RUNSTATE_ADDR/_CURRENT/_DATA/_ADJUST are
+supported by the KVM_XEN_VCPU_SET_ATTR/KVM_XEN_VCPU_GET_ATTR ioctls.
+
+The KVM_XEN_HVM_CONFIG_EVTCHN_2LEVEL flag indicates that IRQ routing entries
+of the type KVM_IRQ_ROUTING_XEN_EVTCHN are supported, with the priority
+field set to indicate 2 level event channel delivery.
+
+The KVM_XEN_HVM_CONFIG_EVTCHN_SEND flag indicates that KVM supports
+injecting event channel events directly into the guest with the
+KVM_XEN_HVM_EVTCHN_SEND ioctl. It also indicates support for the
+KVM_XEN_ATTR_TYPE_EVTCHN/XEN_VERSION HVM attributes and the
+KVM_XEN_VCPU_ATTR_TYPE_VCPU_ID/TIMER/UPCALL_VECTOR vCPU attributes.
+related to event channel delivery, timers, and the XENVER_version
+interception.
+
+The KVM_XEN_HVM_CONFIG_RUNSTATE_UPDATE_FLAG flag indicates that KVM supports
+the KVM_XEN_ATTR_TYPE_RUNSTATE_UPDATE_FLAG attribute in the KVM_XEN_SET_ATTR
+and KVM_XEN_GET_ATTR ioctls. This controls whether KVM will set the
+XEN_RUNSTATE_UPDATE flag in guest memory mapped vcpu_runstate_info during
+updates of the runstate information. Note that versions of KVM which support
+the RUNSTATE feature above, but not the RUNSTATE_UPDATE_FLAG feature, will
+always set the XEN_RUNSTATE_UPDATE flag when updating the guest structure,
+which is perhaps counterintuitive. When this flag is advertised, KVM will
+behave more correctly, not using the XEN_RUNSTATE_UPDATE flag until/unless
+specifically enabled (by the guest making the hypercall, causing the VMM
+to enable the KVM_XEN_ATTR_TYPE_RUNSTATE_UPDATE_FLAG attribute).
+
+8.31 KVM_CAP_PPC_MULTITCE
+-------------------------
+
+:Capability: KVM_CAP_PPC_MULTITCE
+:Architectures: ppc
+:Type: vm
+
+This capability means the kernel is capable of handling hypercalls
+H_PUT_TCE_INDIRECT and H_STUFF_TCE without passing those into the user
+space. This significantly accelerates DMA operations for PPC KVM guests.
+User space should expect that its handlers for these hypercalls
+are not going to be called if user space previously registered LIOBN
+in KVM (via KVM_CREATE_SPAPR_TCE or similar calls).
+
+In order to enable H_PUT_TCE_INDIRECT and H_STUFF_TCE use in the guest,
+user space might have to advertise it for the guest. For example,
+IBM pSeries (sPAPR) guest starts using them if "hcall-multi-tce" is
+present in the "ibm,hypertas-functions" device-tree property.
+
+The hypercalls mentioned above may or may not be processed successfully
+in the kernel based fast path. If they can not be handled by the kernel,
+they will get passed on to user space. So user space still has to have
+an implementation for these despite the in kernel acceleration.
+
+This capability is always enabled.
+
+8.32 KVM_CAP_PTP_KVM
+--------------------
+
+:Architectures: arm64
+
+This capability indicates that the KVM virtual PTP service is
+supported in the host. A VMM can check whether the service is
+available to the guest on migration.
+
+8.33 KVM_CAP_HYPERV_ENFORCE_CPUID
+---------------------------------
+
+Architectures: x86
+
+When enabled, KVM will disable emulated Hyper-V features provided to the
+guest according to the bits Hyper-V CPUID feature leaves. Otherwise, all
+currently implemented Hyper-V features are provided unconditionally when
+Hyper-V identification is set in the HYPERV_CPUID_INTERFACE (0x40000001)
+leaf.
+
+8.34 KVM_CAP_EXIT_HYPERCALL
+---------------------------
+
+:Capability: KVM_CAP_EXIT_HYPERCALL
+:Architectures: x86
+:Type: vm
+
+This capability, if enabled, will cause KVM to exit to userspace
+with KVM_EXIT_HYPERCALL exit reason to process some hypercalls.
+
+Calling KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION for this capability will return a bitmask
+of hypercalls that can be configured to exit to userspace.
+Right now, the only such hypercall is KVM_HC_MAP_GPA_RANGE.
+
+The argument to KVM_ENABLE_CAP is also a bitmask, and must be a subset
+of the result of KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION. KVM will forward to userspace
+the hypercalls whose corresponding bit is in the argument, and return
+ENOSYS for the others.
+
+8.35 KVM_CAP_PMU_CAPABILITY
+---------------------------
+
+:Capability: KVM_CAP_PMU_CAPABILITY
+:Architectures: x86
+:Type: vm
+:Parameters: arg[0] is bitmask of PMU virtualization capabilities.
+:Returns: 0 on success, -EINVAL when arg[0] contains invalid bits
+
+This capability alters PMU virtualization in KVM.
+
+Calling KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION for this capability returns a bitmask of
+PMU virtualization capabilities that can be adjusted on a VM.
+
+The argument to KVM_ENABLE_CAP is also a bitmask and selects specific
+PMU virtualization capabilities to be applied to the VM. This can
+only be invoked on a VM prior to the creation of VCPUs.
+
+At this time, KVM_PMU_CAP_DISABLE is the only capability. Setting
+this capability will disable PMU virtualization for that VM. Usermode
+should adjust CPUID leaf 0xA to reflect that the PMU is disabled.
+
+8.36 KVM_CAP_ARM_SYSTEM_SUSPEND
+-------------------------------
+
+:Capability: KVM_CAP_ARM_SYSTEM_SUSPEND
+:Architectures: arm64
+:Type: vm
+
+When enabled, KVM will exit to userspace with KVM_EXIT_SYSTEM_EVENT of
+type KVM_SYSTEM_EVENT_SUSPEND to process the guest suspend request.
+
+8.37 KVM_CAP_S390_PROTECTED_DUMP
+--------------------------------
+
+:Capability: KVM_CAP_S390_PROTECTED_DUMP
+:Architectures: s390
+:Type: vm
+
+This capability indicates that KVM and the Ultravisor support dumping
+PV guests. The `KVM_PV_DUMP` command is available for the
+`KVM_S390_PV_COMMAND` ioctl and the `KVM_PV_INFO` command provides
+dump related UV data. Also the vcpu ioctl `KVM_S390_PV_CPU_COMMAND` is
+available and supports the `KVM_PV_DUMP_CPU` subcommand.
+
+8.38 KVM_CAP_VM_DISABLE_NX_HUGE_PAGES
+-------------------------------------
+
+:Capability: KVM_CAP_VM_DISABLE_NX_HUGE_PAGES
+:Architectures: x86
+:Type: vm
+:Parameters: arg[0] must be 0.
+:Returns: 0 on success, -EPERM if the userspace process does not
+ have CAP_SYS_BOOT, -EINVAL if args[0] is not 0 or any vCPUs have been
+ created.
+
+This capability disables the NX huge pages mitigation for iTLB MULTIHIT.
+
+The capability has no effect if the nx_huge_pages module parameter is not set.
+
+This capability may only be set before any vCPUs are created.
+
+8.39 KVM_CAP_S390_CPU_TOPOLOGY
+------------------------------
+
+:Capability: KVM_CAP_S390_CPU_TOPOLOGY
+:Architectures: s390
+:Type: vm
+
+This capability indicates that KVM will provide the S390 CPU Topology
+facility which consist of the interpretation of the PTF instruction for
+the function code 2 along with interception and forwarding of both the
+PTF instruction with function codes 0 or 1 and the STSI(15,1,x)
+instruction to the userland hypervisor.
+
+The stfle facility 11, CPU Topology facility, should not be indicated
+to the guest without this capability.
+
+When this capability is present, KVM provides a new attribute group
+on vm fd, KVM_S390_VM_CPU_TOPOLOGY.
+This new attribute allows to get, set or clear the Modified Change
+Topology Report (MTCR) bit of the SCA through the kvm_device_attr
+structure.
+
+When getting the Modified Change Topology Report value, the attr->addr
+must point to a byte where the value will be stored or retrieved from.
+
+8.40 KVM_CAP_ARM_EAGER_SPLIT_CHUNK_SIZE
+---------------------------------------
+
+:Capability: KVM_CAP_ARM_EAGER_SPLIT_CHUNK_SIZE
+:Architectures: arm64
+:Type: vm
+:Parameters: arg[0] is the new split chunk size.
+:Returns: 0 on success, -EINVAL if any memslot was already created.
+
+This capability sets the chunk size used in Eager Page Splitting.
+
+Eager Page Splitting improves the performance of dirty-logging (used
+in live migrations) when guest memory is backed by huge-pages. It
+avoids splitting huge-pages (into PAGE_SIZE pages) on fault, by doing
+it eagerly when enabling dirty logging (with the
+KVM_MEM_LOG_DIRTY_PAGES flag for a memory region), or when using
+KVM_CLEAR_DIRTY_LOG.
+
+The chunk size specifies how many pages to break at a time, using a
+single allocation for each chunk. Bigger the chunk size, more pages
+need to be allocated ahead of time.
+
+The chunk size needs to be a valid block size. The list of acceptable
+block sizes is exposed in KVM_CAP_ARM_SUPPORTED_BLOCK_SIZES as a
+64-bit bitmap (each bit describing a block size). The default value is
+0, to disable the eager page splitting.
+
+9. Known KVM API problems
+=========================
+
+In some cases, KVM's API has some inconsistencies or common pitfalls
+that userspace need to be aware of. This section details some of
+these issues.
+
+Most of them are architecture specific, so the section is split by
+architecture.
+
+9.1. x86
+--------
+
+``KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID`` issues
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+In general, ``KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID`` is designed so that it is possible
+to take its result and pass it directly to ``KVM_SET_CPUID2``. This section
+documents some cases in which that requires some care.
+
+Local APIC features
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+CPU[EAX=1]:ECX[21] (X2APIC) is reported by ``KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID``,
+but it can only be enabled if ``KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP`` or
+``KVM_ENABLE_CAP(KVM_CAP_IRQCHIP_SPLIT)`` are used to enable in-kernel emulation of
+the local APIC.
+
+The same is true for the ``KVM_FEATURE_PV_UNHALT`` paravirtualized feature.
+
+CPU[EAX=1]:ECX[24] (TSC_DEADLINE) is not reported by ``KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID``.
+It can be enabled if ``KVM_CAP_TSC_DEADLINE_TIMER`` is present and the kernel
+has enabled in-kernel emulation of the local APIC.
+
+CPU topology
+~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+Several CPUID values include topology information for the host CPU:
+0x0b and 0x1f for Intel systems, 0x8000001e for AMD systems. Different
+versions of KVM return different values for this information and userspace
+should not rely on it. Currently they return all zeroes.
+
+If userspace wishes to set up a guest topology, it should be careful that
+the values of these three leaves differ for each CPU. In particular,
+the APIC ID is found in EDX for all subleaves of 0x0b and 0x1f, and in EAX
+for 0x8000001e; the latter also encodes the core id and node id in bits
+7:0 of EBX and ECX respectively.
+
+Obsolete ioctls and capabilities
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+KVM_CAP_DISABLE_QUIRKS does not let userspace know which quirks are actually
+available. Use ``KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION(KVM_CAP_DISABLE_QUIRKS2)`` instead if
+available.
+
+Ordering of KVM_GET_*/KVM_SET_* ioctls
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+TBD
diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/arm/hyp-abi.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/arm/hyp-abi.rst
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..412b276449
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/arm/hyp-abi.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+=======================================
+Internal ABI between the kernel and HYP
+=======================================
+
+This file documents the interaction between the Linux kernel and the
+hypervisor layer when running Linux as a hypervisor (for example
+KVM). It doesn't cover the interaction of the kernel with the
+hypervisor when running as a guest (under Xen, KVM or any other
+hypervisor), or any hypervisor-specific interaction when the kernel is
+used as a host.
+
+Note: KVM/arm has been removed from the kernel. The API described
+here is still valid though, as it allows the kernel to kexec when
+booted at HYP. It can also be used by a hypervisor other than KVM
+if necessary.
+
+On arm and arm64 (without VHE), the kernel doesn't run in hypervisor
+mode, but still needs to interact with it, allowing a built-in
+hypervisor to be either installed or torn down.
+
+In order to achieve this, the kernel must be booted at HYP (arm) or
+EL2 (arm64), allowing it to install a set of stubs before dropping to
+SVC/EL1. These stubs are accessible by using a 'hvc #0' instruction,
+and only act on individual CPUs.
+
+Unless specified otherwise, any built-in hypervisor must implement
+these functions (see arch/arm{,64}/include/asm/virt.h):
+
+* ::
+
+ r0/x0 = HVC_SET_VECTORS
+ r1/x1 = vectors
+
+ Set HVBAR/VBAR_EL2 to 'vectors' to enable a hypervisor. 'vectors'
+ must be a physical address, and respect the alignment requirements
+ of the architecture. Only implemented by the initial stubs, not by
+ Linux hypervisors.
+
+* ::
+
+ r0/x0 = HVC_RESET_VECTORS
+
+ Turn HYP/EL2 MMU off, and reset HVBAR/VBAR_EL2 to the initials
+ stubs' exception vector value. This effectively disables an existing
+ hypervisor.
+
+* ::
+
+ r0/x0 = HVC_SOFT_RESTART
+ r1/x1 = restart address
+ x2 = x0's value when entering the next payload (arm64)
+ x3 = x1's value when entering the next payload (arm64)
+ x4 = x2's value when entering the next payload (arm64)
+
+ Mask all exceptions, disable the MMU, clear I+D bits, move the arguments
+ into place (arm64 only), and jump to the restart address while at HYP/EL2.
+ This hypercall is not expected to return to its caller.
+
+* ::
+
+ x0 = HVC_FINALISE_EL2 (arm64 only)
+
+ Finish configuring EL2 depending on the command-line options,
+ including an attempt to upgrade the kernel's exception level from
+ EL1 to EL2 by enabling the VHE mode. This is conditioned by the CPU
+ supporting VHE, the EL2 MMU being off, and VHE not being disabled by
+ any other means (command line option, for example).
+
+Any other value of r0/x0 triggers a hypervisor-specific handling,
+which is not documented here.
+
+The return value of a stub hypercall is held by r0/x0, and is 0 on
+success, and HVC_STUB_ERR on error. A stub hypercall is allowed to
+clobber any of the caller-saved registers (x0-x18 on arm64, r0-r3 and
+ip on arm). It is thus recommended to use a function call to perform
+the hypercall.
diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/arm/hypercalls.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/arm/hypercalls.rst
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..3e23084644
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/arm/hypercalls.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,138 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+=======================
+ARM Hypercall Interface
+=======================
+
+KVM handles the hypercall services as requested by the guests. New hypercall
+services are regularly made available by the ARM specification or by KVM (as
+vendor services) if they make sense from a virtualization point of view.
+
+This means that a guest booted on two different versions of KVM can observe
+two different "firmware" revisions. This could cause issues if a given guest
+is tied to a particular version of a hypercall service, or if a migration
+causes a different version to be exposed out of the blue to an unsuspecting
+guest.
+
+In order to remedy this situation, KVM exposes a set of "firmware
+pseudo-registers" that can be manipulated using the GET/SET_ONE_REG
+interface. These registers can be saved/restored by userspace, and set
+to a convenient value as required.
+
+The following registers are defined:
+
+* KVM_REG_ARM_PSCI_VERSION:
+
+ KVM implements the PSCI (Power State Coordination Interface)
+ specification in order to provide services such as CPU on/off, reset
+ and power-off to the guest.
+
+ - Only valid if the vcpu has the KVM_ARM_VCPU_PSCI_0_2 feature set
+ (and thus has already been initialized)
+ - Returns the current PSCI version on GET_ONE_REG (defaulting to the
+ highest PSCI version implemented by KVM and compatible with v0.2)
+ - Allows any PSCI version implemented by KVM and compatible with
+ v0.2 to be set with SET_ONE_REG
+ - Affects the whole VM (even if the register view is per-vcpu)
+
+* KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1:
+ Holds the state of the firmware support to mitigate CVE-2017-5715, as
+ offered by KVM to the guest via a HVC call. The workaround is described
+ under SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1 in [1].
+
+ Accepted values are:
+
+ KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1_NOT_AVAIL:
+ KVM does not offer
+ firmware support for the workaround. The mitigation status for the
+ guest is unknown.
+ KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1_AVAIL:
+ The workaround HVC call is
+ available to the guest and required for the mitigation.
+ KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1_NOT_REQUIRED:
+ The workaround HVC call
+ is available to the guest, but it is not needed on this VCPU.
+
+* KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2:
+ Holds the state of the firmware support to mitigate CVE-2018-3639, as
+ offered by KVM to the guest via a HVC call. The workaround is described
+ under SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2 in [1]_.
+
+ Accepted values are:
+
+ KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2_NOT_AVAIL:
+ A workaround is not
+ available. KVM does not offer firmware support for the workaround.
+ KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2_UNKNOWN:
+ The workaround state is
+ unknown. KVM does not offer firmware support for the workaround.
+ KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2_AVAIL:
+ The workaround is available,
+ and can be disabled by a vCPU. If
+ KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2_ENABLED is set, it is active for
+ this vCPU.
+ KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2_NOT_REQUIRED:
+ The workaround is always active on this vCPU or it is not needed.
+
+
+Bitmap Feature Firmware Registers
+---------------------------------
+
+Contrary to the above registers, the following registers exposes the
+hypercall services in the form of a feature-bitmap to the userspace. This
+bitmap is translated to the services that are available to the guest.
+There is a register defined per service call owner and can be accessed via
+GET/SET_ONE_REG interface.
+
+By default, these registers are set with the upper limit of the features
+that are supported. This way userspace can discover all the usable
+hypercall services via GET_ONE_REG. The user-space can write-back the
+desired bitmap back via SET_ONE_REG. The features for the registers that
+are untouched, probably because userspace isn't aware of them, will be
+exposed as is to the guest.
+
+Note that KVM will not allow the userspace to configure the registers
+anymore once any of the vCPUs has run at least once. Instead, it will
+return a -EBUSY.
+
+The pseudo-firmware bitmap register are as follows:
+
+* KVM_REG_ARM_STD_BMAP:
+ Controls the bitmap of the ARM Standard Secure Service Calls.
+
+ The following bits are accepted:
+
+ Bit-0: KVM_REG_ARM_STD_BIT_TRNG_V1_0:
+ The bit represents the services offered under v1.0 of ARM True Random
+ Number Generator (TRNG) specification, ARM DEN0098.
+
+* KVM_REG_ARM_STD_HYP_BMAP:
+ Controls the bitmap of the ARM Standard Hypervisor Service Calls.
+
+ The following bits are accepted:
+
+ Bit-0: KVM_REG_ARM_STD_HYP_BIT_PV_TIME:
+ The bit represents the Paravirtualized Time service as represented by
+ ARM DEN0057A.
+
+* KVM_REG_ARM_VENDOR_HYP_BMAP:
+ Controls the bitmap of the Vendor specific Hypervisor Service Calls.
+
+ The following bits are accepted:
+
+ Bit-0: KVM_REG_ARM_VENDOR_HYP_BIT_FUNC_FEAT
+ The bit represents the ARM_SMCCC_VENDOR_HYP_KVM_FEATURES_FUNC_ID
+ and ARM_SMCCC_VENDOR_HYP_CALL_UID_FUNC_ID function-ids.
+
+ Bit-1: KVM_REG_ARM_VENDOR_HYP_BIT_PTP:
+ The bit represents the Precision Time Protocol KVM service.
+
+Errors:
+
+ ======= =============================================================
+ -ENOENT Unknown register accessed.
+ -EBUSY Attempt a 'write' to the register after the VM has started.
+ -EINVAL Invalid bitmap written to the register.
+ ======= =============================================================
+
+.. [1] https://developer.arm.com/-/media/developer/pdf/ARM_DEN_0070A_Firmware_interfaces_for_mitigating_CVE-2017-5715.pdf
diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/arm/index.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/arm/index.rst
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e848484321
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/arm/index.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+===
+ARM
+===
+
+.. toctree::
+ :maxdepth: 2
+
+ hyp-abi
+ hypercalls
+ pvtime
+ ptp_kvm
diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/arm/ptp_kvm.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/arm/ptp_kvm.rst
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..aecdc80ddc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/arm/ptp_kvm.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+PTP_KVM support for arm/arm64
+=============================
+
+PTP_KVM is used for high precision time sync between host and guests.
+It relies on transferring the wall clock and counter value from the
+host to the guest using a KVM-specific hypercall.
+
+* ARM_SMCCC_VENDOR_HYP_KVM_PTP_FUNC_ID: 0x86000001
+
+This hypercall uses the SMC32/HVC32 calling convention:
+
+ARM_SMCCC_VENDOR_HYP_KVM_PTP_FUNC_ID
+ ============== ======== =====================================
+ Function ID: (uint32) 0x86000001
+ Arguments: (uint32) KVM_PTP_VIRT_COUNTER(0)
+ KVM_PTP_PHYS_COUNTER(1)
+ Return Values: (int32) NOT_SUPPORTED(-1) on error, or
+ (uint32) Upper 32 bits of wall clock time (r0)
+ (uint32) Lower 32 bits of wall clock time (r1)
+ (uint32) Upper 32 bits of counter (r2)
+ (uint32) Lower 32 bits of counter (r3)
+ Endianness: No Restrictions.
+ ============== ======== =====================================
diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/arm/pvtime.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/arm/pvtime.rst
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e88b34e586
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/arm/pvtime.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+Paravirtualized time support for arm64
+======================================
+
+Arm specification DEN0057/A defines a standard for paravirtualised time
+support for AArch64 guests:
+
+https://developer.arm.com/docs/den0057/a
+
+KVM/arm64 implements the stolen time part of this specification by providing
+some hypervisor service calls to support a paravirtualized guest obtaining a
+view of the amount of time stolen from its execution.
+
+Two new SMCCC compatible hypercalls are defined:
+
+* PV_TIME_FEATURES: 0xC5000020
+* PV_TIME_ST: 0xC5000021
+
+These are only available in the SMC64/HVC64 calling convention as
+paravirtualized time is not available to 32 bit Arm guests. The existence of
+the PV_TIME_FEATURES hypercall should be probed using the SMCCC 1.1
+ARCH_FEATURES mechanism before calling it.
+
+PV_TIME_FEATURES
+
+ ============= ======== =================================================
+ Function ID: (uint32) 0xC5000020
+ PV_call_id: (uint32) The function to query for support.
+ Currently only PV_TIME_ST is supported.
+ Return value: (int64) NOT_SUPPORTED (-1) or SUCCESS (0) if the relevant
+ PV-time feature is supported by the hypervisor.
+ ============= ======== =================================================
+
+PV_TIME_ST
+
+ ============= ======== ==============================================
+ Function ID: (uint32) 0xC5000021
+ Return value: (int64) IPA of the stolen time data structure for this
+ VCPU. On failure:
+ NOT_SUPPORTED (-1)
+ ============= ======== ==============================================
+
+The IPA returned by PV_TIME_ST should be mapped by the guest as normal memory
+with inner and outer write back caching attributes, in the inner shareable
+domain. A total of 16 bytes from the IPA returned are guaranteed to be
+meaningfully filled by the hypervisor (see structure below).
+
+PV_TIME_ST returns the structure for the calling VCPU.
+
+Stolen Time
+-----------
+
+The structure pointed to by the PV_TIME_ST hypercall is as follows:
+
++-------------+-------------+-------------+----------------------------+
+| Field | Byte Length | Byte Offset | Description |
++=============+=============+=============+============================+
+| Revision | 4 | 0 | Must be 0 for version 1.0 |
++-------------+-------------+-------------+----------------------------+
+| Attributes | 4 | 4 | Must be 0 |
++-------------+-------------+-------------+----------------------------+
+| Stolen time | 8 | 8 | Stolen time in unsigned |
+| | | | nanoseconds indicating how |
+| | | | much time this VCPU thread |
+| | | | was involuntarily not |
+| | | | running on a physical CPU. |
++-------------+-------------+-------------+----------------------------+
+
+All values in the structure are stored little-endian.
+
+The structure will be updated by the hypervisor prior to scheduling a VCPU. It
+will be present within a reserved region of the normal memory given to the
+guest. The guest should not attempt to write into this memory. There is a
+structure per VCPU of the guest.
+
+It is advisable that one or more 64k pages are set aside for the purpose of
+these structures and not used for other purposes, this enables the guest to map
+the region using 64k pages and avoids conflicting attributes with other memory.
+
+For the user space interface see
+:ref:`Documentation/virt/kvm/devices/vcpu.rst <kvm_arm_vcpu_pvtime_ctrl>`. \ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/devices/README b/Documentation/virt/kvm/devices/README
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..34a6983412
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/devices/README
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+This directory contains specific device bindings for KVM_CAP_DEVICE_CTRL.
diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/devices/arm-vgic-its.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/devices/arm-vgic-its.rst
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e053124f77
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/devices/arm-vgic-its.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,212 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+===============================================
+ARM Virtual Interrupt Translation Service (ITS)
+===============================================
+
+Device types supported:
+ KVM_DEV_TYPE_ARM_VGIC_ITS ARM Interrupt Translation Service Controller
+
+The ITS allows MSI(-X) interrupts to be injected into guests. This extension is
+optional. Creating a virtual ITS controller also requires a host GICv3 (see
+arm-vgic-v3.txt), but does not depend on having physical ITS controllers.
+
+There can be multiple ITS controllers per guest, each of them has to have
+a separate, non-overlapping MMIO region.
+
+
+Groups
+======
+
+KVM_DEV_ARM_VGIC_GRP_ADDR
+-------------------------
+
+ Attributes:
+ KVM_VGIC_ITS_ADDR_TYPE (rw, 64-bit)
+ Base address in the guest physical address space of the GICv3 ITS
+ control register frame.
+ This address needs to be 64K aligned and the region covers 128K.
+
+ Errors:
+
+ ======= =================================================
+ -E2BIG Address outside of addressable IPA range
+ -EINVAL Incorrectly aligned address
+ -EEXIST Address already configured
+ -EFAULT Invalid user pointer for attr->addr.
+ -ENODEV Incorrect attribute or the ITS is not supported.
+ ======= =================================================
+
+
+KVM_DEV_ARM_VGIC_GRP_CTRL
+-------------------------
+
+ Attributes:
+ KVM_DEV_ARM_VGIC_CTRL_INIT
+ request the initialization of the ITS, no additional parameter in
+ kvm_device_attr.addr.
+
+ KVM_DEV_ARM_ITS_CTRL_RESET
+ reset the ITS, no additional parameter in kvm_device_attr.addr.
+ See "ITS Reset State" section.
+
+ KVM_DEV_ARM_ITS_SAVE_TABLES
+ save the ITS table data into guest RAM, at the location provisioned
+ by the guest in corresponding registers/table entries. Should userspace
+ require a form of dirty tracking to identify which pages are modified
+ by the saving process, it should use a bitmap even if using another
+ mechanism to track the memory dirtied by the vCPUs.
+
+ The layout of the tables in guest memory defines an ABI. The entries
+ are laid out in little endian format as described in the last paragraph.
+
+ KVM_DEV_ARM_ITS_RESTORE_TABLES
+ restore the ITS tables from guest RAM to ITS internal structures.
+
+ The GICV3 must be restored before the ITS and all ITS registers but
+ the GITS_CTLR must be restored before restoring the ITS tables.
+
+ The GITS_IIDR read-only register must also be restored before
+ calling KVM_DEV_ARM_ITS_RESTORE_TABLES as the IIDR revision field
+ encodes the ABI revision.
+
+ The expected ordering when restoring the GICv3/ITS is described in section
+ "ITS Restore Sequence".
+
+ Errors:
+
+ ======= ==========================================================
+ -ENXIO ITS not properly configured as required prior to setting
+ this attribute
+ -ENOMEM Memory shortage when allocating ITS internal data
+ -EINVAL Inconsistent restored data
+ -EFAULT Invalid guest ram access
+ -EBUSY One or more VCPUS are running
+ -EACCES The virtual ITS is backed by a physical GICv4 ITS, and the
+ state is not available without GICv4.1
+ ======= ==========================================================
+
+KVM_DEV_ARM_VGIC_GRP_ITS_REGS
+-----------------------------
+
+ Attributes:
+ The attr field of kvm_device_attr encodes the offset of the
+ ITS register, relative to the ITS control frame base address
+ (ITS_base).
+
+ kvm_device_attr.addr points to a __u64 value whatever the width
+ of the addressed register (32/64 bits). 64 bit registers can only
+ be accessed with full length.
+
+ Writes to read-only registers are ignored by the kernel except for:
+
+ - GITS_CREADR. It must be restored otherwise commands in the queue
+ will be re-executed after restoring CWRITER. GITS_CREADR must be
+ restored before restoring the GITS_CTLR which is likely to enable the
+ ITS. Also it must be restored after GITS_CBASER since a write to
+ GITS_CBASER resets GITS_CREADR.
+ - GITS_IIDR. The Revision field encodes the table layout ABI revision.
+ In the future we might implement direct injection of virtual LPIs.
+ This will require an upgrade of the table layout and an evolution of
+ the ABI. GITS_IIDR must be restored before calling
+ KVM_DEV_ARM_ITS_RESTORE_TABLES.
+
+ For other registers, getting or setting a register has the same
+ effect as reading/writing the register on real hardware.
+
+ Errors:
+
+ ======= ====================================================
+ -ENXIO Offset does not correspond to any supported register
+ -EFAULT Invalid user pointer for attr->addr
+ -EINVAL Offset is not 64-bit aligned
+ -EBUSY one or more VCPUS are running
+ ======= ====================================================
+
+ITS Restore Sequence:
+---------------------
+
+The following ordering must be followed when restoring the GIC and the ITS:
+
+a) restore all guest memory and create vcpus
+b) restore all redistributors
+c) provide the ITS base address
+ (KVM_DEV_ARM_VGIC_GRP_ADDR)
+d) restore the ITS in the following order:
+
+ 1. Restore GITS_CBASER
+ 2. Restore all other ``GITS_`` registers, except GITS_CTLR!
+ 3. Load the ITS table data (KVM_DEV_ARM_ITS_RESTORE_TABLES)
+ 4. Restore GITS_CTLR
+
+Then vcpus can be started.
+
+ITS Table ABI REV0:
+-------------------
+
+ Revision 0 of the ABI only supports the features of a virtual GICv3, and does
+ not support a virtual GICv4 with support for direct injection of virtual
+ interrupts for nested hypervisors.
+
+ The device table and ITT are indexed by the DeviceID and EventID,
+ respectively. The collection table is not indexed by CollectionID, and the
+ entries in the collection are listed in no particular order.
+ All entries are 8 bytes.
+
+ Device Table Entry (DTE)::
+
+ bits: | 63| 62 ... 49 | 48 ... 5 | 4 ... 0 |
+ values: | V | next | ITT_addr | Size |
+
+ where:
+
+ - V indicates whether the entry is valid. If not, other fields
+ are not meaningful.
+ - next: equals to 0 if this entry is the last one; otherwise it
+ corresponds to the DeviceID offset to the next DTE, capped by
+ 2^14 -1.
+ - ITT_addr matches bits [51:8] of the ITT address (256 Byte aligned).
+ - Size specifies the supported number of bits for the EventID,
+ minus one
+
+ Collection Table Entry (CTE)::
+
+ bits: | 63| 62 .. 52 | 51 ... 16 | 15 ... 0 |
+ values: | V | RES0 | RDBase | ICID |
+
+ where:
+
+ - V indicates whether the entry is valid. If not, other fields are
+ not meaningful.
+ - RES0: reserved field with Should-Be-Zero-or-Preserved behavior.
+ - RDBase is the PE number (GICR_TYPER.Processor_Number semantic),
+ - ICID is the collection ID
+
+ Interrupt Translation Entry (ITE)::
+
+ bits: | 63 ... 48 | 47 ... 16 | 15 ... 0 |
+ values: | next | pINTID | ICID |
+
+ where:
+
+ - next: equals to 0 if this entry is the last one; otherwise it corresponds
+ to the EventID offset to the next ITE capped by 2^16 -1.
+ - pINTID is the physical LPI ID; if zero, it means the entry is not valid
+ and other fields are not meaningful.
+ - ICID is the collection ID
+
+ITS Reset State:
+----------------
+
+RESET returns the ITS to the same state that it was when first created and
+initialized. When the RESET command returns, the following things are
+guaranteed:
+
+- The ITS is not enabled and quiescent
+ GITS_CTLR.Enabled = 0 .Quiescent=1
+- There is no internally cached state
+- No collection or device table are used
+ GITS_BASER<n>.Valid = 0
+- GITS_CBASER = 0, GITS_CREADR = 0, GITS_CWRITER = 0
+- The ABI version is unchanged and remains the one set when the ITS
+ device was first created.
diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/devices/arm-vgic-v3.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/devices/arm-vgic-v3.rst
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..51e5e57625
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/devices/arm-vgic-v3.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,291 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+==============================================================
+ARM Virtual Generic Interrupt Controller v3 and later (VGICv3)
+==============================================================
+
+
+Device types supported:
+ - KVM_DEV_TYPE_ARM_VGIC_V3 ARM Generic Interrupt Controller v3.0
+
+Only one VGIC instance may be instantiated through this API. The created VGIC
+will act as the VM interrupt controller, requiring emulated user-space devices
+to inject interrupts to the VGIC instead of directly to CPUs. It is not
+possible to create both a GICv3 and GICv2 on the same VM.
+
+Creating a guest GICv3 device requires a host GICv3 as well.
+
+
+Groups:
+ KVM_DEV_ARM_VGIC_GRP_ADDR
+ Attributes:
+
+ KVM_VGIC_V3_ADDR_TYPE_DIST (rw, 64-bit)
+ Base address in the guest physical address space of the GICv3 distributor
+ register mappings. Only valid for KVM_DEV_TYPE_ARM_VGIC_V3.
+ This address needs to be 64K aligned and the region covers 64 KByte.
+
+ KVM_VGIC_V3_ADDR_TYPE_REDIST (rw, 64-bit)
+ Base address in the guest physical address space of the GICv3
+ redistributor register mappings. There are two 64K pages for each
+ VCPU and all of the redistributor pages are contiguous.
+ Only valid for KVM_DEV_TYPE_ARM_VGIC_V3.
+ This address needs to be 64K aligned.
+
+ KVM_VGIC_V3_ADDR_TYPE_REDIST_REGION (rw, 64-bit)
+ The attribute data pointed to by kvm_device_attr.addr is a __u64 value::
+
+ bits: | 63 .... 52 | 51 .... 16 | 15 - 12 |11 - 0
+ values: | count | base | flags | index
+
+ - index encodes the unique redistributor region index
+ - flags: reserved for future use, currently 0
+ - base field encodes bits [51:16] of the guest physical base address
+ of the first redistributor in the region.
+ - count encodes the number of redistributors in the region. Must be
+ greater than 0.
+
+ There are two 64K pages for each redistributor in the region and
+ redistributors are laid out contiguously within the region. Regions
+ are filled with redistributors in the index order. The sum of all
+ region count fields must be greater than or equal to the number of
+ VCPUs. Redistributor regions must be registered in the incremental
+ index order, starting from index 0.
+
+ The characteristics of a specific redistributor region can be read
+ by presetting the index field in the attr data.
+ Only valid for KVM_DEV_TYPE_ARM_VGIC_V3.
+
+ It is invalid to mix calls with KVM_VGIC_V3_ADDR_TYPE_REDIST and
+ KVM_VGIC_V3_ADDR_TYPE_REDIST_REGION attributes.
+
+ Errors:
+
+ ======= =============================================================
+ -E2BIG Address outside of addressable IPA range
+ -EINVAL Incorrectly aligned address, bad redistributor region
+ count/index, mixed redistributor region attribute usage
+ -EEXIST Address already configured
+ -ENOENT Attempt to read the characteristics of a non existing
+ redistributor region
+ -ENXIO The group or attribute is unknown/unsupported for this device
+ or hardware support is missing.
+ -EFAULT Invalid user pointer for attr->addr.
+ ======= =============================================================
+
+
+ KVM_DEV_ARM_VGIC_GRP_DIST_REGS, KVM_DEV_ARM_VGIC_GRP_REDIST_REGS
+ Attributes:
+
+ The attr field of kvm_device_attr encodes two values::
+
+ bits: | 63 .... 32 | 31 .... 0 |
+ values: | mpidr | offset |
+
+ All distributor regs are (rw, 32-bit) and kvm_device_attr.addr points to a
+ __u32 value. 64-bit registers must be accessed by separately accessing the
+ lower and higher word.
+
+ Writes to read-only registers are ignored by the kernel.
+
+ KVM_DEV_ARM_VGIC_GRP_DIST_REGS accesses the main distributor registers.
+ KVM_DEV_ARM_VGIC_GRP_REDIST_REGS accesses the redistributor of the CPU
+ specified by the mpidr.
+
+ The offset is relative to the "[Re]Distributor base address" as defined
+ in the GICv3/4 specs. Getting or setting such a register has the same
+ effect as reading or writing the register on real hardware, except for the
+ following registers: GICD_STATUSR, GICR_STATUSR, GICD_ISPENDR,
+ GICR_ISPENDR0, GICD_ICPENDR, and GICR_ICPENDR0. These registers behave
+ differently when accessed via this interface compared to their
+ architecturally defined behavior to allow software a full view of the
+ VGIC's internal state.
+
+ The mpidr field is used to specify which
+ redistributor is accessed. The mpidr is ignored for the distributor.
+
+ The mpidr encoding is based on the affinity information in the
+ architecture defined MPIDR, and the field is encoded as follows::
+
+ | 63 .... 56 | 55 .... 48 | 47 .... 40 | 39 .... 32 |
+ | Aff3 | Aff2 | Aff1 | Aff0 |
+
+ Note that distributor fields are not banked, but return the same value
+ regardless of the mpidr used to access the register.
+
+ GICD_IIDR.Revision is updated when the KVM implementation is changed in a
+ way directly observable by the guest or userspace. Userspace should read
+ GICD_IIDR from KVM and write back the read value to confirm its expected
+ behavior is aligned with the KVM implementation. Userspace should set
+ GICD_IIDR before setting any other registers to ensure the expected
+ behavior.
+
+
+ The GICD_STATUSR and GICR_STATUSR registers are architecturally defined such
+ that a write of a clear bit has no effect, whereas a write with a set bit
+ clears that value. To allow userspace to freely set the values of these two
+ registers, setting the attributes with the register offsets for these two
+ registers simply sets the non-reserved bits to the value written.
+
+
+ Accesses (reads and writes) to the GICD_ISPENDR register region and
+ GICR_ISPENDR0 registers get/set the value of the latched pending state for
+ the interrupts.
+
+ This is identical to the value returned by a guest read from ISPENDR for an
+ edge triggered interrupt, but may differ for level triggered interrupts.
+ For edge triggered interrupts, once an interrupt becomes pending (whether
+ because of an edge detected on the input line or because of a guest write
+ to ISPENDR) this state is "latched", and only cleared when either the
+ interrupt is activated or when the guest writes to ICPENDR. A level
+ triggered interrupt may be pending either because the level input is held
+ high by a device, or because of a guest write to the ISPENDR register. Only
+ ISPENDR writes are latched; if the device lowers the line level then the
+ interrupt is no longer pending unless the guest also wrote to ISPENDR, and
+ conversely writes to ICPENDR or activations of the interrupt do not clear
+ the pending status if the line level is still being held high. (These
+ rules are documented in the GICv3 specification descriptions of the ICPENDR
+ and ISPENDR registers.) For a level triggered interrupt the value accessed
+ here is that of the latch which is set by ISPENDR and cleared by ICPENDR or
+ interrupt activation, whereas the value returned by a guest read from
+ ISPENDR is the logical OR of the latch value and the input line level.
+
+ Raw access to the latch state is provided to userspace so that it can save
+ and restore the entire GIC internal state (which is defined by the
+ combination of the current input line level and the latch state, and cannot
+ be deduced from purely the line level and the value of the ISPENDR
+ registers).
+
+ Accesses to GICD_ICPENDR register region and GICR_ICPENDR0 registers have
+ RAZ/WI semantics, meaning that reads always return 0 and writes are always
+ ignored.
+
+ Errors:
+
+ ====== =====================================================
+ -ENXIO Getting or setting this register is not yet supported
+ -EBUSY One or more VCPUs are running
+ ====== =====================================================
+
+
+ KVM_DEV_ARM_VGIC_GRP_CPU_SYSREGS
+ Attributes:
+
+ The attr field of kvm_device_attr encodes two values::
+
+ bits: | 63 .... 32 | 31 .... 16 | 15 .... 0 |
+ values: | mpidr | RES | instr |
+
+ The mpidr field encodes the CPU ID based on the affinity information in the
+ architecture defined MPIDR, and the field is encoded as follows::
+
+ | 63 .... 56 | 55 .... 48 | 47 .... 40 | 39 .... 32 |
+ | Aff3 | Aff2 | Aff1 | Aff0 |
+
+ The instr field encodes the system register to access based on the fields
+ defined in the A64 instruction set encoding for system register access
+ (RES means the bits are reserved for future use and should be zero)::
+
+ | 15 ... 14 | 13 ... 11 | 10 ... 7 | 6 ... 3 | 2 ... 0 |
+ | Op 0 | Op1 | CRn | CRm | Op2 |
+
+ All system regs accessed through this API are (rw, 64-bit) and
+ kvm_device_attr.addr points to a __u64 value.
+
+ KVM_DEV_ARM_VGIC_GRP_CPU_SYSREGS accesses the CPU interface registers for the
+ CPU specified by the mpidr field.
+
+ CPU interface registers access is not implemented for AArch32 mode.
+ Error -ENXIO is returned when accessed in AArch32 mode.
+
+ Errors:
+
+ ======= =====================================================
+ -ENXIO Getting or setting this register is not yet supported
+ -EBUSY VCPU is running
+ -EINVAL Invalid mpidr or register value supplied
+ ======= =====================================================
+
+
+ KVM_DEV_ARM_VGIC_GRP_NR_IRQS
+ Attributes:
+
+ A value describing the number of interrupts (SGI, PPI and SPI) for
+ this GIC instance, ranging from 64 to 1024, in increments of 32.
+
+ kvm_device_attr.addr points to a __u32 value.
+
+ Errors:
+
+ ======= ======================================
+ -EINVAL Value set is out of the expected range
+ -EBUSY Value has already be set.
+ ======= ======================================
+
+
+ KVM_DEV_ARM_VGIC_GRP_CTRL
+ Attributes:
+
+ KVM_DEV_ARM_VGIC_CTRL_INIT
+ request the initialization of the VGIC, no additional parameter in
+ kvm_device_attr.addr. Must be called after all VCPUs have been created.
+ KVM_DEV_ARM_VGIC_SAVE_PENDING_TABLES
+ save all LPI pending bits into guest RAM pending tables.
+
+ The first kB of the pending table is not altered by this operation.
+
+ Errors:
+
+ ======= ========================================================
+ -ENXIO VGIC not properly configured as required prior to calling
+ this attribute
+ -ENODEV no online VCPU
+ -ENOMEM memory shortage when allocating vgic internal data
+ -EFAULT Invalid guest ram access
+ -EBUSY One or more VCPUS are running
+ ======= ========================================================
+
+
+ KVM_DEV_ARM_VGIC_GRP_LEVEL_INFO
+ Attributes:
+
+ The attr field of kvm_device_attr encodes the following values::
+
+ bits: | 63 .... 32 | 31 .... 10 | 9 .... 0 |
+ values: | mpidr | info | vINTID |
+
+ The vINTID specifies which set of IRQs is reported on.
+
+ The info field specifies which information userspace wants to get or set
+ using this interface. Currently we support the following info values:
+
+ VGIC_LEVEL_INFO_LINE_LEVEL:
+ Get/Set the input level of the IRQ line for a set of 32 contiguously
+ numbered interrupts.
+
+ vINTID must be a multiple of 32.
+
+ kvm_device_attr.addr points to a __u32 value which will contain a
+ bitmap where a set bit means the interrupt level is asserted.
+
+ Bit[n] indicates the status for interrupt vINTID + n.
+
+ SGIs and any interrupt with a higher ID than the number of interrupts
+ supported, will be RAZ/WI. LPIs are always edge-triggered and are
+ therefore not supported by this interface.
+
+ PPIs are reported per VCPU as specified in the mpidr field, and SPIs are
+ reported with the same value regardless of the mpidr specified.
+
+ The mpidr field encodes the CPU ID based on the affinity information in the
+ architecture defined MPIDR, and the field is encoded as follows::
+
+ | 63 .... 56 | 55 .... 48 | 47 .... 40 | 39 .... 32 |
+ | Aff3 | Aff2 | Aff1 | Aff0 |
+
+ Errors:
+
+ ======= =============================================
+ -EINVAL vINTID is not multiple of 32 or info field is
+ not VGIC_LEVEL_INFO_LINE_LEVEL
+ ======= =============================================
diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/devices/arm-vgic.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/devices/arm-vgic.rst
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..40bdeea1d8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/devices/arm-vgic.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,156 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+==================================================
+ARM Virtual Generic Interrupt Controller v2 (VGIC)
+==================================================
+
+Device types supported:
+
+ - KVM_DEV_TYPE_ARM_VGIC_V2 ARM Generic Interrupt Controller v2.0
+
+Only one VGIC instance may be instantiated through either this API or the
+legacy KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP API. The created VGIC will act as the VM interrupt
+controller, requiring emulated user-space devices to inject interrupts to the
+VGIC instead of directly to CPUs.
+
+GICv3 implementations with hardware compatibility support allow creating a
+guest GICv2 through this interface. For information on creating a guest GICv3
+device and guest ITS devices, see arm-vgic-v3.txt. It is not possible to
+create both a GICv3 and GICv2 device on the same VM.
+
+
+Groups:
+ KVM_DEV_ARM_VGIC_GRP_ADDR
+ Attributes:
+
+ KVM_VGIC_V2_ADDR_TYPE_DIST (rw, 64-bit)
+ Base address in the guest physical address space of the GIC distributor
+ register mappings. Only valid for KVM_DEV_TYPE_ARM_VGIC_V2.
+ This address needs to be 4K aligned and the region covers 4 KByte.
+
+ KVM_VGIC_V2_ADDR_TYPE_CPU (rw, 64-bit)
+ Base address in the guest physical address space of the GIC virtual cpu
+ interface register mappings. Only valid for KVM_DEV_TYPE_ARM_VGIC_V2.
+ This address needs to be 4K aligned and the region covers 4 KByte.
+
+ Errors:
+
+ ======= =============================================================
+ -E2BIG Address outside of addressable IPA range
+ -EINVAL Incorrectly aligned address
+ -EEXIST Address already configured
+ -ENXIO The group or attribute is unknown/unsupported for this device
+ or hardware support is missing.
+ -EFAULT Invalid user pointer for attr->addr.
+ ======= =============================================================
+
+ KVM_DEV_ARM_VGIC_GRP_DIST_REGS
+ Attributes:
+
+ The attr field of kvm_device_attr encodes two values::
+
+ bits: | 63 .... 40 | 39 .. 32 | 31 .... 0 |
+ values: | reserved | vcpu_index | offset |
+
+ All distributor regs are (rw, 32-bit)
+
+ The offset is relative to the "Distributor base address" as defined in the
+ GICv2 specs. Getting or setting such a register has the same effect as
+ reading or writing the register on the actual hardware from the cpu whose
+ index is specified with the vcpu_index field. Note that most distributor
+ fields are not banked, but return the same value regardless of the
+ vcpu_index used to access the register.
+
+ GICD_IIDR.Revision is updated when the KVM implementation of an emulated
+ GICv2 is changed in a way directly observable by the guest or userspace.
+ Userspace should read GICD_IIDR from KVM and write back the read value to
+ confirm its expected behavior is aligned with the KVM implementation.
+ Userspace should set GICD_IIDR before setting any other registers (both
+ KVM_DEV_ARM_VGIC_GRP_DIST_REGS and KVM_DEV_ARM_VGIC_GRP_CPU_REGS) to ensure
+ the expected behavior. Unless GICD_IIDR has been set from userspace, writes
+ to the interrupt group registers (GICD_IGROUPR) are ignored.
+
+ Errors:
+
+ ======= =====================================================
+ -ENXIO Getting or setting this register is not yet supported
+ -EBUSY One or more VCPUs are running
+ -EINVAL Invalid vcpu_index supplied
+ ======= =====================================================
+
+ KVM_DEV_ARM_VGIC_GRP_CPU_REGS
+ Attributes:
+
+ The attr field of kvm_device_attr encodes two values::
+
+ bits: | 63 .... 40 | 39 .. 32 | 31 .... 0 |
+ values: | reserved | vcpu_index | offset |
+
+ All CPU interface regs are (rw, 32-bit)
+
+ The offset specifies the offset from the "CPU interface base address" as
+ defined in the GICv2 specs. Getting or setting such a register has the
+ same effect as reading or writing the register on the actual hardware.
+
+ The Active Priorities Registers APRn are implementation defined, so we set a
+ fixed format for our implementation that fits with the model of a "GICv2
+ implementation without the security extensions" which we present to the
+ guest. This interface always exposes four register APR[0-3] describing the
+ maximum possible 128 preemption levels. The semantics of the register
+ indicate if any interrupts in a given preemption level are in the active
+ state by setting the corresponding bit.
+
+ Thus, preemption level X has one or more active interrupts if and only if:
+
+ APRn[X mod 32] == 0b1, where n = X / 32
+
+ Bits for undefined preemption levels are RAZ/WI.
+
+ Note that this differs from a CPU's view of the APRs on hardware in which
+ a GIC without the security extensions expose group 0 and group 1 active
+ priorities in separate register groups, whereas we show a combined view
+ similar to GICv2's GICH_APR.
+
+ For historical reasons and to provide ABI compatibility with userspace we
+ export the GICC_PMR register in the format of the GICH_VMCR.VMPriMask
+ field in the lower 5 bits of a word, meaning that userspace must always
+ use the lower 5 bits to communicate with the KVM device and must shift the
+ value left by 3 places to obtain the actual priority mask level.
+
+ Errors:
+
+ ======= =====================================================
+ -ENXIO Getting or setting this register is not yet supported
+ -EBUSY One or more VCPUs are running
+ -EINVAL Invalid vcpu_index supplied
+ ======= =====================================================
+
+ KVM_DEV_ARM_VGIC_GRP_NR_IRQS
+ Attributes:
+
+ A value describing the number of interrupts (SGI, PPI and SPI) for
+ this GIC instance, ranging from 64 to 1024, in increments of 32.
+
+ Errors:
+
+ ======= =============================================================
+ -EINVAL Value set is out of the expected range
+ -EBUSY Value has already be set, or GIC has already been initialized
+ with default values.
+ ======= =============================================================
+
+ KVM_DEV_ARM_VGIC_GRP_CTRL
+ Attributes:
+
+ KVM_DEV_ARM_VGIC_CTRL_INIT
+ request the initialization of the VGIC or ITS, no additional parameter
+ in kvm_device_attr.addr.
+
+ Errors:
+
+ ======= =========================================================
+ -ENXIO VGIC not properly configured as required prior to calling
+ this attribute
+ -ENODEV no online VCPU
+ -ENOMEM memory shortage when allocating vgic internal data
+ ======= =========================================================
diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/devices/index.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/devices/index.rst
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..192cda7405
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/devices/index.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+=======
+Devices
+=======
+
+.. toctree::
+ :maxdepth: 2
+
+ arm-vgic-its
+ arm-vgic
+ arm-vgic-v3
+ mpic
+ s390_flic
+ vcpu
+ vfio
+ vm
+ xics
+ xive
diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/devices/mpic.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/devices/mpic.rst
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..55cefe030d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/devices/mpic.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+=========================
+MPIC interrupt controller
+=========================
+
+Device types supported:
+
+ - KVM_DEV_TYPE_FSL_MPIC_20 Freescale MPIC v2.0
+ - KVM_DEV_TYPE_FSL_MPIC_42 Freescale MPIC v4.2
+
+Only one MPIC instance, of any type, may be instantiated. The created
+MPIC will act as the system interrupt controller, connecting to each
+vcpu's interrupt inputs.
+
+Groups:
+ KVM_DEV_MPIC_GRP_MISC
+ Attributes:
+
+ KVM_DEV_MPIC_BASE_ADDR (rw, 64-bit)
+ Base address of the 256 KiB MPIC register space. Must be
+ naturally aligned. A value of zero disables the mapping.
+ Reset value is zero.
+
+ KVM_DEV_MPIC_GRP_REGISTER (rw, 32-bit)
+ Access an MPIC register, as if the access were made from the guest.
+ "attr" is the byte offset into the MPIC register space. Accesses
+ must be 4-byte aligned.
+
+ MSIs may be signaled by using this attribute group to write
+ to the relevant MSIIR.
+
+ KVM_DEV_MPIC_GRP_IRQ_ACTIVE (rw, 32-bit)
+ IRQ input line for each standard openpic source. 0 is inactive and 1
+ is active, regardless of interrupt sense.
+
+ For edge-triggered interrupts: Writing 1 is considered an activating
+ edge, and writing 0 is ignored. Reading returns 1 if a previously
+ signaled edge has not been acknowledged, and 0 otherwise.
+
+ "attr" is the IRQ number. IRQ numbers for standard sources are the
+ byte offset of the relevant IVPR from EIVPR0, divided by 32.
+
+IRQ Routing:
+
+ The MPIC emulation supports IRQ routing. Only a single MPIC device can
+ be instantiated. Once that device has been created, it's available as
+ irqchip id 0.
+
+ This irqchip 0 has 256 interrupt pins, which expose the interrupts in
+ the main array of interrupt sources (a.k.a. "SRC" interrupts).
+
+ The numbering is the same as the MPIC device tree binding -- based on
+ the register offset from the beginning of the sources array, without
+ regard to any subdivisions in chip documentation such as "internal"
+ or "external" interrupts.
+
+ Access to non-SRC interrupts is not implemented through IRQ routing mechanisms.
diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/devices/s390_flic.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/devices/s390_flic.rst
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..ea96559ba5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/devices/s390_flic.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,166 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+====================================
+FLIC (floating interrupt controller)
+====================================
+
+FLIC handles floating (non per-cpu) interrupts, i.e. I/O, service and some
+machine check interruptions. All interrupts are stored in a per-vm list of
+pending interrupts. FLIC performs operations on this list.
+
+Only one FLIC instance may be instantiated.
+
+FLIC provides support to
+- add interrupts (KVM_DEV_FLIC_ENQUEUE)
+- inspect currently pending interrupts (KVM_FLIC_GET_ALL_IRQS)
+- purge all pending floating interrupts (KVM_DEV_FLIC_CLEAR_IRQS)
+- purge one pending floating I/O interrupt (KVM_DEV_FLIC_CLEAR_IO_IRQ)
+- enable/disable for the guest transparent async page faults
+- register and modify adapter interrupt sources (KVM_DEV_FLIC_ADAPTER_*)
+- modify AIS (adapter-interruption-suppression) mode state (KVM_DEV_FLIC_AISM)
+- inject adapter interrupts on a specified adapter (KVM_DEV_FLIC_AIRQ_INJECT)
+- get/set all AIS mode states (KVM_DEV_FLIC_AISM_ALL)
+
+Groups:
+ KVM_DEV_FLIC_ENQUEUE
+ Passes a buffer and length into the kernel which are then injected into
+ the list of pending interrupts.
+ attr->addr contains the pointer to the buffer and attr->attr contains
+ the length of the buffer.
+ The format of the data structure kvm_s390_irq as it is copied from userspace
+ is defined in usr/include/linux/kvm.h.
+
+ KVM_DEV_FLIC_GET_ALL_IRQS
+ Copies all floating interrupts into a buffer provided by userspace.
+ When the buffer is too small it returns -ENOMEM, which is the indication
+ for userspace to try again with a bigger buffer.
+
+ -ENOBUFS is returned when the allocation of a kernelspace buffer has
+ failed.
+
+ -EFAULT is returned when copying data to userspace failed.
+ All interrupts remain pending, i.e. are not deleted from the list of
+ currently pending interrupts.
+ attr->addr contains the userspace address of the buffer into which all
+ interrupt data will be copied.
+ attr->attr contains the size of the buffer in bytes.
+
+ KVM_DEV_FLIC_CLEAR_IRQS
+ Simply deletes all elements from the list of currently pending floating
+ interrupts. No interrupts are injected into the guest.
+
+ KVM_DEV_FLIC_CLEAR_IO_IRQ
+ Deletes one (if any) I/O interrupt for a subchannel identified by the
+ subsystem identification word passed via the buffer specified by
+ attr->addr (address) and attr->attr (length).
+
+ KVM_DEV_FLIC_APF_ENABLE
+ Enables async page faults for the guest. So in case of a major page fault
+ the host is allowed to handle this async and continues the guest.
+
+ KVM_DEV_FLIC_APF_DISABLE_WAIT
+ Disables async page faults for the guest and waits until already pending
+ async page faults are done. This is necessary to trigger a completion interrupt
+ for every init interrupt before migrating the interrupt list.
+
+ KVM_DEV_FLIC_ADAPTER_REGISTER
+ Register an I/O adapter interrupt source. Takes a kvm_s390_io_adapter
+ describing the adapter to register::
+
+ struct kvm_s390_io_adapter {
+ __u32 id;
+ __u8 isc;
+ __u8 maskable;
+ __u8 swap;
+ __u8 flags;
+ };
+
+ id contains the unique id for the adapter, isc the I/O interruption subclass
+ to use, maskable whether this adapter may be masked (interrupts turned off),
+ swap whether the indicators need to be byte swapped, and flags contains
+ further characteristics of the adapter.
+
+ Currently defined values for 'flags' are:
+
+ - KVM_S390_ADAPTER_SUPPRESSIBLE: adapter is subject to AIS
+ (adapter-interrupt-suppression) facility. This flag only has an effect if
+ the AIS capability is enabled.
+
+ Unknown flag values are ignored.
+
+
+ KVM_DEV_FLIC_ADAPTER_MODIFY
+ Modifies attributes of an existing I/O adapter interrupt source. Takes
+ a kvm_s390_io_adapter_req specifying the adapter and the operation::
+
+ struct kvm_s390_io_adapter_req {
+ __u32 id;
+ __u8 type;
+ __u8 mask;
+ __u16 pad0;
+ __u64 addr;
+ };
+
+ id specifies the adapter and type the operation. The supported operations
+ are:
+
+ KVM_S390_IO_ADAPTER_MASK
+ mask or unmask the adapter, as specified in mask
+
+ KVM_S390_IO_ADAPTER_MAP
+ This is now a no-op. The mapping is purely done by the irq route.
+ KVM_S390_IO_ADAPTER_UNMAP
+ This is now a no-op. The mapping is purely done by the irq route.
+
+ KVM_DEV_FLIC_AISM
+ modify the adapter-interruption-suppression mode for a given isc if the
+ AIS capability is enabled. Takes a kvm_s390_ais_req describing::
+
+ struct kvm_s390_ais_req {
+ __u8 isc;
+ __u16 mode;
+ };
+
+ isc contains the target I/O interruption subclass, mode the target
+ adapter-interruption-suppression mode. The following modes are
+ currently supported:
+
+ - KVM_S390_AIS_MODE_ALL: ALL-Interruptions Mode, i.e. airq injection
+ is always allowed;
+ - KVM_S390_AIS_MODE_SINGLE: SINGLE-Interruption Mode, i.e. airq
+ injection is only allowed once and the following adapter interrupts
+ will be suppressed until the mode is set again to ALL-Interruptions
+ or SINGLE-Interruption mode.
+
+ KVM_DEV_FLIC_AIRQ_INJECT
+ Inject adapter interrupts on a specified adapter.
+ attr->attr contains the unique id for the adapter, which allows for
+ adapter-specific checks and actions.
+ For adapters subject to AIS, handle the airq injection suppression for
+ an isc according to the adapter-interruption-suppression mode on condition
+ that the AIS capability is enabled.
+
+ KVM_DEV_FLIC_AISM_ALL
+ Gets or sets the adapter-interruption-suppression mode for all ISCs. Takes
+ a kvm_s390_ais_all describing::
+
+ struct kvm_s390_ais_all {
+ __u8 simm; /* Single-Interruption-Mode mask */
+ __u8 nimm; /* No-Interruption-Mode mask *
+ };
+
+ simm contains Single-Interruption-Mode mask for all ISCs, nimm contains
+ No-Interruption-Mode mask for all ISCs. Each bit in simm and nimm corresponds
+ to an ISC (MSB0 bit 0 to ISC 0 and so on). The combination of simm bit and
+ nimm bit presents AIS mode for a ISC.
+
+ KVM_DEV_FLIC_AISM_ALL is indicated by KVM_CAP_S390_AIS_MIGRATION.
+
+Note: The KVM_SET_DEVICE_ATTR/KVM_GET_DEVICE_ATTR device ioctls executed on
+FLIC with an unknown group or attribute gives the error code EINVAL (instead of
+ENXIO, as specified in the API documentation). It is not possible to conclude
+that a FLIC operation is unavailable based on the error code resulting from a
+usage attempt.
+
+.. note:: The KVM_DEV_FLIC_CLEAR_IO_IRQ ioctl will return EINVAL in case a
+ zero schid is specified.
diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/devices/vcpu.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/devices/vcpu.rst
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..31f14ec4a6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/devices/vcpu.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,267 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+======================
+Generic vcpu interface
+======================
+
+The virtual cpu "device" also accepts the ioctls KVM_SET_DEVICE_ATTR,
+KVM_GET_DEVICE_ATTR, and KVM_HAS_DEVICE_ATTR. The interface uses the same struct
+kvm_device_attr as other devices, but targets VCPU-wide settings and controls.
+
+The groups and attributes per virtual cpu, if any, are architecture specific.
+
+1. GROUP: KVM_ARM_VCPU_PMU_V3_CTRL
+==================================
+
+:Architectures: ARM64
+
+1.1. ATTRIBUTE: KVM_ARM_VCPU_PMU_V3_IRQ
+---------------------------------------
+
+:Parameters: in kvm_device_attr.addr the address for PMU overflow interrupt is a
+ pointer to an int
+
+Returns:
+
+ ======= ========================================================
+ -EBUSY The PMU overflow interrupt is already set
+ -EFAULT Error reading interrupt number
+ -ENXIO PMUv3 not supported or the overflow interrupt not set
+ when attempting to get it
+ -ENODEV KVM_ARM_VCPU_PMU_V3 feature missing from VCPU
+ -EINVAL Invalid PMU overflow interrupt number supplied or
+ trying to set the IRQ number without using an in-kernel
+ irqchip.
+ ======= ========================================================
+
+A value describing the PMUv3 (Performance Monitor Unit v3) overflow interrupt
+number for this vcpu. This interrupt could be a PPI or SPI, but the interrupt
+type must be same for each vcpu. As a PPI, the interrupt number is the same for
+all vcpus, while as an SPI it must be a separate number per vcpu.
+
+1.2 ATTRIBUTE: KVM_ARM_VCPU_PMU_V3_INIT
+---------------------------------------
+
+:Parameters: no additional parameter in kvm_device_attr.addr
+
+Returns:
+
+ ======= ======================================================
+ -EEXIST Interrupt number already used
+ -ENODEV PMUv3 not supported or GIC not initialized
+ -ENXIO PMUv3 not supported, missing VCPU feature or interrupt
+ number not set
+ -EBUSY PMUv3 already initialized
+ ======= ======================================================
+
+Request the initialization of the PMUv3. If using the PMUv3 with an in-kernel
+virtual GIC implementation, this must be done after initializing the in-kernel
+irqchip.
+
+1.3 ATTRIBUTE: KVM_ARM_VCPU_PMU_V3_FILTER
+-----------------------------------------
+
+:Parameters: in kvm_device_attr.addr the address for a PMU event filter is a
+ pointer to a struct kvm_pmu_event_filter
+
+:Returns:
+
+ ======= ======================================================
+ -ENODEV PMUv3 not supported or GIC not initialized
+ -ENXIO PMUv3 not properly configured or in-kernel irqchip not
+ configured as required prior to calling this attribute
+ -EBUSY PMUv3 already initialized or a VCPU has already run
+ -EINVAL Invalid filter range
+ ======= ======================================================
+
+Request the installation of a PMU event filter described as follows::
+
+ struct kvm_pmu_event_filter {
+ __u16 base_event;
+ __u16 nevents;
+
+ #define KVM_PMU_EVENT_ALLOW 0
+ #define KVM_PMU_EVENT_DENY 1
+
+ __u8 action;
+ __u8 pad[3];
+ };
+
+A filter range is defined as the range [@base_event, @base_event + @nevents),
+together with an @action (KVM_PMU_EVENT_ALLOW or KVM_PMU_EVENT_DENY). The
+first registered range defines the global policy (global ALLOW if the first
+@action is DENY, global DENY if the first @action is ALLOW). Multiple ranges
+can be programmed, and must fit within the event space defined by the PMU
+architecture (10 bits on ARMv8.0, 16 bits from ARMv8.1 onwards).
+
+Note: "Cancelling" a filter by registering the opposite action for the same
+range doesn't change the default action. For example, installing an ALLOW
+filter for event range [0:10) as the first filter and then applying a DENY
+action for the same range will leave the whole range as disabled.
+
+Restrictions: Event 0 (SW_INCR) is never filtered, as it doesn't count a
+hardware event. Filtering event 0x1E (CHAIN) has no effect either, as it
+isn't strictly speaking an event. Filtering the cycle counter is possible
+using event 0x11 (CPU_CYCLES).
+
+1.4 ATTRIBUTE: KVM_ARM_VCPU_PMU_V3_SET_PMU
+------------------------------------------
+
+:Parameters: in kvm_device_attr.addr the address to an int representing the PMU
+ identifier.
+
+:Returns:
+
+ ======= ====================================================
+ -EBUSY PMUv3 already initialized, a VCPU has already run or
+ an event filter has already been set
+ -EFAULT Error accessing the PMU identifier
+ -ENXIO PMU not found
+ -ENODEV PMUv3 not supported or GIC not initialized
+ -ENOMEM Could not allocate memory
+ ======= ====================================================
+
+Request that the VCPU uses the specified hardware PMU when creating guest events
+for the purpose of PMU emulation. The PMU identifier can be read from the "type"
+file for the desired PMU instance under /sys/devices (or, equivalent,
+/sys/bus/even_source). This attribute is particularly useful on heterogeneous
+systems where there are at least two CPU PMUs on the system. The PMU that is set
+for one VCPU will be used by all the other VCPUs. It isn't possible to set a PMU
+if a PMU event filter is already present.
+
+Note that KVM will not make any attempts to run the VCPU on the physical CPUs
+associated with the PMU specified by this attribute. This is entirely left to
+userspace. However, attempting to run the VCPU on a physical CPU not supported
+by the PMU will fail and KVM_RUN will return with
+exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_FAIL_ENTRY and populate the fail_entry struct by setting
+hardare_entry_failure_reason field to KVM_EXIT_FAIL_ENTRY_CPU_UNSUPPORTED and
+the cpu field to the processor id.
+
+2. GROUP: KVM_ARM_VCPU_TIMER_CTRL
+=================================
+
+:Architectures: ARM64
+
+2.1. ATTRIBUTES: KVM_ARM_VCPU_TIMER_IRQ_VTIMER, KVM_ARM_VCPU_TIMER_IRQ_PTIMER
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+:Parameters: in kvm_device_attr.addr the address for the timer interrupt is a
+ pointer to an int
+
+Returns:
+
+ ======= =================================
+ -EINVAL Invalid timer interrupt number
+ -EBUSY One or more VCPUs has already run
+ ======= =================================
+
+A value describing the architected timer interrupt number when connected to an
+in-kernel virtual GIC. These must be a PPI (16 <= intid < 32). Setting the
+attribute overrides the default values (see below).
+
+============================= ==========================================
+KVM_ARM_VCPU_TIMER_IRQ_VTIMER The EL1 virtual timer intid (default: 27)
+KVM_ARM_VCPU_TIMER_IRQ_PTIMER The EL1 physical timer intid (default: 30)
+============================= ==========================================
+
+Setting the same PPI for different timers will prevent the VCPUs from running.
+Setting the interrupt number on a VCPU configures all VCPUs created at that
+time to use the number provided for a given timer, overwriting any previously
+configured values on other VCPUs. Userspace should configure the interrupt
+numbers on at least one VCPU after creating all VCPUs and before running any
+VCPUs.
+
+.. _kvm_arm_vcpu_pvtime_ctrl:
+
+3. GROUP: KVM_ARM_VCPU_PVTIME_CTRL
+==================================
+
+:Architectures: ARM64
+
+3.1 ATTRIBUTE: KVM_ARM_VCPU_PVTIME_IPA
+--------------------------------------
+
+:Parameters: 64-bit base address
+
+Returns:
+
+ ======= ======================================
+ -ENXIO Stolen time not implemented
+ -EEXIST Base address already set for this VCPU
+ -EINVAL Base address not 64 byte aligned
+ ======= ======================================
+
+Specifies the base address of the stolen time structure for this VCPU. The
+base address must be 64 byte aligned and exist within a valid guest memory
+region. See Documentation/virt/kvm/arm/pvtime.rst for more information
+including the layout of the stolen time structure.
+
+4. GROUP: KVM_VCPU_TSC_CTRL
+===========================
+
+:Architectures: x86
+
+4.1 ATTRIBUTE: KVM_VCPU_TSC_OFFSET
+
+:Parameters: 64-bit unsigned TSC offset
+
+Returns:
+
+ ======= ======================================
+ -EFAULT Error reading/writing the provided
+ parameter address.
+ -ENXIO Attribute not supported
+ ======= ======================================
+
+Specifies the guest's TSC offset relative to the host's TSC. The guest's
+TSC is then derived by the following equation:
+
+ guest_tsc = host_tsc + KVM_VCPU_TSC_OFFSET
+
+This attribute is useful to adjust the guest's TSC on live migration,
+so that the TSC counts the time during which the VM was paused. The
+following describes a possible algorithm to use for this purpose.
+
+From the source VMM process:
+
+1. Invoke the KVM_GET_CLOCK ioctl to record the host TSC (tsc_src),
+ kvmclock nanoseconds (guest_src), and host CLOCK_REALTIME nanoseconds
+ (host_src).
+
+2. Read the KVM_VCPU_TSC_OFFSET attribute for every vCPU to record the
+ guest TSC offset (ofs_src[i]).
+
+3. Invoke the KVM_GET_TSC_KHZ ioctl to record the frequency of the
+ guest's TSC (freq).
+
+From the destination VMM process:
+
+4. Invoke the KVM_SET_CLOCK ioctl, providing the source nanoseconds from
+ kvmclock (guest_src) and CLOCK_REALTIME (host_src) in their respective
+ fields. Ensure that the KVM_CLOCK_REALTIME flag is set in the provided
+ structure.
+
+ KVM will advance the VM's kvmclock to account for elapsed time since
+ recording the clock values. Note that this will cause problems in
+ the guest (e.g., timeouts) unless CLOCK_REALTIME is synchronized
+ between the source and destination, and a reasonably short time passes
+ between the source pausing the VMs and the destination executing
+ steps 4-7.
+
+5. Invoke the KVM_GET_CLOCK ioctl to record the host TSC (tsc_dest) and
+ kvmclock nanoseconds (guest_dest).
+
+6. Adjust the guest TSC offsets for every vCPU to account for (1) time
+ elapsed since recording state and (2) difference in TSCs between the
+ source and destination machine:
+
+ ofs_dst[i] = ofs_src[i] -
+ (guest_src - guest_dest) * freq +
+ (tsc_src - tsc_dest)
+
+ ("ofs[i] + tsc - guest * freq" is the guest TSC value corresponding to
+ a time of 0 in kvmclock. The above formula ensures that it is the
+ same on the destination as it was on the source).
+
+7. Write the KVM_VCPU_TSC_OFFSET attribute for every vCPU with the
+ respective value derived in the previous step.
diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/devices/vfio.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/devices/vfio.rst
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c549143bb8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/devices/vfio.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+===================
+VFIO virtual device
+===================
+
+Device types supported:
+
+ - KVM_DEV_TYPE_VFIO
+
+Only one VFIO instance may be created per VM. The created device
+tracks VFIO files (group or device) in use by the VM and features
+of those groups/devices important to the correctness and acceleration
+of the VM. As groups/devices are enabled and disabled for use by the
+VM, KVM should be updated about their presence. When registered with
+KVM, a reference to the VFIO file is held by KVM.
+
+Groups:
+ KVM_DEV_VFIO_FILE
+ alias: KVM_DEV_VFIO_GROUP
+
+KVM_DEV_VFIO_FILE attributes:
+ KVM_DEV_VFIO_FILE_ADD: Add a VFIO file (group/device) to VFIO-KVM device
+ tracking
+
+ kvm_device_attr.addr points to an int32_t file descriptor for the
+ VFIO file.
+
+ KVM_DEV_VFIO_FILE_DEL: Remove a VFIO file (group/device) from VFIO-KVM
+ device tracking
+
+ kvm_device_attr.addr points to an int32_t file descriptor for the
+ VFIO file.
+
+KVM_DEV_VFIO_GROUP (legacy kvm device group restricted to the handling of VFIO group fd):
+ KVM_DEV_VFIO_GROUP_ADD: same as KVM_DEV_VFIO_FILE_ADD for group fd only
+
+ KVM_DEV_VFIO_GROUP_DEL: same as KVM_DEV_VFIO_FILE_DEL for group fd only
+
+ KVM_DEV_VFIO_GROUP_SET_SPAPR_TCE: attaches a guest visible TCE table
+ allocated by sPAPR KVM.
+ kvm_device_attr.addr points to a struct::
+
+ struct kvm_vfio_spapr_tce {
+ __s32 groupfd;
+ __s32 tablefd;
+ };
+
+ where:
+
+ - @groupfd is a file descriptor for a VFIO group;
+ - @tablefd is a file descriptor for a TCE table allocated via
+ KVM_CREATE_SPAPR_TCE.
+
+The FILE/GROUP_ADD operation above should be invoked prior to accessing the
+device file descriptor via VFIO_GROUP_GET_DEVICE_FD in order to support
+drivers which require a kvm pointer to be set in their .open_device()
+callback. It is the same for device file descriptor via character device
+open which gets device access via VFIO_DEVICE_BIND_IOMMUFD. For such file
+descriptors, FILE_ADD should be invoked before VFIO_DEVICE_BIND_IOMMUFD
+to support the drivers mentioned in prior sentence as well.
diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/devices/vm.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/devices/vm.rst
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a4d39fa1b0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/devices/vm.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,402 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+====================
+Generic vm interface
+====================
+
+The virtual machine "device" also accepts the ioctls KVM_SET_DEVICE_ATTR,
+KVM_GET_DEVICE_ATTR, and KVM_HAS_DEVICE_ATTR. The interface uses the same
+struct kvm_device_attr as other devices, but targets VM-wide settings
+and controls.
+
+The groups and attributes per virtual machine, if any, are architecture
+specific.
+
+1. GROUP: KVM_S390_VM_MEM_CTRL
+==============================
+
+:Architectures: s390
+
+1.1. ATTRIBUTE: KVM_S390_VM_MEM_ENABLE_CMMA
+-------------------------------------------
+
+:Parameters: none
+:Returns: -EBUSY if a vcpu is already defined, otherwise 0
+
+Enables Collaborative Memory Management Assist (CMMA) for the virtual machine.
+
+1.2. ATTRIBUTE: KVM_S390_VM_MEM_CLR_CMMA
+----------------------------------------
+
+:Parameters: none
+:Returns: -EINVAL if CMMA was not enabled;
+ 0 otherwise
+
+Clear the CMMA status for all guest pages, so any pages the guest marked
+as unused are again used any may not be reclaimed by the host.
+
+1.3. ATTRIBUTE KVM_S390_VM_MEM_LIMIT_SIZE
+-----------------------------------------
+
+:Parameters: in attr->addr the address for the new limit of guest memory
+:Returns: -EFAULT if the given address is not accessible;
+ -EINVAL if the virtual machine is of type UCONTROL;
+ -E2BIG if the given guest memory is to big for that machine;
+ -EBUSY if a vcpu is already defined;
+ -ENOMEM if not enough memory is available for a new shadow guest mapping;
+ 0 otherwise.
+
+Allows userspace to query the actual limit and set a new limit for
+the maximum guest memory size. The limit will be rounded up to
+2048 MB, 4096 GB, 8192 TB respectively, as this limit is governed by
+the number of page table levels. In the case that there is no limit we will set
+the limit to KVM_S390_NO_MEM_LIMIT (U64_MAX).
+
+2. GROUP: KVM_S390_VM_CPU_MODEL
+===============================
+
+:Architectures: s390
+
+2.1. ATTRIBUTE: KVM_S390_VM_CPU_MACHINE (r/o)
+---------------------------------------------
+
+Allows user space to retrieve machine and kvm specific cpu related information::
+
+ struct kvm_s390_vm_cpu_machine {
+ __u64 cpuid; # CPUID of host
+ __u32 ibc; # IBC level range offered by host
+ __u8 pad[4];
+ __u64 fac_mask[256]; # set of cpu facilities enabled by KVM
+ __u64 fac_list[256]; # set of cpu facilities offered by host
+ }
+
+:Parameters: address of buffer to store the machine related cpu data
+ of type struct kvm_s390_vm_cpu_machine*
+:Returns: -EFAULT if the given address is not accessible from kernel space;
+ -ENOMEM if not enough memory is available to process the ioctl;
+ 0 in case of success.
+
+2.2. ATTRIBUTE: KVM_S390_VM_CPU_PROCESSOR (r/w)
+===============================================
+
+Allows user space to retrieve or request to change cpu related information for a vcpu::
+
+ struct kvm_s390_vm_cpu_processor {
+ __u64 cpuid; # CPUID currently (to be) used by this vcpu
+ __u16 ibc; # IBC level currently (to be) used by this vcpu
+ __u8 pad[6];
+ __u64 fac_list[256]; # set of cpu facilities currently (to be) used
+ # by this vcpu
+ }
+
+KVM does not enforce or limit the cpu model data in any form. Take the information
+retrieved by means of KVM_S390_VM_CPU_MACHINE as hint for reasonable configuration
+setups. Instruction interceptions triggered by additionally set facility bits that
+are not handled by KVM need to by implemented in the VM driver code.
+
+:Parameters: address of buffer to store/set the processor related cpu
+ data of type struct kvm_s390_vm_cpu_processor*.
+:Returns: -EBUSY in case 1 or more vcpus are already activated (only in write case);
+ -EFAULT if the given address is not accessible from kernel space;
+ -ENOMEM if not enough memory is available to process the ioctl;
+ 0 in case of success.
+
+.. _KVM_S390_VM_CPU_MACHINE_FEAT:
+
+2.3. ATTRIBUTE: KVM_S390_VM_CPU_MACHINE_FEAT (r/o)
+--------------------------------------------------
+
+Allows user space to retrieve available cpu features. A feature is available if
+provided by the hardware and supported by kvm. In theory, cpu features could
+even be completely emulated by kvm.
+
+::
+
+ struct kvm_s390_vm_cpu_feat {
+ __u64 feat[16]; # Bitmap (1 = feature available), MSB 0 bit numbering
+ };
+
+:Parameters: address of a buffer to load the feature list from.
+:Returns: -EFAULT if the given address is not accessible from kernel space;
+ 0 in case of success.
+
+2.4. ATTRIBUTE: KVM_S390_VM_CPU_PROCESSOR_FEAT (r/w)
+----------------------------------------------------
+
+Allows user space to retrieve or change enabled cpu features for all VCPUs of a
+VM. Features that are not available cannot be enabled.
+
+See :ref:`KVM_S390_VM_CPU_MACHINE_FEAT` for
+a description of the parameter struct.
+
+:Parameters: address of a buffer to store/load the feature list from.
+:Returns: -EFAULT if the given address is not accessible from kernel space;
+ -EINVAL if a cpu feature that is not available is to be enabled;
+ -EBUSY if at least one VCPU has already been defined;
+ 0 in case of success.
+
+.. _KVM_S390_VM_CPU_MACHINE_SUBFUNC:
+
+2.5. ATTRIBUTE: KVM_S390_VM_CPU_MACHINE_SUBFUNC (r/o)
+-----------------------------------------------------
+
+Allows user space to retrieve available cpu subfunctions without any filtering
+done by a set IBC. These subfunctions are indicated to the guest VCPU via
+query or "test bit" subfunctions and used e.g. by cpacf functions, plo and ptff.
+
+A subfunction block is only valid if KVM_S390_VM_CPU_MACHINE contains the
+STFL(E) bit introducing the affected instruction. If the affected instruction
+indicates subfunctions via a "query subfunction", the response block is
+contained in the returned struct. If the affected instruction
+indicates subfunctions via a "test bit" mechanism, the subfunction codes are
+contained in the returned struct in MSB 0 bit numbering.
+
+::
+
+ struct kvm_s390_vm_cpu_subfunc {
+ u8 plo[32]; # always valid (ESA/390 feature)
+ u8 ptff[16]; # valid with TOD-clock steering
+ u8 kmac[16]; # valid with Message-Security-Assist
+ u8 kmc[16]; # valid with Message-Security-Assist
+ u8 km[16]; # valid with Message-Security-Assist
+ u8 kimd[16]; # valid with Message-Security-Assist
+ u8 klmd[16]; # valid with Message-Security-Assist
+ u8 pckmo[16]; # valid with Message-Security-Assist-Extension 3
+ u8 kmctr[16]; # valid with Message-Security-Assist-Extension 4
+ u8 kmf[16]; # valid with Message-Security-Assist-Extension 4
+ u8 kmo[16]; # valid with Message-Security-Assist-Extension 4
+ u8 pcc[16]; # valid with Message-Security-Assist-Extension 4
+ u8 ppno[16]; # valid with Message-Security-Assist-Extension 5
+ u8 kma[16]; # valid with Message-Security-Assist-Extension 8
+ u8 kdsa[16]; # valid with Message-Security-Assist-Extension 9
+ u8 reserved[1792]; # reserved for future instructions
+ };
+
+:Parameters: address of a buffer to load the subfunction blocks from.
+:Returns: -EFAULT if the given address is not accessible from kernel space;
+ 0 in case of success.
+
+2.6. ATTRIBUTE: KVM_S390_VM_CPU_PROCESSOR_SUBFUNC (r/w)
+-------------------------------------------------------
+
+Allows user space to retrieve or change cpu subfunctions to be indicated for
+all VCPUs of a VM. This attribute will only be available if kernel and
+hardware support are in place.
+
+The kernel uses the configured subfunction blocks for indication to
+the guest. A subfunction block will only be used if the associated STFL(E) bit
+has not been disabled by user space (so the instruction to be queried is
+actually available for the guest).
+
+As long as no data has been written, a read will fail. The IBC will be used
+to determine available subfunctions in this case, this will guarantee backward
+compatibility.
+
+See :ref:`KVM_S390_VM_CPU_MACHINE_SUBFUNC` for a
+description of the parameter struct.
+
+:Parameters: address of a buffer to store/load the subfunction blocks from.
+:Returns: -EFAULT if the given address is not accessible from kernel space;
+ -EINVAL when reading, if there was no write yet;
+ -EBUSY if at least one VCPU has already been defined;
+ 0 in case of success.
+
+3. GROUP: KVM_S390_VM_TOD
+=========================
+
+:Architectures: s390
+
+3.1. ATTRIBUTE: KVM_S390_VM_TOD_HIGH
+------------------------------------
+
+Allows user space to set/get the TOD clock extension (u8) (superseded by
+KVM_S390_VM_TOD_EXT).
+
+:Parameters: address of a buffer in user space to store the data (u8) to
+:Returns: -EFAULT if the given address is not accessible from kernel space;
+ -EINVAL if setting the TOD clock extension to != 0 is not supported
+ -EOPNOTSUPP for a PV guest (TOD managed by the ultravisor)
+
+3.2. ATTRIBUTE: KVM_S390_VM_TOD_LOW
+-----------------------------------
+
+Allows user space to set/get bits 0-63 of the TOD clock register as defined in
+the POP (u64).
+
+:Parameters: address of a buffer in user space to store the data (u64) to
+:Returns: -EFAULT if the given address is not accessible from kernel space
+ -EOPNOTSUPP for a PV guest (TOD managed by the ultravisor)
+
+3.3. ATTRIBUTE: KVM_S390_VM_TOD_EXT
+-----------------------------------
+
+Allows user space to set/get bits 0-63 of the TOD clock register as defined in
+the POP (u64). If the guest CPU model supports the TOD clock extension (u8), it
+also allows user space to get/set it. If the guest CPU model does not support
+it, it is stored as 0 and not allowed to be set to a value != 0.
+
+:Parameters: address of a buffer in user space to store the data
+ (kvm_s390_vm_tod_clock) to
+:Returns: -EFAULT if the given address is not accessible from kernel space;
+ -EINVAL if setting the TOD clock extension to != 0 is not supported
+ -EOPNOTSUPP for a PV guest (TOD managed by the ultravisor)
+
+4. GROUP: KVM_S390_VM_CRYPTO
+============================
+
+:Architectures: s390
+
+4.1. ATTRIBUTE: KVM_S390_VM_CRYPTO_ENABLE_AES_KW (w/o)
+------------------------------------------------------
+
+Allows user space to enable aes key wrapping, including generating a new
+wrapping key.
+
+:Parameters: none
+:Returns: 0
+
+4.2. ATTRIBUTE: KVM_S390_VM_CRYPTO_ENABLE_DEA_KW (w/o)
+------------------------------------------------------
+
+Allows user space to enable dea key wrapping, including generating a new
+wrapping key.
+
+:Parameters: none
+:Returns: 0
+
+4.3. ATTRIBUTE: KVM_S390_VM_CRYPTO_DISABLE_AES_KW (w/o)
+-------------------------------------------------------
+
+Allows user space to disable aes key wrapping, clearing the wrapping key.
+
+:Parameters: none
+:Returns: 0
+
+4.4. ATTRIBUTE: KVM_S390_VM_CRYPTO_DISABLE_DEA_KW (w/o)
+-------------------------------------------------------
+
+Allows user space to disable dea key wrapping, clearing the wrapping key.
+
+:Parameters: none
+:Returns: 0
+
+5. GROUP: KVM_S390_VM_MIGRATION
+===============================
+
+:Architectures: s390
+
+5.1. ATTRIBUTE: KVM_S390_VM_MIGRATION_STOP (w/o)
+------------------------------------------------
+
+Allows userspace to stop migration mode, needed for PGSTE migration.
+Setting this attribute when migration mode is not active will have no
+effects.
+
+:Parameters: none
+:Returns: 0
+
+5.2. ATTRIBUTE: KVM_S390_VM_MIGRATION_START (w/o)
+-------------------------------------------------
+
+Allows userspace to start migration mode, needed for PGSTE migration.
+Setting this attribute when migration mode is already active will have
+no effects.
+
+Dirty tracking must be enabled on all memslots, else -EINVAL is returned. When
+dirty tracking is disabled on any memslot, migration mode is automatically
+stopped.
+
+:Parameters: none
+:Returns: -ENOMEM if there is not enough free memory to start migration mode;
+ -EINVAL if the state of the VM is invalid (e.g. no memory defined);
+ 0 in case of success.
+
+5.3. ATTRIBUTE: KVM_S390_VM_MIGRATION_STATUS (r/o)
+--------------------------------------------------
+
+Allows userspace to query the status of migration mode.
+
+:Parameters: address of a buffer in user space to store the data (u64) to;
+ the data itself is either 0 if migration mode is disabled or 1
+ if it is enabled
+:Returns: -EFAULT if the given address is not accessible from kernel space;
+ 0 in case of success.
+
+6. GROUP: KVM_ARM_VM_SMCCC_CTRL
+===============================
+
+:Architectures: arm64
+
+6.1. ATTRIBUTE: KVM_ARM_VM_SMCCC_FILTER (w/o)
+---------------------------------------------
+
+:Parameters: Pointer to a ``struct kvm_smccc_filter``
+
+:Returns:
+
+ ====== ===========================================
+ EEXIST Range intersects with a previously inserted
+ or reserved range
+ EBUSY A vCPU in the VM has already run
+ EINVAL Invalid filter configuration
+ ENOMEM Failed to allocate memory for the in-kernel
+ representation of the SMCCC filter
+ ====== ===========================================
+
+Requests the installation of an SMCCC call filter described as follows::
+
+ enum kvm_smccc_filter_action {
+ KVM_SMCCC_FILTER_HANDLE = 0,
+ KVM_SMCCC_FILTER_DENY,
+ KVM_SMCCC_FILTER_FWD_TO_USER,
+ };
+
+ struct kvm_smccc_filter {
+ __u32 base;
+ __u32 nr_functions;
+ __u8 action;
+ __u8 pad[15];
+ };
+
+The filter is defined as a set of non-overlapping ranges. Each
+range defines an action to be applied to SMCCC calls within the range.
+Userspace can insert multiple ranges into the filter by using
+successive calls to this attribute.
+
+The default configuration of KVM is such that all implemented SMCCC
+calls are allowed. Thus, the SMCCC filter can be defined sparsely
+by userspace, only describing ranges that modify the default behavior.
+
+The range expressed by ``struct kvm_smccc_filter`` is
+[``base``, ``base + nr_functions``). The range is not allowed to wrap,
+i.e. userspace cannot rely on ``base + nr_functions`` overflowing.
+
+The SMCCC filter applies to both SMC and HVC calls initiated by the
+guest. The SMCCC filter gates the in-kernel emulation of SMCCC calls
+and as such takes effect before other interfaces that interact with
+SMCCC calls (e.g. hypercall bitmap registers).
+
+Actions:
+
+ - ``KVM_SMCCC_FILTER_HANDLE``: Allows the guest SMCCC call to be
+ handled in-kernel. It is strongly recommended that userspace *not*
+ explicitly describe the allowed SMCCC call ranges.
+
+ - ``KVM_SMCCC_FILTER_DENY``: Rejects the guest SMCCC call in-kernel
+ and returns to the guest.
+
+ - ``KVM_SMCCC_FILTER_FWD_TO_USER``: The guest SMCCC call is forwarded
+ to userspace with an exit reason of ``KVM_EXIT_HYPERCALL``.
+
+The ``pad`` field is reserved for future use and must be zero. KVM may
+return ``-EINVAL`` if the field is nonzero.
+
+KVM reserves the 'Arm Architecture Calls' range of function IDs and
+will reject attempts to define a filter for any portion of these ranges:
+
+ =========== ===============
+ Start End (inclusive)
+ =========== ===============
+ 0x8000_0000 0x8000_FFFF
+ 0xC000_0000 0xC000_FFFF
+ =========== ===============
diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/devices/xics.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/devices/xics.rst
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..bf32c77174
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/devices/xics.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+=========================
+XICS interrupt controller
+=========================
+
+Device type supported: KVM_DEV_TYPE_XICS
+
+Groups:
+ 1. KVM_DEV_XICS_GRP_SOURCES
+ Attributes:
+
+ One per interrupt source, indexed by the source number.
+ 2. KVM_DEV_XICS_GRP_CTRL
+ Attributes:
+
+ 2.1 KVM_DEV_XICS_NR_SERVERS (write only)
+
+ The kvm_device_attr.addr points to a __u32 value which is the number of
+ interrupt server numbers (ie, highest possible vcpu id plus one).
+
+ Errors:
+
+ ======= ==========================================
+ -EINVAL Value greater than KVM_MAX_VCPU_IDS.
+ -EFAULT Invalid user pointer for attr->addr.
+ -EBUSY A vcpu is already connected to the device.
+ ======= ==========================================
+
+This device emulates the XICS (eXternal Interrupt Controller
+Specification) defined in PAPR. The XICS has a set of interrupt
+sources, each identified by a 20-bit source number, and a set of
+Interrupt Control Presentation (ICP) entities, also called "servers",
+each associated with a virtual CPU.
+
+The ICP entities are created by enabling the KVM_CAP_IRQ_ARCH
+capability for each vcpu, specifying KVM_CAP_IRQ_XICS in args[0] and
+the interrupt server number (i.e. the vcpu number from the XICS's
+point of view) in args[1] of the kvm_enable_cap struct. Each ICP has
+64 bits of state which can be read and written using the
+KVM_GET_ONE_REG and KVM_SET_ONE_REG ioctls on the vcpu. The 64 bit
+state word has the following bitfields, starting at the
+least-significant end of the word:
+
+* Unused, 16 bits
+
+* Pending interrupt priority, 8 bits
+ Zero is the highest priority, 255 means no interrupt is pending.
+
+* Pending IPI (inter-processor interrupt) priority, 8 bits
+ Zero is the highest priority, 255 means no IPI is pending.
+
+* Pending interrupt source number, 24 bits
+ Zero means no interrupt pending, 2 means an IPI is pending
+
+* Current processor priority, 8 bits
+ Zero is the highest priority, meaning no interrupts can be
+ delivered, and 255 is the lowest priority.
+
+Each source has 64 bits of state that can be read and written using
+the KVM_GET_DEVICE_ATTR and KVM_SET_DEVICE_ATTR ioctls, specifying the
+KVM_DEV_XICS_GRP_SOURCES attribute group, with the attribute number being
+the interrupt source number. The 64 bit state word has the following
+bitfields, starting from the least-significant end of the word:
+
+* Destination (server number), 32 bits
+
+ This specifies where the interrupt should be sent, and is the
+ interrupt server number specified for the destination vcpu.
+
+* Priority, 8 bits
+
+ This is the priority specified for this interrupt source, where 0 is
+ the highest priority and 255 is the lowest. An interrupt with a
+ priority of 255 will never be delivered.
+
+* Level sensitive flag, 1 bit
+
+ This bit is 1 for a level-sensitive interrupt source, or 0 for
+ edge-sensitive (or MSI).
+
+* Masked flag, 1 bit
+
+ This bit is set to 1 if the interrupt is masked (cannot be delivered
+ regardless of its priority), for example by the ibm,int-off RTAS
+ call, or 0 if it is not masked.
+
+* Pending flag, 1 bit
+
+ This bit is 1 if the source has a pending interrupt, otherwise 0.
+
+Only one XICS instance may be created per VM.
diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/devices/xive.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/devices/xive.rst
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a07e16d340
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/devices/xive.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,247 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+===========================================================
+POWER9 eXternal Interrupt Virtualization Engine (XIVE Gen1)
+===========================================================
+
+Device types supported:
+ - KVM_DEV_TYPE_XIVE POWER9 XIVE Interrupt Controller generation 1
+
+This device acts as a VM interrupt controller. It provides the KVM
+interface to configure the interrupt sources of a VM in the underlying
+POWER9 XIVE interrupt controller.
+
+Only one XIVE instance may be instantiated. A guest XIVE device
+requires a POWER9 host and the guest OS should have support for the
+XIVE native exploitation interrupt mode. If not, it should run using
+the legacy interrupt mode, referred as XICS (POWER7/8).
+
+* Device Mappings
+
+ The KVM device exposes different MMIO ranges of the XIVE HW which
+ are required for interrupt management. These are exposed to the
+ guest in VMAs populated with a custom VM fault handler.
+
+ 1. Thread Interrupt Management Area (TIMA)
+
+ Each thread has an associated Thread Interrupt Management context
+ composed of a set of registers. These registers let the thread
+ handle priority management and interrupt acknowledgment. The most
+ important are :
+
+ - Interrupt Pending Buffer (IPB)
+ - Current Processor Priority (CPPR)
+ - Notification Source Register (NSR)
+
+ They are exposed to software in four different pages each proposing
+ a view with a different privilege. The first page is for the
+ physical thread context and the second for the hypervisor. Only the
+ third (operating system) and the fourth (user level) are exposed the
+ guest.
+
+ 2. Event State Buffer (ESB)
+
+ Each source is associated with an Event State Buffer (ESB) with
+ either a pair of even/odd pair of pages which provides commands to
+ manage the source: to trigger, to EOI, to turn off the source for
+ instance.
+
+ 3. Device pass-through
+
+ When a device is passed-through into the guest, the source
+ interrupts are from a different HW controller (PHB4) and the ESB
+ pages exposed to the guest should accommodate this change.
+
+ The passthru_irq helpers, kvmppc_xive_set_mapped() and
+ kvmppc_xive_clr_mapped() are called when the device HW irqs are
+ mapped into or unmapped from the guest IRQ number space. The KVM
+ device extends these helpers to clear the ESB pages of the guest IRQ
+ number being mapped and then lets the VM fault handler repopulate.
+ The handler will insert the ESB page corresponding to the HW
+ interrupt of the device being passed-through or the initial IPI ESB
+ page if the device has being removed.
+
+ The ESB remapping is fully transparent to the guest and the OS
+ device driver. All handling is done within VFIO and the above
+ helpers in KVM-PPC.
+
+* Groups:
+
+1. KVM_DEV_XIVE_GRP_CTRL
+ Provides global controls on the device
+
+ Attributes:
+ 1.1 KVM_DEV_XIVE_RESET (write only)
+ Resets the interrupt controller configuration for sources and event
+ queues. To be used by kexec and kdump.
+
+ Errors: none
+
+ 1.2 KVM_DEV_XIVE_EQ_SYNC (write only)
+ Sync all the sources and queues and mark the EQ pages dirty. This
+ to make sure that a consistent memory state is captured when
+ migrating the VM.
+
+ Errors: none
+
+ 1.3 KVM_DEV_XIVE_NR_SERVERS (write only)
+ The kvm_device_attr.addr points to a __u32 value which is the number of
+ interrupt server numbers (ie, highest possible vcpu id plus one).
+
+ Errors:
+
+ ======= ==========================================
+ -EINVAL Value greater than KVM_MAX_VCPU_IDS.
+ -EFAULT Invalid user pointer for attr->addr.
+ -EBUSY A vCPU is already connected to the device.
+ ======= ==========================================
+
+2. KVM_DEV_XIVE_GRP_SOURCE (write only)
+ Initializes a new source in the XIVE device and mask it.
+
+ Attributes:
+ Interrupt source number (64-bit)
+
+ The kvm_device_attr.addr points to a __u64 value::
+
+ bits: | 63 .... 2 | 1 | 0
+ values: | unused | level | type
+
+ - type: 0:MSI 1:LSI
+ - level: assertion level in case of an LSI.
+
+ Errors:
+
+ ======= ==========================================
+ -E2BIG Interrupt source number is out of range
+ -ENOMEM Could not create a new source block
+ -EFAULT Invalid user pointer for attr->addr.
+ -ENXIO Could not allocate underlying HW interrupt
+ ======= ==========================================
+
+3. KVM_DEV_XIVE_GRP_SOURCE_CONFIG (write only)
+ Configures source targeting
+
+ Attributes:
+ Interrupt source number (64-bit)
+
+ The kvm_device_attr.addr points to a __u64 value::
+
+ bits: | 63 .... 33 | 32 | 31 .. 3 | 2 .. 0
+ values: | eisn | mask | server | priority
+
+ - priority: 0-7 interrupt priority level
+ - server: CPU number chosen to handle the interrupt
+ - mask: mask flag (unused)
+ - eisn: Effective Interrupt Source Number
+
+ Errors:
+
+ ======= =======================================================
+ -ENOENT Unknown source number
+ -EINVAL Not initialized source number
+ -EINVAL Invalid priority
+ -EINVAL Invalid CPU number.
+ -EFAULT Invalid user pointer for attr->addr.
+ -ENXIO CPU event queues not configured or configuration of the
+ underlying HW interrupt failed
+ -EBUSY No CPU available to serve interrupt
+ ======= =======================================================
+
+4. KVM_DEV_XIVE_GRP_EQ_CONFIG (read-write)
+ Configures an event queue of a CPU
+
+ Attributes:
+ EQ descriptor identifier (64-bit)
+
+ The EQ descriptor identifier is a tuple (server, priority)::
+
+ bits: | 63 .... 32 | 31 .. 3 | 2 .. 0
+ values: | unused | server | priority
+
+ The kvm_device_attr.addr points to::
+
+ struct kvm_ppc_xive_eq {
+ __u32 flags;
+ __u32 qshift;
+ __u64 qaddr;
+ __u32 qtoggle;
+ __u32 qindex;
+ __u8 pad[40];
+ };
+
+ - flags: queue flags
+ KVM_XIVE_EQ_ALWAYS_NOTIFY (required)
+ forces notification without using the coalescing mechanism
+ provided by the XIVE END ESBs.
+ - qshift: queue size (power of 2)
+ - qaddr: real address of queue
+ - qtoggle: current queue toggle bit
+ - qindex: current queue index
+ - pad: reserved for future use
+
+ Errors:
+
+ ======= =========================================
+ -ENOENT Invalid CPU number
+ -EINVAL Invalid priority
+ -EINVAL Invalid flags
+ -EINVAL Invalid queue size
+ -EINVAL Invalid queue address
+ -EFAULT Invalid user pointer for attr->addr.
+ -EIO Configuration of the underlying HW failed
+ ======= =========================================
+
+5. KVM_DEV_XIVE_GRP_SOURCE_SYNC (write only)
+ Synchronize the source to flush event notifications
+
+ Attributes:
+ Interrupt source number (64-bit)
+
+ Errors:
+
+ ======= =============================
+ -ENOENT Unknown source number
+ -EINVAL Not initialized source number
+ ======= =============================
+
+* VCPU state
+
+ The XIVE IC maintains VP interrupt state in an internal structure
+ called the NVT. When a VP is not dispatched on a HW processor
+ thread, this structure can be updated by HW if the VP is the target
+ of an event notification.
+
+ It is important for migration to capture the cached IPB from the NVT
+ as it synthesizes the priorities of the pending interrupts. We
+ capture a bit more to report debug information.
+
+ KVM_REG_PPC_VP_STATE (2 * 64bits)::
+
+ bits: | 63 .... 32 | 31 .... 0 |
+ values: | TIMA word0 | TIMA word1 |
+ bits: | 127 .......... 64 |
+ values: | unused |
+
+* Migration:
+
+ Saving the state of a VM using the XIVE native exploitation mode
+ should follow a specific sequence. When the VM is stopped :
+
+ 1. Mask all sources (PQ=01) to stop the flow of events.
+
+ 2. Sync the XIVE device with the KVM control KVM_DEV_XIVE_EQ_SYNC to
+ flush any in-flight event notification and to stabilize the EQs. At
+ this stage, the EQ pages are marked dirty to make sure they are
+ transferred in the migration sequence.
+
+ 3. Capture the state of the source targeting, the EQs configuration
+ and the state of thread interrupt context registers.
+
+ Restore is similar:
+
+ 1. Restore the EQ configuration. As targeting depends on it.
+ 2. Restore targeting
+ 3. Restore the thread interrupt contexts
+ 4. Restore the source states
+ 5. Let the vCPU run
diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/halt-polling.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/halt-polling.rst
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c82a04b709
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/halt-polling.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,153 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+===========================
+The KVM halt polling system
+===========================
+
+The KVM halt polling system provides a feature within KVM whereby the latency
+of a guest can, under some circumstances, be reduced by polling in the host
+for some time period after the guest has elected to no longer run by cedeing.
+That is, when a guest vcpu has ceded, or in the case of powerpc when all of the
+vcpus of a single vcore have ceded, the host kernel polls for wakeup conditions
+before giving up the cpu to the scheduler in order to let something else run.
+
+Polling provides a latency advantage in cases where the guest can be run again
+very quickly by at least saving us a trip through the scheduler, normally on
+the order of a few micro-seconds, although performance benefits are workload
+dependent. In the event that no wakeup source arrives during the polling
+interval or some other task on the runqueue is runnable the scheduler is
+invoked. Thus halt polling is especially useful on workloads with very short
+wakeup periods where the time spent halt polling is minimised and the time
+savings of not invoking the scheduler are distinguishable.
+
+The generic halt polling code is implemented in:
+
+ virt/kvm/kvm_main.c: kvm_vcpu_block()
+
+The powerpc kvm-hv specific case is implemented in:
+
+ arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv.c: kvmppc_vcore_blocked()
+
+Halt Polling Interval
+=====================
+
+The maximum time for which to poll before invoking the scheduler, referred to
+as the halt polling interval, is increased and decreased based on the perceived
+effectiveness of the polling in an attempt to limit pointless polling.
+This value is stored in either the vcpu struct:
+
+ kvm_vcpu->halt_poll_ns
+
+or in the case of powerpc kvm-hv, in the vcore struct:
+
+ kvmppc_vcore->halt_poll_ns
+
+Thus this is a per vcpu (or vcore) value.
+
+During polling if a wakeup source is received within the halt polling interval,
+the interval is left unchanged. In the event that a wakeup source isn't
+received during the polling interval (and thus schedule is invoked) there are
+two options, either the polling interval and total block time[0] were less than
+the global max polling interval (see module params below), or the total block
+time was greater than the global max polling interval.
+
+In the event that both the polling interval and total block time were less than
+the global max polling interval then the polling interval can be increased in
+the hope that next time during the longer polling interval the wake up source
+will be received while the host is polling and the latency benefits will be
+received. The polling interval is grown in the function grow_halt_poll_ns() and
+is multiplied by the module parameters halt_poll_ns_grow and
+halt_poll_ns_grow_start.
+
+In the event that the total block time was greater than the global max polling
+interval then the host will never poll for long enough (limited by the global
+max) to wakeup during the polling interval so it may as well be shrunk in order
+to avoid pointless polling. The polling interval is shrunk in the function
+shrink_halt_poll_ns() and is divided by the module parameter
+halt_poll_ns_shrink, or set to 0 iff halt_poll_ns_shrink == 0.
+
+It is worth noting that this adjustment process attempts to hone in on some
+steady state polling interval but will only really do a good job for wakeups
+which come at an approximately constant rate, otherwise there will be constant
+adjustment of the polling interval.
+
+[0] total block time:
+ the time between when the halt polling function is
+ invoked and a wakeup source received (irrespective of
+ whether the scheduler is invoked within that function).
+
+Module Parameters
+=================
+
+The kvm module has 3 tuneable module parameters to adjust the global max
+polling interval as well as the rate at which the polling interval is grown and
+shrunk. These variables are defined in include/linux/kvm_host.h and as module
+parameters in virt/kvm/kvm_main.c, or arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv.c in the
+powerpc kvm-hv case.
+
++-----------------------+---------------------------+-------------------------+
+|Module Parameter | Description | Default Value |
++-----------------------+---------------------------+-------------------------+
+|halt_poll_ns | The global max polling | KVM_HALT_POLL_NS_DEFAULT|
+| | interval which defines | |
+| | the ceiling value of the | |
+| | polling interval for | (per arch value) |
+| | each vcpu. | |
++-----------------------+---------------------------+-------------------------+
+|halt_poll_ns_grow | The value by which the | 2 |
+| | halt polling interval is | |
+| | multiplied in the | |
+| | grow_halt_poll_ns() | |
+| | function. | |
++-----------------------+---------------------------+-------------------------+
+|halt_poll_ns_grow_start| The initial value to grow | 10000 |
+| | to from zero in the | |
+| | grow_halt_poll_ns() | |
+| | function. | |
++-----------------------+---------------------------+-------------------------+
+|halt_poll_ns_shrink | The value by which the | 0 |
+| | halt polling interval is | |
+| | divided in the | |
+| | shrink_halt_poll_ns() | |
+| | function. | |
++-----------------------+---------------------------+-------------------------+
+
+These module parameters can be set from the sysfs files in:
+
+ /sys/module/kvm/parameters/
+
+Note: these module parameters are system-wide values and are not able to
+ be tuned on a per vm basis.
+
+Any changes to these parameters will be picked up by new and existing vCPUs the
+next time they halt, with the notable exception of VMs using KVM_CAP_HALT_POLL
+(see next section).
+
+KVM_CAP_HALT_POLL
+=================
+
+KVM_CAP_HALT_POLL is a VM capability that allows userspace to override halt_poll_ns
+on a per-VM basis. VMs using KVM_CAP_HALT_POLL ignore halt_poll_ns completely (but
+still obey halt_poll_ns_grow, halt_poll_ns_grow_start, and halt_poll_ns_shrink).
+
+See Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst for more information on this capability.
+
+Further Notes
+=============
+
+- Care should be taken when setting the halt_poll_ns module parameter as a large value
+ has the potential to drive the cpu usage to 100% on a machine which would be almost
+ entirely idle otherwise. This is because even if a guest has wakeups during which very
+ little work is done and which are quite far apart, if the period is shorter than the
+ global max polling interval (halt_poll_ns) then the host will always poll for the
+ entire block time and thus cpu utilisation will go to 100%.
+
+- Halt polling essentially presents a trade-off between power usage and latency and
+ the module parameters should be used to tune the affinity for this. Idle cpu time is
+ essentially converted to host kernel time with the aim of decreasing latency when
+ entering the guest.
+
+- Halt polling will only be conducted by the host when no other tasks are runnable on
+ that cpu, otherwise the polling will cease immediately and schedule will be invoked to
+ allow that other task to run. Thus this doesn't allow a guest to cause denial of service
+ of the cpu.
diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/index.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/index.rst
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..ad13ec55dd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/index.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+===
+KVM
+===
+
+.. toctree::
+ :maxdepth: 2
+
+ api
+ devices/index
+
+ arm/index
+ s390/index
+ ppc-pv
+ x86/index
+
+ locking
+ vcpu-requests
+ halt-polling
+ review-checklist
diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/locking.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/locking.rst
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..3a034db5e5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/locking.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,301 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+=================
+KVM Lock Overview
+=================
+
+1. Acquisition Orders
+---------------------
+
+The acquisition orders for mutexes are as follows:
+
+- cpus_read_lock() is taken outside kvm_lock
+
+- kvm->lock is taken outside vcpu->mutex
+
+- kvm->lock is taken outside kvm->slots_lock and kvm->irq_lock
+
+- kvm->slots_lock is taken outside kvm->irq_lock, though acquiring
+ them together is quite rare.
+
+- kvm->mn_active_invalidate_count ensures that pairs of
+ invalidate_range_start() and invalidate_range_end() callbacks
+ use the same memslots array. kvm->slots_lock and kvm->slots_arch_lock
+ are taken on the waiting side when modifying memslots, so MMU notifiers
+ must not take either kvm->slots_lock or kvm->slots_arch_lock.
+
+For SRCU:
+
+- ``synchronize_srcu(&kvm->srcu)`` is called inside critical sections
+ for kvm->lock, vcpu->mutex and kvm->slots_lock. These locks _cannot_
+ be taken inside a kvm->srcu read-side critical section; that is, the
+ following is broken::
+
+ srcu_read_lock(&kvm->srcu);
+ mutex_lock(&kvm->slots_lock);
+
+- kvm->slots_arch_lock instead is released before the call to
+ ``synchronize_srcu()``. It _can_ therefore be taken inside a
+ kvm->srcu read-side critical section, for example while processing
+ a vmexit.
+
+On x86:
+
+- vcpu->mutex is taken outside kvm->arch.hyperv.hv_lock and kvm->arch.xen.xen_lock
+
+- kvm->arch.mmu_lock is an rwlock. kvm->arch.tdp_mmu_pages_lock and
+ kvm->arch.mmu_unsync_pages_lock are taken inside kvm->arch.mmu_lock, and
+ cannot be taken without already holding kvm->arch.mmu_lock (typically with
+ ``read_lock`` for the TDP MMU, thus the need for additional spinlocks).
+
+Everything else is a leaf: no other lock is taken inside the critical
+sections.
+
+2. Exception
+------------
+
+Fast page fault:
+
+Fast page fault is the fast path which fixes the guest page fault out of
+the mmu-lock on x86. Currently, the page fault can be fast in one of the
+following two cases:
+
+1. Access Tracking: The SPTE is not present, but it is marked for access
+ tracking. That means we need to restore the saved R/X bits. This is
+ described in more detail later below.
+
+2. Write-Protection: The SPTE is present and the fault is caused by
+ write-protect. That means we just need to change the W bit of the spte.
+
+What we use to avoid all the races is the Host-writable bit and MMU-writable bit
+on the spte:
+
+- Host-writable means the gfn is writable in the host kernel page tables and in
+ its KVM memslot.
+- MMU-writable means the gfn is writable in the guest's mmu and it is not
+ write-protected by shadow page write-protection.
+
+On fast page fault path, we will use cmpxchg to atomically set the spte W
+bit if spte.HOST_WRITEABLE = 1 and spte.WRITE_PROTECT = 1, to restore the saved
+R/X bits if for an access-traced spte, or both. This is safe because whenever
+changing these bits can be detected by cmpxchg.
+
+But we need carefully check these cases:
+
+1) The mapping from gfn to pfn
+
+The mapping from gfn to pfn may be changed since we can only ensure the pfn
+is not changed during cmpxchg. This is a ABA problem, for example, below case
+will happen:
+
++------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+| At the beginning:: |
+| |
+| gpte = gfn1 |
+| gfn1 is mapped to pfn1 on host |
+| spte is the shadow page table entry corresponding with gpte and |
+| spte = pfn1 |
++------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+| On fast page fault path: |
++------------------------------------+-----------------------------------+
+| CPU 0: | CPU 1: |
++------------------------------------+-----------------------------------+
+| :: | |
+| | |
+| old_spte = *spte; | |
++------------------------------------+-----------------------------------+
+| | pfn1 is swapped out:: |
+| | |
+| | spte = 0; |
+| | |
+| | pfn1 is re-alloced for gfn2. |
+| | |
+| | gpte is changed to point to |
+| | gfn2 by the guest:: |
+| | |
+| | spte = pfn1; |
++------------------------------------+-----------------------------------+
+| :: |
+| |
+| if (cmpxchg(spte, old_spte, old_spte+W) |
+| mark_page_dirty(vcpu->kvm, gfn1) |
+| OOPS!!! |
++------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+
+We dirty-log for gfn1, that means gfn2 is lost in dirty-bitmap.
+
+For direct sp, we can easily avoid it since the spte of direct sp is fixed
+to gfn. For indirect sp, we disabled fast page fault for simplicity.
+
+A solution for indirect sp could be to pin the gfn, for example via
+kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_pfn_atomic, before the cmpxchg. After the pinning:
+
+- We have held the refcount of pfn; that means the pfn can not be freed and
+ be reused for another gfn.
+- The pfn is writable and therefore it cannot be shared between different gfns
+ by KSM.
+
+Then, we can ensure the dirty bitmaps is correctly set for a gfn.
+
+2) Dirty bit tracking
+
+In the origin code, the spte can be fast updated (non-atomically) if the
+spte is read-only and the Accessed bit has already been set since the
+Accessed bit and Dirty bit can not be lost.
+
+But it is not true after fast page fault since the spte can be marked
+writable between reading spte and updating spte. Like below case:
+
++------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+| At the beginning:: |
+| |
+| spte.W = 0 |
+| spte.Accessed = 1 |
++------------------------------------+-----------------------------------+
+| CPU 0: | CPU 1: |
++------------------------------------+-----------------------------------+
+| In mmu_spte_clear_track_bits():: | |
+| | |
+| old_spte = *spte; | |
+| | |
+| | |
+| /* 'if' condition is satisfied. */| |
+| if (old_spte.Accessed == 1 && | |
+| old_spte.W == 0) | |
+| spte = 0ull; | |
++------------------------------------+-----------------------------------+
+| | on fast page fault path:: |
+| | |
+| | spte.W = 1 |
+| | |
+| | memory write on the spte:: |
+| | |
+| | spte.Dirty = 1 |
++------------------------------------+-----------------------------------+
+| :: | |
+| | |
+| else | |
+| old_spte = xchg(spte, 0ull) | |
+| if (old_spte.Accessed == 1) | |
+| kvm_set_pfn_accessed(spte.pfn);| |
+| if (old_spte.Dirty == 1) | |
+| kvm_set_pfn_dirty(spte.pfn); | |
+| OOPS!!! | |
++------------------------------------+-----------------------------------+
+
+The Dirty bit is lost in this case.
+
+In order to avoid this kind of issue, we always treat the spte as "volatile"
+if it can be updated out of mmu-lock [see spte_has_volatile_bits()]; it means
+the spte is always atomically updated in this case.
+
+3) flush tlbs due to spte updated
+
+If the spte is updated from writable to read-only, we should flush all TLBs,
+otherwise rmap_write_protect will find a read-only spte, even though the
+writable spte might be cached on a CPU's TLB.
+
+As mentioned before, the spte can be updated to writable out of mmu-lock on
+fast page fault path. In order to easily audit the path, we see if TLBs needing
+to be flushed caused this reason in mmu_spte_update() since this is a common
+function to update spte (present -> present).
+
+Since the spte is "volatile" if it can be updated out of mmu-lock, we always
+atomically update the spte and the race caused by fast page fault can be avoided.
+See the comments in spte_has_volatile_bits() and mmu_spte_update().
+
+Lockless Access Tracking:
+
+This is used for Intel CPUs that are using EPT but do not support the EPT A/D
+bits. In this case, PTEs are tagged as A/D disabled (using ignored bits), and
+when the KVM MMU notifier is called to track accesses to a page (via
+kvm_mmu_notifier_clear_flush_young), it marks the PTE not-present in hardware
+by clearing the RWX bits in the PTE and storing the original R & X bits in more
+unused/ignored bits. When the VM tries to access the page later on, a fault is
+generated and the fast page fault mechanism described above is used to
+atomically restore the PTE to a Present state. The W bit is not saved when the
+PTE is marked for access tracking and during restoration to the Present state,
+the W bit is set depending on whether or not it was a write access. If it
+wasn't, then the W bit will remain clear until a write access happens, at which
+time it will be set using the Dirty tracking mechanism described above.
+
+3. Reference
+------------
+
+``kvm_lock``
+^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+:Type: mutex
+:Arch: any
+:Protects: - vm_list
+ - kvm_usage_count
+ - hardware virtualization enable/disable
+:Comment: KVM also disables CPU hotplug via cpus_read_lock() during
+ enable/disable.
+
+``kvm->mn_invalidate_lock``
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+:Type: spinlock_t
+:Arch: any
+:Protects: mn_active_invalidate_count, mn_memslots_update_rcuwait
+
+``kvm_arch::tsc_write_lock``
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+:Type: raw_spinlock_t
+:Arch: x86
+:Protects: - kvm_arch::{last_tsc_write,last_tsc_nsec,last_tsc_offset}
+ - tsc offset in vmcb
+:Comment: 'raw' because updating the tsc offsets must not be preempted.
+
+``kvm->mmu_lock``
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+:Type: spinlock_t or rwlock_t
+:Arch: any
+:Protects: -shadow page/shadow tlb entry
+:Comment: it is a spinlock since it is used in mmu notifier.
+
+``kvm->srcu``
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+:Type: srcu lock
+:Arch: any
+:Protects: - kvm->memslots
+ - kvm->buses
+:Comment: The srcu read lock must be held while accessing memslots (e.g.
+ when using gfn_to_* functions) and while accessing in-kernel
+ MMIO/PIO address->device structure mapping (kvm->buses).
+ The srcu index can be stored in kvm_vcpu->srcu_idx per vcpu
+ if it is needed by multiple functions.
+
+``kvm->slots_arch_lock``
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+:Type: mutex
+:Arch: any (only needed on x86 though)
+:Protects: any arch-specific fields of memslots that have to be modified
+ in a ``kvm->srcu`` read-side critical section.
+:Comment: must be held before reading the pointer to the current memslots,
+ until after all changes to the memslots are complete
+
+``wakeup_vcpus_on_cpu_lock``
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+:Type: spinlock_t
+:Arch: x86
+:Protects: wakeup_vcpus_on_cpu
+:Comment: This is a per-CPU lock and it is used for VT-d posted-interrupts.
+ When VT-d posted-interrupts are supported and the VM has assigned
+ devices, we put the blocked vCPU on the list blocked_vcpu_on_cpu
+ protected by blocked_vcpu_on_cpu_lock. When VT-d hardware issues
+ wakeup notification event since external interrupts from the
+ assigned devices happens, we will find the vCPU on the list to
+ wakeup.
+
+``vendor_module_lock``
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+:Type: mutex
+:Arch: x86
+:Protects: loading a vendor module (kvm_amd or kvm_intel)
+:Comment: Exists because using kvm_lock leads to deadlock. cpu_hotplug_lock is
+ taken outside of kvm_lock, e.g. in KVM's CPU online/offline callbacks, and
+ many operations need to take cpu_hotplug_lock when loading a vendor module,
+ e.g. updating static calls.
diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/ppc-pv.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/ppc-pv.rst
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..740d03d253
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/ppc-pv.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,222 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+=================================
+The PPC KVM paravirtual interface
+=================================
+
+The basic execution principle by which KVM on PowerPC works is to run all kernel
+space code in PR=1 which is user space. This way we trap all privileged
+instructions and can emulate them accordingly.
+
+Unfortunately that is also the downfall. There are quite some privileged
+instructions that needlessly return us to the hypervisor even though they
+could be handled differently.
+
+This is what the PPC PV interface helps with. It takes privileged instructions
+and transforms them into unprivileged ones with some help from the hypervisor.
+This cuts down virtualization costs by about 50% on some of my benchmarks.
+
+The code for that interface can be found in arch/powerpc/kernel/kvm*
+
+Querying for existence
+======================
+
+To find out if we're running on KVM or not, we leverage the device tree. When
+Linux is running on KVM, a node /hypervisor exists. That node contains a
+compatible property with the value "linux,kvm".
+
+Once you determined you're running under a PV capable KVM, you can now use
+hypercalls as described below.
+
+KVM hypercalls
+==============
+
+Inside the device tree's /hypervisor node there's a property called
+'hypercall-instructions'. This property contains at most 4 opcodes that make
+up the hypercall. To call a hypercall, just call these instructions.
+
+The parameters are as follows:
+
+ ======== ================ ================
+ Register IN OUT
+ ======== ================ ================
+ r0 - volatile
+ r3 1st parameter Return code
+ r4 2nd parameter 1st output value
+ r5 3rd parameter 2nd output value
+ r6 4th parameter 3rd output value
+ r7 5th parameter 4th output value
+ r8 6th parameter 5th output value
+ r9 7th parameter 6th output value
+ r10 8th parameter 7th output value
+ r11 hypercall number 8th output value
+ r12 - volatile
+ ======== ================ ================
+
+Hypercall definitions are shared in generic code, so the same hypercall numbers
+apply for x86 and powerpc alike with the exception that each KVM hypercall
+also needs to be ORed with the KVM vendor code which is (42 << 16).
+
+Return codes can be as follows:
+
+ ==== =========================
+ Code Meaning
+ ==== =========================
+ 0 Success
+ 12 Hypercall not implemented
+ <0 Error
+ ==== =========================
+
+The magic page
+==============
+
+To enable communication between the hypervisor and guest there is a new shared
+page that contains parts of supervisor visible register state. The guest can
+map this shared page using the KVM hypercall KVM_HC_PPC_MAP_MAGIC_PAGE.
+
+With this hypercall issued the guest always gets the magic page mapped at the
+desired location. The first parameter indicates the effective address when the
+MMU is enabled. The second parameter indicates the address in real mode, if
+applicable to the target. For now, we always map the page to -4096. This way we
+can access it using absolute load and store functions. The following
+instruction reads the first field of the magic page::
+
+ ld rX, -4096(0)
+
+The interface is designed to be extensible should there be need later to add
+additional registers to the magic page. If you add fields to the magic page,
+also define a new hypercall feature to indicate that the host can give you more
+registers. Only if the host supports the additional features, make use of them.
+
+The magic page layout is described by struct kvm_vcpu_arch_shared
+in arch/powerpc/include/uapi/asm/kvm_para.h.
+
+Magic page features
+===================
+
+When mapping the magic page using the KVM hypercall KVM_HC_PPC_MAP_MAGIC_PAGE,
+a second return value is passed to the guest. This second return value contains
+a bitmap of available features inside the magic page.
+
+The following enhancements to the magic page are currently available:
+
+ ============================ =======================================
+ KVM_MAGIC_FEAT_SR Maps SR registers r/w in the magic page
+ KVM_MAGIC_FEAT_MAS0_TO_SPRG7 Maps MASn, ESR, PIR and high SPRGs
+ ============================ =======================================
+
+For enhanced features in the magic page, please check for the existence of the
+feature before using them!
+
+Magic page flags
+================
+
+In addition to features that indicate whether a host is capable of a particular
+feature we also have a channel for a guest to tell the host whether it's capable
+of something. This is what we call "flags".
+
+Flags are passed to the host in the low 12 bits of the Effective Address.
+
+The following flags are currently available for a guest to expose:
+
+ MAGIC_PAGE_FLAG_NOT_MAPPED_NX Guest handles NX bits correctly wrt magic page
+
+MSR bits
+========
+
+The MSR contains bits that require hypervisor intervention and bits that do
+not require direct hypervisor intervention because they only get interpreted
+when entering the guest or don't have any impact on the hypervisor's behavior.
+
+The following bits are safe to be set inside the guest:
+
+ - MSR_EE
+ - MSR_RI
+
+If any other bit changes in the MSR, please still use mtmsr(d).
+
+Patched instructions
+====================
+
+The "ld" and "std" instructions are transformed to "lwz" and "stw" instructions
+respectively on 32-bit systems with an added offset of 4 to accommodate for big
+endianness.
+
+The following is a list of mapping the Linux kernel performs when running as
+guest. Implementing any of those mappings is optional, as the instruction traps
+also act on the shared page. So calling privileged instructions still works as
+before.
+
+======================= ================================
+From To
+======================= ================================
+mfmsr rX ld rX, magic_page->msr
+mfsprg rX, 0 ld rX, magic_page->sprg0
+mfsprg rX, 1 ld rX, magic_page->sprg1
+mfsprg rX, 2 ld rX, magic_page->sprg2
+mfsprg rX, 3 ld rX, magic_page->sprg3
+mfsrr0 rX ld rX, magic_page->srr0
+mfsrr1 rX ld rX, magic_page->srr1
+mfdar rX ld rX, magic_page->dar
+mfdsisr rX lwz rX, magic_page->dsisr
+
+mtmsr rX std rX, magic_page->msr
+mtsprg 0, rX std rX, magic_page->sprg0
+mtsprg 1, rX std rX, magic_page->sprg1
+mtsprg 2, rX std rX, magic_page->sprg2
+mtsprg 3, rX std rX, magic_page->sprg3
+mtsrr0 rX std rX, magic_page->srr0
+mtsrr1 rX std rX, magic_page->srr1
+mtdar rX std rX, magic_page->dar
+mtdsisr rX stw rX, magic_page->dsisr
+
+tlbsync nop
+
+mtmsrd rX, 0 b <special mtmsr section>
+mtmsr rX b <special mtmsr section>
+
+mtmsrd rX, 1 b <special mtmsrd section>
+
+[Book3S only]
+mtsrin rX, rY b <special mtsrin section>
+
+[BookE only]
+wrteei [0|1] b <special wrteei section>
+======================= ================================
+
+Some instructions require more logic to determine what's going on than a load
+or store instruction can deliver. To enable patching of those, we keep some
+RAM around where we can live translate instructions to. What happens is the
+following:
+
+ 1) copy emulation code to memory
+ 2) patch that code to fit the emulated instruction
+ 3) patch that code to return to the original pc + 4
+ 4) patch the original instruction to branch to the new code
+
+That way we can inject an arbitrary amount of code as replacement for a single
+instruction. This allows us to check for pending interrupts when setting EE=1
+for example.
+
+Hypercall ABIs in KVM on PowerPC
+=================================
+
+1) KVM hypercalls (ePAPR)
+
+These are ePAPR compliant hypercall implementation (mentioned above). Even
+generic hypercalls are implemented here, like the ePAPR idle hcall. These are
+available on all targets.
+
+2) PAPR hypercalls
+
+PAPR hypercalls are needed to run server PowerPC PAPR guests (-M pseries in QEMU).
+These are the same hypercalls that pHyp, the POWER hypervisor, implements. Some of
+them are handled in the kernel, some are handled in user space. This is only
+available on book3s_64.
+
+3) OSI hypercalls
+
+Mac-on-Linux is another user of KVM on PowerPC, which has its own hypercall (long
+before KVM). This is supported to maintain compatibility. All these hypercalls get
+forwarded to user space. This is only useful on book3s_32, but can be used with
+book3s_64 as well.
diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/review-checklist.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/review-checklist.rst
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..dc01aea405
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/review-checklist.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+================================
+Review checklist for kvm patches
+================================
+
+1. The patch must follow Documentation/process/coding-style.rst and
+ Documentation/process/submitting-patches.rst.
+
+2. Patches should be against kvm.git master branch.
+
+3. If the patch introduces or modifies a new userspace API:
+ - the API must be documented in Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst
+ - the API must be discoverable using KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION
+
+4. New state must include support for save/restore.
+
+5. New features must default to off (userspace should explicitly request them).
+ Performance improvements can and should default to on.
+
+6. New cpu features should be exposed via KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID2
+
+7. Emulator changes should be accompanied by unit tests for qemu-kvm.git
+ kvm/test directory.
+
+8. Changes should be vendor neutral when possible. Changes to common code
+ are better than duplicating changes to vendor code.
+
+9. Similarly, prefer changes to arch independent code than to arch dependent
+ code.
+
+10. User/kernel interfaces and guest/host interfaces must be 64-bit clean
+ (all variables and sizes naturally aligned on 64-bit; use specific types
+ only - u64 rather than ulong).
+
+11. New guest visible features must either be documented in a hardware manual
+ or be accompanied by documentation.
+
+12. Features must be robust against reset and kexec - for example, shared
+ host/guest memory must be unshared to prevent the host from writing to
+ guest memory that the guest has not reserved for this purpose.
diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/s390/index.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/s390/index.rst
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..44ec9ab14b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/s390/index.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+====================
+KVM for s390 systems
+====================
+
+.. toctree::
+ :maxdepth: 2
+
+ s390-diag
+ s390-pv
+ s390-pv-boot
+ s390-pv-dump
diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/s390/s390-diag.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/s390/s390-diag.rst
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..ca85f030eb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/s390/s390-diag.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+=============================
+The s390 DIAGNOSE call on KVM
+=============================
+
+KVM on s390 supports the DIAGNOSE call for making hypercalls, both for
+native hypercalls and for selected hypercalls found on other s390
+hypervisors.
+
+Note that bits are numbered as by the usual s390 convention (most significant
+bit on the left).
+
+
+General remarks
+---------------
+
+DIAGNOSE calls by the guest cause a mandatory intercept. This implies
+all supported DIAGNOSE calls need to be handled by either KVM or its
+userspace.
+
+All DIAGNOSE calls supported by KVM use the RS-a format::
+
+ --------------------------------------
+ | '83' | R1 | R3 | B2 | D2 |
+ --------------------------------------
+ 0 8 12 16 20 31
+
+The second-operand address (obtained by the base/displacement calculation)
+is not used to address data. Instead, bits 48-63 of this address specify
+the function code, and bits 0-47 are ignored.
+
+The supported DIAGNOSE function codes vary by the userspace used. For
+DIAGNOSE function codes not specific to KVM, please refer to the
+documentation for the s390 hypervisors defining them.
+
+
+DIAGNOSE function code 'X'500' - KVM virtio functions
+-----------------------------------------------------
+
+If the function code specifies 0x500, various virtio-related functions
+are performed.
+
+General register 1 contains the virtio subfunction code. Supported
+virtio subfunctions depend on KVM's userspace. Generally, userspace
+provides either s390-virtio (subcodes 0-2) or virtio-ccw (subcode 3).
+
+Upon completion of the DIAGNOSE instruction, general register 2 contains
+the function's return code, which is either a return code or a subcode
+specific value.
+
+Subcode 0 - s390-virtio notification and early console printk
+ Handled by userspace.
+
+Subcode 1 - s390-virtio reset
+ Handled by userspace.
+
+Subcode 2 - s390-virtio set status
+ Handled by userspace.
+
+Subcode 3 - virtio-ccw notification
+ Handled by either userspace or KVM (ioeventfd case).
+
+ General register 2 contains a subchannel-identification word denoting
+ the subchannel of the virtio-ccw proxy device to be notified.
+
+ General register 3 contains the number of the virtqueue to be notified.
+
+ General register 4 contains a 64bit identifier for KVM usage (the
+ kvm_io_bus cookie). If general register 4 does not contain a valid
+ identifier, it is ignored.
+
+ After completion of the DIAGNOSE call, general register 2 may contain
+ a 64bit identifier (in the kvm_io_bus cookie case), or a negative
+ error value, if an internal error occurred.
+
+ See also the virtio standard for a discussion of this hypercall.
+
+
+DIAGNOSE function code 'X'501 - KVM breakpoint
+----------------------------------------------
+
+If the function code specifies 0x501, breakpoint functions may be performed.
+This function code is handled by userspace.
+
+This diagnose function code has no subfunctions and uses no parameters.
+
+
+DIAGNOSE function code 'X'9C - Voluntary Time Slice Yield
+---------------------------------------------------------
+
+General register 1 contains the target CPU address.
+
+In a guest of a hypervisor like LPAR, KVM or z/VM using shared host CPUs,
+DIAGNOSE with function code 0x9c may improve system performance by
+yielding the host CPU on which the guest CPU is running to be assigned
+to another guest CPU, preferably the logical CPU containing the specified
+target CPU.
+
+
+DIAG 'X'9C forwarding
++++++++++++++++++++++
+
+The guest may send a DIAGNOSE 0x9c in order to yield to a certain
+other vcpu. An example is a Linux guest that tries to yield to the vcpu
+that is currently holding a spinlock, but not running.
+
+However, on the host the real cpu backing the vcpu may itself not be
+running.
+Forwarding the DIAGNOSE 0x9c initially sent by the guest to yield to
+the backing cpu will hopefully cause that cpu, and thus subsequently
+the guest's vcpu, to be scheduled.
+
+
+diag9c_forwarding_hz
+ KVM kernel parameter allowing to specify the maximum number of DIAGNOSE
+ 0x9c forwarding per second in the purpose of avoiding a DIAGNOSE 0x9c
+ forwarding storm.
+ A value of 0 turns the forwarding off.
diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/s390/s390-pv-boot.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/s390/s390-pv-boot.rst
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..96c48480a3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/s390/s390-pv-boot.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+======================================
+s390 (IBM Z) Boot/IPL of Protected VMs
+======================================
+
+Summary
+-------
+The memory of Protected Virtual Machines (PVMs) is not accessible to
+I/O or the hypervisor. In those cases where the hypervisor needs to
+access the memory of a PVM, that memory must be made accessible.
+Memory made accessible to the hypervisor will be encrypted. See
+Documentation/virt/kvm/s390/s390-pv.rst for details."
+
+On IPL (boot) a small plaintext bootloader is started, which provides
+information about the encrypted components and necessary metadata to
+KVM to decrypt the protected virtual machine.
+
+Based on this data, KVM will make the protected virtual machine known
+to the Ultravisor (UV) and instruct it to secure the memory of the
+PVM, decrypt the components and verify the data and address list
+hashes, to ensure integrity. Afterwards KVM can run the PVM via the
+SIE instruction which the UV will intercept and execute on KVM's
+behalf.
+
+As the guest image is just like an opaque kernel image that does the
+switch into PV mode itself, the user can load encrypted guest
+executables and data via every available method (network, dasd, scsi,
+direct kernel, ...) without the need to change the boot process.
+
+
+Diag308
+-------
+This diagnose instruction is the basic mechanism to handle IPL and
+related operations for virtual machines. The VM can set and retrieve
+IPL information blocks, that specify the IPL method/devices and
+request VM memory and subsystem resets, as well as IPLs.
+
+For PVMs this concept has been extended with new subcodes:
+
+Subcode 8: Set an IPL Information Block of type 5 (information block
+for PVMs)
+Subcode 9: Store the saved block in guest memory
+Subcode 10: Move into Protected Virtualization mode
+
+The new PV load-device-specific-parameters field specifies all data
+that is necessary to move into PV mode.
+
+* PV Header origin
+* PV Header length
+* List of Components composed of
+ * AES-XTS Tweak prefix
+ * Origin
+ * Size
+
+The PV header contains the keys and hashes, which the UV will use to
+decrypt and verify the PV, as well as control flags and a start PSW.
+
+The components are for instance an encrypted kernel, kernel parameters
+and initrd. The components are decrypted by the UV.
+
+After the initial import of the encrypted data, all defined pages will
+contain the guest content. All non-specified pages will start out as
+zero pages on first access.
+
+
+When running in protected virtualization mode, some subcodes will result in
+exceptions or return error codes.
+
+Subcodes 4 and 7, which specify operations that do not clear the guest
+memory, will result in specification exceptions. This is because the
+UV will clear all memory when a secure VM is removed, and therefore
+non-clearing IPL subcodes are not allowed.
+
+Subcodes 8, 9, 10 will result in specification exceptions.
+Re-IPL into a protected mode is only possible via a detour into non
+protected mode.
+
+Keys
+----
+Every CEC will have a unique public key to enable tooling to build
+encrypted images.
+See `s390-tools <https://github.com/ibm-s390-linux/s390-tools/>`_
+for the tooling.
diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/s390/s390-pv-dump.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/s390/s390-pv-dump.rst
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e542f06048
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/s390/s390-pv-dump.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+===========================================
+s390 (IBM Z) Protected Virtualization dumps
+===========================================
+
+Summary
+-------
+
+Dumping a VM is an essential tool for debugging problems inside
+it. This is especially true when a protected VM runs into trouble as
+there's no way to access its memory and registers from the outside
+while it's running.
+
+However when dumping a protected VM we need to maintain its
+confidentiality until the dump is in the hands of the VM owner who
+should be the only one capable of analysing it.
+
+The confidentiality of the VM dump is ensured by the Ultravisor who
+provides an interface to KVM over which encrypted CPU and memory data
+can be requested. The encryption is based on the Customer
+Communication Key which is the key that's used to encrypt VM data in a
+way that the customer is able to decrypt.
+
+
+Dump process
+------------
+
+A dump is done in 3 steps:
+
+**Initiation**
+
+This step initializes the dump process, generates cryptographic seeds
+and extracts dump keys with which the VM dump data will be encrypted.
+
+**Data gathering**
+
+Currently there are two types of data that can be gathered from a VM:
+the memory and the vcpu state.
+
+The vcpu state contains all the important registers, general, floating
+point, vector, control and tod/timers of a vcpu. The vcpu dump can
+contain incomplete data if a vcpu is dumped while an instruction is
+emulated with help of the hypervisor. This is indicated by a flag bit
+in the dump data. For the same reason it is very important to not only
+write out the encrypted vcpu state, but also the unencrypted state
+from the hypervisor.
+
+The memory state is further divided into the encrypted memory and its
+metadata comprised of the encryption tweaks and status flags. The
+encrypted memory can simply be read once it has been exported. The
+time of the export does not matter as no re-encryption is
+needed. Memory that has been swapped out and hence was exported can be
+read from the swap and written to the dump target without need for any
+special actions.
+
+The tweaks / status flags for the exported pages need to be requested
+from the Ultravisor.
+
+**Finalization**
+
+The finalization step will provide the data needed to be able to
+decrypt the vcpu and memory data and end the dump process. When this
+step completes successfully a new dump initiation can be started.
diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/s390/s390-pv.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/s390/s390-pv.rst
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..8e41a3b63f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/s390/s390-pv.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+=========================================
+s390 (IBM Z) Ultravisor and Protected VMs
+=========================================
+
+Summary
+-------
+Protected virtual machines (PVM) are KVM VMs that do not allow KVM to
+access VM state like guest memory or guest registers. Instead, the
+PVMs are mostly managed by a new entity called Ultravisor (UV). The UV
+provides an API that can be used by PVMs and KVM to request management
+actions.
+
+Each guest starts in non-protected mode and then may make a request to
+transition into protected mode. On transition, KVM registers the guest
+and its VCPUs with the Ultravisor and prepares everything for running
+it.
+
+The Ultravisor will secure and decrypt the guest's boot memory
+(i.e. kernel/initrd). It will safeguard state changes like VCPU
+starts/stops and injected interrupts while the guest is running.
+
+As access to the guest's state, such as the SIE state description, is
+normally needed to be able to run a VM, some changes have been made in
+the behavior of the SIE instruction. A new format 4 state description
+has been introduced, where some fields have different meanings for a
+PVM. SIE exits are minimized as much as possible to improve speed and
+reduce exposed guest state.
+
+
+Interrupt injection
+-------------------
+Interrupt injection is safeguarded by the Ultravisor. As KVM doesn't
+have access to the VCPUs' lowcores, injection is handled via the
+format 4 state description.
+
+Machine check, external, IO and restart interruptions each can be
+injected on SIE entry via a bit in the interrupt injection control
+field (offset 0x54). If the guest cpu is not enabled for the interrupt
+at the time of injection, a validity interception is recognized. The
+format 4 state description contains fields in the interception data
+block where data associated with the interrupt can be transported.
+
+Program and Service Call exceptions have another layer of
+safeguarding; they can only be injected for instructions that have
+been intercepted into KVM. The exceptions need to be a valid outcome
+of an instruction emulation by KVM, e.g. we can never inject a
+addressing exception as they are reported by SIE since KVM has no
+access to the guest memory.
+
+
+Mask notification interceptions
+-------------------------------
+KVM cannot intercept lctl(g) and lpsw(e) anymore in order to be
+notified when a PVM enables a certain class of interrupt. As a
+replacement, two new interception codes have been introduced: One
+indicating that the contents of CRs 0, 6, or 14 have been changed,
+indicating different interruption subclasses; and one indicating that
+PSW bit 13 has been changed, indicating that a machine check
+intervention was requested and those are now enabled.
+
+Instruction emulation
+---------------------
+With the format 4 state description for PVMs, the SIE instruction already
+interprets more instructions than it does with format 2. It is not able
+to interpret every instruction, but needs to hand some tasks to KVM;
+therefore, the SIE and the ultravisor safeguard emulation inputs and outputs.
+
+The control structures associated with SIE provide the Secure
+Instruction Data Area (SIDA), the Interception Parameters (IP) and the
+Secure Interception General Register Save Area. Guest GRs and most of
+the instruction data, such as I/O data structures, are filtered.
+Instruction data is copied to and from the SIDA when needed. Guest
+GRs are put into / retrieved from the Secure Interception General
+Register Save Area.
+
+Only GR values needed to emulate an instruction will be copied into this
+save area and the real register numbers will be hidden.
+
+The Interception Parameters state description field still contains
+the bytes of the instruction text, but with pre-set register values
+instead of the actual ones. I.e. each instruction always uses the same
+instruction text, in order not to leak guest instruction text.
+This also implies that the register content that a guest had in r<n>
+may be in r<m> from the hypervisor's point of view.
+
+The Secure Instruction Data Area contains instruction storage
+data. Instruction data, i.e. data being referenced by an instruction
+like the SCCB for sclp, is moved via the SIDA. When an instruction is
+intercepted, the SIE will only allow data and program interrupts for
+this instruction to be moved to the guest via the two data areas
+discussed before. Other data is either ignored or results in validity
+interceptions.
+
+
+Instruction emulation interceptions
+-----------------------------------
+There are two types of SIE secure instruction intercepts: the normal
+and the notification type. Normal secure instruction intercepts will
+make the guest pending for instruction completion of the intercepted
+instruction type, i.e. on SIE entry it is attempted to complete
+emulation of the instruction with the data provided by KVM. That might
+be a program exception or instruction completion.
+
+The notification type intercepts inform KVM about guest environment
+changes due to guest instruction interpretation. Such an interception
+is recognized, for example, for the store prefix instruction to provide
+the new lowcore location. On SIE reentry, any KVM data in the data areas
+is ignored and execution continues as if the guest instruction had
+completed. For that reason KVM is not allowed to inject a program
+interrupt.
+
+Links
+-----
+`KVM Forum 2019 presentation <https://static.sched.com/hosted_files/kvmforum2019/3b/ibm_protected_vms_s390x.pdf>`_
diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/vcpu-requests.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/vcpu-requests.rst
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..06718b9bc9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/vcpu-requests.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,294 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+=================
+KVM VCPU Requests
+=================
+
+Overview
+========
+
+KVM supports an internal API enabling threads to request a VCPU thread to
+perform some activity. For example, a thread may request a VCPU to flush
+its TLB with a VCPU request. The API consists of the following functions::
+
+ /* Check if any requests are pending for VCPU @vcpu. */
+ bool kvm_request_pending(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+
+ /* Check if VCPU @vcpu has request @req pending. */
+ bool kvm_test_request(int req, struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+
+ /* Clear request @req for VCPU @vcpu. */
+ void kvm_clear_request(int req, struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+
+ /*
+ * Check if VCPU @vcpu has request @req pending. When the request is
+ * pending it will be cleared and a memory barrier, which pairs with
+ * another in kvm_make_request(), will be issued.
+ */
+ bool kvm_check_request(int req, struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+
+ /*
+ * Make request @req of VCPU @vcpu. Issues a memory barrier, which pairs
+ * with another in kvm_check_request(), prior to setting the request.
+ */
+ void kvm_make_request(int req, struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+
+ /* Make request @req of all VCPUs of the VM with struct kvm @kvm. */
+ bool kvm_make_all_cpus_request(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int req);
+
+Typically a requester wants the VCPU to perform the activity as soon
+as possible after making the request. This means most requests
+(kvm_make_request() calls) are followed by a call to kvm_vcpu_kick(),
+and kvm_make_all_cpus_request() has the kicking of all VCPUs built
+into it.
+
+VCPU Kicks
+----------
+
+The goal of a VCPU kick is to bring a VCPU thread out of guest mode in
+order to perform some KVM maintenance. To do so, an IPI is sent, forcing
+a guest mode exit. However, a VCPU thread may not be in guest mode at the
+time of the kick. Therefore, depending on the mode and state of the VCPU
+thread, there are two other actions a kick may take. All three actions
+are listed below:
+
+1) Send an IPI. This forces a guest mode exit.
+2) Waking a sleeping VCPU. Sleeping VCPUs are VCPU threads outside guest
+ mode that wait on waitqueues. Waking them removes the threads from
+ the waitqueues, allowing the threads to run again. This behavior
+ may be suppressed, see KVM_REQUEST_NO_WAKEUP below.
+3) Nothing. When the VCPU is not in guest mode and the VCPU thread is not
+ sleeping, then there is nothing to do.
+
+VCPU Mode
+---------
+
+VCPUs have a mode state, ``vcpu->mode``, that is used to track whether the
+guest is running in guest mode or not, as well as some specific
+outside guest mode states. The architecture may use ``vcpu->mode`` to
+ensure VCPU requests are seen by VCPUs (see "Ensuring Requests Are Seen"),
+as well as to avoid sending unnecessary IPIs (see "IPI Reduction"), and
+even to ensure IPI acknowledgements are waited upon (see "Waiting for
+Acknowledgements"). The following modes are defined:
+
+OUTSIDE_GUEST_MODE
+
+ The VCPU thread is outside guest mode.
+
+IN_GUEST_MODE
+
+ The VCPU thread is in guest mode.
+
+EXITING_GUEST_MODE
+
+ The VCPU thread is transitioning from IN_GUEST_MODE to
+ OUTSIDE_GUEST_MODE.
+
+READING_SHADOW_PAGE_TABLES
+
+ The VCPU thread is outside guest mode, but it wants the sender of
+ certain VCPU requests, namely KVM_REQ_TLB_FLUSH, to wait until the VCPU
+ thread is done reading the page tables.
+
+VCPU Request Internals
+======================
+
+VCPU requests are simply bit indices of the ``vcpu->requests`` bitmap.
+This means general bitops, like those documented in [atomic-ops]_ could
+also be used, e.g. ::
+
+ clear_bit(KVM_REQ_UNBLOCK & KVM_REQUEST_MASK, &vcpu->requests);
+
+However, VCPU request users should refrain from doing so, as it would
+break the abstraction. The first 8 bits are reserved for architecture
+independent requests; all additional bits are available for architecture
+dependent requests.
+
+Architecture Independent Requests
+---------------------------------
+
+KVM_REQ_TLB_FLUSH
+
+ KVM's common MMU notifier may need to flush all of a guest's TLB
+ entries, calling kvm_flush_remote_tlbs() to do so. Architectures that
+ choose to use the common kvm_flush_remote_tlbs() implementation will
+ need to handle this VCPU request.
+
+KVM_REQ_VM_DEAD
+
+ This request informs all VCPUs that the VM is dead and unusable, e.g. due to
+ fatal error or because the VM's state has been intentionally destroyed.
+
+KVM_REQ_UNBLOCK
+
+ This request informs the vCPU to exit kvm_vcpu_block. It is used for
+ example from timer handlers that run on the host on behalf of a vCPU,
+ or in order to update the interrupt routing and ensure that assigned
+ devices will wake up the vCPU.
+
+KVM_REQ_OUTSIDE_GUEST_MODE
+
+ This "request" ensures the target vCPU has exited guest mode prior to the
+ sender of the request continuing on. No action needs be taken by the target,
+ and so no request is actually logged for the target. This request is similar
+ to a "kick", but unlike a kick it guarantees the vCPU has actually exited
+ guest mode. A kick only guarantees the vCPU will exit at some point in the
+ future, e.g. a previous kick may have started the process, but there's no
+ guarantee the to-be-kicked vCPU has fully exited guest mode.
+
+KVM_REQUEST_MASK
+----------------
+
+VCPU requests should be masked by KVM_REQUEST_MASK before using them with
+bitops. This is because only the lower 8 bits are used to represent the
+request's number. The upper bits are used as flags. Currently only two
+flags are defined.
+
+VCPU Request Flags
+------------------
+
+KVM_REQUEST_NO_WAKEUP
+
+ This flag is applied to requests that only need immediate attention
+ from VCPUs running in guest mode. That is, sleeping VCPUs do not need
+ to be awakened for these requests. Sleeping VCPUs will handle the
+ requests when they are awakened later for some other reason.
+
+KVM_REQUEST_WAIT
+
+ When requests with this flag are made with kvm_make_all_cpus_request(),
+ then the caller will wait for each VCPU to acknowledge its IPI before
+ proceeding. This flag only applies to VCPUs that would receive IPIs.
+ If, for example, the VCPU is sleeping, so no IPI is necessary, then
+ the requesting thread does not wait. This means that this flag may be
+ safely combined with KVM_REQUEST_NO_WAKEUP. See "Waiting for
+ Acknowledgements" for more information about requests with
+ KVM_REQUEST_WAIT.
+
+VCPU Requests with Associated State
+===================================
+
+Requesters that want the receiving VCPU to handle new state need to ensure
+the newly written state is observable to the receiving VCPU thread's CPU
+by the time it observes the request. This means a write memory barrier
+must be inserted after writing the new state and before setting the VCPU
+request bit. Additionally, on the receiving VCPU thread's side, a
+corresponding read barrier must be inserted after reading the request bit
+and before proceeding to read the new state associated with it. See
+scenario 3, Message and Flag, of [lwn-mb]_ and the kernel documentation
+[memory-barriers]_.
+
+The pair of functions, kvm_check_request() and kvm_make_request(), provide
+the memory barriers, allowing this requirement to be handled internally by
+the API.
+
+Ensuring Requests Are Seen
+==========================
+
+When making requests to VCPUs, we want to avoid the receiving VCPU
+executing in guest mode for an arbitrary long time without handling the
+request. We can be sure this won't happen as long as we ensure the VCPU
+thread checks kvm_request_pending() before entering guest mode and that a
+kick will send an IPI to force an exit from guest mode when necessary.
+Extra care must be taken to cover the period after the VCPU thread's last
+kvm_request_pending() check and before it has entered guest mode, as kick
+IPIs will only trigger guest mode exits for VCPU threads that are in guest
+mode or at least have already disabled interrupts in order to prepare to
+enter guest mode. This means that an optimized implementation (see "IPI
+Reduction") must be certain when it's safe to not send the IPI. One
+solution, which all architectures except s390 apply, is to:
+
+- set ``vcpu->mode`` to IN_GUEST_MODE between disabling the interrupts and
+ the last kvm_request_pending() check;
+- enable interrupts atomically when entering the guest.
+
+This solution also requires memory barriers to be placed carefully in both
+the requesting thread and the receiving VCPU. With the memory barriers we
+can exclude the possibility of a VCPU thread observing
+!kvm_request_pending() on its last check and then not receiving an IPI for
+the next request made of it, even if the request is made immediately after
+the check. This is done by way of the Dekker memory barrier pattern
+(scenario 10 of [lwn-mb]_). As the Dekker pattern requires two variables,
+this solution pairs ``vcpu->mode`` with ``vcpu->requests``. Substituting
+them into the pattern gives::
+
+ CPU1 CPU2
+ ================= =================
+ local_irq_disable();
+ WRITE_ONCE(vcpu->mode, IN_GUEST_MODE); kvm_make_request(REQ, vcpu);
+ smp_mb(); smp_mb();
+ if (kvm_request_pending(vcpu)) { if (READ_ONCE(vcpu->mode) ==
+ IN_GUEST_MODE) {
+ ...abort guest entry... ...send IPI...
+ } }
+
+As stated above, the IPI is only useful for VCPU threads in guest mode or
+that have already disabled interrupts. This is why this specific case of
+the Dekker pattern has been extended to disable interrupts before setting
+``vcpu->mode`` to IN_GUEST_MODE. WRITE_ONCE() and READ_ONCE() are used to
+pedantically implement the memory barrier pattern, guaranteeing the
+compiler doesn't interfere with ``vcpu->mode``'s carefully planned
+accesses.
+
+IPI Reduction
+-------------
+
+As only one IPI is needed to get a VCPU to check for any/all requests,
+then they may be coalesced. This is easily done by having the first IPI
+sending kick also change the VCPU mode to something !IN_GUEST_MODE. The
+transitional state, EXITING_GUEST_MODE, is used for this purpose.
+
+Waiting for Acknowledgements
+----------------------------
+
+Some requests, those with the KVM_REQUEST_WAIT flag set, require IPIs to
+be sent, and the acknowledgements to be waited upon, even when the target
+VCPU threads are in modes other than IN_GUEST_MODE. For example, one case
+is when a target VCPU thread is in READING_SHADOW_PAGE_TABLES mode, which
+is set after disabling interrupts. To support these cases, the
+KVM_REQUEST_WAIT flag changes the condition for sending an IPI from
+checking that the VCPU is IN_GUEST_MODE to checking that it is not
+OUTSIDE_GUEST_MODE.
+
+Request-less VCPU Kicks
+-----------------------
+
+As the determination of whether or not to send an IPI depends on the
+two-variable Dekker memory barrier pattern, then it's clear that
+request-less VCPU kicks are almost never correct. Without the assurance
+that a non-IPI generating kick will still result in an action by the
+receiving VCPU, as the final kvm_request_pending() check does for
+request-accompanying kicks, then the kick may not do anything useful at
+all. If, for instance, a request-less kick was made to a VCPU that was
+just about to set its mode to IN_GUEST_MODE, meaning no IPI is sent, then
+the VCPU thread may continue its entry without actually having done
+whatever it was the kick was meant to initiate.
+
+One exception is x86's posted interrupt mechanism. In this case, however,
+even the request-less VCPU kick is coupled with the same
+local_irq_disable() + smp_mb() pattern described above; the ON bit
+(Outstanding Notification) in the posted interrupt descriptor takes the
+role of ``vcpu->requests``. When sending a posted interrupt, PIR.ON is
+set before reading ``vcpu->mode``; dually, in the VCPU thread,
+vmx_sync_pir_to_irr() reads PIR after setting ``vcpu->mode`` to
+IN_GUEST_MODE.
+
+Additional Considerations
+=========================
+
+Sleeping VCPUs
+--------------
+
+VCPU threads may need to consider requests before and/or after calling
+functions that may put them to sleep, e.g. kvm_vcpu_block(). Whether they
+do or not, and, if they do, which requests need consideration, is
+architecture dependent. kvm_vcpu_block() calls kvm_arch_vcpu_runnable()
+to check if it should awaken. One reason to do so is to provide
+architectures a function where requests may be checked if necessary.
+
+References
+==========
+
+.. [atomic-ops] Documentation/atomic_bitops.txt and Documentation/atomic_t.txt
+.. [memory-barriers] Documentation/memory-barriers.txt
+.. [lwn-mb] https://lwn.net/Articles/573436/
diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/x86/amd-memory-encryption.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/x86/amd-memory-encryption.rst
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..995780088e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/x86/amd-memory-encryption.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,446 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+======================================
+Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV)
+======================================
+
+Overview
+========
+
+Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) is a feature found on AMD processors.
+
+SEV is an extension to the AMD-V architecture which supports running
+virtual machines (VMs) under the control of a hypervisor. When enabled,
+the memory contents of a VM will be transparently encrypted with a key
+unique to that VM.
+
+The hypervisor can determine the SEV support through the CPUID
+instruction. The CPUID function 0x8000001f reports information related
+to SEV::
+
+ 0x8000001f[eax]:
+ Bit[1] indicates support for SEV
+ ...
+ [ecx]:
+ Bits[31:0] Number of encrypted guests supported simultaneously
+
+If support for SEV is present, MSR 0xc001_0010 (MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG) and MSR 0xc001_0015
+(MSR_K7_HWCR) can be used to determine if it can be enabled::
+
+ 0xc001_0010:
+ Bit[23] 1 = memory encryption can be enabled
+ 0 = memory encryption can not be enabled
+
+ 0xc001_0015:
+ Bit[0] 1 = memory encryption can be enabled
+ 0 = memory encryption can not be enabled
+
+When SEV support is available, it can be enabled in a specific VM by
+setting the SEV bit before executing VMRUN.::
+
+ VMCB[0x90]:
+ Bit[1] 1 = SEV is enabled
+ 0 = SEV is disabled
+
+SEV hardware uses ASIDs to associate a memory encryption key with a VM.
+Hence, the ASID for the SEV-enabled guests must be from 1 to a maximum value
+defined in the CPUID 0x8000001f[ecx] field.
+
+SEV Key Management
+==================
+
+The SEV guest key management is handled by a separate processor called the AMD
+Secure Processor (AMD-SP). Firmware running inside the AMD-SP provides a secure
+key management interface to perform common hypervisor activities such as
+encrypting bootstrap code, snapshot, migrating and debugging the guest. For more
+information, see the SEV Key Management spec [api-spec]_
+
+The main ioctl to access SEV is KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP. If the argument
+to KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP is NULL, the ioctl returns 0 if SEV is enabled
+and ``ENOTTY`` if it is disabled (on some older versions of Linux,
+the ioctl runs normally even with a NULL argument, and therefore will
+likely return ``EFAULT``). If non-NULL, the argument to KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP
+must be a struct kvm_sev_cmd::
+
+ struct kvm_sev_cmd {
+ __u32 id;
+ __u64 data;
+ __u32 error;
+ __u32 sev_fd;
+ };
+
+
+The ``id`` field contains the subcommand, and the ``data`` field points to
+another struct containing arguments specific to command. The ``sev_fd``
+should point to a file descriptor that is opened on the ``/dev/sev``
+device, if needed (see individual commands).
+
+On output, ``error`` is zero on success, or an error code. Error codes
+are defined in ``<linux/psp-dev.h>``.
+
+KVM implements the following commands to support common lifecycle events of SEV
+guests, such as launching, running, snapshotting, migrating and decommissioning.
+
+1. KVM_SEV_INIT
+---------------
+
+The KVM_SEV_INIT command is used by the hypervisor to initialize the SEV platform
+context. In a typical workflow, this command should be the first command issued.
+
+The firmware can be initialized either by using its own non-volatile storage or
+the OS can manage the NV storage for the firmware using the module parameter
+``init_ex_path``. If the file specified by ``init_ex_path`` does not exist or
+is invalid, the OS will create or override the file with output from PSP.
+
+Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error
+
+2. KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_START
+-----------------------
+
+The KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_START command is used for creating the memory encryption
+context. To create the encryption context, user must provide a guest policy,
+the owner's public Diffie-Hellman (PDH) key and session information.
+
+Parameters: struct kvm_sev_launch_start (in/out)
+
+Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error
+
+::
+
+ struct kvm_sev_launch_start {
+ __u32 handle; /* if zero then firmware creates a new handle */
+ __u32 policy; /* guest's policy */
+
+ __u64 dh_uaddr; /* userspace address pointing to the guest owner's PDH key */
+ __u32 dh_len;
+
+ __u64 session_addr; /* userspace address which points to the guest session information */
+ __u32 session_len;
+ };
+
+On success, the 'handle' field contains a new handle and on error, a negative value.
+
+KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_START requires the ``sev_fd`` field to be valid.
+
+For more details, see SEV spec Section 6.2.
+
+3. KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA
+-----------------------------
+
+The KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA is used for encrypting a memory region. It also
+calculates a measurement of the memory contents. The measurement is a signature
+of the memory contents that can be sent to the guest owner as an attestation
+that the memory was encrypted correctly by the firmware.
+
+Parameters (in): struct kvm_sev_launch_update_data
+
+Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error
+
+::
+
+ struct kvm_sev_launch_update {
+ __u64 uaddr; /* userspace address to be encrypted (must be 16-byte aligned) */
+ __u32 len; /* length of the data to be encrypted (must be 16-byte aligned) */
+ };
+
+For more details, see SEV spec Section 6.3.
+
+4. KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_MEASURE
+-------------------------
+
+The KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_MEASURE command is used to retrieve the measurement of the
+data encrypted by the KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA command. The guest owner may
+wait to provide the guest with confidential information until it can verify the
+measurement. Since the guest owner knows the initial contents of the guest at
+boot, the measurement can be verified by comparing it to what the guest owner
+expects.
+
+If len is zero on entry, the measurement blob length is written to len and
+uaddr is unused.
+
+Parameters (in): struct kvm_sev_launch_measure
+
+Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error
+
+::
+
+ struct kvm_sev_launch_measure {
+ __u64 uaddr; /* where to copy the measurement */
+ __u32 len; /* length of measurement blob */
+ };
+
+For more details on the measurement verification flow, see SEV spec Section 6.4.
+
+5. KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_FINISH
+------------------------
+
+After completion of the launch flow, the KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_FINISH command can be
+issued to make the guest ready for the execution.
+
+Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error
+
+6. KVM_SEV_GUEST_STATUS
+-----------------------
+
+The KVM_SEV_GUEST_STATUS command is used to retrieve status information about a
+SEV-enabled guest.
+
+Parameters (out): struct kvm_sev_guest_status
+
+Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error
+
+::
+
+ struct kvm_sev_guest_status {
+ __u32 handle; /* guest handle */
+ __u32 policy; /* guest policy */
+ __u8 state; /* guest state (see enum below) */
+ };
+
+SEV guest state:
+
+::
+
+ enum {
+ SEV_STATE_INVALID = 0;
+ SEV_STATE_LAUNCHING, /* guest is currently being launched */
+ SEV_STATE_SECRET, /* guest is being launched and ready to accept the ciphertext data */
+ SEV_STATE_RUNNING, /* guest is fully launched and running */
+ SEV_STATE_RECEIVING, /* guest is being migrated in from another SEV machine */
+ SEV_STATE_SENDING /* guest is getting migrated out to another SEV machine */
+ };
+
+7. KVM_SEV_DBG_DECRYPT
+----------------------
+
+The KVM_SEV_DEBUG_DECRYPT command can be used by the hypervisor to request the
+firmware to decrypt the data at the given memory region.
+
+Parameters (in): struct kvm_sev_dbg
+
+Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error
+
+::
+
+ struct kvm_sev_dbg {
+ __u64 src_uaddr; /* userspace address of data to decrypt */
+ __u64 dst_uaddr; /* userspace address of destination */
+ __u32 len; /* length of memory region to decrypt */
+ };
+
+The command returns an error if the guest policy does not allow debugging.
+
+8. KVM_SEV_DBG_ENCRYPT
+----------------------
+
+The KVM_SEV_DEBUG_ENCRYPT command can be used by the hypervisor to request the
+firmware to encrypt the data at the given memory region.
+
+Parameters (in): struct kvm_sev_dbg
+
+Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error
+
+::
+
+ struct kvm_sev_dbg {
+ __u64 src_uaddr; /* userspace address of data to encrypt */
+ __u64 dst_uaddr; /* userspace address of destination */
+ __u32 len; /* length of memory region to encrypt */
+ };
+
+The command returns an error if the guest policy does not allow debugging.
+
+9. KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_SECRET
+------------------------
+
+The KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_SECRET command can be used by the hypervisor to inject secret
+data after the measurement has been validated by the guest owner.
+
+Parameters (in): struct kvm_sev_launch_secret
+
+Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error
+
+::
+
+ struct kvm_sev_launch_secret {
+ __u64 hdr_uaddr; /* userspace address containing the packet header */
+ __u32 hdr_len;
+
+ __u64 guest_uaddr; /* the guest memory region where the secret should be injected */
+ __u32 guest_len;
+
+ __u64 trans_uaddr; /* the hypervisor memory region which contains the secret */
+ __u32 trans_len;
+ };
+
+10. KVM_SEV_GET_ATTESTATION_REPORT
+----------------------------------
+
+The KVM_SEV_GET_ATTESTATION_REPORT command can be used by the hypervisor to query the attestation
+report containing the SHA-256 digest of the guest memory and VMSA passed through the KVM_SEV_LAUNCH
+commands and signed with the PEK. The digest returned by the command should match the digest
+used by the guest owner with the KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_MEASURE.
+
+If len is zero on entry, the measurement blob length is written to len and
+uaddr is unused.
+
+Parameters (in): struct kvm_sev_attestation
+
+Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error
+
+::
+
+ struct kvm_sev_attestation_report {
+ __u8 mnonce[16]; /* A random mnonce that will be placed in the report */
+
+ __u64 uaddr; /* userspace address where the report should be copied */
+ __u32 len;
+ };
+
+11. KVM_SEV_SEND_START
+----------------------
+
+The KVM_SEV_SEND_START command can be used by the hypervisor to create an
+outgoing guest encryption context.
+
+If session_len is zero on entry, the length of the guest session information is
+written to session_len and all other fields are not used.
+
+Parameters (in): struct kvm_sev_send_start
+
+Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error
+
+::
+
+ struct kvm_sev_send_start {
+ __u32 policy; /* guest policy */
+
+ __u64 pdh_cert_uaddr; /* platform Diffie-Hellman certificate */
+ __u32 pdh_cert_len;
+
+ __u64 plat_certs_uaddr; /* platform certificate chain */
+ __u32 plat_certs_len;
+
+ __u64 amd_certs_uaddr; /* AMD certificate */
+ __u32 amd_certs_len;
+
+ __u64 session_uaddr; /* Guest session information */
+ __u32 session_len;
+ };
+
+12. KVM_SEV_SEND_UPDATE_DATA
+----------------------------
+
+The KVM_SEV_SEND_UPDATE_DATA command can be used by the hypervisor to encrypt the
+outgoing guest memory region with the encryption context creating using
+KVM_SEV_SEND_START.
+
+If hdr_len or trans_len are zero on entry, the length of the packet header and
+transport region are written to hdr_len and trans_len respectively, and all
+other fields are not used.
+
+Parameters (in): struct kvm_sev_send_update_data
+
+Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error
+
+::
+
+ struct kvm_sev_launch_send_update_data {
+ __u64 hdr_uaddr; /* userspace address containing the packet header */
+ __u32 hdr_len;
+
+ __u64 guest_uaddr; /* the source memory region to be encrypted */
+ __u32 guest_len;
+
+ __u64 trans_uaddr; /* the destination memory region */
+ __u32 trans_len;
+ };
+
+13. KVM_SEV_SEND_FINISH
+------------------------
+
+After completion of the migration flow, the KVM_SEV_SEND_FINISH command can be
+issued by the hypervisor to delete the encryption context.
+
+Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error
+
+14. KVM_SEV_SEND_CANCEL
+------------------------
+
+After completion of SEND_START, but before SEND_FINISH, the source VMM can issue the
+SEND_CANCEL command to stop a migration. This is necessary so that a cancelled
+migration can restart with a new target later.
+
+Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error
+
+15. KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_START
+-------------------------
+
+The KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_START command is used for creating the memory encryption
+context for an incoming SEV guest. To create the encryption context, the user must
+provide a guest policy, the platform public Diffie-Hellman (PDH) key and session
+information.
+
+Parameters: struct kvm_sev_receive_start (in/out)
+
+Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error
+
+::
+
+ struct kvm_sev_receive_start {
+ __u32 handle; /* if zero then firmware creates a new handle */
+ __u32 policy; /* guest's policy */
+
+ __u64 pdh_uaddr; /* userspace address pointing to the PDH key */
+ __u32 pdh_len;
+
+ __u64 session_uaddr; /* userspace address which points to the guest session information */
+ __u32 session_len;
+ };
+
+On success, the 'handle' field contains a new handle and on error, a negative value.
+
+For more details, see SEV spec Section 6.12.
+
+16. KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA
+-------------------------------
+
+The KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA command can be used by the hypervisor to copy
+the incoming buffers into the guest memory region with encryption context
+created during the KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_START.
+
+Parameters (in): struct kvm_sev_receive_update_data
+
+Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error
+
+::
+
+ struct kvm_sev_launch_receive_update_data {
+ __u64 hdr_uaddr; /* userspace address containing the packet header */
+ __u32 hdr_len;
+
+ __u64 guest_uaddr; /* the destination guest memory region */
+ __u32 guest_len;
+
+ __u64 trans_uaddr; /* the incoming buffer memory region */
+ __u32 trans_len;
+ };
+
+17. KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_FINISH
+--------------------------
+
+After completion of the migration flow, the KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_FINISH command can be
+issued by the hypervisor to make the guest ready for execution.
+
+Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error
+
+References
+==========
+
+
+See [white-paper]_, [api-spec]_, [amd-apm]_ and [kvm-forum]_ for more info.
+
+.. [white-paper] https://developer.amd.com/wordpress/media/2013/12/AMD_Memory_Encryption_Whitepaper_v7-Public.pdf
+.. [api-spec] https://support.amd.com/TechDocs/55766_SEV-KM_API_Specification.pdf
+.. [amd-apm] https://support.amd.com/TechDocs/24593.pdf (section 15.34)
+.. [kvm-forum] https://www.linux-kvm.org/images/7/74/02x08A-Thomas_Lendacky-AMDs_Virtualizatoin_Memory_Encryption_Technology.pdf
diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/x86/cpuid.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/x86/cpuid.rst
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..bda3e3e737
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/x86/cpuid.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+==============
+KVM CPUID bits
+==============
+
+:Author: Glauber Costa <glommer@gmail.com>
+
+A guest running on a kvm host, can check some of its features using
+cpuid. This is not always guaranteed to work, since userspace can
+mask-out some, or even all KVM-related cpuid features before launching
+a guest.
+
+KVM cpuid functions are:
+
+function: KVM_CPUID_SIGNATURE (0x40000000)
+
+returns::
+
+ eax = 0x40000001
+ ebx = 0x4b4d564b
+ ecx = 0x564b4d56
+ edx = 0x4d
+
+Note that this value in ebx, ecx and edx corresponds to the string "KVMKVMKVM".
+The value in eax corresponds to the maximum cpuid function present in this leaf,
+and will be updated if more functions are added in the future.
+Note also that old hosts set eax value to 0x0. This should
+be interpreted as if the value was 0x40000001.
+This function queries the presence of KVM cpuid leafs.
+
+function: define KVM_CPUID_FEATURES (0x40000001)
+
+returns::
+
+ ebx, ecx
+ eax = an OR'ed group of (1 << flag)
+
+where ``flag`` is defined as below:
+
+================================== =========== ================================
+flag value meaning
+================================== =========== ================================
+KVM_FEATURE_CLOCKSOURCE 0 kvmclock available at msrs
+ 0x11 and 0x12
+
+KVM_FEATURE_NOP_IO_DELAY 1 not necessary to perform delays
+ on PIO operations
+
+KVM_FEATURE_MMU_OP 2 deprecated
+
+KVM_FEATURE_CLOCKSOURCE2 3 kvmclock available at msrs
+ 0x4b564d00 and 0x4b564d01
+
+KVM_FEATURE_ASYNC_PF 4 async pf can be enabled by
+ writing to msr 0x4b564d02
+
+KVM_FEATURE_STEAL_TIME 5 steal time can be enabled by
+ writing to msr 0x4b564d03
+
+KVM_FEATURE_PV_EOI 6 paravirtualized end of interrupt
+ handler can be enabled by
+ writing to msr 0x4b564d04
+
+KVM_FEATURE_PV_UNHALT 7 guest checks this feature bit
+ before enabling paravirtualized
+ spinlock support
+
+KVM_FEATURE_PV_TLB_FLUSH 9 guest checks this feature bit
+ before enabling paravirtualized
+ tlb flush
+
+KVM_FEATURE_ASYNC_PF_VMEXIT 10 paravirtualized async PF VM EXIT
+ can be enabled by setting bit 2
+ when writing to msr 0x4b564d02
+
+KVM_FEATURE_PV_SEND_IPI 11 guest checks this feature bit
+ before enabling paravirtualized
+ send IPIs
+
+KVM_FEATURE_POLL_CONTROL 12 host-side polling on HLT can
+ be disabled by writing
+ to msr 0x4b564d05.
+
+KVM_FEATURE_PV_SCHED_YIELD 13 guest checks this feature bit
+ before using paravirtualized
+ sched yield.
+
+KVM_FEATURE_ASYNC_PF_INT 14 guest checks this feature bit
+ before using the second async
+ pf control msr 0x4b564d06 and
+ async pf acknowledgment msr
+ 0x4b564d07.
+
+KVM_FEATURE_MSI_EXT_DEST_ID 15 guest checks this feature bit
+ before using extended destination
+ ID bits in MSI address bits 11-5.
+
+KVM_FEATURE_HC_MAP_GPA_RANGE 16 guest checks this feature bit before
+ using the map gpa range hypercall
+ to notify the page state change
+
+KVM_FEATURE_MIGRATION_CONTROL 17 guest checks this feature bit before
+ using MSR_KVM_MIGRATION_CONTROL
+
+KVM_FEATURE_CLOCKSOURCE_STABLE_BIT 24 host will warn if no guest-side
+ per-cpu warps are expected in
+ kvmclock
+================================== =========== ================================
+
+::
+
+ edx = an OR'ed group of (1 << flag)
+
+Where ``flag`` here is defined as below:
+
+================== ============ =================================
+flag value meaning
+================== ============ =================================
+KVM_HINTS_REALTIME 0 guest checks this feature bit to
+ determine that vCPUs are never
+ preempted for an unlimited time
+ allowing optimizations
+================== ============ =================================
diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/x86/errata.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/x86/errata.rst
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..49a05f2474
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/x86/errata.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+=======================================
+Known limitations of CPU virtualization
+=======================================
+
+Whenever perfect emulation of a CPU feature is impossible or too hard, KVM
+has to choose between not implementing the feature at all or introducing
+behavioral differences between virtual machines and bare metal systems.
+
+This file documents some of the known limitations that KVM has in
+virtualizing CPU features.
+
+x86
+===
+
+``KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID`` issues
+----------------------------------
+
+x87 features
+~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+Unlike most other CPUID feature bits, CPUID[EAX=7,ECX=0]:EBX[6]
+(FDP_EXCPTN_ONLY) and CPUID[EAX=7,ECX=0]:EBX]13] (ZERO_FCS_FDS) are
+clear if the features are present and set if the features are not present.
+
+Clearing these bits in CPUID has no effect on the operation of the guest;
+if these bits are set on hardware, the features will not be present on
+any virtual machine that runs on that hardware.
+
+**Workaround:** It is recommended to always set these bits in guest CPUID.
+Note however that any software (e.g ``WIN87EM.DLL``) expecting these features
+to be present likely predates these CPUID feature bits, and therefore
+doesn't know to check for them anyway.
+
+Nested virtualization features
+------------------------------
+
+TBD
+
+x2APIC
+------
+When KVM_X2APIC_API_USE_32BIT_IDS is enabled, KVM activates a hack/quirk that
+allows sending events to a single vCPU using its x2APIC ID even if the target
+vCPU has legacy xAPIC enabled, e.g. to bring up hotplugged vCPUs via INIT-SIPI
+on VMs with > 255 vCPUs. A side effect of the quirk is that, if multiple vCPUs
+have the same physical APIC ID, KVM will deliver events targeting that APIC ID
+only to the vCPU with the lowest vCPU ID. If KVM_X2APIC_API_USE_32BIT_IDS is
+not enabled, KVM follows x86 architecture when processing interrupts (all vCPUs
+matching the target APIC ID receive the interrupt).
diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/x86/hypercalls.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/x86/hypercalls.rst
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..10db792472
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/x86/hypercalls.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,192 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+===================
+Linux KVM Hypercall
+===================
+
+X86:
+ KVM Hypercalls have a three-byte sequence of either the vmcall or the vmmcall
+ instruction. The hypervisor can replace it with instructions that are
+ guaranteed to be supported.
+
+ Up to four arguments may be passed in rbx, rcx, rdx, and rsi respectively.
+ The hypercall number should be placed in rax and the return value will be
+ placed in rax. No other registers will be clobbered unless explicitly stated
+ by the particular hypercall.
+
+S390:
+ R2-R7 are used for parameters 1-6. In addition, R1 is used for hypercall
+ number. The return value is written to R2.
+
+ S390 uses diagnose instruction as hypercall (0x500) along with hypercall
+ number in R1.
+
+ For further information on the S390 diagnose call as supported by KVM,
+ refer to Documentation/virt/kvm/s390/s390-diag.rst.
+
+PowerPC:
+ It uses R3-R10 and hypercall number in R11. R4-R11 are used as output registers.
+ Return value is placed in R3.
+
+ KVM hypercalls uses 4 byte opcode, that are patched with 'hypercall-instructions'
+ property inside the device tree's /hypervisor node.
+ For more information refer to Documentation/virt/kvm/ppc-pv.rst
+
+MIPS:
+ KVM hypercalls use the HYPCALL instruction with code 0 and the hypercall
+ number in $2 (v0). Up to four arguments may be placed in $4-$7 (a0-a3) and
+ the return value is placed in $2 (v0).
+
+KVM Hypercalls Documentation
+============================
+
+The template for each hypercall is:
+1. Hypercall name.
+2. Architecture(s)
+3. Status (deprecated, obsolete, active)
+4. Purpose
+
+1. KVM_HC_VAPIC_POLL_IRQ
+------------------------
+
+:Architecture: x86
+:Status: active
+:Purpose: Trigger guest exit so that the host can check for pending
+ interrupts on reentry.
+
+2. KVM_HC_MMU_OP
+----------------
+
+:Architecture: x86
+:Status: deprecated.
+:Purpose: Support MMU operations such as writing to PTE,
+ flushing TLB, release PT.
+
+3. KVM_HC_FEATURES
+------------------
+
+:Architecture: PPC
+:Status: active
+:Purpose: Expose hypercall availability to the guest. On x86 platforms, cpuid
+ used to enumerate which hypercalls are available. On PPC, either
+ device tree based lookup ( which is also what EPAPR dictates)
+ OR KVM specific enumeration mechanism (which is this hypercall)
+ can be used.
+
+4. KVM_HC_PPC_MAP_MAGIC_PAGE
+----------------------------
+
+:Architecture: PPC
+:Status: active
+:Purpose: To enable communication between the hypervisor and guest there is a
+ shared page that contains parts of supervisor visible register state.
+ The guest can map this shared page to access its supervisor register
+ through memory using this hypercall.
+
+5. KVM_HC_KICK_CPU
+------------------
+
+:Architecture: x86
+:Status: active
+:Purpose: Hypercall used to wakeup a vcpu from HLT state
+:Usage example:
+ A vcpu of a paravirtualized guest that is busywaiting in guest
+ kernel mode for an event to occur (ex: a spinlock to become available) can
+ execute HLT instruction once it has busy-waited for more than a threshold
+ time-interval. Execution of HLT instruction would cause the hypervisor to put
+ the vcpu to sleep until occurrence of an appropriate event. Another vcpu of the
+ same guest can wakeup the sleeping vcpu by issuing KVM_HC_KICK_CPU hypercall,
+ specifying APIC ID (a1) of the vcpu to be woken up. An additional argument (a0)
+ is used in the hypercall for future use.
+
+
+6. KVM_HC_CLOCK_PAIRING
+-----------------------
+:Architecture: x86
+:Status: active
+:Purpose: Hypercall used to synchronize host and guest clocks.
+
+Usage:
+
+a0: guest physical address where host copies
+"struct kvm_clock_offset" structure.
+
+a1: clock_type, ATM only KVM_CLOCK_PAIRING_WALLCLOCK (0)
+is supported (corresponding to the host's CLOCK_REALTIME clock).
+
+ ::
+
+ struct kvm_clock_pairing {
+ __s64 sec;
+ __s64 nsec;
+ __u64 tsc;
+ __u32 flags;
+ __u32 pad[9];
+ };
+
+ Where:
+ * sec: seconds from clock_type clock.
+ * nsec: nanoseconds from clock_type clock.
+ * tsc: guest TSC value used to calculate sec/nsec pair
+ * flags: flags, unused (0) at the moment.
+
+The hypercall lets a guest compute a precise timestamp across
+host and guest. The guest can use the returned TSC value to
+compute the CLOCK_REALTIME for its clock, at the same instant.
+
+Returns KVM_EOPNOTSUPP if the host does not use TSC clocksource,
+or if clock type is different than KVM_CLOCK_PAIRING_WALLCLOCK.
+
+6. KVM_HC_SEND_IPI
+------------------
+
+:Architecture: x86
+:Status: active
+:Purpose: Send IPIs to multiple vCPUs.
+
+- a0: lower part of the bitmap of destination APIC IDs
+- a1: higher part of the bitmap of destination APIC IDs
+- a2: the lowest APIC ID in bitmap
+- a3: APIC ICR
+
+The hypercall lets a guest send multicast IPIs, with at most 128
+128 destinations per hypercall in 64-bit mode and 64 vCPUs per
+hypercall in 32-bit mode. The destinations are represented by a
+bitmap contained in the first two arguments (a0 and a1). Bit 0 of
+a0 corresponds to the APIC ID in the third argument (a2), bit 1
+corresponds to the APIC ID a2+1, and so on.
+
+Returns the number of CPUs to which the IPIs were delivered successfully.
+
+7. KVM_HC_SCHED_YIELD
+---------------------
+
+:Architecture: x86
+:Status: active
+:Purpose: Hypercall used to yield if the IPI target vCPU is preempted
+
+a0: destination APIC ID
+
+:Usage example: When sending a call-function IPI-many to vCPUs, yield if
+ any of the IPI target vCPUs was preempted.
+
+8. KVM_HC_MAP_GPA_RANGE
+-------------------------
+:Architecture: x86
+:Status: active
+:Purpose: Request KVM to map a GPA range with the specified attributes.
+
+a0: the guest physical address of the start page
+a1: the number of (4kb) pages (must be contiguous in GPA space)
+a2: attributes
+
+ Where 'attributes' :
+ * bits 3:0 - preferred page size encoding 0 = 4kb, 1 = 2mb, 2 = 1gb, etc...
+ * bit 4 - plaintext = 0, encrypted = 1
+ * bits 63:5 - reserved (must be zero)
+
+**Implementation note**: this hypercall is implemented in userspace via
+the KVM_CAP_EXIT_HYPERCALL capability. Userspace must enable that capability
+before advertising KVM_FEATURE_HC_MAP_GPA_RANGE in the guest CPUID. In
+addition, if the guest supports KVM_FEATURE_MIGRATION_CONTROL, userspace
+must also set up an MSR filter to process writes to MSR_KVM_MIGRATION_CONTROL.
diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/x86/index.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/x86/index.rst
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9ece6b8dc8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/x86/index.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+===================
+KVM for x86 systems
+===================
+
+.. toctree::
+ :maxdepth: 2
+
+ amd-memory-encryption
+ cpuid
+ errata
+ hypercalls
+ mmu
+ msr
+ nested-vmx
+ running-nested-guests
+ timekeeping
diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/x86/mmu.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/x86/mmu.rst
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..d47595b33f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/x86/mmu.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,484 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+======================
+The x86 kvm shadow mmu
+======================
+
+The mmu (in arch/x86/kvm, files mmu.[ch] and paging_tmpl.h) is responsible
+for presenting a standard x86 mmu to the guest, while translating guest
+physical addresses to host physical addresses.
+
+The mmu code attempts to satisfy the following requirements:
+
+- correctness:
+ the guest should not be able to determine that it is running
+ on an emulated mmu except for timing (we attempt to comply
+ with the specification, not emulate the characteristics of
+ a particular implementation such as tlb size)
+- security:
+ the guest must not be able to touch host memory not assigned
+ to it
+- performance:
+ minimize the performance penalty imposed by the mmu
+- scaling:
+ need to scale to large memory and large vcpu guests
+- hardware:
+ support the full range of x86 virtualization hardware
+- integration:
+ Linux memory management code must be in control of guest memory
+ so that swapping, page migration, page merging, transparent
+ hugepages, and similar features work without change
+- dirty tracking:
+ report writes to guest memory to enable live migration
+ and framebuffer-based displays
+- footprint:
+ keep the amount of pinned kernel memory low (most memory
+ should be shrinkable)
+- reliability:
+ avoid multipage or GFP_ATOMIC allocations
+
+Acronyms
+========
+
+==== ====================================================================
+pfn host page frame number
+hpa host physical address
+hva host virtual address
+gfn guest frame number
+gpa guest physical address
+gva guest virtual address
+ngpa nested guest physical address
+ngva nested guest virtual address
+pte page table entry (used also to refer generically to paging structure
+ entries)
+gpte guest pte (referring to gfns)
+spte shadow pte (referring to pfns)
+tdp two dimensional paging (vendor neutral term for NPT and EPT)
+==== ====================================================================
+
+Virtual and real hardware supported
+===================================
+
+The mmu supports first-generation mmu hardware, which allows an atomic switch
+of the current paging mode and cr3 during guest entry, as well as
+two-dimensional paging (AMD's NPT and Intel's EPT). The emulated hardware
+it exposes is the traditional 2/3/4 level x86 mmu, with support for global
+pages, pae, pse, pse36, cr0.wp, and 1GB pages. Emulated hardware also
+able to expose NPT capable hardware on NPT capable hosts.
+
+Translation
+===========
+
+The primary job of the mmu is to program the processor's mmu to translate
+addresses for the guest. Different translations are required at different
+times:
+
+- when guest paging is disabled, we translate guest physical addresses to
+ host physical addresses (gpa->hpa)
+- when guest paging is enabled, we translate guest virtual addresses, to
+ guest physical addresses, to host physical addresses (gva->gpa->hpa)
+- when the guest launches a guest of its own, we translate nested guest
+ virtual addresses, to nested guest physical addresses, to guest physical
+ addresses, to host physical addresses (ngva->ngpa->gpa->hpa)
+
+The primary challenge is to encode between 1 and 3 translations into hardware
+that support only 1 (traditional) and 2 (tdp) translations. When the
+number of required translations matches the hardware, the mmu operates in
+direct mode; otherwise it operates in shadow mode (see below).
+
+Memory
+======
+
+Guest memory (gpa) is part of the user address space of the process that is
+using kvm. Userspace defines the translation between guest addresses and user
+addresses (gpa->hva); note that two gpas may alias to the same hva, but not
+vice versa.
+
+These hvas may be backed using any method available to the host: anonymous
+memory, file backed memory, and device memory. Memory might be paged by the
+host at any time.
+
+Events
+======
+
+The mmu is driven by events, some from the guest, some from the host.
+
+Guest generated events:
+
+- writes to control registers (especially cr3)
+- invlpg/invlpga instruction execution
+- access to missing or protected translations
+
+Host generated events:
+
+- changes in the gpa->hpa translation (either through gpa->hva changes or
+ through hva->hpa changes)
+- memory pressure (the shrinker)
+
+Shadow pages
+============
+
+The principal data structure is the shadow page, 'struct kvm_mmu_page'. A
+shadow page contains 512 sptes, which can be either leaf or nonleaf sptes. A
+shadow page may contain a mix of leaf and nonleaf sptes.
+
+A nonleaf spte allows the hardware mmu to reach the leaf pages and
+is not related to a translation directly. It points to other shadow pages.
+
+A leaf spte corresponds to either one or two translations encoded into
+one paging structure entry. These are always the lowest level of the
+translation stack, with optional higher level translations left to NPT/EPT.
+Leaf ptes point at guest pages.
+
+The following table shows translations encoded by leaf ptes, with higher-level
+translations in parentheses:
+
+ Non-nested guests::
+
+ nonpaging: gpa->hpa
+ paging: gva->gpa->hpa
+ paging, tdp: (gva->)gpa->hpa
+
+ Nested guests::
+
+ non-tdp: ngva->gpa->hpa (*)
+ tdp: (ngva->)ngpa->gpa->hpa
+
+ (*) the guest hypervisor will encode the ngva->gpa translation into its page
+ tables if npt is not present
+
+Shadow pages contain the following information:
+ role.level:
+ The level in the shadow paging hierarchy that this shadow page belongs to.
+ 1=4k sptes, 2=2M sptes, 3=1G sptes, etc.
+ role.direct:
+ If set, leaf sptes reachable from this page are for a linear range.
+ Examples include real mode translation, large guest pages backed by small
+ host pages, and gpa->hpa translations when NPT or EPT is active.
+ The linear range starts at (gfn << PAGE_SHIFT) and its size is determined
+ by role.level (2MB for first level, 1GB for second level, 0.5TB for third
+ level, 256TB for fourth level)
+ If clear, this page corresponds to a guest page table denoted by the gfn
+ field.
+ role.quadrant:
+ When role.has_4_byte_gpte=1, the guest uses 32-bit gptes while the host uses 64-bit
+ sptes. That means a guest page table contains more ptes than the host,
+ so multiple shadow pages are needed to shadow one guest page.
+ For first-level shadow pages, role.quadrant can be 0 or 1 and denotes the
+ first or second 512-gpte block in the guest page table. For second-level
+ page tables, each 32-bit gpte is converted to two 64-bit sptes
+ (since each first-level guest page is shadowed by two first-level
+ shadow pages) so role.quadrant takes values in the range 0..3. Each
+ quadrant maps 1GB virtual address space.
+ role.access:
+ Inherited guest access permissions from the parent ptes in the form uwx.
+ Note execute permission is positive, not negative.
+ role.invalid:
+ The page is invalid and should not be used. It is a root page that is
+ currently pinned (by a cpu hardware register pointing to it); once it is
+ unpinned it will be destroyed.
+ role.has_4_byte_gpte:
+ Reflects the size of the guest PTE for which the page is valid, i.e. '0'
+ if direct map or 64-bit gptes are in use, '1' if 32-bit gptes are in use.
+ role.efer_nx:
+ Contains the value of efer.nx for which the page is valid.
+ role.cr0_wp:
+ Contains the value of cr0.wp for which the page is valid.
+ role.smep_andnot_wp:
+ Contains the value of cr4.smep && !cr0.wp for which the page is valid
+ (pages for which this is true are different from other pages; see the
+ treatment of cr0.wp=0 below).
+ role.smap_andnot_wp:
+ Contains the value of cr4.smap && !cr0.wp for which the page is valid
+ (pages for which this is true are different from other pages; see the
+ treatment of cr0.wp=0 below).
+ role.smm:
+ Is 1 if the page is valid in system management mode. This field
+ determines which of the kvm_memslots array was used to build this
+ shadow page; it is also used to go back from a struct kvm_mmu_page
+ to a memslot, through the kvm_memslots_for_spte_role macro and
+ __gfn_to_memslot.
+ role.ad_disabled:
+ Is 1 if the MMU instance cannot use A/D bits. EPT did not have A/D
+ bits before Haswell; shadow EPT page tables also cannot use A/D bits
+ if the L1 hypervisor does not enable them.
+ role.passthrough:
+ The page is not backed by a guest page table, but its first entry
+ points to one. This is set if NPT uses 5-level page tables (host
+ CR4.LA57=1) and is shadowing L1's 4-level NPT (L1 CR4.LA57=0).
+ gfn:
+ Either the guest page table containing the translations shadowed by this
+ page, or the base page frame for linear translations. See role.direct.
+ spt:
+ A pageful of 64-bit sptes containing the translations for this page.
+ Accessed by both kvm and hardware.
+ The page pointed to by spt will have its page->private pointing back
+ at the shadow page structure.
+ sptes in spt point either at guest pages, or at lower-level shadow pages.
+ Specifically, if sp1 and sp2 are shadow pages, then sp1->spt[n] may point
+ at __pa(sp2->spt). sp2 will point back at sp1 through parent_pte.
+ The spt array forms a DAG structure with the shadow page as a node, and
+ guest pages as leaves.
+ gfns:
+ An array of 512 guest frame numbers, one for each present pte. Used to
+ perform a reverse map from a pte to a gfn. When role.direct is set, any
+ element of this array can be calculated from the gfn field when used, in
+ this case, the array of gfns is not allocated. See role.direct and gfn.
+ root_count:
+ A counter keeping track of how many hardware registers (guest cr3 or
+ pdptrs) are now pointing at the page. While this counter is nonzero, the
+ page cannot be destroyed. See role.invalid.
+ parent_ptes:
+ The reverse mapping for the pte/ptes pointing at this page's spt. If
+ parent_ptes bit 0 is zero, only one spte points at this page and
+ parent_ptes points at this single spte, otherwise, there exists multiple
+ sptes pointing at this page and (parent_ptes & ~0x1) points at a data
+ structure with a list of parent sptes.
+ unsync:
+ If true, then the translations in this page may not match the guest's
+ translation. This is equivalent to the state of the tlb when a pte is
+ changed but before the tlb entry is flushed. Accordingly, unsync ptes
+ are synchronized when the guest executes invlpg or flushes its tlb by
+ other means. Valid for leaf pages.
+ unsync_children:
+ How many sptes in the page point at pages that are unsync (or have
+ unsynchronized children).
+ unsync_child_bitmap:
+ A bitmap indicating which sptes in spt point (directly or indirectly) at
+ pages that may be unsynchronized. Used to quickly locate all unsynchronized
+ pages reachable from a given page.
+ clear_spte_count:
+ Only present on 32-bit hosts, where a 64-bit spte cannot be written
+ atomically. The reader uses this while running out of the MMU lock
+ to detect in-progress updates and retry them until the writer has
+ finished the write.
+ write_flooding_count:
+ A guest may write to a page table many times, causing a lot of
+ emulations if the page needs to be write-protected (see "Synchronized
+ and unsynchronized pages" below). Leaf pages can be unsynchronized
+ so that they do not trigger frequent emulation, but this is not
+ possible for non-leafs. This field counts the number of emulations
+ since the last time the page table was actually used; if emulation
+ is triggered too frequently on this page, KVM will unmap the page
+ to avoid emulation in the future.
+
+Reverse map
+===========
+
+The mmu maintains a reverse mapping whereby all ptes mapping a page can be
+reached given its gfn. This is used, for example, when swapping out a page.
+
+Synchronized and unsynchronized pages
+=====================================
+
+The guest uses two events to synchronize its tlb and page tables: tlb flushes
+and page invalidations (invlpg).
+
+A tlb flush means that we need to synchronize all sptes reachable from the
+guest's cr3. This is expensive, so we keep all guest page tables write
+protected, and synchronize sptes to gptes when a gpte is written.
+
+A special case is when a guest page table is reachable from the current
+guest cr3. In this case, the guest is obliged to issue an invlpg instruction
+before using the translation. We take advantage of that by removing write
+protection from the guest page, and allowing the guest to modify it freely.
+We synchronize modified gptes when the guest invokes invlpg. This reduces
+the amount of emulation we have to do when the guest modifies multiple gptes,
+or when the a guest page is no longer used as a page table and is used for
+random guest data.
+
+As a side effect we have to resynchronize all reachable unsynchronized shadow
+pages on a tlb flush.
+
+
+Reaction to events
+==================
+
+- guest page fault (or npt page fault, or ept violation)
+
+This is the most complicated event. The cause of a page fault can be:
+
+ - a true guest fault (the guest translation won't allow the access) (*)
+ - access to a missing translation
+ - access to a protected translation
+ - when logging dirty pages, memory is write protected
+ - synchronized shadow pages are write protected (*)
+ - access to untranslatable memory (mmio)
+
+ (*) not applicable in direct mode
+
+Handling a page fault is performed as follows:
+
+ - if the RSV bit of the error code is set, the page fault is caused by guest
+ accessing MMIO and cached MMIO information is available.
+
+ - walk shadow page table
+ - check for valid generation number in the spte (see "Fast invalidation of
+ MMIO sptes" below)
+ - cache the information to vcpu->arch.mmio_gva, vcpu->arch.mmio_access and
+ vcpu->arch.mmio_gfn, and call the emulator
+
+ - If both P bit and R/W bit of error code are set, this could possibly
+ be handled as a "fast page fault" (fixed without taking the MMU lock). See
+ the description in Documentation/virt/kvm/locking.rst.
+
+ - if needed, walk the guest page tables to determine the guest translation
+ (gva->gpa or ngpa->gpa)
+
+ - if permissions are insufficient, reflect the fault back to the guest
+
+ - determine the host page
+
+ - if this is an mmio request, there is no host page; cache the info to
+ vcpu->arch.mmio_gva, vcpu->arch.mmio_access and vcpu->arch.mmio_gfn
+
+ - walk the shadow page table to find the spte for the translation,
+ instantiating missing intermediate page tables as necessary
+
+ - If this is an mmio request, cache the mmio info to the spte and set some
+ reserved bit on the spte (see callers of kvm_mmu_set_mmio_spte_mask)
+
+ - try to unsynchronize the page
+
+ - if successful, we can let the guest continue and modify the gpte
+
+ - emulate the instruction
+
+ - if failed, unshadow the page and let the guest continue
+
+ - update any translations that were modified by the instruction
+
+invlpg handling:
+
+ - walk the shadow page hierarchy and drop affected translations
+ - try to reinstantiate the indicated translation in the hope that the
+ guest will use it in the near future
+
+Guest control register updates:
+
+- mov to cr3
+
+ - look up new shadow roots
+ - synchronize newly reachable shadow pages
+
+- mov to cr0/cr4/efer
+
+ - set up mmu context for new paging mode
+ - look up new shadow roots
+ - synchronize newly reachable shadow pages
+
+Host translation updates:
+
+ - mmu notifier called with updated hva
+ - look up affected sptes through reverse map
+ - drop (or update) translations
+
+Emulating cr0.wp
+================
+
+If tdp is not enabled, the host must keep cr0.wp=1 so page write protection
+works for the guest kernel, not guest userspace. When the guest
+cr0.wp=1, this does not present a problem. However when the guest cr0.wp=0,
+we cannot map the permissions for gpte.u=1, gpte.w=0 to any spte (the
+semantics require allowing any guest kernel access plus user read access).
+
+We handle this by mapping the permissions to two possible sptes, depending
+on fault type:
+
+- kernel write fault: spte.u=0, spte.w=1 (allows full kernel access,
+ disallows user access)
+- read fault: spte.u=1, spte.w=0 (allows full read access, disallows kernel
+ write access)
+
+(user write faults generate a #PF)
+
+In the first case there are two additional complications:
+
+- if CR4.SMEP is enabled: since we've turned the page into a kernel page,
+ the kernel may now execute it. We handle this by also setting spte.nx.
+ If we get a user fetch or read fault, we'll change spte.u=1 and
+ spte.nx=gpte.nx back. For this to work, KVM forces EFER.NX to 1 when
+ shadow paging is in use.
+- if CR4.SMAP is disabled: since the page has been changed to a kernel
+ page, it can not be reused when CR4.SMAP is enabled. We set
+ CR4.SMAP && !CR0.WP into shadow page's role to avoid this case. Note,
+ here we do not care the case that CR4.SMAP is enabled since KVM will
+ directly inject #PF to guest due to failed permission check.
+
+To prevent an spte that was converted into a kernel page with cr0.wp=0
+from being written by the kernel after cr0.wp has changed to 1, we make
+the value of cr0.wp part of the page role. This means that an spte created
+with one value of cr0.wp cannot be used when cr0.wp has a different value -
+it will simply be missed by the shadow page lookup code. A similar issue
+exists when an spte created with cr0.wp=0 and cr4.smep=0 is used after
+changing cr4.smep to 1. To avoid this, the value of !cr0.wp && cr4.smep
+is also made a part of the page role.
+
+Large pages
+===========
+
+The mmu supports all combinations of large and small guest and host pages.
+Supported page sizes include 4k, 2M, 4M, and 1G. 4M pages are treated as
+two separate 2M pages, on both guest and host, since the mmu always uses PAE
+paging.
+
+To instantiate a large spte, four constraints must be satisfied:
+
+- the spte must point to a large host page
+- the guest pte must be a large pte of at least equivalent size (if tdp is
+ enabled, there is no guest pte and this condition is satisfied)
+- if the spte will be writeable, the large page frame may not overlap any
+ write-protected pages
+- the guest page must be wholly contained by a single memory slot
+
+To check the last two conditions, the mmu maintains a ->disallow_lpage set of
+arrays for each memory slot and large page size. Every write protected page
+causes its disallow_lpage to be incremented, thus preventing instantiation of
+a large spte. The frames at the end of an unaligned memory slot have
+artificially inflated ->disallow_lpages so they can never be instantiated.
+
+Fast invalidation of MMIO sptes
+===============================
+
+As mentioned in "Reaction to events" above, kvm will cache MMIO
+information in leaf sptes. When a new memslot is added or an existing
+memslot is changed, this information may become stale and needs to be
+invalidated. This also needs to hold the MMU lock while walking all
+shadow pages, and is made more scalable with a similar technique.
+
+MMIO sptes have a few spare bits, which are used to store a
+generation number. The global generation number is stored in
+kvm_memslots(kvm)->generation, and increased whenever guest memory info
+changes.
+
+When KVM finds an MMIO spte, it checks the generation number of the spte.
+If the generation number of the spte does not equal the global generation
+number, it will ignore the cached MMIO information and handle the page
+fault through the slow path.
+
+Since only 18 bits are used to store generation-number on mmio spte, all
+pages are zapped when there is an overflow.
+
+Unfortunately, a single memory access might access kvm_memslots(kvm) multiple
+times, the last one happening when the generation number is retrieved and
+stored into the MMIO spte. Thus, the MMIO spte might be created based on
+out-of-date information, but with an up-to-date generation number.
+
+To avoid this, the generation number is incremented again after synchronize_srcu
+returns; thus, bit 63 of kvm_memslots(kvm)->generation set to 1 only during a
+memslot update, while some SRCU readers might be using the old copy. We do not
+want to use an MMIO sptes created with an odd generation number, and we can do
+this without losing a bit in the MMIO spte. The "update in-progress" bit of the
+generation is not stored in MMIO spte, and is so is implicitly zero when the
+generation is extracted out of the spte. If KVM is unlucky and creates an MMIO
+spte while an update is in-progress, the next access to the spte will always be
+a cache miss. For example, a subsequent access during the update window will
+miss due to the in-progress flag diverging, while an access after the update
+window closes will have a higher generation number (as compared to the spte).
+
+
+Further reading
+===============
+
+- NPT presentation from KVM Forum 2008
+ https://www.linux-kvm.org/images/c/c8/KvmForum2008%24kdf2008_21.pdf
diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/x86/msr.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/x86/msr.rst
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9315fc385f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/x86/msr.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,391 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+=================
+KVM-specific MSRs
+=================
+
+:Author: Glauber Costa <glommer@redhat.com>, Red Hat Inc, 2010
+
+KVM makes use of some custom MSRs to service some requests.
+
+Custom MSRs have a range reserved for them, that goes from
+0x4b564d00 to 0x4b564dff. There are MSRs outside this area,
+but they are deprecated and their use is discouraged.
+
+Custom MSR list
+---------------
+
+The current supported Custom MSR list is:
+
+MSR_KVM_WALL_CLOCK_NEW:
+ 0x4b564d00
+
+data:
+ 4-byte alignment physical address of a memory area which must be
+ in guest RAM. This memory is expected to hold a copy of the following
+ structure::
+
+ struct pvclock_wall_clock {
+ u32 version;
+ u32 sec;
+ u32 nsec;
+ } __attribute__((__packed__));
+
+ whose data will be filled in by the hypervisor. The hypervisor is only
+ guaranteed to update this data at the moment of MSR write.
+ Users that want to reliably query this information more than once have
+ to write more than once to this MSR. Fields have the following meanings:
+
+ version:
+ guest has to check version before and after grabbing
+ time information and check that they are both equal and even.
+ An odd version indicates an in-progress update.
+
+ sec:
+ number of seconds for wallclock at time of boot.
+
+ nsec:
+ number of nanoseconds for wallclock at time of boot.
+
+ In order to get the current wallclock time, the system_time from
+ MSR_KVM_SYSTEM_TIME_NEW needs to be added.
+
+ Note that although MSRs are per-CPU entities, the effect of this
+ particular MSR is global.
+
+ Availability of this MSR must be checked via bit 3 in 0x4000001 cpuid
+ leaf prior to usage.
+
+MSR_KVM_SYSTEM_TIME_NEW:
+ 0x4b564d01
+
+data:
+ 4-byte aligned physical address of a memory area which must be in
+ guest RAM, plus an enable bit in bit 0. This memory is expected to hold
+ a copy of the following structure::
+
+ struct pvclock_vcpu_time_info {
+ u32 version;
+ u32 pad0;
+ u64 tsc_timestamp;
+ u64 system_time;
+ u32 tsc_to_system_mul;
+ s8 tsc_shift;
+ u8 flags;
+ u8 pad[2];
+ } __attribute__((__packed__)); /* 32 bytes */
+
+ whose data will be filled in by the hypervisor periodically. Only one
+ write, or registration, is needed for each VCPU. The interval between
+ updates of this structure is arbitrary and implementation-dependent.
+ The hypervisor may update this structure at any time it sees fit until
+ anything with bit0 == 0 is written to it.
+
+ Fields have the following meanings:
+
+ version:
+ guest has to check version before and after grabbing
+ time information and check that they are both equal and even.
+ An odd version indicates an in-progress update.
+
+ tsc_timestamp:
+ the tsc value at the current VCPU at the time
+ of the update of this structure. Guests can subtract this value
+ from current tsc to derive a notion of elapsed time since the
+ structure update.
+
+ system_time:
+ a host notion of monotonic time, including sleep
+ time at the time this structure was last updated. Unit is
+ nanoseconds.
+
+ tsc_to_system_mul:
+ multiplier to be used when converting
+ tsc-related quantity to nanoseconds
+
+ tsc_shift:
+ shift to be used when converting tsc-related
+ quantity to nanoseconds. This shift will ensure that
+ multiplication with tsc_to_system_mul does not overflow.
+ A positive value denotes a left shift, a negative value
+ a right shift.
+
+ The conversion from tsc to nanoseconds involves an additional
+ right shift by 32 bits. With this information, guests can
+ derive per-CPU time by doing::
+
+ time = (current_tsc - tsc_timestamp)
+ if (tsc_shift >= 0)
+ time <<= tsc_shift;
+ else
+ time >>= -tsc_shift;
+ time = (time * tsc_to_system_mul) >> 32
+ time = time + system_time
+
+ flags:
+ bits in this field indicate extended capabilities
+ coordinated between the guest and the hypervisor. Availability
+ of specific flags has to be checked in 0x40000001 cpuid leaf.
+ Current flags are:
+
+
+ +-----------+--------------+----------------------------------+
+ | flag bit | cpuid bit | meaning |
+ +-----------+--------------+----------------------------------+
+ | | | time measures taken across |
+ | 0 | 24 | multiple cpus are guaranteed to |
+ | | | be monotonic |
+ +-----------+--------------+----------------------------------+
+ | | | guest vcpu has been paused by |
+ | 1 | N/A | the host |
+ | | | See 4.70 in api.txt |
+ +-----------+--------------+----------------------------------+
+
+ Availability of this MSR must be checked via bit 3 in 0x4000001 cpuid
+ leaf prior to usage.
+
+
+MSR_KVM_WALL_CLOCK:
+ 0x11
+
+data and functioning:
+ same as MSR_KVM_WALL_CLOCK_NEW. Use that instead.
+
+ This MSR falls outside the reserved KVM range and may be removed in the
+ future. Its usage is deprecated.
+
+ Availability of this MSR must be checked via bit 0 in 0x4000001 cpuid
+ leaf prior to usage.
+
+MSR_KVM_SYSTEM_TIME:
+ 0x12
+
+data and functioning:
+ same as MSR_KVM_SYSTEM_TIME_NEW. Use that instead.
+
+ This MSR falls outside the reserved KVM range and may be removed in the
+ future. Its usage is deprecated.
+
+ Availability of this MSR must be checked via bit 0 in 0x4000001 cpuid
+ leaf prior to usage.
+
+ The suggested algorithm for detecting kvmclock presence is then::
+
+ if (!kvm_para_available()) /* refer to cpuid.txt */
+ return NON_PRESENT;
+
+ flags = cpuid_eax(0x40000001);
+ if (flags & 3) {
+ msr_kvm_system_time = MSR_KVM_SYSTEM_TIME_NEW;
+ msr_kvm_wall_clock = MSR_KVM_WALL_CLOCK_NEW;
+ return PRESENT;
+ } else if (flags & 0) {
+ msr_kvm_system_time = MSR_KVM_SYSTEM_TIME;
+ msr_kvm_wall_clock = MSR_KVM_WALL_CLOCK;
+ return PRESENT;
+ } else
+ return NON_PRESENT;
+
+MSR_KVM_ASYNC_PF_EN:
+ 0x4b564d02
+
+data:
+ Asynchronous page fault (APF) control MSR.
+
+ Bits 63-6 hold 64-byte aligned physical address of a 64 byte memory area
+ which must be in guest RAM and must be zeroed. This memory is expected
+ to hold a copy of the following structure::
+
+ struct kvm_vcpu_pv_apf_data {
+ /* Used for 'page not present' events delivered via #PF */
+ __u32 flags;
+
+ /* Used for 'page ready' events delivered via interrupt notification */
+ __u32 token;
+
+ __u8 pad[56];
+ __u32 enabled;
+ };
+
+ Bits 5-4 of the MSR are reserved and should be zero. Bit 0 is set to 1
+ when asynchronous page faults are enabled on the vcpu, 0 when disabled.
+ Bit 1 is 1 if asynchronous page faults can be injected when vcpu is in
+ cpl == 0. Bit 2 is 1 if asynchronous page faults are delivered to L1 as
+ #PF vmexits. Bit 2 can be set only if KVM_FEATURE_ASYNC_PF_VMEXIT is
+ present in CPUID. Bit 3 enables interrupt based delivery of 'page ready'
+ events. Bit 3 can only be set if KVM_FEATURE_ASYNC_PF_INT is present in
+ CPUID.
+
+ 'Page not present' events are currently always delivered as synthetic
+ #PF exception. During delivery of these events APF CR2 register contains
+ a token that will be used to notify the guest when missing page becomes
+ available. Also, to make it possible to distinguish between real #PF and
+ APF, first 4 bytes of 64 byte memory location ('flags') will be written
+ to by the hypervisor at the time of injection. Only first bit of 'flags'
+ is currently supported, when set, it indicates that the guest is dealing
+ with asynchronous 'page not present' event. If during a page fault APF
+ 'flags' is '0' it means that this is regular page fault. Guest is
+ supposed to clear 'flags' when it is done handling #PF exception so the
+ next event can be delivered.
+
+ Note, since APF 'page not present' events use the same exception vector
+ as regular page fault, guest must reset 'flags' to '0' before it does
+ something that can generate normal page fault.
+
+ Bytes 5-7 of 64 byte memory location ('token') will be written to by the
+ hypervisor at the time of APF 'page ready' event injection. The content
+ of these bytes is a token which was previously delivered as 'page not
+ present' event. The event indicates the page in now available. Guest is
+ supposed to write '0' to 'token' when it is done handling 'page ready'
+ event and to write 1' to MSR_KVM_ASYNC_PF_ACK after clearing the location;
+ writing to the MSR forces KVM to re-scan its queue and deliver the next
+ pending notification.
+
+ Note, MSR_KVM_ASYNC_PF_INT MSR specifying the interrupt vector for 'page
+ ready' APF delivery needs to be written to before enabling APF mechanism
+ in MSR_KVM_ASYNC_PF_EN or interrupt #0 can get injected. The MSR is
+ available if KVM_FEATURE_ASYNC_PF_INT is present in CPUID.
+
+ Note, previously, 'page ready' events were delivered via the same #PF
+ exception as 'page not present' events but this is now deprecated. If
+ bit 3 (interrupt based delivery) is not set APF events are not delivered.
+
+ If APF is disabled while there are outstanding APFs, they will
+ not be delivered.
+
+ Currently 'page ready' APF events will be always delivered on the
+ same vcpu as 'page not present' event was, but guest should not rely on
+ that.
+
+MSR_KVM_STEAL_TIME:
+ 0x4b564d03
+
+data:
+ 64-byte alignment physical address of a memory area which must be
+ in guest RAM, plus an enable bit in bit 0. This memory is expected to
+ hold a copy of the following structure::
+
+ struct kvm_steal_time {
+ __u64 steal;
+ __u32 version;
+ __u32 flags;
+ __u8 preempted;
+ __u8 u8_pad[3];
+ __u32 pad[11];
+ }
+
+ whose data will be filled in by the hypervisor periodically. Only one
+ write, or registration, is needed for each VCPU. The interval between
+ updates of this structure is arbitrary and implementation-dependent.
+ The hypervisor may update this structure at any time it sees fit until
+ anything with bit0 == 0 is written to it. Guest is required to make sure
+ this structure is initialized to zero.
+
+ Fields have the following meanings:
+
+ version:
+ a sequence counter. In other words, guest has to check
+ this field before and after grabbing time information and make
+ sure they are both equal and even. An odd version indicates an
+ in-progress update.
+
+ flags:
+ At this point, always zero. May be used to indicate
+ changes in this structure in the future.
+
+ steal:
+ the amount of time in which this vCPU did not run, in
+ nanoseconds. Time during which the vcpu is idle, will not be
+ reported as steal time.
+
+ preempted:
+ indicate the vCPU who owns this struct is running or
+ not. Non-zero values mean the vCPU has been preempted. Zero
+ means the vCPU is not preempted. NOTE, it is always zero if the
+ the hypervisor doesn't support this field.
+
+MSR_KVM_EOI_EN:
+ 0x4b564d04
+
+data:
+ Bit 0 is 1 when PV end of interrupt is enabled on the vcpu; 0
+ when disabled. Bit 1 is reserved and must be zero. When PV end of
+ interrupt is enabled (bit 0 set), bits 63-2 hold a 4-byte aligned
+ physical address of a 4 byte memory area which must be in guest RAM and
+ must be zeroed.
+
+ The first, least significant bit of 4 byte memory location will be
+ written to by the hypervisor, typically at the time of interrupt
+ injection. Value of 1 means that guest can skip writing EOI to the apic
+ (using MSR or MMIO write); instead, it is sufficient to signal
+ EOI by clearing the bit in guest memory - this location will
+ later be polled by the hypervisor.
+ Value of 0 means that the EOI write is required.
+
+ It is always safe for the guest to ignore the optimization and perform
+ the APIC EOI write anyway.
+
+ Hypervisor is guaranteed to only modify this least
+ significant bit while in the current VCPU context, this means that
+ guest does not need to use either lock prefix or memory ordering
+ primitives to synchronise with the hypervisor.
+
+ However, hypervisor can set and clear this memory bit at any time:
+ therefore to make sure hypervisor does not interrupt the
+ guest and clear the least significant bit in the memory area
+ in the window between guest testing it to detect
+ whether it can skip EOI apic write and between guest
+ clearing it to signal EOI to the hypervisor,
+ guest must both read the least significant bit in the memory area and
+ clear it using a single CPU instruction, such as test and clear, or
+ compare and exchange.
+
+MSR_KVM_POLL_CONTROL:
+ 0x4b564d05
+
+ Control host-side polling.
+
+data:
+ Bit 0 enables (1) or disables (0) host-side HLT polling logic.
+
+ KVM guests can request the host not to poll on HLT, for example if
+ they are performing polling themselves.
+
+MSR_KVM_ASYNC_PF_INT:
+ 0x4b564d06
+
+data:
+ Second asynchronous page fault (APF) control MSR.
+
+ Bits 0-7: APIC vector for delivery of 'page ready' APF events.
+ Bits 8-63: Reserved
+
+ Interrupt vector for asynchnonous 'page ready' notifications delivery.
+ The vector has to be set up before asynchronous page fault mechanism
+ is enabled in MSR_KVM_ASYNC_PF_EN. The MSR is only available if
+ KVM_FEATURE_ASYNC_PF_INT is present in CPUID.
+
+MSR_KVM_ASYNC_PF_ACK:
+ 0x4b564d07
+
+data:
+ Asynchronous page fault (APF) acknowledgment.
+
+ When the guest is done processing 'page ready' APF event and 'token'
+ field in 'struct kvm_vcpu_pv_apf_data' is cleared it is supposed to
+ write '1' to bit 0 of the MSR, this causes the host to re-scan its queue
+ and check if there are more notifications pending. The MSR is available
+ if KVM_FEATURE_ASYNC_PF_INT is present in CPUID.
+
+MSR_KVM_MIGRATION_CONTROL:
+ 0x4b564d08
+
+data:
+ This MSR is available if KVM_FEATURE_MIGRATION_CONTROL is present in
+ CPUID. Bit 0 represents whether live migration of the guest is allowed.
+
+ When a guest is started, bit 0 will be 0 if the guest has encrypted
+ memory and 1 if the guest does not have encrypted memory. If the
+ guest is communicating page encryption status to the host using the
+ ``KVM_HC_MAP_GPA_RANGE`` hypercall, it can set bit 0 in this MSR to
+ allow live migration of the guest.
diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/x86/nested-vmx.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/x86/nested-vmx.rst
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..ac2095d41f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/x86/nested-vmx.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,244 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+==========
+Nested VMX
+==========
+
+Overview
+---------
+
+On Intel processors, KVM uses Intel's VMX (Virtual-Machine eXtensions)
+to easily and efficiently run guest operating systems. Normally, these guests
+*cannot* themselves be hypervisors running their own guests, because in VMX,
+guests cannot use VMX instructions.
+
+The "Nested VMX" feature adds this missing capability - of running guest
+hypervisors (which use VMX) with their own nested guests. It does so by
+allowing a guest to use VMX instructions, and correctly and efficiently
+emulating them using the single level of VMX available in the hardware.
+
+We describe in much greater detail the theory behind the nested VMX feature,
+its implementation and its performance characteristics, in the OSDI 2010 paper
+"The Turtles Project: Design and Implementation of Nested Virtualization",
+available at:
+
+ https://www.usenix.org/events/osdi10/tech/full_papers/Ben-Yehuda.pdf
+
+
+Terminology
+-----------
+
+Single-level virtualization has two levels - the host (KVM) and the guests.
+In nested virtualization, we have three levels: The host (KVM), which we call
+L0, the guest hypervisor, which we call L1, and its nested guest, which we
+call L2.
+
+
+Running nested VMX
+------------------
+
+The nested VMX feature is enabled by default since Linux kernel v4.20. For
+older Linux kernel, it can be enabled by giving the "nested=1" option to the
+kvm-intel module.
+
+
+No modifications are required to user space (qemu). However, qemu's default
+emulated CPU type (qemu64) does not list the "VMX" CPU feature, so it must be
+explicitly enabled, by giving qemu one of the following options:
+
+ - cpu host (emulated CPU has all features of the real CPU)
+
+ - cpu qemu64,+vmx (add just the vmx feature to a named CPU type)
+
+
+ABIs
+----
+
+Nested VMX aims to present a standard and (eventually) fully-functional VMX
+implementation for the a guest hypervisor to use. As such, the official
+specification of the ABI that it provides is Intel's VMX specification,
+namely volume 3B of their "Intel 64 and IA-32 Architectures Software
+Developer's Manual". Not all of VMX's features are currently fully supported,
+but the goal is to eventually support them all, starting with the VMX features
+which are used in practice by popular hypervisors (KVM and others).
+
+As a VMX implementation, nested VMX presents a VMCS structure to L1.
+As mandated by the spec, other than the two fields revision_id and abort,
+this structure is *opaque* to its user, who is not supposed to know or care
+about its internal structure. Rather, the structure is accessed through the
+VMREAD and VMWRITE instructions.
+Still, for debugging purposes, KVM developers might be interested to know the
+internals of this structure; This is struct vmcs12 from arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c.
+
+The name "vmcs12" refers to the VMCS that L1 builds for L2. In the code we
+also have "vmcs01", the VMCS that L0 built for L1, and "vmcs02" is the VMCS
+which L0 builds to actually run L2 - how this is done is explained in the
+aforementioned paper.
+
+For convenience, we repeat the content of struct vmcs12 here. If the internals
+of this structure changes, this can break live migration across KVM versions.
+VMCS12_REVISION (from vmx.c) should be changed if struct vmcs12 or its inner
+struct shadow_vmcs is ever changed.
+
+::
+
+ typedef u64 natural_width;
+ struct __packed vmcs12 {
+ /* According to the Intel spec, a VMCS region must start with
+ * these two user-visible fields */
+ u32 revision_id;
+ u32 abort;
+
+ u32 launch_state; /* set to 0 by VMCLEAR, to 1 by VMLAUNCH */
+ u32 padding[7]; /* room for future expansion */
+
+ u64 io_bitmap_a;
+ u64 io_bitmap_b;
+ u64 msr_bitmap;
+ u64 vm_exit_msr_store_addr;
+ u64 vm_exit_msr_load_addr;
+ u64 vm_entry_msr_load_addr;
+ u64 tsc_offset;
+ u64 virtual_apic_page_addr;
+ u64 apic_access_addr;
+ u64 ept_pointer;
+ u64 guest_physical_address;
+ u64 vmcs_link_pointer;
+ u64 guest_ia32_debugctl;
+ u64 guest_ia32_pat;
+ u64 guest_ia32_efer;
+ u64 guest_pdptr0;
+ u64 guest_pdptr1;
+ u64 guest_pdptr2;
+ u64 guest_pdptr3;
+ u64 host_ia32_pat;
+ u64 host_ia32_efer;
+ u64 padding64[8]; /* room for future expansion */
+ natural_width cr0_guest_host_mask;
+ natural_width cr4_guest_host_mask;
+ natural_width cr0_read_shadow;
+ natural_width cr4_read_shadow;
+ natural_width dead_space[4]; /* Last remnants of cr3_target_value[0-3]. */
+ natural_width exit_qualification;
+ natural_width guest_linear_address;
+ natural_width guest_cr0;
+ natural_width guest_cr3;
+ natural_width guest_cr4;
+ natural_width guest_es_base;
+ natural_width guest_cs_base;
+ natural_width guest_ss_base;
+ natural_width guest_ds_base;
+ natural_width guest_fs_base;
+ natural_width guest_gs_base;
+ natural_width guest_ldtr_base;
+ natural_width guest_tr_base;
+ natural_width guest_gdtr_base;
+ natural_width guest_idtr_base;
+ natural_width guest_dr7;
+ natural_width guest_rsp;
+ natural_width guest_rip;
+ natural_width guest_rflags;
+ natural_width guest_pending_dbg_exceptions;
+ natural_width guest_sysenter_esp;
+ natural_width guest_sysenter_eip;
+ natural_width host_cr0;
+ natural_width host_cr3;
+ natural_width host_cr4;
+ natural_width host_fs_base;
+ natural_width host_gs_base;
+ natural_width host_tr_base;
+ natural_width host_gdtr_base;
+ natural_width host_idtr_base;
+ natural_width host_ia32_sysenter_esp;
+ natural_width host_ia32_sysenter_eip;
+ natural_width host_rsp;
+ natural_width host_rip;
+ natural_width paddingl[8]; /* room for future expansion */
+ u32 pin_based_vm_exec_control;
+ u32 cpu_based_vm_exec_control;
+ u32 exception_bitmap;
+ u32 page_fault_error_code_mask;
+ u32 page_fault_error_code_match;
+ u32 cr3_target_count;
+ u32 vm_exit_controls;
+ u32 vm_exit_msr_store_count;
+ u32 vm_exit_msr_load_count;
+ u32 vm_entry_controls;
+ u32 vm_entry_msr_load_count;
+ u32 vm_entry_intr_info_field;
+ u32 vm_entry_exception_error_code;
+ u32 vm_entry_instruction_len;
+ u32 tpr_threshold;
+ u32 secondary_vm_exec_control;
+ u32 vm_instruction_error;
+ u32 vm_exit_reason;
+ u32 vm_exit_intr_info;
+ u32 vm_exit_intr_error_code;
+ u32 idt_vectoring_info_field;
+ u32 idt_vectoring_error_code;
+ u32 vm_exit_instruction_len;
+ u32 vmx_instruction_info;
+ u32 guest_es_limit;
+ u32 guest_cs_limit;
+ u32 guest_ss_limit;
+ u32 guest_ds_limit;
+ u32 guest_fs_limit;
+ u32 guest_gs_limit;
+ u32 guest_ldtr_limit;
+ u32 guest_tr_limit;
+ u32 guest_gdtr_limit;
+ u32 guest_idtr_limit;
+ u32 guest_es_ar_bytes;
+ u32 guest_cs_ar_bytes;
+ u32 guest_ss_ar_bytes;
+ u32 guest_ds_ar_bytes;
+ u32 guest_fs_ar_bytes;
+ u32 guest_gs_ar_bytes;
+ u32 guest_ldtr_ar_bytes;
+ u32 guest_tr_ar_bytes;
+ u32 guest_interruptibility_info;
+ u32 guest_activity_state;
+ u32 guest_sysenter_cs;
+ u32 host_ia32_sysenter_cs;
+ u32 padding32[8]; /* room for future expansion */
+ u16 virtual_processor_id;
+ u16 guest_es_selector;
+ u16 guest_cs_selector;
+ u16 guest_ss_selector;
+ u16 guest_ds_selector;
+ u16 guest_fs_selector;
+ u16 guest_gs_selector;
+ u16 guest_ldtr_selector;
+ u16 guest_tr_selector;
+ u16 host_es_selector;
+ u16 host_cs_selector;
+ u16 host_ss_selector;
+ u16 host_ds_selector;
+ u16 host_fs_selector;
+ u16 host_gs_selector;
+ u16 host_tr_selector;
+ };
+
+
+Authors
+-------
+
+These patches were written by:
+ - Abel Gordon, abelg <at> il.ibm.com
+ - Nadav Har'El, nyh <at> il.ibm.com
+ - Orit Wasserman, oritw <at> il.ibm.com
+ - Ben-Ami Yassor, benami <at> il.ibm.com
+ - Muli Ben-Yehuda, muli <at> il.ibm.com
+
+With contributions by:
+ - Anthony Liguori, aliguori <at> us.ibm.com
+ - Mike Day, mdday <at> us.ibm.com
+ - Michael Factor, factor <at> il.ibm.com
+ - Zvi Dubitzky, dubi <at> il.ibm.com
+
+And valuable reviews by:
+ - Avi Kivity, avi <at> redhat.com
+ - Gleb Natapov, gleb <at> redhat.com
+ - Marcelo Tosatti, mtosatti <at> redhat.com
+ - Kevin Tian, kevin.tian <at> intel.com
+ - and others.
diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/x86/running-nested-guests.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/x86/running-nested-guests.rst
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..87326413d5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/x86/running-nested-guests.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,278 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+==============================
+Running nested guests with KVM
+==============================
+
+A nested guest is the ability to run a guest inside another guest (it
+can be KVM-based or a different hypervisor). The straightforward
+example is a KVM guest that in turn runs on a KVM guest (the rest of
+this document is built on this example)::
+
+ .----------------. .----------------.
+ | | | |
+ | L2 | | L2 |
+ | (Nested Guest) | | (Nested Guest) |
+ | | | |
+ |----------------'--'----------------|
+ | |
+ | L1 (Guest Hypervisor) |
+ | KVM (/dev/kvm) |
+ | |
+ .------------------------------------------------------.
+ | L0 (Host Hypervisor) |
+ | KVM (/dev/kvm) |
+ |------------------------------------------------------|
+ | Hardware (with virtualization extensions) |
+ '------------------------------------------------------'
+
+Terminology:
+
+- L0 – level-0; the bare metal host, running KVM
+
+- L1 – level-1 guest; a VM running on L0; also called the "guest
+ hypervisor", as it itself is capable of running KVM.
+
+- L2 – level-2 guest; a VM running on L1, this is the "nested guest"
+
+.. note:: The above diagram is modelled after the x86 architecture;
+ s390x, ppc64 and other architectures are likely to have
+ a different design for nesting.
+
+ For example, s390x always has an LPAR (LogicalPARtition)
+ hypervisor running on bare metal, adding another layer and
+ resulting in at least four levels in a nested setup — L0 (bare
+ metal, running the LPAR hypervisor), L1 (host hypervisor), L2
+ (guest hypervisor), L3 (nested guest).
+
+ This document will stick with the three-level terminology (L0,
+ L1, and L2) for all architectures; and will largely focus on
+ x86.
+
+
+Use Cases
+---------
+
+There are several scenarios where nested KVM can be useful, to name a
+few:
+
+- As a developer, you want to test your software on different operating
+ systems (OSes). Instead of renting multiple VMs from a Cloud
+ Provider, using nested KVM lets you rent a large enough "guest
+ hypervisor" (level-1 guest). This in turn allows you to create
+ multiple nested guests (level-2 guests), running different OSes, on
+ which you can develop and test your software.
+
+- Live migration of "guest hypervisors" and their nested guests, for
+ load balancing, disaster recovery, etc.
+
+- VM image creation tools (e.g. ``virt-install``, etc) often run
+ their own VM, and users expect these to work inside a VM.
+
+- Some OSes use virtualization internally for security (e.g. to let
+ applications run safely in isolation).
+
+
+Enabling "nested" (x86)
+-----------------------
+
+From Linux kernel v4.20 onwards, the ``nested`` KVM parameter is enabled
+by default for Intel and AMD. (Though your Linux distribution might
+override this default.)
+
+In case you are running a Linux kernel older than v4.19, to enable
+nesting, set the ``nested`` KVM module parameter to ``Y`` or ``1``. To
+persist this setting across reboots, you can add it in a config file, as
+shown below:
+
+1. On the bare metal host (L0), list the kernel modules and ensure that
+ the KVM modules::
+
+ $ lsmod | grep -i kvm
+ kvm_intel 133627 0
+ kvm 435079 1 kvm_intel
+
+2. Show information for ``kvm_intel`` module::
+
+ $ modinfo kvm_intel | grep -i nested
+ parm: nested:bool
+
+3. For the nested KVM configuration to persist across reboots, place the
+ below in ``/etc/modprobed/kvm_intel.conf`` (create the file if it
+ doesn't exist)::
+
+ $ cat /etc/modprobe.d/kvm_intel.conf
+ options kvm-intel nested=y
+
+4. Unload and re-load the KVM Intel module::
+
+ $ sudo rmmod kvm-intel
+ $ sudo modprobe kvm-intel
+
+5. Verify if the ``nested`` parameter for KVM is enabled::
+
+ $ cat /sys/module/kvm_intel/parameters/nested
+ Y
+
+For AMD hosts, the process is the same as above, except that the module
+name is ``kvm-amd``.
+
+
+Additional nested-related kernel parameters (x86)
+-------------------------------------------------
+
+If your hardware is sufficiently advanced (Intel Haswell processor or
+higher, which has newer hardware virt extensions), the following
+additional features will also be enabled by default: "Shadow VMCS
+(Virtual Machine Control Structure)", APIC Virtualization on your bare
+metal host (L0). Parameters for Intel hosts::
+
+ $ cat /sys/module/kvm_intel/parameters/enable_shadow_vmcs
+ Y
+
+ $ cat /sys/module/kvm_intel/parameters/enable_apicv
+ Y
+
+ $ cat /sys/module/kvm_intel/parameters/ept
+ Y
+
+.. note:: If you suspect your L2 (i.e. nested guest) is running slower,
+ ensure the above are enabled (particularly
+ ``enable_shadow_vmcs`` and ``ept``).
+
+
+Starting a nested guest (x86)
+-----------------------------
+
+Once your bare metal host (L0) is configured for nesting, you should be
+able to start an L1 guest with::
+
+ $ qemu-kvm -cpu host [...]
+
+The above will pass through the host CPU's capabilities as-is to the
+guest, or for better live migration compatibility, use a named CPU
+model supported by QEMU. e.g.::
+
+ $ qemu-kvm -cpu Haswell-noTSX-IBRS,vmx=on
+
+then the guest hypervisor will subsequently be capable of running a
+nested guest with accelerated KVM.
+
+
+Enabling "nested" (s390x)
+-------------------------
+
+1. On the host hypervisor (L0), enable the ``nested`` parameter on
+ s390x::
+
+ $ rmmod kvm
+ $ modprobe kvm nested=1
+
+.. note:: On s390x, the kernel parameter ``hpage`` is mutually exclusive
+ with the ``nested`` parameter — i.e. to be able to enable
+ ``nested``, the ``hpage`` parameter *must* be disabled.
+
+2. The guest hypervisor (L1) must be provided with the ``sie`` CPU
+ feature — with QEMU, this can be done by using "host passthrough"
+ (via the command-line ``-cpu host``).
+
+3. Now the KVM module can be loaded in the L1 (guest hypervisor)::
+
+ $ modprobe kvm
+
+
+Live migration with nested KVM
+------------------------------
+
+Migrating an L1 guest, with a *live* nested guest in it, to another
+bare metal host, works as of Linux kernel 5.3 and QEMU 4.2.0 for
+Intel x86 systems, and even on older versions for s390x.
+
+On AMD systems, once an L1 guest has started an L2 guest, the L1 guest
+should no longer be migrated or saved (refer to QEMU documentation on
+"savevm"/"loadvm") until the L2 guest shuts down. Attempting to migrate
+or save-and-load an L1 guest while an L2 guest is running will result in
+undefined behavior. You might see a ``kernel BUG!`` entry in ``dmesg``, a
+kernel 'oops', or an outright kernel panic. Such a migrated or loaded L1
+guest can no longer be considered stable or secure, and must be restarted.
+Migrating an L1 guest merely configured to support nesting, while not
+actually running L2 guests, is expected to function normally even on AMD
+systems but may fail once guests are started.
+
+Migrating an L2 guest is always expected to succeed, so all the following
+scenarios should work even on AMD systems:
+
+- Migrating a nested guest (L2) to another L1 guest on the *same* bare
+ metal host.
+
+- Migrating a nested guest (L2) to another L1 guest on a *different*
+ bare metal host.
+
+- Migrating a nested guest (L2) to a bare metal host.
+
+Reporting bugs from nested setups
+-----------------------------------
+
+Debugging "nested" problems can involve sifting through log files across
+L0, L1 and L2; this can result in tedious back-n-forth between the bug
+reporter and the bug fixer.
+
+- Mention that you are in a "nested" setup. If you are running any kind
+ of "nesting" at all, say so. Unfortunately, this needs to be called
+ out because when reporting bugs, people tend to forget to even
+ *mention* that they're using nested virtualization.
+
+- Ensure you are actually running KVM on KVM. Sometimes people do not
+ have KVM enabled for their guest hypervisor (L1), which results in
+ them running with pure emulation or what QEMU calls it as "TCG", but
+ they think they're running nested KVM. Thus confusing "nested Virt"
+ (which could also mean, QEMU on KVM) with "nested KVM" (KVM on KVM).
+
+Information to collect (generic)
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+The following is not an exhaustive list, but a very good starting point:
+
+ - Kernel, libvirt, and QEMU version from L0
+
+ - Kernel, libvirt and QEMU version from L1
+
+ - QEMU command-line of L1 -- when using libvirt, you'll find it here:
+ ``/var/log/libvirt/qemu/instance.log``
+
+ - QEMU command-line of L2 -- as above, when using libvirt, get the
+ complete libvirt-generated QEMU command-line
+
+ - ``cat /sys/cpuinfo`` from L0
+
+ - ``cat /sys/cpuinfo`` from L1
+
+ - ``lscpu`` from L0
+
+ - ``lscpu`` from L1
+
+ - Full ``dmesg`` output from L0
+
+ - Full ``dmesg`` output from L1
+
+x86-specific info to collect
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+Both the below commands, ``x86info`` and ``dmidecode``, should be
+available on most Linux distributions with the same name:
+
+ - Output of: ``x86info -a`` from L0
+
+ - Output of: ``x86info -a`` from L1
+
+ - Output of: ``dmidecode`` from L0
+
+ - Output of: ``dmidecode`` from L1
+
+s390x-specific info to collect
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+Along with the earlier mentioned generic details, the below is
+also recommended:
+
+ - ``/proc/sysinfo`` from L1; this will also include the info from L0
diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/x86/timekeeping.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/x86/timekeeping.rst
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..21ae7efa29
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/x86/timekeeping.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,645 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+======================================================
+Timekeeping Virtualization for X86-Based Architectures
+======================================================
+
+:Author: Zachary Amsden <zamsden@redhat.com>
+:Copyright: (c) 2010, Red Hat. All rights reserved.
+
+.. Contents
+
+ 1) Overview
+ 2) Timing Devices
+ 3) TSC Hardware
+ 4) Virtualization Problems
+
+1. Overview
+===========
+
+One of the most complicated parts of the X86 platform, and specifically,
+the virtualization of this platform is the plethora of timing devices available
+and the complexity of emulating those devices. In addition, virtualization of
+time introduces a new set of challenges because it introduces a multiplexed
+division of time beyond the control of the guest CPU.
+
+First, we will describe the various timekeeping hardware available, then
+present some of the problems which arise and solutions available, giving
+specific recommendations for certain classes of KVM guests.
+
+The purpose of this document is to collect data and information relevant to
+timekeeping which may be difficult to find elsewhere, specifically,
+information relevant to KVM and hardware-based virtualization.
+
+2. Timing Devices
+=================
+
+First we discuss the basic hardware devices available. TSC and the related
+KVM clock are special enough to warrant a full exposition and are described in
+the following section.
+
+2.1. i8254 - PIT
+----------------
+
+One of the first timer devices available is the programmable interrupt timer,
+or PIT. The PIT has a fixed frequency 1.193182 MHz base clock and three
+channels which can be programmed to deliver periodic or one-shot interrupts.
+These three channels can be configured in different modes and have individual
+counters. Channel 1 and 2 were not available for general use in the original
+IBM PC, and historically were connected to control RAM refresh and the PC
+speaker. Now the PIT is typically integrated as part of an emulated chipset
+and a separate physical PIT is not used.
+
+The PIT uses I/O ports 0x40 - 0x43. Access to the 16-bit counters is done
+using single or multiple byte access to the I/O ports. There are 6 modes
+available, but not all modes are available to all timers, as only timer 2
+has a connected gate input, required for modes 1 and 5. The gate line is
+controlled by port 61h, bit 0, as illustrated in the following diagram::
+
+ -------------- ----------------
+ | | | |
+ | 1.1932 MHz|---------->| CLOCK OUT | ---------> IRQ 0
+ | Clock | | | |
+ -------------- | +->| GATE TIMER 0 |
+ | ----------------
+ |
+ | ----------------
+ | | |
+ |------>| CLOCK OUT | ---------> 66.3 KHZ DRAM
+ | | | (aka /dev/null)
+ | +->| GATE TIMER 1 |
+ | ----------------
+ |
+ | ----------------
+ | | |
+ |------>| CLOCK OUT | ---------> Port 61h, bit 5
+ | | |
+ Port 61h, bit 0 -------->| GATE TIMER 2 | \_.---- ____
+ ---------------- _| )--|LPF|---Speaker
+ / *---- \___/
+ Port 61h, bit 1 ---------------------------------/
+
+The timer modes are now described.
+
+Mode 0: Single Timeout.
+ This is a one-shot software timeout that counts down
+ when the gate is high (always true for timers 0 and 1). When the count
+ reaches zero, the output goes high.
+
+Mode 1: Triggered One-shot.
+ The output is initially set high. When the gate
+ line is set high, a countdown is initiated (which does not stop if the gate is
+ lowered), during which the output is set low. When the count reaches zero,
+ the output goes high.
+
+Mode 2: Rate Generator.
+ The output is initially set high. When the countdown
+ reaches 1, the output goes low for one count and then returns high. The value
+ is reloaded and the countdown automatically resumes. If the gate line goes
+ low, the count is halted. If the output is low when the gate is lowered, the
+ output automatically goes high (this only affects timer 2).
+
+Mode 3: Square Wave.
+ This generates a high / low square wave. The count
+ determines the length of the pulse, which alternates between high and low
+ when zero is reached. The count only proceeds when gate is high and is
+ automatically reloaded on reaching zero. The count is decremented twice at
+ each clock to generate a full high / low cycle at the full periodic rate.
+ If the count is even, the clock remains high for N/2 counts and low for N/2
+ counts; if the clock is odd, the clock is high for (N+1)/2 counts and low
+ for (N-1)/2 counts. Only even values are latched by the counter, so odd
+ values are not observed when reading. This is the intended mode for timer 2,
+ which generates sine-like tones by low-pass filtering the square wave output.
+
+Mode 4: Software Strobe.
+ After programming this mode and loading the counter,
+ the output remains high until the counter reaches zero. Then the output
+ goes low for 1 clock cycle and returns high. The counter is not reloaded.
+ Counting only occurs when gate is high.
+
+Mode 5: Hardware Strobe.
+ After programming and loading the counter, the
+ output remains high. When the gate is raised, a countdown is initiated
+ (which does not stop if the gate is lowered). When the counter reaches zero,
+ the output goes low for 1 clock cycle and then returns high. The counter is
+ not reloaded.
+
+In addition to normal binary counting, the PIT supports BCD counting. The
+command port, 0x43 is used to set the counter and mode for each of the three
+timers.
+
+PIT commands, issued to port 0x43, using the following bit encoding::
+
+ Bit 7-4: Command (See table below)
+ Bit 3-1: Mode (000 = Mode 0, 101 = Mode 5, 11X = undefined)
+ Bit 0 : Binary (0) / BCD (1)
+
+Command table::
+
+ 0000 - Latch Timer 0 count for port 0x40
+ sample and hold the count to be read in port 0x40;
+ additional commands ignored until counter is read;
+ mode bits ignored.
+
+ 0001 - Set Timer 0 LSB mode for port 0x40
+ set timer to read LSB only and force MSB to zero;
+ mode bits set timer mode
+
+ 0010 - Set Timer 0 MSB mode for port 0x40
+ set timer to read MSB only and force LSB to zero;
+ mode bits set timer mode
+
+ 0011 - Set Timer 0 16-bit mode for port 0x40
+ set timer to read / write LSB first, then MSB;
+ mode bits set timer mode
+
+ 0100 - Latch Timer 1 count for port 0x41 - as described above
+ 0101 - Set Timer 1 LSB mode for port 0x41 - as described above
+ 0110 - Set Timer 1 MSB mode for port 0x41 - as described above
+ 0111 - Set Timer 1 16-bit mode for port 0x41 - as described above
+
+ 1000 - Latch Timer 2 count for port 0x42 - as described above
+ 1001 - Set Timer 2 LSB mode for port 0x42 - as described above
+ 1010 - Set Timer 2 MSB mode for port 0x42 - as described above
+ 1011 - Set Timer 2 16-bit mode for port 0x42 as described above
+
+ 1101 - General counter latch
+ Latch combination of counters into corresponding ports
+ Bit 3 = Counter 2
+ Bit 2 = Counter 1
+ Bit 1 = Counter 0
+ Bit 0 = Unused
+
+ 1110 - Latch timer status
+ Latch combination of counter mode into corresponding ports
+ Bit 3 = Counter 2
+ Bit 2 = Counter 1
+ Bit 1 = Counter 0
+
+ The output of ports 0x40-0x42 following this command will be:
+
+ Bit 7 = Output pin
+ Bit 6 = Count loaded (0 if timer has expired)
+ Bit 5-4 = Read / Write mode
+ 01 = MSB only
+ 10 = LSB only
+ 11 = LSB / MSB (16-bit)
+ Bit 3-1 = Mode
+ Bit 0 = Binary (0) / BCD mode (1)
+
+2.2. RTC
+--------
+
+The second device which was available in the original PC was the MC146818 real
+time clock. The original device is now obsolete, and usually emulated by the
+system chipset, sometimes by an HPET and some frankenstein IRQ routing.
+
+The RTC is accessed through CMOS variables, which uses an index register to
+control which bytes are read. Since there is only one index register, read
+of the CMOS and read of the RTC require lock protection (in addition, it is
+dangerous to allow userspace utilities such as hwclock to have direct RTC
+access, as they could corrupt kernel reads and writes of CMOS memory).
+
+The RTC generates an interrupt which is usually routed to IRQ 8. The interrupt
+can function as a periodic timer, an additional once a day alarm, and can issue
+interrupts after an update of the CMOS registers by the MC146818 is complete.
+The type of interrupt is signalled in the RTC status registers.
+
+The RTC will update the current time fields by battery power even while the
+system is off. The current time fields should not be read while an update is
+in progress, as indicated in the status register.
+
+The clock uses a 32.768kHz crystal, so bits 6-4 of register A should be
+programmed to a 32kHz divider if the RTC is to count seconds.
+
+This is the RAM map originally used for the RTC/CMOS::
+
+ Location Size Description
+ ------------------------------------------
+ 00h byte Current second (BCD)
+ 01h byte Seconds alarm (BCD)
+ 02h byte Current minute (BCD)
+ 03h byte Minutes alarm (BCD)
+ 04h byte Current hour (BCD)
+ 05h byte Hours alarm (BCD)
+ 06h byte Current day of week (BCD)
+ 07h byte Current day of month (BCD)
+ 08h byte Current month (BCD)
+ 09h byte Current year (BCD)
+ 0Ah byte Register A
+ bit 7 = Update in progress
+ bit 6-4 = Divider for clock
+ 000 = 4.194 MHz
+ 001 = 1.049 MHz
+ 010 = 32 kHz
+ 10X = test modes
+ 110 = reset / disable
+ 111 = reset / disable
+ bit 3-0 = Rate selection for periodic interrupt
+ 000 = periodic timer disabled
+ 001 = 3.90625 uS
+ 010 = 7.8125 uS
+ 011 = .122070 mS
+ 100 = .244141 mS
+ ...
+ 1101 = 125 mS
+ 1110 = 250 mS
+ 1111 = 500 mS
+ 0Bh byte Register B
+ bit 7 = Run (0) / Halt (1)
+ bit 6 = Periodic interrupt enable
+ bit 5 = Alarm interrupt enable
+ bit 4 = Update-ended interrupt enable
+ bit 3 = Square wave interrupt enable
+ bit 2 = BCD calendar (0) / Binary (1)
+ bit 1 = 12-hour mode (0) / 24-hour mode (1)
+ bit 0 = 0 (DST off) / 1 (DST enabled)
+ OCh byte Register C (read only)
+ bit 7 = interrupt request flag (IRQF)
+ bit 6 = periodic interrupt flag (PF)
+ bit 5 = alarm interrupt flag (AF)
+ bit 4 = update interrupt flag (UF)
+ bit 3-0 = reserved
+ ODh byte Register D (read only)
+ bit 7 = RTC has power
+ bit 6-0 = reserved
+ 32h byte Current century BCD (*)
+ (*) location vendor specific and now determined from ACPI global tables
+
+2.3. APIC
+---------
+
+On Pentium and later processors, an on-board timer is available to each CPU
+as part of the Advanced Programmable Interrupt Controller. The APIC is
+accessed through memory-mapped registers and provides interrupt service to each
+CPU, used for IPIs and local timer interrupts.
+
+Although in theory the APIC is a safe and stable source for local interrupts,
+in practice, many bugs and glitches have occurred due to the special nature of
+the APIC CPU-local memory-mapped hardware. Beware that CPU errata may affect
+the use of the APIC and that workarounds may be required. In addition, some of
+these workarounds pose unique constraints for virtualization - requiring either
+extra overhead incurred from extra reads of memory-mapped I/O or additional
+functionality that may be more computationally expensive to implement.
+
+Since the APIC is documented quite well in the Intel and AMD manuals, we will
+avoid repetition of the detail here. It should be pointed out that the APIC
+timer is programmed through the LVT (local vector timer) register, is capable
+of one-shot or periodic operation, and is based on the bus clock divided down
+by the programmable divider register.
+
+2.4. HPET
+---------
+
+HPET is quite complex, and was originally intended to replace the PIT / RTC
+support of the X86 PC. It remains to be seen whether that will be the case, as
+the de facto standard of PC hardware is to emulate these older devices. Some
+systems designated as legacy free may support only the HPET as a hardware timer
+device.
+
+The HPET spec is rather loose and vague, requiring at least 3 hardware timers,
+but allowing implementation freedom to support many more. It also imposes no
+fixed rate on the timer frequency, but does impose some extremal values on
+frequency, error and slew.
+
+In general, the HPET is recommended as a high precision (compared to PIT /RTC)
+time source which is independent of local variation (as there is only one HPET
+in any given system). The HPET is also memory-mapped, and its presence is
+indicated through ACPI tables by the BIOS.
+
+Detailed specification of the HPET is beyond the current scope of this
+document, as it is also very well documented elsewhere.
+
+2.5. Offboard Timers
+--------------------
+
+Several cards, both proprietary (watchdog boards) and commonplace (e1000) have
+timing chips built into the cards which may have registers which are accessible
+to kernel or user drivers. To the author's knowledge, using these to generate
+a clocksource for a Linux or other kernel has not yet been attempted and is in
+general frowned upon as not playing by the agreed rules of the game. Such a
+timer device would require additional support to be virtualized properly and is
+not considered important at this time as no known operating system does this.
+
+3. TSC Hardware
+===============
+
+The TSC or time stamp counter is relatively simple in theory; it counts
+instruction cycles issued by the processor, which can be used as a measure of
+time. In practice, due to a number of problems, it is the most complicated
+timekeeping device to use.
+
+The TSC is represented internally as a 64-bit MSR which can be read with the
+RDMSR, RDTSC, or RDTSCP (when available) instructions. In the past, hardware
+limitations made it possible to write the TSC, but generally on old hardware it
+was only possible to write the low 32-bits of the 64-bit counter, and the upper
+32-bits of the counter were cleared. Now, however, on Intel processors family
+0Fh, for models 3, 4 and 6, and family 06h, models e and f, this restriction
+has been lifted and all 64-bits are writable. On AMD systems, the ability to
+write the TSC MSR is not an architectural guarantee.
+
+The TSC is accessible from CPL-0 and conditionally, for CPL > 0 software by
+means of the CR4.TSD bit, which when enabled, disables CPL > 0 TSC access.
+
+Some vendors have implemented an additional instruction, RDTSCP, which returns
+atomically not just the TSC, but an indicator which corresponds to the
+processor number. This can be used to index into an array of TSC variables to
+determine offset information in SMP systems where TSCs are not synchronized.
+The presence of this instruction must be determined by consulting CPUID feature
+bits.
+
+Both VMX and SVM provide extension fields in the virtualization hardware which
+allows the guest visible TSC to be offset by a constant. Newer implementations
+promise to allow the TSC to additionally be scaled, but this hardware is not
+yet widely available.
+
+3.1. TSC synchronization
+------------------------
+
+The TSC is a CPU-local clock in most implementations. This means, on SMP
+platforms, the TSCs of different CPUs may start at different times depending
+on when the CPUs are powered on. Generally, CPUs on the same die will share
+the same clock, however, this is not always the case.
+
+The BIOS may attempt to resynchronize the TSCs during the poweron process and
+the operating system or other system software may attempt to do this as well.
+Several hardware limitations make the problem worse - if it is not possible to
+write the full 64-bits of the TSC, it may be impossible to match the TSC in
+newly arriving CPUs to that of the rest of the system, resulting in
+unsynchronized TSCs. This may be done by BIOS or system software, but in
+practice, getting a perfectly synchronized TSC will not be possible unless all
+values are read from the same clock, which generally only is possible on single
+socket systems or those with special hardware support.
+
+3.2. TSC and CPU hotplug
+------------------------
+
+As touched on already, CPUs which arrive later than the boot time of the system
+may not have a TSC value that is synchronized with the rest of the system.
+Either system software, BIOS, or SMM code may actually try to establish the TSC
+to a value matching the rest of the system, but a perfect match is usually not
+a guarantee. This can have the effect of bringing a system from a state where
+TSC is synchronized back to a state where TSC synchronization flaws, however
+small, may be exposed to the OS and any virtualization environment.
+
+3.3. TSC and multi-socket / NUMA
+--------------------------------
+
+Multi-socket systems, especially large multi-socket systems are likely to have
+individual clocksources rather than a single, universally distributed clock.
+Since these clocks are driven by different crystals, they will not have
+perfectly matched frequency, and temperature and electrical variations will
+cause the CPU clocks, and thus the TSCs to drift over time. Depending on the
+exact clock and bus design, the drift may or may not be fixed in absolute
+error, and may accumulate over time.
+
+In addition, very large systems may deliberately slew the clocks of individual
+cores. This technique, known as spread-spectrum clocking, reduces EMI at the
+clock frequency and harmonics of it, which may be required to pass FCC
+standards for telecommunications and computer equipment.
+
+It is recommended not to trust the TSCs to remain synchronized on NUMA or
+multiple socket systems for these reasons.
+
+3.4. TSC and C-states
+---------------------
+
+C-states, or idling states of the processor, especially C1E and deeper sleep
+states may be problematic for TSC as well. The TSC may stop advancing in such
+a state, resulting in a TSC which is behind that of other CPUs when execution
+is resumed. Such CPUs must be detected and flagged by the operating system
+based on CPU and chipset identifications.
+
+The TSC in such a case may be corrected by catching it up to a known external
+clocksource.
+
+3.5. TSC frequency change / P-states
+------------------------------------
+
+To make things slightly more interesting, some CPUs may change frequency. They
+may or may not run the TSC at the same rate, and because the frequency change
+may be staggered or slewed, at some points in time, the TSC rate may not be
+known other than falling within a range of values. In this case, the TSC will
+not be a stable time source, and must be calibrated against a known, stable,
+external clock to be a usable source of time.
+
+Whether the TSC runs at a constant rate or scales with the P-state is model
+dependent and must be determined by inspecting CPUID, chipset or vendor
+specific MSR fields.
+
+In addition, some vendors have known bugs where the P-state is actually
+compensated for properly during normal operation, but when the processor is
+inactive, the P-state may be raised temporarily to service cache misses from
+other processors. In such cases, the TSC on halted CPUs could advance faster
+than that of non-halted processors. AMD Turion processors are known to have
+this problem.
+
+3.6. TSC and STPCLK / T-states
+------------------------------
+
+External signals given to the processor may also have the effect of stopping
+the TSC. This is typically done for thermal emergency power control to prevent
+an overheating condition, and typically, there is no way to detect that this
+condition has happened.
+
+3.7. TSC virtualization - VMX
+-----------------------------
+
+VMX provides conditional trapping of RDTSC, RDMSR, WRMSR and RDTSCP
+instructions, which is enough for full virtualization of TSC in any manner. In
+addition, VMX allows passing through the host TSC plus an additional TSC_OFFSET
+field specified in the VMCS. Special instructions must be used to read and
+write the VMCS field.
+
+3.8. TSC virtualization - SVM
+-----------------------------
+
+SVM provides conditional trapping of RDTSC, RDMSR, WRMSR and RDTSCP
+instructions, which is enough for full virtualization of TSC in any manner. In
+addition, SVM allows passing through the host TSC plus an additional offset
+field specified in the SVM control block.
+
+3.9. TSC feature bits in Linux
+------------------------------
+
+In summary, there is no way to guarantee the TSC remains in perfect
+synchronization unless it is explicitly guaranteed by the architecture. Even
+if so, the TSCs in multi-sockets or NUMA systems may still run independently
+despite being locally consistent.
+
+The following feature bits are used by Linux to signal various TSC attributes,
+but they can only be taken to be meaningful for UP or single node systems.
+
+========================= =======================================
+X86_FEATURE_TSC The TSC is available in hardware
+X86_FEATURE_RDTSCP The RDTSCP instruction is available
+X86_FEATURE_CONSTANT_TSC The TSC rate is unchanged with P-states
+X86_FEATURE_NONSTOP_TSC The TSC does not stop in C-states
+X86_FEATURE_TSC_RELIABLE TSC sync checks are skipped (VMware)
+========================= =======================================
+
+4. Virtualization Problems
+==========================
+
+Timekeeping is especially problematic for virtualization because a number of
+challenges arise. The most obvious problem is that time is now shared between
+the host and, potentially, a number of virtual machines. Thus the virtual
+operating system does not run with 100% usage of the CPU, despite the fact that
+it may very well make that assumption. It may expect it to remain true to very
+exacting bounds when interrupt sources are disabled, but in reality only its
+virtual interrupt sources are disabled, and the machine may still be preempted
+at any time. This causes problems as the passage of real time, the injection
+of machine interrupts and the associated clock sources are no longer completely
+synchronized with real time.
+
+This same problem can occur on native hardware to a degree, as SMM mode may
+steal cycles from the naturally on X86 systems when SMM mode is used by the
+BIOS, but not in such an extreme fashion. However, the fact that SMM mode may
+cause similar problems to virtualization makes it a good justification for
+solving many of these problems on bare metal.
+
+4.1. Interrupt clocking
+-----------------------
+
+One of the most immediate problems that occurs with legacy operating systems
+is that the system timekeeping routines are often designed to keep track of
+time by counting periodic interrupts. These interrupts may come from the PIT
+or the RTC, but the problem is the same: the host virtualization engine may not
+be able to deliver the proper number of interrupts per second, and so guest
+time may fall behind. This is especially problematic if a high interrupt rate
+is selected, such as 1000 HZ, which is unfortunately the default for many Linux
+guests.
+
+There are three approaches to solving this problem; first, it may be possible
+to simply ignore it. Guests which have a separate time source for tracking
+'wall clock' or 'real time' may not need any adjustment of their interrupts to
+maintain proper time. If this is not sufficient, it may be necessary to inject
+additional interrupts into the guest in order to increase the effective
+interrupt rate. This approach leads to complications in extreme conditions,
+where host load or guest lag is too much to compensate for, and thus another
+solution to the problem has risen: the guest may need to become aware of lost
+ticks and compensate for them internally. Although promising in theory, the
+implementation of this policy in Linux has been extremely error prone, and a
+number of buggy variants of lost tick compensation are distributed across
+commonly used Linux systems.
+
+Windows uses periodic RTC clocking as a means of keeping time internally, and
+thus requires interrupt slewing to keep proper time. It does use a low enough
+rate (ed: is it 18.2 Hz?) however that it has not yet been a problem in
+practice.
+
+4.2. TSC sampling and serialization
+-----------------------------------
+
+As the highest precision time source available, the cycle counter of the CPU
+has aroused much interest from developers. As explained above, this timer has
+many problems unique to its nature as a local, potentially unstable and
+potentially unsynchronized source. One issue which is not unique to the TSC,
+but is highlighted because of its very precise nature is sampling delay. By
+definition, the counter, once read is already old. However, it is also
+possible for the counter to be read ahead of the actual use of the result.
+This is a consequence of the superscalar execution of the instruction stream,
+which may execute instructions out of order. Such execution is called
+non-serialized. Forcing serialized execution is necessary for precise
+measurement with the TSC, and requires a serializing instruction, such as CPUID
+or an MSR read.
+
+Since CPUID may actually be virtualized by a trap and emulate mechanism, this
+serialization can pose a performance issue for hardware virtualization. An
+accurate time stamp counter reading may therefore not always be available, and
+it may be necessary for an implementation to guard against "backwards" reads of
+the TSC as seen from other CPUs, even in an otherwise perfectly synchronized
+system.
+
+4.3. Timespec aliasing
+----------------------
+
+Additionally, this lack of serialization from the TSC poses another challenge
+when using results of the TSC when measured against another time source. As
+the TSC is much higher precision, many possible values of the TSC may be read
+while another clock is still expressing the same value.
+
+That is, you may read (T,T+10) while external clock C maintains the same value.
+Due to non-serialized reads, you may actually end up with a range which
+fluctuates - from (T-1.. T+10). Thus, any time calculated from a TSC, but
+calibrated against an external value may have a range of valid values.
+Re-calibrating this computation may actually cause time, as computed after the
+calibration, to go backwards, compared with time computed before the
+calibration.
+
+This problem is particularly pronounced with an internal time source in Linux,
+the kernel time, which is expressed in the theoretically high resolution
+timespec - but which advances in much larger granularity intervals, sometimes
+at the rate of jiffies, and possibly in catchup modes, at a much larger step.
+
+This aliasing requires care in the computation and recalibration of kvmclock
+and any other values derived from TSC computation (such as TSC virtualization
+itself).
+
+4.4. Migration
+--------------
+
+Migration of a virtual machine raises problems for timekeeping in two ways.
+First, the migration itself may take time, during which interrupts cannot be
+delivered, and after which, the guest time may need to be caught up. NTP may
+be able to help to some degree here, as the clock correction required is
+typically small enough to fall in the NTP-correctable window.
+
+An additional concern is that timers based off the TSC (or HPET, if the raw bus
+clock is exposed) may now be running at different rates, requiring compensation
+in some way in the hypervisor by virtualizing these timers. In addition,
+migrating to a faster machine may preclude the use of a passthrough TSC, as a
+faster clock cannot be made visible to a guest without the potential of time
+advancing faster than usual. A slower clock is less of a problem, as it can
+always be caught up to the original rate. KVM clock avoids these problems by
+simply storing multipliers and offsets against the TSC for the guest to convert
+back into nanosecond resolution values.
+
+4.5. Scheduling
+---------------
+
+Since scheduling may be based on precise timing and firing of interrupts, the
+scheduling algorithms of an operating system may be adversely affected by
+virtualization. In theory, the effect is random and should be universally
+distributed, but in contrived as well as real scenarios (guest device access,
+causes of virtualization exits, possible context switch), this may not always
+be the case. The effect of this has not been well studied.
+
+In an attempt to work around this, several implementations have provided a
+paravirtualized scheduler clock, which reveals the true amount of CPU time for
+which a virtual machine has been running.
+
+4.6. Watchdogs
+--------------
+
+Watchdog timers, such as the lock detector in Linux may fire accidentally when
+running under hardware virtualization due to timer interrupts being delayed or
+misinterpretation of the passage of real time. Usually, these warnings are
+spurious and can be ignored, but in some circumstances it may be necessary to
+disable such detection.
+
+4.7. Delays and precision timing
+--------------------------------
+
+Precise timing and delays may not be possible in a virtualized system. This
+can happen if the system is controlling physical hardware, or issues delays to
+compensate for slower I/O to and from devices. The first issue is not solvable
+in general for a virtualized system; hardware control software can't be
+adequately virtualized without a full real-time operating system, which would
+require an RT aware virtualization platform.
+
+The second issue may cause performance problems, but this is unlikely to be a
+significant issue. In many cases these delays may be eliminated through
+configuration or paravirtualization.
+
+4.8. Covert channels and leaks
+------------------------------
+
+In addition to the above problems, time information will inevitably leak to the
+guest about the host in anything but a perfect implementation of virtualized
+time. This may allow the guest to infer the presence of a hypervisor (as in a
+red-pill type detection), and it may allow information to leak between guests
+by using CPU utilization itself as a signalling channel. Preventing such
+problems would require completely isolated virtual time which may not track
+real time any longer. This may be useful in certain security or QA contexts,
+but in general isn't recommended for real-world deployment scenarios.
diff --git a/Documentation/virt/ne_overview.rst b/Documentation/virt/ne_overview.rst
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..74c2f5919c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/virt/ne_overview.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+==============
+Nitro Enclaves
+==============
+
+Overview
+========
+
+Nitro Enclaves (NE) is a new Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2) capability
+that allows customers to carve out isolated compute environments within EC2
+instances [1].
+
+For example, an application that processes sensitive data and runs in a VM,
+can be separated from other applications running in the same VM. This
+application then runs in a separate VM than the primary VM, namely an enclave.
+It runs alongside the VM that spawned it. This setup matches low latency
+applications needs.
+
+The current supported architectures for the NE kernel driver, available in the
+upstream Linux kernel, are x86 and ARM64.
+
+The resources that are allocated for the enclave, such as memory and CPUs, are
+carved out of the primary VM. Each enclave is mapped to a process running in the
+primary VM, that communicates with the NE kernel driver via an ioctl interface.
+
+In this sense, there are two components:
+
+1. An enclave abstraction process - a user space process running in the primary
+VM guest that uses the provided ioctl interface of the NE driver to spawn an
+enclave VM (that's 2 below).
+
+There is a NE emulated PCI device exposed to the primary VM. The driver for this
+new PCI device is included in the NE driver.
+
+The ioctl logic is mapped to PCI device commands e.g. the NE_START_ENCLAVE ioctl
+maps to an enclave start PCI command. The PCI device commands are then
+translated into actions taken on the hypervisor side; that's the Nitro
+hypervisor running on the host where the primary VM is running. The Nitro
+hypervisor is based on core KVM technology.
+
+2. The enclave itself - a VM running on the same host as the primary VM that
+spawned it. Memory and CPUs are carved out of the primary VM and are dedicated
+for the enclave VM. An enclave does not have persistent storage attached.
+
+The memory regions carved out of the primary VM and given to an enclave need to
+be aligned 2 MiB / 1 GiB physically contiguous memory regions (or multiple of
+this size e.g. 8 MiB). The memory can be allocated e.g. by using hugetlbfs from
+user space [2][3][7]. The memory size for an enclave needs to be at least
+64 MiB. The enclave memory and CPUs need to be from the same NUMA node.
+
+An enclave runs on dedicated cores. CPU 0 and its CPU siblings need to remain
+available for the primary VM. A CPU pool has to be set for NE purposes by an
+user with admin capability. See the cpu list section from the kernel
+documentation [4] for how a CPU pool format looks.
+
+An enclave communicates with the primary VM via a local communication channel,
+using virtio-vsock [5]. The primary VM has virtio-pci vsock emulated device,
+while the enclave VM has a virtio-mmio vsock emulated device. The vsock device
+uses eventfd for signaling. The enclave VM sees the usual interfaces - local
+APIC and IOAPIC - to get interrupts from virtio-vsock device. The virtio-mmio
+device is placed in memory below the typical 4 GiB.
+
+The application that runs in the enclave needs to be packaged in an enclave
+image together with the OS ( e.g. kernel, ramdisk, init ) that will run in the
+enclave VM. The enclave VM has its own kernel and follows the standard Linux
+boot protocol [6][8].
+
+The kernel bzImage, the kernel command line, the ramdisk(s) are part of the
+Enclave Image Format (EIF); plus an EIF header including metadata such as magic
+number, eif version, image size and CRC.
+
+Hash values are computed for the entire enclave image (EIF), the kernel and
+ramdisk(s). That's used, for example, to check that the enclave image that is
+loaded in the enclave VM is the one that was intended to be run.
+
+These crypto measurements are included in a signed attestation document
+generated by the Nitro Hypervisor and further used to prove the identity of the
+enclave; KMS is an example of service that NE is integrated with and that checks
+the attestation doc.
+
+The enclave image (EIF) is loaded in the enclave memory at offset 8 MiB. The
+init process in the enclave connects to the vsock CID of the primary VM and a
+predefined port - 9000 - to send a heartbeat value - 0xb7. This mechanism is
+used to check in the primary VM that the enclave has booted. The CID of the
+primary VM is 3.
+
+If the enclave VM crashes or gracefully exits, an interrupt event is received by
+the NE driver. This event is sent further to the user space enclave process
+running in the primary VM via a poll notification mechanism. Then the user space
+enclave process can exit.
+
+[1] https://aws.amazon.com/ec2/nitro/nitro-enclaves/
+[2] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/mm/hugetlbpage.html
+[3] https://lwn.net/Articles/807108/
+[4] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.html
+[5] https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man7/vsock.7.html
+[6] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/x86/boot.html
+[7] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/arm64/hugetlbpage.html
+[8] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/arm64/booting.html
diff --git a/Documentation/virt/paravirt_ops.rst b/Documentation/virt/paravirt_ops.rst
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..62d867e0d4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/virt/paravirt_ops.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+============
+Paravirt_ops
+============
+
+Linux provides support for different hypervisor virtualization technologies.
+Historically, different binary kernels would be required in order to support
+different hypervisors; this restriction was removed with pv_ops.
+Linux pv_ops is a virtualization API which enables support for different
+hypervisors. It allows each hypervisor to override critical operations and
+allows a single kernel binary to run on all supported execution environments
+including native machine -- without any hypervisors.
+
+pv_ops provides a set of function pointers which represent operations
+corresponding to low-level critical instructions and high-level
+functionalities in various areas. pv_ops allows for optimizations at run
+time by enabling binary patching of the low-level critical operations
+at boot time.
+
+pv_ops operations are classified into three categories:
+
+- simple indirect call
+ These operations correspond to high-level functionality where it is
+ known that the overhead of indirect call isn't very important.
+
+- indirect call which allows optimization with binary patch
+ Usually these operations correspond to low-level critical instructions. They
+ are called frequently and are performance critical. The overhead is
+ very important.
+
+- a set of macros for hand written assembly code
+ Hand written assembly codes (.S files) also need paravirtualization
+ because they include sensitive instructions or some code paths in
+ them are very performance critical.
diff --git a/Documentation/virt/uml/user_mode_linux_howto_v2.rst b/Documentation/virt/uml/user_mode_linux_howto_v2.rst
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..d1cfe415e4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/virt/uml/user_mode_linux_howto_v2.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,1238 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+#########
+UML HowTo
+#########
+
+.. contents:: :local:
+
+************
+Introduction
+************
+
+Welcome to User Mode Linux
+
+User Mode Linux is the first Open Source virtualization platform (first
+release date 1991) and second virtualization platform for an x86 PC.
+
+How is UML Different from a VM using Virtualization package X?
+==============================================================
+
+We have come to assume that virtualization also means some level of
+hardware emulation. In fact, it does not. As long as a virtualization
+package provides the OS with devices which the OS can recognize and
+has a driver for, the devices do not need to emulate real hardware.
+Most OSes today have built-in support for a number of "fake"
+devices used only under virtualization.
+User Mode Linux takes this concept to the ultimate extreme - there
+is not a single real device in sight. It is 100% artificial or if
+we use the correct term 100% paravirtual. All UML devices are abstract
+concepts which map onto something provided by the host - files, sockets,
+pipes, etc.
+
+The other major difference between UML and various virtualization
+packages is that there is a distinct difference between the way the UML
+kernel and the UML programs operate.
+The UML kernel is just a process running on Linux - same as any other
+program. It can be run by an unprivileged user and it does not require
+anything in terms of special CPU features.
+The UML userspace, however, is a bit different. The Linux kernel on the
+host machine assists UML in intercepting everything the program running
+on a UML instance is trying to do and making the UML kernel handle all
+of its requests.
+This is different from other virtualization packages which do not make any
+difference between the guest kernel and guest programs. This difference
+results in a number of advantages and disadvantages of UML over let's say
+QEMU which we will cover later in this document.
+
+
+Why Would I Want User Mode Linux?
+=================================
+
+
+* If User Mode Linux kernel crashes, your host kernel is still fine. It
+ is not accelerated in any way (vhost, kvm, etc) and it is not trying to
+ access any devices directly. It is, in fact, a process like any other.
+
+* You can run a usermode kernel as a non-root user (you may need to
+ arrange appropriate permissions for some devices).
+
+* You can run a very small VM with a minimal footprint for a specific
+ task (for example 32M or less).
+
+* You can get extremely high performance for anything which is a "kernel
+ specific task" such as forwarding, firewalling, etc while still being
+ isolated from the host kernel.
+
+* You can play with kernel concepts without breaking things.
+
+* You are not bound by "emulating" hardware, so you can try weird and
+ wonderful concepts which are very difficult to support when emulating
+ real hardware such as time travel and making your system clock
+ dependent on what UML does (very useful for things like tests).
+
+* It's fun.
+
+Why not to run UML
+==================
+
+* The syscall interception technique used by UML makes it inherently
+ slower for any userspace applications. While it can do kernel tasks
+ on par with most other virtualization packages, its userspace is
+ **slow**. The root cause is that UML has a very high cost of creating
+ new processes and threads (something most Unix/Linux applications
+ take for granted).
+
+* UML is strictly uniprocessor at present. If you want to run an
+ application which needs many CPUs to function, it is clearly the
+ wrong choice.
+
+***********************
+Building a UML instance
+***********************
+
+There is no UML installer in any distribution. While you can use off
+the shelf install media to install into a blank VM using a virtualization
+package, there is no UML equivalent. You have to use appropriate tools on
+your host to build a viable filesystem image.
+
+This is extremely easy on Debian - you can do it using debootstrap. It is
+also easy on OpenWRT - the build process can build UML images. All other
+distros - YMMV.
+
+Creating an image
+=================
+
+Create a sparse raw disk image::
+
+ # dd if=/dev/zero of=disk_image_name bs=1 count=1 seek=16G
+
+This will create a 16G disk image. The OS will initially allocate only one
+block and will allocate more as they are written by UML. As of kernel
+version 4.19 UML fully supports TRIM (as usually used by flash drives).
+Using TRIM inside the UML image by specifying discard as a mount option
+or by running ``tune2fs -o discard /dev/ubdXX`` will request UML to
+return any unused blocks to the OS.
+
+Create a filesystem on the disk image and mount it::
+
+ # mkfs.ext4 ./disk_image_name && mount ./disk_image_name /mnt
+
+This example uses ext4, any other filesystem such as ext3, btrfs, xfs,
+jfs, etc will work too.
+
+Create a minimal OS installation on the mounted filesystem::
+
+ # debootstrap buster /mnt http://deb.debian.org/debian
+
+debootstrap does not set up the root password, fstab, hostname or
+anything related to networking. It is up to the user to do that.
+
+Set the root password - the easiest way to do that is to chroot into the
+mounted image::
+
+ # chroot /mnt
+ # passwd
+ # exit
+
+Edit key system files
+=====================
+
+UML block devices are called ubds. The fstab created by debootstrap
+will be empty and it needs an entry for the root file system::
+
+ /dev/ubd0 ext4 discard,errors=remount-ro 0 1
+
+The image hostname will be set to the same as the host on which you
+are creating its image. It is a good idea to change that to avoid
+"Oh, bummer, I rebooted the wrong machine".
+
+UML supports two classes of network devices - the older uml_net ones
+which are scheduled for obsoletion. These are called ethX. It also
+supports the newer vector IO devices which are significantly faster
+and have support for some standard virtual network encapsulations like
+Ethernet over GRE and Ethernet over L2TPv3. These are called vec0.
+
+Depending on which one is in use, ``/etc/network/interfaces`` will
+need entries like::
+
+ # legacy UML network devices
+ auto eth0
+ iface eth0 inet dhcp
+
+ # vector UML network devices
+ auto vec0
+ iface vec0 inet dhcp
+
+We now have a UML image which is nearly ready to run, all we need is a
+UML kernel and modules for it.
+
+Most distributions have a UML package. Even if you intend to use your own
+kernel, testing the image with a stock one is always a good start. These
+packages come with a set of modules which should be copied to the target
+filesystem. The location is distribution dependent. For Debian these
+reside under /usr/lib/uml/modules. Copy recursively the content of this
+directory to the mounted UML filesystem::
+
+ # cp -rax /usr/lib/uml/modules /mnt/lib/modules
+
+If you have compiled your own kernel, you need to use the usual "install
+modules to a location" procedure by running::
+
+ # make INSTALL_MOD_PATH=/mnt/lib/modules modules_install
+
+This will install modules into /mnt/lib/modules/$(KERNELRELEASE).
+To specify the full module installation path, use::
+
+ # make MODLIB=/mnt/lib/modules modules_install
+
+At this point the image is ready to be brought up.
+
+*************************
+Setting Up UML Networking
+*************************
+
+UML networking is designed to emulate an Ethernet connection. This
+connection may be either point-to-point (similar to a connection
+between machines using a back-to-back cable) or a connection to a
+switch. UML supports a wide variety of means to build these
+connections to all of: local machine, remote machine(s), local and
+remote UML and other VM instances.
+
+
++-----------+--------+------------------------------------+------------+
+| Transport | Type | Capabilities | Throughput |
++===========+========+====================================+============+
+| tap | vector | checksum, tso | > 8Gbit |
++-----------+--------+------------------------------------+------------+
+| hybrid | vector | checksum, tso, multipacket rx | > 6GBit |
++-----------+--------+------------------------------------+------------+
+| raw | vector | checksum, tso, multipacket rx, tx" | > 6GBit |
++-----------+--------+------------------------------------+------------+
+| EoGRE | vector | multipacket rx, tx | > 3Gbit |
++-----------+--------+------------------------------------+------------+
+| Eol2tpv3 | vector | multipacket rx, tx | > 3Gbit |
++-----------+--------+------------------------------------+------------+
+| bess | vector | multipacket rx, tx | > 3Gbit |
++-----------+--------+------------------------------------+------------+
+| fd | vector | dependent on fd type | varies |
++-----------+--------+------------------------------------+------------+
+| tuntap | legacy | none | ~ 500Mbit |
++-----------+--------+------------------------------------+------------+
+| daemon | legacy | none | ~ 450Mbit |
++-----------+--------+------------------------------------+------------+
+| socket | legacy | none | ~ 450Mbit |
++-----------+--------+------------------------------------+------------+
+| pcap | legacy | rx only | ~ 450Mbit |
++-----------+--------+------------------------------------+------------+
+| ethertap | legacy | obsolete | ~ 500Mbit |
++-----------+--------+------------------------------------+------------+
+| vde | legacy | obsolete | ~ 500Mbit |
++-----------+--------+------------------------------------+------------+
+
+* All transports which have tso and checksum offloads can deliver speeds
+ approaching 10G on TCP streams.
+
+* All transports which have multi-packet rx and/or tx can deliver pps
+ rates of up to 1Mps or more.
+
+* All legacy transports are generally limited to ~600-700MBit and 0.05Mps.
+
+* GRE and L2TPv3 allow connections to all of: local machine, remote
+ machines, remote network devices and remote UML instances.
+
+* Socket allows connections only between UML instances.
+
+* Daemon and bess require running a local switch. This switch may be
+ connected to the host as well.
+
+
+Network configuration privileges
+================================
+
+The majority of the supported networking modes need ``root`` privileges.
+For example, in the legacy tuntap networking mode, users were required
+to be part of the group associated with the tunnel device.
+
+For newer network drivers like the vector transports, ``root`` privilege
+is required to fire an ioctl to setup the tun interface and/or use
+raw sockets where needed.
+
+This can be achieved by granting the user a particular capability instead
+of running UML as root. In case of vector transport, a user can add the
+capability ``CAP_NET_ADMIN`` or ``CAP_NET_RAW`` to the uml binary.
+Thenceforth, UML can be run with normal user privilges, along with
+full networking.
+
+For example::
+
+ # sudo setcap cap_net_raw,cap_net_admin+ep linux
+
+Configuring vector transports
+===============================
+
+All vector transports support a similar syntax:
+
+If X is the interface number as in vec0, vec1, vec2, etc, the general
+syntax for options is::
+
+ vecX:transport="Transport Name",option=value,option=value,...,option=value
+
+Common options
+--------------
+
+These options are common for all transports:
+
+* ``depth=int`` - sets the queue depth for vector IO. This is the
+ amount of packets UML will attempt to read or write in a single
+ system call. The default number is 64 and is generally sufficient
+ for most applications that need throughput in the 2-4 Gbit range.
+ Higher speeds may require larger values.
+
+* ``mac=XX:XX:XX:XX:XX`` - sets the interface MAC address value.
+
+* ``gro=[0,1]`` - sets GRO off or on. Enables receive/transmit offloads.
+ The effect of this option depends on the host side support in the transport
+ which is being configured. In most cases it will enable TCP segmentation and
+ RX/TX checksumming offloads. The setting must be identical on the host side
+ and the UML side. The UML kernel will produce warnings if it is not.
+ For example, GRO is enabled by default on local machine interfaces
+ (e.g. veth pairs, bridge, etc), so it should be enabled in UML in the
+ corresponding UML transports (raw, tap, hybrid) in order for networking to
+ operate correctly.
+
+* ``mtu=int`` - sets the interface MTU
+
+* ``headroom=int`` - adjusts the default headroom (32 bytes) reserved
+ if a packet will need to be re-encapsulated into for instance VXLAN.
+
+* ``vec=0`` - disable multipacket IO and fall back to packet at a
+ time mode
+
+Shared Options
+--------------
+
+* ``ifname=str`` Transports which bind to a local network interface
+ have a shared option - the name of the interface to bind to.
+
+* ``src, dst, src_port, dst_port`` - all transports which use sockets
+ which have the notion of source and destination and/or source port
+ and destination port use these to specify them.
+
+* ``v6=[0,1]`` to specify if a v6 connection is desired for all
+ transports which operate over IP. Additionally, for transports that
+ have some differences in the way they operate over v4 and v6 (for example
+ EoL2TPv3), sets the correct mode of operation. In the absence of this
+ option, the socket type is determined based on what do the src and dst
+ arguments resolve/parse to.
+
+tap transport
+-------------
+
+Example::
+
+ vecX:transport=tap,ifname=tap0,depth=128,gro=1
+
+This will connect vec0 to tap0 on the host. Tap0 must already exist (for example
+created using tunctl) and UP.
+
+tap0 can be configured as a point-to-point interface and given an IP
+address so that UML can talk to the host. Alternatively, it is possible
+to connect UML to a tap interface which is connected to a bridge.
+
+While tap relies on the vector infrastructure, it is not a true vector
+transport at this point, because Linux does not support multi-packet
+IO on tap file descriptors for normal userspace apps like UML. This
+is a privilege which is offered only to something which can hook up
+to it at kernel level via specialized interfaces like vhost-net. A
+vhost-net like helper for UML is planned at some point in the future.
+
+Privileges required: tap transport requires either:
+
+* tap interface to exist and be created persistent and owned by the
+ UML user using tunctl. Example ``tunctl -u uml-user -t tap0``
+
+* binary to have ``CAP_NET_ADMIN`` privilege
+
+hybrid transport
+----------------
+
+Example::
+
+ vecX:transport=hybrid,ifname=tap0,depth=128,gro=1
+
+This is an experimental/demo transport which couples tap for transmit
+and a raw socket for receive. The raw socket allows multi-packet
+receive resulting in significantly higher packet rates than normal tap.
+
+Privileges required: hybrid requires ``CAP_NET_RAW`` capability by
+the UML user as well as the requirements for the tap transport.
+
+raw socket transport
+--------------------
+
+Example::
+
+ vecX:transport=raw,ifname=p-veth0,depth=128,gro=1
+
+
+This transport uses vector IO on raw sockets. While you can bind to any
+interface including a physical one, the most common use it to bind to
+the "peer" side of a veth pair with the other side configured on the
+host.
+
+Example host configuration for Debian:
+
+**/etc/network/interfaces**::
+
+ auto veth0
+ iface veth0 inet static
+ address 192.168.4.1
+ netmask 255.255.255.252
+ broadcast 192.168.4.3
+ pre-up ip link add veth0 type veth peer name p-veth0 && \
+ ifconfig p-veth0 up
+
+UML can now bind to p-veth0 like this::
+
+ vec0:transport=raw,ifname=p-veth0,depth=128,gro=1
+
+
+If the UML guest is configured with 192.168.4.2 and netmask 255.255.255.0
+it can talk to the host on 192.168.4.1
+
+The raw transport also provides some support for offloading some of the
+filtering to the host. The two options to control it are:
+
+* ``bpffile=str`` filename of raw bpf code to be loaded as a socket filter
+
+* ``bpfflash=int`` 0/1 allow loading of bpf from inside User Mode Linux.
+ This option allows the use of the ethtool load firmware command to
+ load bpf code.
+
+In either case the bpf code is loaded into the host kernel. While this is
+presently limited to legacy bpf syntax (not ebpf), it is still a security
+risk. It is not recommended to allow this unless the User Mode Linux
+instance is considered trusted.
+
+Privileges required: raw socket transport requires `CAP_NET_RAW`
+capability.
+
+GRE socket transport
+--------------------
+
+Example::
+
+ vecX:transport=gre,src=$src_host,dst=$dst_host
+
+
+This will configure an Ethernet over ``GRE`` (aka ``GRETAP`` or
+``GREIRB``) tunnel which will connect the UML instance to a ``GRE``
+endpoint at host dst_host. ``GRE`` supports the following additional
+options:
+
+* ``rx_key=int`` - GRE 32-bit integer key for rx packets, if set,
+ ``txkey`` must be set too
+
+* ``tx_key=int`` - GRE 32-bit integer key for tx packets, if set
+ ``rx_key`` must be set too
+
+* ``sequence=[0,1]`` - enable GRE sequence
+
+* ``pin_sequence=[0,1]`` - pretend that the sequence is always reset
+ on each packet (needed to interoperate with some really broken
+ implementations)
+
+* ``v6=[0,1]`` - force IPv4 or IPv6 sockets respectively
+
+* GRE checksum is not presently supported
+
+GRE has a number of caveats:
+
+* You can use only one GRE connection per IP address. There is no way to
+ multiplex connections as each GRE tunnel is terminated directly on
+ the UML instance.
+
+* The key is not really a security feature. While it was intended as such
+ its "security" is laughable. It is, however, a useful feature to
+ ensure that the tunnel is not misconfigured.
+
+An example configuration for a Linux host with a local address of
+192.168.128.1 to connect to a UML instance at 192.168.129.1
+
+**/etc/network/interfaces**::
+
+ auto gt0
+ iface gt0 inet static
+ address 10.0.0.1
+ netmask 255.255.255.0
+ broadcast 10.0.0.255
+ mtu 1500
+ pre-up ip link add gt0 type gretap local 192.168.128.1 \
+ remote 192.168.129.1 || true
+ down ip link del gt0 || true
+
+Additionally, GRE has been tested versus a variety of network equipment.
+
+Privileges required: GRE requires ``CAP_NET_RAW``
+
+l2tpv3 socket transport
+-----------------------
+
+_Warning_. L2TPv3 has a "bug". It is the "bug" known as "has more
+options than GNU ls". While it has some advantages, there are usually
+easier (and less verbose) ways to connect a UML instance to something.
+For example, most devices which support L2TPv3 also support GRE.
+
+Example::
+
+ vec0:transport=l2tpv3,udp=1,src=$src_host,dst=$dst_host,srcport=$src_port,dstport=$dst_port,depth=128,rx_session=0xffffffff,tx_session=0xffff
+
+This will configure an Ethernet over L2TPv3 fixed tunnel which will
+connect the UML instance to a L2TPv3 endpoint at host $dst_host using
+the L2TPv3 UDP flavour and UDP destination port $dst_port.
+
+L2TPv3 always requires the following additional options:
+
+* ``rx_session=int`` - l2tpv3 32-bit integer session for rx packets
+
+* ``tx_session=int`` - l2tpv3 32-bit integer session for tx packets
+
+As the tunnel is fixed these are not negotiated and they are
+preconfigured on both ends.
+
+Additionally, L2TPv3 supports the following optional parameters.
+
+* ``rx_cookie=int`` - l2tpv3 32-bit integer cookie for rx packets - same
+ functionality as GRE key, more to prevent misconfiguration than provide
+ actual security
+
+* ``tx_cookie=int`` - l2tpv3 32-bit integer cookie for tx packets
+
+* ``cookie64=[0,1]`` - use 64-bit cookies instead of 32-bit.
+
+* ``counter=[0,1]`` - enable l2tpv3 counter
+
+* ``pin_counter=[0,1]`` - pretend that the counter is always reset on
+ each packet (needed to interoperate with some really broken
+ implementations)
+
+* ``v6=[0,1]`` - force v6 sockets
+
+* ``udp=[0,1]`` - use raw sockets (0) or UDP (1) version of the protocol
+
+L2TPv3 has a number of caveats:
+
+* you can use only one connection per IP address in raw mode. There is
+ no way to multiplex connections as each L2TPv3 tunnel is terminated
+ directly on the UML instance. UDP mode can use different ports for
+ this purpose.
+
+Here is an example of how to configure a Linux host to connect to UML
+via L2TPv3:
+
+**/etc/network/interfaces**::
+
+ auto l2tp1
+ iface l2tp1 inet static
+ address 192.168.126.1
+ netmask 255.255.255.0
+ broadcast 192.168.126.255
+ mtu 1500
+ pre-up ip l2tp add tunnel remote 127.0.0.1 \
+ local 127.0.0.1 encap udp tunnel_id 2 \
+ peer_tunnel_id 2 udp_sport 1706 udp_dport 1707 && \
+ ip l2tp add session name l2tp1 tunnel_id 2 \
+ session_id 0xffffffff peer_session_id 0xffffffff
+ down ip l2tp del session tunnel_id 2 session_id 0xffffffff && \
+ ip l2tp del tunnel tunnel_id 2
+
+
+Privileges required: L2TPv3 requires ``CAP_NET_RAW`` for raw IP mode and
+no special privileges for the UDP mode.
+
+BESS socket transport
+---------------------
+
+BESS is a high performance modular network switch.
+
+https://github.com/NetSys/bess
+
+It has support for a simple sequential packet socket mode which in the
+more recent versions is using vector IO for high performance.
+
+Example::
+
+ vecX:transport=bess,src=$unix_src,dst=$unix_dst
+
+This will configure a BESS transport using the unix_src Unix domain
+socket address as source and unix_dst socket address as destination.
+
+For BESS configuration and how to allocate a BESS Unix domain socket port
+please see the BESS documentation.
+
+https://github.com/NetSys/bess/wiki/Built-In-Modules-and-Ports
+
+BESS transport does not require any special privileges.
+
+Configuring Legacy transports
+=============================
+
+Legacy transports are now considered obsolete. Please use the vector
+versions.
+
+***********
+Running UML
+***********
+
+This section assumes that either the user-mode-linux package from the
+distribution or a custom built kernel has been installed on the host.
+
+These add an executable called linux to the system. This is the UML
+kernel. It can be run just like any other executable.
+It will take most normal linux kernel arguments as command line
+arguments. Additionally, it will need some UML-specific arguments
+in order to do something useful.
+
+Arguments
+=========
+
+Mandatory Arguments:
+--------------------
+
+* ``mem=int[K,M,G]`` - amount of memory. By default in bytes. It will
+ also accept K, M or G qualifiers.
+
+* ``ubdX[s,d,c,t]=`` virtual disk specification. This is not really
+ mandatory, but it is likely to be needed in nearly all cases so we can
+ specify a root file system.
+ The simplest possible image specification is the name of the image
+ file for the filesystem (created using one of the methods described
+ in `Creating an image`_).
+
+ * UBD devices support copy on write (COW). The changes are kept in
+ a separate file which can be discarded allowing a rollback to the
+ original pristine image. If COW is desired, the UBD image is
+ specified as: ``cow_file,master_image``.
+ Example:``ubd0=Filesystem.cow,Filesystem.img``
+
+ * UBD devices can be set to use synchronous IO. Any writes are
+ immediately flushed to disk. This is done by adding ``s`` after
+ the ``ubdX`` specification.
+
+ * UBD performs some heuristics on devices specified as a single
+ filename to make sure that a COW file has not been specified as
+ the image. To turn them off, use the ``d`` flag after ``ubdX``.
+
+ * UBD supports TRIM - asking the Host OS to reclaim any unused
+ blocks in the image. To turn it off, specify the ``t`` flag after
+ ``ubdX``.
+
+* ``root=`` root device - most likely ``/dev/ubd0`` (this is a Linux
+ filesystem image)
+
+Important Optional Arguments
+----------------------------
+
+If UML is run as "linux" with no extra arguments, it will try to start an
+xterm for every console configured inside the image (up to 6 in most
+Linux distributions). Each console is started inside an
+xterm. This makes it nice and easy to use UML on a host with a GUI. It is,
+however, the wrong approach if UML is to be used as a testing harness or run
+in a text-only environment.
+
+In order to change this behaviour we need to specify an alternative console
+and wire it to one of the supported "line" channels. For this we need to map a
+console to use something different from the default xterm.
+
+Example which will divert console number 1 to stdin/stdout::
+
+ con1=fd:0,fd:1
+
+UML supports a wide variety of serial line channels which are specified using
+the following syntax
+
+ conX=channel_type:options[,channel_type:options]
+
+
+If the channel specification contains two parts separated by comma, the first
+one is input, the second one output.
+
+* The null channel - Discard all input or output. Example ``con=null`` will set
+ all consoles to null by default.
+
+* The fd channel - use file descriptor numbers for input/output. Example:
+ ``con1=fd:0,fd:1.``
+
+* The port channel - start a telnet server on TCP port number. Example:
+ ``con1=port:4321``. The host must have /usr/sbin/in.telnetd (usually part of
+ a telnetd package) and the port-helper from the UML utilities (see the
+ information for the xterm channel below). UML will not boot until a client
+ connects.
+
+* The pty and pts channels - use system pty/pts.
+
+* The tty channel - bind to an existing system tty. Example: ``con1=/dev/tty8``
+ will make UML use the host 8th console (usually unused).
+
+* The xterm channel - this is the default - bring up an xterm on this channel
+ and direct IO to it. Note that in order for xterm to work, the host must
+ have the UML distribution package installed. This usually contains the
+ port-helper and other utilities needed for UML to communicate with the xterm.
+ Alternatively, these need to be complied and installed from source. All
+ options applicable to consoles also apply to UML serial lines which are
+ presented as ttyS inside UML.
+
+Starting UML
+============
+
+We can now run UML.
+::
+
+ # linux mem=2048M umid=TEST \
+ ubd0=Filesystem.img \
+ vec0:transport=tap,ifname=tap0,depth=128,gro=1 \
+ root=/dev/ubda con=null con0=null,fd:2 con1=fd:0,fd:1
+
+This will run an instance with ``2048M RAM`` and try to use the image file
+called ``Filesystem.img`` as root. It will connect to the host using tap0.
+All consoles except ``con1`` will be disabled and console 1 will
+use standard input/output making it appear in the same terminal it was started.
+
+Logging in
+============
+
+If you have not set up a password when generating the image, you will have to
+shut down the UML instance, mount the image, chroot into it and set it - as
+described in the Generating an Image section. If the password is already set,
+you can just log in.
+
+The UML Management Console
+============================
+
+In addition to managing the image from "the inside" using normal sysadmin tools,
+it is possible to perform a number of low-level operations using the UML
+management console. The UML management console is a low-level interface to the
+kernel on a running UML instance, somewhat like the i386 SysRq interface. Since
+there is a full-blown operating system under UML, there is much greater
+flexibility possible than with the SysRq mechanism.
+
+There are a number of things you can do with the mconsole interface:
+
+* get the kernel version
+* add and remove devices
+* halt or reboot the machine
+* Send SysRq commands
+* Pause and resume the UML
+* Inspect processes running inside UML
+* Inspect UML internal /proc state
+
+You need the mconsole client (uml\_mconsole) which is a part of the UML
+tools package available in most Linux distritions.
+
+You also need ``CONFIG_MCONSOLE`` (under 'General Setup') enabled in the UML
+kernel. When you boot UML, you'll see a line like::
+
+ mconsole initialized on /home/jdike/.uml/umlNJ32yL/mconsole
+
+If you specify a unique machine id on the UML command line, i.e.
+``umid=debian``, you'll see this::
+
+ mconsole initialized on /home/jdike/.uml/debian/mconsole
+
+
+That file is the socket that uml_mconsole will use to communicate with
+UML. Run it with either the umid or the full path as its argument::
+
+ # uml_mconsole debian
+
+or
+
+ # uml_mconsole /home/jdike/.uml/debian/mconsole
+
+
+You'll get a prompt, at which you can run one of these commands:
+
+* version
+* help
+* halt
+* reboot
+* config
+* remove
+* sysrq
+* help
+* cad
+* stop
+* go
+* proc
+* stack
+
+version
+-------
+
+This command takes no arguments. It prints the UML version::
+
+ (mconsole) version
+ OK Linux OpenWrt 4.14.106 #0 Tue Mar 19 08:19:41 2019 x86_64
+
+
+There are a couple actual uses for this. It's a simple no-op which
+can be used to check that a UML is running. It's also a way of
+sending a device interrupt to the UML. UML mconsole is treated internally as
+a UML device.
+
+help
+----
+
+This command takes no arguments. It prints a short help screen with the
+supported mconsole commands.
+
+
+halt and reboot
+---------------
+
+These commands take no arguments. They shut the machine down immediately, with
+no syncing of disks and no clean shutdown of userspace. So, they are
+pretty close to crashing the machine::
+
+ (mconsole) halt
+ OK
+
+config
+------
+
+"config" adds a new device to the virtual machine. This is supported
+by most UML device drivers. It takes one argument, which is the
+device to add, with the same syntax as the kernel command line::
+
+ (mconsole) config ubd3=/home/jdike/incoming/roots/root_fs_debian22
+
+remove
+------
+
+"remove" deletes a device from the system. Its argument is just the
+name of the device to be removed. The device must be idle in whatever
+sense the driver considers necessary. In the case of the ubd driver,
+the removed block device must not be mounted, swapped on, or otherwise
+open, and in the case of the network driver, the device must be down::
+
+ (mconsole) remove ubd3
+
+sysrq
+-----
+
+This command takes one argument, which is a single letter. It calls the
+generic kernel's SysRq driver, which does whatever is called for by
+that argument. See the SysRq documentation in
+Documentation/admin-guide/sysrq.rst in your favorite kernel tree to
+see what letters are valid and what they do.
+
+cad
+---
+
+This invokes the ``Ctl-Alt-Del`` action in the running image. What exactly
+this ends up doing is up to init, systemd, etc. Normally, it reboots the
+machine.
+
+stop
+----
+
+This puts the UML in a loop reading mconsole requests until a 'go'
+mconsole command is received. This is very useful as a
+debugging/snapshotting tool.
+
+go
+--
+
+This resumes a UML after being paused by a 'stop' command. Note that
+when the UML has resumed, TCP connections may have timed out and if
+the UML is paused for a long period of time, crond might go a little
+crazy, running all the jobs it didn't do earlier.
+
+proc
+----
+
+This takes one argument - the name of a file in /proc which is printed
+to the mconsole standard output
+
+stack
+-----
+
+This takes one argument - the pid number of a process. Its stack is
+printed to a standard output.
+
+*******************
+Advanced UML Topics
+*******************
+
+Sharing Filesystems between Virtual Machines
+============================================
+
+Don't attempt to share filesystems simply by booting two UMLs from the
+same file. That's the same thing as booting two physical machines
+from a shared disk. It will result in filesystem corruption.
+
+Using layered block devices
+---------------------------
+
+The way to share a filesystem between two virtual machines is to use
+the copy-on-write (COW) layering capability of the ubd block driver.
+Any changed blocks are stored in the private COW file, while reads come
+from either device - the private one if the requested block is valid in
+it, the shared one if not. Using this scheme, the majority of data
+which is unchanged is shared between an arbitrary number of virtual
+machines, each of which has a much smaller file containing the changes
+that it has made. With a large number of UMLs booting from a large root
+filesystem, this leads to a huge disk space saving.
+
+Sharing file system data will also help performance, since the host will
+be able to cache the shared data using a much smaller amount of memory,
+so UML disk requests will be served from the host's memory rather than
+its disks. There is a major caveat in doing this on multisocket NUMA
+machines. On such hardware, running many UML instances with a shared
+master image and COW changes may cause issues like NMIs from excess of
+inter-socket traffic.
+
+If you are running UML on high-end hardware like this, make sure to
+bind UML to a set of logical CPUs residing on the same socket using the
+``taskset`` command or have a look at the "tuning" section.
+
+To add a copy-on-write layer to an existing block device file, simply
+add the name of the COW file to the appropriate ubd switch::
+
+ ubd0=root_fs_cow,root_fs_debian_22
+
+where ``root_fs_cow`` is the private COW file and ``root_fs_debian_22`` is
+the existing shared filesystem. The COW file need not exist. If it
+doesn't, the driver will create and initialize it.
+
+Disk Usage
+----------
+
+UML has TRIM support which will release any unused space in its disk
+image files to the underlying OS. It is important to use either ls -ls
+or du to verify the actual file size.
+
+COW validity.
+-------------
+
+Any changes to the master image will invalidate all COW files. If this
+happens, UML will *NOT* automatically delete any of the COW files and
+will refuse to boot. In this case the only solution is to either
+restore the old image (including its last modified timestamp) or remove
+all COW files which will result in their recreation. Any changes in
+the COW files will be lost.
+
+Cows can moo - uml_moo : Merging a COW file with its backing file
+-----------------------------------------------------------------
+
+Depending on how you use UML and COW devices, it may be advisable to
+merge the changes in the COW file into the backing file every once in
+a while.
+
+The utility that does this is uml_moo. Its usage is::
+
+ uml_moo COW_file new_backing_file
+
+
+There's no need to specify the backing file since that information is
+already in the COW file header. If you're paranoid, boot the new
+merged file, and if you're happy with it, move it over the old backing
+file.
+
+``uml_moo`` creates a new backing file by default as a safety measure.
+It also has a destructive merge option which will merge the COW file
+directly into its current backing file. This is really only usable
+when the backing file only has one COW file associated with it. If
+there are multiple COWs associated with a backing file, a -d merge of
+one of them will invalidate all of the others. However, it is
+convenient if you're short of disk space, and it should also be
+noticeably faster than a non-destructive merge.
+
+``uml_moo`` is installed with the UML distribution packages and is
+available as a part of UML utilities.
+
+Host file access
+==================
+
+If you want to access files on the host machine from inside UML, you
+can treat it as a separate machine and either nfs mount directories
+from the host or copy files into the virtual machine with scp.
+However, since UML is running on the host, it can access those
+files just like any other process and make them available inside the
+virtual machine without the need to use the network.
+This is possible with the hostfs virtual filesystem. With it, you
+can mount a host directory into the UML filesystem and access the
+files contained in it just as you would on the host.
+
+*SECURITY WARNING*
+
+Hostfs without any parameters to the UML Image will allow the image
+to mount any part of the host filesystem and write to it. Always
+confine hostfs to a specific "harmless" directory (for example ``/var/tmp``)
+if running UML. This is especially important if UML is being run as root.
+
+Using hostfs
+------------
+
+To begin with, make sure that hostfs is available inside the virtual
+machine with::
+
+ # cat /proc/filesystems
+
+``hostfs`` should be listed. If it's not, either rebuild the kernel
+with hostfs configured into it or make sure that hostfs is built as a
+module and available inside the virtual machine, and insmod it.
+
+
+Now all you need to do is run mount::
+
+ # mount none /mnt/host -t hostfs
+
+will mount the host's ``/`` on the virtual machine's ``/mnt/host``.
+If you don't want to mount the host root directory, then you can
+specify a subdirectory to mount with the -o switch to mount::
+
+ # mount none /mnt/home -t hostfs -o /home
+
+will mount the host's /home on the virtual machine's /mnt/home.
+
+hostfs as the root filesystem
+-----------------------------
+
+It's possible to boot from a directory hierarchy on the host using
+hostfs rather than using the standard filesystem in a file.
+To start, you need that hierarchy. The easiest way is to loop mount
+an existing root_fs file::
+
+ # mount root_fs uml_root_dir -o loop
+
+
+You need to change the filesystem type of ``/`` in ``etc/fstab`` to be
+'hostfs', so that line looks like this::
+
+ /dev/ubd/0 / hostfs defaults 1 1
+
+Then you need to chown to yourself all the files in that directory
+that are owned by root. This worked for me::
+
+ # find . -uid 0 -exec chown jdike {} \;
+
+Next, make sure that your UML kernel has hostfs compiled in, not as a
+module. Then run UML with the boot device pointing at that directory::
+
+ ubd0=/path/to/uml/root/directory
+
+UML should then boot as it does normally.
+
+Hostfs Caveats
+--------------
+
+Hostfs does not support keeping track of host filesystem changes on the
+host (outside UML). As a result, if a file is changed without UML's
+knowledge, UML will not know about it and its own in-memory cache of
+the file may be corrupt. While it is possible to fix this, it is not
+something which is being worked on at present.
+
+Tuning UML
+============
+
+UML at present is strictly uniprocessor. It will, however spin up a
+number of threads to handle various functions.
+
+The UBD driver, SIGIO and the MMU emulation do that. If the system is
+idle, these threads will be migrated to other processors on a SMP host.
+This, unfortunately, will usually result in LOWER performance because of
+all of the cache/memory synchronization traffic between cores. As a
+result, UML will usually benefit from being pinned on a single CPU,
+especially on a large system. This can result in performance differences
+of 5 times or higher on some benchmarks.
+
+Similarly, on large multi-node NUMA systems UML will benefit if all of
+its memory is allocated from the same NUMA node it will run on. The
+OS will *NOT* do that by default. In order to do that, the sysadmin
+needs to create a suitable tmpfs ramdisk bound to a particular node
+and use that as the source for UML RAM allocation by specifying it
+in the TMP or TEMP environment variables. UML will look at the values
+of ``TMPDIR``, ``TMP`` or ``TEMP`` for that. If that fails, it will
+look for shmfs mounted under ``/dev/shm``. If everything else fails use
+``/tmp/`` regardless of the filesystem type used for it::
+
+ mount -t tmpfs -ompol=bind:X none /mnt/tmpfs-nodeX
+ TEMP=/mnt/tmpfs-nodeX taskset -cX linux options options options..
+
+*******************************************
+Contributing to UML and Developing with UML
+*******************************************
+
+UML is an excellent platform to develop new Linux kernel concepts -
+filesystems, devices, virtualization, etc. It provides unrivalled
+opportunities to create and test them without being constrained to
+emulating specific hardware.
+
+Example - want to try how Linux will work with 4096 "proper" network
+devices?
+
+Not an issue with UML. At the same time, this is something which
+is difficult with other virtualization packages - they are
+constrained by the number of devices allowed on the hardware bus
+they are trying to emulate (for example 16 on a PCI bus in qemu).
+
+If you have something to contribute such as a patch, a bugfix, a
+new feature, please send it to ``linux-um@lists.infradead.org``.
+
+Please follow all standard Linux patch guidelines such as cc-ing
+relevant maintainers and run ``./scripts/checkpatch.pl`` on your patch.
+For more details see ``Documentation/process/submitting-patches.rst``
+
+Note - the list does not accept HTML or attachments, all emails must
+be formatted as plain text.
+
+Developing always goes hand in hand with debugging. First of all,
+you can always run UML under gdb and there will be a whole section
+later on on how to do that. That, however, is not the only way to
+debug a Linux kernel. Quite often adding tracing statements and/or
+using UML specific approaches such as ptracing the UML kernel process
+are significantly more informative.
+
+Tracing UML
+=============
+
+When running, UML consists of a main kernel thread and a number of
+helper threads. The ones of interest for tracing are NOT the ones
+that are already ptraced by UML as a part of its MMU emulation.
+
+These are usually the first three threads visible in a ps display.
+The one with the lowest PID number and using most CPU is usually the
+kernel thread. The other threads are the disk
+(ubd) device helper thread and the SIGIO helper thread.
+Running ptrace on this thread usually results in the following picture::
+
+ host$ strace -p 16566
+ --- SIGIO {si_signo=SIGIO, si_code=POLL_IN, si_band=65} ---
+ epoll_wait(4, [{EPOLLIN, {u32=3721159424, u64=3721159424}}], 64, 0) = 1
+ epoll_wait(4, [], 64, 0) = 0
+ rt_sigreturn({mask=[PIPE]}) = 16967
+ ptrace(PTRACE_GETREGS, 16967, NULL, 0xd5f34f38) = 0
+ ptrace(PTRACE_GETREGSET, 16967, NT_X86_XSTATE, [{iov_base=0xd5f35010, iov_len=832}]) = 0
+ ptrace(PTRACE_GETSIGINFO, 16967, NULL, {si_signo=SIGTRAP, si_code=0x85, si_pid=16967, si_uid=0}) = 0
+ ptrace(PTRACE_SETREGS, 16967, NULL, 0xd5f34f38) = 0
+ ptrace(PTRACE_SETREGSET, 16967, NT_X86_XSTATE, [{iov_base=0xd5f35010, iov_len=2696}]) = 0
+ ptrace(PTRACE_SYSEMU, 16967, NULL, 0) = 0
+ --- SIGCHLD {si_signo=SIGCHLD, si_code=CLD_TRAPPED, si_pid=16967, si_uid=0, si_status=SIGTRAP, si_utime=65, si_stime=89} ---
+ wait4(16967, [{WIFSTOPPED(s) && WSTOPSIG(s) == SIGTRAP | 0x80}], WSTOPPED|__WALL, NULL) = 16967
+ ptrace(PTRACE_GETREGS, 16967, NULL, 0xd5f34f38) = 0
+ ptrace(PTRACE_GETREGSET, 16967, NT_X86_XSTATE, [{iov_base=0xd5f35010, iov_len=832}]) = 0
+ ptrace(PTRACE_GETSIGINFO, 16967, NULL, {si_signo=SIGTRAP, si_code=0x85, si_pid=16967, si_uid=0}) = 0
+ timer_settime(0, 0, {it_interval={tv_sec=0, tv_nsec=0}, it_value={tv_sec=0, tv_nsec=2830912}}, NULL) = 0
+ getpid() = 16566
+ clock_nanosleep(CLOCK_MONOTONIC, 0, {tv_sec=1, tv_nsec=0}, NULL) = ? ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK (Interrupted by signal)
+ --- SIGALRM {si_signo=SIGALRM, si_code=SI_TIMER, si_timerid=0, si_overrun=0, si_value={int=1631716592, ptr=0x614204f0}} ---
+ rt_sigreturn({mask=[PIPE]}) = -1 EINTR (Interrupted system call)
+
+This is a typical picture from a mostly idle UML instance.
+
+* UML interrupt controller uses epoll - this is UML waiting for IO
+ interrupts:
+
+ epoll_wait(4, [{EPOLLIN, {u32=3721159424, u64=3721159424}}], 64, 0) = 1
+
+* The sequence of ptrace calls is part of MMU emulation and running the
+ UML userspace.
+* ``timer_settime`` is part of the UML high res timer subsystem mapping
+ timer requests from inside UML onto the host high resolution timers.
+* ``clock_nanosleep`` is UML going into idle (similar to the way a PC
+ will execute an ACPI idle).
+
+As you can see UML will generate quite a bit of output even in idle. The output
+can be very informative when observing IO. It shows the actual IO calls, their
+arguments and returns values.
+
+Kernel debugging
+================
+
+You can run UML under gdb now, though it will not necessarily agree to
+be started under it. If you are trying to track a runtime bug, it is
+much better to attach gdb to a running UML instance and let UML run.
+
+Assuming the same PID number as in the previous example, this would be::
+
+ # gdb -p 16566
+
+This will STOP the UML instance, so you must enter `cont` at the GDB
+command line to request it to continue. It may be a good idea to make
+this into a gdb script and pass it to gdb as an argument.
+
+Developing Device Drivers
+=========================
+
+Nearly all UML drivers are monolithic. While it is possible to build a
+UML driver as a kernel module, that limits the possible functionality
+to in-kernel only and non-UML specific. The reason for this is that
+in order to really leverage UML, one needs to write a piece of
+userspace code which maps driver concepts onto actual userspace host
+calls.
+
+This forms the so-called "user" portion of the driver. While it can
+reuse a lot of kernel concepts, it is generally just another piece of
+userspace code. This portion needs some matching "kernel" code which
+resides inside the UML image and which implements the Linux kernel part.
+
+*Note: There are very few limitations in the way "kernel" and "user" interact*.
+
+UML does not have a strictly defined kernel-to-host API. It does not
+try to emulate a specific architecture or bus. UML's "kernel" and
+"user" can share memory, code and interact as needed to implement
+whatever design the software developer has in mind. The only
+limitations are purely technical. Due to a lot of functions and
+variables having the same names, the developer should be careful
+which includes and libraries they are trying to refer to.
+
+As a result a lot of userspace code consists of simple wrappers.
+E.g. ``os_close_file()`` is just a wrapper around ``close()``
+which ensures that the userspace function close does not clash
+with similarly named function(s) in the kernel part.
+
+Using UML as a Test Platform
+============================
+
+UML is an excellent test platform for device driver development. As
+with most things UML, "some user assembly may be required". It is
+up to the user to build their emulation environment. UML at present
+provides only the kernel infrastructure.
+
+Part of this infrastructure is the ability to load and parse fdt
+device tree blobs as used in Arm or Open Firmware platforms. These
+are supplied as an optional extra argument to the kernel command
+line::
+
+ dtb=filename
+
+The device tree is loaded and parsed at boottime and is accessible by
+drivers which query it. At this moment in time this facility is
+intended solely for development purposes. UML's own devices do not
+query the device tree.
+
+Security Considerations
+-----------------------
+
+Drivers or any new functionality should default to not
+accepting arbitrary filename, bpf code or other parameters
+which can affect the host from inside the UML instance.
+For example, specifying the socket used for IPC communication
+between a driver and the host at the UML command line is OK
+security-wise. Allowing it as a loadable module parameter
+isn't.
+
+If such functionality is desirable for a particular application
+(e.g. loading BPF "firmware" for raw socket network transports),
+it should be off by default and should be explicitly turned on
+as a command line parameter at startup.
+
+Even with this in mind, the level of isolation between UML
+and the host is relatively weak. If the UML userspace is
+allowed to load arbitrary kernel drivers, an attacker can
+use this to break out of UML. Thus, if UML is used in
+a production application, it is recommended that all modules
+are loaded at boot and kernel module loading is disabled
+afterwards.