Adding upstream version 6.6.15.upstream/6.6.15

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

1 files changed, 1510 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/arch/Kconfig b/arch/Kconfig
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--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/Kconfig
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+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#
+# General architecture dependent options
+#
+
+#
+# Note: arch/$(SRCARCH)/Kconfig needs to be included first so that it can
+# override the default values in this file.
+#
+source "arch/$(SRCARCH)/Kconfig"
+
+menu "General architecture-dependent options"
+
+config ARCH_HAS_SUBPAGE_FAULTS
+	bool
+	help
+	  Select if the architecture can check permissions at sub-page
+	  granularity (e.g. arm64 MTE). The probe_user_*() functions
+	  must be implemented.
+
+config HOTPLUG_SMT
+	bool
+
+config SMT_NUM_THREADS_DYNAMIC
+	bool
+
+# Selected by HOTPLUG_CORE_SYNC_DEAD or HOTPLUG_CORE_SYNC_FULL
+config HOTPLUG_CORE_SYNC
+	bool
+
+# Basic CPU dead synchronization selected by architecture
+config HOTPLUG_CORE_SYNC_DEAD
+	bool
+	select HOTPLUG_CORE_SYNC
+
+# Full CPU synchronization with alive state selected by architecture
+config HOTPLUG_CORE_SYNC_FULL
+	bool
+	select HOTPLUG_CORE_SYNC_DEAD if HOTPLUG_CPU
+	select HOTPLUG_CORE_SYNC
+
+config HOTPLUG_SPLIT_STARTUP
+	bool
+	select HOTPLUG_CORE_SYNC_FULL
+
+config HOTPLUG_PARALLEL
+	bool
+	select HOTPLUG_SPLIT_STARTUP
+
+config GENERIC_ENTRY
+	bool
+
+config KPROBES
+	bool "Kprobes"
+	depends on MODULES
+	depends on HAVE_KPROBES
+	select KALLSYMS
+	select TASKS_RCU if PREEMPTION
+	help
+	  Kprobes allows you to trap at almost any kernel address and
+	  execute a callback function.  register_kprobe() establishes
+	  a probepoint and specifies the callback.  Kprobes is useful
+	  for kernel debugging, non-intrusive instrumentation and testing.
+	  If in doubt, say "N".
+
+config JUMP_LABEL
+	bool "Optimize very unlikely/likely branches"
+	depends on HAVE_ARCH_JUMP_LABEL
+	select OBJTOOL if HAVE_JUMP_LABEL_HACK
+	help
+	  This option enables a transparent branch optimization that
+	  makes certain almost-always-true or almost-always-false branch
+	  conditions even cheaper to execute within the kernel.
+
+	  Certain performance-sensitive kernel code, such as trace points,
+	  scheduler functionality, networking code and KVM have such
+	  branches and include support for this optimization technique.
+
+	  If it is detected that the compiler has support for "asm goto",
+	  the kernel will compile such branches with just a nop
+	  instruction. When the condition flag is toggled to true, the
+	  nop will be converted to a jump instruction to execute the
+	  conditional block of instructions.
+
+	  This technique lowers overhead and stress on the branch prediction
+	  of the processor and generally makes the kernel faster. The update
+	  of the condition is slower, but those are always very rare.
+
+	  ( On 32-bit x86, the necessary options added to the compiler
+	    flags may increase the size of the kernel slightly. )
+
+config STATIC_KEYS_SELFTEST
+	bool "Static key selftest"
+	depends on JUMP_LABEL
+	help
+	  Boot time self-test of the branch patching code.
+
+config STATIC_CALL_SELFTEST
+	bool "Static call selftest"
+	depends on HAVE_STATIC_CALL
+	help
+	  Boot time self-test of the call patching code.
+
+config OPTPROBES
+	def_bool y
+	depends on KPROBES && HAVE_OPTPROBES
+	select TASKS_RCU if PREEMPTION
+
+config KPROBES_ON_FTRACE
+	def_bool y
+	depends on KPROBES && HAVE_KPROBES_ON_FTRACE
+	depends on DYNAMIC_FTRACE_WITH_REGS
+	help
+	  If function tracer is enabled and the arch supports full
+	  passing of pt_regs to function tracing, then kprobes can
+	  optimize on top of function tracing.
+
+config UPROBES
+	def_bool n
+	depends on ARCH_SUPPORTS_UPROBES
+	help
+	  Uprobes is the user-space counterpart to kprobes: they
+	  enable instrumentation applications (such as 'perf probe')
+	  to establish unintrusive probes in user-space binaries and
+	  libraries, by executing handler functions when the probes
+	  are hit by user-space applications.
+
+	  ( These probes come in the form of single-byte breakpoints,
+	    managed by the kernel and kept transparent to the probed
+	    application. )
+
+config HAVE_64BIT_ALIGNED_ACCESS
+	def_bool 64BIT && !HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS
+	help
+	  Some architectures require 64 bit accesses to be 64 bit
+	  aligned, which also requires structs containing 64 bit values
+	  to be 64 bit aligned too. This includes some 32 bit
+	  architectures which can do 64 bit accesses, as well as 64 bit
+	  architectures without unaligned access.
+
+	  This symbol should be selected by an architecture if 64 bit
+	  accesses are required to be 64 bit aligned in this way even
+	  though it is not a 64 bit architecture.
+
+	  See Documentation/core-api/unaligned-memory-access.rst for
+	  more information on the topic of unaligned memory accesses.
+
+config HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS
+	bool
+	help
+	  Some architectures are unable to perform unaligned accesses
+	  without the use of get_unaligned/put_unaligned. Others are
+	  unable to perform such accesses efficiently (e.g. trap on
+	  unaligned access and require fixing it up in the exception
+	  handler.)
+
+	  This symbol should be selected by an architecture if it can
+	  perform unaligned accesses efficiently to allow different
+	  code paths to be selected for these cases. Some network
+	  drivers, for example, could opt to not fix up alignment
+	  problems with received packets if doing so would not help
+	  much.
+
+	  See Documentation/core-api/unaligned-memory-access.rst for more
+	  information on the topic of unaligned memory accesses.
+
+config ARCH_USE_BUILTIN_BSWAP
+	bool
+	help
+	  Modern versions of GCC (since 4.4) have builtin functions
+	  for handling byte-swapping. Using these, instead of the old
+	  inline assembler that the architecture code provides in the
+	  __arch_bswapXX() macros, allows the compiler to see what's
+	  happening and offers more opportunity for optimisation. In
+	  particular, the compiler will be able to combine the byteswap
+	  with a nearby load or store and use load-and-swap or
+	  store-and-swap instructions if the architecture has them. It
+	  should almost *never* result in code which is worse than the
+	  hand-coded assembler in <asm/swab.h>.  But just in case it
+	  does, the use of the builtins is optional.
+
+	  Any architecture with load-and-swap or store-and-swap
+	  instructions should set this. And it shouldn't hurt to set it
+	  on architectures that don't have such instructions.
+
+config KRETPROBES
+	def_bool y
+	depends on KPROBES && (HAVE_KRETPROBES || HAVE_RETHOOK)
+
+config KRETPROBE_ON_RETHOOK
+	def_bool y
+	depends on HAVE_RETHOOK
+	depends on KRETPROBES
+	select RETHOOK
+
+config USER_RETURN_NOTIFIER
+	bool
+	depends on HAVE_USER_RETURN_NOTIFIER
+	help
+	  Provide a kernel-internal notification when a cpu is about to
+	  switch to user mode.
+
+config HAVE_IOREMAP_PROT
+	bool
+
+config HAVE_KPROBES
+	bool
+
+config HAVE_KRETPROBES
+	bool
+
+config HAVE_OPTPROBES
+	bool
+
+config HAVE_KPROBES_ON_FTRACE
+	bool
+
+config ARCH_CORRECT_STACKTRACE_ON_KRETPROBE
+	bool
+	help
+	  Since kretprobes modifies return address on the stack, the
+	  stacktrace may see the kretprobe trampoline address instead
+	  of correct one. If the architecture stacktrace code and
+	  unwinder can adjust such entries, select this configuration.
+
+config HAVE_FUNCTION_ERROR_INJECTION
+	bool
+
+config HAVE_NMI
+	bool
+
+config HAVE_FUNCTION_DESCRIPTORS
+	bool
+
+config TRACE_IRQFLAGS_SUPPORT
+	bool
+
+config TRACE_IRQFLAGS_NMI_SUPPORT
+	bool
+
+#
+# An arch should select this if it provides all these things:
+#
+#	task_pt_regs()		in asm/processor.h or asm/ptrace.h
+#	arch_has_single_step()	if there is hardware single-step support
+#	arch_has_block_step()	if there is hardware block-step support
+#	asm/syscall.h		supplying asm-generic/syscall.h interface
+#	linux/regset.h		user_regset interfaces
+#	CORE_DUMP_USE_REGSET	#define'd in linux/elf.h
+#	TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE	calls ptrace_report_syscall_{entry,exit}
+#	TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME	calls resume_user_mode_work()
+#
+config HAVE_ARCH_TRACEHOOK
+	bool
+
+config HAVE_DMA_CONTIGUOUS
+	bool
+
+config GENERIC_SMP_IDLE_THREAD
+	bool
+
+config GENERIC_IDLE_POLL_SETUP
+	bool
+
+config ARCH_HAS_FORTIFY_SOURCE
+	bool
+	help
+	  An architecture should select this when it can successfully
+	  build and run with CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE.
+
+#
+# Select if the arch provides a historic keepinit alias for the retain_initrd
+# command line option
+#
+config ARCH_HAS_KEEPINITRD
+	bool
+
+# Select if arch has all set_memory_ro/rw/x/nx() functions in asm/cacheflush.h
+config ARCH_HAS_SET_MEMORY
+	bool
+
+# Select if arch has all set_direct_map_invalid/default() functions
+config ARCH_HAS_SET_DIRECT_MAP
+	bool
+
+#
+# Select if the architecture provides the arch_dma_set_uncached symbol to
+# either provide an uncached segment alias for a DMA allocation, or
+# to remap the page tables in place.
+#
+config ARCH_HAS_DMA_SET_UNCACHED
+	bool
+
+#
+# Select if the architectures provides the arch_dma_clear_uncached symbol
+# to undo an in-place page table remap for uncached access.
+#
+config ARCH_HAS_DMA_CLEAR_UNCACHED
+	bool
+
+config ARCH_HAS_CPU_FINALIZE_INIT
+	bool
+
+# Select if arch init_task must go in the __init_task_data section
+config ARCH_TASK_STRUCT_ON_STACK
+	bool
+
+# Select if arch has its private alloc_task_struct() function
+config ARCH_TASK_STRUCT_ALLOCATOR
+	bool
+
+config HAVE_ARCH_THREAD_STRUCT_WHITELIST
+	bool
+	depends on !ARCH_TASK_STRUCT_ALLOCATOR
+	help
+	  An architecture should select this to provide hardened usercopy
+	  knowledge about what region of the thread_struct should be
+	  whitelisted for copying to userspace. Normally this is only the
+	  FPU registers. Specifically, arch_thread_struct_whitelist()
+	  should be implemented. Without this, the entire thread_struct
+	  field in task_struct will be left whitelisted.
+
+# Select if arch has its private alloc_thread_stack() function
+config ARCH_THREAD_STACK_ALLOCATOR
+	bool
+
+# Select if arch wants to size task_struct dynamically via arch_task_struct_size:
+config ARCH_WANTS_DYNAMIC_TASK_STRUCT
+	bool
+
+config ARCH_WANTS_NO_INSTR
+	bool
+	help
+	  An architecture should select this if the noinstr macro is being used on
+	  functions to denote that the toolchain should avoid instrumenting such
+	  functions and is required for correctness.
+
+config ARCH_32BIT_OFF_T
+	bool
+	depends on !64BIT
+	help
+	  All new 32-bit architectures should have 64-bit off_t type on
+	  userspace side which corresponds to the loff_t kernel type. This
+	  is the requirement for modern ABIs. Some existing architectures
+	  still support 32-bit off_t. This option is enabled for all such
+	  architectures explicitly.
+
+# Selected by 64 bit architectures which have a 32 bit f_tinode in struct ustat
+config ARCH_32BIT_USTAT_F_TINODE
+	bool
+
+config HAVE_ASM_MODVERSIONS
+	bool
+	help
+	  This symbol should be selected by an architecture if it provides
+	  <asm/asm-prototypes.h> to support the module versioning for symbols
+	  exported from assembly code.
+
+config HAVE_REGS_AND_STACK_ACCESS_API
+	bool
+	help
+	  This symbol should be selected by an architecture if it supports
+	  the API needed to access registers and stack entries from pt_regs,
+	  declared in asm/ptrace.h
+	  For example the kprobes-based event tracer needs this API.
+
+config HAVE_RSEQ
+	bool
+	depends on HAVE_REGS_AND_STACK_ACCESS_API
+	help
+	  This symbol should be selected by an architecture if it
+	  supports an implementation of restartable sequences.
+
+config HAVE_RUST
+	bool
+	help
+	  This symbol should be selected by an architecture if it
+	  supports Rust.
+
+config HAVE_FUNCTION_ARG_ACCESS_API
+	bool
+	help
+	  This symbol should be selected by an architecture if it supports
+	  the API needed to access function arguments from pt_regs,
+	  declared in asm/ptrace.h
+
+config HAVE_HW_BREAKPOINT
+	bool
+	depends on PERF_EVENTS
+
+config HAVE_MIXED_BREAKPOINTS_REGS
+	bool
+	depends on HAVE_HW_BREAKPOINT
+	help
+	  Depending on the arch implementation of hardware breakpoints,
+	  some of them have separate registers for data and instruction
+	  breakpoints addresses, others have mixed registers to store
+	  them but define the access type in a control register.
+	  Select this option if your arch implements breakpoints under the
+	  latter fashion.
+
+config HAVE_USER_RETURN_NOTIFIER
+	bool
+
+config HAVE_PERF_EVENTS_NMI
+	bool
+	help
+	  System hardware can generate an NMI using the perf event
+	  subsystem.  Also has support for calculating CPU cycle events
+	  to determine how many clock cycles in a given period.
+
+config HAVE_HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR_PERF
+	bool
+	depends on HAVE_PERF_EVENTS_NMI
+	help
+	  The arch chooses to use the generic perf-NMI-based hardlockup
+	  detector. Must define HAVE_PERF_EVENTS_NMI.
+
+config HAVE_HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR_ARCH
+	bool
+	help
+	  The arch provides its own hardlockup detector implementation instead
+	  of the generic ones.
+
+	  It uses the same command line parameters, and sysctl interface,
+	  as the generic hardlockup detectors.
+
+config HAVE_PERF_REGS
+	bool
+	help
+	  Support selective register dumps for perf events. This includes
+	  bit-mapping of each registers and a unique architecture id.
+
+config HAVE_PERF_USER_STACK_DUMP
+	bool
+	help
+	  Support user stack dumps for perf event samples. This needs
+	  access to the user stack pointer which is not unified across
+	  architectures.
+
+config HAVE_ARCH_JUMP_LABEL
+	bool
+
+config HAVE_ARCH_JUMP_LABEL_RELATIVE
+	bool
+
+config MMU_GATHER_TABLE_FREE
+	bool
+
+config MMU_GATHER_RCU_TABLE_FREE
+	bool
+	select MMU_GATHER_TABLE_FREE
+
+config MMU_GATHER_PAGE_SIZE
+	bool
+
+config MMU_GATHER_NO_RANGE
+	bool
+	select MMU_GATHER_MERGE_VMAS
+
+config MMU_GATHER_NO_FLUSH_CACHE
+	bool
+
+config MMU_GATHER_MERGE_VMAS
+	bool
+
+config MMU_GATHER_NO_GATHER
+	bool
+	depends on MMU_GATHER_TABLE_FREE
+
+config ARCH_WANT_IRQS_OFF_ACTIVATE_MM
+	bool
+	help
+	  Temporary select until all architectures can be converted to have
+	  irqs disabled over activate_mm. Architectures that do IPI based TLB
+	  shootdowns should enable this.
+
+# Use normal mm refcounting for MMU_LAZY_TLB kernel thread references.
+# MMU_LAZY_TLB_REFCOUNT=n can improve the scalability of context switching
+# to/from kernel threads when the same mm is running on a lot of CPUs (a large
+# multi-threaded application), by reducing contention on the mm refcount.
+#
+# This can be disabled if the architecture ensures no CPUs are using an mm as a
+# "lazy tlb" beyond its final refcount (i.e., by the time __mmdrop frees the mm
+# or its kernel page tables). This could be arranged by arch_exit_mmap(), or
+# final exit(2) TLB flush, for example.
+#
+# To implement this, an arch *must*:
+# Ensure the _lazy_tlb variants of mmgrab/mmdrop are used when manipulating
+# the lazy tlb reference of a kthread's ->active_mm (non-arch code has been
+# converted already).
+config MMU_LAZY_TLB_REFCOUNT
+	def_bool y
+	depends on !MMU_LAZY_TLB_SHOOTDOWN
+
+# This option allows MMU_LAZY_TLB_REFCOUNT=n. It ensures no CPUs are using an
+# mm as a lazy tlb beyond its last reference count, by shooting down these
+# users before the mm is deallocated. __mmdrop() first IPIs all CPUs that may
+# be using the mm as a lazy tlb, so that they may switch themselves to using
+# init_mm for their active mm. mm_cpumask(mm) is used to determine which CPUs
+# may be using mm as a lazy tlb mm.
+#
+# To implement this, an arch *must*:
+# - At the time of the final mmdrop of the mm, ensure mm_cpumask(mm) contains
+#   at least all possible CPUs in which the mm is lazy.
+# - It must meet the requirements for MMU_LAZY_TLB_REFCOUNT=n (see above).
+config MMU_LAZY_TLB_SHOOTDOWN
+	bool
+
+config ARCH_HAVE_NMI_SAFE_CMPXCHG
+	bool
+
+config ARCH_HAS_NMI_SAFE_THIS_CPU_OPS
+	bool
+
+config HAVE_ALIGNED_STRUCT_PAGE
+	bool
+	help
+	  This makes sure that struct pages are double word aligned and that
+	  e.g. the SLUB allocator can perform double word atomic operations
+	  on a struct page for better performance. However selecting this
+	  might increase the size of a struct page by a word.
+
+config HAVE_CMPXCHG_LOCAL
+	bool
+
+config HAVE_CMPXCHG_DOUBLE
+	bool
+
+config ARCH_WEAK_RELEASE_ACQUIRE
+	bool
+
+config ARCH_WANT_IPC_PARSE_VERSION
+	bool
+
+config ARCH_WANT_COMPAT_IPC_PARSE_VERSION
+	bool
+
+config ARCH_WANT_OLD_COMPAT_IPC
+	select ARCH_WANT_COMPAT_IPC_PARSE_VERSION
+	bool
+
+config HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP
+	bool
+	help
+	  An arch should select this symbol to support seccomp mode 1 (the fixed
+	  syscall policy), and must provide an overrides for __NR_seccomp_sigreturn,
+	  and compat syscalls if the asm-generic/seccomp.h defaults need adjustment:
+	  - __NR_seccomp_read_32
+	  - __NR_seccomp_write_32
+	  - __NR_seccomp_exit_32
+	  - __NR_seccomp_sigreturn_32
+
+config HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER
+	bool
+	select HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP
+	help
+	  An arch should select this symbol if it provides all of these things:
+	  - all the requirements for HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP
+	  - syscall_get_arch()
+	  - syscall_get_arguments()
+	  - syscall_rollback()
+	  - syscall_set_return_value()
+	  - SIGSYS siginfo_t support
+	  - secure_computing is called from a ptrace_event()-safe context
+	  - secure_computing return value is checked and a return value of -1
+	    results in the system call being skipped immediately.
+	  - seccomp syscall wired up
+	  - if !HAVE_SPARSE_SYSCALL_NR, have SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE,
+	    SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE_NR, SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE_NAME defined. If
+	    COMPAT is supported, have the SECCOMP_ARCH_COMPAT* defines too.
+
+config SECCOMP
+	prompt "Enable seccomp to safely execute untrusted bytecode"
+	def_bool y
+	depends on HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP
+	help
+	  This kernel feature is useful for number crunching applications
+	  that may need to handle untrusted bytecode during their
+	  execution. By using pipes or other transports made available
+	  to the process as file descriptors supporting the read/write
+	  syscalls, it's possible to isolate those applications in their
+	  own address space using seccomp. Once seccomp is enabled via
+	  prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP) or the seccomp() syscall, it cannot be
+	  disabled and the task is only allowed to execute a few safe
+	  syscalls defined by each seccomp mode.
+
+	  If unsure, say Y.
+
+config SECCOMP_FILTER
+	def_bool y
+	depends on HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER && SECCOMP && NET
+	help
+	  Enable tasks to build secure computing environments defined
+	  in terms of Berkeley Packet Filter programs which implement
+	  task-defined system call filtering polices.
+
+	  See Documentation/userspace-api/seccomp_filter.rst for details.
+
+config SECCOMP_CACHE_DEBUG
+	bool "Show seccomp filter cache status in /proc/pid/seccomp_cache"
+	depends on SECCOMP_FILTER && !HAVE_SPARSE_SYSCALL_NR
+	depends on PROC_FS
+	help
+	  This enables the /proc/pid/seccomp_cache interface to monitor
+	  seccomp cache data. The file format is subject to change. Reading
+	  the file requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
+
+	  This option is for debugging only. Enabling presents the risk that
+	  an adversary may be able to infer the seccomp filter logic.
+
+	  If unsure, say N.
+
+config HAVE_ARCH_STACKLEAK
+	bool
+	help
+	  An architecture should select this if it has the code which
+	  fills the used part of the kernel stack with the STACKLEAK_POISON
+	  value before returning from system calls.
+
+config HAVE_STACKPROTECTOR
+	bool
+	help
+	  An arch should select this symbol if:
+	  - it has implemented a stack canary (e.g. __stack_chk_guard)
+
+config STACKPROTECTOR
+	bool "Stack Protector buffer overflow detection"
+	depends on HAVE_STACKPROTECTOR
+	depends on $(cc-option,-fstack-protector)
+	default y
+	help
+	  This option turns on the "stack-protector" GCC feature. This
+	  feature puts, at the beginning of functions, a canary value on
+	  the stack just before the return address, and validates
+	  the value just before actually returning.  Stack based buffer
+	  overflows (that need to overwrite this return address) now also
+	  overwrite the canary, which gets detected and the attack is then
+	  neutralized via a kernel panic.
+
+	  Functions will have the stack-protector canary logic added if they
+	  have an 8-byte or larger character array on the stack.
+
+	  This feature requires gcc version 4.2 or above, or a distribution
+	  gcc with the feature backported ("-fstack-protector").
+
+	  On an x86 "defconfig" build, this feature adds canary checks to
+	  about 3% of all kernel functions, which increases kernel code size
+	  by about 0.3%.
+
+config STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG
+	bool "Strong Stack Protector"
+	depends on STACKPROTECTOR
+	depends on $(cc-option,-fstack-protector-strong)
+	default y
+	help
+	  Functions will have the stack-protector canary logic added in any
+	  of the following conditions:
+
+	  - local variable's address used as part of the right hand side of an
+	    assignment or function argument
+	  - local variable is an array (or union containing an array),
+	    regardless of array type or length
+	  - uses register local variables
+
+	  This feature requires gcc version 4.9 or above, or a distribution
+	  gcc with the feature backported ("-fstack-protector-strong").
+
+	  On an x86 "defconfig" build, this feature adds canary checks to
+	  about 20% of all kernel functions, which increases the kernel code
+	  size by about 2%.
+
+config ARCH_SUPPORTS_SHADOW_CALL_STACK
+	bool
+	help
+	  An architecture should select this if it supports the compiler's
+	  Shadow Call Stack and implements runtime support for shadow stack
+	  switching.
+
+config SHADOW_CALL_STACK
+	bool "Shadow Call Stack"
+	depends on ARCH_SUPPORTS_SHADOW_CALL_STACK
+	depends on DYNAMIC_FTRACE_WITH_ARGS || DYNAMIC_FTRACE_WITH_REGS || !FUNCTION_GRAPH_TRACER
+	help
+	  This option enables the compiler's Shadow Call Stack, which
+	  uses a shadow stack to protect function return addresses from
+	  being overwritten by an attacker. More information can be found
+	  in the compiler's documentation:
+
+	  - Clang: https://clang.llvm.org/docs/ShadowCallStack.html
+	  - GCC: https://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc/Instrumentation-Options.html#Instrumentation-Options
+
+	  Note that security guarantees in the kernel differ from the
+	  ones documented for user space. The kernel must store addresses
+	  of shadow stacks in memory, which means an attacker capable of
+	  reading and writing arbitrary memory may be able to locate them
+	  and hijack control flow by modifying the stacks.
+
+config DYNAMIC_SCS
+	bool
+	help
+	  Set by the arch code if it relies on code patching to insert the
+	  shadow call stack push and pop instructions rather than on the
+	  compiler.
+
+config LTO
+	bool
+	help
+	  Selected if the kernel will be built using the compiler's LTO feature.
+
+config LTO_CLANG
+	bool
+	select LTO
+	help
+	  Selected if the kernel will be built using Clang's LTO feature.
+
+config ARCH_SUPPORTS_LTO_CLANG
+	bool
+	help
+	  An architecture should select this option if it supports:
+	  - compiling with Clang,
+	  - compiling inline assembly with Clang's integrated assembler,
+	  - and linking with LLD.
+
+config ARCH_SUPPORTS_LTO_CLANG_THIN
+	bool
+	help
+	  An architecture should select this option if it can support Clang's
+	  ThinLTO mode.
+
+config HAS_LTO_CLANG
+	def_bool y
+	depends on CC_IS_CLANG && LD_IS_LLD && AS_IS_LLVM
+	depends on $(success,$(NM) --help | head -n 1 | grep -qi llvm)
+	depends on $(success,$(AR) --help | head -n 1 | grep -qi llvm)
+	depends on ARCH_SUPPORTS_LTO_CLANG
+	depends on !FTRACE_MCOUNT_USE_RECORDMCOUNT
+	# https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/1721
+	depends on (!KASAN || KASAN_HW_TAGS || CLANG_VERSION >= 170000) || !DEBUG_INFO
+	depends on (!KCOV || CLANG_VERSION >= 170000) || !DEBUG_INFO
+	depends on !GCOV_KERNEL
+	help
+	  The compiler and Kconfig options support building with Clang's
+	  LTO.
+
+choice
+	prompt "Link Time Optimization (LTO)"
+	default LTO_NONE
+	help
+	  This option enables Link Time Optimization (LTO), which allows the
+	  compiler to optimize binaries globally.
+
+	  If unsure, select LTO_NONE. Note that LTO is very resource-intensive
+	  so it's disabled by default.
+
+config LTO_NONE
+	bool "None"
+	help
+	  Build the kernel normally, without Link Time Optimization (LTO).
+
+config LTO_CLANG_FULL
+	bool "Clang Full LTO (EXPERIMENTAL)"
+	depends on HAS_LTO_CLANG
+	depends on !COMPILE_TEST
+	select LTO_CLANG
+	help
+	  This option enables Clang's full Link Time Optimization (LTO), which
+	  allows the compiler to optimize the kernel globally. If you enable
+	  this option, the compiler generates LLVM bitcode instead of ELF
+	  object files, and the actual compilation from bitcode happens at
+	  the LTO link step, which may take several minutes depending on the
+	  kernel configuration. More information can be found from LLVM's
+	  documentation:
+
+	    https://llvm.org/docs/LinkTimeOptimization.html
+
+	  During link time, this option can use a large amount of RAM, and
+	  may take much longer than the ThinLTO option.
+
+config LTO_CLANG_THIN
+	bool "Clang ThinLTO (EXPERIMENTAL)"
+	depends on HAS_LTO_CLANG && ARCH_SUPPORTS_LTO_CLANG_THIN
+	select LTO_CLANG
+	help
+	  This option enables Clang's ThinLTO, which allows for parallel
+	  optimization and faster incremental compiles compared to the
+	  CONFIG_LTO_CLANG_FULL option. More information can be found
+	  from Clang's documentation:
+
+	    https://clang.llvm.org/docs/ThinLTO.html
+
+	  If unsure, say Y.
+endchoice
+
+config ARCH_SUPPORTS_CFI_CLANG
+	bool
+	help
+	  An architecture should select this option if it can support Clang's
+	  Control-Flow Integrity (CFI) checking.
+
+config ARCH_USES_CFI_TRAPS
+	bool
+
+config CFI_CLANG
+	bool "Use Clang's Control Flow Integrity (CFI)"
+	depends on ARCH_SUPPORTS_CFI_CLANG
+	depends on $(cc-option,-fsanitize=kcfi)
+	help
+	  This option enables Clang’s forward-edge Control Flow Integrity
+	  (CFI) checking, where the compiler injects a runtime check to each
+	  indirect function call to ensure the target is a valid function with
+	  the correct static type. This restricts possible call targets and
+	  makes it more difficult for an attacker to exploit bugs that allow
+	  the modification of stored function pointers. More information can be
+	  found from Clang's documentation:
+
+	    https://clang.llvm.org/docs/ControlFlowIntegrity.html
+
+config CFI_PERMISSIVE
+	bool "Use CFI in permissive mode"
+	depends on CFI_CLANG
+	help
+	  When selected, Control Flow Integrity (CFI) violations result in a
+	  warning instead of a kernel panic. This option should only be used
+	  for finding indirect call type mismatches during development.
+
+	  If unsure, say N.
+
+config HAVE_ARCH_WITHIN_STACK_FRAMES
+	bool
+	help
+	  An architecture should select this if it can walk the kernel stack
+	  frames to determine if an object is part of either the arguments
+	  or local variables (i.e. that it excludes saved return addresses,
+	  and similar) by implementing an inline arch_within_stack_frames(),
+	  which is used by CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY.
+
+config HAVE_CONTEXT_TRACKING_USER
+	bool
+	help
+	  Provide kernel/user boundaries probes necessary for subsystems
+	  that need it, such as userspace RCU extended quiescent state.
+	  Syscalls need to be wrapped inside user_exit()-user_enter(), either
+	  optimized behind static key or through the slow path using TIF_NOHZ
+	  flag. Exceptions handlers must be wrapped as well. Irqs are already
+	  protected inside ct_irq_enter/ct_irq_exit() but preemption or signal
+	  handling on irq exit still need to be protected.
+
+config HAVE_CONTEXT_TRACKING_USER_OFFSTACK
+	bool
+	help
+	  Architecture neither relies on exception_enter()/exception_exit()
+	  nor on schedule_user(). Also preempt_schedule_notrace() and
+	  preempt_schedule_irq() can't be called in a preemptible section
+	  while context tracking is CONTEXT_USER. This feature reflects a sane
+	  entry implementation where the following requirements are met on
+	  critical entry code, ie: before user_exit() or after user_enter():
+
+	  - Critical entry code isn't preemptible (or better yet:
+	    not interruptible).
+	  - No use of RCU read side critical sections, unless ct_nmi_enter()
+	    got called.
+	  - No use of instrumentation, unless instrumentation_begin() got
+	    called.
+
+config HAVE_TIF_NOHZ
+	bool
+	help
+	  Arch relies on TIF_NOHZ and syscall slow path to implement context
+	  tracking calls to user_enter()/user_exit().
+
+config HAVE_VIRT_CPU_ACCOUNTING
+	bool
+
+config HAVE_VIRT_CPU_ACCOUNTING_IDLE
+	bool
+	help
+	  Architecture has its own way to account idle CPU time and therefore
+	  doesn't implement vtime_account_idle().
+
+config ARCH_HAS_SCALED_CPUTIME
+	bool
+
+config HAVE_VIRT_CPU_ACCOUNTING_GEN
+	bool
+	default y if 64BIT
+	help
+	  With VIRT_CPU_ACCOUNTING_GEN, cputime_t becomes 64-bit.
+	  Before enabling this option, arch code must be audited
+	  to ensure there are no races in concurrent read/write of
+	  cputime_t. For example, reading/writing 64-bit cputime_t on
+	  some 32-bit arches may require multiple accesses, so proper
+	  locking is needed to protect against concurrent accesses.
+
+config HAVE_IRQ_TIME_ACCOUNTING
+	bool
+	help
+	  Archs need to ensure they use a high enough resolution clock to
+	  support irq time accounting and then call enable_sched_clock_irqtime().
+
+config HAVE_MOVE_PUD
+	bool
+	help
+	  Architectures that select this are able to move page tables at the
+	  PUD level. If there are only 3 page table levels, the move effectively
+	  happens at the PGD level.
+
+config HAVE_MOVE_PMD
+	bool
+	help
+	  Archs that select this are able to move page tables at the PMD level.
+
+config HAVE_ARCH_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE
+	bool
+
+config HAVE_ARCH_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE_PUD
+	bool
+
+config HAVE_ARCH_HUGE_VMAP
+	bool
+
+#
+#  Archs that select this would be capable of PMD-sized vmaps (i.e.,
+#  arch_vmap_pmd_supported() returns true). The VM_ALLOW_HUGE_VMAP flag
+#  must be used to enable allocations to use hugepages.
+#
+config HAVE_ARCH_HUGE_VMALLOC
+	depends on HAVE_ARCH_HUGE_VMAP
+	bool
+
+config ARCH_WANT_HUGE_PMD_SHARE
+	bool
+
+# Archs that want to use pmd_mkwrite on kernel memory need it defined even
+# if there are no userspace memory management features that use it
+config ARCH_WANT_KERNEL_PMD_MKWRITE
+	bool
+
+config ARCH_WANT_PMD_MKWRITE
+	def_bool TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE || ARCH_WANT_KERNEL_PMD_MKWRITE
+
+config HAVE_ARCH_SOFT_DIRTY
+	bool
+
+config HAVE_MOD_ARCH_SPECIFIC
+	bool
+	help
+	  The arch uses struct mod_arch_specific to store data.  Many arches
+	  just need a simple module loader without arch specific data - those
+	  should not enable this.
+
+config MODULES_USE_ELF_RELA
+	bool
+	help
+	  Modules only use ELF RELA relocations.  Modules with ELF REL
+	  relocations will give an error.
+
+config MODULES_USE_ELF_REL
+	bool
+	help
+	  Modules only use ELF REL relocations.  Modules with ELF RELA
+	  relocations will give an error.
+
+config ARCH_WANTS_MODULES_DATA_IN_VMALLOC
+	bool
+	help
+	  For architectures like powerpc/32 which have constraints on module
+	  allocation and need to allocate module data outside of module area.
+
+config HAVE_IRQ_EXIT_ON_IRQ_STACK
+	bool
+	help
+	  Architecture doesn't only execute the irq handler on the irq stack
+	  but also irq_exit(). This way we can process softirqs on this irq
+	  stack instead of switching to a new one when we call __do_softirq()
+	  in the end of an hardirq.
+	  This spares a stack switch and improves cache usage on softirq
+	  processing.
+
+config HAVE_SOFTIRQ_ON_OWN_STACK
+	bool
+	help
+	  Architecture provides a function to run __do_softirq() on a
+	  separate stack.
+
+config SOFTIRQ_ON_OWN_STACK
+	def_bool HAVE_SOFTIRQ_ON_OWN_STACK && !PREEMPT_RT
+
+config ALTERNATE_USER_ADDRESS_SPACE
+	bool
+	help
+	  Architectures set this when the CPU uses separate address
+	  spaces for kernel and user space pointers. In this case, the
+	  access_ok() check on a __user pointer is skipped.
+
+config PGTABLE_LEVELS
+	int
+	default 2
+
+config ARCH_HAS_ELF_RANDOMIZE
+	bool
+	help
+	  An architecture supports choosing randomized locations for
+	  stack, mmap, brk, and ET_DYN. Defined functions:
+	  - arch_mmap_rnd()
+	  - arch_randomize_brk()
+
+config HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS
+	bool
+	help
+	  An arch should select this symbol if it supports setting a variable
+	  number of bits for use in establishing the base address for mmap
+	  allocations, has MMU enabled and provides values for both:
+	  - ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_MIN
+	  - ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_MAX
+
+config HAVE_EXIT_THREAD
+	bool
+	help
+	  An architecture implements exit_thread.
+
+config ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_MIN
+	int
+
+config ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_MAX
+	int
+
+config ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_DEFAULT
+	int
+
+config ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS
+	int "Number of bits to use for ASLR of mmap base address" if EXPERT
+	range ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_MIN ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_MAX
+	default ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_DEFAULT if ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_DEFAULT
+	default ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_MIN
+	depends on HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS
+	help
+	  This value can be used to select the number of bits to use to
+	  determine the random offset to the base address of vma regions
+	  resulting from mmap allocations. This value will be bounded
+	  by the architecture's minimum and maximum supported values.
+
+	  This value can be changed after boot using the
+	  /proc/sys/vm/mmap_rnd_bits tunable
+
+config HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS
+	bool
+	help
+	  An arch should select this symbol if it supports running applications
+	  in compatibility mode, supports setting a variable number of bits for
+	  use in establishing the base address for mmap allocations, has MMU
+	  enabled and provides values for both:
+	  - ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS_MIN
+	  - ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS_MAX
+
+config ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS_MIN
+	int
+
+config ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS_MAX
+	int
+
+config ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS_DEFAULT
+	int
+
+config ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS
+	int "Number of bits to use for ASLR of mmap base address for compatible applications" if EXPERT
+	range ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS_MIN ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS_MAX
+	default ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS_DEFAULT if ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS_DEFAULT
+	default ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS_MIN
+	depends on HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS
+	help
+	  This value can be used to select the number of bits to use to
+	  determine the random offset to the base address of vma regions
+	  resulting from mmap allocations for compatible applications This
+	  value will be bounded by the architecture's minimum and maximum
+	  supported values.
+
+	  This value can be changed after boot using the
+	  /proc/sys/vm/mmap_rnd_compat_bits tunable
+
+config HAVE_ARCH_COMPAT_MMAP_BASES
+	bool
+	help
+	  This allows 64bit applications to invoke 32-bit mmap() syscall
+	  and vice-versa 32-bit applications to call 64-bit mmap().
+	  Required for applications doing different bitness syscalls.
+
+config PAGE_SIZE_LESS_THAN_64KB
+	def_bool y
+	depends on !ARM64_64K_PAGES
+	depends on !IA64_PAGE_SIZE_64KB
+	depends on !PAGE_SIZE_64KB
+	depends on !PARISC_PAGE_SIZE_64KB
+	depends on PAGE_SIZE_LESS_THAN_256KB
+
+config PAGE_SIZE_LESS_THAN_256KB
+	def_bool y
+	depends on !PAGE_SIZE_256KB
+
+# This allows to use a set of generic functions to determine mmap base
+# address by giving priority to top-down scheme only if the process
+# is not in legacy mode (compat task, unlimited stack size or
+# sysctl_legacy_va_layout).
+# Architecture that selects this option can provide its own version of:
+# - STACK_RND_MASK
+config ARCH_WANT_DEFAULT_TOPDOWN_MMAP_LAYOUT
+	bool
+	depends on MMU
+	select ARCH_HAS_ELF_RANDOMIZE
+
+config HAVE_OBJTOOL
+	bool
+
+config HAVE_JUMP_LABEL_HACK
+	bool
+
+config HAVE_NOINSTR_HACK
+	bool
+
+config HAVE_NOINSTR_VALIDATION
+	bool
+
+config HAVE_UACCESS_VALIDATION
+	bool
+	select OBJTOOL
+
+config HAVE_STACK_VALIDATION
+	bool
+	help
+	  Architecture supports objtool compile-time frame pointer rule
+	  validation.
+
+config HAVE_RELIABLE_STACKTRACE
+	bool
+	help
+	  Architecture has either save_stack_trace_tsk_reliable() or
+	  arch_stack_walk_reliable() function which only returns a stack trace
+	  if it can guarantee the trace is reliable.
+
+config HAVE_ARCH_HASH
+	bool
+	default n
+	help
+	  If this is set, the architecture provides an <asm/hash.h>
+	  file which provides platform-specific implementations of some
+	  functions in <linux/hash.h> or fs/namei.c.
+
+config HAVE_ARCH_NVRAM_OPS
+	bool
+
+config ISA_BUS_API
+	def_bool ISA
+
+#
+# ABI hall of shame
+#
+config CLONE_BACKWARDS
+	bool
+	help
+	  Architecture has tls passed as the 4th argument of clone(2),
+	  not the 5th one.
+
+config CLONE_BACKWARDS2
+	bool
+	help
+	  Architecture has the first two arguments of clone(2) swapped.
+
+config CLONE_BACKWARDS3
+	bool
+	help
+	  Architecture has tls passed as the 3rd argument of clone(2),
+	  not the 5th one.
+
+config ODD_RT_SIGACTION
+	bool
+	help
+	  Architecture has unusual rt_sigaction(2) arguments
+
+config OLD_SIGSUSPEND
+	bool
+	help
+	  Architecture has old sigsuspend(2) syscall, of one-argument variety
+
+config OLD_SIGSUSPEND3
+	bool
+	help
+	  Even weirder antique ABI - three-argument sigsuspend(2)
+
+config OLD_SIGACTION
+	bool
+	help
+	  Architecture has old sigaction(2) syscall.  Nope, not the same
+	  as OLD_SIGSUSPEND | OLD_SIGSUSPEND3 - alpha has sigsuspend(2),
+	  but fairly different variant of sigaction(2), thanks to OSF/1
+	  compatibility...
+
+config COMPAT_OLD_SIGACTION
+	bool
+
+config COMPAT_32BIT_TIME
+	bool "Provide system calls for 32-bit time_t"
+	default !64BIT || COMPAT
+	help
+	  This enables 32 bit time_t support in addition to 64 bit time_t support.
+	  This is relevant on all 32-bit architectures, and 64-bit architectures
+	  as part of compat syscall handling.
+
+config ARCH_NO_PREEMPT
+	bool
+
+config ARCH_SUPPORTS_RT
+	bool
+
+config CPU_NO_EFFICIENT_FFS
+	def_bool n
+
+config HAVE_ARCH_VMAP_STACK
+	def_bool n
+	help
+	  An arch should select this symbol if it can support kernel stacks
+	  in vmalloc space.  This means:
+
+	  - vmalloc space must be large enough to hold many kernel stacks.
+	    This may rule out many 32-bit architectures.
+
+	  - Stacks in vmalloc space need to work reliably.  For example, if
+	    vmap page tables are created on demand, either this mechanism
+	    needs to work while the stack points to a virtual address with
+	    unpopulated page tables or arch code (switch_to() and switch_mm(),
+	    most likely) needs to ensure that the stack's page table entries
+	    are populated before running on a possibly unpopulated stack.
+
+	  - If the stack overflows into a guard page, something reasonable
+	    should happen.  The definition of "reasonable" is flexible, but
+	    instantly rebooting without logging anything would be unfriendly.
+
+config VMAP_STACK
+	default y
+	bool "Use a virtually-mapped stack"
+	depends on HAVE_ARCH_VMAP_STACK
+	depends on !KASAN || KASAN_HW_TAGS || KASAN_VMALLOC
+	help
+	  Enable this if you want the use virtually-mapped kernel stacks
+	  with guard pages.  This causes kernel stack overflows to be
+	  caught immediately rather than causing difficult-to-diagnose
+	  corruption.
+
+	  To use this with software KASAN modes, the architecture must support
+	  backing virtual mappings with real shadow memory, and KASAN_VMALLOC
+	  must be enabled.
+
+config HAVE_ARCH_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET
+	def_bool n
+	help
+	  An arch should select this symbol if it can support kernel stack
+	  offset randomization with calls to add_random_kstack_offset()
+	  during syscall entry and choose_random_kstack_offset() during
+	  syscall exit. Careful removal of -fstack-protector-strong and
+	  -fstack-protector should also be applied to the entry code and
+	  closely examined, as the artificial stack bump looks like an array
+	  to the compiler, so it will attempt to add canary checks regardless
+	  of the static branch state.
+
+config RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET
+	bool "Support for randomizing kernel stack offset on syscall entry" if EXPERT
+	default y
+	depends on HAVE_ARCH_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET
+	depends on INIT_STACK_NONE || !CC_IS_CLANG || CLANG_VERSION >= 140000
+	help
+	  The kernel stack offset can be randomized (after pt_regs) by
+	  roughly 5 bits of entropy, frustrating memory corruption
+	  attacks that depend on stack address determinism or
+	  cross-syscall address exposures.
+
+	  The feature is controlled via the "randomize_kstack_offset=on/off"
+	  kernel boot param, and if turned off has zero overhead due to its use
+	  of static branches (see JUMP_LABEL).
+
+	  If unsure, say Y.
+
+config RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET_DEFAULT
+	bool "Default state of kernel stack offset randomization"
+	depends on RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET
+	help
+	  Kernel stack offset randomization is controlled by kernel boot param
+	  "randomize_kstack_offset=on/off", and this config chooses the default
+	  boot state.
+
+config ARCH_OPTIONAL_KERNEL_RWX
+	def_bool n
+
+config ARCH_OPTIONAL_KERNEL_RWX_DEFAULT
+	def_bool n
+
+config ARCH_HAS_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX
+	def_bool n
+
+config STRICT_KERNEL_RWX
+	bool "Make kernel text and rodata read-only" if ARCH_OPTIONAL_KERNEL_RWX
+	depends on ARCH_HAS_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX
+	default !ARCH_OPTIONAL_KERNEL_RWX || ARCH_OPTIONAL_KERNEL_RWX_DEFAULT
+	help
+	  If this is set, kernel text and rodata memory will be made read-only,
+	  and non-text memory will be made non-executable. This provides
+	  protection against certain security exploits (e.g. executing the heap
+	  or modifying text)
+
+	  These features are considered standard security practice these days.
+	  You should say Y here in almost all cases.
+
+config ARCH_HAS_STRICT_MODULE_RWX
+	def_bool n
+
+config STRICT_MODULE_RWX
+	bool "Set loadable kernel module data as NX and text as RO" if ARCH_OPTIONAL_KERNEL_RWX
+	depends on ARCH_HAS_STRICT_MODULE_RWX && MODULES
+	default !ARCH_OPTIONAL_KERNEL_RWX || ARCH_OPTIONAL_KERNEL_RWX_DEFAULT
+	help
+	  If this is set, module text and rodata memory will be made read-only,
+	  and non-text memory will be made non-executable. This provides
+	  protection against certain security exploits (e.g. writing to text)
+
+# select if the architecture provides an asm/dma-direct.h header
+config ARCH_HAS_PHYS_TO_DMA
+	bool
+
+config HAVE_ARCH_COMPILER_H
+	bool
+	help
+	  An architecture can select this if it provides an
+	  asm/compiler.h header that should be included after
+	  linux/compiler-*.h in order to override macro definitions that those
+	  headers generally provide.
+
+config HAVE_ARCH_PREL32_RELOCATIONS
+	bool
+	help
+	  May be selected by an architecture if it supports place-relative
+	  32-bit relocations, both in the toolchain and in the module loader,
+	  in which case relative references can be used in special sections
+	  for PCI fixup, initcalls etc which are only half the size on 64 bit
+	  architectures, and don't require runtime relocation on relocatable
+	  kernels.
+
+config ARCH_USE_MEMREMAP_PROT
+	bool
+
+config LOCK_EVENT_COUNTS
+	bool "Locking event counts collection"
+	depends on DEBUG_FS
+	help
+	  Enable light-weight counting of various locking related events
+	  in the system with minimal performance impact. This reduces
+	  the chance of application behavior change because of timing
+	  differences. The counts are reported via debugfs.
+
+# Select if the architecture has support for applying RELR relocations.
+config ARCH_HAS_RELR
+	bool
+
+config RELR
+	bool "Use RELR relocation packing"
+	depends on ARCH_HAS_RELR && TOOLS_SUPPORT_RELR
+	default y
+	help
+	  Store the kernel's dynamic relocations in the RELR relocation packing
+	  format. Requires a compatible linker (LLD supports this feature), as
+	  well as compatible NM and OBJCOPY utilities (llvm-nm and llvm-objcopy
+	  are compatible).
+
+config ARCH_HAS_MEM_ENCRYPT
+	bool
+
+config ARCH_HAS_CC_PLATFORM
+	bool
+
+config HAVE_SPARSE_SYSCALL_NR
+	bool
+	help
+	  An architecture should select this if its syscall numbering is sparse
+	  to save space. For example, MIPS architecture has a syscall array with
+	  entries at 4000, 5000 and 6000 locations. This option turns on syscall
+	  related optimizations for a given architecture.
+
+config ARCH_HAS_VDSO_DATA
+	bool
+
+config HAVE_STATIC_CALL
+	bool
+
+config HAVE_STATIC_CALL_INLINE
+	bool
+	depends on HAVE_STATIC_CALL
+	select OBJTOOL
+
+config HAVE_PREEMPT_DYNAMIC
+	bool
+
+config HAVE_PREEMPT_DYNAMIC_CALL
+	bool
+	depends on HAVE_STATIC_CALL
+	select HAVE_PREEMPT_DYNAMIC
+	help
+	  An architecture should select this if it can handle the preemption
+	  model being selected at boot time using static calls.
+
+	  Where an architecture selects HAVE_STATIC_CALL_INLINE, any call to a
+	  preemption function will be patched directly.
+
+	  Where an architecture does not select HAVE_STATIC_CALL_INLINE, any
+	  call to a preemption function will go through a trampoline, and the
+	  trampoline will be patched.
+
+	  It is strongly advised to support inline static call to avoid any
+	  overhead.
+
+config HAVE_PREEMPT_DYNAMIC_KEY
+	bool
+	depends on HAVE_ARCH_JUMP_LABEL
+	select HAVE_PREEMPT_DYNAMIC
+	help
+	  An architecture should select this if it can handle the preemption
+	  model being selected at boot time using static keys.
+
+	  Each preemption function will be given an early return based on a
+	  static key. This should have slightly lower overhead than non-inline
+	  static calls, as this effectively inlines each trampoline into the
+	  start of its callee. This may avoid redundant work, and may
+	  integrate better with CFI schemes.
+
+	  This will have greater overhead than using inline static calls as
+	  the call to the preemption function cannot be entirely elided.
+
+config ARCH_WANT_LD_ORPHAN_WARN
+	bool
+	help
+	  An arch should select this symbol once all linker sections are explicitly
+	  included, size-asserted, or discarded in the linker scripts. This is
+	  important because we never want expected sections to be placed heuristically
+	  by the linker, since the locations of such sections can change between linker
+	  versions.
+
+config HAVE_ARCH_PFN_VALID
+	bool
+
+config ARCH_SUPPORTS_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
+	bool
+
+config ARCH_SUPPORTS_PAGE_TABLE_CHECK
+	bool
+
+config ARCH_SPLIT_ARG64
+	bool
+	help
+	  If a 32-bit architecture requires 64-bit arguments to be split into
+	  pairs of 32-bit arguments, select this option.
+
+config ARCH_HAS_ELFCORE_COMPAT
+	bool
+
+config ARCH_HAS_PARANOID_L1D_FLUSH
+	bool
+
+config ARCH_HAVE_TRACE_MMIO_ACCESS
+	bool
+
+config DYNAMIC_SIGFRAME
+	bool
+
+# Select, if arch has a named attribute group bound to NUMA device nodes.
+config HAVE_ARCH_NODE_DEV_GROUP
+	bool
+
+config ARCH_HAS_NONLEAF_PMD_YOUNG
+	bool
+	help
+	  Architectures that select this option are capable of setting the
+	  accessed bit in non-leaf PMD entries when using them as part of linear
+	  address translations. Page table walkers that clear the accessed bit
+	  may use this capability to reduce their search space.
+
+source "kernel/gcov/Kconfig"
+
+source "scripts/gcc-plugins/Kconfig"
+
+config FUNCTION_ALIGNMENT_4B
+	bool
+
+config FUNCTION_ALIGNMENT_8B
+	bool
+
+config FUNCTION_ALIGNMENT_16B
+	bool
+
+config FUNCTION_ALIGNMENT_32B
+	bool
+
+config FUNCTION_ALIGNMENT_64B
+	bool
+
+config FUNCTION_ALIGNMENT
+	int
+	default 64 if FUNCTION_ALIGNMENT_64B
+	default 32 if FUNCTION_ALIGNMENT_32B
+	default 16 if FUNCTION_ALIGNMENT_16B
+	default 8 if FUNCTION_ALIGNMENT_8B
+	default 4 if FUNCTION_ALIGNMENT_4B
+	default 0
+
+endmenu