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author | Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org> | 2024-05-18 18:50:12 +0000 |
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committer | Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org> | 2024-05-18 18:50:12 +0000 |
commit | 8665bd53f2f2e27e5511d90428cb3f60e6d0ce15 (patch) | |
tree | 8d58900dc0ebd4a3011f92c128d2fe45bc7c4bf2 /arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | |
parent | Adding debian version 6.7.12-1. (diff) | |
download | linux-8665bd53f2f2e27e5511d90428cb3f60e6d0ce15.tar.xz linux-8665bd53f2f2e27e5511d90428cb3f60e6d0ce15.zip |
Merging upstream version 6.8.9.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c')
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 122 |
1 files changed, 62 insertions, 60 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c index 97ea52a4e8..46603c6e40 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c @@ -66,6 +66,7 @@ #include <asm/set_memory.h> #include <asm/traps.h> #include <asm/sev.h> +#include <asm/tdx.h> #include "cpu.h" @@ -188,45 +189,37 @@ DEFINE_PER_CPU_PAGE_ALIGNED(struct gdt_page, gdt_page) = { .gdt = { * TLS descriptors are currently at a different place compared to i386. * Hopefully nobody expects them at a fixed place (Wine?) */ - [GDT_ENTRY_KERNEL32_CS] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(0xc09b, 0, 0xfffff), - [GDT_ENTRY_KERNEL_CS] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(0xa09b, 0, 0xfffff), - [GDT_ENTRY_KERNEL_DS] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(0xc093, 0, 0xfffff), - [GDT_ENTRY_DEFAULT_USER32_CS] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(0xc0fb, 0, 0xfffff), - [GDT_ENTRY_DEFAULT_USER_DS] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(0xc0f3, 0, 0xfffff), - [GDT_ENTRY_DEFAULT_USER_CS] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(0xa0fb, 0, 0xfffff), + [GDT_ENTRY_KERNEL32_CS] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(DESC_CODE32, 0, 0xfffff), + [GDT_ENTRY_KERNEL_CS] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(DESC_CODE64, 0, 0xfffff), + [GDT_ENTRY_KERNEL_DS] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(DESC_DATA64, 0, 0xfffff), + [GDT_ENTRY_DEFAULT_USER32_CS] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(DESC_CODE32 | DESC_USER, 0, 0xfffff), + [GDT_ENTRY_DEFAULT_USER_DS] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(DESC_DATA64 | DESC_USER, 0, 0xfffff), + [GDT_ENTRY_DEFAULT_USER_CS] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(DESC_CODE64 | DESC_USER, 0, 0xfffff), #else - [GDT_ENTRY_KERNEL_CS] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(0xc09a, 0, 0xfffff), - [GDT_ENTRY_KERNEL_DS] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(0xc092, 0, 0xfffff), - [GDT_ENTRY_DEFAULT_USER_CS] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(0xc0fa, 0, 0xfffff), - [GDT_ENTRY_DEFAULT_USER_DS] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(0xc0f2, 0, 0xfffff), + [GDT_ENTRY_KERNEL_CS] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(DESC_CODE32, 0, 0xfffff), + [GDT_ENTRY_KERNEL_DS] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(DESC_DATA32, 0, 0xfffff), + [GDT_ENTRY_DEFAULT_USER_CS] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(DESC_CODE32 | DESC_USER, 0, 0xfffff), + [GDT_ENTRY_DEFAULT_USER_DS] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(DESC_DATA32 | DESC_USER, 0, 0xfffff), /* * Segments used for calling PnP BIOS have byte granularity. * They code segments and data segments have fixed 64k limits, * the transfer segment sizes are set at run time. */ - /* 32-bit code */ - [GDT_ENTRY_PNPBIOS_CS32] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(0x409a, 0, 0xffff), - /* 16-bit code */ - [GDT_ENTRY_PNPBIOS_CS16] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(0x009a, 0, 0xffff), - /* 16-bit data */ - [GDT_ENTRY_PNPBIOS_DS] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(0x0092, 0, 0xffff), - /* 16-bit data */ - [GDT_ENTRY_PNPBIOS_TS1] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(0x0092, 0, 0), - /* 16-bit data */ - [GDT_ENTRY_PNPBIOS_TS2] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(0x0092, 0, 0), + [GDT_ENTRY_PNPBIOS_CS32] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(DESC_CODE32_BIOS, 0, 0xffff), + [GDT_ENTRY_PNPBIOS_CS16] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(DESC_CODE16, 0, 0xffff), + [GDT_ENTRY_PNPBIOS_DS] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(DESC_DATA16, 0, 0xffff), + [GDT_ENTRY_PNPBIOS_TS1] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(DESC_DATA16, 0, 0), + [GDT_ENTRY_PNPBIOS_TS2] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(DESC_DATA16, 0, 0), /* * The APM segments have byte granularity and their bases * are set at run time. All have 64k limits. */ - /* 32-bit code */ - [GDT_ENTRY_APMBIOS_BASE] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(0x409a, 0, 0xffff), - /* 16-bit code */ - [GDT_ENTRY_APMBIOS_BASE+1] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(0x009a, 0, 0xffff), - /* data */ - [GDT_ENTRY_APMBIOS_BASE+2] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(0x4092, 0, 0xffff), - - [GDT_ENTRY_ESPFIX_SS] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(0xc092, 0, 0xfffff), - [GDT_ENTRY_PERCPU] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(0xc092, 0, 0xfffff), + [GDT_ENTRY_APMBIOS_BASE] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(DESC_CODE32_BIOS, 0, 0xffff), + [GDT_ENTRY_APMBIOS_BASE+1] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(DESC_CODE16, 0, 0xffff), + [GDT_ENTRY_APMBIOS_BASE+2] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(DESC_DATA32_BIOS, 0, 0xffff), + + [GDT_ENTRY_ESPFIX_SS] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(DESC_DATA32, 0, 0xfffff), + [GDT_ENTRY_PERCPU] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(DESC_DATA32, 0, 0xfffff), #endif } }; EXPORT_PER_CPU_SYMBOL_GPL(gdt_page); @@ -1170,6 +1163,7 @@ static void identify_cpu_without_cpuid(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) #define NO_SPECTRE_V2 BIT(8) #define NO_MMIO BIT(9) #define NO_EIBRS_PBRSB BIT(10) +#define NO_BHI BIT(11) #define VULNWL(vendor, family, model, whitelist) \ X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL(vendor, family, model, whitelist) @@ -1232,18 +1226,18 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_whitelist[] = { VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_TREMONT_D, NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_EIBRS_PBRSB), /* AMD Family 0xf - 0x12 */ - VULNWL_AMD(0x0f, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO), - VULNWL_AMD(0x10, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO), - VULNWL_AMD(0x11, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO), - VULNWL_AMD(0x12, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO), + VULNWL_AMD(0x0f, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO | NO_BHI), + VULNWL_AMD(0x10, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO | NO_BHI), + VULNWL_AMD(0x11, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO | NO_BHI), + VULNWL_AMD(0x12, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO | NO_BHI), /* FAMILY_ANY must be last, otherwise 0x0f - 0x12 matches won't work */ - VULNWL_AMD(X86_FAMILY_ANY, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO | NO_EIBRS_PBRSB), - VULNWL_HYGON(X86_FAMILY_ANY, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO | NO_EIBRS_PBRSB), + VULNWL_AMD(X86_FAMILY_ANY, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO | NO_EIBRS_PBRSB | NO_BHI), + VULNWL_HYGON(X86_FAMILY_ANY, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO | NO_EIBRS_PBRSB | NO_BHI), /* Zhaoxin Family 7 */ - VULNWL(CENTAUR, 7, X86_MODEL_ANY, NO_SPECTRE_V2 | NO_SWAPGS | NO_MMIO), - VULNWL(ZHAOXIN, 7, X86_MODEL_ANY, NO_SPECTRE_V2 | NO_SWAPGS | NO_MMIO), + VULNWL(CENTAUR, 7, X86_MODEL_ANY, NO_SPECTRE_V2 | NO_SWAPGS | NO_MMIO | NO_BHI), + VULNWL(ZHAOXIN, 7, X86_MODEL_ANY, NO_SPECTRE_V2 | NO_SWAPGS | NO_MMIO | NO_BHI), {} }; @@ -1333,25 +1327,25 @@ static bool __init cpu_matches(const struct x86_cpu_id *table, unsigned long whi u64 x86_read_arch_cap_msr(void) { - u64 ia32_cap = 0; + u64 x86_arch_cap_msr = 0; if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES)) - rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES, ia32_cap); + rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES, x86_arch_cap_msr); - return ia32_cap; + return x86_arch_cap_msr; } -static bool arch_cap_mmio_immune(u64 ia32_cap) +static bool arch_cap_mmio_immune(u64 x86_arch_cap_msr) { - return (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_FBSDP_NO && - ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_PSDP_NO && - ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_SBDR_SSDP_NO); + return (x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_FBSDP_NO && + x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_PSDP_NO && + x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_SBDR_SSDP_NO); } -static bool __init vulnerable_to_rfds(u64 ia32_cap) +static bool __init vulnerable_to_rfds(u64 x86_arch_cap_msr) { /* The "immunity" bit trumps everything else: */ - if (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_RFDS_NO) + if (x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_RFDS_NO) return false; /* @@ -1359,7 +1353,7 @@ static bool __init vulnerable_to_rfds(u64 ia32_cap) * indicate that mitigation is needed because guest is running on a * vulnerable hardware or may migrate to such hardware: */ - if (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_RFDS_CLEAR) + if (x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_RFDS_CLEAR) return true; /* Only consult the blacklist when there is no enumeration: */ @@ -1368,11 +1362,11 @@ static bool __init vulnerable_to_rfds(u64 ia32_cap) static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) { - u64 ia32_cap = x86_read_arch_cap_msr(); + u64 x86_arch_cap_msr = x86_read_arch_cap_msr(); /* Set ITLB_MULTIHIT bug if cpu is not in the whitelist and not mitigated */ if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT) && - !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_PSCHANGE_MC_NO)) + !(x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_PSCHANGE_MC_NO)) setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT); if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_SPECULATION)) @@ -1384,7 +1378,7 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2); if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_SSB) && - !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_SSB_NO) && + !(x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_SSB_NO) && !cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSB_NO)) setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS); @@ -1392,15 +1386,15 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) * AMD's AutoIBRS is equivalent to Intel's eIBRS - use the Intel feature * flag and protect from vendor-specific bugs via the whitelist. */ - if ((ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_IBRS_ALL) || cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AUTOIBRS)) { + if ((x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_IBRS_ALL) || cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AUTOIBRS)) { setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED); if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_EIBRS_PBRSB) && - !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_PBRSB_NO)) + !(x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_PBRSB_NO)) setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_EIBRS_PBRSB); } if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MDS) && - !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO)) { + !(x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO)) { setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MDS); if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, MSBDS_ONLY)) setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY); @@ -1419,9 +1413,9 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) * TSX_CTRL check alone is not sufficient for cases when the microcode * update is not present or running as guest that don't get TSX_CTRL. */ - if (!(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_TAA_NO) && + if (!(x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_TAA_NO) && (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_RTM) || - (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR))) + (x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR))) setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_TAA); /* @@ -1447,7 +1441,7 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) * Set X86_BUG_MMIO_UNKNOWN for CPUs that are neither in the blacklist, * nor in the whitelist and also don't enumerate MSR ARCH_CAP MMIO bits. */ - if (!arch_cap_mmio_immune(ia32_cap)) { + if (!arch_cap_mmio_immune(x86_arch_cap_msr)) { if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, MMIO)) setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA); else if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MMIO)) @@ -1455,7 +1449,7 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) } if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_BTC_NO)) { - if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, RETBLEED) || (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_RSBA)) + if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, RETBLEED) || (x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_RSBA)) setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_RETBLEED); } @@ -1473,18 +1467,25 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) * disabling AVX2. The only way to do this in HW is to clear XCR0[2], * which means that AVX will be disabled. */ - if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, GDS) && !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_GDS_NO) && + if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, GDS) && !(x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_GDS_NO) && boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AVX)) setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_GDS); - if (vulnerable_to_rfds(ia32_cap)) + if (vulnerable_to_rfds(x86_arch_cap_msr)) setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_RFDS); + /* When virtualized, eIBRS could be hidden, assume vulnerable */ + if (!(x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_BHI_NO) && + !cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_BHI) && + (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED) || + boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR))) + setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_BHI); + if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MELTDOWN)) return; /* Rogue Data Cache Load? No! */ - if (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_RDCL_NO) + if (x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_RDCL_NO) return; setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN); @@ -2026,6 +2027,7 @@ static __init void identify_boot_cpu(void) setup_cr_pinning(); tsx_init(); + tdx_init(); lkgs_init(); } |