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authorDaniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>2024-04-11 08:27:49 +0000
committerDaniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>2024-04-11 08:27:49 +0000
commitace9429bb58fd418f0c81d4c2835699bddf6bde6 (patch)
treeb2d64bc10158fdd5497876388cd68142ca374ed3 /fs/ecryptfs/messaging.c
parentInitial commit. (diff)
downloadlinux-ace9429bb58fd418f0c81d4c2835699bddf6bde6.tar.xz
linux-ace9429bb58fd418f0c81d4c2835699bddf6bde6.zip
Adding upstream version 6.6.15.upstream/6.6.15
Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/ecryptfs/messaging.c')
-rw-r--r--fs/ecryptfs/messaging.c451
1 files changed, 451 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/fs/ecryptfs/messaging.c b/fs/ecryptfs/messaging.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..6318f3500
--- /dev/null
+++ b/fs/ecryptfs/messaging.c
@@ -0,0 +1,451 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * eCryptfs: Linux filesystem encryption layer
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2004-2008 International Business Machines Corp.
+ * Author(s): Michael A. Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
+ * Tyler Hicks <code@tyhicks.com>
+ */
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
+#include <linux/nsproxy.h>
+#include "ecryptfs_kernel.h"
+
+static LIST_HEAD(ecryptfs_msg_ctx_free_list);
+static LIST_HEAD(ecryptfs_msg_ctx_alloc_list);
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(ecryptfs_msg_ctx_lists_mux);
+
+static struct hlist_head *ecryptfs_daemon_hash;
+DEFINE_MUTEX(ecryptfs_daemon_hash_mux);
+static int ecryptfs_hash_bits;
+#define ecryptfs_current_euid_hash(uid) \
+ hash_long((unsigned long)from_kuid(&init_user_ns, current_euid()), ecryptfs_hash_bits)
+
+static u32 ecryptfs_msg_counter;
+static struct ecryptfs_msg_ctx *ecryptfs_msg_ctx_arr;
+
+/**
+ * ecryptfs_acquire_free_msg_ctx
+ * @msg_ctx: The context that was acquired from the free list
+ *
+ * Acquires a context element from the free list and locks the mutex
+ * on the context. Sets the msg_ctx task to current. Returns zero on
+ * success; non-zero on error or upon failure to acquire a free
+ * context element. Must be called with ecryptfs_msg_ctx_lists_mux
+ * held.
+ */
+static int ecryptfs_acquire_free_msg_ctx(struct ecryptfs_msg_ctx **msg_ctx)
+{
+ struct list_head *p;
+ int rc;
+
+ if (list_empty(&ecryptfs_msg_ctx_free_list)) {
+ printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: The eCryptfs free "
+ "context list is empty. It may be helpful to "
+ "specify the ecryptfs_message_buf_len "
+ "parameter to be greater than the current "
+ "value of [%d]\n", __func__, ecryptfs_message_buf_len);
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ list_for_each(p, &ecryptfs_msg_ctx_free_list) {
+ *msg_ctx = list_entry(p, struct ecryptfs_msg_ctx, node);
+ if (mutex_trylock(&(*msg_ctx)->mux)) {
+ (*msg_ctx)->task = current;
+ rc = 0;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+out:
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * ecryptfs_msg_ctx_free_to_alloc
+ * @msg_ctx: The context to move from the free list to the alloc list
+ *
+ * Must be called with ecryptfs_msg_ctx_lists_mux held.
+ */
+static void ecryptfs_msg_ctx_free_to_alloc(struct ecryptfs_msg_ctx *msg_ctx)
+{
+ list_move(&msg_ctx->node, &ecryptfs_msg_ctx_alloc_list);
+ msg_ctx->state = ECRYPTFS_MSG_CTX_STATE_PENDING;
+ msg_ctx->counter = ++ecryptfs_msg_counter;
+}
+
+/**
+ * ecryptfs_msg_ctx_alloc_to_free
+ * @msg_ctx: The context to move from the alloc list to the free list
+ *
+ * Must be called with ecryptfs_msg_ctx_lists_mux held.
+ */
+void ecryptfs_msg_ctx_alloc_to_free(struct ecryptfs_msg_ctx *msg_ctx)
+{
+ list_move(&(msg_ctx->node), &ecryptfs_msg_ctx_free_list);
+ kfree(msg_ctx->msg);
+ msg_ctx->msg = NULL;
+ msg_ctx->state = ECRYPTFS_MSG_CTX_STATE_FREE;
+}
+
+/**
+ * ecryptfs_find_daemon_by_euid
+ * @daemon: If return value is zero, points to the desired daemon pointer
+ *
+ * Must be called with ecryptfs_daemon_hash_mux held.
+ *
+ * Search the hash list for the current effective user id.
+ *
+ * Returns zero if the user id exists in the list; non-zero otherwise.
+ */
+int ecryptfs_find_daemon_by_euid(struct ecryptfs_daemon **daemon)
+{
+ int rc;
+
+ hlist_for_each_entry(*daemon,
+ &ecryptfs_daemon_hash[ecryptfs_current_euid_hash()],
+ euid_chain) {
+ if (uid_eq((*daemon)->file->f_cred->euid, current_euid())) {
+ rc = 0;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+out:
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * ecryptfs_spawn_daemon - Create and initialize a new daemon struct
+ * @daemon: Pointer to set to newly allocated daemon struct
+ * @file: File used when opening /dev/ecryptfs
+ *
+ * Must be called ceremoniously while in possession of
+ * ecryptfs_sacred_daemon_hash_mux
+ *
+ * Returns zero on success; non-zero otherwise
+ */
+int
+ecryptfs_spawn_daemon(struct ecryptfs_daemon **daemon, struct file *file)
+{
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ (*daemon) = kzalloc(sizeof(**daemon), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!(*daemon)) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ (*daemon)->file = file;
+ mutex_init(&(*daemon)->mux);
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&(*daemon)->msg_ctx_out_queue);
+ init_waitqueue_head(&(*daemon)->wait);
+ (*daemon)->num_queued_msg_ctx = 0;
+ hlist_add_head(&(*daemon)->euid_chain,
+ &ecryptfs_daemon_hash[ecryptfs_current_euid_hash()]);
+out:
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * ecryptfs_exorcise_daemon - Destroy the daemon struct
+ *
+ * Must be called ceremoniously while in possession of
+ * ecryptfs_daemon_hash_mux and the daemon's own mux.
+ */
+int ecryptfs_exorcise_daemon(struct ecryptfs_daemon *daemon)
+{
+ struct ecryptfs_msg_ctx *msg_ctx, *msg_ctx_tmp;
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ mutex_lock(&daemon->mux);
+ if ((daemon->flags & ECRYPTFS_DAEMON_IN_READ)
+ || (daemon->flags & ECRYPTFS_DAEMON_IN_POLL)) {
+ rc = -EBUSY;
+ mutex_unlock(&daemon->mux);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ list_for_each_entry_safe(msg_ctx, msg_ctx_tmp,
+ &daemon->msg_ctx_out_queue, daemon_out_list) {
+ list_del(&msg_ctx->daemon_out_list);
+ daemon->num_queued_msg_ctx--;
+ printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: Warning: dropping message that is in "
+ "the out queue of a dying daemon\n", __func__);
+ ecryptfs_msg_ctx_alloc_to_free(msg_ctx);
+ }
+ hlist_del(&daemon->euid_chain);
+ mutex_unlock(&daemon->mux);
+ kfree_sensitive(daemon);
+out:
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * ecryptfs_process_response
+ * @daemon: eCryptfs daemon object
+ * @msg: The ecryptfs message received; the caller should sanity check
+ * msg->data_len and free the memory
+ * @seq: The sequence number of the message; must match the sequence
+ * number for the existing message context waiting for this
+ * response
+ *
+ * Processes a response message after sending an operation request to
+ * userspace. Some other process is awaiting this response. Before
+ * sending out its first communications, the other process allocated a
+ * msg_ctx from the ecryptfs_msg_ctx_arr at a particular index. The
+ * response message contains this index so that we can copy over the
+ * response message into the msg_ctx that the process holds a
+ * reference to. The other process is going to wake up, check to see
+ * that msg_ctx->state == ECRYPTFS_MSG_CTX_STATE_DONE, and then
+ * proceed to read off and process the response message. Returns zero
+ * upon delivery to desired context element; non-zero upon delivery
+ * failure or error.
+ *
+ * Returns zero on success; non-zero otherwise
+ */
+int ecryptfs_process_response(struct ecryptfs_daemon *daemon,
+ struct ecryptfs_message *msg, u32 seq)
+{
+ struct ecryptfs_msg_ctx *msg_ctx;
+ size_t msg_size;
+ int rc;
+
+ if (msg->index >= ecryptfs_message_buf_len) {
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ printk(KERN_ERR "%s: Attempt to reference "
+ "context buffer at index [%d]; maximum "
+ "allowable is [%d]\n", __func__, msg->index,
+ (ecryptfs_message_buf_len - 1));
+ goto out;
+ }
+ msg_ctx = &ecryptfs_msg_ctx_arr[msg->index];
+ mutex_lock(&msg_ctx->mux);
+ if (msg_ctx->state != ECRYPTFS_MSG_CTX_STATE_PENDING) {
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: Desired context element is not "
+ "pending a response\n", __func__);
+ goto unlock;
+ } else if (msg_ctx->counter != seq) {
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: Invalid message sequence; "
+ "expected [%d]; received [%d]\n", __func__,
+ msg_ctx->counter, seq);
+ goto unlock;
+ }
+ msg_size = (sizeof(*msg) + msg->data_len);
+ msg_ctx->msg = kmemdup(msg, msg_size, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!msg_ctx->msg) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto unlock;
+ }
+ msg_ctx->state = ECRYPTFS_MSG_CTX_STATE_DONE;
+ wake_up_process(msg_ctx->task);
+ rc = 0;
+unlock:
+ mutex_unlock(&msg_ctx->mux);
+out:
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * ecryptfs_send_message_locked
+ * @data: The data to send
+ * @data_len: The length of data
+ * @msg_type: Type of message
+ * @msg_ctx: The message context allocated for the send
+ *
+ * Must be called with ecryptfs_daemon_hash_mux held.
+ *
+ * Returns zero on success; non-zero otherwise
+ */
+static int
+ecryptfs_send_message_locked(char *data, int data_len, u8 msg_type,
+ struct ecryptfs_msg_ctx **msg_ctx)
+{
+ struct ecryptfs_daemon *daemon;
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = ecryptfs_find_daemon_by_euid(&daemon);
+ if (rc) {
+ rc = -ENOTCONN;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ mutex_lock(&ecryptfs_msg_ctx_lists_mux);
+ rc = ecryptfs_acquire_free_msg_ctx(msg_ctx);
+ if (rc) {
+ mutex_unlock(&ecryptfs_msg_ctx_lists_mux);
+ printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: Could not claim a free "
+ "context element\n", __func__);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ ecryptfs_msg_ctx_free_to_alloc(*msg_ctx);
+ mutex_unlock(&(*msg_ctx)->mux);
+ mutex_unlock(&ecryptfs_msg_ctx_lists_mux);
+ rc = ecryptfs_send_miscdev(data, data_len, *msg_ctx, msg_type, 0,
+ daemon);
+ if (rc)
+ printk(KERN_ERR "%s: Error attempting to send message to "
+ "userspace daemon; rc = [%d]\n", __func__, rc);
+out:
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * ecryptfs_send_message
+ * @data: The data to send
+ * @data_len: The length of data
+ * @msg_ctx: The message context allocated for the send
+ *
+ * Grabs ecryptfs_daemon_hash_mux.
+ *
+ * Returns zero on success; non-zero otherwise
+ */
+int ecryptfs_send_message(char *data, int data_len,
+ struct ecryptfs_msg_ctx **msg_ctx)
+{
+ int rc;
+
+ mutex_lock(&ecryptfs_daemon_hash_mux);
+ rc = ecryptfs_send_message_locked(data, data_len, ECRYPTFS_MSG_REQUEST,
+ msg_ctx);
+ mutex_unlock(&ecryptfs_daemon_hash_mux);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * ecryptfs_wait_for_response
+ * @msg_ctx: The context that was assigned when sending a message
+ * @msg: The incoming message from userspace; not set if rc != 0
+ *
+ * Sleeps until awaken by ecryptfs_receive_message or until the amount
+ * of time exceeds ecryptfs_message_wait_timeout. If zero is
+ * returned, msg will point to a valid message from userspace; a
+ * non-zero value is returned upon failure to receive a message or an
+ * error occurs. Callee must free @msg on success.
+ */
+int ecryptfs_wait_for_response(struct ecryptfs_msg_ctx *msg_ctx,
+ struct ecryptfs_message **msg)
+{
+ signed long timeout = ecryptfs_message_wait_timeout * HZ;
+ int rc = 0;
+
+sleep:
+ timeout = schedule_timeout_interruptible(timeout);
+ mutex_lock(&ecryptfs_msg_ctx_lists_mux);
+ mutex_lock(&msg_ctx->mux);
+ if (msg_ctx->state != ECRYPTFS_MSG_CTX_STATE_DONE) {
+ if (timeout) {
+ mutex_unlock(&msg_ctx->mux);
+ mutex_unlock(&ecryptfs_msg_ctx_lists_mux);
+ goto sleep;
+ }
+ rc = -ENOMSG;
+ } else {
+ *msg = msg_ctx->msg;
+ msg_ctx->msg = NULL;
+ }
+ ecryptfs_msg_ctx_alloc_to_free(msg_ctx);
+ mutex_unlock(&msg_ctx->mux);
+ mutex_unlock(&ecryptfs_msg_ctx_lists_mux);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+int __init ecryptfs_init_messaging(void)
+{
+ int i;
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ if (ecryptfs_number_of_users > ECRYPTFS_MAX_NUM_USERS) {
+ ecryptfs_number_of_users = ECRYPTFS_MAX_NUM_USERS;
+ printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: Specified number of users is "
+ "too large, defaulting to [%d] users\n", __func__,
+ ecryptfs_number_of_users);
+ }
+ mutex_lock(&ecryptfs_daemon_hash_mux);
+ ecryptfs_hash_bits = 1;
+ while (ecryptfs_number_of_users >> ecryptfs_hash_bits)
+ ecryptfs_hash_bits++;
+ ecryptfs_daemon_hash = kmalloc((sizeof(struct hlist_head)
+ * (1 << ecryptfs_hash_bits)),
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!ecryptfs_daemon_hash) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ mutex_unlock(&ecryptfs_daemon_hash_mux);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < (1 << ecryptfs_hash_bits); i++)
+ INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&ecryptfs_daemon_hash[i]);
+ mutex_unlock(&ecryptfs_daemon_hash_mux);
+ ecryptfs_msg_ctx_arr = kmalloc((sizeof(struct ecryptfs_msg_ctx)
+ * ecryptfs_message_buf_len),
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!ecryptfs_msg_ctx_arr) {
+ kfree(ecryptfs_daemon_hash);
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ mutex_lock(&ecryptfs_msg_ctx_lists_mux);
+ ecryptfs_msg_counter = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < ecryptfs_message_buf_len; i++) {
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ecryptfs_msg_ctx_arr[i].node);
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ecryptfs_msg_ctx_arr[i].daemon_out_list);
+ mutex_init(&ecryptfs_msg_ctx_arr[i].mux);
+ mutex_lock(&ecryptfs_msg_ctx_arr[i].mux);
+ ecryptfs_msg_ctx_arr[i].index = i;
+ ecryptfs_msg_ctx_arr[i].state = ECRYPTFS_MSG_CTX_STATE_FREE;
+ ecryptfs_msg_ctx_arr[i].counter = 0;
+ ecryptfs_msg_ctx_arr[i].task = NULL;
+ ecryptfs_msg_ctx_arr[i].msg = NULL;
+ list_add_tail(&ecryptfs_msg_ctx_arr[i].node,
+ &ecryptfs_msg_ctx_free_list);
+ mutex_unlock(&ecryptfs_msg_ctx_arr[i].mux);
+ }
+ mutex_unlock(&ecryptfs_msg_ctx_lists_mux);
+ rc = ecryptfs_init_ecryptfs_miscdev();
+ if (rc)
+ ecryptfs_release_messaging();
+out:
+ return rc;
+}
+
+void ecryptfs_release_messaging(void)
+{
+ if (ecryptfs_msg_ctx_arr) {
+ int i;
+
+ mutex_lock(&ecryptfs_msg_ctx_lists_mux);
+ for (i = 0; i < ecryptfs_message_buf_len; i++) {
+ mutex_lock(&ecryptfs_msg_ctx_arr[i].mux);
+ kfree(ecryptfs_msg_ctx_arr[i].msg);
+ mutex_unlock(&ecryptfs_msg_ctx_arr[i].mux);
+ }
+ kfree(ecryptfs_msg_ctx_arr);
+ mutex_unlock(&ecryptfs_msg_ctx_lists_mux);
+ }
+ if (ecryptfs_daemon_hash) {
+ struct ecryptfs_daemon *daemon;
+ struct hlist_node *n;
+ int i;
+
+ mutex_lock(&ecryptfs_daemon_hash_mux);
+ for (i = 0; i < (1 << ecryptfs_hash_bits); i++) {
+ int rc;
+
+ hlist_for_each_entry_safe(daemon, n,
+ &ecryptfs_daemon_hash[i],
+ euid_chain) {
+ rc = ecryptfs_exorcise_daemon(daemon);
+ if (rc)
+ printk(KERN_ERR "%s: Error whilst "
+ "attempting to destroy daemon; "
+ "rc = [%d]. Dazed and confused, "
+ "but trying to continue.\n",
+ __func__, rc);
+ }
+ }
+ kfree(ecryptfs_daemon_hash);
+ mutex_unlock(&ecryptfs_daemon_hash_mux);
+ }
+ ecryptfs_destroy_ecryptfs_miscdev();
+ return;
+}