Adding upstream version 6.6.15.upstream/6.6.15

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

1 files changed, 666 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pti.c b/arch/x86/mm/pti.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..78414c6d1b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/pti.c
@@ -0,0 +1,666 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Copyright(c) 2017 Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This code is based in part on work published here:
+ *
+ *	https://github.com/IAIK/KAISER
+ *
+ * The original work was written by and and signed off by for the Linux
+ * kernel by:
+ *
+ *   Signed-off-by: Richard Fellner <richard.fellner@student.tugraz.at>
+ *   Signed-off-by: Moritz Lipp <moritz.lipp@iaik.tugraz.at>
+ *   Signed-off-by: Daniel Gruss <daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at>
+ *   Signed-off-by: Michael Schwarz <michael.schwarz@iaik.tugraz.at>
+ *
+ * Major changes to the original code by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
+ * Mostly rewritten by Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> and
+ *		       Andy Lutomirsky <luto@amacapital.net>
+ */
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/bug.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/cpu.h>
+
+#include <asm/cpufeature.h>
+#include <asm/hypervisor.h>
+#include <asm/vsyscall.h>
+#include <asm/cmdline.h>
+#include <asm/pti.h>
+#include <asm/tlbflush.h>
+#include <asm/desc.h>
+#include <asm/sections.h>
+#include <asm/set_memory.h>
+
+#undef pr_fmt
+#define pr_fmt(fmt)     "Kernel/User page tables isolation: " fmt
+
+/* Backporting helper */
+#ifndef __GFP_NOTRACK
+#define __GFP_NOTRACK	0
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Define the page-table levels we clone for user-space on 32
+ * and 64 bit.
+ */
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+#define	PTI_LEVEL_KERNEL_IMAGE	PTI_CLONE_PMD
+#else
+#define	PTI_LEVEL_KERNEL_IMAGE	PTI_CLONE_PTE
+#endif
+
+static void __init pti_print_if_insecure(const char *reason)
+{
+	if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN))
+		pr_info("%s\n", reason);
+}
+
+static void __init pti_print_if_secure(const char *reason)
+{
+	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN))
+		pr_info("%s\n", reason);
+}
+
+static enum pti_mode {
+	PTI_AUTO = 0,
+	PTI_FORCE_OFF,
+	PTI_FORCE_ON
+} pti_mode;
+
+void __init pti_check_boottime_disable(void)
+{
+	char arg[5];
+	int ret;
+
+	/* Assume mode is auto unless overridden. */
+	pti_mode = PTI_AUTO;
+
+	if (hypervisor_is_type(X86_HYPER_XEN_PV)) {
+		pti_mode = PTI_FORCE_OFF;
+		pti_print_if_insecure("disabled on XEN PV.");
+		return;
+	}
+
+	ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "pti", arg, sizeof(arg));
+	if (ret > 0)  {
+		if (ret == 3 && !strncmp(arg, "off", 3)) {
+			pti_mode = PTI_FORCE_OFF;
+			pti_print_if_insecure("disabled on command line.");
+			return;
+		}
+		if (ret == 2 && !strncmp(arg, "on", 2)) {
+			pti_mode = PTI_FORCE_ON;
+			pti_print_if_secure("force enabled on command line.");
+			goto enable;
+		}
+		if (ret == 4 && !strncmp(arg, "auto", 4)) {
+			pti_mode = PTI_AUTO;
+			goto autosel;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nopti") ||
+	    cpu_mitigations_off()) {
+		pti_mode = PTI_FORCE_OFF;
+		pti_print_if_insecure("disabled on command line.");
+		return;
+	}
+
+autosel:
+	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN))
+		return;
+enable:
+	setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_PTI);
+}
+
+pgd_t __pti_set_user_pgtbl(pgd_t *pgdp, pgd_t pgd)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Changes to the high (kernel) portion of the kernelmode page
+	 * tables are not automatically propagated to the usermode tables.
+	 *
+	 * Users should keep in mind that, unlike the kernelmode tables,
+	 * there is no vmalloc_fault equivalent for the usermode tables.
+	 * Top-level entries added to init_mm's usermode pgd after boot
+	 * will not be automatically propagated to other mms.
+	 */
+	if (!pgdp_maps_userspace(pgdp))
+		return pgd;
+
+	/*
+	 * The user page tables get the full PGD, accessible from
+	 * userspace:
+	 */
+	kernel_to_user_pgdp(pgdp)->pgd = pgd.pgd;
+
+	/*
+	 * If this is normal user memory, make it NX in the kernel
+	 * pagetables so that, if we somehow screw up and return to
+	 * usermode with the kernel CR3 loaded, we'll get a page fault
+	 * instead of allowing user code to execute with the wrong CR3.
+	 *
+	 * As exceptions, we don't set NX if:
+	 *  - _PAGE_USER is not set.  This could be an executable
+	 *     EFI runtime mapping or something similar, and the kernel
+	 *     may execute from it
+	 *  - we don't have NX support
+	 *  - we're clearing the PGD (i.e. the new pgd is not present).
+	 */
+	if ((pgd.pgd & (_PAGE_USER|_PAGE_PRESENT)) == (_PAGE_USER|_PAGE_PRESENT) &&
+	    (__supported_pte_mask & _PAGE_NX))
+		pgd.pgd |= _PAGE_NX;
+
+	/* return the copy of the PGD we want the kernel to use: */
+	return pgd;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Walk the user copy of the page tables (optionally) trying to allocate
+ * page table pages on the way down.
+ *
+ * Returns a pointer to a P4D on success, or NULL on failure.
+ */
+static p4d_t *pti_user_pagetable_walk_p4d(unsigned long address)
+{
+	pgd_t *pgd = kernel_to_user_pgdp(pgd_offset_k(address));
+	gfp_t gfp = (GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOTRACK | __GFP_ZERO);
+
+	if (address < PAGE_OFFSET) {
+		WARN_ONCE(1, "attempt to walk user address\n");
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	if (pgd_none(*pgd)) {
+		unsigned long new_p4d_page = __get_free_page(gfp);
+		if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!new_p4d_page))
+			return NULL;
+
+		set_pgd(pgd, __pgd(_KERNPG_TABLE | __pa(new_p4d_page)));
+	}
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(pgd_large(*pgd) != 0);
+
+	return p4d_offset(pgd, address);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Walk the user copy of the page tables (optionally) trying to allocate
+ * page table pages on the way down.
+ *
+ * Returns a pointer to a PMD on success, or NULL on failure.
+ */
+static pmd_t *pti_user_pagetable_walk_pmd(unsigned long address)
+{
+	gfp_t gfp = (GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOTRACK | __GFP_ZERO);
+	p4d_t *p4d;
+	pud_t *pud;
+
+	p4d = pti_user_pagetable_walk_p4d(address);
+	if (!p4d)
+		return NULL;
+
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(p4d_large(*p4d) != 0);
+	if (p4d_none(*p4d)) {
+		unsigned long new_pud_page = __get_free_page(gfp);
+		if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!new_pud_page))
+			return NULL;
+
+		set_p4d(p4d, __p4d(_KERNPG_TABLE | __pa(new_pud_page)));
+	}
+
+	pud = pud_offset(p4d, address);
+	/* The user page tables do not use large mappings: */
+	if (pud_large(*pud)) {
+		WARN_ON(1);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	if (pud_none(*pud)) {
+		unsigned long new_pmd_page = __get_free_page(gfp);
+		if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!new_pmd_page))
+			return NULL;
+
+		set_pud(pud, __pud(_KERNPG_TABLE | __pa(new_pmd_page)));
+	}
+
+	return pmd_offset(pud, address);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Walk the shadow copy of the page tables (optionally) trying to allocate
+ * page table pages on the way down.  Does not support large pages.
+ *
+ * Note: this is only used when mapping *new* kernel data into the
+ * user/shadow page tables.  It is never used for userspace data.
+ *
+ * Returns a pointer to a PTE on success, or NULL on failure.
+ */
+static pte_t *pti_user_pagetable_walk_pte(unsigned long address)
+{
+	gfp_t gfp = (GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOTRACK | __GFP_ZERO);
+	pmd_t *pmd;
+	pte_t *pte;
+
+	pmd = pti_user_pagetable_walk_pmd(address);
+	if (!pmd)
+		return NULL;
+
+	/* We can't do anything sensible if we hit a large mapping. */
+	if (pmd_large(*pmd)) {
+		WARN_ON(1);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	if (pmd_none(*pmd)) {
+		unsigned long new_pte_page = __get_free_page(gfp);
+		if (!new_pte_page)
+			return NULL;
+
+		set_pmd(pmd, __pmd(_KERNPG_TABLE | __pa(new_pte_page)));
+	}
+
+	pte = pte_offset_kernel(pmd, address);
+	if (pte_flags(*pte) & _PAGE_USER) {
+		WARN_ONCE(1, "attempt to walk to user pte\n");
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	return pte;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_VSYSCALL_EMULATION
+static void __init pti_setup_vsyscall(void)
+{
+	pte_t *pte, *target_pte;
+	unsigned int level;
+
+	pte = lookup_address(VSYSCALL_ADDR, &level);
+	if (!pte || WARN_ON(level != PG_LEVEL_4K) || pte_none(*pte))
+		return;
+
+	target_pte = pti_user_pagetable_walk_pte(VSYSCALL_ADDR);
+	if (WARN_ON(!target_pte))
+		return;
+
+	*target_pte = *pte;
+	set_vsyscall_pgtable_user_bits(kernel_to_user_pgdp(swapper_pg_dir));
+}
+#else
+static void __init pti_setup_vsyscall(void) { }
+#endif
+
+enum pti_clone_level {
+	PTI_CLONE_PMD,
+	PTI_CLONE_PTE,
+};
+
+static void
+pti_clone_pgtable(unsigned long start, unsigned long end,
+		  enum pti_clone_level level)
+{
+	unsigned long addr;
+
+	/*
+	 * Clone the populated PMDs which cover start to end. These PMD areas
+	 * can have holes.
+	 */
+	for (addr = start; addr < end;) {
+		pte_t *pte, *target_pte;
+		pmd_t *pmd, *target_pmd;
+		pgd_t *pgd;
+		p4d_t *p4d;
+		pud_t *pud;
+
+		/* Overflow check */
+		if (addr < start)
+			break;
+
+		pgd = pgd_offset_k(addr);
+		if (WARN_ON(pgd_none(*pgd)))
+			return;
+		p4d = p4d_offset(pgd, addr);
+		if (WARN_ON(p4d_none(*p4d)))
+			return;
+
+		pud = pud_offset(p4d, addr);
+		if (pud_none(*pud)) {
+			WARN_ON_ONCE(addr & ~PUD_MASK);
+			addr = round_up(addr + 1, PUD_SIZE);
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		pmd = pmd_offset(pud, addr);
+		if (pmd_none(*pmd)) {
+			WARN_ON_ONCE(addr & ~PMD_MASK);
+			addr = round_up(addr + 1, PMD_SIZE);
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		if (pmd_large(*pmd) || level == PTI_CLONE_PMD) {
+			target_pmd = pti_user_pagetable_walk_pmd(addr);
+			if (WARN_ON(!target_pmd))
+				return;
+
+			/*
+			 * Only clone present PMDs.  This ensures only setting
+			 * _PAGE_GLOBAL on present PMDs.  This should only be
+			 * called on well-known addresses anyway, so a non-
+			 * present PMD would be a surprise.
+			 */
+			if (WARN_ON(!(pmd_flags(*pmd) & _PAGE_PRESENT)))
+				return;
+
+			/*
+			 * Setting 'target_pmd' below creates a mapping in both
+			 * the user and kernel page tables.  It is effectively
+			 * global, so set it as global in both copies.  Note:
+			 * the X86_FEATURE_PGE check is not _required_ because
+			 * the CPU ignores _PAGE_GLOBAL when PGE is not
+			 * supported.  The check keeps consistency with
+			 * code that only set this bit when supported.
+			 */
+			if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PGE))
+				*pmd = pmd_set_flags(*pmd, _PAGE_GLOBAL);
+
+			/*
+			 * Copy the PMD.  That is, the kernelmode and usermode
+			 * tables will share the last-level page tables of this
+			 * address range
+			 */
+			*target_pmd = *pmd;
+
+			addr += PMD_SIZE;
+
+		} else if (level == PTI_CLONE_PTE) {
+
+			/* Walk the page-table down to the pte level */
+			pte = pte_offset_kernel(pmd, addr);
+			if (pte_none(*pte)) {
+				addr += PAGE_SIZE;
+				continue;
+			}
+
+			/* Only clone present PTEs */
+			if (WARN_ON(!(pte_flags(*pte) & _PAGE_PRESENT)))
+				return;
+
+			/* Allocate PTE in the user page-table */
+			target_pte = pti_user_pagetable_walk_pte(addr);
+			if (WARN_ON(!target_pte))
+				return;
+
+			/* Set GLOBAL bit in both PTEs */
+			if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PGE))
+				*pte = pte_set_flags(*pte, _PAGE_GLOBAL);
+
+			/* Clone the PTE */
+			*target_pte = *pte;
+
+			addr += PAGE_SIZE;
+
+		} else {
+			BUG();
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+/*
+ * Clone a single p4d (i.e. a top-level entry on 4-level systems and a
+ * next-level entry on 5-level systems.
+ */
+static void __init pti_clone_p4d(unsigned long addr)
+{
+	p4d_t *kernel_p4d, *user_p4d;
+	pgd_t *kernel_pgd;
+
+	user_p4d = pti_user_pagetable_walk_p4d(addr);
+	if (!user_p4d)
+		return;
+
+	kernel_pgd = pgd_offset_k(addr);
+	kernel_p4d = p4d_offset(kernel_pgd, addr);
+	*user_p4d = *kernel_p4d;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Clone the CPU_ENTRY_AREA and associated data into the user space visible
+ * page table.
+ */
+static void __init pti_clone_user_shared(void)
+{
+	unsigned int cpu;
+
+	pti_clone_p4d(CPU_ENTRY_AREA_BASE);
+
+	for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
+		/*
+		 * The SYSCALL64 entry code needs one word of scratch space
+		 * in which to spill a register.  It lives in the sp2 slot
+		 * of the CPU's TSS.
+		 *
+		 * This is done for all possible CPUs during boot to ensure
+		 * that it's propagated to all mms.
+		 */
+
+		unsigned long va = (unsigned long)&per_cpu(cpu_tss_rw, cpu);
+		phys_addr_t pa = per_cpu_ptr_to_phys((void *)va);
+		pte_t *target_pte;
+
+		target_pte = pti_user_pagetable_walk_pte(va);
+		if (WARN_ON(!target_pte))
+			return;
+
+		*target_pte = pfn_pte(pa >> PAGE_SHIFT, PAGE_KERNEL);
+	}
+}
+
+#else /* CONFIG_X86_64 */
+
+/*
+ * On 32 bit PAE systems with 1GB of Kernel address space there is only
+ * one pgd/p4d for the whole kernel. Cloning that would map the whole
+ * address space into the user page-tables, making PTI useless. So clone
+ * the page-table on the PMD level to prevent that.
+ */
+static void __init pti_clone_user_shared(void)
+{
+	unsigned long start, end;
+
+	start = CPU_ENTRY_AREA_BASE;
+	end   = start + (PAGE_SIZE * CPU_ENTRY_AREA_PAGES);
+
+	pti_clone_pgtable(start, end, PTI_CLONE_PMD);
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_X86_64 */
+
+/*
+ * Clone the ESPFIX P4D into the user space visible page table
+ */
+static void __init pti_setup_espfix64(void)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_ESPFIX64
+	pti_clone_p4d(ESPFIX_BASE_ADDR);
+#endif
+}
+
+/*
+ * Clone the populated PMDs of the entry text and force it RO.
+ */
+static void pti_clone_entry_text(void)
+{
+	pti_clone_pgtable((unsigned long) __entry_text_start,
+			  (unsigned long) __entry_text_end,
+			  PTI_CLONE_PMD);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Global pages and PCIDs are both ways to make kernel TLB entries
+ * live longer, reduce TLB misses and improve kernel performance.
+ * But, leaving all kernel text Global makes it potentially accessible
+ * to Meltdown-style attacks which make it trivial to find gadgets or
+ * defeat KASLR.
+ *
+ * Only use global pages when it is really worth it.
+ */
+static inline bool pti_kernel_image_global_ok(void)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Systems with PCIDs get little benefit from global
+	 * kernel text and are not worth the downsides.
+	 */
+	if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_PCID))
+		return false;
+
+	/*
+	 * Only do global kernel image for pti=auto.  Do the most
+	 * secure thing (not global) if pti=on specified.
+	 */
+	if (pti_mode != PTI_AUTO)
+		return false;
+
+	/*
+	 * K8 may not tolerate the cleared _PAGE_RW on the userspace
+	 * global kernel image pages.  Do the safe thing (disable
+	 * global kernel image).  This is unlikely to ever be
+	 * noticed because PTI is disabled by default on AMD CPUs.
+	 */
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_K8))
+		return false;
+
+	/*
+	 * RANDSTRUCT derives its hardening benefits from the
+	 * attacker's lack of knowledge about the layout of kernel
+	 * data structures.  Keep the kernel image non-global in
+	 * cases where RANDSTRUCT is in use to help keep the layout a
+	 * secret.
+	 */
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RANDSTRUCT))
+		return false;
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+/*
+ * For some configurations, map all of kernel text into the user page
+ * tables.  This reduces TLB misses, especially on non-PCID systems.
+ */
+static void pti_clone_kernel_text(void)
+{
+	/*
+	 * rodata is part of the kernel image and is normally
+	 * readable on the filesystem or on the web.  But, do not
+	 * clone the areas past rodata, they might contain secrets.
+	 */
+	unsigned long start = PFN_ALIGN(_text);
+	unsigned long end_clone  = (unsigned long)__end_rodata_aligned;
+	unsigned long end_global = PFN_ALIGN((unsigned long)_etext);
+
+	if (!pti_kernel_image_global_ok())
+		return;
+
+	pr_debug("mapping partial kernel image into user address space\n");
+
+	/*
+	 * Note that this will undo _some_ of the work that
+	 * pti_set_kernel_image_nonglobal() did to clear the
+	 * global bit.
+	 */
+	pti_clone_pgtable(start, end_clone, PTI_LEVEL_KERNEL_IMAGE);
+
+	/*
+	 * pti_clone_pgtable() will set the global bit in any PMDs
+	 * that it clones, but we also need to get any PTEs in
+	 * the last level for areas that are not huge-page-aligned.
+	 */
+
+	/* Set the global bit for normal non-__init kernel text: */
+	set_memory_global(start, (end_global - start) >> PAGE_SHIFT);
+}
+
+static void pti_set_kernel_image_nonglobal(void)
+{
+	/*
+	 * The identity map is created with PMDs, regardless of the
+	 * actual length of the kernel.  We need to clear
+	 * _PAGE_GLOBAL up to a PMD boundary, not just to the end
+	 * of the image.
+	 */
+	unsigned long start = PFN_ALIGN(_text);
+	unsigned long end = ALIGN((unsigned long)_end, PMD_SIZE);
+
+	/*
+	 * This clears _PAGE_GLOBAL from the entire kernel image.
+	 * pti_clone_kernel_text() map put _PAGE_GLOBAL back for
+	 * areas that are mapped to userspace.
+	 */
+	set_memory_nonglobal(start, (end - start) >> PAGE_SHIFT);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Initialize kernel page table isolation
+ */
+void __init pti_init(void)
+{
+	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PTI))
+		return;
+
+	pr_info("enabled\n");
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
+	/*
+	 * We check for X86_FEATURE_PCID here. But the init-code will
+	 * clear the feature flag on 32 bit because the feature is not
+	 * supported on 32 bit anyway. To print the warning we need to
+	 * check with cpuid directly again.
+	 */
+	if (cpuid_ecx(0x1) & BIT(17)) {
+		/* Use printk to work around pr_fmt() */
+		printk(KERN_WARNING "\n");
+		printk(KERN_WARNING "************************************************************\n");
+		printk(KERN_WARNING "** WARNING! WARNING! WARNING! WARNING! WARNING! WARNING!  **\n");
+		printk(KERN_WARNING "**                                                        **\n");
+		printk(KERN_WARNING "** You are using 32-bit PTI on a 64-bit PCID-capable CPU. **\n");
+		printk(KERN_WARNING "** Your performance will increase dramatically if you     **\n");
+		printk(KERN_WARNING "** switch to a 64-bit kernel!                             **\n");
+		printk(KERN_WARNING "**                                                        **\n");
+		printk(KERN_WARNING "** WARNING! WARNING! WARNING! WARNING! WARNING! WARNING!  **\n");
+		printk(KERN_WARNING "************************************************************\n");
+	}
+#endif
+
+	pti_clone_user_shared();
+
+	/* Undo all global bits from the init pagetables in head_64.S: */
+	pti_set_kernel_image_nonglobal();
+	/* Replace some of the global bits just for shared entry text: */
+	pti_clone_entry_text();
+	pti_setup_espfix64();
+	pti_setup_vsyscall();
+}
+
+/*
+ * Finalize the kernel mappings in the userspace page-table. Some of the
+ * mappings for the kernel image might have changed since pti_init()
+ * cloned them. This is because parts of the kernel image have been
+ * mapped RO and/or NX.  These changes need to be cloned again to the
+ * userspace page-table.
+ */
+void pti_finalize(void)
+{
+	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PTI))
+		return;
+	/*
+	 * We need to clone everything (again) that maps parts of the
+	 * kernel image.
+	 */
+	pti_clone_entry_text();
+	pti_clone_kernel_text();
+
+	debug_checkwx_user();
+}