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authorDaniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>2024-04-11 08:27:49 +0000
committerDaniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>2024-04-11 08:27:49 +0000
commitace9429bb58fd418f0c81d4c2835699bddf6bde6 (patch)
treeb2d64bc10158fdd5497876388cd68142ca374ed3 /arch/arm64/kvm/fpsimd.c
parentInitial commit. (diff)
downloadlinux-ace9429bb58fd418f0c81d4c2835699bddf6bde6.tar.xz
linux-ace9429bb58fd418f0c81d4c2835699bddf6bde6.zip
Adding upstream version 6.6.15.upstream/6.6.15
Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/arm64/kvm/fpsimd.c')
-rw-r--r--arch/arm64/kvm/fpsimd.c224
1 files changed, 224 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/fpsimd.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/fpsimd.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..8c1d0d4853
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/fpsimd.c
@@ -0,0 +1,224 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * arch/arm64/kvm/fpsimd.c: Guest/host FPSIMD context coordination helpers
+ *
+ * Copyright 2018 Arm Limited
+ * Author: Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>
+ */
+#include <linux/irqflags.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/kvm_host.h>
+#include <asm/fpsimd.h>
+#include <asm/kvm_asm.h>
+#include <asm/kvm_hyp.h>
+#include <asm/kvm_mmu.h>
+#include <asm/sysreg.h>
+
+void kvm_vcpu_unshare_task_fp(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ struct task_struct *p = vcpu->arch.parent_task;
+ struct user_fpsimd_state *fpsimd;
+
+ if (!is_protected_kvm_enabled() || !p)
+ return;
+
+ fpsimd = &p->thread.uw.fpsimd_state;
+ kvm_unshare_hyp(fpsimd, fpsimd + 1);
+ put_task_struct(p);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Called on entry to KVM_RUN unless this vcpu previously ran at least
+ * once and the most recent prior KVM_RUN for this vcpu was called from
+ * the same task as current (highly likely).
+ *
+ * This is guaranteed to execute before kvm_arch_vcpu_load_fp(vcpu),
+ * such that on entering hyp the relevant parts of current are already
+ * mapped.
+ */
+int kvm_arch_vcpu_run_map_fp(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ struct user_fpsimd_state *fpsimd = &current->thread.uw.fpsimd_state;
+
+ kvm_vcpu_unshare_task_fp(vcpu);
+
+ /* Make sure the host task fpsimd state is visible to hyp: */
+ ret = kvm_share_hyp(fpsimd, fpsimd + 1);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ vcpu->arch.host_fpsimd_state = kern_hyp_va(fpsimd);
+
+ /*
+ * We need to keep current's task_struct pinned until its data has been
+ * unshared with the hypervisor to make sure it is not re-used by the
+ * kernel and donated to someone else while already shared -- see
+ * kvm_vcpu_unshare_task_fp() for the matching put_task_struct().
+ */
+ if (is_protected_kvm_enabled()) {
+ get_task_struct(current);
+ vcpu->arch.parent_task = current;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Prepare vcpu for saving the host's FPSIMD state and loading the guest's.
+ * The actual loading is done by the FPSIMD access trap taken to hyp.
+ *
+ * Here, we just set the correct metadata to indicate that the FPSIMD
+ * state in the cpu regs (if any) belongs to current on the host.
+ */
+void kvm_arch_vcpu_load_fp(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ BUG_ON(!current->mm);
+
+ if (!system_supports_fpsimd())
+ return;
+
+ fpsimd_kvm_prepare();
+
+ /*
+ * We will check TIF_FOREIGN_FPSTATE just before entering the
+ * guest in kvm_arch_vcpu_ctxflush_fp() and override this to
+ * FP_STATE_FREE if the flag set.
+ */
+ vcpu->arch.fp_state = FP_STATE_HOST_OWNED;
+
+ vcpu_clear_flag(vcpu, HOST_SVE_ENABLED);
+ if (read_sysreg(cpacr_el1) & CPACR_EL1_ZEN_EL0EN)
+ vcpu_set_flag(vcpu, HOST_SVE_ENABLED);
+
+ if (system_supports_sme()) {
+ vcpu_clear_flag(vcpu, HOST_SME_ENABLED);
+ if (read_sysreg(cpacr_el1) & CPACR_EL1_SMEN_EL0EN)
+ vcpu_set_flag(vcpu, HOST_SME_ENABLED);
+
+ /*
+ * If PSTATE.SM is enabled then save any pending FP
+ * state and disable PSTATE.SM. If we leave PSTATE.SM
+ * enabled and the guest does not enable SME via
+ * CPACR_EL1.SMEN then operations that should be valid
+ * may generate SME traps from EL1 to EL1 which we
+ * can't intercept and which would confuse the guest.
+ *
+ * Do the same for PSTATE.ZA in the case where there
+ * is state in the registers which has not already
+ * been saved, this is very unlikely to happen.
+ */
+ if (read_sysreg_s(SYS_SVCR) & (SVCR_SM_MASK | SVCR_ZA_MASK)) {
+ vcpu->arch.fp_state = FP_STATE_FREE;
+ fpsimd_save_and_flush_cpu_state();
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Called just before entering the guest once we are no longer preemptable
+ * and interrupts are disabled. If we have managed to run anything using
+ * FP while we were preemptible (such as off the back of an interrupt),
+ * then neither the host nor the guest own the FP hardware (and it was the
+ * responsibility of the code that used FP to save the existing state).
+ */
+void kvm_arch_vcpu_ctxflush_fp(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ if (test_thread_flag(TIF_FOREIGN_FPSTATE))
+ vcpu->arch.fp_state = FP_STATE_FREE;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Called just after exiting the guest. If the guest FPSIMD state
+ * was loaded, update the host's context tracking data mark the CPU
+ * FPSIMD regs as dirty and belonging to vcpu so that they will be
+ * written back if the kernel clobbers them due to kernel-mode NEON
+ * before re-entry into the guest.
+ */
+void kvm_arch_vcpu_ctxsync_fp(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ struct cpu_fp_state fp_state;
+
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(!irqs_disabled());
+
+ if (vcpu->arch.fp_state == FP_STATE_GUEST_OWNED) {
+
+ /*
+ * Currently we do not support SME guests so SVCR is
+ * always 0 and we just need a variable to point to.
+ */
+ fp_state.st = &vcpu->arch.ctxt.fp_regs;
+ fp_state.sve_state = vcpu->arch.sve_state;
+ fp_state.sve_vl = vcpu->arch.sve_max_vl;
+ fp_state.sme_state = NULL;
+ fp_state.svcr = &vcpu->arch.svcr;
+ fp_state.fp_type = &vcpu->arch.fp_type;
+
+ if (vcpu_has_sve(vcpu))
+ fp_state.to_save = FP_STATE_SVE;
+ else
+ fp_state.to_save = FP_STATE_FPSIMD;
+
+ fpsimd_bind_state_to_cpu(&fp_state);
+
+ clear_thread_flag(TIF_FOREIGN_FPSTATE);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Write back the vcpu FPSIMD regs if they are dirty, and invalidate the
+ * cpu FPSIMD regs so that they can't be spuriously reused if this vcpu
+ * disappears and another task or vcpu appears that recycles the same
+ * struct fpsimd_state.
+ */
+void kvm_arch_vcpu_put_fp(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ unsigned long flags;
+
+ local_irq_save(flags);
+
+ /*
+ * If we have VHE then the Hyp code will reset CPACR_EL1 to
+ * the default value and we need to reenable SME.
+ */
+ if (has_vhe() && system_supports_sme()) {
+ /* Also restore EL0 state seen on entry */
+ if (vcpu_get_flag(vcpu, HOST_SME_ENABLED))
+ sysreg_clear_set(CPACR_EL1, 0,
+ CPACR_EL1_SMEN_EL0EN |
+ CPACR_EL1_SMEN_EL1EN);
+ else
+ sysreg_clear_set(CPACR_EL1,
+ CPACR_EL1_SMEN_EL0EN,
+ CPACR_EL1_SMEN_EL1EN);
+ isb();
+ }
+
+ if (vcpu->arch.fp_state == FP_STATE_GUEST_OWNED) {
+ if (vcpu_has_sve(vcpu)) {
+ __vcpu_sys_reg(vcpu, ZCR_EL1) = read_sysreg_el1(SYS_ZCR);
+
+ /* Restore the VL that was saved when bound to the CPU */
+ if (!has_vhe())
+ sve_cond_update_zcr_vq(vcpu_sve_max_vq(vcpu) - 1,
+ SYS_ZCR_EL1);
+ }
+
+ fpsimd_save_and_flush_cpu_state();
+ } else if (has_vhe() && system_supports_sve()) {
+ /*
+ * The FPSIMD/SVE state in the CPU has not been touched, and we
+ * have SVE (and VHE): CPACR_EL1 (alias CPTR_EL2) has been
+ * reset by kvm_reset_cptr_el2() in the Hyp code, disabling SVE
+ * for EL0. To avoid spurious traps, restore the trap state
+ * seen by kvm_arch_vcpu_load_fp():
+ */
+ if (vcpu_get_flag(vcpu, HOST_SVE_ENABLED))
+ sysreg_clear_set(CPACR_EL1, 0, CPACR_EL1_ZEN_EL0EN);
+ else
+ sysreg_clear_set(CPACR_EL1, CPACR_EL1_ZEN_EL0EN, 0);
+ }
+
+ local_irq_restore(flags);
+}