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| author | Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org> | 2024-05-18 17:40:19 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org> | 2024-05-18 17:40:19 +0000 |
| commit | 9f0fc191371843c4fc000a226b0a26b6c059aacd (patch) | |
| tree | 35f8be3ef04506ac891ad001e8c41e535ae8d01d /certs/Kconfig | |
| parent | Releasing progress-linux version 6.6.15-2~progress7.99u1. (diff) | |
| download | linux-9f0fc191371843c4fc000a226b0a26b6c059aacd.tar.xz linux-9f0fc191371843c4fc000a226b0a26b6c059aacd.zip | |
Merging upstream version 6.7.7.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'certs/Kconfig')
| -rw-r--r-- | certs/Kconfig | 22 |
1 files changed, 19 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/certs/Kconfig b/certs/Kconfig index 1f109b0708..78307dc255 100644 --- a/certs/Kconfig +++ b/certs/Kconfig @@ -30,9 +30,11 @@ config MODULE_SIG_KEY_TYPE_RSA config MODULE_SIG_KEY_TYPE_ECDSA bool "ECDSA" select CRYPTO_ECDSA + depends on !(MODULE_SIG_SHA256 || MODULE_SIG_SHA3_256) help - Use an elliptic curve key (NIST P384) for module signing. Consider - using a strong hash like sha256 or sha384 for hashing modules. + Use an elliptic curve key (NIST P384) for module signing. Use + a strong hash of same or higher bit length, i.e. sha384 or + sha512 for hashing modules. Note: Remove all ECDSA signing keys, e.g. certs/signing_key.pem, when falling back to building Linux 5.14 and older kernels. @@ -88,7 +90,21 @@ config SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING help If set, provide a keyring to which extra keys may be added, provided those keys are not blacklisted and are vouched for by a key built - into the kernel or already in the secondary trusted keyring. + into the kernel, machine keyring (if configured), or already in the + secondary trusted keyring. + +config SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING_SIGNED_BY_BUILTIN + bool "Only allow additional certs signed by keys on the builtin trusted keyring" + depends on SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING + help + If set, only certificates signed by keys on the builtin trusted + keyring may be loaded onto the secondary trusted keyring. + + Note: The machine keyring, if configured, will be linked to the + secondary keyring. When enabling this option, it is recommended + to also configure INTEGRITY_CA_MACHINE_KEYRING_MAX to prevent + linking code signing keys with imputed trust to the secondary + trusted keyring. config SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING bool "Provide system-wide ring of blacklisted keys" |