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author | Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org> | 2024-05-18 17:39:57 +0000 |
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committer | Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org> | 2024-05-18 17:39:57 +0000 |
commit | dc50eab76b709d68175a358d6e23a5a3890764d3 (patch) | |
tree | c754d0390db060af0213ff994f0ac310e4cfd6e9 /kernel/configs | |
parent | Adding debian version 6.6.15-2. (diff) | |
download | linux-dc50eab76b709d68175a358d6e23a5a3890764d3.tar.xz linux-dc50eab76b709d68175a358d6e23a5a3890764d3.zip |
Merging upstream version 6.7.7.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel/configs')
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/configs/hardening.config | 98 |
1 files changed, 98 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/configs/hardening.config b/kernel/configs/hardening.config new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..95a400f042 --- /dev/null +++ b/kernel/configs/hardening.config @@ -0,0 +1,98 @@ +# Help: Basic kernel hardening options +# +# These are considered the basic kernel hardening, self-protection, and +# attack surface reduction options. They are expected to have low (or +# no) performance impact on most workloads, and have a reasonable level +# of legacy API removals. + +# Make sure reporting of various hardening actions is possible. +CONFIG_BUG=y + +# Basic kernel memory permission enforcement. +CONFIG_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX=y +CONFIG_STRICT_MODULE_RWX=y +CONFIG_VMAP_STACK=y + +# Kernel image and memory ASLR. +CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE=y +CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MEMORY=y + +# Randomize allocator freelists, harden metadata. +CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM=y +CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED=y +CONFIG_SHUFFLE_PAGE_ALLOCATOR=y +CONFIG_RANDOM_KMALLOC_CACHES=y + +# Randomize kernel stack offset on syscall entry. +CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET_DEFAULT=y + +# Basic stack frame overflow protection. +CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR=y +CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG=y + +# Basic buffer length bounds checking. +CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY=y +CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE=y + +# Basic array index bounds checking. +CONFIG_UBSAN=y +CONFIG_UBSAN_TRAP=y +CONFIG_UBSAN_BOUNDS=y +# CONFIG_UBSAN_SHIFT is not set +# CONFIG_UBSAN_DIV_ZERO +# CONFIG_UBSAN_UNREACHABLE +# CONFIG_UBSAN_BOOL +# CONFIG_UBSAN_ENUM +# CONFIG_UBSAN_ALIGNMENT +CONFIG_UBSAN_SANITIZE_ALL=y + +# Linked list integrity checking. +CONFIG_LIST_HARDENED=y + +# Initialize all heap variables to zero on allocation. +CONFIG_INIT_ON_ALLOC_DEFAULT_ON=y + +# Initialize all stack variables to zero on function entry. +CONFIG_INIT_STACK_ALL_ZERO=y + +# Wipe RAM at reboot via EFI. For more details, see: +# https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/resource/pc-client-work-group-platform-reset-attack-mitigation-specification/ +# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1532058 +CONFIG_RESET_ATTACK_MITIGATION=y + +# Disable DMA between EFI hand-off and the kernel's IOMMU setup. +CONFIG_EFI_DISABLE_PCI_DMA=y + +# Force IOMMU TLB invalidation so devices will never be able to access stale +# data content. +CONFIG_IOMMU_SUPPORT=y +CONFIG_IOMMU_DEFAULT_DMA_STRICT=y + +# Do not allow direct physical memory access to non-device memory. +CONFIG_STRICT_DEVMEM=y +CONFIG_IO_STRICT_DEVMEM=y + +# Provide userspace with seccomp BPF API for syscall attack surface reduction. +CONFIG_SECCOMP=y +CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER=y + +# Provides some protections against SYN flooding. +CONFIG_SYN_COOKIES=y + +# Attack surface reduction: do not autoload TTY line disciplines. +# CONFIG_LDISC_AUTOLOAD is not set + +# Dangerous; enabling this disables userspace brk ASLR. +# CONFIG_COMPAT_BRK is not set + +# Dangerous; exposes kernel text image layout. +# CONFIG_PROC_KCORE is not set + +# Dangerous; enabling this disables userspace VDSO ASLR. +# CONFIG_COMPAT_VDSO is not set + +# Attack surface reduction: Use the modern PTY interface (devpts) only. +# CONFIG_LEGACY_PTYS is not set + +# Attack surface reduction: Use only modesetting video drivers. +# CONFIG_DRM_LEGACY is not set |