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authorDaniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>2024-08-07 13:11:40 +0000
committerDaniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>2024-08-07 13:11:40 +0000
commit8b0a8165cdad0f4133837d753649ef4682e42c3b (patch)
tree5c58f869f31ddb1f7bd6e8bdea269b680b36c5b6 /arch/x86/mm
parentReleasing progress-linux version 6.8.12-1~progress7.99u1. (diff)
downloadlinux-8b0a8165cdad0f4133837d753649ef4682e42c3b.tar.xz
linux-8b0a8165cdad0f4133837d753649ef4682e42c3b.zip
Merging upstream version 6.9.7.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86/mm')
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/mm/Makefile3
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/mm/amdtopology.c34
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/mm/debug_pagetables.c4
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/mm/dump_pagetables.c28
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/mm/extable.c78
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/mm/fault.c49
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/mm/init_32.c4
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/mm/init_64.c12
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/mm/kasan_init_64.c2
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c62
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c2
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c4
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/mm/numa.c6
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/mm/numa_32.c1
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/mm/pat/memtype.c9
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c27
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c8
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/mm/pti.c8
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/mm/tlb.c49
19 files changed, 246 insertions, 144 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/Makefile b/arch/x86/mm/Makefile
index c80febc44c..428048e73b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/Makefile
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ KASAN_SANITIZE_pgprot.o := n
KCSAN_SANITIZE := n
# Avoid recursion by not calling KMSAN hooks for CEA code.
KMSAN_SANITIZE_cpu_entry_area.o := n
+KMSAN_SANITIZE_mem_encrypt_identity.o := n
ifdef CONFIG_FUNCTION_TRACER
CFLAGS_REMOVE_mem_encrypt.o = -pg
@@ -60,7 +61,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_NUMA_EMU) += numa_emulation.o
obj-$(CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS) += pkeys.o
obj-$(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MEMORY) += kaslr.o
-obj-$(CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION) += pti.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION) += pti.o
obj-$(CONFIG_X86_MEM_ENCRYPT) += mem_encrypt.o
obj-$(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT) += mem_encrypt_amd.o
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/amdtopology.c b/arch/x86/mm/amdtopology.c
index b3ca7d23e4..9332b36a10 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/amdtopology.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/amdtopology.c
@@ -54,13 +54,11 @@ static __init int find_northbridge(void)
int __init amd_numa_init(void)
{
- u64 start = PFN_PHYS(0);
+ unsigned int numnodes, cores, apicid;
+ u64 prevbase, start = PFN_PHYS(0);
u64 end = PFN_PHYS(max_pfn);
- unsigned numnodes;
- u64 prevbase;
- int i, j, nb;
u32 nodeid, reg;
- unsigned int bits, cores, apicid_base;
+ int i, j, nb;
if (!early_pci_allowed())
return -EINVAL;
@@ -158,26 +156,18 @@ int __init amd_numa_init(void)
return -ENOENT;
/*
- * We seem to have valid NUMA configuration. Map apicids to nodes
- * using the coreid bits from early_identify_cpu.
+ * We seem to have valid NUMA configuration. Map apicids to nodes
+ * using the size of the core domain in the APIC space.
*/
- bits = boot_cpu_data.x86_coreid_bits;
- cores = 1 << bits;
- apicid_base = 0;
+ cores = topology_get_domain_size(TOPO_CORE_DOMAIN);
- /*
- * get boot-time SMP configuration:
- */
- early_get_smp_config();
+ apicid = boot_cpu_physical_apicid;
+ if (apicid > 0)
+ pr_info("BSP APIC ID: %02x\n", apicid);
- if (boot_cpu_physical_apicid > 0) {
- pr_info("BSP APIC ID: %02x\n", boot_cpu_physical_apicid);
- apicid_base = boot_cpu_physical_apicid;
+ for_each_node_mask(i, numa_nodes_parsed) {
+ for (j = 0; j < cores; j++, apicid++)
+ set_apicid_to_node(apicid, i);
}
-
- for_each_node_mask(i, numa_nodes_parsed)
- for (j = apicid_base; j < cores + apicid_base; j++)
- set_apicid_to_node((i << bits) + j, i);
-
return 0;
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/debug_pagetables.c b/arch/x86/mm/debug_pagetables.c
index b43301cb2a..ae5c213a1c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/debug_pagetables.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/debug_pagetables.c
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ static int ptdump_curknl_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
DEFINE_SHOW_ATTRIBUTE(ptdump_curknl);
-#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
static int ptdump_curusr_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
{
if (current->mm->pgd)
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ static int __init pt_dump_debug_init(void)
debugfs_create_file("current_kernel", 0400, dir, NULL,
&ptdump_curknl_fops);
-#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
debugfs_create_file("current_user", 0400, dir, NULL,
&ptdump_curusr_fops);
#endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/dump_pagetables.c b/arch/x86/mm/dump_pagetables.c
index e1b599ecbb..89079ea73e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/dump_pagetables.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/dump_pagetables.c
@@ -362,9 +362,9 @@ static void note_page(struct ptdump_state *pt_st, unsigned long addr, int level,
}
}
-static void ptdump_walk_pgd_level_core(struct seq_file *m,
- struct mm_struct *mm, pgd_t *pgd,
- bool checkwx, bool dmesg)
+bool ptdump_walk_pgd_level_core(struct seq_file *m,
+ struct mm_struct *mm, pgd_t *pgd,
+ bool checkwx, bool dmesg)
{
const struct ptdump_range ptdump_ranges[] = {
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
@@ -391,12 +391,17 @@ static void ptdump_walk_pgd_level_core(struct seq_file *m,
ptdump_walk_pgd(&st.ptdump, mm, pgd);
if (!checkwx)
- return;
- if (st.wx_pages)
+ return true;
+ if (st.wx_pages) {
pr_info("x86/mm: Checked W+X mappings: FAILED, %lu W+X pages found.\n",
st.wx_pages);
- else
+
+ return false;
+ } else {
pr_info("x86/mm: Checked W+X mappings: passed, no W+X pages found.\n");
+
+ return true;
+ }
}
void ptdump_walk_pgd_level(struct seq_file *m, struct mm_struct *mm)
@@ -408,7 +413,7 @@ void ptdump_walk_pgd_level_debugfs(struct seq_file *m, struct mm_struct *mm,
bool user)
{
pgd_t *pgd = mm->pgd;
-#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
if (user && boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PTI))
pgd = kernel_to_user_pgdp(pgd);
#endif
@@ -418,7 +423,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ptdump_walk_pgd_level_debugfs);
void ptdump_walk_user_pgd_level_checkwx(void)
{
-#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
pgd_t *pgd = INIT_PGD;
if (!(__supported_pte_mask & _PAGE_NX) ||
@@ -431,9 +436,12 @@ void ptdump_walk_user_pgd_level_checkwx(void)
#endif
}
-void ptdump_walk_pgd_level_checkwx(void)
+bool ptdump_walk_pgd_level_checkwx(void)
{
- ptdump_walk_pgd_level_core(NULL, &init_mm, INIT_PGD, true, false);
+ if (!(__supported_pte_mask & _PAGE_NX))
+ return true;
+
+ return ptdump_walk_pgd_level_core(NULL, &init_mm, INIT_PGD, true, false);
}
static int __init pt_dump_init(void)
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/extable.c b/arch/x86/mm/extable.c
index 271dcb2dea..b522933bfa 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/extable.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/extable.c
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
#include <xen/xen.h>
#include <asm/fpu/api.h>
+#include <asm/fred.h>
#include <asm/sev.h>
#include <asm/traps.h>
#include <asm/kdebug.h>
@@ -223,6 +224,79 @@ static bool ex_handler_ucopy_len(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup,
return ex_handler_uaccess(fixup, regs, trapnr, fault_address);
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_FRED
+static bool ex_handler_eretu(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup,
+ struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code)
+{
+ struct pt_regs *uregs = (struct pt_regs *)(regs->sp - offsetof(struct pt_regs, orig_ax));
+ unsigned short ss = uregs->ss;
+ unsigned short cs = uregs->cs;
+
+ /*
+ * Move the NMI bit from the invalid stack frame, which caused ERETU
+ * to fault, to the fault handler's stack frame, thus to unblock NMI
+ * with the fault handler's ERETS instruction ASAP if NMI is blocked.
+ */
+ regs->fred_ss.nmi = uregs->fred_ss.nmi;
+
+ /*
+ * Sync event information to uregs, i.e., the ERETU return frame, but
+ * is it safe to write to the ERETU return frame which is just above
+ * current event stack frame?
+ *
+ * The RSP used by FRED to push a stack frame is not the value in %rsp,
+ * it is calculated from %rsp with the following 2 steps:
+ * 1) RSP = %rsp - (IA32_FRED_CONFIG & 0x1c0) // Reserve N*64 bytes
+ * 2) RSP = RSP & ~0x3f // Align to a 64-byte cache line
+ * when an event delivery doesn't trigger a stack level change.
+ *
+ * Here is an example with N*64 (N=1) bytes reserved:
+ *
+ * 64-byte cache line ==> ______________
+ * |___Reserved___|
+ * |__Event_data__|
+ * |_____SS_______|
+ * |_____RSP______|
+ * |_____FLAGS____|
+ * |_____CS_______|
+ * |_____IP_______|
+ * 64-byte cache line ==> |__Error_code__| <== ERETU return frame
+ * |______________|
+ * |______________|
+ * |______________|
+ * |______________|
+ * |______________|
+ * |______________|
+ * |______________|
+ * 64-byte cache line ==> |______________| <== RSP after step 1) and 2)
+ * |___Reserved___|
+ * |__Event_data__|
+ * |_____SS_______|
+ * |_____RSP______|
+ * |_____FLAGS____|
+ * |_____CS_______|
+ * |_____IP_______|
+ * 64-byte cache line ==> |__Error_code__| <== ERETS return frame
+ *
+ * Thus a new FRED stack frame will always be pushed below a previous
+ * FRED stack frame ((N*64) bytes may be reserved between), and it is
+ * safe to write to a previous FRED stack frame as they never overlap.
+ */
+ fred_info(uregs)->edata = fred_event_data(regs);
+ uregs->ssx = regs->ssx;
+ uregs->fred_ss.ss = ss;
+ /* The NMI bit was moved away above */
+ uregs->fred_ss.nmi = 0;
+ uregs->csx = regs->csx;
+ uregs->fred_cs.sl = 0;
+ uregs->fred_cs.wfe = 0;
+ uregs->cs = cs;
+ uregs->orig_ax = error_code;
+
+ return ex_handler_default(fixup, regs);
+}
+#endif
+
int ex_get_fixup_type(unsigned long ip)
{
const struct exception_table_entry *e = search_exception_tables(ip);
@@ -300,6 +374,10 @@ int fixup_exception(struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr, unsigned long error_code,
return ex_handler_ucopy_len(e, regs, trapnr, fault_addr, reg, imm);
case EX_TYPE_ZEROPAD:
return ex_handler_zeropad(e, regs, fault_addr);
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_FRED
+ case EX_TYPE_ERETU:
+ return ex_handler_eretu(e, regs, error_code);
+#endif
}
BUG();
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
index e604d2d6cc..bba4e020dd 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
@@ -34,6 +34,8 @@
#include <asm/kvm_para.h> /* kvm_handle_async_pf */
#include <asm/vdso.h> /* fixup_vdso_exception() */
#include <asm/irq_stack.h>
+#include <asm/fred.h>
+#include <asm/sev.h> /* snp_dump_hva_rmpentry() */
#define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS
#include <asm/trace/exceptions.h>
@@ -250,7 +252,7 @@ static noinline int vmalloc_fault(unsigned long address)
if (!pmd_k)
return -1;
- if (pmd_large(*pmd_k))
+ if (pmd_leaf(*pmd_k))
return 0;
pte_k = pte_offset_kernel(pmd_k, address);
@@ -319,7 +321,7 @@ static void dump_pagetable(unsigned long address)
* And let's rather not kmap-atomic the pte, just in case
* it's allocated already:
*/
- if (!low_pfn(pmd_pfn(*pmd)) || !pmd_present(*pmd) || pmd_large(*pmd))
+ if (!low_pfn(pmd_pfn(*pmd)) || !pmd_present(*pmd) || pmd_leaf(*pmd))
goto out;
pte = pte_offset_kernel(pmd, address);
@@ -368,7 +370,7 @@ static void dump_pagetable(unsigned long address)
goto bad;
pr_cont("P4D %lx ", p4d_val(*p4d));
- if (!p4d_present(*p4d) || p4d_large(*p4d))
+ if (!p4d_present(*p4d) || p4d_leaf(*p4d))
goto out;
pud = pud_offset(p4d, address);
@@ -384,7 +386,7 @@ static void dump_pagetable(unsigned long address)
goto bad;
pr_cont("PMD %lx ", pmd_val(*pmd));
- if (!pmd_present(*pmd) || pmd_large(*pmd))
+ if (!pmd_present(*pmd) || pmd_leaf(*pmd))
goto out;
pte = pte_offset_kernel(pmd, address);
@@ -547,6 +549,7 @@ show_fault_oops(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code, unsigned long ad
!(error_code & X86_PF_PROT) ? "not-present page" :
(error_code & X86_PF_RSVD) ? "reserved bit violation" :
(error_code & X86_PF_PK) ? "protection keys violation" :
+ (error_code & X86_PF_RMP) ? "RMP violation" :
"permissions violation");
if (!(error_code & X86_PF_USER) && user_mode(regs)) {
@@ -579,6 +582,9 @@ show_fault_oops(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code, unsigned long ad
}
dump_pagetable(address);
+
+ if (error_code & X86_PF_RMP)
+ snp_dump_hva_rmpentry(address);
}
static noinline void
@@ -999,7 +1005,7 @@ spurious_kernel_fault(unsigned long error_code, unsigned long address)
if (!p4d_present(*p4d))
return 0;
- if (p4d_large(*p4d))
+ if (p4d_leaf(*p4d))
return spurious_kernel_fault_check(error_code, (pte_t *) p4d);
pud = pud_offset(p4d, address);
@@ -1013,7 +1019,7 @@ spurious_kernel_fault(unsigned long error_code, unsigned long address)
if (!pmd_present(*pmd))
return 0;
- if (pmd_large(*pmd))
+ if (pmd_leaf(*pmd))
return spurious_kernel_fault_check(error_code, (pte_t *) pmd);
pte = pte_offset_kernel(pmd, address);
@@ -1262,21 +1268,14 @@ void do_user_addr_fault(struct pt_regs *regs,
return;
}
- /*
- * It's safe to allow irq's after cr2 has been saved and the
- * vmalloc fault has been handled.
- *
- * User-mode registers count as a user access even for any
- * potential system fault or CPU buglet:
- */
- if (user_mode(regs)) {
- local_irq_enable();
- flags |= FAULT_FLAG_USER;
- } else {
- if (regs->flags & X86_EFLAGS_IF)
- local_irq_enable();
+ /* Legacy check - remove this after verifying that it doesn't trigger */
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!(regs->flags & X86_EFLAGS_IF))) {
+ bad_area_nosemaphore(regs, error_code, address);
+ return;
}
+ local_irq_enable();
+
perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_PAGE_FAULTS, 1, regs, address);
/*
@@ -1292,6 +1291,14 @@ void do_user_addr_fault(struct pt_regs *regs,
if (error_code & X86_PF_INSTR)
flags |= FAULT_FLAG_INSTRUCTION;
+ /*
+ * We set FAULT_FLAG_USER based on the register state, not
+ * based on X86_PF_USER. User space accesses that cause
+ * system page faults are still user accesses.
+ */
+ if (user_mode(regs))
+ flags |= FAULT_FLAG_USER;
+
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
/*
* Faults in the vsyscall page might need emulation. The
@@ -1478,8 +1485,10 @@ handle_page_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code,
DEFINE_IDTENTRY_RAW_ERRORCODE(exc_page_fault)
{
- unsigned long address = read_cr2();
irqentry_state_t state;
+ unsigned long address;
+
+ address = cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_FRED) ? fred_event_data(regs) : read_cr2();
prefetchw(&current->mm->mmap_lock);
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/init_32.c b/arch/x86/mm/init_32.c
index b63403d717..ac41b1e094 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/init_32.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/init_32.c
@@ -463,7 +463,7 @@ void __init native_pagetable_init(void)
break;
/* should not be large page here */
- if (pmd_large(*pmd)) {
+ if (pmd_leaf(*pmd)) {
pr_warn("try to clear pte for ram above max_low_pfn: pfn: %lx pmd: %p pmd phys: %lx, but pmd is big page and is not using pte !\n",
pfn, pmd, __pa(pmd));
BUG_ON(1);
@@ -800,6 +800,4 @@ void mark_rodata_ro(void)
set_pages_ro(virt_to_page(start), size >> PAGE_SHIFT);
#endif
mark_nxdata_nx();
- if (__supported_pte_mask & _PAGE_NX)
- debug_checkwx();
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c b/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c
index 534436c9d3..7e177856ee 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c
@@ -530,7 +530,7 @@ phys_pmd_init(pmd_t *pmd_page, unsigned long paddr, unsigned long paddr_end,
}
if (!pmd_none(*pmd)) {
- if (!pmd_large(*pmd)) {
+ if (!pmd_leaf(*pmd)) {
spin_lock(&init_mm.page_table_lock);
pte = (pte_t *)pmd_page_vaddr(*pmd);
paddr_last = phys_pte_init(pte, paddr,
@@ -1114,7 +1114,7 @@ remove_pmd_table(pmd_t *pmd_start, unsigned long addr, unsigned long end,
if (!pmd_present(*pmd))
continue;
- if (pmd_large(*pmd)) {
+ if (pmd_leaf(*pmd)) {
if (IS_ALIGNED(addr, PMD_SIZE) &&
IS_ALIGNED(next, PMD_SIZE)) {
if (!direct)
@@ -1197,7 +1197,7 @@ remove_p4d_table(p4d_t *p4d_start, unsigned long addr, unsigned long end,
if (!p4d_present(*p4d))
continue;
- BUILD_BUG_ON(p4d_large(*p4d));
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(p4d_leaf(*p4d));
pud_base = pud_offset(p4d, 0);
remove_pud_table(pud_base, addr, next, altmap, direct);
@@ -1412,8 +1412,6 @@ void mark_rodata_ro(void)
(void *)text_end, (void *)rodata_start);
free_kernel_image_pages("unused kernel image (rodata/data gap)",
(void *)rodata_end, (void *)_sdata);
-
- debug_checkwx();
}
/*
@@ -1522,9 +1520,9 @@ void __meminit vmemmap_set_pmd(pmd_t *pmd, void *p, int node,
int __meminit vmemmap_check_pmd(pmd_t *pmd, int node,
unsigned long addr, unsigned long next)
{
- int large = pmd_large(*pmd);
+ int large = pmd_leaf(*pmd);
- if (pmd_large(*pmd)) {
+ if (pmd_leaf(*pmd)) {
vmemmap_verify((pte_t *)pmd, node, addr, next);
vmemmap_use_sub_pmd(addr, next);
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/kasan_init_64.c b/arch/x86/mm/kasan_init_64.c
index fcf508c52b..9dddf19a55 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/kasan_init_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/kasan_init_64.c
@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ static void __init kasan_populate_pud(pud_t *pud, unsigned long addr,
pmd = pmd_offset(pud, addr);
do {
next = pmd_addr_end(addr, end);
- if (!pmd_large(*pmd))
+ if (!pmd_leaf(*pmd))
kasan_populate_pmd(pmd, addr, next, nid);
} while (pmd++, addr = next, addr != end);
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
index c290c55b63..0a120d85d7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
@@ -14,6 +14,8 @@
#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
#include <linux/virtio_anchor.h>
+#include <asm/sev.h>
+
/* Override for DMA direct allocation check - ARCH_HAS_FORCE_DMA_UNENCRYPTED */
bool force_dma_unencrypted(struct device *dev)
{
@@ -42,38 +44,45 @@ bool force_dma_unencrypted(struct device *dev)
static void print_mem_encrypt_feature_info(void)
{
- pr_info("Memory Encryption Features active:");
-
- if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_TDX_GUEST)) {
- pr_cont(" Intel TDX\n");
- return;
- }
+ pr_info("Memory Encryption Features active: ");
- pr_cont(" AMD");
+ switch (cc_vendor) {
+ case CC_VENDOR_INTEL:
+ pr_cont("Intel TDX\n");
+ break;
+ case CC_VENDOR_AMD:
+ pr_cont("AMD");
- /* Secure Memory Encryption */
- if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) {
+ /* Secure Memory Encryption */
+ if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) {
/*
* SME is mutually exclusive with any of the SEV
* features below.
- */
- pr_cont(" SME\n");
- return;
- }
+ */
+ pr_cont(" SME\n");
+ return;
+ }
- /* Secure Encrypted Virtualization */
- if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT))
- pr_cont(" SEV");
+ /* Secure Encrypted Virtualization */
+ if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT))
+ pr_cont(" SEV");
+
+ /* Encrypted Register State */
+ if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_STATE_ENCRYPT))
+ pr_cont(" SEV-ES");
- /* Encrypted Register State */
- if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_STATE_ENCRYPT))
- pr_cont(" SEV-ES");
+ /* Secure Nested Paging */
+ if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_SEV_SNP))
+ pr_cont(" SEV-SNP");
- /* Secure Nested Paging */
- if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_SEV_SNP))
- pr_cont(" SEV-SNP");
+ pr_cont("\n");
- pr_cont("\n");
+ sev_show_status();
+
+ break;
+ default:
+ pr_cont("Unknown\n");
+ }
}
/* Architecture __weak replacement functions */
@@ -93,6 +102,13 @@ void __init mem_encrypt_setup_arch(void)
phys_addr_t total_mem = memblock_phys_mem_size();
unsigned long size;
+ /*
+ * Do RMP table fixups after the e820 tables have been setup by
+ * e820__memory_setup().
+ */
+ if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_SEV_SNP))
+ snp_fixup_e820_tables();
+
if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT))
return;
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c
index 94cd06d4b0..422602f603 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c
@@ -498,7 +498,7 @@ void __init sme_early_init(void)
* as this memory is not pre-validated and would thus cause a crash.
*/
if (sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_SNP_ENABLED) {
- x86_init.mpparse.find_smp_config = x86_init_noop;
+ x86_init.mpparse.find_mptable = x86_init_noop;
x86_init.pci.init_irq = x86_init_noop;
x86_init.resources.probe_roms = x86_init_noop;
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c
index cc47a818a6..ac33b2263a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c
@@ -157,7 +157,7 @@ static void __head sme_populate_pgd_large(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd)
return;
pmd = pmd_offset(pud, ppd->vaddr);
- if (pmd_large(*pmd))
+ if (pmd_leaf(*pmd))
return;
set_pmd(pmd, __pmd(ppd->paddr | ppd->pmd_flags));
@@ -181,7 +181,7 @@ static void __head sme_populate_pgd(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd)
set_pmd(pmd, __pmd(PMD_FLAGS | __pa(pte)));
}
- if (pmd_large(*pmd))
+ if (pmd_leaf(*pmd))
return;
pte = pte_offset_kernel(pmd, ppd->vaddr);
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/numa.c b/arch/x86/mm/numa.c
index ce84ba86e6..6ce10e3c62 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/numa.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/numa.c
@@ -493,7 +493,7 @@ static void __init numa_clear_kernel_node_hotplug(void)
for_each_reserved_mem_region(mb_region) {
int nid = memblock_get_region_node(mb_region);
- if (nid != MAX_NUMNODES)
+ if (nid != NUMA_NO_NODE)
node_set(nid, reserved_nodemask);
}
@@ -614,9 +614,9 @@ static int __init numa_init(int (*init_func)(void))
nodes_clear(node_online_map);
memset(&numa_meminfo, 0, sizeof(numa_meminfo));
WARN_ON(memblock_set_node(0, ULLONG_MAX, &memblock.memory,
- MAX_NUMNODES));
+ NUMA_NO_NODE));
WARN_ON(memblock_set_node(0, ULLONG_MAX, &memblock.reserved,
- MAX_NUMNODES));
+ NUMA_NO_NODE));
/* In case that parsing SRAT failed. */
WARN_ON(memblock_clear_hotplug(0, ULLONG_MAX));
numa_reset_distance();
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/numa_32.c b/arch/x86/mm/numa_32.c
index 104544359d..025fd7ea5d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/numa_32.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/numa_32.c
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
#include <linux/memblock.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <asm/pgtable_areas.h>
#include "numa_internal.h"
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pat/memtype.c b/arch/x86/mm/pat/memtype.c
index 37d51cfd77..36b603d0cd 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/pat/memtype.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/pat/memtype.c
@@ -240,6 +240,8 @@ void pat_cpu_init(void)
}
wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_CR_PAT, pat_msr_val);
+
+ __flush_tlb_all();
}
/**
@@ -296,13 +298,8 @@ void __init pat_bp_init(void)
/*
* Xen PV doesn't allow to set PAT MSR, but all cache modes are
* supported.
- * When running as TDX guest setting the PAT MSR won't work either
- * due to the requirement to set CR0.CD when doing so. Rely on
- * firmware to have set the PAT MSR correctly.
*/
- if (pat_disabled ||
- cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_XENPV) ||
- cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_TDX_GUEST)) {
+ if (pat_disabled || cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_XENPV)) {
init_cache_modes(pat_msr_val);
return;
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c b/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c
index b4073fb452..19fdfbb171 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c
@@ -687,7 +687,7 @@ pte_t *lookup_address_in_pgd_attr(pgd_t *pgd, unsigned long address,
return NULL;
*level = PG_LEVEL_512G;
- if (p4d_large(*p4d) || !p4d_present(*p4d))
+ if (p4d_leaf(*p4d) || !p4d_present(*p4d))
return (pte_t *)p4d;
*nx |= p4d_flags(*p4d) & _PAGE_NX;
@@ -709,7 +709,7 @@ pte_t *lookup_address_in_pgd_attr(pgd_t *pgd, unsigned long address,
return NULL;
*level = PG_LEVEL_2M;
- if (pmd_large(*pmd) || !pmd_present(*pmd))
+ if (pmd_leaf(*pmd) || !pmd_present(*pmd))
return (pte_t *)pmd;
*nx |= pmd_flags(*pmd) & _PAGE_NX;
@@ -774,7 +774,7 @@ pmd_t *lookup_pmd_address(unsigned long address)
return NULL;
p4d = p4d_offset(pgd, address);
- if (p4d_none(*p4d) || p4d_large(*p4d) || !p4d_present(*p4d))
+ if (p4d_none(*p4d) || p4d_leaf(*p4d) || !p4d_present(*p4d))
return NULL;
pud = pud_offset(p4d, address);
@@ -1271,7 +1271,7 @@ static void unmap_pmd_range(pud_t *pud, unsigned long start, unsigned long end)
* Try to unmap in 2M chunks.
*/
while (end - start >= PMD_SIZE) {
- if (pmd_large(*pmd))
+ if (pmd_leaf(*pmd))
pmd_clear(pmd);
else
__unmap_pmd_range(pud, pmd, start, start + PMD_SIZE);
@@ -2197,7 +2197,7 @@ static int __set_memory_enc_pgtable(unsigned long addr, int numpages, bool enc)
/* Notify hypervisor that we are about to set/clr encryption attribute. */
if (!x86_platform.guest.enc_status_change_prepare(addr, numpages, enc))
- return -EIO;
+ goto vmm_fail;
ret = __change_page_attr_set_clr(&cpa, 1);
@@ -2210,13 +2210,20 @@ static int __set_memory_enc_pgtable(unsigned long addr, int numpages, bool enc)
*/
cpa_flush(&cpa, 0);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
/* Notify hypervisor that we have successfully set/clr encryption attribute. */
- if (!ret) {
- if (!x86_platform.guest.enc_status_change_finish(addr, numpages, enc))
- ret = -EIO;
- }
+ if (!x86_platform.guest.enc_status_change_finish(addr, numpages, enc))
+ goto vmm_fail;
- return ret;
+ return 0;
+
+vmm_fail:
+ WARN_ONCE(1, "CPA VMM failure to convert memory (addr=%p, numpages=%d) to %s.\n",
+ (void *)addr, numpages, enc ? "private" : "shared");
+
+ return -EIO;
}
static int __set_memory_enc_dec(unsigned long addr, int numpages, bool enc)
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c b/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c
index a67bb8f982..103cbccf1d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c
@@ -293,7 +293,7 @@ static void pgd_mop_up_pmds(struct mm_struct *mm, pgd_t *pgdp)
for (i = 0; i < PREALLOCATED_PMDS; i++)
mop_up_one_pmd(mm, &pgdp[i]);
-#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PTI))
return;
@@ -325,7 +325,7 @@ static void pgd_prepopulate_pmd(struct mm_struct *mm, pgd_t *pgd, pmd_t *pmds[])
}
}
-#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
static void pgd_prepopulate_user_pmd(struct mm_struct *mm,
pgd_t *k_pgd, pmd_t *pmds[])
{
@@ -631,6 +631,8 @@ int pmdp_clear_flush_young(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
pmd_t pmdp_invalidate_ad(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address,
pmd_t *pmdp)
{
+ VM_WARN_ON_ONCE(!pmd_present(*pmdp));
+
/*
* No flush is necessary. Once an invalid PTE is established, the PTE's
* access and dirty bits cannot be updated.
@@ -792,7 +794,7 @@ int pud_clear_huge(pud_t *pud)
*/
int pmd_clear_huge(pmd_t *pmd)
{
- if (pmd_large(*pmd)) {
+ if (pmd_leaf(*pmd)) {
pmd_clear(pmd);
return 1;
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pti.c b/arch/x86/mm/pti.c
index 912b1da7ed..2e69abf4f8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/pti.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/pti.c
@@ -185,7 +185,7 @@ static p4d_t *pti_user_pagetable_walk_p4d(unsigned long address)
set_pgd(pgd, __pgd(_KERNPG_TABLE | __pa(new_p4d_page)));
}
- BUILD_BUG_ON(pgd_large(*pgd) != 0);
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(pgd_leaf(*pgd) != 0);
return p4d_offset(pgd, address);
}
@@ -206,7 +206,7 @@ static pmd_t *pti_user_pagetable_walk_pmd(unsigned long address)
if (!p4d)
return NULL;
- BUILD_BUG_ON(p4d_large(*p4d) != 0);
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(p4d_leaf(*p4d) != 0);
if (p4d_none(*p4d)) {
unsigned long new_pud_page = __get_free_page(gfp);
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!new_pud_page))
@@ -252,7 +252,7 @@ static pte_t *pti_user_pagetable_walk_pte(unsigned long address)
return NULL;
/* We can't do anything sensible if we hit a large mapping. */
- if (pmd_large(*pmd)) {
+ if (pmd_leaf(*pmd)) {
WARN_ON(1);
return NULL;
}
@@ -341,7 +341,7 @@ pti_clone_pgtable(unsigned long start, unsigned long end,
continue;
}
- if (pmd_large(*pmd) || level == PTI_CLONE_PMD) {
+ if (pmd_leaf(*pmd) || level == PTI_CLONE_PMD) {
target_pmd = pti_user_pagetable_walk_pmd(addr);
if (WARN_ON(!target_pmd))
return;
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c b/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c
index 5768d386ef..44ac64f3a0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c
@@ -89,10 +89,10 @@
#define CR3_HW_ASID_BITS 12
/*
- * When enabled, PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION consumes a single bit for
+ * When enabled, MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION consumes a single bit for
* user/kernel switches
*/
-#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
# define PTI_CONSUMED_PCID_BITS 1
#else
# define PTI_CONSUMED_PCID_BITS 0
@@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ static inline u16 kern_pcid(u16 asid)
{
VM_WARN_ON_ONCE(asid > MAX_ASID_AVAILABLE);
-#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
/*
* Make sure that the dynamic ASID space does not conflict with the
* bit we are using to switch between user and kernel ASIDs.
@@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ static inline u16 kern_pcid(u16 asid)
static inline u16 user_pcid(u16 asid)
{
u16 ret = kern_pcid(asid);
-#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
ret |= 1 << X86_CR3_PTI_PCID_USER_BIT;
#endif
return ret;
@@ -262,7 +262,7 @@ static void choose_new_asid(struct mm_struct *next, u64 next_tlb_gen,
static inline void invalidate_user_asid(u16 asid)
{
/* There is no user ASID if address space separation is off */
- if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION))
+ if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION))
return;
/*
@@ -299,7 +299,7 @@ static void load_new_mm_cr3(pgd_t *pgdir, u16 new_asid, unsigned long lam,
write_cr3(new_mm_cr3);
}
-void leave_mm(int cpu)
+void leave_mm(void)
{
struct mm_struct *loaded_mm = this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.loaded_mm);
@@ -327,7 +327,7 @@ void switch_mm(struct mm_struct *prev, struct mm_struct *next,
unsigned long flags;
local_irq_save(flags);
- switch_mm_irqs_off(prev, next, tsk);
+ switch_mm_irqs_off(NULL, next, tsk);
local_irq_restore(flags);
}
@@ -492,10 +492,16 @@ void cr4_update_pce(void *ignored)
static inline void cr4_update_pce_mm(struct mm_struct *mm) { }
#endif
-void switch_mm_irqs_off(struct mm_struct *prev, struct mm_struct *next,
+/*
+ * This optimizes when not actually switching mm's. Some architectures use the
+ * 'unused' argument for this optimization, but x86 must use
+ * 'cpu_tlbstate.loaded_mm' instead because it does not always keep
+ * 'current->active_mm' up to date.
+ */
+void switch_mm_irqs_off(struct mm_struct *unused, struct mm_struct *next,
struct task_struct *tsk)
{
- struct mm_struct *real_prev = this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.loaded_mm);
+ struct mm_struct *prev = this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.loaded_mm);
u16 prev_asid = this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.loaded_mm_asid);
unsigned long new_lam = mm_lam_cr3_mask(next);
bool was_lazy = this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate_shared.is_lazy);
@@ -504,15 +510,6 @@ void switch_mm_irqs_off(struct mm_struct *prev, struct mm_struct *next,
bool need_flush;
u16 new_asid;
- /*
- * NB: The scheduler will call us with prev == next when switching
- * from lazy TLB mode to normal mode if active_mm isn't changing.
- * When this happens, we don't assume that CR3 (and hence
- * cpu_tlbstate.loaded_mm) matches next.
- *
- * NB: leave_mm() calls us with prev == NULL and tsk == NULL.
- */
-
/* We don't want flush_tlb_func() to run concurrently with us. */
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING))
WARN_ON_ONCE(!irqs_disabled());
@@ -527,7 +524,7 @@ void switch_mm_irqs_off(struct mm_struct *prev, struct mm_struct *next,
* isn't free.
*/
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_VM
- if (WARN_ON_ONCE(__read_cr3() != build_cr3(real_prev->pgd, prev_asid,
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(__read_cr3() != build_cr3(prev->pgd, prev_asid,
tlbstate_lam_cr3_mask()))) {
/*
* If we were to BUG here, we'd be very likely to kill
@@ -559,7 +556,7 @@ void switch_mm_irqs_off(struct mm_struct *prev, struct mm_struct *next,
* provides that full memory barrier and core serializing
* instruction.
*/
- if (real_prev == next) {
+ if (prev == next) {
/* Not actually switching mm's */
VM_WARN_ON(this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.ctxs[prev_asid].ctx_id) !=
next->context.ctx_id);
@@ -574,7 +571,7 @@ void switch_mm_irqs_off(struct mm_struct *prev, struct mm_struct *next,
* mm_cpumask. The TLB shootdown code can figure out from
* cpu_tlbstate_shared.is_lazy whether or not to send an IPI.
*/
- if (WARN_ON_ONCE(real_prev != &init_mm &&
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(prev != &init_mm &&
!cpumask_test_cpu(cpu, mm_cpumask(next))))
cpumask_set_cpu(cpu, mm_cpumask(next));
@@ -616,10 +613,10 @@ void switch_mm_irqs_off(struct mm_struct *prev, struct mm_struct *next,
* Skip kernel threads; we never send init_mm TLB flushing IPIs,
* but the bitmap manipulation can cause cache line contention.
*/
- if (real_prev != &init_mm) {
+ if (prev != &init_mm) {
VM_WARN_ON_ONCE(!cpumask_test_cpu(cpu,
- mm_cpumask(real_prev)));
- cpumask_clear_cpu(cpu, mm_cpumask(real_prev));
+ mm_cpumask(prev)));
+ cpumask_clear_cpu(cpu, mm_cpumask(prev));
}
/*
@@ -656,9 +653,9 @@ void switch_mm_irqs_off(struct mm_struct *prev, struct mm_struct *next,
this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.loaded_mm, next);
this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.loaded_mm_asid, new_asid);
- if (next != real_prev) {
+ if (next != prev) {
cr4_update_pce_mm(next);
- switch_ldt(real_prev, next);
+ switch_ldt(prev, next);
}
}