Merging upstream version 6.7.12.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

10 files changed, 147 insertions, 21 deletions

diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu
index a1db6db475..710d47be11 100644
--- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu
+++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu
@@ -516,6 +516,7 @@ What:		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mds
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/meltdown
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mmio_stale_data
+		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/reg_file_data_sampling
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/retbleed
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spec_store_bypass
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v1
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst
index de99caabf6..ff0b440ef2 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst
@@ -21,3 +21,4 @@ are configurable at compile, boot or run time.
    cross-thread-rsb
    srso
    gather_data_sampling
+   reg-file-data-sampling
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/reg-file-data-sampling.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/reg-file-data-sampling.rst
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0585d02b9a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/reg-file-data-sampling.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
+==================================
+Register File Data Sampling (RFDS)
+==================================
+
+Register File Data Sampling (RFDS) is a microarchitectural vulnerability that
+only affects Intel Atom parts(also branded as E-cores). RFDS may allow
+a malicious actor to infer data values previously used in floating point
+registers, vector registers, or integer registers. RFDS does not provide the
+ability to choose which data is inferred. CVE-2023-28746 is assigned to RFDS.
+
+Affected Processors
+===================
+Below is the list of affected Intel processors [#f1]_:
+
+   ===================  ============
+   Common name          Family_Model
+   ===================  ============
+   ATOM_GOLDMONT           06_5CH
+   ATOM_GOLDMONT_D         06_5FH
+   ATOM_GOLDMONT_PLUS      06_7AH
+   ATOM_TREMONT_D          06_86H
+   ATOM_TREMONT            06_96H
+   ALDERLAKE               06_97H
+   ALDERLAKE_L             06_9AH
+   ATOM_TREMONT_L          06_9CH
+   RAPTORLAKE              06_B7H
+   RAPTORLAKE_P            06_BAH
+   ATOM_GRACEMONT          06_BEH
+   RAPTORLAKE_S            06_BFH
+   ===================  ============
+
+As an exception to this table, Intel Xeon E family parts ALDERLAKE(06_97H) and
+RAPTORLAKE(06_B7H) codenamed Catlow are not affected. They are reported as
+vulnerable in Linux because they share the same family/model with an affected
+part. Unlike their affected counterparts, they do not enumerate RFDS_CLEAR or
+CPUID.HYBRID. This information could be used to distinguish between the
+affected and unaffected parts, but it is deemed not worth adding complexity as
+the reporting is fixed automatically when these parts enumerate RFDS_NO.
+
+Mitigation
+==========
+Intel released a microcode update that enables software to clear sensitive
+information using the VERW instruction. Like MDS, RFDS deploys the same
+mitigation strategy to force the CPU to clear the affected buffers before an
+attacker can extract the secrets. This is achieved by using the otherwise
+unused and obsolete VERW instruction in combination with a microcode update.
+The microcode clears the affected CPU buffers when the VERW instruction is
+executed.
+
+Mitigation points
+-----------------
+VERW is executed by the kernel before returning to user space, and by KVM
+before VMentry. None of the affected cores support SMT, so VERW is not required
+at C-state transitions.
+
+New bits in IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES
+----------------------------------
+Newer processors and microcode update on existing affected processors added new
+bits to IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR. These bits can be used to enumerate
+vulnerability and mitigation capability:
+
+- Bit 27 - RFDS_NO - When set, processor is not affected by RFDS.
+- Bit 28 - RFDS_CLEAR - When set, processor is affected by RFDS, and has the
+  microcode that clears the affected buffers on VERW execution.
+
+Mitigation control on the kernel command line
+---------------------------------------------
+The kernel command line allows to control RFDS mitigation at boot time with the
+parameter "reg_file_data_sampling=". The valid arguments are:
+
+  ==========  =================================================================
+  on          If the CPU is vulnerable, enable mitigation; CPU buffer clearing
+              on exit to userspace and before entering a VM.
+  off         Disables mitigation.
+  ==========  =================================================================
+
+Mitigation default is selected by CONFIG_MITIGATION_RFDS.
+
+Mitigation status information
+-----------------------------
+The Linux kernel provides a sysfs interface to enumerate the current
+vulnerability status of the system: whether the system is vulnerable, and
+which mitigations are active. The relevant sysfs file is:
+
+	/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/reg_file_data_sampling
+
+The possible values in this file are:
+
+  .. list-table::
+
+     * - 'Not affected'
+       - The processor is not vulnerable
+     * - 'Vulnerable'
+       - The processor is vulnerable, but no mitigation enabled
+     * - 'Vulnerable: No microcode'
+       - The processor is vulnerable but microcode is not updated.
+     * - 'Mitigation: Clear Register File'
+       - The processor is vulnerable and the CPU buffer clearing mitigation is
+	 enabled.
+
+References
+----------
+.. [#f1] Affected Processors
+   https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/topic-technology/software-security-guidance/processors-affected-consolidated-product-cpu-model.html
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index b72e2049c4..7120c4e169 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -1137,6 +1137,26 @@
 			The filter can be disabled or changed to another
 			driver later using sysfs.
 
+	reg_file_data_sampling=
+			[X86] Controls mitigation for Register File Data
+			Sampling (RFDS) vulnerability. RFDS is a CPU
+			vulnerability which may allow userspace to infer
+			kernel data values previously stored in floating point
+			registers, vector registers, or integer registers.
+			RFDS only affects Intel Atom processors.
+
+			on:	Turns ON the mitigation.
+			off:	Turns OFF the mitigation.
+
+			This parameter overrides the compile time default set
+			by CONFIG_MITIGATION_RFDS. Mitigation cannot be
+			disabled when other VERW based mitigations (like MDS)
+			are enabled. In order to disable RFDS mitigation all
+			VERW based mitigations need to be disabled.
+
+			For details see:
+			Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/reg-file-data-sampling.rst
+
 	driver_async_probe=  [KNL]
 			List of driver names to be probed asynchronously. *
 			matches with all driver names. If * is specified, the
@@ -3307,9 +3327,7 @@
 
 	mem_encrypt=	[X86-64] AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME) control
 			Valid arguments: on, off
-			Default (depends on kernel configuration option):
-			  on  (CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT=y)
-			  off (CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT=n)
+			Default: off
 			mem_encrypt=on:		Activate SME
 			mem_encrypt=off:	Do not activate SME
 
@@ -3385,6 +3403,7 @@
 					       nospectre_bhb [ARM64]
 					       nospectre_v1 [X86,PPC]
 					       nospectre_v2 [X86,PPC,S390,ARM64]
+					       reg_file_data_sampling=off [X86]
 					       retbleed=off [X86]
 					       spec_store_bypass_disable=off [X86,PPC]
 					       spectre_v2_user=off [X86]
diff --git a/Documentation/arch/x86/amd-memory-encryption.rst b/Documentation/arch/x86/amd-memory-encryption.rst
index 07caa8fff8..414bc7402a 100644
--- a/Documentation/arch/x86/amd-memory-encryption.rst
+++ b/Documentation/arch/x86/amd-memory-encryption.rst
@@ -87,14 +87,14 @@ The state of SME in the Linux kernel can be documented as follows:
 	  kernel is non-zero).
 
 SME can also be enabled and activated in the BIOS. If SME is enabled and
-activated in the BIOS, then all memory accesses will be encrypted and it will
-not be necessary to activate the Linux memory encryption support.  If the BIOS
-merely enables SME (sets bit 23 of the MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG), then Linux can activate
-memory encryption by default (CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT=y) or
-by supplying mem_encrypt=on on the kernel command line.  However, if BIOS does
-not enable SME, then Linux will not be able to activate memory encryption, even
-if configured to do so by default or the mem_encrypt=on command line parameter
-is specified.
+activated in the BIOS, then all memory accesses will be encrypted and it
+will not be necessary to activate the Linux memory encryption support.
+
+If the BIOS merely enables SME (sets bit 23 of the MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG),
+then memory encryption can be enabled by supplying mem_encrypt=on on the
+kernel command line.  However, if BIOS does not enable SME, then Linux
+will not be able to activate memory encryption, even if configured to do
+so by default or the mem_encrypt=on command line parameter is specified.
 
 Secure Nested Paging (SNP)
 ==========================
diff --git a/Documentation/conf.py b/Documentation/conf.py
index dfc19c915d..e385e24fe9 100644
--- a/Documentation/conf.py
+++ b/Documentation/conf.py
@@ -345,9 +345,9 @@ sys.stderr.write("Using %s theme\n" % html_theme)
 html_static_path = ['sphinx-static']
 
 # If true, Docutils "smart quotes" will be used to convert quotes and dashes
-# to typographically correct entities.  This will convert "--" to "—",
-# which is not always what we want, so disable it.
-smartquotes = False
+# to typographically correct entities.  However, conversion of "--" to "—"
+# is not always what we want, so enable only quotes.
+smartquotes_action = 'q'
 
 # Custom sidebar templates, maps document names to template names.
 # Note that the RTD theme ignores this
diff --git a/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/display/msm/qcom,mdss.yaml b/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/display/msm/qcom,mdss.yaml
index 0999ea07f4..e4576546bf 100644
--- a/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/display/msm/qcom,mdss.yaml
+++ b/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/display/msm/qcom,mdss.yaml
@@ -127,6 +127,7 @@ patternProperties:
           - qcom,dsi-phy-20nm
           - qcom,dsi-phy-28nm-8226
           - qcom,dsi-phy-28nm-hpm
+          - qcom,dsi-phy-28nm-hpm-fam-b
           - qcom,dsi-phy-28nm-lp
           - qcom,hdmi-phy-8084
           - qcom,hdmi-phy-8660
diff --git a/Documentation/netlink/specs/devlink.yaml b/Documentation/netlink/specs/devlink.yaml
index 572d83a414..42a9d77803 100644
--- a/Documentation/netlink/specs/devlink.yaml
+++ b/Documentation/netlink/specs/devlink.yaml
@@ -244,7 +244,7 @@ attribute-sets:
 
       -
         name: eswitch-inline-mode
-        type: u16
+        type: u8
         enum: eswitch-inline-mode
       -
         name: dpipe-tables
diff --git a/Documentation/netlink/specs/dpll.yaml b/Documentation/netlink/specs/dpll.yaml
index 2b4c4bcd83..5b25ad589e 100644
--- a/Documentation/netlink/specs/dpll.yaml
+++ b/Documentation/netlink/specs/dpll.yaml
@@ -274,6 +274,7 @@ attribute-sets:
       -
         name: capabilities
         type: u32
+        enum: pin-capabilities
       -
         name: parent-device
         type: nest
diff --git a/Documentation/userspace-api/media/mediactl/media-types.rst b/Documentation/userspace-api/media/mediactl/media-types.rst
index 0ffeece1e0..6332e83952 100644
--- a/Documentation/userspace-api/media/mediactl/media-types.rst
+++ b/Documentation/userspace-api/media/mediactl/media-types.rst
@@ -375,12 +375,11 @@ Types and flags used to represent the media graph elements
 	  are origins of links.
 
     *  -  ``MEDIA_PAD_FL_MUST_CONNECT``
-       -  If this flag is set and the pad is linked to any other pad, then
-	  at least one of those links must be enabled for the entity to be
-	  able to stream. There could be temporary reasons (e.g. device
-	  configuration dependent) for the pad to need enabled links even
-	  when this flag isn't set; the absence of the flag doesn't imply
-	  there is none.
+       -  If this flag is set, then for this pad to be able to stream, it must
+	  be connected by at least one enabled link. There could be temporary
+	  reasons (e.g. device configuration dependent) for the pad to need
+	  enabled links even when this flag isn't set; the absence of the flag
+	  doesn't imply there is none.
 
 
 One and only one of ``MEDIA_PAD_FL_SINK`` and ``MEDIA_PAD_FL_SOURCE``