summaryrefslogtreecommitdiffstats
path: root/security/selinux
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorDaniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>2024-04-11 08:27:49 +0000
committerDaniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>2024-04-11 08:27:49 +0000
commitace9429bb58fd418f0c81d4c2835699bddf6bde6 (patch)
treeb2d64bc10158fdd5497876388cd68142ca374ed3 /security/selinux
parentInitial commit. (diff)
downloadlinux-ace9429bb58fd418f0c81d4c2835699bddf6bde6.tar.xz
linux-ace9429bb58fd418f0c81d4c2835699bddf6bde6.zip
Adding upstream version 6.6.15.upstream/6.6.15
Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/selinux')
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/.gitignore3
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/Kconfig79
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/Makefile40
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/avc.c1205
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/hooks.c7419
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ibpkey.c237
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ima.c120
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/include/audit.h60
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/include/avc.h176
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/include/avc_ss.h23
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/include/classmap.h264
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/include/conditional.h23
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/include/ibpkey.h35
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/include/ima.h28
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/include/initial_sid_to_string.h35
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/include/netif.h24
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/include/netlabel.h150
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/include/netnode.h26
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/include/netport.h25
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/include/objsec.h197
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/include/policycap.h21
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/include/policycap_names.h19
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/include/security.h385
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/include/xfrm.h94
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/netif.c280
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/netlabel.c615
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/netlink.c121
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/netnode.c305
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/netport.c238
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c219
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/selinuxfs.c2177
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/avtab.c649
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/avtab.h126
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/conditional.c758
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/conditional.h85
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/constraint.h63
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/context.c32
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/context.h201
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c564
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h154
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c194
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/hashtab.h154
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/mls.c662
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/mls.h116
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/mls_types.h52
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/policydb.c3741
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/policydb.h394
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/services.c3998
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/services.h46
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c633
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/sidtab.h158
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/symtab.c54
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/symtab.h27
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/status.c122
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/xfrm.c469
55 files changed, 28095 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/selinux/.gitignore b/security/selinux/.gitignore
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..168fae13ca
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/.gitignore
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+av_permissions.h
+flask.h
diff --git a/security/selinux/Kconfig b/security/selinux/Kconfig
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..d30348fbe0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/Kconfig
@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+config SECURITY_SELINUX
+ bool "SELinux Support"
+ depends on SECURITY_NETWORK && AUDIT && NET && INET
+ select NETWORK_SECMARK
+ default n
+ help
+ This selects Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux).
+ You will also need a policy configuration and a labeled filesystem.
+ If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
+
+config SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
+ bool "SELinux boot parameter"
+ depends on SECURITY_SELINUX
+ default n
+ help
+ This option adds a kernel parameter 'selinux', which allows SELinux
+ to be disabled at boot. If this option is selected, SELinux
+ functionality can be disabled with selinux=0 on the kernel
+ command line. The purpose of this option is to allow a single
+ kernel image to be distributed with SELinux built in, but not
+ necessarily enabled.
+
+ If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
+
+config SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
+ bool "SELinux Development Support"
+ depends on SECURITY_SELINUX
+ default y
+ help
+ This enables the development support option of SELinux,
+ which is useful for experimenting with SELinux and developing
+ policies. If unsure, say Y. With this option enabled, the
+ kernel will start in permissive mode (log everything, deny nothing)
+ unless you specify enforcing=1 on the kernel command line. You
+ can interactively toggle the kernel between enforcing mode and
+ permissive mode (if permitted by the policy) via
+ /sys/fs/selinux/enforce.
+
+config SECURITY_SELINUX_AVC_STATS
+ bool "SELinux AVC Statistics"
+ depends on SECURITY_SELINUX
+ default y
+ help
+ This option collects access vector cache statistics to
+ /sys/fs/selinux/avc/cache_stats, which may be monitored via
+ tools such as avcstat.
+
+config SECURITY_SELINUX_SIDTAB_HASH_BITS
+ int "SELinux sidtab hashtable size"
+ depends on SECURITY_SELINUX
+ range 8 13
+ default 9
+ help
+ This option sets the number of buckets used in the sidtab hashtable
+ to 2^SECURITY_SELINUX_SIDTAB_HASH_BITS buckets. The number of hash
+ collisions may be viewed at /sys/fs/selinux/ss/sidtab_hash_stats. If
+ chain lengths are high (e.g. > 20) then selecting a higher value here
+ will ensure that lookups times are short and stable.
+
+config SECURITY_SELINUX_SID2STR_CACHE_SIZE
+ int "SELinux SID to context string translation cache size"
+ depends on SECURITY_SELINUX
+ default 256
+ help
+ This option defines the size of the internal SID -> context string
+ cache, which improves the performance of context to string
+ conversion. Setting this option to 0 disables the cache completely.
+
+ If unsure, keep the default value.
+
+config SECURITY_SELINUX_DEBUG
+ bool "SELinux kernel debugging support"
+ depends on SECURITY_SELINUX
+ default n
+ help
+ This enables debugging code designed to help SELinux kernel
+ developers, unless you know what this does in the kernel code you
+ should leave this disabled.
diff --git a/security/selinux/Makefile b/security/selinux/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..8363796390
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#
+# Makefile for building the SELinux module as part of the kernel tree.
+#
+
+# NOTE: There are a number of improvements that can be made to this Makefile
+# once the kernel requires make v4.3 or greater; the most important feature
+# lacking in older versions of make is support for grouped targets. These
+# improvements are noted inline in the Makefile below ...
+
+obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) := selinux.o
+
+ccflags-y := -I$(srctree)/security/selinux -I$(srctree)/security/selinux/include
+
+selinux-y := avc.o hooks.o selinuxfs.o netlink.o nlmsgtab.o netif.o \
+ netnode.o netport.o status.o \
+ ss/ebitmap.o ss/hashtab.o ss/symtab.o ss/sidtab.o ss/avtab.o \
+ ss/policydb.o ss/services.o ss/conditional.o ss/mls.o ss/context.o
+
+selinux-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM) += xfrm.o
+selinux-$(CONFIG_NETLABEL) += netlabel.o
+selinux-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND) += ibpkey.o
+selinux-$(CONFIG_IMA) += ima.o
+
+genhdrs := flask.h av_permissions.h
+
+# see the note above, replace the dependency rule with the one below:
+# $(addprefix $(obj)/,$(selinux-y)): $(addprefix $(obj)/,$(genhdrs))
+$(addprefix $(obj)/,$(selinux-y)): $(obj)/flask.h
+
+quiet_cmd_genhdrs = GEN $(addprefix $(obj)/,$(genhdrs))
+ cmd_genhdrs = $< $(addprefix $(obj)/,$(genhdrs))
+
+# see the note above, replace the $targets and 'flask.h' rule with the lines
+# below:
+# targets += $(genhdrs)
+# $(addprefix $(obj)/,$(genhdrs)) &: scripts/selinux/...
+targets += flask.h
+$(obj)/flask.h: scripts/selinux/genheaders/genheaders FORCE
+ $(call if_changed,genhdrs)
diff --git a/security/selinux/avc.c b/security/selinux/avc.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..32eb67fb3e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/avc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1205 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Implementation of the kernel access vector cache (AVC).
+ *
+ * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
+ * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ *
+ * Update: KaiGai, Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com>
+ * Replaced the avc_lock spinlock by RCU.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2003 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ */
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/stddef.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/dcache.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/skbuff.h>
+#include <linux/percpu.h>
+#include <linux/list.h>
+#include <net/sock.h>
+#include <linux/un.h>
+#include <net/af_unix.h>
+#include <linux/ip.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h>
+#include <linux/ipv6.h>
+#include <net/ipv6.h>
+#include "avc.h"
+#include "avc_ss.h"
+#include "classmap.h"
+
+#define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS
+#include <trace/events/avc.h>
+
+#define AVC_CACHE_SLOTS 512
+#define AVC_DEF_CACHE_THRESHOLD 512
+#define AVC_CACHE_RECLAIM 16
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_AVC_STATS
+#define avc_cache_stats_incr(field) this_cpu_inc(avc_cache_stats.field)
+#else
+#define avc_cache_stats_incr(field) do {} while (0)
+#endif
+
+struct avc_entry {
+ u32 ssid;
+ u32 tsid;
+ u16 tclass;
+ struct av_decision avd;
+ struct avc_xperms_node *xp_node;
+};
+
+struct avc_node {
+ struct avc_entry ae;
+ struct hlist_node list; /* anchored in avc_cache->slots[i] */
+ struct rcu_head rhead;
+};
+
+struct avc_xperms_decision_node {
+ struct extended_perms_decision xpd;
+ struct list_head xpd_list; /* list of extended_perms_decision */
+};
+
+struct avc_xperms_node {
+ struct extended_perms xp;
+ struct list_head xpd_head; /* list head of extended_perms_decision */
+};
+
+struct avc_cache {
+ struct hlist_head slots[AVC_CACHE_SLOTS]; /* head for avc_node->list */
+ spinlock_t slots_lock[AVC_CACHE_SLOTS]; /* lock for writes */
+ atomic_t lru_hint; /* LRU hint for reclaim scan */
+ atomic_t active_nodes;
+ u32 latest_notif; /* latest revocation notification */
+};
+
+struct avc_callback_node {
+ int (*callback) (u32 event);
+ u32 events;
+ struct avc_callback_node *next;
+};
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_AVC_STATS
+DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct avc_cache_stats, avc_cache_stats) = { 0 };
+#endif
+
+struct selinux_avc {
+ unsigned int avc_cache_threshold;
+ struct avc_cache avc_cache;
+};
+
+static struct selinux_avc selinux_avc;
+
+void selinux_avc_init(void)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ selinux_avc.avc_cache_threshold = AVC_DEF_CACHE_THRESHOLD;
+ for (i = 0; i < AVC_CACHE_SLOTS; i++) {
+ INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&selinux_avc.avc_cache.slots[i]);
+ spin_lock_init(&selinux_avc.avc_cache.slots_lock[i]);
+ }
+ atomic_set(&selinux_avc.avc_cache.active_nodes, 0);
+ atomic_set(&selinux_avc.avc_cache.lru_hint, 0);
+}
+
+unsigned int avc_get_cache_threshold(void)
+{
+ return selinux_avc.avc_cache_threshold;
+}
+
+void avc_set_cache_threshold(unsigned int cache_threshold)
+{
+ selinux_avc.avc_cache_threshold = cache_threshold;
+}
+
+static struct avc_callback_node *avc_callbacks __ro_after_init;
+static struct kmem_cache *avc_node_cachep __ro_after_init;
+static struct kmem_cache *avc_xperms_data_cachep __ro_after_init;
+static struct kmem_cache *avc_xperms_decision_cachep __ro_after_init;
+static struct kmem_cache *avc_xperms_cachep __ro_after_init;
+
+static inline u32 avc_hash(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass)
+{
+ return (ssid ^ (tsid<<2) ^ (tclass<<4)) & (AVC_CACHE_SLOTS - 1);
+}
+
+/**
+ * avc_init - Initialize the AVC.
+ *
+ * Initialize the access vector cache.
+ */
+void __init avc_init(void)
+{
+ avc_node_cachep = kmem_cache_create("avc_node", sizeof(struct avc_node),
+ 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
+ avc_xperms_cachep = kmem_cache_create("avc_xperms_node",
+ sizeof(struct avc_xperms_node),
+ 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
+ avc_xperms_decision_cachep = kmem_cache_create(
+ "avc_xperms_decision_node",
+ sizeof(struct avc_xperms_decision_node),
+ 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
+ avc_xperms_data_cachep = kmem_cache_create("avc_xperms_data",
+ sizeof(struct extended_perms_data),
+ 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
+}
+
+int avc_get_hash_stats(char *page)
+{
+ int i, chain_len, max_chain_len, slots_used;
+ struct avc_node *node;
+ struct hlist_head *head;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+
+ slots_used = 0;
+ max_chain_len = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < AVC_CACHE_SLOTS; i++) {
+ head = &selinux_avc.avc_cache.slots[i];
+ if (!hlist_empty(head)) {
+ slots_used++;
+ chain_len = 0;
+ hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(node, head, list)
+ chain_len++;
+ if (chain_len > max_chain_len)
+ max_chain_len = chain_len;
+ }
+ }
+
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+
+ return scnprintf(page, PAGE_SIZE, "entries: %d\nbuckets used: %d/%d\n"
+ "longest chain: %d\n",
+ atomic_read(&selinux_avc.avc_cache.active_nodes),
+ slots_used, AVC_CACHE_SLOTS, max_chain_len);
+}
+
+/*
+ * using a linked list for extended_perms_decision lookup because the list is
+ * always small. i.e. less than 5, typically 1
+ */
+static struct extended_perms_decision *avc_xperms_decision_lookup(u8 driver,
+ struct avc_xperms_node *xp_node)
+{
+ struct avc_xperms_decision_node *xpd_node;
+
+ list_for_each_entry(xpd_node, &xp_node->xpd_head, xpd_list) {
+ if (xpd_node->xpd.driver == driver)
+ return &xpd_node->xpd;
+ }
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static inline unsigned int
+avc_xperms_has_perm(struct extended_perms_decision *xpd,
+ u8 perm, u8 which)
+{
+ unsigned int rc = 0;
+
+ if ((which == XPERMS_ALLOWED) &&
+ (xpd->used & XPERMS_ALLOWED))
+ rc = security_xperm_test(xpd->allowed->p, perm);
+ else if ((which == XPERMS_AUDITALLOW) &&
+ (xpd->used & XPERMS_AUDITALLOW))
+ rc = security_xperm_test(xpd->auditallow->p, perm);
+ else if ((which == XPERMS_DONTAUDIT) &&
+ (xpd->used & XPERMS_DONTAUDIT))
+ rc = security_xperm_test(xpd->dontaudit->p, perm);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static void avc_xperms_allow_perm(struct avc_xperms_node *xp_node,
+ u8 driver, u8 perm)
+{
+ struct extended_perms_decision *xpd;
+ security_xperm_set(xp_node->xp.drivers.p, driver);
+ xpd = avc_xperms_decision_lookup(driver, xp_node);
+ if (xpd && xpd->allowed)
+ security_xperm_set(xpd->allowed->p, perm);
+}
+
+static void avc_xperms_decision_free(struct avc_xperms_decision_node *xpd_node)
+{
+ struct extended_perms_decision *xpd;
+
+ xpd = &xpd_node->xpd;
+ if (xpd->allowed)
+ kmem_cache_free(avc_xperms_data_cachep, xpd->allowed);
+ if (xpd->auditallow)
+ kmem_cache_free(avc_xperms_data_cachep, xpd->auditallow);
+ if (xpd->dontaudit)
+ kmem_cache_free(avc_xperms_data_cachep, xpd->dontaudit);
+ kmem_cache_free(avc_xperms_decision_cachep, xpd_node);
+}
+
+static void avc_xperms_free(struct avc_xperms_node *xp_node)
+{
+ struct avc_xperms_decision_node *xpd_node, *tmp;
+
+ if (!xp_node)
+ return;
+
+ list_for_each_entry_safe(xpd_node, tmp, &xp_node->xpd_head, xpd_list) {
+ list_del(&xpd_node->xpd_list);
+ avc_xperms_decision_free(xpd_node);
+ }
+ kmem_cache_free(avc_xperms_cachep, xp_node);
+}
+
+static void avc_copy_xperms_decision(struct extended_perms_decision *dest,
+ struct extended_perms_decision *src)
+{
+ dest->driver = src->driver;
+ dest->used = src->used;
+ if (dest->used & XPERMS_ALLOWED)
+ memcpy(dest->allowed->p, src->allowed->p,
+ sizeof(src->allowed->p));
+ if (dest->used & XPERMS_AUDITALLOW)
+ memcpy(dest->auditallow->p, src->auditallow->p,
+ sizeof(src->auditallow->p));
+ if (dest->used & XPERMS_DONTAUDIT)
+ memcpy(dest->dontaudit->p, src->dontaudit->p,
+ sizeof(src->dontaudit->p));
+}
+
+/*
+ * similar to avc_copy_xperms_decision, but only copy decision
+ * information relevant to this perm
+ */
+static inline void avc_quick_copy_xperms_decision(u8 perm,
+ struct extended_perms_decision *dest,
+ struct extended_perms_decision *src)
+{
+ /*
+ * compute index of the u32 of the 256 bits (8 u32s) that contain this
+ * command permission
+ */
+ u8 i = perm >> 5;
+
+ dest->used = src->used;
+ if (dest->used & XPERMS_ALLOWED)
+ dest->allowed->p[i] = src->allowed->p[i];
+ if (dest->used & XPERMS_AUDITALLOW)
+ dest->auditallow->p[i] = src->auditallow->p[i];
+ if (dest->used & XPERMS_DONTAUDIT)
+ dest->dontaudit->p[i] = src->dontaudit->p[i];
+}
+
+static struct avc_xperms_decision_node
+ *avc_xperms_decision_alloc(u8 which)
+{
+ struct avc_xperms_decision_node *xpd_node;
+ struct extended_perms_decision *xpd;
+
+ xpd_node = kmem_cache_zalloc(avc_xperms_decision_cachep,
+ GFP_NOWAIT | __GFP_NOWARN);
+ if (!xpd_node)
+ return NULL;
+
+ xpd = &xpd_node->xpd;
+ if (which & XPERMS_ALLOWED) {
+ xpd->allowed = kmem_cache_zalloc(avc_xperms_data_cachep,
+ GFP_NOWAIT | __GFP_NOWARN);
+ if (!xpd->allowed)
+ goto error;
+ }
+ if (which & XPERMS_AUDITALLOW) {
+ xpd->auditallow = kmem_cache_zalloc(avc_xperms_data_cachep,
+ GFP_NOWAIT | __GFP_NOWARN);
+ if (!xpd->auditallow)
+ goto error;
+ }
+ if (which & XPERMS_DONTAUDIT) {
+ xpd->dontaudit = kmem_cache_zalloc(avc_xperms_data_cachep,
+ GFP_NOWAIT | __GFP_NOWARN);
+ if (!xpd->dontaudit)
+ goto error;
+ }
+ return xpd_node;
+error:
+ avc_xperms_decision_free(xpd_node);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static int avc_add_xperms_decision(struct avc_node *node,
+ struct extended_perms_decision *src)
+{
+ struct avc_xperms_decision_node *dest_xpd;
+
+ node->ae.xp_node->xp.len++;
+ dest_xpd = avc_xperms_decision_alloc(src->used);
+ if (!dest_xpd)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ avc_copy_xperms_decision(&dest_xpd->xpd, src);
+ list_add(&dest_xpd->xpd_list, &node->ae.xp_node->xpd_head);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static struct avc_xperms_node *avc_xperms_alloc(void)
+{
+ struct avc_xperms_node *xp_node;
+
+ xp_node = kmem_cache_zalloc(avc_xperms_cachep, GFP_NOWAIT | __GFP_NOWARN);
+ if (!xp_node)
+ return xp_node;
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&xp_node->xpd_head);
+ return xp_node;
+}
+
+static int avc_xperms_populate(struct avc_node *node,
+ struct avc_xperms_node *src)
+{
+ struct avc_xperms_node *dest;
+ struct avc_xperms_decision_node *dest_xpd;
+ struct avc_xperms_decision_node *src_xpd;
+
+ if (src->xp.len == 0)
+ return 0;
+ dest = avc_xperms_alloc();
+ if (!dest)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ memcpy(dest->xp.drivers.p, src->xp.drivers.p, sizeof(dest->xp.drivers.p));
+ dest->xp.len = src->xp.len;
+
+ /* for each source xpd allocate a destination xpd and copy */
+ list_for_each_entry(src_xpd, &src->xpd_head, xpd_list) {
+ dest_xpd = avc_xperms_decision_alloc(src_xpd->xpd.used);
+ if (!dest_xpd)
+ goto error;
+ avc_copy_xperms_decision(&dest_xpd->xpd, &src_xpd->xpd);
+ list_add(&dest_xpd->xpd_list, &dest->xpd_head);
+ }
+ node->ae.xp_node = dest;
+ return 0;
+error:
+ avc_xperms_free(dest);
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+}
+
+static inline u32 avc_xperms_audit_required(u32 requested,
+ struct av_decision *avd,
+ struct extended_perms_decision *xpd,
+ u8 perm,
+ int result,
+ u32 *deniedp)
+{
+ u32 denied, audited;
+
+ denied = requested & ~avd->allowed;
+ if (unlikely(denied)) {
+ audited = denied & avd->auditdeny;
+ if (audited && xpd) {
+ if (avc_xperms_has_perm(xpd, perm, XPERMS_DONTAUDIT))
+ audited &= ~requested;
+ }
+ } else if (result) {
+ audited = denied = requested;
+ } else {
+ audited = requested & avd->auditallow;
+ if (audited && xpd) {
+ if (!avc_xperms_has_perm(xpd, perm, XPERMS_AUDITALLOW))
+ audited &= ~requested;
+ }
+ }
+
+ *deniedp = denied;
+ return audited;
+}
+
+static inline int avc_xperms_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
+ u32 requested, struct av_decision *avd,
+ struct extended_perms_decision *xpd,
+ u8 perm, int result,
+ struct common_audit_data *ad)
+{
+ u32 audited, denied;
+
+ audited = avc_xperms_audit_required(
+ requested, avd, xpd, perm, result, &denied);
+ if (likely(!audited))
+ return 0;
+ return slow_avc_audit(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested,
+ audited, denied, result, ad);
+}
+
+static void avc_node_free(struct rcu_head *rhead)
+{
+ struct avc_node *node = container_of(rhead, struct avc_node, rhead);
+ avc_xperms_free(node->ae.xp_node);
+ kmem_cache_free(avc_node_cachep, node);
+ avc_cache_stats_incr(frees);
+}
+
+static void avc_node_delete(struct avc_node *node)
+{
+ hlist_del_rcu(&node->list);
+ call_rcu(&node->rhead, avc_node_free);
+ atomic_dec(&selinux_avc.avc_cache.active_nodes);
+}
+
+static void avc_node_kill(struct avc_node *node)
+{
+ avc_xperms_free(node->ae.xp_node);
+ kmem_cache_free(avc_node_cachep, node);
+ avc_cache_stats_incr(frees);
+ atomic_dec(&selinux_avc.avc_cache.active_nodes);
+}
+
+static void avc_node_replace(struct avc_node *new, struct avc_node *old)
+{
+ hlist_replace_rcu(&old->list, &new->list);
+ call_rcu(&old->rhead, avc_node_free);
+ atomic_dec(&selinux_avc.avc_cache.active_nodes);
+}
+
+static inline int avc_reclaim_node(void)
+{
+ struct avc_node *node;
+ int hvalue, try, ecx;
+ unsigned long flags;
+ struct hlist_head *head;
+ spinlock_t *lock;
+
+ for (try = 0, ecx = 0; try < AVC_CACHE_SLOTS; try++) {
+ hvalue = atomic_inc_return(&selinux_avc.avc_cache.lru_hint) &
+ (AVC_CACHE_SLOTS - 1);
+ head = &selinux_avc.avc_cache.slots[hvalue];
+ lock = &selinux_avc.avc_cache.slots_lock[hvalue];
+
+ if (!spin_trylock_irqsave(lock, flags))
+ continue;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ hlist_for_each_entry(node, head, list) {
+ avc_node_delete(node);
+ avc_cache_stats_incr(reclaims);
+ ecx++;
+ if (ecx >= AVC_CACHE_RECLAIM) {
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(lock, flags);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(lock, flags);
+ }
+out:
+ return ecx;
+}
+
+static struct avc_node *avc_alloc_node(void)
+{
+ struct avc_node *node;
+
+ node = kmem_cache_zalloc(avc_node_cachep, GFP_NOWAIT | __GFP_NOWARN);
+ if (!node)
+ goto out;
+
+ INIT_HLIST_NODE(&node->list);
+ avc_cache_stats_incr(allocations);
+
+ if (atomic_inc_return(&selinux_avc.avc_cache.active_nodes) >
+ selinux_avc.avc_cache_threshold)
+ avc_reclaim_node();
+
+out:
+ return node;
+}
+
+static void avc_node_populate(struct avc_node *node, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd)
+{
+ node->ae.ssid = ssid;
+ node->ae.tsid = tsid;
+ node->ae.tclass = tclass;
+ memcpy(&node->ae.avd, avd, sizeof(node->ae.avd));
+}
+
+static inline struct avc_node *avc_search_node(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass)
+{
+ struct avc_node *node, *ret = NULL;
+ u32 hvalue;
+ struct hlist_head *head;
+
+ hvalue = avc_hash(ssid, tsid, tclass);
+ head = &selinux_avc.avc_cache.slots[hvalue];
+ hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(node, head, list) {
+ if (ssid == node->ae.ssid &&
+ tclass == node->ae.tclass &&
+ tsid == node->ae.tsid) {
+ ret = node;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * avc_lookup - Look up an AVC entry.
+ * @ssid: source security identifier
+ * @tsid: target security identifier
+ * @tclass: target security class
+ *
+ * Look up an AVC entry that is valid for the
+ * (@ssid, @tsid), interpreting the permissions
+ * based on @tclass. If a valid AVC entry exists,
+ * then this function returns the avc_node.
+ * Otherwise, this function returns NULL.
+ */
+static struct avc_node *avc_lookup(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass)
+{
+ struct avc_node *node;
+
+ avc_cache_stats_incr(lookups);
+ node = avc_search_node(ssid, tsid, tclass);
+
+ if (node)
+ return node;
+
+ avc_cache_stats_incr(misses);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static int avc_latest_notif_update(u32 seqno, int is_insert)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(notif_lock);
+ unsigned long flag;
+
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&notif_lock, flag);
+ if (is_insert) {
+ if (seqno < selinux_avc.avc_cache.latest_notif) {
+ pr_warn("SELinux: avc: seqno %d < latest_notif %d\n",
+ seqno, selinux_avc.avc_cache.latest_notif);
+ ret = -EAGAIN;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (seqno > selinux_avc.avc_cache.latest_notif)
+ selinux_avc.avc_cache.latest_notif = seqno;
+ }
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&notif_lock, flag);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * avc_insert - Insert an AVC entry.
+ * @ssid: source security identifier
+ * @tsid: target security identifier
+ * @tclass: target security class
+ * @avd: resulting av decision
+ * @xp_node: resulting extended permissions
+ *
+ * Insert an AVC entry for the SID pair
+ * (@ssid, @tsid) and class @tclass.
+ * The access vectors and the sequence number are
+ * normally provided by the security server in
+ * response to a security_compute_av() call. If the
+ * sequence number @avd->seqno is not less than the latest
+ * revocation notification, then the function copies
+ * the access vectors into a cache entry.
+ */
+static void avc_insert(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
+ struct av_decision *avd, struct avc_xperms_node *xp_node)
+{
+ struct avc_node *pos, *node = NULL;
+ u32 hvalue;
+ unsigned long flag;
+ spinlock_t *lock;
+ struct hlist_head *head;
+
+ if (avc_latest_notif_update(avd->seqno, 1))
+ return;
+
+ node = avc_alloc_node();
+ if (!node)
+ return;
+
+ avc_node_populate(node, ssid, tsid, tclass, avd);
+ if (avc_xperms_populate(node, xp_node)) {
+ avc_node_kill(node);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ hvalue = avc_hash(ssid, tsid, tclass);
+ head = &selinux_avc.avc_cache.slots[hvalue];
+ lock = &selinux_avc.avc_cache.slots_lock[hvalue];
+ spin_lock_irqsave(lock, flag);
+ hlist_for_each_entry(pos, head, list) {
+ if (pos->ae.ssid == ssid &&
+ pos->ae.tsid == tsid &&
+ pos->ae.tclass == tclass) {
+ avc_node_replace(node, pos);
+ goto found;
+ }
+ }
+ hlist_add_head_rcu(&node->list, head);
+found:
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(lock, flag);
+}
+
+/**
+ * avc_audit_pre_callback - SELinux specific information
+ * will be called by generic audit code
+ * @ab: the audit buffer
+ * @a: audit_data
+ */
+static void avc_audit_pre_callback(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *a)
+{
+ struct common_audit_data *ad = a;
+ struct selinux_audit_data *sad = ad->selinux_audit_data;
+ u32 av = sad->audited, perm;
+ const char *const *perms;
+ u32 i;
+
+ audit_log_format(ab, "avc: %s ", sad->denied ? "denied" : "granted");
+
+ if (av == 0) {
+ audit_log_format(ab, " null");
+ return;
+ }
+
+ perms = secclass_map[sad->tclass-1].perms;
+
+ audit_log_format(ab, " {");
+ i = 0;
+ perm = 1;
+ while (i < (sizeof(av) * 8)) {
+ if ((perm & av) && perms[i]) {
+ audit_log_format(ab, " %s", perms[i]);
+ av &= ~perm;
+ }
+ i++;
+ perm <<= 1;
+ }
+
+ if (av)
+ audit_log_format(ab, " 0x%x", av);
+
+ audit_log_format(ab, " } for ");
+}
+
+/**
+ * avc_audit_post_callback - SELinux specific information
+ * will be called by generic audit code
+ * @ab: the audit buffer
+ * @a: audit_data
+ */
+static void avc_audit_post_callback(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *a)
+{
+ struct common_audit_data *ad = a;
+ struct selinux_audit_data *sad = ad->selinux_audit_data;
+ char *scontext = NULL;
+ char *tcontext = NULL;
+ const char *tclass = NULL;
+ u32 scontext_len;
+ u32 tcontext_len;
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = security_sid_to_context(sad->ssid, &scontext,
+ &scontext_len);
+ if (rc)
+ audit_log_format(ab, " ssid=%d", sad->ssid);
+ else
+ audit_log_format(ab, " scontext=%s", scontext);
+
+ rc = security_sid_to_context(sad->tsid, &tcontext,
+ &tcontext_len);
+ if (rc)
+ audit_log_format(ab, " tsid=%d", sad->tsid);
+ else
+ audit_log_format(ab, " tcontext=%s", tcontext);
+
+ tclass = secclass_map[sad->tclass-1].name;
+ audit_log_format(ab, " tclass=%s", tclass);
+
+ if (sad->denied)
+ audit_log_format(ab, " permissive=%u", sad->result ? 0 : 1);
+
+ trace_selinux_audited(sad, scontext, tcontext, tclass);
+ kfree(tcontext);
+ kfree(scontext);
+
+ /* in case of invalid context report also the actual context string */
+ rc = security_sid_to_context_inval(sad->ssid, &scontext,
+ &scontext_len);
+ if (!rc && scontext) {
+ if (scontext_len && scontext[scontext_len - 1] == '\0')
+ scontext_len--;
+ audit_log_format(ab, " srawcon=");
+ audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, scontext, scontext_len);
+ kfree(scontext);
+ }
+
+ rc = security_sid_to_context_inval(sad->tsid, &scontext,
+ &scontext_len);
+ if (!rc && scontext) {
+ if (scontext_len && scontext[scontext_len - 1] == '\0')
+ scontext_len--;
+ audit_log_format(ab, " trawcon=");
+ audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, scontext, scontext_len);
+ kfree(scontext);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * This is the slow part of avc audit with big stack footprint.
+ * Note that it is non-blocking and can be called from under
+ * rcu_read_lock().
+ */
+noinline int slow_avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
+ u32 requested, u32 audited, u32 denied, int result,
+ struct common_audit_data *a)
+{
+ struct common_audit_data stack_data;
+ struct selinux_audit_data sad;
+
+ if (WARN_ON(!tclass || tclass >= ARRAY_SIZE(secclass_map)))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (!a) {
+ a = &stack_data;
+ a->type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE;
+ }
+
+ sad.tclass = tclass;
+ sad.requested = requested;
+ sad.ssid = ssid;
+ sad.tsid = tsid;
+ sad.audited = audited;
+ sad.denied = denied;
+ sad.result = result;
+
+ a->selinux_audit_data = &sad;
+
+ common_lsm_audit(a, avc_audit_pre_callback, avc_audit_post_callback);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * avc_add_callback - Register a callback for security events.
+ * @callback: callback function
+ * @events: security events
+ *
+ * Register a callback function for events in the set @events.
+ * Returns %0 on success or -%ENOMEM if insufficient memory
+ * exists to add the callback.
+ */
+int __init avc_add_callback(int (*callback)(u32 event), u32 events)
+{
+ struct avc_callback_node *c;
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ c = kmalloc(sizeof(*c), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!c) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ c->callback = callback;
+ c->events = events;
+ c->next = avc_callbacks;
+ avc_callbacks = c;
+out:
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * avc_update_node - Update an AVC entry
+ * @event : Updating event
+ * @perms : Permission mask bits
+ * @driver: xperm driver information
+ * @xperm: xperm permissions
+ * @ssid: AVC entry source sid
+ * @tsid: AVC entry target sid
+ * @tclass : AVC entry target object class
+ * @seqno : sequence number when decision was made
+ * @xpd: extended_perms_decision to be added to the node
+ * @flags: the AVC_* flags, e.g. AVC_EXTENDED_PERMS, or 0.
+ *
+ * if a valid AVC entry doesn't exist,this function returns -ENOENT.
+ * if kmalloc() called internal returns NULL, this function returns -ENOMEM.
+ * otherwise, this function updates the AVC entry. The original AVC-entry object
+ * will release later by RCU.
+ */
+static int avc_update_node(u32 event, u32 perms, u8 driver, u8 xperm, u32 ssid,
+ u32 tsid, u16 tclass, u32 seqno,
+ struct extended_perms_decision *xpd,
+ u32 flags)
+{
+ u32 hvalue;
+ int rc = 0;
+ unsigned long flag;
+ struct avc_node *pos, *node, *orig = NULL;
+ struct hlist_head *head;
+ spinlock_t *lock;
+
+ node = avc_alloc_node();
+ if (!node) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* Lock the target slot */
+ hvalue = avc_hash(ssid, tsid, tclass);
+
+ head = &selinux_avc.avc_cache.slots[hvalue];
+ lock = &selinux_avc.avc_cache.slots_lock[hvalue];
+
+ spin_lock_irqsave(lock, flag);
+
+ hlist_for_each_entry(pos, head, list) {
+ if (ssid == pos->ae.ssid &&
+ tsid == pos->ae.tsid &&
+ tclass == pos->ae.tclass &&
+ seqno == pos->ae.avd.seqno){
+ orig = pos;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!orig) {
+ rc = -ENOENT;
+ avc_node_kill(node);
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Copy and replace original node.
+ */
+
+ avc_node_populate(node, ssid, tsid, tclass, &orig->ae.avd);
+
+ if (orig->ae.xp_node) {
+ rc = avc_xperms_populate(node, orig->ae.xp_node);
+ if (rc) {
+ avc_node_kill(node);
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
+ }
+
+ switch (event) {
+ case AVC_CALLBACK_GRANT:
+ node->ae.avd.allowed |= perms;
+ if (node->ae.xp_node && (flags & AVC_EXTENDED_PERMS))
+ avc_xperms_allow_perm(node->ae.xp_node, driver, xperm);
+ break;
+ case AVC_CALLBACK_TRY_REVOKE:
+ case AVC_CALLBACK_REVOKE:
+ node->ae.avd.allowed &= ~perms;
+ break;
+ case AVC_CALLBACK_AUDITALLOW_ENABLE:
+ node->ae.avd.auditallow |= perms;
+ break;
+ case AVC_CALLBACK_AUDITALLOW_DISABLE:
+ node->ae.avd.auditallow &= ~perms;
+ break;
+ case AVC_CALLBACK_AUDITDENY_ENABLE:
+ node->ae.avd.auditdeny |= perms;
+ break;
+ case AVC_CALLBACK_AUDITDENY_DISABLE:
+ node->ae.avd.auditdeny &= ~perms;
+ break;
+ case AVC_CALLBACK_ADD_XPERMS:
+ avc_add_xperms_decision(node, xpd);
+ break;
+ }
+ avc_node_replace(node, orig);
+out_unlock:
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(lock, flag);
+out:
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * avc_flush - Flush the cache
+ */
+static void avc_flush(void)
+{
+ struct hlist_head *head;
+ struct avc_node *node;
+ spinlock_t *lock;
+ unsigned long flag;
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < AVC_CACHE_SLOTS; i++) {
+ head = &selinux_avc.avc_cache.slots[i];
+ lock = &selinux_avc.avc_cache.slots_lock[i];
+
+ spin_lock_irqsave(lock, flag);
+ /*
+ * With preemptable RCU, the outer spinlock does not
+ * prevent RCU grace periods from ending.
+ */
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ hlist_for_each_entry(node, head, list)
+ avc_node_delete(node);
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(lock, flag);
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ * avc_ss_reset - Flush the cache and revalidate migrated permissions.
+ * @seqno: policy sequence number
+ */
+int avc_ss_reset(u32 seqno)
+{
+ struct avc_callback_node *c;
+ int rc = 0, tmprc;
+
+ avc_flush();
+
+ for (c = avc_callbacks; c; c = c->next) {
+ if (c->events & AVC_CALLBACK_RESET) {
+ tmprc = c->callback(AVC_CALLBACK_RESET);
+ /* save the first error encountered for the return
+ value and continue processing the callbacks */
+ if (!rc)
+ rc = tmprc;
+ }
+ }
+
+ avc_latest_notif_update(seqno, 0);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * avc_compute_av - Add an entry to the AVC based on the security policy
+ * @ssid: subject
+ * @tsid: object/target
+ * @tclass: object class
+ * @avd: access vector decision
+ * @xp_node: AVC extended permissions node
+ *
+ * Slow-path helper function for avc_has_perm_noaudit, when the avc_node lookup
+ * fails. Don't inline this, since it's the slow-path and just results in a
+ * bigger stack frame.
+ */
+static noinline void avc_compute_av(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
+ struct av_decision *avd,
+ struct avc_xperms_node *xp_node)
+{
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&xp_node->xpd_head);
+ security_compute_av(ssid, tsid, tclass, avd, &xp_node->xp);
+ avc_insert(ssid, tsid, tclass, avd, xp_node);
+}
+
+static noinline int avc_denied(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
+ u16 tclass, u32 requested,
+ u8 driver, u8 xperm, unsigned int flags,
+ struct av_decision *avd)
+{
+ if (flags & AVC_STRICT)
+ return -EACCES;
+
+ if (enforcing_enabled() &&
+ !(avd->flags & AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE))
+ return -EACCES;
+
+ avc_update_node(AVC_CALLBACK_GRANT, requested, driver,
+ xperm, ssid, tsid, tclass, avd->seqno, NULL, flags);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * The avc extended permissions logic adds an additional 256 bits of
+ * permissions to an avc node when extended permissions for that node are
+ * specified in the avtab. If the additional 256 permissions is not adequate,
+ * as-is the case with ioctls, then multiple may be chained together and the
+ * driver field is used to specify which set contains the permission.
+ */
+int avc_has_extended_perms(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, u32 requested,
+ u8 driver, u8 xperm, struct common_audit_data *ad)
+{
+ struct avc_node *node;
+ struct av_decision avd;
+ u32 denied;
+ struct extended_perms_decision local_xpd;
+ struct extended_perms_decision *xpd = NULL;
+ struct extended_perms_data allowed;
+ struct extended_perms_data auditallow;
+ struct extended_perms_data dontaudit;
+ struct avc_xperms_node local_xp_node;
+ struct avc_xperms_node *xp_node;
+ int rc = 0, rc2;
+
+ xp_node = &local_xp_node;
+ if (WARN_ON(!requested))
+ return -EACCES;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+
+ node = avc_lookup(ssid, tsid, tclass);
+ if (unlikely(!node)) {
+ avc_compute_av(ssid, tsid, tclass, &avd, xp_node);
+ } else {
+ memcpy(&avd, &node->ae.avd, sizeof(avd));
+ xp_node = node->ae.xp_node;
+ }
+ /* if extended permissions are not defined, only consider av_decision */
+ if (!xp_node || !xp_node->xp.len)
+ goto decision;
+
+ local_xpd.allowed = &allowed;
+ local_xpd.auditallow = &auditallow;
+ local_xpd.dontaudit = &dontaudit;
+
+ xpd = avc_xperms_decision_lookup(driver, xp_node);
+ if (unlikely(!xpd)) {
+ /*
+ * Compute the extended_perms_decision only if the driver
+ * is flagged
+ */
+ if (!security_xperm_test(xp_node->xp.drivers.p, driver)) {
+ avd.allowed &= ~requested;
+ goto decision;
+ }
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ security_compute_xperms_decision(ssid, tsid, tclass,
+ driver, &local_xpd);
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ avc_update_node(AVC_CALLBACK_ADD_XPERMS, requested,
+ driver, xperm, ssid, tsid, tclass, avd.seqno,
+ &local_xpd, 0);
+ } else {
+ avc_quick_copy_xperms_decision(xperm, &local_xpd, xpd);
+ }
+ xpd = &local_xpd;
+
+ if (!avc_xperms_has_perm(xpd, xperm, XPERMS_ALLOWED))
+ avd.allowed &= ~requested;
+
+decision:
+ denied = requested & ~(avd.allowed);
+ if (unlikely(denied))
+ rc = avc_denied(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested,
+ driver, xperm, AVC_EXTENDED_PERMS, &avd);
+
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+
+ rc2 = avc_xperms_audit(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested,
+ &avd, xpd, xperm, rc, ad);
+ if (rc2)
+ return rc2;
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * avc_perm_nonode - Add an entry to the AVC
+ * @ssid: subject
+ * @tsid: object/target
+ * @tclass: object class
+ * @requested: requested permissions
+ * @flags: AVC flags
+ * @avd: access vector decision
+ *
+ * This is the "we have no node" part of avc_has_perm_noaudit(), which is
+ * unlikely and needs extra stack space for the new node that we generate, so
+ * don't inline it.
+ */
+static noinline int avc_perm_nonode(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
+ u32 requested, unsigned int flags,
+ struct av_decision *avd)
+{
+ u32 denied;
+ struct avc_xperms_node xp_node;
+
+ avc_compute_av(ssid, tsid, tclass, avd, &xp_node);
+ denied = requested & ~(avd->allowed);
+ if (unlikely(denied))
+ return avc_denied(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, 0, 0,
+ flags, avd);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * avc_has_perm_noaudit - Check permissions but perform no auditing.
+ * @ssid: source security identifier
+ * @tsid: target security identifier
+ * @tclass: target security class
+ * @requested: requested permissions, interpreted based on @tclass
+ * @flags: AVC_STRICT or 0
+ * @avd: access vector decisions
+ *
+ * Check the AVC to determine whether the @requested permissions are granted
+ * for the SID pair (@ssid, @tsid), interpreting the permissions
+ * based on @tclass, and call the security server on a cache miss to obtain
+ * a new decision and add it to the cache. Return a copy of the decisions
+ * in @avd. Return %0 if all @requested permissions are granted,
+ * -%EACCES if any permissions are denied, or another -errno upon
+ * other errors. This function is typically called by avc_has_perm(),
+ * but may also be called directly to separate permission checking from
+ * auditing, e.g. in cases where a lock must be held for the check but
+ * should be released for the auditing.
+ */
+inline int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
+ u16 tclass, u32 requested,
+ unsigned int flags,
+ struct av_decision *avd)
+{
+ u32 denied;
+ struct avc_node *node;
+
+ if (WARN_ON(!requested))
+ return -EACCES;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ node = avc_lookup(ssid, tsid, tclass);
+ if (unlikely(!node)) {
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return avc_perm_nonode(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested,
+ flags, avd);
+ }
+ denied = requested & ~node->ae.avd.allowed;
+ memcpy(avd, &node->ae.avd, sizeof(*avd));
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+
+ if (unlikely(denied))
+ return avc_denied(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, 0, 0,
+ flags, avd);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * avc_has_perm - Check permissions and perform any appropriate auditing.
+ * @ssid: source security identifier
+ * @tsid: target security identifier
+ * @tclass: target security class
+ * @requested: requested permissions, interpreted based on @tclass
+ * @auditdata: auxiliary audit data
+ *
+ * Check the AVC to determine whether the @requested permissions are granted
+ * for the SID pair (@ssid, @tsid), interpreting the permissions
+ * based on @tclass, and call the security server on a cache miss to obtain
+ * a new decision and add it to the cache. Audit the granting or denial of
+ * permissions in accordance with the policy. Return %0 if all @requested
+ * permissions are granted, -%EACCES if any permissions are denied, or
+ * another -errno upon other errors.
+ */
+int avc_has_perm(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
+ u32 requested, struct common_audit_data *auditdata)
+{
+ struct av_decision avd;
+ int rc, rc2;
+
+ rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, 0,
+ &avd);
+
+ rc2 = avc_audit(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, &avd, rc,
+ auditdata);
+ if (rc2)
+ return rc2;
+ return rc;
+}
+
+u32 avc_policy_seqno(void)
+{
+ return selinux_avc.avc_cache.latest_notif;
+}
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..53cfeefb2f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -0,0 +1,7419 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
+ *
+ * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
+ *
+ * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
+ * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
+ * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
+ * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
+ * Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ * Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
+ * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
+ * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
+ * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007, 2009 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
+ * Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
+ * Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
+ * Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
+ * Copyright (C) 2016 Mellanox Technologies
+ */
+
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/kd.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/kernel_read_file.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/sched/signal.h>
+#include <linux/sched/task.h>
+#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
+#include <linux/xattr.h>
+#include <linux/capability.h>
+#include <linux/unistd.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/mman.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/pagemap.h>
+#include <linux/proc_fs.h>
+#include <linux/swap.h>
+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
+#include <linux/syscalls.h>
+#include <linux/dcache.h>
+#include <linux/file.h>
+#include <linux/fdtable.h>
+#include <linux/namei.h>
+#include <linux/mount.h>
+#include <linux/fs_context.h>
+#include <linux/fs_parser.h>
+#include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
+#include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
+#include <linux/tty.h>
+#include <net/icmp.h>
+#include <net/ip.h> /* for local_port_range[] */
+#include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
+#include <net/inet_connection_sock.h>
+#include <net/net_namespace.h>
+#include <net/netlabel.h>
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <asm/ioctls.h>
+#include <linux/atomic.h>
+#include <linux/bitops.h>
+#include <linux/interrupt.h>
+#include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */
+#include <net/netlink.h>
+#include <linux/tcp.h>
+#include <linux/udp.h>
+#include <linux/dccp.h>
+#include <linux/sctp.h>
+#include <net/sctp/structs.h>
+#include <linux/quota.h>
+#include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */
+#include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */
+#include <linux/parser.h>
+#include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
+#include <net/ipv6.h>
+#include <linux/hugetlb.h>
+#include <linux/personality.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/mutex.h>
+#include <linux/posix-timers.h>
+#include <linux/syslog.h>
+#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
+#include <linux/export.h>
+#include <linux/msg.h>
+#include <linux/shm.h>
+#include <linux/bpf.h>
+#include <linux/kernfs.h>
+#include <linux/stringhash.h> /* for hashlen_string() */
+#include <uapi/linux/mount.h>
+#include <linux/fsnotify.h>
+#include <linux/fanotify.h>
+#include <linux/io_uring.h>
+
+#include "avc.h"
+#include "objsec.h"
+#include "netif.h"
+#include "netnode.h"
+#include "netport.h"
+#include "ibpkey.h"
+#include "xfrm.h"
+#include "netlabel.h"
+#include "audit.h"
+#include "avc_ss.h"
+
+#define SELINUX_INODE_INIT_XATTRS 1
+
+struct selinux_state selinux_state;
+
+/* SECMARK reference count */
+static atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
+static int selinux_enforcing_boot __initdata;
+
+static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
+{
+ unsigned long enforcing;
+ if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &enforcing))
+ selinux_enforcing_boot = enforcing ? 1 : 0;
+ return 1;
+}
+__setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
+#else
+#define selinux_enforcing_boot 1
+#endif
+
+int selinux_enabled_boot __initdata = 1;
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
+static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
+{
+ unsigned long enabled;
+ if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &enabled))
+ selinux_enabled_boot = enabled ? 1 : 0;
+ return 1;
+}
+__setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
+#endif
+
+static int __init checkreqprot_setup(char *str)
+{
+ unsigned long checkreqprot;
+
+ if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &checkreqprot)) {
+ if (checkreqprot)
+ pr_err("SELinux: checkreqprot set to 1 via kernel parameter. This is no longer supported.\n");
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+__setup("checkreqprot=", checkreqprot_setup);
+
+/**
+ * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK
+ * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than
+ * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled. Returns true (1) if SECMARK is
+ * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled. If the always_check_network
+ * policy capability is enabled, SECMARK is always considered enabled.
+ *
+ */
+static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
+{
+ return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork() ||
+ atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount));
+}
+
+/**
+ * selinux_peerlbl_enabled - Check to see if peer labeling is currently enabled
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * This function checks if NetLabel or labeled IPSEC is enabled. Returns true
+ * (1) if any are enabled or false (0) if neither are enabled. If the
+ * always_check_network policy capability is enabled, peer labeling
+ * is always considered enabled.
+ *
+ */
+static int selinux_peerlbl_enabled(void)
+{
+ return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork() ||
+ netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled());
+}
+
+static int selinux_netcache_avc_callback(u32 event)
+{
+ if (event == AVC_CALLBACK_RESET) {
+ sel_netif_flush();
+ sel_netnode_flush();
+ sel_netport_flush();
+ synchronize_net();
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int selinux_lsm_notifier_avc_callback(u32 event)
+{
+ if (event == AVC_CALLBACK_RESET) {
+ sel_ib_pkey_flush();
+ call_blocking_lsm_notifier(LSM_POLICY_CHANGE, NULL);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * initialise the security for the init task
+ */
+static void cred_init_security(void)
+{
+ struct task_security_struct *tsec;
+
+ tsec = selinux_cred(unrcu_pointer(current->real_cred));
+ tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * get the security ID of a set of credentials
+ */
+static inline u32 cred_sid(const struct cred *cred)
+{
+ const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
+
+ tsec = selinux_cred(cred);
+ return tsec->sid;
+}
+
+static void __ad_net_init(struct common_audit_data *ad,
+ struct lsm_network_audit *net,
+ int ifindex, struct sock *sk, u16 family)
+{
+ ad->type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
+ ad->u.net = net;
+ net->netif = ifindex;
+ net->sk = sk;
+ net->family = family;
+}
+
+static void ad_net_init_from_sk(struct common_audit_data *ad,
+ struct lsm_network_audit *net,
+ struct sock *sk)
+{
+ __ad_net_init(ad, net, 0, sk, 0);
+}
+
+static void ad_net_init_from_iif(struct common_audit_data *ad,
+ struct lsm_network_audit *net,
+ int ifindex, u16 family)
+{
+ __ad_net_init(ad, net, ifindex, NULL, family);
+}
+
+/*
+ * get the objective security ID of a task
+ */
+static inline u32 task_sid_obj(const struct task_struct *task)
+{
+ u32 sid;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ sid = cred_sid(__task_cred(task));
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return sid;
+}
+
+static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry);
+
+/*
+ * Try reloading inode security labels that have been marked as invalid. The
+ * @may_sleep parameter indicates when sleeping and thus reloading labels is
+ * allowed; when set to false, returns -ECHILD when the label is
+ * invalid. The @dentry parameter should be set to a dentry of the inode.
+ */
+static int __inode_security_revalidate(struct inode *inode,
+ struct dentry *dentry,
+ bool may_sleep)
+{
+ struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
+
+ might_sleep_if(may_sleep);
+
+ if (selinux_initialized() &&
+ isec->initialized != LABEL_INITIALIZED) {
+ if (!may_sleep)
+ return -ECHILD;
+
+ /*
+ * Try reloading the inode security label. This will fail if
+ * @opt_dentry is NULL and no dentry for this inode can be
+ * found; in that case, continue using the old label.
+ */
+ inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static struct inode_security_struct *inode_security_novalidate(struct inode *inode)
+{
+ return selinux_inode(inode);
+}
+
+static struct inode_security_struct *inode_security_rcu(struct inode *inode, bool rcu)
+{
+ int error;
+
+ error = __inode_security_revalidate(inode, NULL, !rcu);
+ if (error)
+ return ERR_PTR(error);
+ return selinux_inode(inode);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Get the security label of an inode.
+ */
+static struct inode_security_struct *inode_security(struct inode *inode)
+{
+ __inode_security_revalidate(inode, NULL, true);
+ return selinux_inode(inode);
+}
+
+static struct inode_security_struct *backing_inode_security_novalidate(struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+ struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
+
+ return selinux_inode(inode);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Get the security label of a dentry's backing inode.
+ */
+static struct inode_security_struct *backing_inode_security(struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+ struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
+
+ __inode_security_revalidate(inode, dentry, true);
+ return selinux_inode(inode);
+}
+
+static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
+{
+ struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
+ struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
+
+ if (!isec)
+ return;
+ sbsec = selinux_superblock(inode->i_sb);
+ /*
+ * As not all inode security structures are in a list, we check for
+ * empty list outside of the lock to make sure that we won't waste
+ * time taking a lock doing nothing.
+ *
+ * The list_del_init() function can be safely called more than once.
+ * It should not be possible for this function to be called with
+ * concurrent list_add(), but for better safety against future changes
+ * in the code, we use list_empty_careful() here.
+ */
+ if (!list_empty_careful(&isec->list)) {
+ spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
+ list_del_init(&isec->list);
+ spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
+ }
+}
+
+struct selinux_mnt_opts {
+ u32 fscontext_sid;
+ u32 context_sid;
+ u32 rootcontext_sid;
+ u32 defcontext_sid;
+};
+
+static void selinux_free_mnt_opts(void *mnt_opts)
+{
+ kfree(mnt_opts);
+}
+
+enum {
+ Opt_error = -1,
+ Opt_context = 0,
+ Opt_defcontext = 1,
+ Opt_fscontext = 2,
+ Opt_rootcontext = 3,
+ Opt_seclabel = 4,
+};
+
+#define A(s, has_arg) {#s, sizeof(#s) - 1, Opt_##s, has_arg}
+static const struct {
+ const char *name;
+ int len;
+ int opt;
+ bool has_arg;
+} tokens[] = {
+ A(context, true),
+ A(fscontext, true),
+ A(defcontext, true),
+ A(rootcontext, true),
+ A(seclabel, false),
+};
+#undef A
+
+static int match_opt_prefix(char *s, int l, char **arg)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tokens); i++) {
+ size_t len = tokens[i].len;
+ if (len > l || memcmp(s, tokens[i].name, len))
+ continue;
+ if (tokens[i].has_arg) {
+ if (len == l || s[len] != '=')
+ continue;
+ *arg = s + len + 1;
+ } else if (len != l)
+ continue;
+ return tokens[i].opt;
+ }
+ return Opt_error;
+}
+
+#define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
+
+static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid,
+ struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
+ const struct cred *cred)
+{
+ const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(cred);
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
+ FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
+ FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid,
+ struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
+ const struct cred *cred)
+{
+ const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(cred);
+ int rc;
+ rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
+ FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
+ FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static int selinux_is_genfs_special_handling(struct super_block *sb)
+{
+ /* Special handling. Genfs but also in-core setxattr handler */
+ return !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs") ||
+ !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "pstore") ||
+ !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "debugfs") ||
+ !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "tracefs") ||
+ !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "rootfs") ||
+ (selinux_policycap_cgroupseclabel() &&
+ (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup") ||
+ !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup2")));
+}
+
+static int selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(struct super_block *sb)
+{
+ struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
+
+ /*
+ * IMPORTANT: Double-check logic in this function when adding a new
+ * SECURITY_FS_USE_* definition!
+ */
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(SECURITY_FS_USE_MAX != 7);
+
+ switch (sbsec->behavior) {
+ case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
+ case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
+ case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
+ case SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE:
+ return 1;
+
+ case SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS:
+ return selinux_is_genfs_special_handling(sb);
+
+ /* Never allow relabeling on context mounts */
+ case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
+ case SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE:
+ default:
+ return 0;
+ }
+}
+
+static int sb_check_xattr_support(struct super_block *sb)
+{
+ struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
+ struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
+ struct inode *root_inode = d_backing_inode(root);
+ u32 sid;
+ int rc;
+
+ /*
+ * Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
+ * error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
+ * the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
+ * the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
+ * assigned xattr values to the filesystem.
+ */
+ if (!(root_inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) {
+ pr_warn("SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no xattr support\n",
+ sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
+ goto fallback;
+ }
+
+ rc = __vfs_getxattr(root, root_inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
+ if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
+ if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP) {
+ pr_warn("SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no security xattr handler\n",
+ sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
+ goto fallback;
+ } else {
+ pr_warn("SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) getxattr errno %d\n",
+ sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name, -rc);
+ return rc;
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+
+fallback:
+ /* No xattr support - try to fallback to genfs if possible. */
+ rc = security_genfs_sid(sb->s_type->name, "/",
+ SECCLASS_DIR, &sid);
+ if (rc)
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+ pr_warn("SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) falling back to genfs\n",
+ sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
+ sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS;
+ sbsec->sid = sid;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
+{
+ struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
+ struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
+ struct inode *root_inode = d_backing_inode(root);
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
+ rc = sb_check_xattr_support(sb);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ sbsec->flags |= SE_SBINITIALIZED;
+
+ /*
+ * Explicitly set or clear SBLABEL_MNT. It's not sufficient to simply
+ * leave the flag untouched because sb_clone_mnt_opts might be handing
+ * us a superblock that needs the flag to be cleared.
+ */
+ if (selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(sb))
+ sbsec->flags |= SBLABEL_MNT;
+ else
+ sbsec->flags &= ~SBLABEL_MNT;
+
+ /* Initialize the root inode. */
+ rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root);
+
+ /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
+ inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
+ during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
+ populates itself. */
+ spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
+ while (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) {
+ struct inode_security_struct *isec =
+ list_first_entry(&sbsec->isec_head,
+ struct inode_security_struct, list);
+ struct inode *inode = isec->inode;
+ list_del_init(&isec->list);
+ spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
+ inode = igrab(inode);
+ if (inode) {
+ if (!IS_PRIVATE(inode))
+ inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL);
+ iput(inode);
+ }
+ spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
+ }
+ spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag,
+ u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
+{
+ char mnt_flags = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
+
+ /* check if the old mount command had the same options */
+ if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
+ if (!(sbsec->flags & flag) ||
+ (old_sid != new_sid))
+ return 1;
+
+ /* check if we were passed the same options twice,
+ * aka someone passed context=a,context=b
+ */
+ if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
+ if (mnt_flags & flag)
+ return 1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set mount point
+ * labeling information.
+ */
+static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
+ void *mnt_opts,
+ unsigned long kern_flags,
+ unsigned long *set_kern_flags)
+{
+ const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+ struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
+ struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
+ struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts = mnt_opts;
+ struct inode_security_struct *root_isec;
+ u32 fscontext_sid = 0, context_sid = 0, rootcontext_sid = 0;
+ u32 defcontext_sid = 0;
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Specifying internal flags without providing a place to
+ * place the results is not allowed
+ */
+ if (kern_flags && !set_kern_flags)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock);
+
+ if (!selinux_initialized()) {
+ if (!opts) {
+ /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
+ after the initial policy is loaded and the security
+ server is ready to handle calls. */
+ if (kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS) {
+ sbsec->flags |= SE_SBNATIVE;
+ *set_kern_flags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS;
+ }
+ goto out;
+ }
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ pr_warn("SELinux: Unable to set superblock options "
+ "before the security server is initialized\n");
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice. Once
+ * from an explicit call and once from the generic calls from the vfs.
+ * Since the generic VFS calls will not contain any security mount data
+ * we need to skip the double mount verification.
+ *
+ * This does open a hole in which we will not notice if the first
+ * mount using this sb set explicit options and a second mount using
+ * this sb does not set any security options. (The first options
+ * will be used for both mounts)
+ */
+ if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) && (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
+ && !opts)
+ goto out;
+
+ root_isec = backing_inode_security_novalidate(root);
+
+ /*
+ * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids.
+ * also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more
+ * than once with different security options.
+ */
+ if (opts) {
+ if (opts->fscontext_sid) {
+ fscontext_sid = opts->fscontext_sid;
+ if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid,
+ fscontext_sid))
+ goto out_double_mount;
+ sbsec->flags |= FSCONTEXT_MNT;
+ }
+ if (opts->context_sid) {
+ context_sid = opts->context_sid;
+ if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
+ context_sid))
+ goto out_double_mount;
+ sbsec->flags |= CONTEXT_MNT;
+ }
+ if (opts->rootcontext_sid) {
+ rootcontext_sid = opts->rootcontext_sid;
+ if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid,
+ rootcontext_sid))
+ goto out_double_mount;
+ sbsec->flags |= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
+ }
+ if (opts->defcontext_sid) {
+ defcontext_sid = opts->defcontext_sid;
+ if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid,
+ defcontext_sid))
+ goto out_double_mount;
+ sbsec->flags |= DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
+ /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */
+ if ((sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK) && !opts)
+ goto out_double_mount;
+ rc = 0;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
+ sbsec->flags |= SE_SBPROC | SE_SBGENFS;
+
+ if (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "debugfs") ||
+ !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "tracefs") ||
+ !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "binder") ||
+ !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "bpf") ||
+ !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "pstore") ||
+ !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "securityfs"))
+ sbsec->flags |= SE_SBGENFS;
+
+ if (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs") ||
+ !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup") ||
+ !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup2"))
+ sbsec->flags |= SE_SBGENFS | SE_SBGENFS_XATTR;
+
+ if (!sbsec->behavior) {
+ /*
+ * Determine the labeling behavior to use for this
+ * filesystem type.
+ */
+ rc = security_fs_use(sb);
+ if (rc) {
+ pr_warn("%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
+ __func__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If this is a user namespace mount and the filesystem type is not
+ * explicitly whitelisted, then no contexts are allowed on the command
+ * line and security labels must be ignored.
+ */
+ if (sb->s_user_ns != &init_user_ns &&
+ strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "tmpfs") &&
+ strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "ramfs") &&
+ strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "devpts") &&
+ strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "overlay")) {
+ if (context_sid || fscontext_sid || rootcontext_sid ||
+ defcontext_sid) {
+ rc = -EACCES;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
+ sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
+ rc = security_transition_sid(current_sid(),
+ current_sid(),
+ SECCLASS_FILE, NULL,
+ &sbsec->mntpoint_sid);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ }
+ goto out_set_opts;
+ }
+
+ /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
+ if (fscontext_sid) {
+ rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid, sbsec, cred);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ sbsec->sid = fscontext_sid;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
+ * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
+ * the superblock context if not already set.
+ */
+ if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBNATIVE) {
+ /*
+ * This means we are initializing a superblock that has been
+ * mounted before the SELinux was initialized and the
+ * filesystem requested native labeling. We had already
+ * returned SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS in *set_kern_flags
+ * in the original mount attempt, so now we just need to set
+ * the SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE behavior.
+ */
+ sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE;
+ } else if (kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS && !context_sid) {
+ sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE;
+ *set_kern_flags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS;
+ }
+
+ if (context_sid) {
+ if (!fscontext_sid) {
+ rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
+ cred);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ sbsec->sid = context_sid;
+ } else {
+ rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
+ cred);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (!rootcontext_sid)
+ rootcontext_sid = context_sid;
+
+ sbsec->mntpoint_sid = context_sid;
+ sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
+ }
+
+ if (rootcontext_sid) {
+ rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(rootcontext_sid, sbsec,
+ cred);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ root_isec->sid = rootcontext_sid;
+ root_isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
+ }
+
+ if (defcontext_sid) {
+ if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR &&
+ sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE) {
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ pr_warn("SELinux: defcontext option is "
+ "invalid for this filesystem type\n");
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (defcontext_sid != sbsec->def_sid) {
+ rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(defcontext_sid,
+ sbsec, cred);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ sbsec->def_sid = defcontext_sid;
+ }
+
+out_set_opts:
+ rc = sb_finish_set_opts(sb);
+out:
+ mutex_unlock(&sbsec->lock);
+ return rc;
+out_double_mount:
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ pr_warn("SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different "
+ "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb->s_id,
+ sb->s_type->name);
+ goto out;
+}
+
+static int selinux_cmp_sb_context(const struct super_block *oldsb,
+ const struct super_block *newsb)
+{
+ struct superblock_security_struct *old = selinux_superblock(oldsb);
+ struct superblock_security_struct *new = selinux_superblock(newsb);
+ char oldflags = old->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
+ char newflags = new->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
+
+ if (oldflags != newflags)
+ goto mismatch;
+ if ((oldflags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) && old->sid != new->sid)
+ goto mismatch;
+ if ((oldflags & CONTEXT_MNT) && old->mntpoint_sid != new->mntpoint_sid)
+ goto mismatch;
+ if ((oldflags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) && old->def_sid != new->def_sid)
+ goto mismatch;
+ if (oldflags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
+ struct inode_security_struct *oldroot = backing_inode_security(oldsb->s_root);
+ struct inode_security_struct *newroot = backing_inode_security(newsb->s_root);
+ if (oldroot->sid != newroot->sid)
+ goto mismatch;
+ }
+ return 0;
+mismatch:
+ pr_warn("SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, "
+ "different security settings for (dev %s, "
+ "type %s)\n", newsb->s_id, newsb->s_type->name);
+ return -EBUSY;
+}
+
+static int selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
+ struct super_block *newsb,
+ unsigned long kern_flags,
+ unsigned long *set_kern_flags)
+{
+ int rc = 0;
+ const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec =
+ selinux_superblock(oldsb);
+ struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = selinux_superblock(newsb);
+
+ int set_fscontext = (oldsbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT);
+ int set_context = (oldsbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT);
+ int set_rootcontext = (oldsbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT);
+
+ /*
+ * Specifying internal flags without providing a place to
+ * place the results is not allowed.
+ */
+ if (kern_flags && !set_kern_flags)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ mutex_lock(&newsbsec->lock);
+
+ /*
+ * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm
+ * mount options. thus we can safely deal with this superblock later
+ */
+ if (!selinux_initialized()) {
+ if (kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS) {
+ newsbsec->flags |= SE_SBNATIVE;
+ *set_kern_flags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS;
+ }
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
+ BUG_ON(!(oldsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED));
+
+ /* if fs is reusing a sb, make sure that the contexts match */
+ if (newsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
+ mutex_unlock(&newsbsec->lock);
+ if ((kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS) && !set_context)
+ *set_kern_flags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS;
+ return selinux_cmp_sb_context(oldsb, newsb);
+ }
+
+ newsbsec->flags = oldsbsec->flags;
+
+ newsbsec->sid = oldsbsec->sid;
+ newsbsec->def_sid = oldsbsec->def_sid;
+ newsbsec->behavior = oldsbsec->behavior;
+
+ if (newsbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE &&
+ !(kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS) && !set_context) {
+ rc = security_fs_use(newsb);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS && !set_context) {
+ newsbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE;
+ *set_kern_flags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS;
+ }
+
+ if (set_context) {
+ u32 sid = oldsbsec->mntpoint_sid;
+
+ if (!set_fscontext)
+ newsbsec->sid = sid;
+ if (!set_rootcontext) {
+ struct inode_security_struct *newisec = backing_inode_security(newsb->s_root);
+ newisec->sid = sid;
+ }
+ newsbsec->mntpoint_sid = sid;
+ }
+ if (set_rootcontext) {
+ const struct inode_security_struct *oldisec = backing_inode_security(oldsb->s_root);
+ struct inode_security_struct *newisec = backing_inode_security(newsb->s_root);
+
+ newisec->sid = oldisec->sid;
+ }
+
+ sb_finish_set_opts(newsb);
+out:
+ mutex_unlock(&newsbsec->lock);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * NOTE: the caller is responsible for freeing the memory even if on error.
+ */
+static int selinux_add_opt(int token, const char *s, void **mnt_opts)
+{
+ struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts = *mnt_opts;
+ u32 *dst_sid;
+ int rc;
+
+ if (token == Opt_seclabel)
+ /* eaten and completely ignored */
+ return 0;
+ if (!s)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (!selinux_initialized()) {
+ pr_warn("SELinux: Unable to set superblock options before the security server is initialized\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (!opts) {
+ opts = kzalloc(sizeof(*opts), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!opts)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ *mnt_opts = opts;
+ }
+
+ switch (token) {
+ case Opt_context:
+ if (opts->context_sid || opts->defcontext_sid)
+ goto err;
+ dst_sid = &opts->context_sid;
+ break;
+ case Opt_fscontext:
+ if (opts->fscontext_sid)
+ goto err;
+ dst_sid = &opts->fscontext_sid;
+ break;
+ case Opt_rootcontext:
+ if (opts->rootcontext_sid)
+ goto err;
+ dst_sid = &opts->rootcontext_sid;
+ break;
+ case Opt_defcontext:
+ if (opts->context_sid || opts->defcontext_sid)
+ goto err;
+ dst_sid = &opts->defcontext_sid;
+ break;
+ default:
+ WARN_ON(1);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ rc = security_context_str_to_sid(s, dst_sid, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (rc)
+ pr_warn("SELinux: security_context_str_to_sid (%s) failed with errno=%d\n",
+ s, rc);
+ return rc;
+
+err:
+ pr_warn(SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
+ return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+static int show_sid(struct seq_file *m, u32 sid)
+{
+ char *context = NULL;
+ u32 len;
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = security_sid_to_context(sid, &context, &len);
+ if (!rc) {
+ bool has_comma = strchr(context, ',');
+
+ seq_putc(m, '=');
+ if (has_comma)
+ seq_putc(m, '\"');
+ seq_escape(m, context, "\"\n\\");
+ if (has_comma)
+ seq_putc(m, '\"');
+ }
+ kfree(context);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
+{
+ struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
+ int rc;
+
+ if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (!selinux_initialized())
+ return 0;
+
+ if (sbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) {
+ seq_putc(m, ',');
+ seq_puts(m, FSCONTEXT_STR);
+ rc = show_sid(m, sbsec->sid);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ }
+ if (sbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT) {
+ seq_putc(m, ',');
+ seq_puts(m, CONTEXT_STR);
+ rc = show_sid(m, sbsec->mntpoint_sid);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ }
+ if (sbsec->flags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) {
+ seq_putc(m, ',');
+ seq_puts(m, DEFCONTEXT_STR);
+ rc = show_sid(m, sbsec->def_sid);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ }
+ if (sbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
+ struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
+ struct inode_security_struct *isec = backing_inode_security(root);
+ seq_putc(m, ',');
+ seq_puts(m, ROOTCONTEXT_STR);
+ rc = show_sid(m, isec->sid);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ }
+ if (sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT) {
+ seq_putc(m, ',');
+ seq_puts(m, SECLABEL_STR);
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode)
+{
+ switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
+ case S_IFSOCK:
+ return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE;
+ case S_IFLNK:
+ return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE;
+ case S_IFREG:
+ return SECCLASS_FILE;
+ case S_IFBLK:
+ return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE;
+ case S_IFDIR:
+ return SECCLASS_DIR;
+ case S_IFCHR:
+ return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
+ case S_IFIFO:
+ return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE;
+
+ }
+
+ return SECCLASS_FILE;
+}
+
+static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol)
+{
+ return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP ||
+ protocol == IPPROTO_MPTCP);
+}
+
+static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol)
+{
+ return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP);
+}
+
+static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
+{
+ bool extsockclass = selinux_policycap_extsockclass();
+
+ switch (family) {
+ case PF_UNIX:
+ switch (type) {
+ case SOCK_STREAM:
+ case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
+ return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET;
+ case SOCK_DGRAM:
+ case SOCK_RAW:
+ return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET;
+ }
+ break;
+ case PF_INET:
+ case PF_INET6:
+ switch (type) {
+ case SOCK_STREAM:
+ case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
+ if (default_protocol_stream(protocol))
+ return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET;
+ else if (extsockclass && protocol == IPPROTO_SCTP)
+ return SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET;
+ else
+ return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
+ case SOCK_DGRAM:
+ if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol))
+ return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET;
+ else if (extsockclass && (protocol == IPPROTO_ICMP ||
+ protocol == IPPROTO_ICMPV6))
+ return SECCLASS_ICMP_SOCKET;
+ else
+ return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
+ case SOCK_DCCP:
+ return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET;
+ default:
+ return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
+ }
+ break;
+ case PF_NETLINK:
+ switch (protocol) {
+ case NETLINK_ROUTE:
+ return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET;
+ case NETLINK_SOCK_DIAG:
+ return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET;
+ case NETLINK_NFLOG:
+ return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET;
+ case NETLINK_XFRM:
+ return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET;
+ case NETLINK_SELINUX:
+ return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET;
+ case NETLINK_ISCSI:
+ return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ISCSI_SOCKET;
+ case NETLINK_AUDIT:
+ return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET;
+ case NETLINK_FIB_LOOKUP:
+ return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIB_LOOKUP_SOCKET;
+ case NETLINK_CONNECTOR:
+ return SECCLASS_NETLINK_CONNECTOR_SOCKET;
+ case NETLINK_NETFILTER:
+ return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NETFILTER_SOCKET;
+ case NETLINK_DNRTMSG:
+ return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET;
+ case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT:
+ return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET;
+ case NETLINK_GENERIC:
+ return SECCLASS_NETLINK_GENERIC_SOCKET;
+ case NETLINK_SCSITRANSPORT:
+ return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SCSITRANSPORT_SOCKET;
+ case NETLINK_RDMA:
+ return SECCLASS_NETLINK_RDMA_SOCKET;
+ case NETLINK_CRYPTO:
+ return SECCLASS_NETLINK_CRYPTO_SOCKET;
+ default:
+ return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
+ }
+ case PF_PACKET:
+ return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET;
+ case PF_KEY:
+ return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET;
+ case PF_APPLETALK:
+ return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET;
+ }
+
+ if (extsockclass) {
+ switch (family) {
+ case PF_AX25:
+ return SECCLASS_AX25_SOCKET;
+ case PF_IPX:
+ return SECCLASS_IPX_SOCKET;
+ case PF_NETROM:
+ return SECCLASS_NETROM_SOCKET;
+ case PF_ATMPVC:
+ return SECCLASS_ATMPVC_SOCKET;
+ case PF_X25:
+ return SECCLASS_X25_SOCKET;
+ case PF_ROSE:
+ return SECCLASS_ROSE_SOCKET;
+ case PF_DECnet:
+ return SECCLASS_DECNET_SOCKET;
+ case PF_ATMSVC:
+ return SECCLASS_ATMSVC_SOCKET;
+ case PF_RDS:
+ return SECCLASS_RDS_SOCKET;
+ case PF_IRDA:
+ return SECCLASS_IRDA_SOCKET;
+ case PF_PPPOX:
+ return SECCLASS_PPPOX_SOCKET;
+ case PF_LLC:
+ return SECCLASS_LLC_SOCKET;
+ case PF_CAN:
+ return SECCLASS_CAN_SOCKET;
+ case PF_TIPC:
+ return SECCLASS_TIPC_SOCKET;
+ case PF_BLUETOOTH:
+ return SECCLASS_BLUETOOTH_SOCKET;
+ case PF_IUCV:
+ return SECCLASS_IUCV_SOCKET;
+ case PF_RXRPC:
+ return SECCLASS_RXRPC_SOCKET;
+ case PF_ISDN:
+ return SECCLASS_ISDN_SOCKET;
+ case PF_PHONET:
+ return SECCLASS_PHONET_SOCKET;
+ case PF_IEEE802154:
+ return SECCLASS_IEEE802154_SOCKET;
+ case PF_CAIF:
+ return SECCLASS_CAIF_SOCKET;
+ case PF_ALG:
+ return SECCLASS_ALG_SOCKET;
+ case PF_NFC:
+ return SECCLASS_NFC_SOCKET;
+ case PF_VSOCK:
+ return SECCLASS_VSOCK_SOCKET;
+ case PF_KCM:
+ return SECCLASS_KCM_SOCKET;
+ case PF_QIPCRTR:
+ return SECCLASS_QIPCRTR_SOCKET;
+ case PF_SMC:
+ return SECCLASS_SMC_SOCKET;
+ case PF_XDP:
+ return SECCLASS_XDP_SOCKET;
+ case PF_MCTP:
+ return SECCLASS_MCTP_SOCKET;
+#if PF_MAX > 46
+#error New address family defined, please update this function.
+#endif
+ }
+ }
+
+ return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
+}
+
+static int selinux_genfs_get_sid(struct dentry *dentry,
+ u16 tclass,
+ u16 flags,
+ u32 *sid)
+{
+ int rc;
+ struct super_block *sb = dentry->d_sb;
+ char *buffer, *path;
+
+ buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!buffer)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ path = dentry_path_raw(dentry, buffer, PAGE_SIZE);
+ if (IS_ERR(path))
+ rc = PTR_ERR(path);
+ else {
+ if (flags & SE_SBPROC) {
+ /* each process gets a /proc/PID/ entry. Strip off the
+ * PID part to get a valid selinux labeling.
+ * e.g. /proc/1/net/rpc/nfs -> /net/rpc/nfs */
+ while (path[1] >= '0' && path[1] <= '9') {
+ path[1] = '/';
+ path++;
+ }
+ }
+ rc = security_genfs_sid(sb->s_type->name,
+ path, tclass, sid);
+ if (rc == -ENOENT) {
+ /* No match in policy, mark as unlabeled. */
+ *sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+ rc = 0;
+ }
+ }
+ free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static int inode_doinit_use_xattr(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *dentry,
+ u32 def_sid, u32 *sid)
+{
+#define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
+ char *context;
+ unsigned int len;
+ int rc;
+
+ len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
+ context = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_NOFS);
+ if (!context)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ context[len] = '\0';
+ rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, context, len);
+ if (rc == -ERANGE) {
+ kfree(context);
+
+ /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */
+ rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
+ if (rc < 0)
+ return rc;
+
+ len = rc;
+ context = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_NOFS);
+ if (!context)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ context[len] = '\0';
+ rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
+ context, len);
+ }
+ if (rc < 0) {
+ kfree(context);
+ if (rc != -ENODATA) {
+ pr_warn("SELinux: %s: getxattr returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
+ __func__, -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
+ return rc;
+ }
+ *sid = def_sid;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ rc = security_context_to_sid_default(context, rc, sid,
+ def_sid, GFP_NOFS);
+ if (rc) {
+ char *dev = inode->i_sb->s_id;
+ unsigned long ino = inode->i_ino;
+
+ if (rc == -EINVAL) {
+ pr_notice_ratelimited("SELinux: inode=%lu on dev=%s was found to have an invalid context=%s. This indicates you may need to relabel the inode or the filesystem in question.\n",
+ ino, dev, context);
+ } else {
+ pr_warn("SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
+ __func__, context, -rc, dev, ino);
+ }
+ }
+ kfree(context);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
+static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
+{
+ struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL;
+ struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
+ u32 task_sid, sid = 0;
+ u16 sclass;
+ struct dentry *dentry;
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ if (isec->initialized == LABEL_INITIALIZED)
+ return 0;
+
+ spin_lock(&isec->lock);
+ if (isec->initialized == LABEL_INITIALIZED)
+ goto out_unlock;
+
+ if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
+ isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
+
+ sbsec = selinux_superblock(inode->i_sb);
+ if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) {
+ /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
+ after the initial policy is loaded and the security
+ server is ready to handle calls. */
+ spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
+ if (list_empty(&isec->list))
+ list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head);
+ spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
+
+ sclass = isec->sclass;
+ task_sid = isec->task_sid;
+ sid = isec->sid;
+ isec->initialized = LABEL_PENDING;
+ spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
+
+ switch (sbsec->behavior) {
+ /*
+ * In case of SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE we need to re-fetch the labels
+ * via xattr when called from delayed_superblock_init().
+ */
+ case SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE:
+ case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
+ if (!(inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) {
+ sid = sbsec->def_sid;
+ break;
+ }
+ /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
+ Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
+ if (opt_dentry) {
+ /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
+ dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry.
+ * Some filesystems really want a connected one, so try
+ * that first. We could split SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR in
+ * two, depending upon that...
+ */
+ dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
+ if (!dentry)
+ dentry = d_find_any_alias(inode);
+ }
+ if (!dentry) {
+ /*
+ * this is can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
+ * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we
+ * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
+ * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as these
+ * will get fixed up the next time we go through
+ * inode_doinit with a dentry, before these inodes could
+ * be used again by userspace.
+ */
+ goto out_invalid;
+ }
+
+ rc = inode_doinit_use_xattr(inode, dentry, sbsec->def_sid,
+ &sid);
+ dput(dentry);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ break;
+ case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
+ sid = task_sid;
+ break;
+ case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
+ /* Default to the fs SID. */
+ sid = sbsec->sid;
+
+ /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
+ rc = security_transition_sid(task_sid, sid,
+ sclass, NULL, &sid);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ break;
+ case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
+ sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
+ break;
+ default:
+ /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
+ sid = sbsec->sid;
+
+ if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBGENFS) &&
+ (!S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode) ||
+ selinux_policycap_genfs_seclabel_symlinks())) {
+ /* We must have a dentry to determine the label on
+ * procfs inodes */
+ if (opt_dentry) {
+ /* Called from d_instantiate or
+ * d_splice_alias. */
+ dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
+ } else {
+ /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to
+ * find a dentry. Some filesystems really want
+ * a connected one, so try that first.
+ */
+ dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
+ if (!dentry)
+ dentry = d_find_any_alias(inode);
+ }
+ /*
+ * This can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
+ * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we
+ * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
+ * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as
+ * these will get fixed up the next time we go through
+ * inode_doinit() with a dentry, before these inodes
+ * could be used again by userspace.
+ */
+ if (!dentry)
+ goto out_invalid;
+ rc = selinux_genfs_get_sid(dentry, sclass,
+ sbsec->flags, &sid);
+ if (rc) {
+ dput(dentry);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBGENFS_XATTR) &&
+ (inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) {
+ rc = inode_doinit_use_xattr(inode, dentry,
+ sid, &sid);
+ if (rc) {
+ dput(dentry);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+ dput(dentry);
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+
+out:
+ spin_lock(&isec->lock);
+ if (isec->initialized == LABEL_PENDING) {
+ if (rc) {
+ isec->initialized = LABEL_INVALID;
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
+ isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
+ isec->sid = sid;
+ }
+
+out_unlock:
+ spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
+ return rc;
+
+out_invalid:
+ spin_lock(&isec->lock);
+ if (isec->initialized == LABEL_PENDING) {
+ isec->initialized = LABEL_INVALID;
+ isec->sid = sid;
+ }
+ spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
+static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
+{
+ u32 perm = 0;
+
+ switch (sig) {
+ case SIGCHLD:
+ /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
+ perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD;
+ break;
+ case SIGKILL:
+ /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
+ perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL;
+ break;
+ case SIGSTOP:
+ /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
+ perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP;
+ break;
+ default:
+ /* All other signals. */
+ perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return perm;
+}
+
+#if CAP_LAST_CAP > 63
+#error Fix SELinux to handle capabilities > 63.
+#endif
+
+/* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
+static int cred_has_capability(const struct cred *cred,
+ int cap, unsigned int opts, bool initns)
+{
+ struct common_audit_data ad;
+ struct av_decision avd;
+ u16 sclass;
+ u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
+ u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);
+ int rc;
+
+ ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_CAP;
+ ad.u.cap = cap;
+
+ switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) {
+ case 0:
+ sclass = initns ? SECCLASS_CAPABILITY : SECCLASS_CAP_USERNS;
+ break;
+ case 1:
+ sclass = initns ? SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2 : SECCLASS_CAP2_USERNS;
+ break;
+ default:
+ pr_err("SELinux: out of range capability %d\n", cap);
+ BUG();
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, sid, sclass, av, 0, &avd);
+ if (!(opts & CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT)) {
+ int rc2 = avc_audit(sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad);
+ if (rc2)
+ return rc2;
+ }
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
+ The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
+ data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
+static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
+ struct inode *inode,
+ u32 perms,
+ struct common_audit_data *adp)
+{
+ struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+ u32 sid;
+
+ if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
+ return 0;
+
+ sid = cred_sid(cred);
+ isec = selinux_inode(inode);
+
+ return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp);
+}
+
+/* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
+ the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
+ pathname if needed. */
+static inline int dentry_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
+ struct dentry *dentry,
+ u32 av)
+{
+ struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
+ struct common_audit_data ad;
+
+ ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
+ ad.u.dentry = dentry;
+ __inode_security_revalidate(inode, dentry, true);
+ return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
+}
+
+/* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
+ the path to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
+ pathname if needed. */
+static inline int path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
+ const struct path *path,
+ u32 av)
+{
+ struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(path->dentry);
+ struct common_audit_data ad;
+
+ ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
+ ad.u.path = *path;
+ __inode_security_revalidate(inode, path->dentry, true);
+ return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
+}
+
+/* Same as path_has_perm, but uses the inode from the file struct. */
+static inline int file_path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
+ struct file *file,
+ u32 av)
+{
+ struct common_audit_data ad;
+
+ ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
+ ad.u.file = file;
+ return inode_has_perm(cred, file_inode(file), av, &ad);
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
+static int bpf_fd_pass(const struct file *file, u32 sid);
+#endif
+
+/* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
+ access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
+ descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
+ check a particular permission to the file.
+ Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
+ has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then
+ access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
+ where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
+static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
+ struct file *file,
+ u32 av)
+{
+ struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file);
+ struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
+ struct common_audit_data ad;
+ u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
+ int rc;
+
+ ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
+ ad.u.file = file;
+
+ if (sid != fsec->sid) {
+ rc = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->sid,
+ SECCLASS_FD,
+ FD__USE,
+ &ad);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
+ rc = bpf_fd_pass(file, cred_sid(cred));
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+#endif
+
+ /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
+ rc = 0;
+ if (av)
+ rc = inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
+
+out:
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Determine the label for an inode that might be unioned.
+ */
+static int
+selinux_determine_inode_label(const struct task_security_struct *tsec,
+ struct inode *dir,
+ const struct qstr *name, u16 tclass,
+ u32 *_new_isid)
+{
+ const struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec =
+ selinux_superblock(dir->i_sb);
+
+ if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) &&
+ (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)) {
+ *_new_isid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
+ } else if ((sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT) &&
+ tsec->create_sid) {
+ *_new_isid = tsec->create_sid;
+ } else {
+ const struct inode_security_struct *dsec = inode_security(dir);
+ return security_transition_sid(tsec->sid,
+ dsec->sid, tclass,
+ name, _new_isid);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Check whether a task can create a file. */
+static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
+ struct dentry *dentry,
+ u16 tclass)
+{
+ const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
+ struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
+ struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
+ u32 sid, newsid;
+ struct common_audit_data ad;
+ int rc;
+
+ dsec = inode_security(dir);
+ sbsec = selinux_superblock(dir->i_sb);
+
+ sid = tsec->sid;
+
+ ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
+ ad.u.dentry = dentry;
+
+ rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
+ DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
+ &ad);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(tsec, dir, &dentry->d_name, tclass,
+ &newsid);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ return avc_has_perm(newsid, sbsec->sid,
+ SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
+ FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
+}
+
+#define MAY_LINK 0
+#define MAY_UNLINK 1
+#define MAY_RMDIR 2
+
+/* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
+static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
+ struct dentry *dentry,
+ int kind)
+
+{
+ struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
+ struct common_audit_data ad;
+ u32 sid = current_sid();
+ u32 av;
+ int rc;
+
+ dsec = inode_security(dir);
+ isec = backing_inode_security(dentry);
+
+ ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
+ ad.u.dentry = dentry;
+
+ av = DIR__SEARCH;
+ av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
+ rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ switch (kind) {
+ case MAY_LINK:
+ av = FILE__LINK;
+ break;
+ case MAY_UNLINK:
+ av = FILE__UNLINK;
+ break;
+ case MAY_RMDIR:
+ av = DIR__RMDIR;
+ break;
+ default:
+ pr_warn("SELinux: %s: unrecognized kind %d\n",
+ __func__, kind);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
+ struct dentry *old_dentry,
+ struct inode *new_dir,
+ struct dentry *new_dentry)
+{
+ struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
+ struct common_audit_data ad;
+ u32 sid = current_sid();
+ u32 av;
+ int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
+ int rc;
+
+ old_dsec = inode_security(old_dir);
+ old_isec = backing_inode_security(old_dentry);
+ old_is_dir = d_is_dir(old_dentry);
+ new_dsec = inode_security(new_dir);
+
+ ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
+
+ ad.u.dentry = old_dentry;
+ rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
+ DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
+ old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) {
+ rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
+ old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ ad.u.dentry = new_dentry;
+ av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
+ if (d_is_positive(new_dentry))
+ av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
+ rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ if (d_is_positive(new_dentry)) {
+ new_isec = backing_inode_security(new_dentry);
+ new_is_dir = d_is_dir(new_dentry);
+ rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_isec->sid,
+ new_isec->sclass,
+ (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
+static int superblock_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
+ struct super_block *sb,
+ u32 perms,
+ struct common_audit_data *ad)
+{
+ struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
+ u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
+
+ sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
+ return avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, perms, ad);
+}
+
+/* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
+static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
+{
+ u32 av = 0;
+
+ if (!S_ISDIR(mode)) {
+ if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
+ av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
+ if (mask & MAY_READ)
+ av |= FILE__READ;
+
+ if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
+ av |= FILE__APPEND;
+ else if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
+ av |= FILE__WRITE;
+
+ } else {
+ if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
+ av |= DIR__SEARCH;
+ if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
+ av |= DIR__WRITE;
+ if (mask & MAY_READ)
+ av |= DIR__READ;
+ }
+
+ return av;
+}
+
+/* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
+static inline u32 file_to_av(const struct file *file)
+{
+ u32 av = 0;
+
+ if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
+ av |= FILE__READ;
+ if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
+ if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND)
+ av |= FILE__APPEND;
+ else
+ av |= FILE__WRITE;
+ }
+ if (!av) {
+ /*
+ * Special file opened with flags 3 for ioctl-only use.
+ */
+ av = FILE__IOCTL;
+ }
+
+ return av;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Convert a file to an access vector and include the correct
+ * open permission.
+ */
+static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file)
+{
+ u32 av = file_to_av(file);
+ struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
+
+ if (selinux_policycap_openperm() &&
+ inode->i_sb->s_magic != SOCKFS_MAGIC)
+ av |= FILE__OPEN;
+
+ return av;
+}
+
+/* Hook functions begin here. */
+
+static int selinux_binder_set_context_mgr(const struct cred *mgr)
+{
+ return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), cred_sid(mgr), SECCLASS_BINDER,
+ BINDER__SET_CONTEXT_MGR, NULL);
+}
+
+static int selinux_binder_transaction(const struct cred *from,
+ const struct cred *to)
+{
+ u32 mysid = current_sid();
+ u32 fromsid = cred_sid(from);
+ u32 tosid = cred_sid(to);
+ int rc;
+
+ if (mysid != fromsid) {
+ rc = avc_has_perm(mysid, fromsid, SECCLASS_BINDER,
+ BINDER__IMPERSONATE, NULL);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ return avc_has_perm(fromsid, tosid,
+ SECCLASS_BINDER, BINDER__CALL, NULL);
+}
+
+static int selinux_binder_transfer_binder(const struct cred *from,
+ const struct cred *to)
+{
+ return avc_has_perm(cred_sid(from), cred_sid(to),
+ SECCLASS_BINDER, BINDER__TRANSFER,
+ NULL);
+}
+
+static int selinux_binder_transfer_file(const struct cred *from,
+ const struct cred *to,
+ const struct file *file)
+{
+ u32 sid = cred_sid(to);
+ struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file);
+ struct dentry *dentry = file->f_path.dentry;
+ struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+ struct common_audit_data ad;
+ int rc;
+
+ ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
+ ad.u.path = file->f_path;
+
+ if (sid != fsec->sid) {
+ rc = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->sid,
+ SECCLASS_FD,
+ FD__USE,
+ &ad);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
+ rc = bpf_fd_pass(file, sid);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+#endif
+
+ if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
+ return 0;
+
+ isec = backing_inode_security(dentry);
+ return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, file_to_av(file),
+ &ad);
+}
+
+static int selinux_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
+ unsigned int mode)
+{
+ u32 sid = current_sid();
+ u32 csid = task_sid_obj(child);
+
+ if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_READ)
+ return avc_has_perm(sid, csid, SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ,
+ NULL);
+
+ return avc_has_perm(sid, csid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__PTRACE,
+ NULL);
+}
+
+static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
+{
+ return avc_has_perm(task_sid_obj(parent), task_sid_obj(current),
+ SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
+}
+
+static int selinux_capget(const struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
+ kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
+{
+ return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid_obj(target),
+ SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__GETCAP, NULL);
+}
+
+static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
+ const kernel_cap_t *effective,
+ const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
+ const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
+{
+ return avc_has_perm(cred_sid(old), cred_sid(new), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+ PROCESS__SETCAP, NULL);
+}
+
+/*
+ * (This comment used to live with the selinux_task_setuid hook,
+ * which was removed).
+ *
+ * Since setuid only affects the current process, and since the SELinux
+ * controls are not based on the Linux identity attributes, SELinux does not
+ * need to control this operation. However, SELinux does control the use of
+ * the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the capable hook.
+ */
+
+static int selinux_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
+ int cap, unsigned int opts)
+{
+ return cred_has_capability(cred, cap, opts, ns == &init_user_ns);
+}
+
+static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
+{
+ const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ if (!sb)
+ return 0;
+
+ switch (cmds) {
+ case Q_SYNC:
+ case Q_QUOTAON:
+ case Q_QUOTAOFF:
+ case Q_SETINFO:
+ case Q_SETQUOTA:
+ case Q_XQUOTAOFF:
+ case Q_XQUOTAON:
+ case Q_XSETQLIM:
+ rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD, NULL);
+ break;
+ case Q_GETFMT:
+ case Q_GETINFO:
+ case Q_GETQUOTA:
+ case Q_XGETQUOTA:
+ case Q_XGETQSTAT:
+ case Q_XGETQSTATV:
+ case Q_XGETNEXTQUOTA:
+ rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET, NULL);
+ break;
+ default:
+ rc = 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
+ break;
+ }
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+ const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+
+ return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
+}
+
+static int selinux_syslog(int type)
+{
+ switch (type) {
+ case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL: /* Read last kernel messages */
+ case SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER: /* Return size of the log buffer */
+ return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
+ SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ, NULL);
+ case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_OFF: /* Disable logging to console */
+ case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_ON: /* Enable logging to console */
+ /* Set level of messages printed to console */
+ case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_LEVEL:
+ return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
+ SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE,
+ NULL);
+ }
+ /* All other syslog types */
+ return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
+ SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD, NULL);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
+ * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
+ * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
+ *
+ * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
+ * processes that allocate mappings.
+ */
+static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
+{
+ int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
+
+ rc = cred_has_capability(current_cred(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
+ CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT, true);
+ if (rc == 0)
+ cap_sys_admin = 1;
+
+ return cap_sys_admin;
+}
+
+/* binprm security operations */
+
+static u32 ptrace_parent_sid(void)
+{
+ u32 sid = 0;
+ struct task_struct *tracer;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ tracer = ptrace_parent(current);
+ if (tracer)
+ sid = task_sid_obj(tracer);
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+
+ return sid;
+}
+
+static int check_nnp_nosuid(const struct linux_binprm *bprm,
+ const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec,
+ const struct task_security_struct *new_tsec)
+{
+ int nnp = (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS);
+ int nosuid = !mnt_may_suid(bprm->file->f_path.mnt);
+ int rc;
+ u32 av;
+
+ if (!nnp && !nosuid)
+ return 0; /* neither NNP nor nosuid */
+
+ if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid)
+ return 0; /* No change in credentials */
+
+ /*
+ * If the policy enables the nnp_nosuid_transition policy capability,
+ * then we permit transitions under NNP or nosuid if the
+ * policy allows the corresponding permission between
+ * the old and new contexts.
+ */
+ if (selinux_policycap_nnp_nosuid_transition()) {
+ av = 0;
+ if (nnp)
+ av |= PROCESS2__NNP_TRANSITION;
+ if (nosuid)
+ av |= PROCESS2__NOSUID_TRANSITION;
+ rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
+ SECCLASS_PROCESS2, av, NULL);
+ if (!rc)
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We also permit NNP or nosuid transitions to bounded SIDs,
+ * i.e. SIDs that are guaranteed to only be allowed a subset
+ * of the permissions of the current SID.
+ */
+ rc = security_bounded_transition(old_tsec->sid,
+ new_tsec->sid);
+ if (!rc)
+ return 0;
+
+ /*
+ * On failure, preserve the errno values for NNP vs nosuid.
+ * NNP: Operation not permitted for caller.
+ * nosuid: Permission denied to file.
+ */
+ if (nnp)
+ return -EPERM;
+ return -EACCES;
+}
+
+static int selinux_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+ const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
+ struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
+ struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+ struct common_audit_data ad;
+ struct inode *inode = file_inode(bprm->file);
+ int rc;
+
+ /* SELinux context only depends on initial program or script and not
+ * the script interpreter */
+
+ old_tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
+ new_tsec = selinux_cred(bprm->cred);
+ isec = inode_security(inode);
+
+ /* Default to the current task SID. */
+ new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
+ new_tsec->osid = old_tsec->sid;
+
+ /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
+ new_tsec->create_sid = 0;
+ new_tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
+ new_tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
+
+ if (old_tsec->exec_sid) {
+ new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->exec_sid;
+ /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
+ new_tsec->exec_sid = 0;
+
+ /* Fail on NNP or nosuid if not an allowed transition. */
+ rc = check_nnp_nosuid(bprm, old_tsec, new_tsec);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ } else {
+ /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
+ rc = security_transition_sid(old_tsec->sid,
+ isec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, NULL,
+ &new_tsec->sid);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ /*
+ * Fallback to old SID on NNP or nosuid if not an allowed
+ * transition.
+ */
+ rc = check_nnp_nosuid(bprm, old_tsec, new_tsec);
+ if (rc)
+ new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
+ }
+
+ ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
+ ad.u.file = bprm->file;
+
+ if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid) {
+ rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
+ SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ } else {
+ /* Check permissions for the transition. */
+ rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
+ SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
+ SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ /* Check for shared state */
+ if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
+ rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
+ SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SHARE,
+ NULL);
+ if (rc)
+ return -EPERM;
+ }
+
+ /* Make sure that anyone attempting to ptrace over a task that
+ * changes its SID has the appropriate permit */
+ if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE) {
+ u32 ptsid = ptrace_parent_sid();
+ if (ptsid != 0) {
+ rc = avc_has_perm(ptsid, new_tsec->sid,
+ SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+ PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
+ if (rc)
+ return -EPERM;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
+ bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
+
+ /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
+ the noatsecure permission is granted between
+ the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
+ rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
+ SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__NOATSECURE,
+ NULL);
+ bprm->secureexec |= !!rc;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int match_file(const void *p, struct file *file, unsigned fd)
+{
+ return file_has_perm(p, file, file_to_av(file)) ? fd + 1 : 0;
+}
+
+/* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
+static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
+ struct files_struct *files)
+{
+ struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
+ struct tty_struct *tty;
+ int drop_tty = 0;
+ unsigned n;
+
+ tty = get_current_tty();
+ if (tty) {
+ spin_lock(&tty->files_lock);
+ if (!list_empty(&tty->tty_files)) {
+ struct tty_file_private *file_priv;
+
+ /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
+ Use file_path_has_perm on the tty path directly
+ rather than using file_has_perm, as this particular
+ open file may belong to another process and we are
+ only interested in the inode-based check here. */
+ file_priv = list_first_entry(&tty->tty_files,
+ struct tty_file_private, list);
+ file = file_priv->file;
+ if (file_path_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE))
+ drop_tty = 1;
+ }
+ spin_unlock(&tty->files_lock);
+ tty_kref_put(tty);
+ }
+ /* Reset controlling tty. */
+ if (drop_tty)
+ no_tty();
+
+ /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
+ n = iterate_fd(files, 0, match_file, cred);
+ if (!n) /* none found? */
+ return;
+
+ devnull = dentry_open(&selinux_null, O_RDWR, cred);
+ if (IS_ERR(devnull))
+ devnull = NULL;
+ /* replace all the matching ones with this */
+ do {
+ replace_fd(n - 1, devnull, 0);
+ } while ((n = iterate_fd(files, n, match_file, cred)) != 0);
+ if (devnull)
+ fput(devnull);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Prepare a process for imminent new credential changes due to exec
+ */
+static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+ struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
+ struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
+ int rc, i;
+
+ new_tsec = selinux_cred(bprm->cred);
+ if (new_tsec->sid == new_tsec->osid)
+ return;
+
+ /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
+ flush_unauthorized_files(bprm->cred, current->files);
+
+ /* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */
+ current->pdeath_signal = 0;
+
+ /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits from the old
+ * SID. If not, reset all soft limits to the lower of the current
+ * task's hard limit and the init task's soft limit.
+ *
+ * Note that the setting of hard limits (even to lower them) can be
+ * controlled by the setrlimit check. The inclusion of the init task's
+ * soft limit into the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits
+ * higher than the default soft limit for cases where the default is
+ * lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or RLIMIT_STACK.
+ */
+ rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->osid, new_tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+ PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
+ if (rc) {
+ /* protect against do_prlimit() */
+ task_lock(current);
+ for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
+ rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
+ initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim + i;
+ rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max, initrlim->rlim_cur);
+ }
+ task_unlock(current);
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_POSIX_TIMERS))
+ update_rlimit_cpu(current, rlimit(RLIMIT_CPU));
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Clean up the process immediately after the installation of new credentials
+ * due to exec
+ */
+static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+ const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
+ u32 osid, sid;
+ int rc;
+
+ osid = tsec->osid;
+ sid = tsec->sid;
+
+ if (sid == osid)
+ return;
+
+ /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state from the old SID.
+ * If not, clear itimers to avoid subsequent signal generation and
+ * flush and unblock signals.
+ *
+ * This must occur _after_ the task SID has been updated so that any
+ * kill done after the flush will be checked against the new SID.
+ */
+ rc = avc_has_perm(osid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
+ if (rc) {
+ clear_itimer();
+
+ spin_lock_irq(&unrcu_pointer(current->sighand)->siglock);
+ if (!fatal_signal_pending(current)) {
+ flush_sigqueue(&current->pending);
+ flush_sigqueue(&current->signal->shared_pending);
+ flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
+ sigemptyset(&current->blocked);
+ recalc_sigpending();
+ }
+ spin_unlock_irq(&unrcu_pointer(current->sighand)->siglock);
+ }
+
+ /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can recheck
+ * wait permission to the new task SID. */
+ read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
+ __wake_up_parent(current, unrcu_pointer(current->real_parent));
+ read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
+}
+
+/* superblock security operations */
+
+static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
+{
+ struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
+
+ mutex_init(&sbsec->lock);
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
+ spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock);
+ sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+ sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
+ sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int opt_len(const char *s)
+{
+ bool open_quote = false;
+ int len;
+ char c;
+
+ for (len = 0; (c = s[len]) != '\0'; len++) {
+ if (c == '"')
+ open_quote = !open_quote;
+ if (c == ',' && !open_quote)
+ break;
+ }
+ return len;
+}
+
+static int selinux_sb_eat_lsm_opts(char *options, void **mnt_opts)
+{
+ char *from = options;
+ char *to = options;
+ bool first = true;
+ int rc;
+
+ while (1) {
+ int len = opt_len(from);
+ int token;
+ char *arg = NULL;
+
+ token = match_opt_prefix(from, len, &arg);
+
+ if (token != Opt_error) {
+ char *p, *q;
+
+ /* strip quotes */
+ if (arg) {
+ for (p = q = arg; p < from + len; p++) {
+ char c = *p;
+ if (c != '"')
+ *q++ = c;
+ }
+ arg = kmemdup_nul(arg, q - arg, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!arg) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto free_opt;
+ }
+ }
+ rc = selinux_add_opt(token, arg, mnt_opts);
+ kfree(arg);
+ arg = NULL;
+ if (unlikely(rc)) {
+ goto free_opt;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (!first) { // copy with preceding comma
+ from--;
+ len++;
+ }
+ if (to != from)
+ memmove(to, from, len);
+ to += len;
+ first = false;
+ }
+ if (!from[len])
+ break;
+ from += len + 1;
+ }
+ *to = '\0';
+ return 0;
+
+free_opt:
+ if (*mnt_opts) {
+ selinux_free_mnt_opts(*mnt_opts);
+ *mnt_opts = NULL;
+ }
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static int selinux_sb_mnt_opts_compat(struct super_block *sb, void *mnt_opts)
+{
+ struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts = mnt_opts;
+ struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
+
+ /*
+ * Superblock not initialized (i.e. no options) - reject if any
+ * options specified, otherwise accept.
+ */
+ if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
+ return opts ? 1 : 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Superblock initialized and no options specified - reject if
+ * superblock has any options set, otherwise accept.
+ */
+ if (!opts)
+ return (sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK) ? 1 : 0;
+
+ if (opts->fscontext_sid) {
+ if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid,
+ opts->fscontext_sid))
+ return 1;
+ }
+ if (opts->context_sid) {
+ if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
+ opts->context_sid))
+ return 1;
+ }
+ if (opts->rootcontext_sid) {
+ struct inode_security_struct *root_isec;
+
+ root_isec = backing_inode_security(sb->s_root);
+ if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid,
+ opts->rootcontext_sid))
+ return 1;
+ }
+ if (opts->defcontext_sid) {
+ if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid,
+ opts->defcontext_sid))
+ return 1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int selinux_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *mnt_opts)
+{
+ struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts = mnt_opts;
+ struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
+
+ if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (!opts)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (opts->fscontext_sid) {
+ if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid,
+ opts->fscontext_sid))
+ goto out_bad_option;
+ }
+ if (opts->context_sid) {
+ if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
+ opts->context_sid))
+ goto out_bad_option;
+ }
+ if (opts->rootcontext_sid) {
+ struct inode_security_struct *root_isec;
+ root_isec = backing_inode_security(sb->s_root);
+ if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid,
+ opts->rootcontext_sid))
+ goto out_bad_option;
+ }
+ if (opts->defcontext_sid) {
+ if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid,
+ opts->defcontext_sid))
+ goto out_bad_option;
+ }
+ return 0;
+
+out_bad_option:
+ pr_warn("SELinux: unable to change security options "
+ "during remount (dev %s, type=%s)\n", sb->s_id,
+ sb->s_type->name);
+ return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb)
+{
+ const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+ struct common_audit_data ad;
+
+ ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
+ ad.u.dentry = sb->s_root;
+ return superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
+}
+
+static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+ const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+ struct common_audit_data ad;
+
+ ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
+ ad.u.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
+ return superblock_has_perm(cred, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
+}
+
+static int selinux_mount(const char *dev_name,
+ const struct path *path,
+ const char *type,
+ unsigned long flags,
+ void *data)
+{
+ const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+
+ if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
+ return superblock_has_perm(cred, path->dentry->d_sb,
+ FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
+ else
+ return path_has_perm(cred, path, FILE__MOUNTON);
+}
+
+static int selinux_move_mount(const struct path *from_path,
+ const struct path *to_path)
+{
+ const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+
+ return path_has_perm(cred, to_path, FILE__MOUNTON);
+}
+
+static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
+{
+ const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+
+ return superblock_has_perm(cred, mnt->mnt_sb,
+ FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT, NULL);
+}
+
+static int selinux_fs_context_submount(struct fs_context *fc,
+ struct super_block *reference)
+{
+ const struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(reference);
+ struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts;
+
+ /*
+ * Ensure that fc->security remains NULL when no options are set
+ * as expected by selinux_set_mnt_opts().
+ */
+ if (!(sbsec->flags & (FSCONTEXT_MNT|CONTEXT_MNT|DEFCONTEXT_MNT)))
+ return 0;
+
+ opts = kzalloc(sizeof(*opts), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!opts)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ if (sbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT)
+ opts->fscontext_sid = sbsec->sid;
+ if (sbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT)
+ opts->context_sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
+ if (sbsec->flags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT)
+ opts->defcontext_sid = sbsec->def_sid;
+ fc->security = opts;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int selinux_fs_context_dup(struct fs_context *fc,
+ struct fs_context *src_fc)
+{
+ const struct selinux_mnt_opts *src = src_fc->security;
+
+ if (!src)
+ return 0;
+
+ fc->security = kmemdup(src, sizeof(*src), GFP_KERNEL);
+ return fc->security ? 0 : -ENOMEM;
+}
+
+static const struct fs_parameter_spec selinux_fs_parameters[] = {
+ fsparam_string(CONTEXT_STR, Opt_context),
+ fsparam_string(DEFCONTEXT_STR, Opt_defcontext),
+ fsparam_string(FSCONTEXT_STR, Opt_fscontext),
+ fsparam_string(ROOTCONTEXT_STR, Opt_rootcontext),
+ fsparam_flag (SECLABEL_STR, Opt_seclabel),
+ {}
+};
+
+static int selinux_fs_context_parse_param(struct fs_context *fc,
+ struct fs_parameter *param)
+{
+ struct fs_parse_result result;
+ int opt;
+
+ opt = fs_parse(fc, selinux_fs_parameters, param, &result);
+ if (opt < 0)
+ return opt;
+
+ return selinux_add_opt(opt, param->string, &fc->security);
+}
+
+/* inode security operations */
+
+static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
+{
+ struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
+ u32 sid = current_sid();
+
+ spin_lock_init(&isec->lock);
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
+ isec->inode = inode;
+ isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+ isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
+ isec->task_sid = sid;
+ isec->initialized = LABEL_INVALID;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
+{
+ inode_free_security(inode);
+}
+
+static int selinux_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
+ const struct qstr *name,
+ const char **xattr_name, void **ctx,
+ u32 *ctxlen)
+{
+ u32 newsid;
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(selinux_cred(current_cred()),
+ d_inode(dentry->d_parent), name,
+ inode_mode_to_security_class(mode),
+ &newsid);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ if (xattr_name)
+ *xattr_name = XATTR_NAME_SELINUX;
+
+ return security_sid_to_context(newsid, (char **)ctx,
+ ctxlen);
+}
+
+static int selinux_dentry_create_files_as(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
+ struct qstr *name,
+ const struct cred *old,
+ struct cred *new)
+{
+ u32 newsid;
+ int rc;
+ struct task_security_struct *tsec;
+
+ rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(selinux_cred(old),
+ d_inode(dentry->d_parent), name,
+ inode_mode_to_security_class(mode),
+ &newsid);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ tsec = selinux_cred(new);
+ tsec->create_sid = newsid;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
+ const struct qstr *qstr,
+ struct xattr *xattrs, int *xattr_count)
+{
+ const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
+ struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
+ struct xattr *xattr = lsm_get_xattr_slot(xattrs, xattr_count);
+ u32 newsid, clen;
+ int rc;
+ char *context;
+
+ sbsec = selinux_superblock(dir->i_sb);
+
+ newsid = tsec->create_sid;
+
+ rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(tsec, dir, qstr,
+ inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
+ &newsid);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
+ if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
+ struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
+ isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
+ isec->sid = newsid;
+ isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
+ }
+
+ if (!selinux_initialized() ||
+ !(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+ if (xattr) {
+ rc = security_sid_to_context_force(newsid,
+ &context, &clen);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ xattr->value = context;
+ xattr->value_len = clen;
+ xattr->name = XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_init_security_anon(struct inode *inode,
+ const struct qstr *name,
+ const struct inode *context_inode)
+{
+ const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
+ struct common_audit_data ad;
+ struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+ int rc;
+
+ if (unlikely(!selinux_initialized()))
+ return 0;
+
+ isec = selinux_inode(inode);
+
+ /*
+ * We only get here once per ephemeral inode. The inode has
+ * been initialized via inode_alloc_security but is otherwise
+ * untouched.
+ */
+
+ if (context_inode) {
+ struct inode_security_struct *context_isec =
+ selinux_inode(context_inode);
+ if (context_isec->initialized != LABEL_INITIALIZED) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: context_inode is not initialized\n");
+ return -EACCES;
+ }
+
+ isec->sclass = context_isec->sclass;
+ isec->sid = context_isec->sid;
+ } else {
+ isec->sclass = SECCLASS_ANON_INODE;
+ rc = security_transition_sid(
+ tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
+ isec->sclass, name, &isec->sid);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
+ /*
+ * Now that we've initialized security, check whether we're
+ * allowed to actually create this type of anonymous inode.
+ */
+
+ ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_ANONINODE;
+ ad.u.anonclass = name ? (const char *)name->name : "?";
+
+ return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid,
+ isec->sid,
+ isec->sclass,
+ FILE__CREATE,
+ &ad);
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode)
+{
+ return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
+{
+ return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+ return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
+{
+ return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE);
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mask)
+{
+ return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR);
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+ return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR);
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode, dev_t dev)
+{
+ return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
+ struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
+{
+ return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+ const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+
+ return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__READ);
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
+ bool rcu)
+{
+ const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+ struct common_audit_data ad;
+ struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+ u32 sid;
+
+ ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
+ ad.u.dentry = dentry;
+ sid = cred_sid(cred);
+ isec = inode_security_rcu(inode, rcu);
+ if (IS_ERR(isec))
+ return PTR_ERR(isec);
+
+ return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, FILE__READ, &ad);
+}
+
+static noinline int audit_inode_permission(struct inode *inode,
+ u32 perms, u32 audited, u32 denied,
+ int result)
+{
+ struct common_audit_data ad;
+ struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
+
+ ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE;
+ ad.u.inode = inode;
+
+ return slow_avc_audit(current_sid(), isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms,
+ audited, denied, result, &ad);
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
+{
+ const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+ u32 perms;
+ bool from_access;
+ bool no_block = mask & MAY_NOT_BLOCK;
+ struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+ u32 sid;
+ struct av_decision avd;
+ int rc, rc2;
+ u32 audited, denied;
+
+ from_access = mask & MAY_ACCESS;
+ mask &= (MAY_READ|MAY_WRITE|MAY_EXEC|MAY_APPEND);
+
+ /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
+ if (!mask)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
+ return 0;
+
+ perms = file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask);
+
+ sid = cred_sid(cred);
+ isec = inode_security_rcu(inode, no_block);
+ if (IS_ERR(isec))
+ return PTR_ERR(isec);
+
+ rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, 0,
+ &avd);
+ audited = avc_audit_required(perms, &avd, rc,
+ from_access ? FILE__AUDIT_ACCESS : 0,
+ &denied);
+ if (likely(!audited))
+ return rc;
+
+ rc2 = audit_inode_permission(inode, perms, audited, denied, rc);
+ if (rc2)
+ return rc2;
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
+{
+ const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+ struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
+ unsigned int ia_valid = iattr->ia_valid;
+ __u32 av = FILE__WRITE;
+
+ /* ATTR_FORCE is just used for ATTR_KILL_S[UG]ID. */
+ if (ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE) {
+ ia_valid &= ~(ATTR_KILL_SUID | ATTR_KILL_SGID | ATTR_MODE |
+ ATTR_FORCE);
+ if (!ia_valid)
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
+ ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET | ATTR_TIMES_SET))
+ return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
+
+ if (selinux_policycap_openperm() &&
+ inode->i_sb->s_magic != SOCKFS_MAGIC &&
+ (ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE) &&
+ !(ia_valid & ATTR_FILE))
+ av |= FILE__OPEN;
+
+ return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, av);
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_getattr(const struct path *path)
+{
+ return path_has_perm(current_cred(), path, FILE__GETATTR);
+}
+
+static bool has_cap_mac_admin(bool audit)
+{
+ const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+ unsigned int opts = audit ? CAP_OPT_NONE : CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT;
+
+ if (cap_capable(cred, &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN, opts))
+ return false;
+ if (cred_has_capability(cred, CAP_MAC_ADMIN, opts, true))
+ return false;
+ return true;
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+ struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
+ const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
+{
+ struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
+ struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+ struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
+ struct common_audit_data ad;
+ u32 newsid, sid = current_sid();
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
+ rc = cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
+ ordinary setattr permission. */
+ return dentry_has_perm(current_cred(), dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
+ }
+
+ if (!selinux_initialized())
+ return (inode_owner_or_capable(idmap, inode) ? 0 : -EPERM);
+
+ sbsec = selinux_superblock(inode->i_sb);
+ if (!(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+ if (!inode_owner_or_capable(idmap, inode))
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
+ ad.u.dentry = dentry;
+
+ isec = backing_inode_security(dentry);
+ rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
+ FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid,
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (rc == -EINVAL) {
+ if (!has_cap_mac_admin(true)) {
+ struct audit_buffer *ab;
+ size_t audit_size;
+
+ /* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the
+ * context contains a nul and we should audit that */
+ if (value) {
+ const char *str = value;
+
+ if (str[size - 1] == '\0')
+ audit_size = size - 1;
+ else
+ audit_size = size;
+ } else {
+ audit_size = 0;
+ }
+ ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(),
+ GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR);
+ if (!ab)
+ return rc;
+ audit_log_format(ab, "op=setxattr invalid_context=");
+ audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, value, audit_size);
+ audit_log_end(ab);
+
+ return rc;
+ }
+ rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value,
+ size, &newsid);
+ }
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
+ FILE__RELABELTO, &ad);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = security_validate_transition(isec->sid, newsid,
+ sid, isec->sclass);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ return avc_has_perm(newsid,
+ sbsec->sid,
+ SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
+ FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE,
+ &ad);
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+ struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name,
+ struct posix_acl *kacl)
+{
+ return dentry_has_perm(current_cred(), dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_get_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+ struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name)
+{
+ return dentry_has_perm(current_cred(), dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+ struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name)
+{
+ return dentry_has_perm(current_cred(), dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
+}
+
+static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
+ const void *value, size_t size,
+ int flags)
+{
+ struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
+ struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+ u32 newsid;
+ int rc;
+
+ if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
+ /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (!selinux_initialized()) {
+ /* If we haven't even been initialized, then we can't validate
+ * against a policy, so leave the label as invalid. It may
+ * resolve to a valid label on the next revalidation try if
+ * we've since initialized.
+ */
+ return;
+ }
+
+ rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size,
+ &newsid);
+ if (rc) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: unable to map context to SID"
+ "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n",
+ inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, -rc);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ isec = backing_inode_security(dentry);
+ spin_lock(&isec->lock);
+ isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
+ isec->sid = newsid;
+ isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
+ spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
+{
+ const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+
+ return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+ const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+
+ return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+ struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
+{
+ if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
+ int rc = cap_inode_removexattr(idmap, dentry, name);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
+ ordinary setattr permission. */
+ return dentry_has_perm(current_cred(), dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
+ }
+
+ if (!selinux_initialized())
+ return 0;
+
+ /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
+ You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
+ return -EACCES;
+}
+
+static int selinux_path_notify(const struct path *path, u64 mask,
+ unsigned int obj_type)
+{
+ int ret;
+ u32 perm;
+
+ struct common_audit_data ad;
+
+ ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
+ ad.u.path = *path;
+
+ /*
+ * Set permission needed based on the type of mark being set.
+ * Performs an additional check for sb watches.
+ */
+ switch (obj_type) {
+ case FSNOTIFY_OBJ_TYPE_VFSMOUNT:
+ perm = FILE__WATCH_MOUNT;
+ break;
+ case FSNOTIFY_OBJ_TYPE_SB:
+ perm = FILE__WATCH_SB;
+ ret = superblock_has_perm(current_cred(), path->dentry->d_sb,
+ FILESYSTEM__WATCH, &ad);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+ break;
+ case FSNOTIFY_OBJ_TYPE_INODE:
+ perm = FILE__WATCH;
+ break;
+ default:
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ /* blocking watches require the file:watch_with_perm permission */
+ if (mask & (ALL_FSNOTIFY_PERM_EVENTS))
+ perm |= FILE__WATCH_WITH_PERM;
+
+ /* watches on read-like events need the file:watch_reads permission */
+ if (mask & (FS_ACCESS | FS_ACCESS_PERM | FS_CLOSE_NOWRITE))
+ perm |= FILE__WATCH_READS;
+
+ return path_has_perm(current_cred(), path, perm);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Copy the inode security context value to the user.
+ *
+ * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
+ */
+static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+ struct inode *inode, const char *name,
+ void **buffer, bool alloc)
+{
+ u32 size;
+ int error;
+ char *context = NULL;
+ struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+
+ /*
+ * If we're not initialized yet, then we can't validate contexts, so
+ * just let vfs_getxattr fall back to using the on-disk xattr.
+ */
+ if (!selinux_initialized() ||
+ strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+ /*
+ * If the caller has CAP_MAC_ADMIN, then get the raw context
+ * value even if it is not defined by current policy; otherwise,
+ * use the in-core value under current policy.
+ * Use the non-auditing forms of the permission checks since
+ * getxattr may be called by unprivileged processes commonly
+ * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
+ * in-core context value, not a denial.
+ */
+ isec = inode_security(inode);
+ if (has_cap_mac_admin(false))
+ error = security_sid_to_context_force(isec->sid, &context,
+ &size);
+ else
+ error = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid,
+ &context, &size);
+ if (error)
+ return error;
+ error = size;
+ if (alloc) {
+ *buffer = context;
+ goto out_nofree;
+ }
+ kfree(context);
+out_nofree:
+ return error;
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
+ const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
+{
+ struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security_novalidate(inode);
+ struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
+ u32 newsid;
+ int rc;
+
+ if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+ sbsec = selinux_superblock(inode->i_sb);
+ if (!(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+ if (!value || !size)
+ return -EACCES;
+
+ rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid,
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ spin_lock(&isec->lock);
+ isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
+ isec->sid = newsid;
+ isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
+ spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
+{
+ const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
+
+ if (!selinux_initialized())
+ return 0;
+
+ if (buffer && len <= buffer_size)
+ memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len);
+ return len;
+}
+
+static void selinux_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
+{
+ struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security_novalidate(inode);
+ *secid = isec->sid;
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new)
+{
+ u32 sid;
+ struct task_security_struct *tsec;
+ struct cred *new_creds = *new;
+
+ if (new_creds == NULL) {
+ new_creds = prepare_creds();
+ if (!new_creds)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ tsec = selinux_cred(new_creds);
+ /* Get label from overlay inode and set it in create_sid */
+ selinux_inode_getsecid(d_inode(src), &sid);
+ tsec->create_sid = sid;
+ *new = new_creds;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name)
+{
+ /* The copy_up hook above sets the initial context on an inode, but we
+ * don't then want to overwrite it by blindly copying all the lower
+ * xattrs up. Instead, we have to filter out SELinux-related xattrs.
+ */
+ if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX) == 0)
+ return 1; /* Discard */
+ /*
+ * Any other attribute apart from SELINUX is not claimed, supported
+ * by selinux.
+ */
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+}
+
+/* kernfs node operations */
+
+static int selinux_kernfs_init_security(struct kernfs_node *kn_dir,
+ struct kernfs_node *kn)
+{
+ const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
+ u32 parent_sid, newsid, clen;
+ int rc;
+ char *context;
+
+ rc = kernfs_xattr_get(kn_dir, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
+ if (rc == -ENODATA)
+ return 0;
+ else if (rc < 0)
+ return rc;
+
+ clen = (u32)rc;
+ context = kmalloc(clen, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!context)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ rc = kernfs_xattr_get(kn_dir, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, context, clen);
+ if (rc < 0) {
+ kfree(context);
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ rc = security_context_to_sid(context, clen, &parent_sid,
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ kfree(context);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ if (tsec->create_sid) {
+ newsid = tsec->create_sid;
+ } else {
+ u16 secclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(kn->mode);
+ struct qstr q;
+
+ q.name = kn->name;
+ q.hash_len = hashlen_string(kn_dir, kn->name);
+
+ rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid,
+ parent_sid, secclass, &q,
+ &newsid);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ rc = security_sid_to_context_force(newsid,
+ &context, &clen);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = kernfs_xattr_set(kn, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, context, clen,
+ XATTR_CREATE);
+ kfree(context);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+
+/* file security operations */
+
+static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
+{
+ const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+ struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
+
+ /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
+ if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
+ mask |= MAY_APPEND;
+
+ return file_has_perm(cred, file,
+ file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
+}
+
+static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
+{
+ struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
+ struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file);
+ struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+ u32 sid = current_sid();
+
+ if (!mask)
+ /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
+ return 0;
+
+ isec = inode_security(inode);
+ if (sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid &&
+ fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno())
+ /* No change since file_open check. */
+ return 0;
+
+ return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask);
+}
+
+static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
+{
+ struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file);
+ u32 sid = current_sid();
+
+ fsec->sid = sid;
+ fsec->fown_sid = sid;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check whether a task has the ioctl permission and cmd
+ * operation to an inode.
+ */
+static int ioctl_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, struct file *file,
+ u32 requested, u16 cmd)
+{
+ struct common_audit_data ad;
+ struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file);
+ struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
+ struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+ struct lsm_ioctlop_audit ioctl;
+ u32 ssid = cred_sid(cred);
+ int rc;
+ u8 driver = cmd >> 8;
+ u8 xperm = cmd & 0xff;
+
+ ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IOCTL_OP;
+ ad.u.op = &ioctl;
+ ad.u.op->cmd = cmd;
+ ad.u.op->path = file->f_path;
+
+ if (ssid != fsec->sid) {
+ rc = avc_has_perm(ssid, fsec->sid,
+ SECCLASS_FD,
+ FD__USE,
+ &ad);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
+ return 0;
+
+ isec = inode_security(inode);
+ rc = avc_has_extended_perms(ssid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
+ requested, driver, xperm, &ad);
+out:
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
+ unsigned long arg)
+{
+ const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+ int error = 0;
+
+ switch (cmd) {
+ case FIONREAD:
+ case FIBMAP:
+ case FIGETBSZ:
+ case FS_IOC_GETFLAGS:
+ case FS_IOC_GETVERSION:
+ error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__GETATTR);
+ break;
+
+ case FS_IOC_SETFLAGS:
+ case FS_IOC_SETVERSION:
+ error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__SETATTR);
+ break;
+
+ /* sys_ioctl() checks */
+ case FIONBIO:
+ case FIOASYNC:
+ error = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
+ break;
+
+ case KDSKBENT:
+ case KDSKBSENT:
+ error = cred_has_capability(cred, CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG,
+ CAP_OPT_NONE, true);
+ break;
+
+ case FIOCLEX:
+ case FIONCLEX:
+ if (!selinux_policycap_ioctl_skip_cloexec())
+ error = ioctl_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__IOCTL, (u16) cmd);
+ break;
+
+ /* default case assumes that the command will go
+ * to the file's ioctl() function.
+ */
+ default:
+ error = ioctl_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__IOCTL, (u16) cmd);
+ }
+ return error;
+}
+
+static int selinux_file_ioctl_compat(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
+ unsigned long arg)
+{
+ /*
+ * If we are in a 64-bit kernel running 32-bit userspace, we need to
+ * make sure we don't compare 32-bit flags to 64-bit flags.
+ */
+ switch (cmd) {
+ case FS_IOC32_GETFLAGS:
+ cmd = FS_IOC_GETFLAGS;
+ break;
+ case FS_IOC32_SETFLAGS:
+ cmd = FS_IOC_SETFLAGS;
+ break;
+ case FS_IOC32_GETVERSION:
+ cmd = FS_IOC_GETVERSION;
+ break;
+ case FS_IOC32_SETVERSION:
+ cmd = FS_IOC_SETVERSION;
+ break;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return selinux_file_ioctl(file, cmd, arg);
+}
+
+static int default_noexec __ro_after_init;
+
+static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
+{
+ const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+ u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ if (default_noexec &&
+ (prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || IS_PRIVATE(file_inode(file)) ||
+ (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
+ /*
+ * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
+ * private file mapping that will also be writable.
+ * This has an additional check.
+ */
+ rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+ PROCESS__EXECMEM, NULL);
+ if (rc)
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ if (file) {
+ /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
+ u32 av = FILE__READ;
+
+ /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
+ if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
+ av |= FILE__WRITE;
+
+ if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
+ av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
+
+ return file_has_perm(cred, file, av);
+ }
+
+error:
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static int selinux_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
+{
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ if (addr < CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR) {
+ u32 sid = current_sid();
+ rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
+ MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL);
+ }
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static int selinux_mmap_file(struct file *file,
+ unsigned long reqprot __always_unused,
+ unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
+{
+ struct common_audit_data ad;
+ int rc;
+
+ if (file) {
+ ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
+ ad.u.file = file;
+ rc = inode_has_perm(current_cred(), file_inode(file),
+ FILE__MAP, &ad);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
+ (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
+}
+
+static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
+ unsigned long reqprot __always_unused,
+ unsigned long prot)
+{
+ const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+ u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
+
+ if (default_noexec &&
+ (prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
+ int rc = 0;
+ if (vma_is_initial_heap(vma)) {
+ rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+ PROCESS__EXECHEAP, NULL);
+ } else if (!vma->vm_file && (vma_is_initial_stack(vma) ||
+ vma_is_stack_for_current(vma))) {
+ rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+ PROCESS__EXECSTACK, NULL);
+ } else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) {
+ /*
+ * We are making executable a file mapping that has
+ * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
+ * written, check ability to execute the possibly
+ * modified content. This typically should only
+ * occur for text relocations.
+ */
+ rc = file_has_perm(cred, vma->vm_file, FILE__EXECMOD);
+ }
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED);
+}
+
+static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
+{
+ const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+
+ return file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
+}
+
+static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
+ unsigned long arg)
+{
+ const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+ int err = 0;
+
+ switch (cmd) {
+ case F_SETFL:
+ if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) {
+ err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__WRITE);
+ break;
+ }
+ fallthrough;
+ case F_SETOWN:
+ case F_SETSIG:
+ case F_GETFL:
+ case F_GETOWN:
+ case F_GETSIG:
+ case F_GETOWNER_UIDS:
+ /* Just check FD__USE permission */
+ err = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
+ break;
+ case F_GETLK:
+ case F_SETLK:
+ case F_SETLKW:
+ case F_OFD_GETLK:
+ case F_OFD_SETLK:
+ case F_OFD_SETLKW:
+#if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
+ case F_GETLK64:
+ case F_SETLK64:
+ case F_SETLKW64:
+#endif
+ err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return err;
+}
+
+static void selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
+{
+ struct file_security_struct *fsec;
+
+ fsec = selinux_file(file);
+ fsec->fown_sid = current_sid();
+}
+
+static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
+ struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
+{
+ struct file *file;
+ u32 sid = task_sid_obj(tsk);
+ u32 perm;
+ struct file_security_struct *fsec;
+
+ /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
+ file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
+
+ fsec = selinux_file(file);
+
+ if (!signum)
+ perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
+ else
+ perm = signal_to_av(signum);
+
+ return avc_has_perm(fsec->fown_sid, sid,
+ SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
+}
+
+static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
+{
+ const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+
+ return file_has_perm(cred, file, file_to_av(file));
+}
+
+static int selinux_file_open(struct file *file)
+{
+ struct file_security_struct *fsec;
+ struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+
+ fsec = selinux_file(file);
+ isec = inode_security(file_inode(file));
+ /*
+ * Save inode label and policy sequence number
+ * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission
+ * can determine whether revalidation is necessary.
+ * Task label is already saved in the file security
+ * struct as its SID.
+ */
+ fsec->isid = isec->sid;
+ fsec->pseqno = avc_policy_seqno();
+ /*
+ * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed
+ * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving
+ * of state above, recheck that access is still permitted.
+ * Otherwise, access might never be revalidated against the
+ * new inode label or new policy.
+ * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
+ */
+ return file_path_has_perm(file->f_cred, file, open_file_to_av(file));
+}
+
+/* task security operations */
+
+static int selinux_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task,
+ unsigned long clone_flags)
+{
+ u32 sid = current_sid();
+
+ return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__FORK, NULL);
+}
+
+/*
+ * prepare a new set of credentials for modification
+ */
+static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
+ gfp_t gfp)
+{
+ const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec = selinux_cred(old);
+ struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new);
+
+ *tsec = *old_tsec;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * transfer the SELinux data to a blank set of creds
+ */
+static void selinux_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
+{
+ const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec = selinux_cred(old);
+ struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new);
+
+ *tsec = *old_tsec;
+}
+
+static void selinux_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid)
+{
+ *secid = cred_sid(c);
+}
+
+/*
+ * set the security data for a kernel service
+ * - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled
+ */
+static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
+{
+ struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new);
+ u32 sid = current_sid();
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = avc_has_perm(sid, secid,
+ SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
+ KERNEL_SERVICE__USE_AS_OVERRIDE,
+ NULL);
+ if (ret == 0) {
+ tsec->sid = secid;
+ tsec->create_sid = 0;
+ tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
+ tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * set the file creation context in a security record to the same as the
+ * objective context of the specified inode
+ */
+static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
+{
+ struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security(inode);
+ struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new);
+ u32 sid = current_sid();
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
+ SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
+ KERNEL_SERVICE__CREATE_FILES_AS,
+ NULL);
+
+ if (ret == 0)
+ tsec->create_sid = isec->sid;
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int selinux_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
+{
+ struct common_audit_data ad;
+
+ ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KMOD;
+ ad.u.kmod_name = kmod_name;
+
+ return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
+ SYSTEM__MODULE_REQUEST, &ad);
+}
+
+static int selinux_kernel_module_from_file(struct file *file)
+{
+ struct common_audit_data ad;
+ struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+ struct file_security_struct *fsec;
+ u32 sid = current_sid();
+ int rc;
+
+ /* init_module */
+ if (file == NULL)
+ return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
+ SYSTEM__MODULE_LOAD, NULL);
+
+ /* finit_module */
+
+ ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
+ ad.u.file = file;
+
+ fsec = selinux_file(file);
+ if (sid != fsec->sid) {
+ rc = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->sid, SECCLASS_FD, FD__USE, &ad);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ isec = inode_security(file_inode(file));
+ return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
+ SYSTEM__MODULE_LOAD, &ad);
+}
+
+static int selinux_kernel_read_file(struct file *file,
+ enum kernel_read_file_id id,
+ bool contents)
+{
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ switch (id) {
+ case READING_MODULE:
+ rc = selinux_kernel_module_from_file(contents ? file : NULL);
+ break;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static int selinux_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents)
+{
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ switch (id) {
+ case LOADING_MODULE:
+ rc = selinux_kernel_module_from_file(NULL);
+ break;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
+{
+ return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+ PROCESS__SETPGID, NULL);
+}
+
+static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
+{
+ return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+ PROCESS__GETPGID, NULL);
+}
+
+static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
+{
+ return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+ PROCESS__GETSESSION, NULL);
+}
+
+static void selinux_current_getsecid_subj(u32 *secid)
+{
+ *secid = current_sid();
+}
+
+static void selinux_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
+{
+ *secid = task_sid_obj(p);
+}
+
+static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
+{
+ return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+ PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL);
+}
+
+static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
+{
+ return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+ PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL);
+}
+
+static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
+{
+ return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+ PROCESS__GETSCHED, NULL);
+}
+
+static int selinux_task_prlimit(const struct cred *cred, const struct cred *tcred,
+ unsigned int flags)
+{
+ u32 av = 0;
+
+ if (!flags)
+ return 0;
+ if (flags & LSM_PRLIMIT_WRITE)
+ av |= PROCESS__SETRLIMIT;
+ if (flags & LSM_PRLIMIT_READ)
+ av |= PROCESS__GETRLIMIT;
+ return avc_has_perm(cred_sid(cred), cred_sid(tcred),
+ SECCLASS_PROCESS, av, NULL);
+}
+
+static int selinux_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource,
+ struct rlimit *new_rlim)
+{
+ struct rlimit *old_rlim = p->signal->rlim + resource;
+
+ /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
+ lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
+ later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
+ upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_committing_creds. */
+ if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
+ return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p),
+ SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT, NULL);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
+{
+ return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+ PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL);
+}
+
+static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
+{
+ return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+ PROCESS__GETSCHED, NULL);
+}
+
+static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
+{
+ return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+ PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL);
+}
+
+static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct kernel_siginfo *info,
+ int sig, const struct cred *cred)
+{
+ u32 secid;
+ u32 perm;
+
+ if (!sig)
+ perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
+ else
+ perm = signal_to_av(sig);
+ if (!cred)
+ secid = current_sid();
+ else
+ secid = cred_sid(cred);
+ return avc_has_perm(secid, task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
+}
+
+static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
+ struct inode *inode)
+{
+ struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
+ u32 sid = task_sid_obj(p);
+
+ spin_lock(&isec->lock);
+ isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
+ isec->sid = sid;
+ isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
+ spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
+}
+
+static int selinux_userns_create(const struct cred *cred)
+{
+ u32 sid = current_sid();
+
+ return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_USER_NAMESPACE,
+ USER_NAMESPACE__CREATE, NULL);
+}
+
+/* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
+static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
+ struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
+{
+ int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
+ struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
+
+ offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
+ ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph);
+ if (ih == NULL)
+ goto out;
+
+ ihlen = ih->ihl * 4;
+ if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph))
+ goto out;
+
+ ad->u.net->v4info.saddr = ih->saddr;
+ ad->u.net->v4info.daddr = ih->daddr;
+ ret = 0;
+
+ if (proto)
+ *proto = ih->protocol;
+
+ switch (ih->protocol) {
+ case IPPROTO_TCP: {
+ struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
+
+ if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
+ break;
+
+ offset += ihlen;
+ th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
+ if (th == NULL)
+ break;
+
+ ad->u.net->sport = th->source;
+ ad->u.net->dport = th->dest;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ case IPPROTO_UDP: {
+ struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
+
+ if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
+ break;
+
+ offset += ihlen;
+ uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
+ if (uh == NULL)
+ break;
+
+ ad->u.net->sport = uh->source;
+ ad->u.net->dport = uh->dest;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
+ struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
+
+ if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
+ break;
+
+ offset += ihlen;
+ dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
+ if (dh == NULL)
+ break;
+
+ ad->u.net->sport = dh->dccph_sport;
+ ad->u.net->dport = dh->dccph_dport;
+ break;
+ }
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IP_SCTP)
+ case IPPROTO_SCTP: {
+ struct sctphdr _sctph, *sh;
+
+ if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
+ break;
+
+ offset += ihlen;
+ sh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_sctph), &_sctph);
+ if (sh == NULL)
+ break;
+
+ ad->u.net->sport = sh->source;
+ ad->u.net->dport = sh->dest;
+ break;
+ }
+#endif
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+out:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
+
+/* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
+static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb,
+ struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
+{
+ u8 nexthdr;
+ int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
+ struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6;
+ __be16 frag_off;
+
+ offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
+ ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
+ if (ip6 == NULL)
+ goto out;
+
+ ad->u.net->v6info.saddr = ip6->saddr;
+ ad->u.net->v6info.daddr = ip6->daddr;
+ ret = 0;
+
+ nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
+ offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
+ offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr, &frag_off);
+ if (offset < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (proto)
+ *proto = nexthdr;
+
+ switch (nexthdr) {
+ case IPPROTO_TCP: {
+ struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
+
+ th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
+ if (th == NULL)
+ break;
+
+ ad->u.net->sport = th->source;
+ ad->u.net->dport = th->dest;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ case IPPROTO_UDP: {
+ struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
+
+ uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
+ if (uh == NULL)
+ break;
+
+ ad->u.net->sport = uh->source;
+ ad->u.net->dport = uh->dest;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
+ struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
+
+ dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
+ if (dh == NULL)
+ break;
+
+ ad->u.net->sport = dh->dccph_sport;
+ ad->u.net->dport = dh->dccph_dport;
+ break;
+ }
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IP_SCTP)
+ case IPPROTO_SCTP: {
+ struct sctphdr _sctph, *sh;
+
+ sh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_sctph), &_sctph);
+ if (sh == NULL)
+ break;
+
+ ad->u.net->sport = sh->source;
+ ad->u.net->dport = sh->dest;
+ break;
+ }
+#endif
+ /* includes fragments */
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+out:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+#endif /* IPV6 */
+
+static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct common_audit_data *ad,
+ char **_addrp, int src, u8 *proto)
+{
+ char *addrp;
+ int ret;
+
+ switch (ad->u.net->family) {
+ case PF_INET:
+ ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad, proto);
+ if (ret)
+ goto parse_error;
+ addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net->v4info.saddr :
+ &ad->u.net->v4info.daddr);
+ goto okay;
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
+ case PF_INET6:
+ ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad, proto);
+ if (ret)
+ goto parse_error;
+ addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net->v6info.saddr :
+ &ad->u.net->v6info.daddr);
+ goto okay;
+#endif /* IPV6 */
+ default:
+ addrp = NULL;
+ goto okay;
+ }
+
+parse_error:
+ pr_warn(
+ "SELinux: failure in selinux_parse_skb(),"
+ " unable to parse packet\n");
+ return ret;
+
+okay:
+ if (_addrp)
+ *_addrp = addrp;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid - Determine the peer label of a packet
+ * @skb: the packet
+ * @family: protocol family
+ * @sid: the packet's peer label SID
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Check the various different forms of network peer labeling and determine
+ * the peer label/SID for the packet; most of the magic actually occurs in
+ * the security server function security_net_peersid_cmp(). The function
+ * returns zero if the value in @sid is valid (although it may be SECSID_NULL)
+ * or -EACCES if @sid is invalid due to inconsistencies with the different
+ * peer labels.
+ *
+ */
+static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid)
+{
+ int err;
+ u32 xfrm_sid;
+ u32 nlbl_sid;
+ u32 nlbl_type;
+
+ err = selinux_xfrm_skb_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
+ if (unlikely(err))
+ return -EACCES;
+ err = selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, family, &nlbl_type, &nlbl_sid);
+ if (unlikely(err))
+ return -EACCES;
+
+ err = security_net_peersid_resolve(nlbl_sid,
+ nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid);
+ if (unlikely(err)) {
+ pr_warn(
+ "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(),"
+ " unable to determine packet's peer label\n");
+ return -EACCES;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * selinux_conn_sid - Determine the child socket label for a connection
+ * @sk_sid: the parent socket's SID
+ * @skb_sid: the packet's SID
+ * @conn_sid: the resulting connection SID
+ *
+ * If @skb_sid is valid then the user:role:type information from @sk_sid is
+ * combined with the MLS information from @skb_sid in order to create
+ * @conn_sid. If @skb_sid is not valid then @conn_sid is simply a copy
+ * of @sk_sid. Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
+ *
+ */
+static int selinux_conn_sid(u32 sk_sid, u32 skb_sid, u32 *conn_sid)
+{
+ int err = 0;
+
+ if (skb_sid != SECSID_NULL)
+ err = security_sid_mls_copy(sk_sid, skb_sid,
+ conn_sid);
+ else
+ *conn_sid = sk_sid;
+
+ return err;
+}
+
+/* socket security operations */
+
+static int socket_sockcreate_sid(const struct task_security_struct *tsec,
+ u16 secclass, u32 *socksid)
+{
+ if (tsec->sockcreate_sid > SECSID_NULL) {
+ *socksid = tsec->sockcreate_sid;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
+ secclass, NULL, socksid);
+}
+
+static int sock_has_perm(struct sock *sk, u32 perms)
+{
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct common_audit_data ad;
+ struct lsm_network_audit net;
+
+ if (sksec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
+ return 0;
+
+ ad_net_init_from_sk(&ad, &net, sk);
+
+ return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), sksec->sid, sksec->sclass, perms,
+ &ad);
+}
+
+static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
+ int protocol, int kern)
+{
+ const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
+ u32 newsid;
+ u16 secclass;
+ int rc;
+
+ if (kern)
+ return 0;
+
+ secclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
+ rc = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, secclass, &newsid);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, secclass, SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
+}
+
+static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
+ int type, int protocol, int kern)
+{
+ const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
+ struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(sock));
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
+ u16 sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
+ u32 sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
+ int err = 0;
+
+ if (!kern) {
+ err = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, sclass, &sid);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ }
+
+ isec->sclass = sclass;
+ isec->sid = sid;
+ isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
+
+ if (sock->sk) {
+ sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ sksec->sclass = sclass;
+ sksec->sid = sid;
+ /* Allows detection of the first association on this socket */
+ if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET)
+ sksec->sctp_assoc_state = SCTP_ASSOC_UNSET;
+
+ err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock->sk, family);
+ }
+
+ return err;
+}
+
+static int selinux_socket_socketpair(struct socket *socka,
+ struct socket *sockb)
+{
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec_a = socka->sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec_b = sockb->sk->sk_security;
+
+ sksec_a->peer_sid = sksec_b->sid;
+ sksec_b->peer_sid = sksec_a->sid;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
+ Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
+ permission check between the socket and the port number. */
+
+static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
+{
+ struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ u16 family;
+ int err;
+
+ err = sock_has_perm(sk, SOCKET__BIND);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port. */
+ family = sk->sk_family;
+ if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
+ char *addrp;
+ struct common_audit_data ad;
+ struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
+ struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
+ struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
+ u16 family_sa;
+ unsigned short snum;
+ u32 sid, node_perm;
+
+ /*
+ * sctp_bindx(3) calls via selinux_sctp_bind_connect()
+ * that validates multiple binding addresses. Because of this
+ * need to check address->sa_family as it is possible to have
+ * sk->sk_family = PF_INET6 with addr->sa_family = AF_INET.
+ */
+ if (addrlen < offsetofend(struct sockaddr, sa_family))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ family_sa = address->sa_family;
+ switch (family_sa) {
+ case AF_UNSPEC:
+ case AF_INET:
+ if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
+ if (family_sa == AF_UNSPEC) {
+ if (family == PF_INET6) {
+ /* Length check from inet6_bind_sk() */
+ if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ /* Family check from __inet6_bind() */
+ goto err_af;
+ }
+ /* see __inet_bind(), we only want to allow
+ * AF_UNSPEC if the address is INADDR_ANY
+ */
+ if (addr4->sin_addr.s_addr != htonl(INADDR_ANY))
+ goto err_af;
+ family_sa = AF_INET;
+ }
+ snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
+ addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
+ break;
+ case AF_INET6:
+ if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
+ snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
+ addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
+ break;
+ default:
+ goto err_af;
+ }
+
+ ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
+ ad.u.net = &net;
+ ad.u.net->sport = htons(snum);
+ ad.u.net->family = family_sa;
+
+ if (snum) {
+ int low, high;
+
+ inet_get_local_port_range(sock_net(sk), &low, &high);
+
+ if (inet_port_requires_bind_service(sock_net(sk), snum) ||
+ snum < low || snum > high) {
+ err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
+ snum, &sid);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
+ err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid,
+ sksec->sclass,
+ SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+
+ switch (sksec->sclass) {
+ case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
+ node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
+ break;
+
+ case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
+ node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
+ break;
+
+ case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
+ node_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
+ break;
+
+ case SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET:
+ node_perm = SCTP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family_sa, &sid);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (family_sa == AF_INET)
+ ad.u.net->v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
+ else
+ ad.u.net->v6info.saddr = addr6->sin6_addr;
+
+ err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid,
+ sksec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
+ }
+out:
+ return err;
+err_af:
+ /* Note that SCTP services expect -EINVAL, others -EAFNOSUPPORT. */
+ if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
+}
+
+/* This supports connect(2) and SCTP connect services such as sctp_connectx(3)
+ * and sctp_sendmsg(3) as described in Documentation/security/SCTP.rst
+ */
+static int selinux_socket_connect_helper(struct socket *sock,
+ struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
+{
+ struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ int err;
+
+ err = sock_has_perm(sk, SOCKET__CONNECT);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ if (addrlen < offsetofend(struct sockaddr, sa_family))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /* connect(AF_UNSPEC) has special handling, as it is a documented
+ * way to disconnect the socket
+ */
+ if (address->sa_family == AF_UNSPEC)
+ return 0;
+
+ /*
+ * If a TCP, DCCP or SCTP socket, check name_connect permission
+ * for the port.
+ */
+ if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
+ sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET ||
+ sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET) {
+ struct common_audit_data ad;
+ struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
+ struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
+ struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
+ unsigned short snum;
+ u32 sid, perm;
+
+ /* sctp_connectx(3) calls via selinux_sctp_bind_connect()
+ * that validates multiple connect addresses. Because of this
+ * need to check address->sa_family as it is possible to have
+ * sk->sk_family = PF_INET6 with addr->sa_family = AF_INET.
+ */
+ switch (address->sa_family) {
+ case AF_INET:
+ addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
+ if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
+ break;
+ case AF_INET6:
+ addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
+ if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
+ break;
+ default:
+ /* Note that SCTP services expect -EINVAL, whereas
+ * others expect -EAFNOSUPPORT.
+ */
+ if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ else
+ return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
+ }
+
+ err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ switch (sksec->sclass) {
+ case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
+ perm = TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
+ break;
+ case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
+ perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
+ break;
+ case SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET:
+ perm = SCTP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
+ ad.u.net = &net;
+ ad.u.net->dport = htons(snum);
+ ad.u.net->family = address->sa_family;
+ err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid, sksec->sclass, perm, &ad);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Supports connect(2), see comments in selinux_socket_connect_helper() */
+static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock,
+ struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
+{
+ int err;
+ struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
+
+ err = selinux_socket_connect_helper(sock, address, addrlen);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ return selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(sk, address);
+}
+
+static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
+{
+ return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__LISTEN);
+}
+
+static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
+{
+ int err;
+ struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+ struct inode_security_struct *newisec;
+ u16 sclass;
+ u32 sid;
+
+ err = sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__ACCEPT);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ isec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(sock));
+ spin_lock(&isec->lock);
+ sclass = isec->sclass;
+ sid = isec->sid;
+ spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
+
+ newisec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(newsock));
+ newisec->sclass = sclass;
+ newisec->sid = sid;
+ newisec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
+ int size)
+{
+ return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__WRITE);
+}
+
+static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
+ int size, int flags)
+{
+ return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__READ);
+}
+
+static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
+{
+ return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR);
+}
+
+static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
+{
+ return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR);
+}
+
+static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
+{
+ int err;
+
+ err = sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__SETOPT);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock, level, optname);
+}
+
+static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
+ int optname)
+{
+ return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__GETOPT);
+}
+
+static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
+{
+ return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN);
+}
+
+static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
+ struct sock *other,
+ struct sock *newsk)
+{
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec_sock = sock->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec_other = other->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec_new = newsk->sk_security;
+ struct common_audit_data ad;
+ struct lsm_network_audit net;
+ int err;
+
+ ad_net_init_from_sk(&ad, &net, other);
+
+ err = avc_has_perm(sksec_sock->sid, sksec_other->sid,
+ sksec_other->sclass,
+ UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ /* server child socket */
+ sksec_new->peer_sid = sksec_sock->sid;
+ err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec_other->sid,
+ sksec_sock->sid, &sksec_new->sid);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ /* connecting socket */
+ sksec_sock->peer_sid = sksec_new->sid;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
+ struct socket *other)
+{
+ struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *osec = other->sk->sk_security;
+ struct common_audit_data ad;
+ struct lsm_network_audit net;
+
+ ad_net_init_from_sk(&ad, &net, other->sk);
+
+ return avc_has_perm(ssec->sid, osec->sid, osec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO,
+ &ad);
+}
+
+static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(struct net *ns, int ifindex,
+ char *addrp, u16 family, u32 peer_sid,
+ struct common_audit_data *ad)
+{
+ int err;
+ u32 if_sid;
+ u32 node_sid;
+
+ err = sel_netif_sid(ns, ifindex, &if_sid);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ err = avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
+ SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__INGRESS, ad);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ return avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
+ SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__RECVFROM, ad);
+}
+
+static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
+ u16 family)
+{
+ int err = 0;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
+ struct common_audit_data ad;
+ struct lsm_network_audit net;
+ char *addrp;
+
+ ad_net_init_from_iif(&ad, &net, skb->skb_iif, family);
+ err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) {
+ err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
+ PACKET__RECV, &ad);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ }
+
+ err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, &ad);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, &ad);
+
+ return err;
+}
+
+static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ int err, peerlbl_active, secmark_active;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ u16 family = sk->sk_family;
+ u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
+ struct common_audit_data ad;
+ struct lsm_network_audit net;
+ char *addrp;
+
+ if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
+ if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
+ family = PF_INET;
+
+ /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
+ * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
+ * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
+ * as fast and as clean as possible. */
+ if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer())
+ return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, family);
+
+ secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
+ peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
+ if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
+ return 0;
+
+ ad_net_init_from_iif(&ad, &net, skb->skb_iif, family);
+ err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ if (peerlbl_active) {
+ u32 peer_sid;
+
+ err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(sock_net(sk), skb->skb_iif,
+ addrp, family, peer_sid, &ad);
+ if (err) {
+ selinux_netlbl_err(skb, family, err, 0);
+ return err;
+ }
+ err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER,
+ PEER__RECV, &ad);
+ if (err) {
+ selinux_netlbl_err(skb, family, err, 0);
+ return err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (secmark_active) {
+ err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
+ PACKET__RECV, &ad);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ }
+
+ return err;
+}
+
+static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
+ sockptr_t optval, sockptr_t optlen,
+ unsigned int len)
+{
+ int err = 0;
+ char *scontext = NULL;
+ u32 scontext_len;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
+
+ if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
+ sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
+ sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET)
+ peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
+ if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL)
+ return -ENOPROTOOPT;
+
+ err = security_sid_to_context(peer_sid, &scontext,
+ &scontext_len);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ if (scontext_len > len) {
+ err = -ERANGE;
+ goto out_len;
+ }
+
+ if (copy_to_sockptr(optval, scontext, scontext_len))
+ err = -EFAULT;
+out_len:
+ if (copy_to_sockptr(optlen, &scontext_len, sizeof(scontext_len)))
+ err = -EFAULT;
+ kfree(scontext);
+ return err;
+}
+
+static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
+{
+ u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
+ u16 family;
+ struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+
+ if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
+ family = PF_INET;
+ else if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
+ family = PF_INET6;
+ else if (sock)
+ family = sock->sk->sk_family;
+ else
+ goto out;
+
+ if (sock && family == PF_UNIX) {
+ isec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(sock));
+ peer_secid = isec->sid;
+ } else if (skb)
+ selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid);
+
+out:
+ *secid = peer_secid;
+ if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
+{
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
+
+ sksec = kzalloc(sizeof(*sksec), priority);
+ if (!sksec)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ sksec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+ sksec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+ sksec->sclass = SECCLASS_SOCKET;
+ selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(sksec);
+ sk->sk_security = sksec;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
+{
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+
+ sk->sk_security = NULL;
+ selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(sksec);
+ kfree(sksec);
+}
+
+static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
+{
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
+
+ newsksec->sid = sksec->sid;
+ newsksec->peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
+ newsksec->sclass = sksec->sclass;
+
+ selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec);
+}
+
+static void selinux_sk_getsecid(const struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
+{
+ if (!sk)
+ *secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
+ else {
+ const struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+
+ *secid = sksec->sid;
+ }
+}
+
+static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
+{
+ struct inode_security_struct *isec =
+ inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(parent));
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+
+ if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 ||
+ sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
+ isec->sid = sksec->sid;
+ sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Determines peer_secid for the asoc and updates socket's peer label
+ * if it's the first association on the socket.
+ */
+static int selinux_sctp_process_new_assoc(struct sctp_association *asoc,
+ struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ struct sock *sk = asoc->base.sk;
+ u16 family = sk->sk_family;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct common_audit_data ad;
+ struct lsm_network_audit net;
+ int err;
+
+ /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
+ if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
+ family = PF_INET;
+
+ if (selinux_peerlbl_enabled()) {
+ asoc->peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
+
+ /* This will return peer_sid = SECSID_NULL if there are
+ * no peer labels, see security_net_peersid_resolve().
+ */
+ err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &asoc->peer_secid);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ if (asoc->peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
+ asoc->peer_secid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+ } else {
+ asoc->peer_secid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+ }
+
+ if (sksec->sctp_assoc_state == SCTP_ASSOC_UNSET) {
+ sksec->sctp_assoc_state = SCTP_ASSOC_SET;
+
+ /* Here as first association on socket. As the peer SID
+ * was allowed by peer recv (and the netif/node checks),
+ * then it is approved by policy and used as the primary
+ * peer SID for getpeercon(3).
+ */
+ sksec->peer_sid = asoc->peer_secid;
+ } else if (sksec->peer_sid != asoc->peer_secid) {
+ /* Other association peer SIDs are checked to enforce
+ * consistency among the peer SIDs.
+ */
+ ad_net_init_from_sk(&ad, &net, asoc->base.sk);
+ err = avc_has_perm(sksec->peer_sid, asoc->peer_secid,
+ sksec->sclass, SCTP_SOCKET__ASSOCIATION,
+ &ad);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Called whenever SCTP receives an INIT or COOKIE ECHO chunk. This
+ * happens on an incoming connect(2), sctp_connectx(3) or
+ * sctp_sendmsg(3) (with no association already present).
+ */
+static int selinux_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_association *asoc,
+ struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = asoc->base.sk->sk_security;
+ u32 conn_sid;
+ int err;
+
+ if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass())
+ return 0;
+
+ err = selinux_sctp_process_new_assoc(asoc, skb);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ /* Compute the MLS component for the connection and store
+ * the information in asoc. This will be used by SCTP TCP type
+ * sockets and peeled off connections as they cause a new
+ * socket to be generated. selinux_sctp_sk_clone() will then
+ * plug this into the new socket.
+ */
+ err = selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, asoc->peer_secid, &conn_sid);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ asoc->secid = conn_sid;
+
+ /* Set any NetLabel labels including CIPSO/CALIPSO options. */
+ return selinux_netlbl_sctp_assoc_request(asoc, skb);
+}
+
+/* Called when SCTP receives a COOKIE ACK chunk as the final
+ * response to an association request (initited by us).
+ */
+static int selinux_sctp_assoc_established(struct sctp_association *asoc,
+ struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = asoc->base.sk->sk_security;
+
+ if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass())
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Inherit secid from the parent socket - this will be picked up
+ * by selinux_sctp_sk_clone() if the association gets peeled off
+ * into a new socket.
+ */
+ asoc->secid = sksec->sid;
+
+ return selinux_sctp_process_new_assoc(asoc, skb);
+}
+
+/* Check if sctp IPv4/IPv6 addresses are valid for binding or connecting
+ * based on their @optname.
+ */
+static int selinux_sctp_bind_connect(struct sock *sk, int optname,
+ struct sockaddr *address,
+ int addrlen)
+{
+ int len, err = 0, walk_size = 0;
+ void *addr_buf;
+ struct sockaddr *addr;
+ struct socket *sock;
+
+ if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass())
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Process one or more addresses that may be IPv4 or IPv6 */
+ sock = sk->sk_socket;
+ addr_buf = address;
+
+ while (walk_size < addrlen) {
+ if (walk_size + sizeof(sa_family_t) > addrlen)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ addr = addr_buf;
+ switch (addr->sa_family) {
+ case AF_UNSPEC:
+ case AF_INET:
+ len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in);
+ break;
+ case AF_INET6:
+ len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
+ break;
+ default:
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (walk_size + len > addrlen)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ switch (optname) {
+ /* Bind checks */
+ case SCTP_PRIMARY_ADDR:
+ case SCTP_SET_PEER_PRIMARY_ADDR:
+ case SCTP_SOCKOPT_BINDX_ADD:
+ err = selinux_socket_bind(sock, addr, len);
+ break;
+ /* Connect checks */
+ case SCTP_SOCKOPT_CONNECTX:
+ case SCTP_PARAM_SET_PRIMARY:
+ case SCTP_PARAM_ADD_IP:
+ case SCTP_SENDMSG_CONNECT:
+ err = selinux_socket_connect_helper(sock, addr, len);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ /* As selinux_sctp_bind_connect() is called by the
+ * SCTP protocol layer, the socket is already locked,
+ * therefore selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked()
+ * is called here. The situations handled are:
+ * sctp_connectx(3), sctp_sendmsg(3), sendmsg(2),
+ * whenever a new IP address is added or when a new
+ * primary address is selected.
+ * Note that an SCTP connect(2) call happens before
+ * the SCTP protocol layer and is handled via
+ * selinux_socket_connect().
+ */
+ err = selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked(sk, addr);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ addr_buf += len;
+ walk_size += len;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Called whenever a new socket is created by accept(2) or sctp_peeloff(3). */
+static void selinux_sctp_sk_clone(struct sctp_association *asoc, struct sock *sk,
+ struct sock *newsk)
+{
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
+
+ /* If policy does not support SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET then call
+ * the non-sctp clone version.
+ */
+ if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass())
+ return selinux_sk_clone_security(sk, newsk);
+
+ newsksec->sid = asoc->secid;
+ newsksec->peer_sid = asoc->peer_secid;
+ newsksec->sclass = sksec->sclass;
+ selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone(sk, newsk);
+}
+
+static int selinux_mptcp_add_subflow(struct sock *sk, struct sock *ssk)
+{
+ struct sk_security_struct *ssksec = ssk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+
+ ssksec->sclass = sksec->sclass;
+ ssksec->sid = sksec->sid;
+
+ /* replace the existing subflow label deleting the existing one
+ * and re-recreating a new label using the updated context
+ */
+ selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(ssksec);
+ return selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(ssk, ssk->sk_family);
+}
+
+static int selinux_inet_conn_request(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
+ struct request_sock *req)
+{
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ int err;
+ u16 family = req->rsk_ops->family;
+ u32 connsid;
+ u32 peersid;
+
+ err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peersid);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ err = selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, peersid, &connsid);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ req->secid = connsid;
+ req->peer_secid = peersid;
+
+ return selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(req, family);
+}
+
+static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
+ const struct request_sock *req)
+{
+ struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
+
+ newsksec->sid = req->secid;
+ newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid;
+ /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the
+ new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet.
+ So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which
+ time it will have been created and available. */
+
+ /* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only
+ * thread with access to newsksec */
+ selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(newsk, req->rsk_ops->family);
+}
+
+static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ u16 family = sk->sk_family;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+
+ /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
+ if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
+ family = PF_INET;
+
+ selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &sksec->peer_sid);
+}
+
+static int selinux_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 sid)
+{
+ const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
+ u32 tsid;
+
+ tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
+ tsid = tsec->sid;
+
+ return avc_has_perm(tsid, sid, SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__RELABELTO,
+ NULL);
+}
+
+static void selinux_secmark_refcount_inc(void)
+{
+ atomic_inc(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
+}
+
+static void selinux_secmark_refcount_dec(void)
+{
+ atomic_dec(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
+}
+
+static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
+ struct flowi_common *flic)
+{
+ flic->flowic_secid = req->secid;
+}
+
+static int selinux_tun_dev_alloc_security(void **security)
+{
+ struct tun_security_struct *tunsec;
+
+ tunsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*tunsec), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!tunsec)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ tunsec->sid = current_sid();
+
+ *security = tunsec;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void selinux_tun_dev_free_security(void *security)
+{
+ kfree(security);
+}
+
+static int selinux_tun_dev_create(void)
+{
+ u32 sid = current_sid();
+
+ /* we aren't taking into account the "sockcreate" SID since the socket
+ * that is being created here is not a socket in the traditional sense,
+ * instead it is a private sock, accessible only to the kernel, and
+ * representing a wide range of network traffic spanning multiple
+ * connections unlike traditional sockets - check the TUN driver to
+ * get a better understanding of why this socket is special */
+
+ return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET, TUN_SOCKET__CREATE,
+ NULL);
+}
+
+static int selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue(void *security)
+{
+ struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
+
+ return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), tunsec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
+ TUN_SOCKET__ATTACH_QUEUE, NULL);
+}
+
+static int selinux_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk, void *security)
+{
+ struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+
+ /* we don't currently perform any NetLabel based labeling here and it
+ * isn't clear that we would want to do so anyway; while we could apply
+ * labeling without the support of the TUN user the resulting labeled
+ * traffic from the other end of the connection would almost certainly
+ * cause confusion to the TUN user that had no idea network labeling
+ * protocols were being used */
+
+ sksec->sid = tunsec->sid;
+ sksec->sclass = SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int selinux_tun_dev_open(void *security)
+{
+ struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
+ u32 sid = current_sid();
+ int err;
+
+ err = avc_has_perm(sid, tunsec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
+ TUN_SOCKET__RELABELFROM, NULL);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ err = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
+ TUN_SOCKET__RELABELTO, NULL);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ tunsec->sid = sid;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
+
+static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(void *priv, struct sk_buff *skb,
+ const struct nf_hook_state *state)
+{
+ int ifindex;
+ u16 family;
+ char *addrp;
+ u32 peer_sid;
+ struct common_audit_data ad;
+ struct lsm_network_audit net;
+ int secmark_active, peerlbl_active;
+
+ if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer())
+ return NF_ACCEPT;
+
+ secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
+ peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
+ if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
+ return NF_ACCEPT;
+
+ family = state->pf;
+ if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0)
+ return NF_DROP;
+
+ ifindex = state->in->ifindex;
+ ad_net_init_from_iif(&ad, &net, ifindex, family);
+ if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0)
+ return NF_DROP;
+
+ if (peerlbl_active) {
+ int err;
+
+ err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(state->net, ifindex,
+ addrp, family, peer_sid, &ad);
+ if (err) {
+ selinux_netlbl_err(skb, family, err, 1);
+ return NF_DROP;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (secmark_active)
+ if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
+ SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FORWARD_IN, &ad))
+ return NF_DROP;
+
+ if (netlbl_enabled())
+ /* we do this in the FORWARD path and not the POST_ROUTING
+ * path because we want to make sure we apply the necessary
+ * labeling before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH
+ * protection */
+ if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, peer_sid) != 0)
+ return NF_DROP;
+
+ return NF_ACCEPT;
+}
+
+static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(void *priv, struct sk_buff *skb,
+ const struct nf_hook_state *state)
+{
+ struct sock *sk;
+ u32 sid;
+
+ if (!netlbl_enabled())
+ return NF_ACCEPT;
+
+ /* we do this in the LOCAL_OUT path and not the POST_ROUTING path
+ * because we want to make sure we apply the necessary labeling
+ * before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH protection */
+ sk = skb->sk;
+ if (sk) {
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
+
+ if (sk_listener(sk))
+ /* if the socket is the listening state then this
+ * packet is a SYN-ACK packet which means it needs to
+ * be labeled based on the connection/request_sock and
+ * not the parent socket. unfortunately, we can't
+ * lookup the request_sock yet as it isn't queued on
+ * the parent socket until after the SYN-ACK is sent.
+ * the "solution" is to simply pass the packet as-is
+ * as any IP option based labeling should be copied
+ * from the initial connection request (in the IP
+ * layer). it is far from ideal, but until we get a
+ * security label in the packet itself this is the
+ * best we can do. */
+ return NF_ACCEPT;
+
+ /* standard practice, label using the parent socket */
+ sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ sid = sksec->sid;
+ } else
+ sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
+ if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, state->pf, sid) != 0)
+ return NF_DROP;
+
+ return NF_ACCEPT;
+}
+
+
+static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
+ const struct nf_hook_state *state)
+{
+ struct sock *sk;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
+ struct common_audit_data ad;
+ struct lsm_network_audit net;
+ u8 proto = 0;
+
+ sk = skb_to_full_sk(skb);
+ if (sk == NULL)
+ return NF_ACCEPT;
+ sksec = sk->sk_security;
+
+ ad_net_init_from_iif(&ad, &net, state->out->ifindex, state->pf);
+ if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, NULL, 0, &proto))
+ return NF_DROP;
+
+ if (selinux_secmark_enabled())
+ if (avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark,
+ SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, &ad))
+ return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
+
+ if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto))
+ return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
+
+ return NF_ACCEPT;
+}
+
+static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(void *priv,
+ struct sk_buff *skb,
+ const struct nf_hook_state *state)
+{
+ u16 family;
+ u32 secmark_perm;
+ u32 peer_sid;
+ int ifindex;
+ struct sock *sk;
+ struct common_audit_data ad;
+ struct lsm_network_audit net;
+ char *addrp;
+ int secmark_active, peerlbl_active;
+
+ /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
+ * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the
+ * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
+ * as fast and as clean as possible. */
+ if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer())
+ return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, state);
+
+ secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
+ peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
+ if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
+ return NF_ACCEPT;
+
+ sk = skb_to_full_sk(skb);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_XFRM
+ /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec
+ * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks
+ * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks
+ * when the packet is on it's final way out.
+ * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst
+ * is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control.
+ * NOTE: if this is a local socket (skb->sk != NULL) that is in the
+ * TCP listening state we cannot wait until the XFRM processing
+ * is done as we will miss out on the SA label if we do;
+ * unfortunately, this means more work, but it is only once per
+ * connection. */
+ if (skb_dst(skb) != NULL && skb_dst(skb)->xfrm != NULL &&
+ !(sk && sk_listener(sk)))
+ return NF_ACCEPT;
+#endif
+
+ family = state->pf;
+ if (sk == NULL) {
+ /* Without an associated socket the packet is either coming
+ * from the kernel or it is being forwarded; check the packet
+ * to determine which and if the packet is being forwarded
+ * query the packet directly to determine the security label. */
+ if (skb->skb_iif) {
+ secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
+ if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid))
+ return NF_DROP;
+ } else {
+ secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
+ peer_sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
+ }
+ } else if (sk_listener(sk)) {
+ /* Locally generated packet but the associated socket is in the
+ * listening state which means this is a SYN-ACK packet. In
+ * this particular case the correct security label is assigned
+ * to the connection/request_sock but unfortunately we can't
+ * query the request_sock as it isn't queued on the parent
+ * socket until after the SYN-ACK packet is sent; the only
+ * viable choice is to regenerate the label like we do in
+ * selinux_inet_conn_request(). See also selinux_ip_output()
+ * for similar problems. */
+ u32 skb_sid;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
+
+ sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &skb_sid))
+ return NF_DROP;
+ /* At this point, if the returned skb peerlbl is SECSID_NULL
+ * and the packet has been through at least one XFRM
+ * transformation then we must be dealing with the "final"
+ * form of labeled IPsec packet; since we've already applied
+ * all of our access controls on this packet we can safely
+ * pass the packet. */
+ if (skb_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
+ switch (family) {
+ case PF_INET:
+ if (IPCB(skb)->flags & IPSKB_XFRM_TRANSFORMED)
+ return NF_ACCEPT;
+ break;
+ case PF_INET6:
+ if (IP6CB(skb)->flags & IP6SKB_XFRM_TRANSFORMED)
+ return NF_ACCEPT;
+ break;
+ default:
+ return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
+ }
+ }
+ if (selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, skb_sid, &peer_sid))
+ return NF_DROP;
+ secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
+ } else {
+ /* Locally generated packet, fetch the security label from the
+ * associated socket. */
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ peer_sid = sksec->sid;
+ secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
+ }
+
+ ifindex = state->out->ifindex;
+ ad_net_init_from_iif(&ad, &net, ifindex, family);
+ if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, NULL))
+ return NF_DROP;
+
+ if (secmark_active)
+ if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
+ SECCLASS_PACKET, secmark_perm, &ad))
+ return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
+
+ if (peerlbl_active) {
+ u32 if_sid;
+ u32 node_sid;
+
+ if (sel_netif_sid(state->net, ifindex, &if_sid))
+ return NF_DROP;
+ if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
+ SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__EGRESS, &ad))
+ return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
+
+ if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid))
+ return NF_DROP;
+ if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
+ SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__SENDTO, &ad))
+ return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
+ }
+
+ return NF_ACCEPT;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
+
+static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ int rc = 0;
+ unsigned int msg_len;
+ unsigned int data_len = skb->len;
+ unsigned char *data = skb->data;
+ struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ u16 sclass = sksec->sclass;
+ u32 perm;
+
+ while (data_len >= nlmsg_total_size(0)) {
+ nlh = (struct nlmsghdr *)data;
+
+ /* NOTE: the nlmsg_len field isn't reliably set by some netlink
+ * users which means we can't reject skb's with bogus
+ * length fields; our solution is to follow what
+ * netlink_rcv_skb() does and simply skip processing at
+ * messages with length fields that are clearly junk
+ */
+ if (nlh->nlmsg_len < NLMSG_HDRLEN || nlh->nlmsg_len > data_len)
+ return 0;
+
+ rc = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
+ if (rc == 0) {
+ rc = sock_has_perm(sk, perm);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ } else if (rc == -EINVAL) {
+ /* -EINVAL is a missing msg/perm mapping */
+ pr_warn_ratelimited("SELinux: unrecognized netlink"
+ " message: protocol=%hu nlmsg_type=%hu sclass=%s"
+ " pid=%d comm=%s\n",
+ sk->sk_protocol, nlh->nlmsg_type,
+ secclass_map[sclass - 1].name,
+ task_pid_nr(current), current->comm);
+ if (enforcing_enabled() &&
+ !security_get_allow_unknown())
+ return rc;
+ rc = 0;
+ } else if (rc == -ENOENT) {
+ /* -ENOENT is a missing socket/class mapping, ignore */
+ rc = 0;
+ } else {
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ /* move to the next message after applying netlink padding */
+ msg_len = NLMSG_ALIGN(nlh->nlmsg_len);
+ if (msg_len >= data_len)
+ return 0;
+ data_len -= msg_len;
+ data += msg_len;
+ }
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static void ipc_init_security(struct ipc_security_struct *isec, u16 sclass)
+{
+ isec->sclass = sclass;
+ isec->sid = current_sid();
+}
+
+static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
+ u32 perms)
+{
+ struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
+ struct common_audit_data ad;
+ u32 sid = current_sid();
+
+ isec = selinux_ipc(ipc_perms);
+
+ ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
+ ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
+
+ return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
+}
+
+static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
+{
+ struct msg_security_struct *msec;
+
+ msec = selinux_msg_msg(msg);
+ msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* message queue security operations */
+static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq)
+{
+ struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
+ struct common_audit_data ad;
+ u32 sid = current_sid();
+
+ isec = selinux_ipc(msq);
+ ipc_init_security(isec, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
+
+ ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
+ ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key;
+
+ return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
+ MSGQ__CREATE, &ad);
+}
+
+static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, int msqflg)
+{
+ struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
+ struct common_audit_data ad;
+ u32 sid = current_sid();
+
+ isec = selinux_ipc(msq);
+
+ ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
+ ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key;
+
+ return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
+ MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
+}
+
+static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, int cmd)
+{
+ u32 perms;
+
+ switch (cmd) {
+ case IPC_INFO:
+ case MSG_INFO:
+ /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
+ return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
+ SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO, NULL);
+ case IPC_STAT:
+ case MSG_STAT:
+ case MSG_STAT_ANY:
+ perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE;
+ break;
+ case IPC_SET:
+ perms = MSGQ__SETATTR;
+ break;
+ case IPC_RMID:
+ perms = MSGQ__DESTROY;
+ break;
+ default:
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return ipc_has_perm(msq, perms);
+}
+
+static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
+{
+ struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
+ struct msg_security_struct *msec;
+ struct common_audit_data ad;
+ u32 sid = current_sid();
+ int rc;
+
+ isec = selinux_ipc(msq);
+ msec = selinux_msg_msg(msg);
+
+ /*
+ * First time through, need to assign label to the message
+ */
+ if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) {
+ /*
+ * Compute new sid based on current process and
+ * message queue this message will be stored in
+ */
+ rc = security_transition_sid(sid, isec->sid,
+ SECCLASS_MSG, NULL, &msec->sid);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
+ ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key;
+
+ /* Can this process write to the queue? */
+ rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
+ MSGQ__WRITE, &ad);
+ if (!rc)
+ /* Can this process send the message */
+ rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
+ MSG__SEND, &ad);
+ if (!rc)
+ /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
+ rc = avc_has_perm(msec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
+ MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad);
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
+ struct task_struct *target,
+ long type, int mode)
+{
+ struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
+ struct msg_security_struct *msec;
+ struct common_audit_data ad;
+ u32 sid = task_sid_obj(target);
+ int rc;
+
+ isec = selinux_ipc(msq);
+ msec = selinux_msg_msg(msg);
+
+ ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
+ ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key;
+
+ rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
+ SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad);
+ if (!rc)
+ rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid,
+ SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/* Shared Memory security operations */
+static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp)
+{
+ struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
+ struct common_audit_data ad;
+ u32 sid = current_sid();
+
+ isec = selinux_ipc(shp);
+ ipc_init_security(isec, SECCLASS_SHM);
+
+ ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
+ ad.u.ipc_id = shp->key;
+
+ return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
+ SHM__CREATE, &ad);
+}
+
+static int selinux_shm_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, int shmflg)
+{
+ struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
+ struct common_audit_data ad;
+ u32 sid = current_sid();
+
+ isec = selinux_ipc(shp);
+
+ ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
+ ad.u.ipc_id = shp->key;
+
+ return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
+ SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
+}
+
+/* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
+static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, int cmd)
+{
+ u32 perms;
+
+ switch (cmd) {
+ case IPC_INFO:
+ case SHM_INFO:
+ /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
+ return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
+ SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO, NULL);
+ case IPC_STAT:
+ case SHM_STAT:
+ case SHM_STAT_ANY:
+ perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE;
+ break;
+ case IPC_SET:
+ perms = SHM__SETATTR;
+ break;
+ case SHM_LOCK:
+ case SHM_UNLOCK:
+ perms = SHM__LOCK;
+ break;
+ case IPC_RMID:
+ perms = SHM__DESTROY;
+ break;
+ default:
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return ipc_has_perm(shp, perms);
+}
+
+static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp,
+ char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
+{
+ u32 perms;
+
+ if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
+ perms = SHM__READ;
+ else
+ perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE;
+
+ return ipc_has_perm(shp, perms);
+}
+
+/* Semaphore security operations */
+static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma)
+{
+ struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
+ struct common_audit_data ad;
+ u32 sid = current_sid();
+
+ isec = selinux_ipc(sma);
+ ipc_init_security(isec, SECCLASS_SEM);
+
+ ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
+ ad.u.ipc_id = sma->key;
+
+ return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
+ SEM__CREATE, &ad);
+}
+
+static int selinux_sem_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, int semflg)
+{
+ struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
+ struct common_audit_data ad;
+ u32 sid = current_sid();
+
+ isec = selinux_ipc(sma);
+
+ ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
+ ad.u.ipc_id = sma->key;
+
+ return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
+ SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
+}
+
+/* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
+static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, int cmd)
+{
+ int err;
+ u32 perms;
+
+ switch (cmd) {
+ case IPC_INFO:
+ case SEM_INFO:
+ /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
+ return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
+ SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO, NULL);
+ case GETPID:
+ case GETNCNT:
+ case GETZCNT:
+ perms = SEM__GETATTR;
+ break;
+ case GETVAL:
+ case GETALL:
+ perms = SEM__READ;
+ break;
+ case SETVAL:
+ case SETALL:
+ perms = SEM__WRITE;
+ break;
+ case IPC_RMID:
+ perms = SEM__DESTROY;
+ break;
+ case IPC_SET:
+ perms = SEM__SETATTR;
+ break;
+ case IPC_STAT:
+ case SEM_STAT:
+ case SEM_STAT_ANY:
+ perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE;
+ break;
+ default:
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ err = ipc_has_perm(sma, perms);
+ return err;
+}
+
+static int selinux_sem_semop(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma,
+ struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter)
+{
+ u32 perms;
+
+ if (alter)
+ perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE;
+ else
+ perms = SEM__READ;
+
+ return ipc_has_perm(sma, perms);
+}
+
+static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
+{
+ u32 av = 0;
+
+ av = 0;
+ if (flag & S_IRUGO)
+ av |= IPC__UNIX_READ;
+ if (flag & S_IWUGO)
+ av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE;
+
+ if (av == 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
+}
+
+static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
+{
+ struct ipc_security_struct *isec = selinux_ipc(ipcp);
+ *secid = isec->sid;
+}
+
+static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
+{
+ if (inode)
+ inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
+}
+
+static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
+ const char *name, char **value)
+{
+ const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
+ u32 sid;
+ int error;
+ unsigned len;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ __tsec = selinux_cred(__task_cred(p));
+
+ if (current != p) {
+ error = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), __tsec->sid,
+ SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__GETATTR, NULL);
+ if (error)
+ goto bad;
+ }
+
+ if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
+ sid = __tsec->sid;
+ else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
+ sid = __tsec->osid;
+ else if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
+ sid = __tsec->exec_sid;
+ else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
+ sid = __tsec->create_sid;
+ else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
+ sid = __tsec->keycreate_sid;
+ else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
+ sid = __tsec->sockcreate_sid;
+ else {
+ error = -EINVAL;
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+
+ if (!sid)
+ return 0;
+
+ error = security_sid_to_context(sid, value, &len);
+ if (error)
+ return error;
+ return len;
+
+bad:
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return error;
+}
+
+static int selinux_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size)
+{
+ struct task_security_struct *tsec;
+ struct cred *new;
+ u32 mysid = current_sid(), sid = 0, ptsid;
+ int error;
+ char *str = value;
+
+ /*
+ * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
+ */
+ if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
+ error = avc_has_perm(mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+ PROCESS__SETEXEC, NULL);
+ else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
+ error = avc_has_perm(mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+ PROCESS__SETFSCREATE, NULL);
+ else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
+ error = avc_has_perm(mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+ PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE, NULL);
+ else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
+ error = avc_has_perm(mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+ PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE, NULL);
+ else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
+ error = avc_has_perm(mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+ PROCESS__SETCURRENT, NULL);
+ else
+ error = -EINVAL;
+ if (error)
+ return error;
+
+ /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
+ if (size && str[0] && str[0] != '\n') {
+ if (str[size-1] == '\n') {
+ str[size-1] = 0;
+ size--;
+ }
+ error = security_context_to_sid(value, size,
+ &sid, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (error == -EINVAL && !strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
+ if (!has_cap_mac_admin(true)) {
+ struct audit_buffer *ab;
+ size_t audit_size;
+
+ /* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the
+ * context contains a nul and we should audit that */
+ if (str[size - 1] == '\0')
+ audit_size = size - 1;
+ else
+ audit_size = size;
+ ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(),
+ GFP_ATOMIC,
+ AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR);
+ if (!ab)
+ return error;
+ audit_log_format(ab, "op=fscreate invalid_context=");
+ audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, value, audit_size);
+ audit_log_end(ab);
+
+ return error;
+ }
+ error = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size,
+ &sid);
+ }
+ if (error)
+ return error;
+ }
+
+ new = prepare_creds();
+ if (!new)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
+ performed during the actual operation (execve,
+ open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
+ operation. See selinux_bprm_creds_for_exec for the execve
+ checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
+ operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
+ tsec = selinux_cred(new);
+ if (!strcmp(name, "exec")) {
+ tsec->exec_sid = sid;
+ } else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
+ tsec->create_sid = sid;
+ } else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) {
+ if (sid) {
+ error = avc_has_perm(mysid, sid,
+ SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL);
+ if (error)
+ goto abort_change;
+ }
+ tsec->keycreate_sid = sid;
+ } else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate")) {
+ tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid;
+ } else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
+ error = -EINVAL;
+ if (sid == 0)
+ goto abort_change;
+
+ /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
+ if (!current_is_single_threaded()) {
+ error = security_bounded_transition(tsec->sid, sid);
+ if (error)
+ goto abort_change;
+ }
+
+ /* Check permissions for the transition. */
+ error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+ PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
+ if (error)
+ goto abort_change;
+
+ /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
+ Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
+ ptsid = ptrace_parent_sid();
+ if (ptsid != 0) {
+ error = avc_has_perm(ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+ PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
+ if (error)
+ goto abort_change;
+ }
+
+ tsec->sid = sid;
+ } else {
+ error = -EINVAL;
+ goto abort_change;
+ }
+
+ commit_creds(new);
+ return size;
+
+abort_change:
+ abort_creds(new);
+ return error;
+}
+
+static int selinux_ismaclabel(const char *name)
+{
+ return (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX) == 0);
+}
+
+static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
+{
+ return security_sid_to_context(secid,
+ secdata, seclen);
+}
+
+static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
+{
+ return security_context_to_sid(secdata, seclen,
+ secid, GFP_KERNEL);
+}
+
+static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
+{
+ kfree(secdata);
+}
+
+static void selinux_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode)
+{
+ struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
+
+ spin_lock(&isec->lock);
+ isec->initialized = LABEL_INVALID;
+ spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
+}
+
+/*
+ * called with inode->i_mutex locked
+ */
+static int selinux_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
+{
+ int rc = selinux_inode_setsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX,
+ ctx, ctxlen, 0);
+ /* Do not return error when suppressing label (SBLABEL_MNT not set). */
+ return rc == -EOPNOTSUPP ? 0 : rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * called with inode->i_mutex locked
+ */
+static int selinux_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
+{
+ return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(&nop_mnt_idmap, dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
+ ctx, ctxlen, 0);
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
+{
+ int len = 0;
+ len = selinux_inode_getsecurity(&nop_mnt_idmap, inode,
+ XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, ctx, true);
+ if (len < 0)
+ return len;
+ *ctxlen = len;
+ return 0;
+}
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
+
+static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, const struct cred *cred,
+ unsigned long flags)
+{
+ const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
+ struct key_security_struct *ksec;
+
+ ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!ksec)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ tsec = selinux_cred(cred);
+ if (tsec->keycreate_sid)
+ ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
+ else
+ ksec->sid = tsec->sid;
+
+ k->security = ksec;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k)
+{
+ struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security;
+
+ k->security = NULL;
+ kfree(ksec);
+}
+
+static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
+ const struct cred *cred,
+ enum key_need_perm need_perm)
+{
+ struct key *key;
+ struct key_security_struct *ksec;
+ u32 perm, sid;
+
+ switch (need_perm) {
+ case KEY_NEED_VIEW:
+ perm = KEY__VIEW;
+ break;
+ case KEY_NEED_READ:
+ perm = KEY__READ;
+ break;
+ case KEY_NEED_WRITE:
+ perm = KEY__WRITE;
+ break;
+ case KEY_NEED_SEARCH:
+ perm = KEY__SEARCH;
+ break;
+ case KEY_NEED_LINK:
+ perm = KEY__LINK;
+ break;
+ case KEY_NEED_SETATTR:
+ perm = KEY__SETATTR;
+ break;
+ case KEY_NEED_UNLINK:
+ case KEY_SYSADMIN_OVERRIDE:
+ case KEY_AUTHTOKEN_OVERRIDE:
+ case KEY_DEFER_PERM_CHECK:
+ return 0;
+ default:
+ WARN_ON(1);
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ }
+
+ sid = cred_sid(cred);
+ key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
+ ksec = key->security;
+
+ return avc_has_perm(sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
+}
+
+static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
+{
+ struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security;
+ char *context = NULL;
+ unsigned len;
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = security_sid_to_context(ksec->sid,
+ &context, &len);
+ if (!rc)
+ rc = len;
+ *_buffer = context;
+ return rc;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEY_NOTIFICATIONS
+static int selinux_watch_key(struct key *key)
+{
+ struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security;
+ u32 sid = current_sid();
+
+ return avc_has_perm(sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__VIEW, NULL);
+}
+#endif
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND
+static int selinux_ib_pkey_access(void *ib_sec, u64 subnet_prefix, u16 pkey_val)
+{
+ struct common_audit_data ad;
+ int err;
+ u32 sid = 0;
+ struct ib_security_struct *sec = ib_sec;
+ struct lsm_ibpkey_audit ibpkey;
+
+ err = sel_ib_pkey_sid(subnet_prefix, pkey_val, &sid);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IBPKEY;
+ ibpkey.subnet_prefix = subnet_prefix;
+ ibpkey.pkey = pkey_val;
+ ad.u.ibpkey = &ibpkey;
+ return avc_has_perm(sec->sid, sid,
+ SECCLASS_INFINIBAND_PKEY,
+ INFINIBAND_PKEY__ACCESS, &ad);
+}
+
+static int selinux_ib_endport_manage_subnet(void *ib_sec, const char *dev_name,
+ u8 port_num)
+{
+ struct common_audit_data ad;
+ int err;
+ u32 sid = 0;
+ struct ib_security_struct *sec = ib_sec;
+ struct lsm_ibendport_audit ibendport;
+
+ err = security_ib_endport_sid(dev_name, port_num,
+ &sid);
+
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IBENDPORT;
+ ibendport.dev_name = dev_name;
+ ibendport.port = port_num;
+ ad.u.ibendport = &ibendport;
+ return avc_has_perm(sec->sid, sid,
+ SECCLASS_INFINIBAND_ENDPORT,
+ INFINIBAND_ENDPORT__MANAGE_SUBNET, &ad);
+}
+
+static int selinux_ib_alloc_security(void **ib_sec)
+{
+ struct ib_security_struct *sec;
+
+ sec = kzalloc(sizeof(*sec), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!sec)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ sec->sid = current_sid();
+
+ *ib_sec = sec;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void selinux_ib_free_security(void *ib_sec)
+{
+ kfree(ib_sec);
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
+static int selinux_bpf(int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr,
+ unsigned int size)
+{
+ u32 sid = current_sid();
+ int ret;
+
+ switch (cmd) {
+ case BPF_MAP_CREATE:
+ ret = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_BPF, BPF__MAP_CREATE,
+ NULL);
+ break;
+ case BPF_PROG_LOAD:
+ ret = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_BPF, BPF__PROG_LOAD,
+ NULL);
+ break;
+ default:
+ ret = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static u32 bpf_map_fmode_to_av(fmode_t fmode)
+{
+ u32 av = 0;
+
+ if (fmode & FMODE_READ)
+ av |= BPF__MAP_READ;
+ if (fmode & FMODE_WRITE)
+ av |= BPF__MAP_WRITE;
+ return av;
+}
+
+/* This function will check the file pass through unix socket or binder to see
+ * if it is a bpf related object. And apply corresponding checks on the bpf
+ * object based on the type. The bpf maps and programs, not like other files and
+ * socket, are using a shared anonymous inode inside the kernel as their inode.
+ * So checking that inode cannot identify if the process have privilege to
+ * access the bpf object and that's why we have to add this additional check in
+ * selinux_file_receive and selinux_binder_transfer_files.
+ */
+static int bpf_fd_pass(const struct file *file, u32 sid)
+{
+ struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
+ struct bpf_prog *prog;
+ struct bpf_map *map;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (file->f_op == &bpf_map_fops) {
+ map = file->private_data;
+ bpfsec = map->security;
+ ret = avc_has_perm(sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
+ bpf_map_fmode_to_av(file->f_mode), NULL);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+ } else if (file->f_op == &bpf_prog_fops) {
+ prog = file->private_data;
+ bpfsec = prog->aux->security;
+ ret = avc_has_perm(sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
+ BPF__PROG_RUN, NULL);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int selinux_bpf_map(struct bpf_map *map, fmode_t fmode)
+{
+ u32 sid = current_sid();
+ struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
+
+ bpfsec = map->security;
+ return avc_has_perm(sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
+ bpf_map_fmode_to_av(fmode), NULL);
+}
+
+static int selinux_bpf_prog(struct bpf_prog *prog)
+{
+ u32 sid = current_sid();
+ struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
+
+ bpfsec = prog->aux->security;
+ return avc_has_perm(sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
+ BPF__PROG_RUN, NULL);
+}
+
+static int selinux_bpf_map_alloc(struct bpf_map *map)
+{
+ struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
+
+ bpfsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*bpfsec), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!bpfsec)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ bpfsec->sid = current_sid();
+ map->security = bpfsec;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void selinux_bpf_map_free(struct bpf_map *map)
+{
+ struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec = map->security;
+
+ map->security = NULL;
+ kfree(bpfsec);
+}
+
+static int selinux_bpf_prog_alloc(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux)
+{
+ struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
+
+ bpfsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*bpfsec), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!bpfsec)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ bpfsec->sid = current_sid();
+ aux->security = bpfsec;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void selinux_bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux)
+{
+ struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec = aux->security;
+
+ aux->security = NULL;
+ kfree(bpfsec);
+}
+#endif
+
+struct lsm_blob_sizes selinux_blob_sizes __ro_after_init = {
+ .lbs_cred = sizeof(struct task_security_struct),
+ .lbs_file = sizeof(struct file_security_struct),
+ .lbs_inode = sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
+ .lbs_ipc = sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct),
+ .lbs_msg_msg = sizeof(struct msg_security_struct),
+ .lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct),
+ .lbs_xattr_count = SELINUX_INODE_INIT_XATTRS,
+};
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
+static int selinux_perf_event_open(struct perf_event_attr *attr, int type)
+{
+ u32 requested, sid = current_sid();
+
+ if (type == PERF_SECURITY_OPEN)
+ requested = PERF_EVENT__OPEN;
+ else if (type == PERF_SECURITY_CPU)
+ requested = PERF_EVENT__CPU;
+ else if (type == PERF_SECURITY_KERNEL)
+ requested = PERF_EVENT__KERNEL;
+ else if (type == PERF_SECURITY_TRACEPOINT)
+ requested = PERF_EVENT__TRACEPOINT;
+ else
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_PERF_EVENT,
+ requested, NULL);
+}
+
+static int selinux_perf_event_alloc(struct perf_event *event)
+{
+ struct perf_event_security_struct *perfsec;
+
+ perfsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*perfsec), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!perfsec)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ perfsec->sid = current_sid();
+ event->security = perfsec;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void selinux_perf_event_free(struct perf_event *event)
+{
+ struct perf_event_security_struct *perfsec = event->security;
+
+ event->security = NULL;
+ kfree(perfsec);
+}
+
+static int selinux_perf_event_read(struct perf_event *event)
+{
+ struct perf_event_security_struct *perfsec = event->security;
+ u32 sid = current_sid();
+
+ return avc_has_perm(sid, perfsec->sid,
+ SECCLASS_PERF_EVENT, PERF_EVENT__READ, NULL);
+}
+
+static int selinux_perf_event_write(struct perf_event *event)
+{
+ struct perf_event_security_struct *perfsec = event->security;
+ u32 sid = current_sid();
+
+ return avc_has_perm(sid, perfsec->sid,
+ SECCLASS_PERF_EVENT, PERF_EVENT__WRITE, NULL);
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_IO_URING
+/**
+ * selinux_uring_override_creds - check the requested cred override
+ * @new: the target creds
+ *
+ * Check to see if the current task is allowed to override it's credentials
+ * to service an io_uring operation.
+ */
+static int selinux_uring_override_creds(const struct cred *new)
+{
+ return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), cred_sid(new),
+ SECCLASS_IO_URING, IO_URING__OVERRIDE_CREDS, NULL);
+}
+
+/**
+ * selinux_uring_sqpoll - check if a io_uring polling thread can be created
+ *
+ * Check to see if the current task is allowed to create a new io_uring
+ * kernel polling thread.
+ */
+static int selinux_uring_sqpoll(void)
+{
+ u32 sid = current_sid();
+
+ return avc_has_perm(sid, sid,
+ SECCLASS_IO_URING, IO_URING__SQPOLL, NULL);
+}
+
+/**
+ * selinux_uring_cmd - check if IORING_OP_URING_CMD is allowed
+ * @ioucmd: the io_uring command structure
+ *
+ * Check to see if the current domain is allowed to execute an
+ * IORING_OP_URING_CMD against the device/file specified in @ioucmd.
+ *
+ */
+static int selinux_uring_cmd(struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd)
+{
+ struct file *file = ioucmd->file;
+ struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
+ struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
+ struct common_audit_data ad;
+
+ ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
+ ad.u.file = file;
+
+ return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), isec->sid,
+ SECCLASS_IO_URING, IO_URING__CMD, &ad);
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */
+
+/*
+ * IMPORTANT NOTE: When adding new hooks, please be careful to keep this order:
+ * 1. any hooks that don't belong to (2.) or (3.) below,
+ * 2. hooks that both access structures allocated by other hooks, and allocate
+ * structures that can be later accessed by other hooks (mostly "cloning"
+ * hooks),
+ * 3. hooks that only allocate structures that can be later accessed by other
+ * hooks ("allocating" hooks).
+ *
+ * Please follow block comment delimiters in the list to keep this order.
+ */
+static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_set_context_mgr, selinux_binder_set_context_mgr),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transaction, selinux_binder_transaction),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transfer_binder, selinux_binder_transfer_binder),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transfer_file, selinux_binder_transfer_file),
+
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, selinux_ptrace_access_check),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, selinux_ptrace_traceme),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(capget, selinux_capget),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(capset, selinux_capset),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, selinux_capable),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(quotactl, selinux_quotactl),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(quota_on, selinux_quota_on),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(syslog, selinux_syslog),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(vm_enough_memory, selinux_vm_enough_memory),
+
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(netlink_send, selinux_netlink_send),
+
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_creds_for_exec, selinux_bprm_creds_for_exec),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committing_creds, selinux_bprm_committing_creds),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committed_creds, selinux_bprm_committed_creds),
+
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_mnt_opts, selinux_free_mnt_opts),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_mnt_opts_compat, selinux_sb_mnt_opts_compat),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_remount, selinux_sb_remount),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_kern_mount, selinux_sb_kern_mount),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_show_options, selinux_sb_show_options),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_statfs, selinux_sb_statfs),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_mount, selinux_mount),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_umount, selinux_umount),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_set_mnt_opts, selinux_set_mnt_opts),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_clone_mnt_opts, selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts),
+
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(move_mount, selinux_move_mount),
+
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(dentry_init_security, selinux_dentry_init_security),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(dentry_create_files_as, selinux_dentry_create_files_as),
+
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_free_security, selinux_inode_free_security),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_init_security, selinux_inode_init_security),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_init_security_anon, selinux_inode_init_security_anon),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_create, selinux_inode_create),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_link, selinux_inode_link),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_unlink, selinux_inode_unlink),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_symlink, selinux_inode_symlink),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_mkdir, selinux_inode_mkdir),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rmdir, selinux_inode_rmdir),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_mknod, selinux_inode_mknod),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rename, selinux_inode_rename),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_readlink, selinux_inode_readlink),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_follow_link, selinux_inode_follow_link),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_permission, selinux_inode_permission),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setattr, selinux_inode_setattr),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getattr, selinux_inode_getattr),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setxattr, selinux_inode_setxattr),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_setxattr, selinux_inode_post_setxattr),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getxattr, selinux_inode_getxattr),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_listxattr, selinux_inode_listxattr),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_removexattr, selinux_inode_removexattr),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_set_acl, selinux_inode_set_acl),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_get_acl, selinux_inode_get_acl),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_remove_acl, selinux_inode_remove_acl),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecurity, selinux_inode_getsecurity),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecurity, selinux_inode_setsecurity),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_listsecurity, selinux_inode_listsecurity),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecid, selinux_inode_getsecid),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up, selinux_inode_copy_up),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up_xattr, selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_notify, selinux_path_notify),
+
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernfs_init_security, selinux_kernfs_init_security),
+
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_permission, selinux_file_permission),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_alloc_security, selinux_file_alloc_security),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_ioctl, selinux_file_ioctl),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_ioctl_compat, selinux_file_ioctl_compat),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, selinux_mmap_file),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_addr, selinux_mmap_addr),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_mprotect, selinux_file_mprotect),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_lock, selinux_file_lock),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_fcntl, selinux_file_fcntl),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_set_fowner, selinux_file_set_fowner),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_send_sigiotask, selinux_file_send_sigiotask),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_receive, selinux_file_receive),
+
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_open, selinux_file_open),
+
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_alloc, selinux_task_alloc),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, selinux_cred_prepare),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_transfer, selinux_cred_transfer),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_getsecid, selinux_cred_getsecid),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_act_as, selinux_kernel_act_as),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_create_files_as, selinux_kernel_create_files_as),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_module_request, selinux_kernel_module_request),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_load_data, selinux_kernel_load_data),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_read_file, selinux_kernel_read_file),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setpgid, selinux_task_setpgid),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getpgid, selinux_task_getpgid),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsid, selinux_task_getsid),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(current_getsecid_subj, selinux_current_getsecid_subj),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid_obj, selinux_task_getsecid_obj),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setnice, selinux_task_setnice),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setioprio, selinux_task_setioprio),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getioprio, selinux_task_getioprio),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_prlimit, selinux_task_prlimit),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setrlimit, selinux_task_setrlimit),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setscheduler, selinux_task_setscheduler),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getscheduler, selinux_task_getscheduler),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_movememory, selinux_task_movememory),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_kill, selinux_task_kill),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_to_inode, selinux_task_to_inode),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(userns_create, selinux_userns_create),
+
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_permission, selinux_ipc_permission),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_getsecid, selinux_ipc_getsecid),
+
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_associate, selinux_msg_queue_associate),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgctl, selinux_msg_queue_msgctl),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgsnd, selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgrcv, selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv),
+
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_associate, selinux_shm_associate),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmctl, selinux_shm_shmctl),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmat, selinux_shm_shmat),
+
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_associate, selinux_sem_associate),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semctl, selinux_sem_semctl),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semop, selinux_sem_semop),
+
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(d_instantiate, selinux_d_instantiate),
+
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(getprocattr, selinux_getprocattr),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(setprocattr, selinux_setprocattr),
+
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(ismaclabel, selinux_ismaclabel),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(secctx_to_secid, selinux_secctx_to_secid),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(release_secctx, selinux_release_secctx),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_invalidate_secctx, selinux_inode_invalidate_secctx),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_notifysecctx, selinux_inode_notifysecctx),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecctx, selinux_inode_setsecctx),
+
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_stream_connect, selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_may_send, selinux_socket_unix_may_send),
+
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_create, selinux_socket_create),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_post_create, selinux_socket_post_create),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_socketpair, selinux_socket_socketpair),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_bind, selinux_socket_bind),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_connect, selinux_socket_connect),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_listen, selinux_socket_listen),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_accept, selinux_socket_accept),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sendmsg, selinux_socket_sendmsg),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_recvmsg, selinux_socket_recvmsg),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockname, selinux_socket_getsockname),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeername, selinux_socket_getpeername),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockopt, selinux_socket_getsockopt),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_setsockopt, selinux_socket_setsockopt),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_shutdown, selinux_socket_shutdown),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sock_rcv_skb, selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_stream,
+ selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_dgram, selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_free_security, selinux_sk_free_security),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_clone_security, selinux_sk_clone_security),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_getsecid, selinux_sk_getsecid),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(sock_graft, selinux_sock_graft),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_assoc_request, selinux_sctp_assoc_request),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_sk_clone, selinux_sctp_sk_clone),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_bind_connect, selinux_sctp_bind_connect),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_assoc_established, selinux_sctp_assoc_established),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(mptcp_add_subflow, selinux_mptcp_add_subflow),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_request, selinux_inet_conn_request),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_csk_clone, selinux_inet_csk_clone),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_established, selinux_inet_conn_established),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_relabel_packet, selinux_secmark_relabel_packet),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_refcount_inc, selinux_secmark_refcount_inc),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_refcount_dec, selinux_secmark_refcount_dec),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(req_classify_flow, selinux_req_classify_flow),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_free_security, selinux_tun_dev_free_security),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_create, selinux_tun_dev_create),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_attach_queue, selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_attach, selinux_tun_dev_attach),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_open, selinux_tun_dev_open),
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(ib_pkey_access, selinux_ib_pkey_access),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(ib_endport_manage_subnet,
+ selinux_ib_endport_manage_subnet),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(ib_free_security, selinux_ib_free_security),
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_free_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_free),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_delete_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_delete),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_free_security, selinux_xfrm_state_free),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_delete_security, selinux_xfrm_state_delete),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_lookup, selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
+ selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_decode_session, selinux_xfrm_decode_session),
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_free, selinux_key_free),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_permission, selinux_key_permission),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_getsecurity, selinux_key_getsecurity),
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEY_NOTIFICATIONS
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(watch_key, selinux_watch_key),
+#endif
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_known, selinux_audit_rule_known),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_match, selinux_audit_rule_match),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_free, selinux_audit_rule_free),
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf, selinux_bpf),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map, selinux_bpf_map),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog, selinux_bpf_prog),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map_free_security, selinux_bpf_map_free),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog_free_security, selinux_bpf_prog_free),
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_open, selinux_perf_event_open),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_free, selinux_perf_event_free),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_read, selinux_perf_event_read),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_write, selinux_perf_event_write),
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_IO_URING
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_override_creds, selinux_uring_override_creds),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_sqpoll, selinux_uring_sqpoll),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_cmd, selinux_uring_cmd),
+#endif
+
+ /*
+ * PUT "CLONING" (ACCESSING + ALLOCATING) HOOKS HERE
+ */
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(fs_context_submount, selinux_fs_context_submount),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(fs_context_dup, selinux_fs_context_dup),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(fs_context_parse_param, selinux_fs_context_parse_param),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_eat_lsm_opts, selinux_sb_eat_lsm_opts),
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_clone_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_clone),
+#endif
+
+ /*
+ * PUT "ALLOCATING" HOOKS HERE
+ */
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_msg_alloc_security, selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_alloc_security,
+ selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_alloc_security, selinux_shm_alloc_security),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_alloc_security, selinux_sb_alloc_security),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_alloc_security, selinux_inode_alloc_security),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_alloc_security, selinux_sem_alloc_security),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(secid_to_secctx, selinux_secid_to_secctx),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecctx, selinux_inode_getsecctx),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_alloc_security, selinux_sk_alloc_security),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_alloc_security, selinux_tun_dev_alloc_security),
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(ib_alloc_security, selinux_ib_alloc_security),
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_alloc_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_alloc, selinux_xfrm_state_alloc),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_alloc_acquire,
+ selinux_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire),
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_alloc, selinux_key_alloc),
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_init, selinux_audit_rule_init),
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map_alloc_security, selinux_bpf_map_alloc),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog_alloc_security, selinux_bpf_prog_alloc),
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_alloc, selinux_perf_event_alloc),
+#endif
+};
+
+static __init int selinux_init(void)
+{
+ pr_info("SELinux: Initializing.\n");
+
+ memset(&selinux_state, 0, sizeof(selinux_state));
+ enforcing_set(selinux_enforcing_boot);
+ selinux_avc_init();
+ mutex_init(&selinux_state.status_lock);
+ mutex_init(&selinux_state.policy_mutex);
+
+ /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
+ cred_init_security();
+
+ default_noexec = !(VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS & VM_EXEC);
+ if (!default_noexec)
+ pr_notice("SELinux: virtual memory is executable by default\n");
+
+ avc_init();
+
+ avtab_cache_init();
+
+ ebitmap_cache_init();
+
+ hashtab_cache_init();
+
+ security_add_hooks(selinux_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks), "selinux");
+
+ if (avc_add_callback(selinux_netcache_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET))
+ panic("SELinux: Unable to register AVC netcache callback\n");
+
+ if (avc_add_callback(selinux_lsm_notifier_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET))
+ panic("SELinux: Unable to register AVC LSM notifier callback\n");
+
+ if (selinux_enforcing_boot)
+ pr_debug("SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n");
+ else
+ pr_debug("SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n");
+
+ fs_validate_description("selinux", selinux_fs_parameters);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void delayed_superblock_init(struct super_block *sb, void *unused)
+{
+ selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb, NULL, 0, NULL);
+}
+
+void selinux_complete_init(void)
+{
+ pr_debug("SELinux: Completing initialization.\n");
+
+ /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
+ pr_debug("SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
+ iterate_supers(delayed_superblock_init, NULL);
+}
+
+/* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
+ all processes and objects when they are created. */
+DEFINE_LSM(selinux) = {
+ .name = "selinux",
+ .flags = LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR | LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE,
+ .enabled = &selinux_enabled_boot,
+ .blobs = &selinux_blob_sizes,
+ .init = selinux_init,
+};
+
+#if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
+static const struct nf_hook_ops selinux_nf_ops[] = {
+ {
+ .hook = selinux_ip_postroute,
+ .pf = NFPROTO_IPV4,
+ .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
+ .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
+ },
+ {
+ .hook = selinux_ip_forward,
+ .pf = NFPROTO_IPV4,
+ .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
+ .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
+ },
+ {
+ .hook = selinux_ip_output,
+ .pf = NFPROTO_IPV4,
+ .hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
+ .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
+ },
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
+ {
+ .hook = selinux_ip_postroute,
+ .pf = NFPROTO_IPV6,
+ .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
+ .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
+ },
+ {
+ .hook = selinux_ip_forward,
+ .pf = NFPROTO_IPV6,
+ .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
+ .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
+ },
+ {
+ .hook = selinux_ip_output,
+ .pf = NFPROTO_IPV6,
+ .hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
+ .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
+ },
+#endif /* IPV6 */
+};
+
+static int __net_init selinux_nf_register(struct net *net)
+{
+ return nf_register_net_hooks(net, selinux_nf_ops,
+ ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_nf_ops));
+}
+
+static void __net_exit selinux_nf_unregister(struct net *net)
+{
+ nf_unregister_net_hooks(net, selinux_nf_ops,
+ ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_nf_ops));
+}
+
+static struct pernet_operations selinux_net_ops = {
+ .init = selinux_nf_register,
+ .exit = selinux_nf_unregister,
+};
+
+static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
+{
+ int err;
+
+ if (!selinux_enabled_boot)
+ return 0;
+
+ pr_debug("SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
+
+ err = register_pernet_subsys(&selinux_net_ops);
+ if (err)
+ panic("SELinux: register_pernet_subsys: error %d\n", err);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+__initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init);
+#endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
diff --git a/security/selinux/ibpkey.c b/security/selinux/ibpkey.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..48f537b41c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ibpkey.c
@@ -0,0 +1,237 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Pkey table
+ *
+ * SELinux must keep a mapping of Infinband PKEYs to labels/SIDs. This
+ * mapping is maintained as part of the normal policy but a fast cache is
+ * needed to reduce the lookup overhead.
+ *
+ * This code is heavily based on the "netif" and "netport" concept originally
+ * developed by
+ * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com> and
+ * Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
+ * (see security/selinux/netif.c and security/selinux/netport.c for more
+ * information)
+ */
+
+/*
+ * (c) Mellanox Technologies, 2016
+ */
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
+#include <linux/list.h>
+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
+
+#include "ibpkey.h"
+#include "objsec.h"
+
+#define SEL_PKEY_HASH_SIZE 256
+#define SEL_PKEY_HASH_BKT_LIMIT 16
+
+struct sel_ib_pkey_bkt {
+ int size;
+ struct list_head list;
+};
+
+struct sel_ib_pkey {
+ struct pkey_security_struct psec;
+ struct list_head list;
+ struct rcu_head rcu;
+};
+
+static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sel_ib_pkey_lock);
+static struct sel_ib_pkey_bkt sel_ib_pkey_hash[SEL_PKEY_HASH_SIZE];
+
+/**
+ * sel_ib_pkey_hashfn - Hashing function for the pkey table
+ * @pkey: pkey number
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * This is the hashing function for the pkey table, it returns the bucket
+ * number for the given pkey.
+ *
+ */
+static unsigned int sel_ib_pkey_hashfn(u16 pkey)
+{
+ return (pkey & (SEL_PKEY_HASH_SIZE - 1));
+}
+
+/**
+ * sel_ib_pkey_find - Search for a pkey record
+ * @subnet_prefix: subnet_prefix
+ * @pkey_num: pkey_num
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Search the pkey table and return the matching record. If an entry
+ * can not be found in the table return NULL.
+ *
+ */
+static struct sel_ib_pkey *sel_ib_pkey_find(u64 subnet_prefix, u16 pkey_num)
+{
+ unsigned int idx;
+ struct sel_ib_pkey *pkey;
+
+ idx = sel_ib_pkey_hashfn(pkey_num);
+ list_for_each_entry_rcu(pkey, &sel_ib_pkey_hash[idx].list, list) {
+ if (pkey->psec.pkey == pkey_num &&
+ pkey->psec.subnet_prefix == subnet_prefix)
+ return pkey;
+ }
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * sel_ib_pkey_insert - Insert a new pkey into the table
+ * @pkey: the new pkey record
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Add a new pkey record to the hash table.
+ *
+ */
+static void sel_ib_pkey_insert(struct sel_ib_pkey *pkey)
+{
+ unsigned int idx;
+
+ /* we need to impose a limit on the growth of the hash table so check
+ * this bucket to make sure it is within the specified bounds
+ */
+ idx = sel_ib_pkey_hashfn(pkey->psec.pkey);
+ list_add_rcu(&pkey->list, &sel_ib_pkey_hash[idx].list);
+ if (sel_ib_pkey_hash[idx].size == SEL_PKEY_HASH_BKT_LIMIT) {
+ struct sel_ib_pkey *tail;
+
+ tail = list_entry(
+ rcu_dereference_protected(
+ list_tail_rcu(&sel_ib_pkey_hash[idx].list),
+ lockdep_is_held(&sel_ib_pkey_lock)),
+ struct sel_ib_pkey, list);
+ list_del_rcu(&tail->list);
+ kfree_rcu(tail, rcu);
+ } else {
+ sel_ib_pkey_hash[idx].size++;
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ * sel_ib_pkey_sid_slow - Lookup the SID of a pkey using the policy
+ * @subnet_prefix: subnet prefix
+ * @pkey_num: pkey number
+ * @sid: pkey SID
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * This function determines the SID of a pkey by querying the security
+ * policy. The result is added to the pkey table to speedup future
+ * queries. Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
+ *
+ */
+static int sel_ib_pkey_sid_slow(u64 subnet_prefix, u16 pkey_num, u32 *sid)
+{
+ int ret;
+ struct sel_ib_pkey *pkey;
+ struct sel_ib_pkey *new = NULL;
+ unsigned long flags;
+
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&sel_ib_pkey_lock, flags);
+ pkey = sel_ib_pkey_find(subnet_prefix, pkey_num);
+ if (pkey) {
+ *sid = pkey->psec.sid;
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&sel_ib_pkey_lock, flags);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ ret = security_ib_pkey_sid(subnet_prefix, pkey_num,
+ sid);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* If this memory allocation fails still return 0. The SID
+ * is valid, it just won't be added to the cache.
+ */
+ new = kzalloc(sizeof(*new), GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!new) {
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ new->psec.subnet_prefix = subnet_prefix;
+ new->psec.pkey = pkey_num;
+ new->psec.sid = *sid;
+ sel_ib_pkey_insert(new);
+
+out:
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&sel_ib_pkey_lock, flags);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * sel_ib_pkey_sid - Lookup the SID of a PKEY
+ * @subnet_prefix: subnet_prefix
+ * @pkey_num: pkey number
+ * @sid: pkey SID
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * This function determines the SID of a PKEY using the fastest method
+ * possible. First the pkey table is queried, but if an entry can't be found
+ * then the policy is queried and the result is added to the table to speedup
+ * future queries. Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
+ *
+ */
+int sel_ib_pkey_sid(u64 subnet_prefix, u16 pkey_num, u32 *sid)
+{
+ struct sel_ib_pkey *pkey;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ pkey = sel_ib_pkey_find(subnet_prefix, pkey_num);
+ if (pkey) {
+ *sid = pkey->psec.sid;
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return 0;
+ }
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+
+ return sel_ib_pkey_sid_slow(subnet_prefix, pkey_num, sid);
+}
+
+/**
+ * sel_ib_pkey_flush - Flush the entire pkey table
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Remove all entries from the pkey table
+ *
+ */
+void sel_ib_pkey_flush(void)
+{
+ unsigned int idx;
+ struct sel_ib_pkey *pkey, *pkey_tmp;
+ unsigned long flags;
+
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&sel_ib_pkey_lock, flags);
+ for (idx = 0; idx < SEL_PKEY_HASH_SIZE; idx++) {
+ list_for_each_entry_safe(pkey, pkey_tmp,
+ &sel_ib_pkey_hash[idx].list, list) {
+ list_del_rcu(&pkey->list);
+ kfree_rcu(pkey, rcu);
+ }
+ sel_ib_pkey_hash[idx].size = 0;
+ }
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&sel_ib_pkey_lock, flags);
+}
+
+static __init int sel_ib_pkey_init(void)
+{
+ int iter;
+
+ if (!selinux_enabled_boot)
+ return 0;
+
+ for (iter = 0; iter < SEL_PKEY_HASH_SIZE; iter++) {
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sel_ib_pkey_hash[iter].list);
+ sel_ib_pkey_hash[iter].size = 0;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+subsys_initcall(sel_ib_pkey_init);
diff --git a/security/selinux/ima.c b/security/selinux/ima.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..aa34da9b0a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ima.c
@@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2021 Microsoft Corporation
+ *
+ * Author: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian (nramas@linux.microsoft.com)
+ *
+ * Measure critical data structures maintained by SELinux
+ * using IMA subsystem.
+ */
+#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
+#include <linux/ima.h>
+#include "security.h"
+#include "ima.h"
+
+/*
+ * selinux_ima_collect_state - Read selinux configuration settings
+ *
+ * On success returns the configuration settings string.
+ * On error, returns NULL.
+ */
+static char *selinux_ima_collect_state(void)
+{
+ const char *on = "=1;", *off = "=0;";
+ char *buf;
+ int buf_len, len, i, rc;
+
+ buf_len = strlen("initialized=0;enforcing=0;checkreqprot=0;") + 1;
+
+ len = strlen(on);
+ for (i = 0; i < __POLICYDB_CAP_MAX; i++)
+ buf_len += strlen(selinux_policycap_names[i]) + len;
+
+ buf = kzalloc(buf_len, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!buf)
+ return NULL;
+
+ rc = strscpy(buf, "initialized", buf_len);
+ WARN_ON(rc < 0);
+
+ rc = strlcat(buf, selinux_initialized() ? on : off, buf_len);
+ WARN_ON(rc >= buf_len);
+
+ rc = strlcat(buf, "enforcing", buf_len);
+ WARN_ON(rc >= buf_len);
+
+ rc = strlcat(buf, enforcing_enabled() ? on : off, buf_len);
+ WARN_ON(rc >= buf_len);
+
+ rc = strlcat(buf, "checkreqprot", buf_len);
+ WARN_ON(rc >= buf_len);
+
+ rc = strlcat(buf, checkreqprot_get() ? on : off, buf_len);
+ WARN_ON(rc >= buf_len);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < __POLICYDB_CAP_MAX; i++) {
+ rc = strlcat(buf, selinux_policycap_names[i], buf_len);
+ WARN_ON(rc >= buf_len);
+
+ rc = strlcat(buf, selinux_state.policycap[i] ? on : off,
+ buf_len);
+ WARN_ON(rc >= buf_len);
+ }
+
+ return buf;
+}
+
+/*
+ * selinux_ima_measure_state_locked - Measure SELinux state and hash of policy
+ */
+void selinux_ima_measure_state_locked(void)
+{
+ char *state_str = NULL;
+ void *policy = NULL;
+ size_t policy_len;
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ lockdep_assert_held(&selinux_state.policy_mutex);
+
+ state_str = selinux_ima_collect_state();
+ if (!state_str) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: %s: failed to read state.\n", __func__);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ ima_measure_critical_data("selinux", "selinux-state",
+ state_str, strlen(state_str), false,
+ NULL, 0);
+
+ kfree(state_str);
+
+ /*
+ * Measure SELinux policy only after initialization is completed.
+ */
+ if (!selinux_initialized())
+ return;
+
+ rc = security_read_state_kernel(&policy, &policy_len);
+ if (rc) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: %s: failed to read policy %d.\n", __func__, rc);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ ima_measure_critical_data("selinux", "selinux-policy-hash",
+ policy, policy_len, true,
+ NULL, 0);
+
+ vfree(policy);
+}
+
+/*
+ * selinux_ima_measure_state - Measure SELinux state and hash of policy
+ */
+void selinux_ima_measure_state(void)
+{
+ lockdep_assert_not_held(&selinux_state.policy_mutex);
+
+ mutex_lock(&selinux_state.policy_mutex);
+ selinux_ima_measure_state_locked();
+ mutex_unlock(&selinux_state.policy_mutex);
+}
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/audit.h b/security/selinux/include/audit.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..d5495134a5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/include/audit.h
@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+/*
+ * SELinux support for the Audit LSM hooks
+ *
+ * Author: James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2005 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ * Copyright (C) 2006 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
+ * Copyright (C) 2006 IBM Corporation, Timothy R. Chavez <tinytim@us.ibm.com>
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SELINUX_AUDIT_H
+#define _SELINUX_AUDIT_H
+
+#include <linux/audit.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+
+/**
+ * selinux_audit_rule_init - alloc/init an selinux audit rule structure.
+ * @field: the field this rule refers to
+ * @op: the operator the rule uses
+ * @rulestr: the text "target" of the rule
+ * @rule: pointer to the new rule structure returned via this
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if successful, -errno if not. On success, the rule structure
+ * will be allocated internally. The caller must free this structure with
+ * selinux_audit_rule_free() after use.
+ */
+int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **rule);
+
+/**
+ * selinux_audit_rule_free - free an selinux audit rule structure.
+ * @rule: pointer to the audit rule to be freed
+ *
+ * This will free all memory associated with the given rule.
+ * If @rule is NULL, no operation is performed.
+ */
+void selinux_audit_rule_free(void *rule);
+
+/**
+ * selinux_audit_rule_match - determine if a context ID matches a rule.
+ * @sid: the context ID to check
+ * @field: the field this rule refers to
+ * @op: the operator the rule uses
+ * @rule: pointer to the audit rule to check against
+ *
+ * Returns 1 if the context id matches the rule, 0 if it does not, and
+ * -errno on failure.
+ */
+int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *rule);
+
+/**
+ * selinux_audit_rule_known - check to see if rule contains selinux fields.
+ * @rule: rule to be checked
+ * Returns 1 if there are selinux fields specified in the rule, 0 otherwise.
+ */
+int selinux_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *rule);
+
+#endif /* _SELINUX_AUDIT_H */
+
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/avc.h b/security/selinux/include/avc.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..8f0aa66ccb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/include/avc.h
@@ -0,0 +1,176 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * Access vector cache interface for object managers.
+ *
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
+ */
+#ifndef _SELINUX_AVC_H_
+#define _SELINUX_AVC_H_
+
+#include <linux/stddef.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/kdev_t.h>
+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h>
+#include <linux/lsm_audit.h>
+#include <linux/in6.h>
+#include "flask.h"
+#include "av_permissions.h"
+#include "security.h"
+
+/*
+ * An entry in the AVC.
+ */
+struct avc_entry;
+
+struct task_struct;
+struct inode;
+struct sock;
+struct sk_buff;
+
+/*
+ * AVC statistics
+ */
+struct avc_cache_stats {
+ unsigned int lookups;
+ unsigned int misses;
+ unsigned int allocations;
+ unsigned int reclaims;
+ unsigned int frees;
+};
+
+/*
+ * We only need this data after we have decided to send an audit message.
+ */
+struct selinux_audit_data {
+ u32 ssid;
+ u32 tsid;
+ u16 tclass;
+ u32 requested;
+ u32 audited;
+ u32 denied;
+ int result;
+} __randomize_layout;
+
+/*
+ * AVC operations
+ */
+
+void __init avc_init(void);
+
+static inline u32 avc_audit_required(u32 requested,
+ struct av_decision *avd,
+ int result,
+ u32 auditdeny,
+ u32 *deniedp)
+{
+ u32 denied, audited;
+ denied = requested & ~avd->allowed;
+ if (unlikely(denied)) {
+ audited = denied & avd->auditdeny;
+ /*
+ * auditdeny is TRICKY! Setting a bit in
+ * this field means that ANY denials should NOT be audited if
+ * the policy contains an explicit dontaudit rule for that
+ * permission. Take notice that this is unrelated to the
+ * actual permissions that were denied. As an example lets
+ * assume:
+ *
+ * denied == READ
+ * avd.auditdeny & ACCESS == 0 (not set means explicit rule)
+ * auditdeny & ACCESS == 1
+ *
+ * We will NOT audit the denial even though the denied
+ * permission was READ and the auditdeny checks were for
+ * ACCESS
+ */
+ if (auditdeny && !(auditdeny & avd->auditdeny))
+ audited = 0;
+ } else if (result)
+ audited = denied = requested;
+ else
+ audited = requested & avd->auditallow;
+ *deniedp = denied;
+ return audited;
+}
+
+int slow_avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
+ u32 requested, u32 audited, u32 denied, int result,
+ struct common_audit_data *a);
+
+/**
+ * avc_audit - Audit the granting or denial of permissions.
+ * @ssid: source security identifier
+ * @tsid: target security identifier
+ * @tclass: target security class
+ * @requested: requested permissions
+ * @avd: access vector decisions
+ * @result: result from avc_has_perm_noaudit
+ * @a: auxiliary audit data
+ *
+ * Audit the granting or denial of permissions in accordance
+ * with the policy. This function is typically called by
+ * avc_has_perm() after a permission check, but can also be
+ * called directly by callers who use avc_has_perm_noaudit()
+ * in order to separate the permission check from the auditing.
+ * For example, this separation is useful when the permission check must
+ * be performed under a lock, to allow the lock to be released
+ * before calling the auditing code.
+ */
+static inline int avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
+ u16 tclass, u32 requested,
+ struct av_decision *avd,
+ int result,
+ struct common_audit_data *a)
+{
+ u32 audited, denied;
+ audited = avc_audit_required(requested, avd, result, 0, &denied);
+ if (likely(!audited))
+ return 0;
+ return slow_avc_audit(ssid, tsid, tclass,
+ requested, audited, denied, result,
+ a);
+}
+
+#define AVC_STRICT 1 /* Ignore permissive mode. */
+#define AVC_EXTENDED_PERMS 2 /* update extended permissions */
+int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
+ u16 tclass, u32 requested,
+ unsigned flags,
+ struct av_decision *avd);
+
+int avc_has_perm(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
+ u16 tclass, u32 requested,
+ struct common_audit_data *auditdata);
+
+int avc_has_extended_perms(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, u32 requested,
+ u8 driver, u8 perm, struct common_audit_data *ad);
+
+
+u32 avc_policy_seqno(void);
+
+#define AVC_CALLBACK_GRANT 1
+#define AVC_CALLBACK_TRY_REVOKE 2
+#define AVC_CALLBACK_REVOKE 4
+#define AVC_CALLBACK_RESET 8
+#define AVC_CALLBACK_AUDITALLOW_ENABLE 16
+#define AVC_CALLBACK_AUDITALLOW_DISABLE 32
+#define AVC_CALLBACK_AUDITDENY_ENABLE 64
+#define AVC_CALLBACK_AUDITDENY_DISABLE 128
+#define AVC_CALLBACK_ADD_XPERMS 256
+
+int avc_add_callback(int (*callback)(u32 event), u32 events);
+
+/* Exported to selinuxfs */
+int avc_get_hash_stats(char *page);
+unsigned int avc_get_cache_threshold(void);
+void avc_set_cache_threshold(unsigned int cache_threshold);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_AVC_STATS
+DECLARE_PER_CPU(struct avc_cache_stats, avc_cache_stats);
+#endif
+
+#endif /* _SELINUX_AVC_H_ */
+
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/avc_ss.h b/security/selinux/include/avc_ss.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..88b139e086
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/include/avc_ss.h
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * Access vector cache interface for the security server.
+ *
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
+ */
+#ifndef _SELINUX_AVC_SS_H_
+#define _SELINUX_AVC_SS_H_
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+
+int avc_ss_reset(u32 seqno);
+
+/* Class/perm mapping support */
+struct security_class_mapping {
+ const char *name;
+ const char *perms[sizeof(u32) * 8 + 1];
+};
+
+extern const struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[];
+
+#endif /* _SELINUX_AVC_SS_H_ */
+
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a3c380775d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
@@ -0,0 +1,264 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#include <linux/capability.h>
+#include <linux/socket.h>
+
+#define COMMON_FILE_SOCK_PERMS "ioctl", "read", "write", "create", \
+ "getattr", "setattr", "lock", "relabelfrom", "relabelto", "append", "map"
+
+#define COMMON_FILE_PERMS COMMON_FILE_SOCK_PERMS, "unlink", "link", \
+ "rename", "execute", "quotaon", "mounton", "audit_access", \
+ "open", "execmod", "watch", "watch_mount", "watch_sb", \
+ "watch_with_perm", "watch_reads"
+
+#define COMMON_SOCK_PERMS COMMON_FILE_SOCK_PERMS, "bind", "connect", \
+ "listen", "accept", "getopt", "setopt", "shutdown", "recvfrom", \
+ "sendto", "name_bind"
+
+#define COMMON_IPC_PERMS "create", "destroy", "getattr", "setattr", "read", \
+ "write", "associate", "unix_read", "unix_write"
+
+#define COMMON_CAP_PERMS "chown", "dac_override", "dac_read_search", \
+ "fowner", "fsetid", "kill", "setgid", "setuid", "setpcap", \
+ "linux_immutable", "net_bind_service", "net_broadcast", \
+ "net_admin", "net_raw", "ipc_lock", "ipc_owner", "sys_module", \
+ "sys_rawio", "sys_chroot", "sys_ptrace", "sys_pacct", "sys_admin", \
+ "sys_boot", "sys_nice", "sys_resource", "sys_time", \
+ "sys_tty_config", "mknod", "lease", "audit_write", \
+ "audit_control", "setfcap"
+
+#define COMMON_CAP2_PERMS "mac_override", "mac_admin", "syslog", \
+ "wake_alarm", "block_suspend", "audit_read", "perfmon", "bpf", \
+ "checkpoint_restore"
+
+#if CAP_LAST_CAP > CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE
+#error New capability defined, please update COMMON_CAP2_PERMS.
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Note: The name for any socket class should be suffixed by "socket",
+ * and doesn't contain more than one substr of "socket".
+ */
+const struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = {
+ { "security",
+ { "compute_av", "compute_create", "compute_member",
+ "check_context", "load_policy", "compute_relabel",
+ "compute_user", "setenforce", "setbool", "setsecparam",
+ "setcheckreqprot", "read_policy", "validate_trans", NULL } },
+ { "process",
+ { "fork", "transition", "sigchld", "sigkill",
+ "sigstop", "signull", "signal", "ptrace", "getsched", "setsched",
+ "getsession", "getpgid", "setpgid", "getcap", "setcap", "share",
+ "getattr", "setexec", "setfscreate", "noatsecure", "siginh",
+ "setrlimit", "rlimitinh", "dyntransition", "setcurrent",
+ "execmem", "execstack", "execheap", "setkeycreate",
+ "setsockcreate", "getrlimit", NULL } },
+ { "process2",
+ { "nnp_transition", "nosuid_transition", NULL } },
+ { "system",
+ { "ipc_info", "syslog_read", "syslog_mod",
+ "syslog_console", "module_request", "module_load", NULL } },
+ { "capability",
+ { COMMON_CAP_PERMS, NULL } },
+ { "filesystem",
+ { "mount", "remount", "unmount", "getattr",
+ "relabelfrom", "relabelto", "associate", "quotamod",
+ "quotaget", "watch", NULL } },
+ { "file",
+ { COMMON_FILE_PERMS,
+ "execute_no_trans", "entrypoint", NULL } },
+ { "dir",
+ { COMMON_FILE_PERMS, "add_name", "remove_name",
+ "reparent", "search", "rmdir", NULL } },
+ { "fd", { "use", NULL } },
+ { "lnk_file",
+ { COMMON_FILE_PERMS, NULL } },
+ { "chr_file",
+ { COMMON_FILE_PERMS, NULL } },
+ { "blk_file",
+ { COMMON_FILE_PERMS, NULL } },
+ { "sock_file",
+ { COMMON_FILE_PERMS, NULL } },
+ { "fifo_file",
+ { COMMON_FILE_PERMS, NULL } },
+ { "socket",
+ { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+ { "tcp_socket",
+ { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS,
+ "node_bind", "name_connect",
+ NULL } },
+ { "udp_socket",
+ { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS,
+ "node_bind", NULL } },
+ { "rawip_socket",
+ { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS,
+ "node_bind", NULL } },
+ { "node",
+ { "recvfrom", "sendto", NULL } },
+ { "netif",
+ { "ingress", "egress", NULL } },
+ { "netlink_socket",
+ { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+ { "packet_socket",
+ { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+ { "key_socket",
+ { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+ { "unix_stream_socket",
+ { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, "connectto", NULL } },
+ { "unix_dgram_socket",
+ { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+ { "sem",
+ { COMMON_IPC_PERMS, NULL } },
+ { "msg", { "send", "receive", NULL } },
+ { "msgq",
+ { COMMON_IPC_PERMS, "enqueue", NULL } },
+ { "shm",
+ { COMMON_IPC_PERMS, "lock", NULL } },
+ { "ipc",
+ { COMMON_IPC_PERMS, NULL } },
+ { "netlink_route_socket",
+ { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS,
+ "nlmsg_read", "nlmsg_write", NULL } },
+ { "netlink_tcpdiag_socket",
+ { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS,
+ "nlmsg_read", "nlmsg_write", NULL } },
+ { "netlink_nflog_socket",
+ { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+ { "netlink_xfrm_socket",
+ { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS,
+ "nlmsg_read", "nlmsg_write", NULL } },
+ { "netlink_selinux_socket",
+ { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+ { "netlink_iscsi_socket",
+ { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+ { "netlink_audit_socket",
+ { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS,
+ "nlmsg_read", "nlmsg_write", "nlmsg_relay", "nlmsg_readpriv",
+ "nlmsg_tty_audit", NULL } },
+ { "netlink_fib_lookup_socket",
+ { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+ { "netlink_connector_socket",
+ { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+ { "netlink_netfilter_socket",
+ { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+ { "netlink_dnrt_socket",
+ { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+ { "association",
+ { "sendto", "recvfrom", "setcontext", "polmatch", NULL } },
+ { "netlink_kobject_uevent_socket",
+ { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+ { "netlink_generic_socket",
+ { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+ { "netlink_scsitransport_socket",
+ { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+ { "netlink_rdma_socket",
+ { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+ { "netlink_crypto_socket",
+ { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+ { "appletalk_socket",
+ { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+ { "packet",
+ { "send", "recv", "relabelto", "forward_in", "forward_out", NULL } },
+ { "key",
+ { "view", "read", "write", "search", "link", "setattr", "create",
+ NULL } },
+ { "dccp_socket",
+ { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS,
+ "node_bind", "name_connect", NULL } },
+ { "memprotect", { "mmap_zero", NULL } },
+ { "peer", { "recv", NULL } },
+ { "capability2",
+ { COMMON_CAP2_PERMS, NULL } },
+ { "kernel_service", { "use_as_override", "create_files_as", NULL } },
+ { "tun_socket",
+ { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, "attach_queue", NULL } },
+ { "binder", { "impersonate", "call", "set_context_mgr", "transfer",
+ NULL } },
+ { "cap_userns",
+ { COMMON_CAP_PERMS, NULL } },
+ { "cap2_userns",
+ { COMMON_CAP2_PERMS, NULL } },
+ { "sctp_socket",
+ { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS,
+ "node_bind", "name_connect", "association", NULL } },
+ { "icmp_socket",
+ { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS,
+ "node_bind", NULL } },
+ { "ax25_socket",
+ { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+ { "ipx_socket",
+ { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+ { "netrom_socket",
+ { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+ { "atmpvc_socket",
+ { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+ { "x25_socket",
+ { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+ { "rose_socket",
+ { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+ { "decnet_socket",
+ { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+ { "atmsvc_socket",
+ { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+ { "rds_socket",
+ { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+ { "irda_socket",
+ { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+ { "pppox_socket",
+ { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+ { "llc_socket",
+ { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+ { "can_socket",
+ { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+ { "tipc_socket",
+ { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+ { "bluetooth_socket",
+ { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+ { "iucv_socket",
+ { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+ { "rxrpc_socket",
+ { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+ { "isdn_socket",
+ { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+ { "phonet_socket",
+ { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+ { "ieee802154_socket",
+ { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+ { "caif_socket",
+ { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+ { "alg_socket",
+ { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+ { "nfc_socket",
+ { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+ { "vsock_socket",
+ { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+ { "kcm_socket",
+ { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+ { "qipcrtr_socket",
+ { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+ { "smc_socket",
+ { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+ { "infiniband_pkey",
+ { "access", NULL } },
+ { "infiniband_endport",
+ { "manage_subnet", NULL } },
+ { "bpf",
+ { "map_create", "map_read", "map_write", "prog_load", "prog_run",
+ NULL } },
+ { "xdp_socket",
+ { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+ { "mctp_socket",
+ { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+ { "perf_event",
+ { "open", "cpu", "kernel", "tracepoint", "read", "write", NULL } },
+ { "anon_inode",
+ { COMMON_FILE_PERMS, NULL } },
+ { "io_uring",
+ { "override_creds", "sqpoll", "cmd", NULL } },
+ { "user_namespace",
+ { "create", NULL } },
+ { NULL }
+ };
+
+#if PF_MAX > 46
+#error New address family defined, please update secclass_map.
+#endif
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/conditional.h b/security/selinux/include/conditional.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..693a654714
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/include/conditional.h
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+/*
+ * Interface to booleans in the security server. This is exported
+ * for the selinuxfs.
+ *
+ * Author: Karl MacMillan <kmacmillan@tresys.com>
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2003 - 2004 Tresys Technology, LLC
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SELINUX_CONDITIONAL_H_
+#define _SELINUX_CONDITIONAL_H_
+
+#include "security.h"
+
+int security_get_bools(struct selinux_policy *policy,
+ u32 *len, char ***names, int **values);
+
+int security_set_bools(u32 len, int *values);
+
+int security_get_bool_value(u32 index);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/ibpkey.h b/security/selinux/include/ibpkey.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..875b055849
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/include/ibpkey.h
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+/*
+ * pkey table
+ *
+ * SELinux must keep a mapping of pkeys to labels/SIDs. This
+ * mapping is maintained as part of the normal policy but a fast cache is
+ * needed to reduce the lookup overhead.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * (c) Mellanox Technologies, 2016
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SELINUX_IB_PKEY_H
+#define _SELINUX_IB_PKEY_H
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include "flask.h"
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND
+void sel_ib_pkey_flush(void);
+int sel_ib_pkey_sid(u64 subnet_prefix, u16 pkey, u32 *sid);
+#else
+static inline void sel_ib_pkey_flush(void)
+{
+ return;
+}
+static inline int sel_ib_pkey_sid(u64 subnet_prefix, u16 pkey, u32 *sid)
+{
+ *sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/ima.h b/security/selinux/include/ima.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..93c05e97eb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/include/ima.h
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2021 Microsoft Corporation
+ *
+ * Author: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian (nramas@linux.microsoft.com)
+ *
+ * Measure critical data structures maintained by SELinux
+ * using IMA subsystem.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SELINUX_IMA_H_
+#define _SELINUX_IMA_H_
+
+#include "security.h"
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA
+extern void selinux_ima_measure_state(void);
+extern void selinux_ima_measure_state_locked(void);
+#else
+static inline void selinux_ima_measure_state(void)
+{
+}
+static inline void selinux_ima_measure_state_locked(void)
+{
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* _SELINUX_IMA_H_ */
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/initial_sid_to_string.h b/security/selinux/include/initial_sid_to_string.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..ecc6e74fa0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/include/initial_sid_to_string.h
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+
+#include <linux/stddef.h>
+
+static const char *const initial_sid_to_string[] = {
+ NULL,
+ "kernel",
+ "security",
+ "unlabeled",
+ NULL,
+ "file",
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ "any_socket",
+ "port",
+ "netif",
+ "netmsg",
+ "node",
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ "devnull",
+};
+
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/netif.h b/security/selinux/include/netif.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..85ec30d111
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/include/netif.h
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+/*
+ * Network interface table.
+ *
+ * Network interfaces (devices) do not have a security field, so we
+ * maintain a table associating each interface with a SID.
+ *
+ * Author: James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2003 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ * Copyright (C) 2007 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
+ * Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
+ */
+#ifndef _SELINUX_NETIF_H_
+#define _SELINUX_NETIF_H_
+
+#include <net/net_namespace.h>
+
+void sel_netif_flush(void);
+
+int sel_netif_sid(struct net *ns, int ifindex, u32 *sid);
+
+#endif /* _SELINUX_NETIF_H_ */
+
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/netlabel.h b/security/selinux/include/netlabel.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..4d0456d3d4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/include/netlabel.h
@@ -0,0 +1,150 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later */
+/*
+ * SELinux interface to the NetLabel subsystem
+ *
+ * Author: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
+ */
+
+/*
+ * (c) Copyright Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P., 2006
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SELINUX_NETLABEL_H_
+#define _SELINUX_NETLABEL_H_
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/net.h>
+#include <linux/skbuff.h>
+#include <net/sock.h>
+#include <net/request_sock.h>
+#include <net/sctp/structs.h>
+
+#include "avc.h"
+#include "objsec.h"
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_NETLABEL
+void selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate(void);
+
+void selinux_netlbl_err(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, int error,
+ int gateway);
+
+void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(struct sk_security_struct *sksec);
+void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(struct sk_security_struct *sksec);
+
+int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(struct sk_buff *skb,
+ u16 family,
+ u32 *type,
+ u32 *sid);
+int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(struct sk_buff *skb,
+ u16 family,
+ u32 sid);
+int selinux_netlbl_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_association *asoc,
+ struct sk_buff *skb);
+int selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(struct request_sock *req, u16 family);
+void selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk, u16 family);
+void selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone(struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk);
+int selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(struct sock *sk, u16 family);
+int selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(struct sk_security_struct *sksec,
+ struct sk_buff *skb,
+ u16 family,
+ struct common_audit_data *ad);
+int selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock,
+ int level,
+ int optname);
+int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *addr);
+int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked(struct sock *sk,
+ struct sockaddr *addr);
+
+#else
+static inline void selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate(void)
+{
+ return;
+}
+
+static inline void selinux_netlbl_err(struct sk_buff *skb,
+ u16 family,
+ int error,
+ int gateway)
+{
+ return;
+}
+
+static inline void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec)
+{
+ return;
+}
+
+static inline void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec)
+{
+ return;
+}
+
+static inline int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(struct sk_buff *skb,
+ u16 family,
+ u32 *type,
+ u32 *sid)
+{
+ *type = NETLBL_NLTYPE_NONE;
+ *sid = SECSID_NULL;
+ return 0;
+}
+static inline int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(struct sk_buff *skb,
+ u16 family,
+ u32 sid)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int selinux_netlbl_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_association *asoc,
+ struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+static inline int selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(struct request_sock *req,
+ u16 family)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+static inline void selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk, u16 family)
+{
+ return;
+}
+static inline void selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone(struct sock *sk,
+ struct sock *newsk)
+{
+ return;
+}
+static inline int selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(struct sock *sk,
+ u16 family)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+static inline int selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(struct sk_security_struct *sksec,
+ struct sk_buff *skb,
+ u16 family,
+ struct common_audit_data *ad)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+static inline int selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock,
+ int level,
+ int optname)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+static inline int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(struct sock *sk,
+ struct sockaddr *addr)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+static inline int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked(struct sock *sk,
+ struct sockaddr *addr)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_NETLABEL */
+
+#endif
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/netnode.h b/security/selinux/include/netnode.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9b8b655a8c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/include/netnode.h
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+/*
+ * Network node table
+ *
+ * SELinux must keep a mapping of network nodes to labels/SIDs. This
+ * mapping is maintained as part of the normal policy but a fast cache is
+ * needed to reduce the lookup overhead since most of these queries happen on
+ * a per-packet basis.
+ *
+ * Author: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
+ */
+
+/*
+ * (c) Copyright Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P., 2007
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SELINUX_NETNODE_H
+#define _SELINUX_NETNODE_H
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+
+void sel_netnode_flush(void);
+
+int sel_netnode_sid(void *addr, u16 family, u32 *sid);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/netport.h b/security/selinux/include/netport.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9096a82899
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/include/netport.h
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+/*
+ * Network port table
+ *
+ * SELinux must keep a mapping of network ports to labels/SIDs. This
+ * mapping is maintained as part of the normal policy but a fast cache is
+ * needed to reduce the lookup overhead.
+ *
+ * Author: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
+ */
+
+/*
+ * (c) Copyright Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P., 2008
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SELINUX_NETPORT_H
+#define _SELINUX_NETPORT_H
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+
+void sel_netport_flush(void);
+
+int sel_netport_sid(u8 protocol, u16 pnum, u32 *sid);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..8159fd53c3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
@@ -0,0 +1,197 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+/*
+ * Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
+ *
+ * This file contains the SELinux security data structures for kernel objects.
+ *
+ * Author(s): Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
+ * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
+ * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
+ * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
+ * Copyright (C) 2003 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ * Copyright (C) 2016 Mellanox Technologies
+ */
+#ifndef _SELINUX_OBJSEC_H_
+#define _SELINUX_OBJSEC_H_
+
+#include <linux/list.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/binfmts.h>
+#include <linux/in.h>
+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
+#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
+#include <linux/msg.h>
+#include <net/net_namespace.h>
+#include "flask.h"
+#include "avc.h"
+
+struct task_security_struct {
+ u32 osid; /* SID prior to last execve */
+ u32 sid; /* current SID */
+ u32 exec_sid; /* exec SID */
+ u32 create_sid; /* fscreate SID */
+ u32 keycreate_sid; /* keycreate SID */
+ u32 sockcreate_sid; /* fscreate SID */
+} __randomize_layout;
+
+enum label_initialized {
+ LABEL_INVALID, /* invalid or not initialized */
+ LABEL_INITIALIZED, /* initialized */
+ LABEL_PENDING
+};
+
+struct inode_security_struct {
+ struct inode *inode; /* back pointer to inode object */
+ struct list_head list; /* list of inode_security_struct */
+ u32 task_sid; /* SID of creating task */
+ u32 sid; /* SID of this object */
+ u16 sclass; /* security class of this object */
+ unsigned char initialized; /* initialization flag */
+ spinlock_t lock;
+};
+
+struct file_security_struct {
+ u32 sid; /* SID of open file description */
+ u32 fown_sid; /* SID of file owner (for SIGIO) */
+ u32 isid; /* SID of inode at the time of file open */
+ u32 pseqno; /* Policy seqno at the time of file open */
+};
+
+struct superblock_security_struct {
+ u32 sid; /* SID of file system superblock */
+ u32 def_sid; /* default SID for labeling */
+ u32 mntpoint_sid; /* SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT context for files */
+ unsigned short behavior; /* labeling behavior */
+ unsigned short flags; /* which mount options were specified */
+ struct mutex lock;
+ struct list_head isec_head;
+ spinlock_t isec_lock;
+};
+
+struct msg_security_struct {
+ u32 sid; /* SID of message */
+};
+
+struct ipc_security_struct {
+ u16 sclass; /* security class of this object */
+ u32 sid; /* SID of IPC resource */
+};
+
+struct netif_security_struct {
+ struct net *ns; /* network namespace */
+ int ifindex; /* device index */
+ u32 sid; /* SID for this interface */
+};
+
+struct netnode_security_struct {
+ union {
+ __be32 ipv4; /* IPv4 node address */
+ struct in6_addr ipv6; /* IPv6 node address */
+ } addr;
+ u32 sid; /* SID for this node */
+ u16 family; /* address family */
+};
+
+struct netport_security_struct {
+ u32 sid; /* SID for this node */
+ u16 port; /* port number */
+ u8 protocol; /* transport protocol */
+};
+
+struct sk_security_struct {
+#ifdef CONFIG_NETLABEL
+ enum { /* NetLabel state */
+ NLBL_UNSET = 0,
+ NLBL_REQUIRE,
+ NLBL_LABELED,
+ NLBL_REQSKB,
+ NLBL_CONNLABELED,
+ } nlbl_state;
+ struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *nlbl_secattr; /* NetLabel sec attributes */
+#endif
+ u32 sid; /* SID of this object */
+ u32 peer_sid; /* SID of peer */
+ u16 sclass; /* sock security class */
+ enum { /* SCTP association state */
+ SCTP_ASSOC_UNSET = 0,
+ SCTP_ASSOC_SET,
+ } sctp_assoc_state;
+};
+
+struct tun_security_struct {
+ u32 sid; /* SID for the tun device sockets */
+};
+
+struct key_security_struct {
+ u32 sid; /* SID of key */
+};
+
+struct ib_security_struct {
+ u32 sid; /* SID of the queue pair or MAD agent */
+};
+
+struct pkey_security_struct {
+ u64 subnet_prefix; /* Port subnet prefix */
+ u16 pkey; /* PKey number */
+ u32 sid; /* SID of pkey */
+};
+
+struct bpf_security_struct {
+ u32 sid; /* SID of bpf obj creator */
+};
+
+struct perf_event_security_struct {
+ u32 sid; /* SID of perf_event obj creator */
+};
+
+extern struct lsm_blob_sizes selinux_blob_sizes;
+static inline struct task_security_struct *selinux_cred(const struct cred *cred)
+{
+ return cred->security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_cred;
+}
+
+static inline struct file_security_struct *selinux_file(const struct file *file)
+{
+ return file->f_security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_file;
+}
+
+static inline struct inode_security_struct *selinux_inode(
+ const struct inode *inode)
+{
+ if (unlikely(!inode->i_security))
+ return NULL;
+ return inode->i_security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_inode;
+}
+
+static inline struct msg_security_struct *selinux_msg_msg(
+ const struct msg_msg *msg_msg)
+{
+ return msg_msg->security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg;
+}
+
+static inline struct ipc_security_struct *selinux_ipc(
+ const struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc)
+{
+ return ipc->security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_ipc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * get the subjective security ID of the current task
+ */
+static inline u32 current_sid(void)
+{
+ const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
+
+ return tsec->sid;
+}
+
+static inline struct superblock_security_struct *selinux_superblock(
+ const struct super_block *superblock)
+{
+ return superblock->s_security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_superblock;
+}
+
+#endif /* _SELINUX_OBJSEC_H_ */
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/policycap.h b/security/selinux/include/policycap.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..f35d3458e7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/include/policycap.h
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#ifndef _SELINUX_POLICYCAP_H_
+#define _SELINUX_POLICYCAP_H_
+
+/* Policy capabilities */
+enum {
+ POLICYDB_CAP_NETPEER,
+ POLICYDB_CAP_OPENPERM,
+ POLICYDB_CAP_EXTSOCKCLASS,
+ POLICYDB_CAP_ALWAYSNETWORK,
+ POLICYDB_CAP_CGROUPSECLABEL,
+ POLICYDB_CAP_NNP_NOSUID_TRANSITION,
+ POLICYDB_CAP_GENFS_SECLABEL_SYMLINKS,
+ POLICYDB_CAP_IOCTL_SKIP_CLOEXEC,
+ __POLICYDB_CAP_MAX
+};
+#define POLICYDB_CAP_MAX (__POLICYDB_CAP_MAX - 1)
+
+extern const char *const selinux_policycap_names[__POLICYDB_CAP_MAX];
+
+#endif /* _SELINUX_POLICYCAP_H_ */
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/policycap_names.h b/security/selinux/include/policycap_names.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..49bbe120d1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/include/policycap_names.h
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#ifndef _SELINUX_POLICYCAP_NAMES_H_
+#define _SELINUX_POLICYCAP_NAMES_H_
+
+#include "policycap.h"
+
+/* Policy capability names */
+const char *const selinux_policycap_names[__POLICYDB_CAP_MAX] = {
+ "network_peer_controls",
+ "open_perms",
+ "extended_socket_class",
+ "always_check_network",
+ "cgroup_seclabel",
+ "nnp_nosuid_transition",
+ "genfs_seclabel_symlinks",
+ "ioctl_skip_cloexec",
+};
+
+#endif /* _SELINUX_POLICYCAP_NAMES_H_ */
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a9de89af8f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h
@@ -0,0 +1,385 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * Security server interface.
+ *
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
+ *
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SELINUX_SECURITY_H_
+#define _SELINUX_SECURITY_H_
+
+#include <linux/compiler.h>
+#include <linux/dcache.h>
+#include <linux/magic.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
+#include <linux/refcount.h>
+#include <linux/workqueue.h>
+#include <linux/delay.h>
+#include <linux/printk.h>
+#include "flask.h"
+#include "policycap.h"
+
+#define SECSID_NULL 0x00000000 /* unspecified SID */
+#define SECSID_WILD 0xffffffff /* wildcard SID */
+#define SECCLASS_NULL 0x0000 /* no class */
+
+/* Identify specific policy version changes */
+#define POLICYDB_VERSION_BASE 15
+#define POLICYDB_VERSION_BOOL 16
+#define POLICYDB_VERSION_IPV6 17
+#define POLICYDB_VERSION_NLCLASS 18
+#define POLICYDB_VERSION_VALIDATETRANS 19
+#define POLICYDB_VERSION_MLS 19
+#define POLICYDB_VERSION_AVTAB 20
+#define POLICYDB_VERSION_RANGETRANS 21
+#define POLICYDB_VERSION_POLCAP 22
+#define POLICYDB_VERSION_PERMISSIVE 23
+#define POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY 24
+#define POLICYDB_VERSION_FILENAME_TRANS 25
+#define POLICYDB_VERSION_ROLETRANS 26
+#define POLICYDB_VERSION_NEW_OBJECT_DEFAULTS 27
+#define POLICYDB_VERSION_DEFAULT_TYPE 28
+#define POLICYDB_VERSION_CONSTRAINT_NAMES 29
+#define POLICYDB_VERSION_XPERMS_IOCTL 30
+#define POLICYDB_VERSION_INFINIBAND 31
+#define POLICYDB_VERSION_GLBLUB 32
+#define POLICYDB_VERSION_COMP_FTRANS 33 /* compressed filename transitions */
+
+/* Range of policy versions we understand*/
+#define POLICYDB_VERSION_MIN POLICYDB_VERSION_BASE
+#define POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX POLICYDB_VERSION_COMP_FTRANS
+
+/* Mask for just the mount related flags */
+#define SE_MNTMASK 0x0f
+/* Super block security struct flags for mount options */
+/* BE CAREFUL, these need to be the low order bits for selinux_get_mnt_opts */
+#define CONTEXT_MNT 0x01
+#define FSCONTEXT_MNT 0x02
+#define ROOTCONTEXT_MNT 0x04
+#define DEFCONTEXT_MNT 0x08
+#define SBLABEL_MNT 0x10
+/* Non-mount related flags */
+#define SE_SBINITIALIZED 0x0100
+#define SE_SBPROC 0x0200
+#define SE_SBGENFS 0x0400
+#define SE_SBGENFS_XATTR 0x0800
+#define SE_SBNATIVE 0x1000
+
+#define CONTEXT_STR "context"
+#define FSCONTEXT_STR "fscontext"
+#define ROOTCONTEXT_STR "rootcontext"
+#define DEFCONTEXT_STR "defcontext"
+#define SECLABEL_STR "seclabel"
+
+struct netlbl_lsm_secattr;
+
+extern int selinux_enabled_boot;
+
+/*
+ * type_datum properties
+ * available at the kernel policy version >= POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY
+ */
+#define TYPEDATUM_PROPERTY_PRIMARY 0x0001
+#define TYPEDATUM_PROPERTY_ATTRIBUTE 0x0002
+
+/* limitation of boundary depth */
+#define POLICYDB_BOUNDS_MAXDEPTH 4
+
+struct selinux_policy;
+
+struct selinux_state {
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
+ bool enforcing;
+#endif
+ bool initialized;
+ bool policycap[__POLICYDB_CAP_MAX];
+
+ struct page *status_page;
+ struct mutex status_lock;
+
+ struct selinux_policy __rcu *policy;
+ struct mutex policy_mutex;
+} __randomize_layout;
+
+void selinux_avc_init(void);
+
+extern struct selinux_state selinux_state;
+
+static inline bool selinux_initialized(void)
+{
+ /* do a synchronized load to avoid race conditions */
+ return smp_load_acquire(&selinux_state.initialized);
+}
+
+static inline void selinux_mark_initialized(void)
+{
+ /* do a synchronized write to avoid race conditions */
+ smp_store_release(&selinux_state.initialized, true);
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
+static inline bool enforcing_enabled(void)
+{
+ return READ_ONCE(selinux_state.enforcing);
+}
+
+static inline void enforcing_set(bool value)
+{
+ WRITE_ONCE(selinux_state.enforcing, value);
+}
+#else
+static inline bool enforcing_enabled(void)
+{
+ return true;
+}
+
+static inline void enforcing_set(bool value)
+{
+}
+#endif
+
+static inline bool checkreqprot_get(void)
+{
+ /* non-zero/true checkreqprot values are no longer supported */
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline bool selinux_policycap_netpeer(void)
+{
+ return READ_ONCE(selinux_state.policycap[POLICYDB_CAP_NETPEER]);
+}
+
+static inline bool selinux_policycap_openperm(void)
+{
+ return READ_ONCE(selinux_state.policycap[POLICYDB_CAP_OPENPERM]);
+}
+
+static inline bool selinux_policycap_extsockclass(void)
+{
+ return READ_ONCE(selinux_state.policycap[POLICYDB_CAP_EXTSOCKCLASS]);
+}
+
+static inline bool selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork(void)
+{
+ return READ_ONCE(selinux_state.policycap[POLICYDB_CAP_ALWAYSNETWORK]);
+}
+
+static inline bool selinux_policycap_cgroupseclabel(void)
+{
+ return READ_ONCE(selinux_state.policycap[POLICYDB_CAP_CGROUPSECLABEL]);
+}
+
+static inline bool selinux_policycap_nnp_nosuid_transition(void)
+{
+ return READ_ONCE(
+ selinux_state.policycap[POLICYDB_CAP_NNP_NOSUID_TRANSITION]);
+}
+
+static inline bool selinux_policycap_genfs_seclabel_symlinks(void)
+{
+ return READ_ONCE(
+ selinux_state.policycap[POLICYDB_CAP_GENFS_SECLABEL_SYMLINKS]);
+}
+
+static inline bool selinux_policycap_ioctl_skip_cloexec(void)
+{
+ return READ_ONCE(
+ selinux_state.policycap[POLICYDB_CAP_IOCTL_SKIP_CLOEXEC]);
+}
+
+struct selinux_policy_convert_data;
+
+struct selinux_load_state {
+ struct selinux_policy *policy;
+ struct selinux_policy_convert_data *convert_data;
+};
+
+int security_mls_enabled(void);
+int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len,
+ struct selinux_load_state *load_state);
+void selinux_policy_commit(struct selinux_load_state *load_state);
+void selinux_policy_cancel(struct selinux_load_state *load_state);
+int security_read_policy(void **data, size_t *len);
+int security_read_state_kernel(void **data, size_t *len);
+int security_policycap_supported(unsigned int req_cap);
+
+#define SEL_VEC_MAX 32
+struct av_decision {
+ u32 allowed;
+ u32 auditallow;
+ u32 auditdeny;
+ u32 seqno;
+ u32 flags;
+};
+
+#define XPERMS_ALLOWED 1
+#define XPERMS_AUDITALLOW 2
+#define XPERMS_DONTAUDIT 4
+
+#define security_xperm_set(perms, x) ((perms)[(x) >> 5] |= 1 << ((x) & 0x1f))
+#define security_xperm_test(perms, x) (1 & ((perms)[(x) >> 5] >> ((x) & 0x1f)))
+struct extended_perms_data {
+ u32 p[8];
+};
+
+struct extended_perms_decision {
+ u8 used;
+ u8 driver;
+ struct extended_perms_data *allowed;
+ struct extended_perms_data *auditallow;
+ struct extended_perms_data *dontaudit;
+};
+
+struct extended_perms {
+ u16 len; /* length associated decision chain */
+ struct extended_perms_data drivers; /* flag drivers that are used */
+};
+
+/* definitions of av_decision.flags */
+#define AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE 0x0001
+
+void security_compute_av(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
+ u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd,
+ struct extended_perms *xperms);
+
+void security_compute_xperms_decision(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
+ u8 driver,
+ struct extended_perms_decision *xpermd);
+
+void security_compute_av_user(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
+ u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd);
+
+int security_transition_sid(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
+ const struct qstr *qstr, u32 *out_sid);
+
+int security_transition_sid_user(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
+ const char *objname, u32 *out_sid);
+
+int security_member_sid(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, u32 *out_sid);
+
+int security_change_sid(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, u32 *out_sid);
+
+int security_sid_to_context(u32 sid, char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len);
+
+int security_sid_to_context_force(u32 sid, char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len);
+
+int security_sid_to_context_inval(u32 sid, char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len);
+
+int security_context_to_sid(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
+ u32 *out_sid, gfp_t gfp);
+
+int security_context_str_to_sid(const char *scontext, u32 *out_sid, gfp_t gfp);
+
+int security_context_to_sid_default(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
+ u32 *out_sid, u32 def_sid, gfp_t gfp_flags);
+
+int security_context_to_sid_force(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
+ u32 *sid);
+
+int security_get_user_sids(u32 callsid, char *username, u32 **sids, u32 *nel);
+
+int security_port_sid(u8 protocol, u16 port, u32 *out_sid);
+
+int security_ib_pkey_sid(u64 subnet_prefix, u16 pkey_num, u32 *out_sid);
+
+int security_ib_endport_sid(const char *dev_name, u8 port_num, u32 *out_sid);
+
+int security_netif_sid(char *name, u32 *if_sid);
+
+int security_node_sid(u16 domain, void *addr, u32 addrlen,
+ u32 *out_sid);
+
+int security_validate_transition(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid,
+ u16 tclass);
+
+int security_validate_transition_user(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid,
+ u16 tclass);
+
+int security_bounded_transition(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid);
+
+int security_sid_mls_copy(u32 sid, u32 mls_sid, u32 *new_sid);
+
+int security_net_peersid_resolve(u32 nlbl_sid, u32 nlbl_type,
+ u32 xfrm_sid,
+ u32 *peer_sid);
+
+int security_get_classes(struct selinux_policy *policy,
+ char ***classes, u32 *nclasses);
+int security_get_permissions(struct selinux_policy *policy,
+ const char *class, char ***perms, u32 *nperms);
+int security_get_reject_unknown(void);
+int security_get_allow_unknown(void);
+
+#define SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR 1 /* use xattr */
+#define SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS 2 /* use transition SIDs, e.g. devpts/tmpfs */
+#define SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK 3 /* use task SIDs, e.g. pipefs/sockfs */
+#define SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS 4 /* use the genfs support */
+#define SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE 5 /* no labeling support */
+#define SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT 6 /* use mountpoint labeling */
+#define SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE 7 /* use native label support */
+#define SECURITY_FS_USE_MAX 7 /* Highest SECURITY_FS_USE_XXX */
+
+int security_fs_use(struct super_block *sb);
+
+int security_genfs_sid(const char *fstype, const char *path, u16 sclass,
+ u32 *sid);
+
+int selinux_policy_genfs_sid(struct selinux_policy *policy,
+ const char *fstype, const char *path, u16 sclass,
+ u32 *sid);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_NETLABEL
+int security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr,
+ u32 *sid);
+
+int security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(u32 sid,
+ struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr);
+#else
+static inline int security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr,
+ u32 *sid)
+{
+ return -EIDRM;
+}
+
+static inline int security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(u32 sid,
+ struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
+{
+ return -ENOENT;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_NETLABEL */
+
+const char *security_get_initial_sid_context(u32 sid);
+
+/*
+ * status notifier using mmap interface
+ */
+extern struct page *selinux_kernel_status_page(void);
+
+#define SELINUX_KERNEL_STATUS_VERSION 1
+struct selinux_kernel_status {
+ u32 version; /* version number of the structure */
+ u32 sequence; /* sequence number of seqlock logic */
+ u32 enforcing; /* current setting of enforcing mode */
+ u32 policyload; /* times of policy reloaded */
+ u32 deny_unknown; /* current setting of deny_unknown */
+ /*
+ * The version > 0 supports above members.
+ */
+} __packed;
+
+extern void selinux_status_update_setenforce(bool enforcing);
+extern void selinux_status_update_policyload(u32 seqno);
+extern void selinux_complete_init(void);
+extern struct path selinux_null;
+extern void selnl_notify_setenforce(int val);
+extern void selnl_notify_policyload(u32 seqno);
+extern int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm);
+
+extern void avtab_cache_init(void);
+extern void ebitmap_cache_init(void);
+extern void hashtab_cache_init(void);
+extern int security_sidtab_hash_stats(char *page);
+
+#endif /* _SELINUX_SECURITY_H_ */
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h b/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c758398602
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h
@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * SELinux support for the XFRM LSM hooks
+ *
+ * Author : Trent Jaeger, <jaegert@us.ibm.com>
+ * Updated : Venkat Yekkirala, <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
+ */
+#ifndef _SELINUX_XFRM_H_
+#define _SELINUX_XFRM_H_
+
+#include <linux/lsm_audit.h>
+#include <net/flow.h>
+#include <net/xfrm.h>
+
+int selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp,
+ struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx,
+ gfp_t gfp);
+int selinux_xfrm_policy_clone(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *old_ctx,
+ struct xfrm_sec_ctx **new_ctxp);
+void selinux_xfrm_policy_free(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx);
+int selinux_xfrm_policy_delete(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx);
+int selinux_xfrm_state_alloc(struct xfrm_state *x,
+ struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx);
+int selinux_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire(struct xfrm_state *x,
+ struct xfrm_sec_ctx *polsec, u32 secid);
+void selinux_xfrm_state_free(struct xfrm_state *x);
+int selinux_xfrm_state_delete(struct xfrm_state *x);
+int selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx, u32 fl_secid);
+int selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x,
+ struct xfrm_policy *xp,
+ const struct flowi_common *flic);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
+extern atomic_t selinux_xfrm_refcount;
+
+static inline int selinux_xfrm_enabled(void)
+{
+ return (atomic_read(&selinux_xfrm_refcount) > 0);
+}
+
+int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 sk_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
+ struct common_audit_data *ad);
+int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 sk_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
+ struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 proto);
+int selinux_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid, int ckall);
+int selinux_xfrm_skb_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid);
+
+static inline void selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload(void)
+{
+ struct net *net;
+
+ down_read(&net_rwsem);
+ for_each_net(net)
+ rt_genid_bump_all(net);
+ up_read(&net_rwsem);
+}
+#else
+static inline int selinux_xfrm_enabled(void)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 sk_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
+ struct common_audit_data *ad)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 sk_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
+ struct common_audit_data *ad,
+ u8 proto)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int selinux_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid,
+ int ckall)
+{
+ *sid = SECSID_NULL;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline void selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload(void)
+{
+}
+
+static inline int selinux_xfrm_skb_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid)
+{
+ *sid = SECSID_NULL;
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* _SELINUX_XFRM_H_ */
diff --git a/security/selinux/netif.c b/security/selinux/netif.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..43a0d3594b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/netif.c
@@ -0,0 +1,280 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Network interface table.
+ *
+ * Network interfaces (devices) do not have a security field, so we
+ * maintain a table associating each interface with a SID.
+ *
+ * Author: James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2003 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ * Copyright (C) 2007 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
+ * Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
+ */
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/stddef.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/list.h>
+#include <linux/notifier.h>
+#include <linux/netdevice.h>
+#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
+#include <net/net_namespace.h>
+
+#include "security.h"
+#include "objsec.h"
+#include "netif.h"
+
+#define SEL_NETIF_HASH_SIZE 64
+#define SEL_NETIF_HASH_MAX 1024
+
+struct sel_netif {
+ struct list_head list;
+ struct netif_security_struct nsec;
+ struct rcu_head rcu_head;
+};
+
+static u32 sel_netif_total;
+static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sel_netif_lock);
+static struct list_head sel_netif_hash[SEL_NETIF_HASH_SIZE];
+
+/**
+ * sel_netif_hashfn - Hashing function for the interface table
+ * @ns: the network namespace
+ * @ifindex: the network interface
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * This is the hashing function for the network interface table, it returns the
+ * bucket number for the given interface.
+ *
+ */
+static inline u32 sel_netif_hashfn(const struct net *ns, int ifindex)
+{
+ return (((uintptr_t)ns + ifindex) & (SEL_NETIF_HASH_SIZE - 1));
+}
+
+/**
+ * sel_netif_find - Search for an interface record
+ * @ns: the network namespace
+ * @ifindex: the network interface
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Search the network interface table and return the record matching @ifindex.
+ * If an entry can not be found in the table return NULL.
+ *
+ */
+static inline struct sel_netif *sel_netif_find(const struct net *ns,
+ int ifindex)
+{
+ u32 idx = sel_netif_hashfn(ns, ifindex);
+ struct sel_netif *netif;
+
+ list_for_each_entry_rcu(netif, &sel_netif_hash[idx], list)
+ if (net_eq(netif->nsec.ns, ns) &&
+ netif->nsec.ifindex == ifindex)
+ return netif;
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * sel_netif_insert - Insert a new interface into the table
+ * @netif: the new interface record
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Add a new interface record to the network interface hash table. Returns
+ * zero on success, negative values on failure.
+ *
+ */
+static int sel_netif_insert(struct sel_netif *netif)
+{
+ u32 idx;
+
+ if (sel_netif_total >= SEL_NETIF_HASH_MAX)
+ return -ENOSPC;
+
+ idx = sel_netif_hashfn(netif->nsec.ns, netif->nsec.ifindex);
+ list_add_rcu(&netif->list, &sel_netif_hash[idx]);
+ sel_netif_total++;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * sel_netif_destroy - Remove an interface record from the table
+ * @netif: the existing interface record
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Remove an existing interface record from the network interface table.
+ *
+ */
+static void sel_netif_destroy(struct sel_netif *netif)
+{
+ list_del_rcu(&netif->list);
+ sel_netif_total--;
+ kfree_rcu(netif, rcu_head);
+}
+
+/**
+ * sel_netif_sid_slow - Lookup the SID of a network interface using the policy
+ * @ns: the network namespace
+ * @ifindex: the network interface
+ * @sid: interface SID
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * This function determines the SID of a network interface by querying the
+ * security policy. The result is added to the network interface table to
+ * speedup future queries. Returns zero on success, negative values on
+ * failure.
+ *
+ */
+static int sel_netif_sid_slow(struct net *ns, int ifindex, u32 *sid)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ struct sel_netif *netif;
+ struct sel_netif *new;
+ struct net_device *dev;
+
+ /* NOTE: we always use init's network namespace since we don't
+ * currently support containers */
+
+ dev = dev_get_by_index(ns, ifindex);
+ if (unlikely(dev == NULL)) {
+ pr_warn("SELinux: failure in %s(), invalid network interface (%d)\n",
+ __func__, ifindex);
+ return -ENOENT;
+ }
+
+ spin_lock_bh(&sel_netif_lock);
+ netif = sel_netif_find(ns, ifindex);
+ if (netif != NULL) {
+ *sid = netif->nsec.sid;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ ret = security_netif_sid(dev->name, sid);
+ if (ret != 0)
+ goto out;
+ new = kzalloc(sizeof(*new), GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (new) {
+ new->nsec.ns = ns;
+ new->nsec.ifindex = ifindex;
+ new->nsec.sid = *sid;
+ if (sel_netif_insert(new))
+ kfree(new);
+ }
+
+out:
+ spin_unlock_bh(&sel_netif_lock);
+ dev_put(dev);
+ if (unlikely(ret))
+ pr_warn("SELinux: failure in %s(), unable to determine network interface label (%d)\n",
+ __func__, ifindex);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * sel_netif_sid - Lookup the SID of a network interface
+ * @ns: the network namespace
+ * @ifindex: the network interface
+ * @sid: interface SID
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * This function determines the SID of a network interface using the fastest
+ * method possible. First the interface table is queried, but if an entry
+ * can't be found then the policy is queried and the result is added to the
+ * table to speedup future queries. Returns zero on success, negative values
+ * on failure.
+ *
+ */
+int sel_netif_sid(struct net *ns, int ifindex, u32 *sid)
+{
+ struct sel_netif *netif;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ netif = sel_netif_find(ns, ifindex);
+ if (likely(netif != NULL)) {
+ *sid = netif->nsec.sid;
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return 0;
+ }
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+
+ return sel_netif_sid_slow(ns, ifindex, sid);
+}
+
+/**
+ * sel_netif_kill - Remove an entry from the network interface table
+ * @ns: the network namespace
+ * @ifindex: the network interface
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * This function removes the entry matching @ifindex from the network interface
+ * table if it exists.
+ *
+ */
+static void sel_netif_kill(const struct net *ns, int ifindex)
+{
+ struct sel_netif *netif;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ spin_lock_bh(&sel_netif_lock);
+ netif = sel_netif_find(ns, ifindex);
+ if (netif)
+ sel_netif_destroy(netif);
+ spin_unlock_bh(&sel_netif_lock);
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+}
+
+/**
+ * sel_netif_flush - Flush the entire network interface table
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Remove all entries from the network interface table.
+ *
+ */
+void sel_netif_flush(void)
+{
+ int idx;
+ struct sel_netif *netif;
+
+ spin_lock_bh(&sel_netif_lock);
+ for (idx = 0; idx < SEL_NETIF_HASH_SIZE; idx++)
+ list_for_each_entry(netif, &sel_netif_hash[idx], list)
+ sel_netif_destroy(netif);
+ spin_unlock_bh(&sel_netif_lock);
+}
+
+static int sel_netif_netdev_notifier_handler(struct notifier_block *this,
+ unsigned long event, void *ptr)
+{
+ struct net_device *dev = netdev_notifier_info_to_dev(ptr);
+
+ if (event == NETDEV_DOWN)
+ sel_netif_kill(dev_net(dev), dev->ifindex);
+
+ return NOTIFY_DONE;
+}
+
+static struct notifier_block sel_netif_netdev_notifier = {
+ .notifier_call = sel_netif_netdev_notifier_handler,
+};
+
+static __init int sel_netif_init(void)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ if (!selinux_enabled_boot)
+ return 0;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < SEL_NETIF_HASH_SIZE; i++)
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sel_netif_hash[i]);
+
+ register_netdevice_notifier(&sel_netif_netdev_notifier);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+__initcall(sel_netif_init);
+
diff --git a/security/selinux/netlabel.c b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..8f182800e4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
@@ -0,0 +1,615 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+/*
+ * SELinux NetLabel Support
+ *
+ * This file provides the necessary glue to tie NetLabel into the SELinux
+ * subsystem.
+ *
+ * Author: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
+ */
+
+/*
+ * (c) Copyright Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P., 2007, 2008
+ */
+
+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
+#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
+#include <linux/gfp.h>
+#include <linux/ip.h>
+#include <linux/ipv6.h>
+#include <net/sock.h>
+#include <net/netlabel.h>
+#include <net/ip.h>
+#include <net/ipv6.h>
+
+#include "objsec.h"
+#include "security.h"
+#include "netlabel.h"
+
+/**
+ * selinux_netlbl_sidlookup_cached - Cache a SID lookup
+ * @skb: the packet
+ * @family: the packet's address family
+ * @secattr: the NetLabel security attributes
+ * @sid: the SID
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Query the SELinux security server to lookup the correct SID for the given
+ * security attributes. If the query is successful, cache the result to speed
+ * up future lookups. Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
+ *
+ */
+static int selinux_netlbl_sidlookup_cached(struct sk_buff *skb,
+ u16 family,
+ struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr,
+ u32 *sid)
+{
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(secattr, sid);
+ if (rc == 0 &&
+ (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHEABLE) &&
+ (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHE))
+ netlbl_cache_add(skb, family, secattr);
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * selinux_netlbl_sock_genattr - Generate the NetLabel socket secattr
+ * @sk: the socket
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Generate the NetLabel security attributes for a socket, making full use of
+ * the socket's attribute cache. Returns a pointer to the security attributes
+ * on success, NULL on failure.
+ *
+ */
+static struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *selinux_netlbl_sock_genattr(struct sock *sk)
+{
+ int rc;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr;
+
+ if (sksec->nlbl_secattr != NULL)
+ return sksec->nlbl_secattr;
+
+ secattr = netlbl_secattr_alloc(GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (secattr == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ rc = security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(sksec->sid, secattr);
+ if (rc != 0) {
+ netlbl_secattr_free(secattr);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ sksec->nlbl_secattr = secattr;
+
+ return secattr;
+}
+
+/**
+ * selinux_netlbl_sock_getattr - Get the cached NetLabel secattr
+ * @sk: the socket
+ * @sid: the SID
+ *
+ * Query the socket's cached secattr and if the SID matches the cached value
+ * return the cache, otherwise return NULL.
+ *
+ */
+static struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *selinux_netlbl_sock_getattr(
+ const struct sock *sk,
+ u32 sid)
+{
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr = sksec->nlbl_secattr;
+
+ if (secattr == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if ((secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID) &&
+ (secattr->attr.secid == sid))
+ return secattr;
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate - Invalidate the NetLabel cache
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Invalidate the NetLabel security attribute mapping cache.
+ *
+ */
+void selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate(void)
+{
+ netlbl_cache_invalidate();
+}
+
+/**
+ * selinux_netlbl_err - Handle a NetLabel packet error
+ * @skb: the packet
+ * @family: the packet's address family
+ * @error: the error code
+ * @gateway: true if host is acting as a gateway, false otherwise
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * When a packet is dropped due to a call to avc_has_perm() pass the error
+ * code to the NetLabel subsystem so any protocol specific processing can be
+ * done. This is safe to call even if you are unsure if NetLabel labeling is
+ * present on the packet, NetLabel is smart enough to only act when it should.
+ *
+ */
+void selinux_netlbl_err(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, int error, int gateway)
+{
+ netlbl_skbuff_err(skb, family, error, gateway);
+}
+
+/**
+ * selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free - Free the NetLabel fields
+ * @sksec: the sk_security_struct
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Free all of the memory in the NetLabel fields of a sk_security_struct.
+ *
+ */
+void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(struct sk_security_struct *sksec)
+{
+ if (!sksec->nlbl_secattr)
+ return;
+
+ netlbl_secattr_free(sksec->nlbl_secattr);
+ sksec->nlbl_secattr = NULL;
+ sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_UNSET;
+}
+
+/**
+ * selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset - Reset the NetLabel fields
+ * @sksec: the sk_security_struct
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Called when the NetLabel state of a sk_security_struct needs to be reset.
+ * The caller is responsible for all the NetLabel sk_security_struct locking.
+ *
+ */
+void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(struct sk_security_struct *sksec)
+{
+ sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_UNSET;
+}
+
+/**
+ * selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid - Get the sid of a packet using NetLabel
+ * @skb: the packet
+ * @family: protocol family
+ * @type: NetLabel labeling protocol type
+ * @sid: the SID
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Call the NetLabel mechanism to get the security attributes of the given
+ * packet and use those attributes to determine the correct context/SID to
+ * assign to the packet. Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
+ *
+ */
+int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(struct sk_buff *skb,
+ u16 family,
+ u32 *type,
+ u32 *sid)
+{
+ int rc;
+ struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
+
+ if (!netlbl_enabled()) {
+ *type = NETLBL_NLTYPE_NONE;
+ *sid = SECSID_NULL;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
+ rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, family, &secattr);
+ if (rc == 0 && secattr.flags != NETLBL_SECATTR_NONE)
+ rc = selinux_netlbl_sidlookup_cached(skb, family,
+ &secattr, sid);
+ else
+ *sid = SECSID_NULL;
+ *type = secattr.type;
+ netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid - Set the NetLabel on a packet given a sid
+ * @skb: the packet
+ * @family: protocol family
+ * @sid: the SID
+ *
+ * Description
+ * Call the NetLabel mechanism to set the label of a packet using @sid.
+ * Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
+ *
+ */
+int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(struct sk_buff *skb,
+ u16 family,
+ u32 sid)
+{
+ int rc;
+ struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr_storage;
+ struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr = NULL;
+ struct sock *sk;
+
+ /* if this is a locally generated packet check to see if it is already
+ * being labeled by it's parent socket, if it is just exit */
+ sk = skb_to_full_sk(skb);
+ if (sk != NULL) {
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+
+ if (sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_REQSKB)
+ return 0;
+ secattr = selinux_netlbl_sock_getattr(sk, sid);
+ }
+ if (secattr == NULL) {
+ secattr = &secattr_storage;
+ netlbl_secattr_init(secattr);
+ rc = security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(sid, secattr);
+ if (rc != 0)
+ goto skbuff_setsid_return;
+ }
+
+ rc = netlbl_skbuff_setattr(skb, family, secattr);
+
+skbuff_setsid_return:
+ if (secattr == &secattr_storage)
+ netlbl_secattr_destroy(secattr);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * selinux_netlbl_sctp_assoc_request - Label an incoming sctp association.
+ * @asoc: incoming association.
+ * @skb: the packet.
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * A new incoming connection is represented by @asoc, ......
+ * Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
+ *
+ */
+int selinux_netlbl_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_association *asoc,
+ struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ int rc;
+ struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = asoc->base.sk->sk_security;
+ struct sockaddr_in addr4;
+ struct sockaddr_in6 addr6;
+
+ if (asoc->base.sk->sk_family != PF_INET &&
+ asoc->base.sk->sk_family != PF_INET6)
+ return 0;
+
+ netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
+ rc = security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(asoc->secid, &secattr);
+ if (rc != 0)
+ goto assoc_request_return;
+
+ /* Move skb hdr address info to a struct sockaddr and then call
+ * netlbl_conn_setattr().
+ */
+ if (ip_hdr(skb)->version == 4) {
+ addr4.sin_family = AF_INET;
+ addr4.sin_addr.s_addr = ip_hdr(skb)->saddr;
+ rc = netlbl_conn_setattr(asoc->base.sk, (void *)&addr4, &secattr);
+ } else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) && ip_hdr(skb)->version == 6) {
+ addr6.sin6_family = AF_INET6;
+ addr6.sin6_addr = ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr;
+ rc = netlbl_conn_setattr(asoc->base.sk, (void *)&addr6, &secattr);
+ } else {
+ rc = -EAFNOSUPPORT;
+ }
+
+ if (rc == 0)
+ sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_LABELED;
+
+assoc_request_return:
+ netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request - Label an incoming stream connection
+ * @req: incoming connection request socket
+ * @family: the request socket's address family
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * A new incoming connection request is represented by @req, we need to label
+ * the new request_sock here and the stack will ensure the on-the-wire label
+ * will get preserved when a full sock is created once the connection handshake
+ * is complete. Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
+ *
+ */
+int selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(struct request_sock *req, u16 family)
+{
+ int rc;
+ struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
+
+ if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
+ return 0;
+
+ netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
+ rc = security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(req->secid, &secattr);
+ if (rc != 0)
+ goto inet_conn_request_return;
+ rc = netlbl_req_setattr(req, &secattr);
+inet_conn_request_return:
+ netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone - Initialize the newly created sock
+ * @sk: the new sock
+ * @family: the sock's address family
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * A new connection has been established using @sk, we've already labeled the
+ * socket via the request_sock struct in selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request() but
+ * we need to set the NetLabel state here since we now have a sock structure.
+ *
+ */
+void selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk, u16 family)
+{
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+
+ if (family == PF_INET)
+ sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_LABELED;
+ else
+ sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_UNSET;
+}
+
+/**
+ * selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone - Copy state to the newly created sock
+ * @sk: current sock
+ * @newsk: the new sock
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Called whenever a new socket is created by accept(2) or sctp_peeloff(3).
+ */
+void selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone(struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
+{
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
+
+ newsksec->nlbl_state = sksec->nlbl_state;
+}
+
+/**
+ * selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create - Label a socket using NetLabel
+ * @sk: the sock to label
+ * @family: protocol family
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Attempt to label a socket using the NetLabel mechanism using the given
+ * SID. Returns zero values on success, negative values on failure.
+ *
+ */
+int selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(struct sock *sk, u16 family)
+{
+ int rc;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr;
+
+ if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
+ return 0;
+
+ secattr = selinux_netlbl_sock_genattr(sk);
+ if (secattr == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ rc = netlbl_sock_setattr(sk, family, secattr);
+ switch (rc) {
+ case 0:
+ sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_LABELED;
+ break;
+ case -EDESTADDRREQ:
+ sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_REQSKB;
+ rc = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb - Do an inbound access check using NetLabel
+ * @sksec: the sock's sk_security_struct
+ * @skb: the packet
+ * @family: protocol family
+ * @ad: the audit data
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Fetch the NetLabel security attributes from @skb and perform an access check
+ * against the receiving socket. Returns zero on success, negative values on
+ * error.
+ *
+ */
+int selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(struct sk_security_struct *sksec,
+ struct sk_buff *skb,
+ u16 family,
+ struct common_audit_data *ad)
+{
+ int rc;
+ u32 nlbl_sid;
+ u32 perm;
+ struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
+
+ if (!netlbl_enabled())
+ return 0;
+
+ netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
+ rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, family, &secattr);
+ if (rc == 0 && secattr.flags != NETLBL_SECATTR_NONE)
+ rc = selinux_netlbl_sidlookup_cached(skb, family,
+ &secattr, &nlbl_sid);
+ else
+ nlbl_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+ netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
+ if (rc != 0)
+ return rc;
+
+ switch (sksec->sclass) {
+ case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
+ perm = UDP_SOCKET__RECVFROM;
+ break;
+ case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
+ perm = TCP_SOCKET__RECVFROM;
+ break;
+ default:
+ perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__RECVFROM;
+ }
+
+ rc = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, nlbl_sid, sksec->sclass, perm, ad);
+ if (rc == 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (nlbl_sid != SECINITSID_UNLABELED)
+ netlbl_skbuff_err(skb, family, rc, 0);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * selinux_netlbl_option - Is this a NetLabel option
+ * @level: the socket level or protocol
+ * @optname: the socket option name
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Returns true if @level and @optname refer to a NetLabel option.
+ * Helper for selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt().
+ */
+static inline int selinux_netlbl_option(int level, int optname)
+{
+ return (level == IPPROTO_IP && optname == IP_OPTIONS) ||
+ (level == IPPROTO_IPV6 && optname == IPV6_HOPOPTS);
+}
+
+/**
+ * selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt - Do not allow users to remove a NetLabel
+ * @sock: the socket
+ * @level: the socket level or protocol
+ * @optname: the socket option name
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Check the setsockopt() call and if the user is trying to replace the IP
+ * options on a socket and a NetLabel is in place for the socket deny the
+ * access; otherwise allow the access. Returns zero when the access is
+ * allowed, -EACCES when denied, and other negative values on error.
+ *
+ */
+int selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock,
+ int level,
+ int optname)
+{
+ int rc = 0;
+ struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
+
+ if (selinux_netlbl_option(level, optname) &&
+ (sksec->nlbl_state == NLBL_LABELED ||
+ sksec->nlbl_state == NLBL_CONNLABELED)) {
+ netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
+ lock_sock(sk);
+ /* call the netlabel function directly as we want to see the
+ * on-the-wire label that is assigned via the socket's options
+ * and not the cached netlabel/lsm attributes */
+ rc = netlbl_sock_getattr(sk, &secattr);
+ release_sock(sk);
+ if (rc == 0)
+ rc = -EACCES;
+ else if (rc == -ENOMSG)
+ rc = 0;
+ netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
+ }
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_helper - Help label a client-side socket on
+ * connect
+ * @sk: the socket to label
+ * @addr: the destination address
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Attempt to label a connected socket with NetLabel using the given address.
+ * Returns zero values on success, negative values on failure.
+ *
+ */
+static int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_helper(struct sock *sk,
+ struct sockaddr *addr)
+{
+ int rc;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr;
+
+ /* connected sockets are allowed to disconnect when the address family
+ * is set to AF_UNSPEC, if that is what is happening we want to reset
+ * the socket */
+ if (addr->sa_family == AF_UNSPEC) {
+ netlbl_sock_delattr(sk);
+ sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_REQSKB;
+ rc = 0;
+ return rc;
+ }
+ secattr = selinux_netlbl_sock_genattr(sk);
+ if (secattr == NULL) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ return rc;
+ }
+ rc = netlbl_conn_setattr(sk, addr, secattr);
+ if (rc == 0)
+ sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_CONNLABELED;
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked - Label a client-side socket on
+ * connect
+ * @sk: the socket to label
+ * @addr: the destination address
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Attempt to label a connected socket that already has the socket locked
+ * with NetLabel using the given address.
+ * Returns zero values on success, negative values on failure.
+ *
+ */
+int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked(struct sock *sk,
+ struct sockaddr *addr)
+{
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+
+ if (sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_REQSKB &&
+ sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_CONNLABELED)
+ return 0;
+
+ return selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_helper(sk, addr);
+}
+
+/**
+ * selinux_netlbl_socket_connect - Label a client-side socket on connect
+ * @sk: the socket to label
+ * @addr: the destination address
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Attempt to label a connected socket with NetLabel using the given address.
+ * Returns zero values on success, negative values on failure.
+ *
+ */
+int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *addr)
+{
+ int rc;
+
+ lock_sock(sk);
+ rc = selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked(sk, addr);
+ release_sock(sk);
+
+ return rc;
+}
diff --git a/security/selinux/netlink.c b/security/selinux/netlink.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..1760aee712
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/netlink.c
@@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Netlink event notifications for SELinux.
+ *
+ * Author: James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2004 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ */
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/stddef.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/export.h>
+#include <linux/skbuff.h>
+#include <linux/selinux_netlink.h>
+#include <net/net_namespace.h>
+#include <net/netlink.h>
+
+#include "security.h"
+
+static struct sock *selnl __ro_after_init;
+
+static int selnl_msglen(int msgtype)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ switch (msgtype) {
+ case SELNL_MSG_SETENFORCE:
+ ret = sizeof(struct selnl_msg_setenforce);
+ break;
+
+ case SELNL_MSG_POLICYLOAD:
+ ret = sizeof(struct selnl_msg_policyload);
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ BUG();
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static void selnl_add_payload(struct nlmsghdr *nlh, int len, int msgtype, void *data)
+{
+ switch (msgtype) {
+ case SELNL_MSG_SETENFORCE: {
+ struct selnl_msg_setenforce *msg = nlmsg_data(nlh);
+
+ memset(msg, 0, len);
+ msg->val = *((int *)data);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ case SELNL_MSG_POLICYLOAD: {
+ struct selnl_msg_policyload *msg = nlmsg_data(nlh);
+
+ memset(msg, 0, len);
+ msg->seqno = *((u32 *)data);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ default:
+ BUG();
+ }
+}
+
+static void selnl_notify(int msgtype, void *data)
+{
+ int len;
+ sk_buff_data_t tmp;
+ struct sk_buff *skb;
+ struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
+
+ len = selnl_msglen(msgtype);
+
+ skb = nlmsg_new(len, GFP_USER);
+ if (!skb)
+ goto oom;
+
+ tmp = skb->tail;
+ nlh = nlmsg_put(skb, 0, 0, msgtype, len, 0);
+ if (!nlh)
+ goto out_kfree_skb;
+ selnl_add_payload(nlh, len, msgtype, data);
+ nlh->nlmsg_len = skb->tail - tmp;
+ NETLINK_CB(skb).dst_group = SELNLGRP_AVC;
+ netlink_broadcast(selnl, skb, 0, SELNLGRP_AVC, GFP_USER);
+out:
+ return;
+
+out_kfree_skb:
+ kfree_skb(skb);
+oom:
+ pr_err("SELinux: OOM in %s\n", __func__);
+ goto out;
+}
+
+void selnl_notify_setenforce(int val)
+{
+ selnl_notify(SELNL_MSG_SETENFORCE, &val);
+}
+
+void selnl_notify_policyload(u32 seqno)
+{
+ selnl_notify(SELNL_MSG_POLICYLOAD, &seqno);
+}
+
+static int __init selnl_init(void)
+{
+ struct netlink_kernel_cfg cfg = {
+ .groups = SELNLGRP_MAX,
+ .flags = NL_CFG_F_NONROOT_RECV,
+ };
+
+ selnl = netlink_kernel_create(&init_net, NETLINK_SELINUX, &cfg);
+ if (selnl == NULL)
+ panic("SELinux: Cannot create netlink socket.");
+ return 0;
+}
+
+__initcall(selnl_init);
diff --git a/security/selinux/netnode.c b/security/selinux/netnode.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..5c8c77e50a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/netnode.c
@@ -0,0 +1,305 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Network node table
+ *
+ * SELinux must keep a mapping of network nodes to labels/SIDs. This
+ * mapping is maintained as part of the normal policy but a fast cache is
+ * needed to reduce the lookup overhead since most of these queries happen on
+ * a per-packet basis.
+ *
+ * Author: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
+ *
+ * This code is heavily based on the "netif" concept originally developed by
+ * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ * (see security/selinux/netif.c for more information)
+ */
+
+/*
+ * (c) Copyright Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P., 2007
+ */
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
+#include <linux/list.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
+#include <linux/in.h>
+#include <linux/in6.h>
+#include <linux/ip.h>
+#include <linux/ipv6.h>
+#include <net/ip.h>
+#include <net/ipv6.h>
+
+#include "netnode.h"
+#include "objsec.h"
+
+#define SEL_NETNODE_HASH_SIZE 256
+#define SEL_NETNODE_HASH_BKT_LIMIT 16
+
+struct sel_netnode_bkt {
+ unsigned int size;
+ struct list_head list;
+};
+
+struct sel_netnode {
+ struct netnode_security_struct nsec;
+
+ struct list_head list;
+ struct rcu_head rcu;
+};
+
+/* NOTE: we are using a combined hash table for both IPv4 and IPv6, the reason
+ * for this is that I suspect most users will not make heavy use of both
+ * address families at the same time so one table will usually end up wasted,
+ * if this becomes a problem we can always add a hash table for each address
+ * family later */
+
+static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sel_netnode_lock);
+static struct sel_netnode_bkt sel_netnode_hash[SEL_NETNODE_HASH_SIZE];
+
+/**
+ * sel_netnode_hashfn_ipv4 - IPv4 hashing function for the node table
+ * @addr: IPv4 address
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * This is the IPv4 hashing function for the node interface table, it returns
+ * the bucket number for the given IP address.
+ *
+ */
+static unsigned int sel_netnode_hashfn_ipv4(__be32 addr)
+{
+ /* at some point we should determine if the mismatch in byte order
+ * affects the hash function dramatically */
+ return (addr & (SEL_NETNODE_HASH_SIZE - 1));
+}
+
+/**
+ * sel_netnode_hashfn_ipv6 - IPv6 hashing function for the node table
+ * @addr: IPv6 address
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * This is the IPv6 hashing function for the node interface table, it returns
+ * the bucket number for the given IP address.
+ *
+ */
+static unsigned int sel_netnode_hashfn_ipv6(const struct in6_addr *addr)
+{
+ /* just hash the least significant 32 bits to keep things fast (they
+ * are the most likely to be different anyway), we can revisit this
+ * later if needed */
+ return (addr->s6_addr32[3] & (SEL_NETNODE_HASH_SIZE - 1));
+}
+
+/**
+ * sel_netnode_find - Search for a node record
+ * @addr: IP address
+ * @family: address family
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Search the network node table and return the record matching @addr. If an
+ * entry can not be found in the table return NULL.
+ *
+ */
+static struct sel_netnode *sel_netnode_find(const void *addr, u16 family)
+{
+ unsigned int idx;
+ struct sel_netnode *node;
+
+ switch (family) {
+ case PF_INET:
+ idx = sel_netnode_hashfn_ipv4(*(const __be32 *)addr);
+ break;
+ case PF_INET6:
+ idx = sel_netnode_hashfn_ipv6(addr);
+ break;
+ default:
+ BUG();
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ list_for_each_entry_rcu(node, &sel_netnode_hash[idx].list, list)
+ if (node->nsec.family == family)
+ switch (family) {
+ case PF_INET:
+ if (node->nsec.addr.ipv4 == *(const __be32 *)addr)
+ return node;
+ break;
+ case PF_INET6:
+ if (ipv6_addr_equal(&node->nsec.addr.ipv6,
+ addr))
+ return node;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * sel_netnode_insert - Insert a new node into the table
+ * @node: the new node record
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Add a new node record to the network address hash table.
+ *
+ */
+static void sel_netnode_insert(struct sel_netnode *node)
+{
+ unsigned int idx;
+
+ switch (node->nsec.family) {
+ case PF_INET:
+ idx = sel_netnode_hashfn_ipv4(node->nsec.addr.ipv4);
+ break;
+ case PF_INET6:
+ idx = sel_netnode_hashfn_ipv6(&node->nsec.addr.ipv6);
+ break;
+ default:
+ BUG();
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /* we need to impose a limit on the growth of the hash table so check
+ * this bucket to make sure it is within the specified bounds */
+ list_add_rcu(&node->list, &sel_netnode_hash[idx].list);
+ if (sel_netnode_hash[idx].size == SEL_NETNODE_HASH_BKT_LIMIT) {
+ struct sel_netnode *tail;
+ tail = list_entry(
+ rcu_dereference_protected(
+ list_tail_rcu(&sel_netnode_hash[idx].list),
+ lockdep_is_held(&sel_netnode_lock)),
+ struct sel_netnode, list);
+ list_del_rcu(&tail->list);
+ kfree_rcu(tail, rcu);
+ } else
+ sel_netnode_hash[idx].size++;
+}
+
+/**
+ * sel_netnode_sid_slow - Lookup the SID of a network address using the policy
+ * @addr: the IP address
+ * @family: the address family
+ * @sid: node SID
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * This function determines the SID of a network address by querying the
+ * security policy. The result is added to the network address table to
+ * speedup future queries. Returns zero on success, negative values on
+ * failure.
+ *
+ */
+static int sel_netnode_sid_slow(void *addr, u16 family, u32 *sid)
+{
+ int ret;
+ struct sel_netnode *node;
+ struct sel_netnode *new;
+
+ spin_lock_bh(&sel_netnode_lock);
+ node = sel_netnode_find(addr, family);
+ if (node != NULL) {
+ *sid = node->nsec.sid;
+ spin_unlock_bh(&sel_netnode_lock);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ new = kzalloc(sizeof(*new), GFP_ATOMIC);
+ switch (family) {
+ case PF_INET:
+ ret = security_node_sid(PF_INET,
+ addr, sizeof(struct in_addr), sid);
+ if (new)
+ new->nsec.addr.ipv4 = *(__be32 *)addr;
+ break;
+ case PF_INET6:
+ ret = security_node_sid(PF_INET6,
+ addr, sizeof(struct in6_addr), sid);
+ if (new)
+ new->nsec.addr.ipv6 = *(struct in6_addr *)addr;
+ break;
+ default:
+ BUG();
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ }
+ if (ret == 0 && new) {
+ new->nsec.family = family;
+ new->nsec.sid = *sid;
+ sel_netnode_insert(new);
+ } else
+ kfree(new);
+
+ spin_unlock_bh(&sel_netnode_lock);
+ if (unlikely(ret))
+ pr_warn("SELinux: failure in %s(), unable to determine network node label\n",
+ __func__);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * sel_netnode_sid - Lookup the SID of a network address
+ * @addr: the IP address
+ * @family: the address family
+ * @sid: node SID
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * This function determines the SID of a network address using the fastest
+ * method possible. First the address table is queried, but if an entry
+ * can't be found then the policy is queried and the result is added to the
+ * table to speedup future queries. Returns zero on success, negative values
+ * on failure.
+ *
+ */
+int sel_netnode_sid(void *addr, u16 family, u32 *sid)
+{
+ struct sel_netnode *node;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ node = sel_netnode_find(addr, family);
+ if (node != NULL) {
+ *sid = node->nsec.sid;
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return 0;
+ }
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+
+ return sel_netnode_sid_slow(addr, family, sid);
+}
+
+/**
+ * sel_netnode_flush - Flush the entire network address table
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Remove all entries from the network address table.
+ *
+ */
+void sel_netnode_flush(void)
+{
+ unsigned int idx;
+ struct sel_netnode *node, *node_tmp;
+
+ spin_lock_bh(&sel_netnode_lock);
+ for (idx = 0; idx < SEL_NETNODE_HASH_SIZE; idx++) {
+ list_for_each_entry_safe(node, node_tmp,
+ &sel_netnode_hash[idx].list, list) {
+ list_del_rcu(&node->list);
+ kfree_rcu(node, rcu);
+ }
+ sel_netnode_hash[idx].size = 0;
+ }
+ spin_unlock_bh(&sel_netnode_lock);
+}
+
+static __init int sel_netnode_init(void)
+{
+ int iter;
+
+ if (!selinux_enabled_boot)
+ return 0;
+
+ for (iter = 0; iter < SEL_NETNODE_HASH_SIZE; iter++) {
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sel_netnode_hash[iter].list);
+ sel_netnode_hash[iter].size = 0;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+__initcall(sel_netnode_init);
diff --git a/security/selinux/netport.c b/security/selinux/netport.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..2e22ad9c2b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/netport.c
@@ -0,0 +1,238 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Network port table
+ *
+ * SELinux must keep a mapping of network ports to labels/SIDs. This
+ * mapping is maintained as part of the normal policy but a fast cache is
+ * needed to reduce the lookup overhead.
+ *
+ * Author: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
+ *
+ * This code is heavily based on the "netif" concept originally developed by
+ * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ * (see security/selinux/netif.c for more information)
+ */
+
+/*
+ * (c) Copyright Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P., 2008
+ */
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
+#include <linux/list.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
+#include <linux/in.h>
+#include <linux/in6.h>
+#include <linux/ip.h>
+#include <linux/ipv6.h>
+#include <net/ip.h>
+#include <net/ipv6.h>
+
+#include "netport.h"
+#include "objsec.h"
+
+#define SEL_NETPORT_HASH_SIZE 256
+#define SEL_NETPORT_HASH_BKT_LIMIT 16
+
+struct sel_netport_bkt {
+ int size;
+ struct list_head list;
+};
+
+struct sel_netport {
+ struct netport_security_struct psec;
+
+ struct list_head list;
+ struct rcu_head rcu;
+};
+
+/* NOTE: we are using a combined hash table for both IPv4 and IPv6, the reason
+ * for this is that I suspect most users will not make heavy use of both
+ * address families at the same time so one table will usually end up wasted,
+ * if this becomes a problem we can always add a hash table for each address
+ * family later */
+
+static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sel_netport_lock);
+static struct sel_netport_bkt sel_netport_hash[SEL_NETPORT_HASH_SIZE];
+
+/**
+ * sel_netport_hashfn - Hashing function for the port table
+ * @pnum: port number
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * This is the hashing function for the port table, it returns the bucket
+ * number for the given port.
+ *
+ */
+static unsigned int sel_netport_hashfn(u16 pnum)
+{
+ return (pnum & (SEL_NETPORT_HASH_SIZE - 1));
+}
+
+/**
+ * sel_netport_find - Search for a port record
+ * @protocol: protocol
+ * @pnum: port
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Search the network port table and return the matching record. If an entry
+ * can not be found in the table return NULL.
+ *
+ */
+static struct sel_netport *sel_netport_find(u8 protocol, u16 pnum)
+{
+ unsigned int idx;
+ struct sel_netport *port;
+
+ idx = sel_netport_hashfn(pnum);
+ list_for_each_entry_rcu(port, &sel_netport_hash[idx].list, list)
+ if (port->psec.port == pnum && port->psec.protocol == protocol)
+ return port;
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * sel_netport_insert - Insert a new port into the table
+ * @port: the new port record
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Add a new port record to the network address hash table.
+ *
+ */
+static void sel_netport_insert(struct sel_netport *port)
+{
+ unsigned int idx;
+
+ /* we need to impose a limit on the growth of the hash table so check
+ * this bucket to make sure it is within the specified bounds */
+ idx = sel_netport_hashfn(port->psec.port);
+ list_add_rcu(&port->list, &sel_netport_hash[idx].list);
+ if (sel_netport_hash[idx].size == SEL_NETPORT_HASH_BKT_LIMIT) {
+ struct sel_netport *tail;
+ tail = list_entry(
+ rcu_dereference_protected(
+ list_tail_rcu(&sel_netport_hash[idx].list),
+ lockdep_is_held(&sel_netport_lock)),
+ struct sel_netport, list);
+ list_del_rcu(&tail->list);
+ kfree_rcu(tail, rcu);
+ } else
+ sel_netport_hash[idx].size++;
+}
+
+/**
+ * sel_netport_sid_slow - Lookup the SID of a network address using the policy
+ * @protocol: protocol
+ * @pnum: port
+ * @sid: port SID
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * This function determines the SID of a network port by querying the security
+ * policy. The result is added to the network port table to speedup future
+ * queries. Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
+ *
+ */
+static int sel_netport_sid_slow(u8 protocol, u16 pnum, u32 *sid)
+{
+ int ret;
+ struct sel_netport *port;
+ struct sel_netport *new;
+
+ spin_lock_bh(&sel_netport_lock);
+ port = sel_netport_find(protocol, pnum);
+ if (port != NULL) {
+ *sid = port->psec.sid;
+ spin_unlock_bh(&sel_netport_lock);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ ret = security_port_sid(protocol, pnum, sid);
+ if (ret != 0)
+ goto out;
+ new = kzalloc(sizeof(*new), GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (new) {
+ new->psec.port = pnum;
+ new->psec.protocol = protocol;
+ new->psec.sid = *sid;
+ sel_netport_insert(new);
+ }
+
+out:
+ spin_unlock_bh(&sel_netport_lock);
+ if (unlikely(ret))
+ pr_warn("SELinux: failure in %s(), unable to determine network port label\n",
+ __func__);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * sel_netport_sid - Lookup the SID of a network port
+ * @protocol: protocol
+ * @pnum: port
+ * @sid: port SID
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * This function determines the SID of a network port using the fastest method
+ * possible. First the port table is queried, but if an entry can't be found
+ * then the policy is queried and the result is added to the table to speedup
+ * future queries. Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
+ *
+ */
+int sel_netport_sid(u8 protocol, u16 pnum, u32 *sid)
+{
+ struct sel_netport *port;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ port = sel_netport_find(protocol, pnum);
+ if (port != NULL) {
+ *sid = port->psec.sid;
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return 0;
+ }
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+
+ return sel_netport_sid_slow(protocol, pnum, sid);
+}
+
+/**
+ * sel_netport_flush - Flush the entire network port table
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Remove all entries from the network address table.
+ *
+ */
+void sel_netport_flush(void)
+{
+ unsigned int idx;
+ struct sel_netport *port, *port_tmp;
+
+ spin_lock_bh(&sel_netport_lock);
+ for (idx = 0; idx < SEL_NETPORT_HASH_SIZE; idx++) {
+ list_for_each_entry_safe(port, port_tmp,
+ &sel_netport_hash[idx].list, list) {
+ list_del_rcu(&port->list);
+ kfree_rcu(port, rcu);
+ }
+ sel_netport_hash[idx].size = 0;
+ }
+ spin_unlock_bh(&sel_netport_lock);
+}
+
+static __init int sel_netport_init(void)
+{
+ int iter;
+
+ if (!selinux_enabled_boot)
+ return 0;
+
+ for (iter = 0; iter < SEL_NETPORT_HASH_SIZE; iter++) {
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sel_netport_hash[iter].list);
+ sel_netport_hash[iter].size = 0;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+__initcall(sel_netport_init);
diff --git a/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c b/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..8ff670cf1e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c
@@ -0,0 +1,219 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Netlink message type permission tables, for user generated messages.
+ *
+ * Author: James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2004 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ */
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/netlink.h>
+#include <linux/rtnetlink.h>
+#include <linux/if.h>
+#include <linux/inet_diag.h>
+#include <linux/xfrm.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h>
+#include <linux/sock_diag.h>
+
+#include "flask.h"
+#include "av_permissions.h"
+#include "security.h"
+
+struct nlmsg_perm {
+ u16 nlmsg_type;
+ u32 perm;
+};
+
+static const struct nlmsg_perm nlmsg_route_perms[] = {
+ { RTM_NEWLINK, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+ { RTM_DELLINK, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+ { RTM_GETLINK, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
+ { RTM_SETLINK, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+ { RTM_NEWADDR, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+ { RTM_DELADDR, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+ { RTM_GETADDR, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
+ { RTM_NEWROUTE, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+ { RTM_DELROUTE, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+ { RTM_GETROUTE, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
+ { RTM_NEWNEIGH, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+ { RTM_DELNEIGH, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+ { RTM_GETNEIGH, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
+ { RTM_NEWRULE, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+ { RTM_DELRULE, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+ { RTM_GETRULE, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
+ { RTM_NEWQDISC, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+ { RTM_DELQDISC, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+ { RTM_GETQDISC, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
+ { RTM_NEWTCLASS, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+ { RTM_DELTCLASS, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+ { RTM_GETTCLASS, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
+ { RTM_NEWTFILTER, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+ { RTM_DELTFILTER, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+ { RTM_GETTFILTER, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
+ { RTM_NEWACTION, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+ { RTM_DELACTION, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+ { RTM_GETACTION, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
+ { RTM_NEWPREFIX, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+ { RTM_GETMULTICAST, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
+ { RTM_GETANYCAST, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
+ { RTM_GETNEIGHTBL, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
+ { RTM_SETNEIGHTBL, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+ { RTM_NEWADDRLABEL, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+ { RTM_DELADDRLABEL, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+ { RTM_GETADDRLABEL, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
+ { RTM_GETDCB, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
+ { RTM_SETDCB, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+ { RTM_NEWNETCONF, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+ { RTM_DELNETCONF, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+ { RTM_GETNETCONF, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
+ { RTM_NEWMDB, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+ { RTM_DELMDB, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+ { RTM_GETMDB, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
+ { RTM_NEWNSID, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+ { RTM_DELNSID, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
+ { RTM_GETNSID, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
+ { RTM_NEWSTATS, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
+ { RTM_GETSTATS, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
+ { RTM_SETSTATS, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+ { RTM_NEWCACHEREPORT, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
+ { RTM_NEWCHAIN, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+ { RTM_DELCHAIN, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+ { RTM_GETCHAIN, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
+ { RTM_NEWNEXTHOP, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+ { RTM_DELNEXTHOP, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+ { RTM_GETNEXTHOP, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
+ { RTM_NEWLINKPROP, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+ { RTM_DELLINKPROP, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+ { RTM_NEWVLAN, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+ { RTM_DELVLAN, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+ { RTM_GETVLAN, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
+ { RTM_NEWNEXTHOPBUCKET, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+ { RTM_DELNEXTHOPBUCKET, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+ { RTM_GETNEXTHOPBUCKET, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
+ { RTM_NEWTUNNEL, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+ { RTM_DELTUNNEL, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+ { RTM_GETTUNNEL, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
+};
+
+static const struct nlmsg_perm nlmsg_tcpdiag_perms[] = {
+ { TCPDIAG_GETSOCK, NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
+ { DCCPDIAG_GETSOCK, NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
+ { SOCK_DIAG_BY_FAMILY, NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
+ { SOCK_DESTROY, NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+};
+
+static const struct nlmsg_perm nlmsg_xfrm_perms[] = {
+ { XFRM_MSG_NEWSA, NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+ { XFRM_MSG_DELSA, NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+ { XFRM_MSG_GETSA, NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
+ { XFRM_MSG_NEWPOLICY, NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+ { XFRM_MSG_DELPOLICY, NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+ { XFRM_MSG_GETPOLICY, NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
+ { XFRM_MSG_ALLOCSPI, NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+ { XFRM_MSG_ACQUIRE, NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+ { XFRM_MSG_EXPIRE, NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+ { XFRM_MSG_UPDPOLICY, NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+ { XFRM_MSG_UPDSA, NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+ { XFRM_MSG_POLEXPIRE, NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+ { XFRM_MSG_FLUSHSA, NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+ { XFRM_MSG_FLUSHPOLICY, NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+ { XFRM_MSG_NEWAE, NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+ { XFRM_MSG_GETAE, NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
+ { XFRM_MSG_REPORT, NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
+ { XFRM_MSG_MIGRATE, NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+ { XFRM_MSG_NEWSADINFO, NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
+ { XFRM_MSG_GETSADINFO, NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
+ { XFRM_MSG_NEWSPDINFO, NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+ { XFRM_MSG_GETSPDINFO, NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
+ { XFRM_MSG_MAPPING, NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
+ { XFRM_MSG_SETDEFAULT, NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+ { XFRM_MSG_GETDEFAULT, NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
+};
+
+static const struct nlmsg_perm nlmsg_audit_perms[] = {
+ { AUDIT_GET, NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
+ { AUDIT_SET, NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+ { AUDIT_LIST, NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_READPRIV },
+ { AUDIT_ADD, NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+ { AUDIT_DEL, NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+ { AUDIT_LIST_RULES, NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_READPRIV },
+ { AUDIT_ADD_RULE, NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+ { AUDIT_DEL_RULE, NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+ { AUDIT_USER, NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_RELAY },
+ { AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO, NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
+ { AUDIT_TRIM, NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+ { AUDIT_MAKE_EQUIV, NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+ { AUDIT_TTY_GET, NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
+ { AUDIT_TTY_SET, NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_TTY_AUDIT },
+ { AUDIT_GET_FEATURE, NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
+ { AUDIT_SET_FEATURE, NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+};
+
+
+static int nlmsg_perm(u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm, const struct nlmsg_perm *tab, size_t tabsize)
+{
+ unsigned int i;
+ int err = -EINVAL;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < tabsize/sizeof(struct nlmsg_perm); i++)
+ if (nlmsg_type == tab[i].nlmsg_type) {
+ *perm = tab[i].perm;
+ err = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return err;
+}
+
+int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm)
+{
+ int err = 0;
+
+ switch (sclass) {
+ case SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET:
+ /* RTM_MAX always points to RTM_SETxxxx, ie RTM_NEWxxx + 3.
+ * If the BUILD_BUG_ON() below fails you must update the
+ * structures at the top of this file with the new mappings
+ * before updating the BUILD_BUG_ON() macro!
+ */
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(RTM_MAX != (RTM_NEWTUNNEL + 3));
+ err = nlmsg_perm(nlmsg_type, perm, nlmsg_route_perms,
+ sizeof(nlmsg_route_perms));
+ break;
+
+ case SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET:
+ err = nlmsg_perm(nlmsg_type, perm, nlmsg_tcpdiag_perms,
+ sizeof(nlmsg_tcpdiag_perms));
+ break;
+
+ case SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET:
+ /* If the BUILD_BUG_ON() below fails you must update the
+ * structures at the top of this file with the new mappings
+ * before updating the BUILD_BUG_ON() macro!
+ */
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(XFRM_MSG_MAX != XFRM_MSG_GETDEFAULT);
+ err = nlmsg_perm(nlmsg_type, perm, nlmsg_xfrm_perms,
+ sizeof(nlmsg_xfrm_perms));
+ break;
+
+ case SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET:
+ if ((nlmsg_type >= AUDIT_FIRST_USER_MSG &&
+ nlmsg_type <= AUDIT_LAST_USER_MSG) ||
+ (nlmsg_type >= AUDIT_FIRST_USER_MSG2 &&
+ nlmsg_type <= AUDIT_LAST_USER_MSG2)) {
+ *perm = NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_RELAY;
+ } else {
+ err = nlmsg_perm(nlmsg_type, perm, nlmsg_audit_perms,
+ sizeof(nlmsg_audit_perms));
+ }
+ break;
+
+ /* No messaging from userspace, or class unknown/unhandled */
+ default:
+ err = -ENOENT;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return err;
+}
diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..6fa6402632
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
@@ -0,0 +1,2177 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/* Updated: Karl MacMillan <kmacmillan@tresys.com>
+ *
+ * Added conditional policy language extensions
+ *
+ * Updated: Hewlett-Packard <paul@paul-moore.com>
+ *
+ * Added support for the policy capability bitmap
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2007 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
+ * Copyright (C) 2003 - 2004 Tresys Technology, LLC
+ * Copyright (C) 2004 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ */
+
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/pagemap.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/fs_context.h>
+#include <linux/mount.h>
+#include <linux/mutex.h>
+#include <linux/namei.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/major.h>
+#include <linux/seq_file.h>
+#include <linux/percpu.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h>
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/kobject.h>
+#include <linux/ctype.h>
+
+/* selinuxfs pseudo filesystem for exporting the security policy API.
+ Based on the proc code and the fs/nfsd/nfsctl.c code. */
+
+#include "flask.h"
+#include "avc.h"
+#include "avc_ss.h"
+#include "security.h"
+#include "objsec.h"
+#include "conditional.h"
+#include "ima.h"
+
+enum sel_inos {
+ SEL_ROOT_INO = 2,
+ SEL_LOAD, /* load policy */
+ SEL_ENFORCE, /* get or set enforcing status */
+ SEL_CONTEXT, /* validate context */
+ SEL_ACCESS, /* compute access decision */
+ SEL_CREATE, /* compute create labeling decision */
+ SEL_RELABEL, /* compute relabeling decision */
+ SEL_USER, /* compute reachable user contexts */
+ SEL_POLICYVERS, /* return policy version for this kernel */
+ SEL_COMMIT_BOOLS, /* commit new boolean values */
+ SEL_MLS, /* return if MLS policy is enabled */
+ SEL_DISABLE, /* disable SELinux until next reboot */
+ SEL_MEMBER, /* compute polyinstantiation membership decision */
+ SEL_CHECKREQPROT, /* check requested protection, not kernel-applied one */
+ SEL_COMPAT_NET, /* whether to use old compat network packet controls */
+ SEL_REJECT_UNKNOWN, /* export unknown reject handling to userspace */
+ SEL_DENY_UNKNOWN, /* export unknown deny handling to userspace */
+ SEL_STATUS, /* export current status using mmap() */
+ SEL_POLICY, /* allow userspace to read the in kernel policy */
+ SEL_VALIDATE_TRANS, /* compute validatetrans decision */
+ SEL_INO_NEXT, /* The next inode number to use */
+};
+
+struct selinux_fs_info {
+ struct dentry *bool_dir;
+ unsigned int bool_num;
+ char **bool_pending_names;
+ int *bool_pending_values;
+ struct dentry *class_dir;
+ unsigned long last_class_ino;
+ bool policy_opened;
+ struct dentry *policycap_dir;
+ unsigned long last_ino;
+ struct super_block *sb;
+};
+
+static int selinux_fs_info_create(struct super_block *sb)
+{
+ struct selinux_fs_info *fsi;
+
+ fsi = kzalloc(sizeof(*fsi), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!fsi)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ fsi->last_ino = SEL_INO_NEXT - 1;
+ fsi->sb = sb;
+ sb->s_fs_info = fsi;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void selinux_fs_info_free(struct super_block *sb)
+{
+ struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = sb->s_fs_info;
+ unsigned int i;
+
+ if (fsi) {
+ for (i = 0; i < fsi->bool_num; i++)
+ kfree(fsi->bool_pending_names[i]);
+ kfree(fsi->bool_pending_names);
+ kfree(fsi->bool_pending_values);
+ }
+ kfree(sb->s_fs_info);
+ sb->s_fs_info = NULL;
+}
+
+#define SEL_INITCON_INO_OFFSET 0x01000000
+#define SEL_BOOL_INO_OFFSET 0x02000000
+#define SEL_CLASS_INO_OFFSET 0x04000000
+#define SEL_POLICYCAP_INO_OFFSET 0x08000000
+#define SEL_INO_MASK 0x00ffffff
+
+#define BOOL_DIR_NAME "booleans"
+#define CLASS_DIR_NAME "class"
+#define POLICYCAP_DIR_NAME "policy_capabilities"
+
+#define TMPBUFLEN 12
+static ssize_t sel_read_enforce(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ char tmpbuf[TMPBUFLEN];
+ ssize_t length;
+
+ length = scnprintf(tmpbuf, TMPBUFLEN, "%d",
+ enforcing_enabled());
+ return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, tmpbuf, length);
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
+static ssize_t sel_write_enforce(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+
+{
+ char *page = NULL;
+ ssize_t length;
+ int scan_value;
+ bool old_value, new_value;
+
+ if (count >= PAGE_SIZE)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ /* No partial writes. */
+ if (*ppos != 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ page = memdup_user_nul(buf, count);
+ if (IS_ERR(page))
+ return PTR_ERR(page);
+
+ length = -EINVAL;
+ if (sscanf(page, "%d", &scan_value) != 1)
+ goto out;
+
+ new_value = !!scan_value;
+
+ old_value = enforcing_enabled();
+ if (new_value != old_value) {
+ length = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
+ SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__SETENFORCE,
+ NULL);
+ if (length)
+ goto out;
+ audit_log(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_MAC_STATUS,
+ "enforcing=%d old_enforcing=%d auid=%u ses=%u"
+ " enabled=1 old-enabled=1 lsm=selinux res=1",
+ new_value, old_value,
+ from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current)),
+ audit_get_sessionid(current));
+ enforcing_set(new_value);
+ if (new_value)
+ avc_ss_reset(0);
+ selnl_notify_setenforce(new_value);
+ selinux_status_update_setenforce(new_value);
+ if (!new_value)
+ call_blocking_lsm_notifier(LSM_POLICY_CHANGE, NULL);
+
+ selinux_ima_measure_state();
+ }
+ length = count;
+out:
+ kfree(page);
+ return length;
+}
+#else
+#define sel_write_enforce NULL
+#endif
+
+static const struct file_operations sel_enforce_ops = {
+ .read = sel_read_enforce,
+ .write = sel_write_enforce,
+ .llseek = generic_file_llseek,
+};
+
+static ssize_t sel_read_handle_unknown(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ char tmpbuf[TMPBUFLEN];
+ ssize_t length;
+ ino_t ino = file_inode(filp)->i_ino;
+ int handle_unknown = (ino == SEL_REJECT_UNKNOWN) ?
+ security_get_reject_unknown() :
+ !security_get_allow_unknown();
+
+ length = scnprintf(tmpbuf, TMPBUFLEN, "%d", handle_unknown);
+ return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, tmpbuf, length);
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations sel_handle_unknown_ops = {
+ .read = sel_read_handle_unknown,
+ .llseek = generic_file_llseek,
+};
+
+static int sel_open_handle_status(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
+{
+ struct page *status = selinux_kernel_status_page();
+
+ if (!status)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ filp->private_data = status;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static ssize_t sel_read_handle_status(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ struct page *status = filp->private_data;
+
+ BUG_ON(!status);
+
+ return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos,
+ page_address(status),
+ sizeof(struct selinux_kernel_status));
+}
+
+static int sel_mmap_handle_status(struct file *filp,
+ struct vm_area_struct *vma)
+{
+ struct page *status = filp->private_data;
+ unsigned long size = vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start;
+
+ BUG_ON(!status);
+
+ /* only allows one page from the head */
+ if (vma->vm_pgoff > 0 || size != PAGE_SIZE)
+ return -EIO;
+ /* disallow writable mapping */
+ if (vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE)
+ return -EPERM;
+ /* disallow mprotect() turns it into writable */
+ vm_flags_clear(vma, VM_MAYWRITE);
+
+ return remap_pfn_range(vma, vma->vm_start,
+ page_to_pfn(status),
+ size, vma->vm_page_prot);
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations sel_handle_status_ops = {
+ .open = sel_open_handle_status,
+ .read = sel_read_handle_status,
+ .mmap = sel_mmap_handle_status,
+ .llseek = generic_file_llseek,
+};
+
+static ssize_t sel_write_disable(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+
+{
+ char *page;
+ ssize_t length;
+ int new_value;
+
+ if (count >= PAGE_SIZE)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ /* No partial writes. */
+ if (*ppos != 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ page = memdup_user_nul(buf, count);
+ if (IS_ERR(page))
+ return PTR_ERR(page);
+
+ if (sscanf(page, "%d", &new_value) != 1) {
+ length = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ length = count;
+
+ if (new_value) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux-kernel/wiki/DEPRECATE-runtime-disable\n");
+ pr_err("SELinux: Runtime disable is not supported, use selinux=0 on the kernel cmdline.\n");
+ }
+
+out:
+ kfree(page);
+ return length;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations sel_disable_ops = {
+ .write = sel_write_disable,
+ .llseek = generic_file_llseek,
+};
+
+static ssize_t sel_read_policyvers(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ char tmpbuf[TMPBUFLEN];
+ ssize_t length;
+
+ length = scnprintf(tmpbuf, TMPBUFLEN, "%u", POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX);
+ return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, tmpbuf, length);
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations sel_policyvers_ops = {
+ .read = sel_read_policyvers,
+ .llseek = generic_file_llseek,
+};
+
+/* declaration for sel_write_load */
+static int sel_make_bools(struct selinux_policy *newpolicy, struct dentry *bool_dir,
+ unsigned int *bool_num, char ***bool_pending_names,
+ int **bool_pending_values);
+static int sel_make_classes(struct selinux_policy *newpolicy,
+ struct dentry *class_dir,
+ unsigned long *last_class_ino);
+
+/* declaration for sel_make_class_dirs */
+static struct dentry *sel_make_dir(struct dentry *dir, const char *name,
+ unsigned long *ino);
+
+/* declaration for sel_make_policy_nodes */
+static struct dentry *sel_make_disconnected_dir(struct super_block *sb,
+ unsigned long *ino);
+
+/* declaration for sel_make_policy_nodes */
+static void sel_remove_entries(struct dentry *de);
+
+static ssize_t sel_read_mls(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ char tmpbuf[TMPBUFLEN];
+ ssize_t length;
+
+ length = scnprintf(tmpbuf, TMPBUFLEN, "%d",
+ security_mls_enabled());
+ return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, tmpbuf, length);
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations sel_mls_ops = {
+ .read = sel_read_mls,
+ .llseek = generic_file_llseek,
+};
+
+struct policy_load_memory {
+ size_t len;
+ void *data;
+};
+
+static int sel_open_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
+{
+ struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = inode->i_sb->s_fs_info;
+ struct policy_load_memory *plm = NULL;
+ int rc;
+
+ BUG_ON(filp->private_data);
+
+ mutex_lock(&selinux_state.policy_mutex);
+
+ rc = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
+ SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__READ_POLICY, NULL);
+ if (rc)
+ goto err;
+
+ rc = -EBUSY;
+ if (fsi->policy_opened)
+ goto err;
+
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ plm = kzalloc(sizeof(*plm), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!plm)
+ goto err;
+
+ rc = security_read_policy(&plm->data, &plm->len);
+ if (rc)
+ goto err;
+
+ if ((size_t)i_size_read(inode) != plm->len) {
+ inode_lock(inode);
+ i_size_write(inode, plm->len);
+ inode_unlock(inode);
+ }
+
+ fsi->policy_opened = 1;
+
+ filp->private_data = plm;
+
+ mutex_unlock(&selinux_state.policy_mutex);
+
+ return 0;
+err:
+ mutex_unlock(&selinux_state.policy_mutex);
+
+ if (plm)
+ vfree(plm->data);
+ kfree(plm);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static int sel_release_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
+{
+ struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = inode->i_sb->s_fs_info;
+ struct policy_load_memory *plm = filp->private_data;
+
+ BUG_ON(!plm);
+
+ fsi->policy_opened = 0;
+
+ vfree(plm->data);
+ kfree(plm);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static ssize_t sel_read_policy(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ struct policy_load_memory *plm = filp->private_data;
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
+ SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__READ_POLICY, NULL);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, plm->data, plm->len);
+}
+
+static vm_fault_t sel_mmap_policy_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf)
+{
+ struct policy_load_memory *plm = vmf->vma->vm_file->private_data;
+ unsigned long offset;
+ struct page *page;
+
+ if (vmf->flags & (FAULT_FLAG_MKWRITE | FAULT_FLAG_WRITE))
+ return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS;
+
+ offset = vmf->pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT;
+ if (offset >= roundup(plm->len, PAGE_SIZE))
+ return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS;
+
+ page = vmalloc_to_page(plm->data + offset);
+ get_page(page);
+
+ vmf->page = page;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static const struct vm_operations_struct sel_mmap_policy_ops = {
+ .fault = sel_mmap_policy_fault,
+ .page_mkwrite = sel_mmap_policy_fault,
+};
+
+static int sel_mmap_policy(struct file *filp, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
+{
+ if (vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED) {
+ /* do not allow mprotect to make mapping writable */
+ vm_flags_clear(vma, VM_MAYWRITE);
+
+ if (vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE)
+ return -EACCES;
+ }
+
+ vm_flags_set(vma, VM_DONTEXPAND | VM_DONTDUMP);
+ vma->vm_ops = &sel_mmap_policy_ops;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations sel_policy_ops = {
+ .open = sel_open_policy,
+ .read = sel_read_policy,
+ .mmap = sel_mmap_policy,
+ .release = sel_release_policy,
+ .llseek = generic_file_llseek,
+};
+
+static void sel_remove_old_bool_data(unsigned int bool_num, char **bool_names,
+ int *bool_values)
+{
+ u32 i;
+
+ /* bool_dir cleanup */
+ for (i = 0; i < bool_num; i++)
+ kfree(bool_names[i]);
+ kfree(bool_names);
+ kfree(bool_values);
+}
+
+static int sel_make_policy_nodes(struct selinux_fs_info *fsi,
+ struct selinux_policy *newpolicy)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ struct dentry *tmp_parent, *tmp_bool_dir, *tmp_class_dir, *old_dentry;
+ unsigned int tmp_bool_num, old_bool_num;
+ char **tmp_bool_names, **old_bool_names;
+ int *tmp_bool_values, *old_bool_values;
+ unsigned long tmp_ino = fsi->last_ino; /* Don't increment last_ino in this function */
+
+ tmp_parent = sel_make_disconnected_dir(fsi->sb, &tmp_ino);
+ if (IS_ERR(tmp_parent))
+ return PTR_ERR(tmp_parent);
+
+ tmp_ino = fsi->bool_dir->d_inode->i_ino - 1; /* sel_make_dir will increment and set */
+ tmp_bool_dir = sel_make_dir(tmp_parent, BOOL_DIR_NAME, &tmp_ino);
+ if (IS_ERR(tmp_bool_dir)) {
+ ret = PTR_ERR(tmp_bool_dir);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ tmp_ino = fsi->class_dir->d_inode->i_ino - 1; /* sel_make_dir will increment and set */
+ tmp_class_dir = sel_make_dir(tmp_parent, CLASS_DIR_NAME, &tmp_ino);
+ if (IS_ERR(tmp_class_dir)) {
+ ret = PTR_ERR(tmp_class_dir);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ ret = sel_make_bools(newpolicy, tmp_bool_dir, &tmp_bool_num,
+ &tmp_bool_names, &tmp_bool_values);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+
+ ret = sel_make_classes(newpolicy, tmp_class_dir,
+ &fsi->last_class_ino);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* booleans */
+ old_dentry = fsi->bool_dir;
+ lock_rename(tmp_bool_dir, old_dentry);
+ d_exchange(tmp_bool_dir, fsi->bool_dir);
+
+ old_bool_num = fsi->bool_num;
+ old_bool_names = fsi->bool_pending_names;
+ old_bool_values = fsi->bool_pending_values;
+
+ fsi->bool_num = tmp_bool_num;
+ fsi->bool_pending_names = tmp_bool_names;
+ fsi->bool_pending_values = tmp_bool_values;
+
+ sel_remove_old_bool_data(old_bool_num, old_bool_names, old_bool_values);
+
+ fsi->bool_dir = tmp_bool_dir;
+ unlock_rename(tmp_bool_dir, old_dentry);
+
+ /* classes */
+ old_dentry = fsi->class_dir;
+ lock_rename(tmp_class_dir, old_dentry);
+ d_exchange(tmp_class_dir, fsi->class_dir);
+ fsi->class_dir = tmp_class_dir;
+ unlock_rename(tmp_class_dir, old_dentry);
+
+out:
+ /* Since the other temporary dirs are children of tmp_parent
+ * this will handle all the cleanup in the case of a failure before
+ * the swapover
+ */
+ sel_remove_entries(tmp_parent);
+ dput(tmp_parent); /* d_genocide() only handles the children */
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static ssize_t sel_write_load(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+
+{
+ struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = file_inode(file)->i_sb->s_fs_info;
+ struct selinux_load_state load_state;
+ ssize_t length;
+ void *data = NULL;
+
+ mutex_lock(&selinux_state.policy_mutex);
+
+ length = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
+ SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__LOAD_POLICY, NULL);
+ if (length)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* No partial writes. */
+ length = -EINVAL;
+ if (*ppos != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ length = -ENOMEM;
+ data = vmalloc(count);
+ if (!data)
+ goto out;
+
+ length = -EFAULT;
+ if (copy_from_user(data, buf, count) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ length = security_load_policy(data, count, &load_state);
+ if (length) {
+ pr_warn_ratelimited("SELinux: failed to load policy\n");
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ length = sel_make_policy_nodes(fsi, load_state.policy);
+ if (length) {
+ pr_warn_ratelimited("SELinux: failed to initialize selinuxfs\n");
+ selinux_policy_cancel(&load_state);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ selinux_policy_commit(&load_state);
+
+ length = count;
+
+ audit_log(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_MAC_POLICY_LOAD,
+ "auid=%u ses=%u lsm=selinux res=1",
+ from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current)),
+ audit_get_sessionid(current));
+out:
+ mutex_unlock(&selinux_state.policy_mutex);
+ vfree(data);
+ return length;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations sel_load_ops = {
+ .write = sel_write_load,
+ .llseek = generic_file_llseek,
+};
+
+static ssize_t sel_write_context(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
+{
+ char *canon = NULL;
+ u32 sid, len;
+ ssize_t length;
+
+ length = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
+ SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__CHECK_CONTEXT, NULL);
+ if (length)
+ goto out;
+
+ length = security_context_to_sid(buf, size, &sid, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (length)
+ goto out;
+
+ length = security_sid_to_context(sid, &canon, &len);
+ if (length)
+ goto out;
+
+ length = -ERANGE;
+ if (len > SIMPLE_TRANSACTION_LIMIT) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: %s: context size (%u) exceeds "
+ "payload max\n", __func__, len);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(buf, canon, len);
+ length = len;
+out:
+ kfree(canon);
+ return length;
+}
+
+static ssize_t sel_read_checkreqprot(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ char tmpbuf[TMPBUFLEN];
+ ssize_t length;
+
+ length = scnprintf(tmpbuf, TMPBUFLEN, "%u",
+ checkreqprot_get());
+ return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, tmpbuf, length);
+}
+
+static ssize_t sel_write_checkreqprot(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ char *page;
+ ssize_t length;
+ unsigned int new_value;
+
+ length = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
+ SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__SETCHECKREQPROT,
+ NULL);
+ if (length)
+ return length;
+
+ if (count >= PAGE_SIZE)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ /* No partial writes. */
+ if (*ppos != 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ page = memdup_user_nul(buf, count);
+ if (IS_ERR(page))
+ return PTR_ERR(page);
+
+ if (sscanf(page, "%u", &new_value) != 1) {
+ length = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ length = count;
+
+ if (new_value) {
+ char comm[sizeof(current->comm)];
+
+ memcpy(comm, current->comm, sizeof(comm));
+ pr_err("SELinux: %s (%d) set checkreqprot to 1. This is no longer supported.\n",
+ comm, current->pid);
+ }
+
+ selinux_ima_measure_state();
+
+out:
+ kfree(page);
+ return length;
+}
+static const struct file_operations sel_checkreqprot_ops = {
+ .read = sel_read_checkreqprot,
+ .write = sel_write_checkreqprot,
+ .llseek = generic_file_llseek,
+};
+
+static ssize_t sel_write_validatetrans(struct file *file,
+ const char __user *buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ char *oldcon = NULL, *newcon = NULL, *taskcon = NULL;
+ char *req = NULL;
+ u32 osid, nsid, tsid;
+ u16 tclass;
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
+ SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__VALIDATE_TRANS, NULL);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ if (count >= PAGE_SIZE)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* No partial writes. */
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ if (*ppos != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ req = memdup_user_nul(buf, count);
+ if (IS_ERR(req)) {
+ rc = PTR_ERR(req);
+ req = NULL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ oldcon = kzalloc(count + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!oldcon)
+ goto out;
+
+ newcon = kzalloc(count + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!newcon)
+ goto out;
+
+ taskcon = kzalloc(count + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!taskcon)
+ goto out;
+
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ if (sscanf(req, "%s %s %hu %s", oldcon, newcon, &tclass, taskcon) != 4)
+ goto out;
+
+ rc = security_context_str_to_sid(oldcon, &osid, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ rc = security_context_str_to_sid(newcon, &nsid, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ rc = security_context_str_to_sid(taskcon, &tsid, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ rc = security_validate_transition_user(osid, nsid, tsid, tclass);
+ if (!rc)
+ rc = count;
+out:
+ kfree(req);
+ kfree(oldcon);
+ kfree(newcon);
+ kfree(taskcon);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations sel_transition_ops = {
+ .write = sel_write_validatetrans,
+ .llseek = generic_file_llseek,
+};
+
+/*
+ * Remaining nodes use transaction based IO methods like nfsd/nfsctl.c
+ */
+static ssize_t sel_write_access(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size);
+static ssize_t sel_write_create(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size);
+static ssize_t sel_write_relabel(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size);
+static ssize_t sel_write_user(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size);
+static ssize_t sel_write_member(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size);
+
+static ssize_t (*const write_op[])(struct file *, char *, size_t) = {
+ [SEL_ACCESS] = sel_write_access,
+ [SEL_CREATE] = sel_write_create,
+ [SEL_RELABEL] = sel_write_relabel,
+ [SEL_USER] = sel_write_user,
+ [SEL_MEMBER] = sel_write_member,
+ [SEL_CONTEXT] = sel_write_context,
+};
+
+static ssize_t selinux_transaction_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, size_t size, loff_t *pos)
+{
+ ino_t ino = file_inode(file)->i_ino;
+ char *data;
+ ssize_t rv;
+
+ if (ino >= ARRAY_SIZE(write_op) || !write_op[ino])
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ data = simple_transaction_get(file, buf, size);
+ if (IS_ERR(data))
+ return PTR_ERR(data);
+
+ rv = write_op[ino](file, data, size);
+ if (rv > 0) {
+ simple_transaction_set(file, rv);
+ rv = size;
+ }
+ return rv;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations transaction_ops = {
+ .write = selinux_transaction_write,
+ .read = simple_transaction_read,
+ .release = simple_transaction_release,
+ .llseek = generic_file_llseek,
+};
+
+/*
+ * payload - write methods
+ * If the method has a response, the response should be put in buf,
+ * and the length returned. Otherwise return 0 or and -error.
+ */
+
+static ssize_t sel_write_access(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
+{
+ char *scon = NULL, *tcon = NULL;
+ u32 ssid, tsid;
+ u16 tclass;
+ struct av_decision avd;
+ ssize_t length;
+
+ length = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
+ SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__COMPUTE_AV, NULL);
+ if (length)
+ goto out;
+
+ length = -ENOMEM;
+ scon = kzalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!scon)
+ goto out;
+
+ length = -ENOMEM;
+ tcon = kzalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!tcon)
+ goto out;
+
+ length = -EINVAL;
+ if (sscanf(buf, "%s %s %hu", scon, tcon, &tclass) != 3)
+ goto out;
+
+ length = security_context_str_to_sid(scon, &ssid, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (length)
+ goto out;
+
+ length = security_context_str_to_sid(tcon, &tsid, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (length)
+ goto out;
+
+ security_compute_av_user(ssid, tsid, tclass, &avd);
+
+ length = scnprintf(buf, SIMPLE_TRANSACTION_LIMIT,
+ "%x %x %x %x %u %x",
+ avd.allowed, 0xffffffff,
+ avd.auditallow, avd.auditdeny,
+ avd.seqno, avd.flags);
+out:
+ kfree(tcon);
+ kfree(scon);
+ return length;
+}
+
+static ssize_t sel_write_create(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
+{
+ char *scon = NULL, *tcon = NULL;
+ char *namebuf = NULL, *objname = NULL;
+ u32 ssid, tsid, newsid;
+ u16 tclass;
+ ssize_t length;
+ char *newcon = NULL;
+ u32 len;
+ int nargs;
+
+ length = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
+ SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__COMPUTE_CREATE,
+ NULL);
+ if (length)
+ goto out;
+
+ length = -ENOMEM;
+ scon = kzalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!scon)
+ goto out;
+
+ length = -ENOMEM;
+ tcon = kzalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!tcon)
+ goto out;
+
+ length = -ENOMEM;
+ namebuf = kzalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!namebuf)
+ goto out;
+
+ length = -EINVAL;
+ nargs = sscanf(buf, "%s %s %hu %s", scon, tcon, &tclass, namebuf);
+ if (nargs < 3 || nargs > 4)
+ goto out;
+ if (nargs == 4) {
+ /*
+ * If and when the name of new object to be queried contains
+ * either whitespace or multibyte characters, they shall be
+ * encoded based on the percentage-encoding rule.
+ * If not encoded, the sscanf logic picks up only left-half
+ * of the supplied name; split by a whitespace unexpectedly.
+ */
+ char *r, *w;
+ int c1, c2;
+
+ r = w = namebuf;
+ do {
+ c1 = *r++;
+ if (c1 == '+')
+ c1 = ' ';
+ else if (c1 == '%') {
+ c1 = hex_to_bin(*r++);
+ if (c1 < 0)
+ goto out;
+ c2 = hex_to_bin(*r++);
+ if (c2 < 0)
+ goto out;
+ c1 = (c1 << 4) | c2;
+ }
+ *w++ = c1;
+ } while (c1 != '\0');
+
+ objname = namebuf;
+ }
+
+ length = security_context_str_to_sid(scon, &ssid, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (length)
+ goto out;
+
+ length = security_context_str_to_sid(tcon, &tsid, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (length)
+ goto out;
+
+ length = security_transition_sid_user(ssid, tsid, tclass,
+ objname, &newsid);
+ if (length)
+ goto out;
+
+ length = security_sid_to_context(newsid, &newcon, &len);
+ if (length)
+ goto out;
+
+ length = -ERANGE;
+ if (len > SIMPLE_TRANSACTION_LIMIT) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: %s: context size (%u) exceeds "
+ "payload max\n", __func__, len);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(buf, newcon, len);
+ length = len;
+out:
+ kfree(newcon);
+ kfree(namebuf);
+ kfree(tcon);
+ kfree(scon);
+ return length;
+}
+
+static ssize_t sel_write_relabel(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
+{
+ char *scon = NULL, *tcon = NULL;
+ u32 ssid, tsid, newsid;
+ u16 tclass;
+ ssize_t length;
+ char *newcon = NULL;
+ u32 len;
+
+ length = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
+ SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__COMPUTE_RELABEL,
+ NULL);
+ if (length)
+ goto out;
+
+ length = -ENOMEM;
+ scon = kzalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!scon)
+ goto out;
+
+ length = -ENOMEM;
+ tcon = kzalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!tcon)
+ goto out;
+
+ length = -EINVAL;
+ if (sscanf(buf, "%s %s %hu", scon, tcon, &tclass) != 3)
+ goto out;
+
+ length = security_context_str_to_sid(scon, &ssid, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (length)
+ goto out;
+
+ length = security_context_str_to_sid(tcon, &tsid, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (length)
+ goto out;
+
+ length = security_change_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, &newsid);
+ if (length)
+ goto out;
+
+ length = security_sid_to_context(newsid, &newcon, &len);
+ if (length)
+ goto out;
+
+ length = -ERANGE;
+ if (len > SIMPLE_TRANSACTION_LIMIT)
+ goto out;
+
+ memcpy(buf, newcon, len);
+ length = len;
+out:
+ kfree(newcon);
+ kfree(tcon);
+ kfree(scon);
+ return length;
+}
+
+static ssize_t sel_write_user(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
+{
+ char *con = NULL, *user = NULL, *ptr;
+ u32 sid, *sids = NULL;
+ ssize_t length;
+ char *newcon;
+ int rc;
+ u32 i, len, nsids;
+
+ length = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
+ SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__COMPUTE_USER,
+ NULL);
+ if (length)
+ goto out;
+
+ length = -ENOMEM;
+ con = kzalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!con)
+ goto out;
+
+ length = -ENOMEM;
+ user = kzalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!user)
+ goto out;
+
+ length = -EINVAL;
+ if (sscanf(buf, "%s %s", con, user) != 2)
+ goto out;
+
+ length = security_context_str_to_sid(con, &sid, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (length)
+ goto out;
+
+ length = security_get_user_sids(sid, user, &sids, &nsids);
+ if (length)
+ goto out;
+
+ length = sprintf(buf, "%u", nsids) + 1;
+ ptr = buf + length;
+ for (i = 0; i < nsids; i++) {
+ rc = security_sid_to_context(sids[i], &newcon, &len);
+ if (rc) {
+ length = rc;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((length + len) >= SIMPLE_TRANSACTION_LIMIT) {
+ kfree(newcon);
+ length = -ERANGE;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ memcpy(ptr, newcon, len);
+ kfree(newcon);
+ ptr += len;
+ length += len;
+ }
+out:
+ kfree(sids);
+ kfree(user);
+ kfree(con);
+ return length;
+}
+
+static ssize_t sel_write_member(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
+{
+ char *scon = NULL, *tcon = NULL;
+ u32 ssid, tsid, newsid;
+ u16 tclass;
+ ssize_t length;
+ char *newcon = NULL;
+ u32 len;
+
+ length = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
+ SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__COMPUTE_MEMBER,
+ NULL);
+ if (length)
+ goto out;
+
+ length = -ENOMEM;
+ scon = kzalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!scon)
+ goto out;
+
+ length = -ENOMEM;
+ tcon = kzalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!tcon)
+ goto out;
+
+ length = -EINVAL;
+ if (sscanf(buf, "%s %s %hu", scon, tcon, &tclass) != 3)
+ goto out;
+
+ length = security_context_str_to_sid(scon, &ssid, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (length)
+ goto out;
+
+ length = security_context_str_to_sid(tcon, &tsid, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (length)
+ goto out;
+
+ length = security_member_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, &newsid);
+ if (length)
+ goto out;
+
+ length = security_sid_to_context(newsid, &newcon, &len);
+ if (length)
+ goto out;
+
+ length = -ERANGE;
+ if (len > SIMPLE_TRANSACTION_LIMIT) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: %s: context size (%u) exceeds "
+ "payload max\n", __func__, len);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(buf, newcon, len);
+ length = len;
+out:
+ kfree(newcon);
+ kfree(tcon);
+ kfree(scon);
+ return length;
+}
+
+static struct inode *sel_make_inode(struct super_block *sb, umode_t mode)
+{
+ struct inode *ret = new_inode(sb);
+
+ if (ret) {
+ ret->i_mode = mode;
+ ret->i_atime = ret->i_mtime = inode_set_ctime_current(ret);
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static ssize_t sel_read_bool(struct file *filep, char __user *buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = file_inode(filep)->i_sb->s_fs_info;
+ char *page = NULL;
+ ssize_t length;
+ ssize_t ret;
+ int cur_enforcing;
+ unsigned index = file_inode(filep)->i_ino & SEL_INO_MASK;
+ const char *name = filep->f_path.dentry->d_name.name;
+
+ mutex_lock(&selinux_state.policy_mutex);
+
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ if (index >= fsi->bool_num || strcmp(name,
+ fsi->bool_pending_names[index]))
+ goto out_unlock;
+
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ page = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!page)
+ goto out_unlock;
+
+ cur_enforcing = security_get_bool_value(index);
+ if (cur_enforcing < 0) {
+ ret = cur_enforcing;
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
+ length = scnprintf(page, PAGE_SIZE, "%d %d", cur_enforcing,
+ fsi->bool_pending_values[index]);
+ mutex_unlock(&selinux_state.policy_mutex);
+ ret = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, page, length);
+out_free:
+ free_page((unsigned long)page);
+ return ret;
+
+out_unlock:
+ mutex_unlock(&selinux_state.policy_mutex);
+ goto out_free;
+}
+
+static ssize_t sel_write_bool(struct file *filep, const char __user *buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = file_inode(filep)->i_sb->s_fs_info;
+ char *page = NULL;
+ ssize_t length;
+ int new_value;
+ unsigned index = file_inode(filep)->i_ino & SEL_INO_MASK;
+ const char *name = filep->f_path.dentry->d_name.name;
+
+ if (count >= PAGE_SIZE)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ /* No partial writes. */
+ if (*ppos != 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ page = memdup_user_nul(buf, count);
+ if (IS_ERR(page))
+ return PTR_ERR(page);
+
+ mutex_lock(&selinux_state.policy_mutex);
+
+ length = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
+ SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__SETBOOL,
+ NULL);
+ if (length)
+ goto out;
+
+ length = -EINVAL;
+ if (index >= fsi->bool_num || strcmp(name,
+ fsi->bool_pending_names[index]))
+ goto out;
+
+ length = -EINVAL;
+ if (sscanf(page, "%d", &new_value) != 1)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (new_value)
+ new_value = 1;
+
+ fsi->bool_pending_values[index] = new_value;
+ length = count;
+
+out:
+ mutex_unlock(&selinux_state.policy_mutex);
+ kfree(page);
+ return length;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations sel_bool_ops = {
+ .read = sel_read_bool,
+ .write = sel_write_bool,
+ .llseek = generic_file_llseek,
+};
+
+static ssize_t sel_commit_bools_write(struct file *filep,
+ const char __user *buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = file_inode(filep)->i_sb->s_fs_info;
+ char *page = NULL;
+ ssize_t length;
+ int new_value;
+
+ if (count >= PAGE_SIZE)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ /* No partial writes. */
+ if (*ppos != 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ page = memdup_user_nul(buf, count);
+ if (IS_ERR(page))
+ return PTR_ERR(page);
+
+ mutex_lock(&selinux_state.policy_mutex);
+
+ length = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
+ SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__SETBOOL,
+ NULL);
+ if (length)
+ goto out;
+
+ length = -EINVAL;
+ if (sscanf(page, "%d", &new_value) != 1)
+ goto out;
+
+ length = 0;
+ if (new_value && fsi->bool_pending_values)
+ length = security_set_bools(fsi->bool_num,
+ fsi->bool_pending_values);
+
+ if (!length)
+ length = count;
+
+out:
+ mutex_unlock(&selinux_state.policy_mutex);
+ kfree(page);
+ return length;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations sel_commit_bools_ops = {
+ .write = sel_commit_bools_write,
+ .llseek = generic_file_llseek,
+};
+
+static void sel_remove_entries(struct dentry *de)
+{
+ d_genocide(de);
+ shrink_dcache_parent(de);
+}
+
+static int sel_make_bools(struct selinux_policy *newpolicy, struct dentry *bool_dir,
+ unsigned int *bool_num, char ***bool_pending_names,
+ int **bool_pending_values)
+{
+ int ret;
+ ssize_t len;
+ struct dentry *dentry = NULL;
+ struct inode *inode = NULL;
+ struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+ char **names = NULL, *page;
+ u32 i, num;
+ int *values = NULL;
+ u32 sid;
+
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ page = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!page)
+ goto out;
+
+ ret = security_get_bools(newpolicy, &num, &names, &values);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ dentry = d_alloc_name(bool_dir, names[i]);
+ if (!dentry)
+ goto out;
+
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ inode = sel_make_inode(bool_dir->d_sb, S_IFREG | S_IRUGO | S_IWUSR);
+ if (!inode) {
+ dput(dentry);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ ret = -ENAMETOOLONG;
+ len = snprintf(page, PAGE_SIZE, "/%s/%s", BOOL_DIR_NAME, names[i]);
+ if (len >= PAGE_SIZE) {
+ dput(dentry);
+ iput(inode);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ isec = selinux_inode(inode);
+ ret = selinux_policy_genfs_sid(newpolicy, "selinuxfs", page,
+ SECCLASS_FILE, &sid);
+ if (ret) {
+ pr_warn_ratelimited("SELinux: no sid found, defaulting to security isid for %s\n",
+ page);
+ sid = SECINITSID_SECURITY;
+ }
+
+ isec->sid = sid;
+ isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
+ inode->i_fop = &sel_bool_ops;
+ inode->i_ino = i|SEL_BOOL_INO_OFFSET;
+ d_add(dentry, inode);
+ }
+ *bool_num = num;
+ *bool_pending_names = names;
+ *bool_pending_values = values;
+
+ free_page((unsigned long)page);
+ return 0;
+out:
+ free_page((unsigned long)page);
+
+ if (names) {
+ for (i = 0; i < num; i++)
+ kfree(names[i]);
+ kfree(names);
+ }
+ kfree(values);
+ sel_remove_entries(bool_dir);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static ssize_t sel_read_avc_cache_threshold(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ char tmpbuf[TMPBUFLEN];
+ ssize_t length;
+
+ length = scnprintf(tmpbuf, TMPBUFLEN, "%u",
+ avc_get_cache_threshold());
+ return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, tmpbuf, length);
+}
+
+static ssize_t sel_write_avc_cache_threshold(struct file *file,
+ const char __user *buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+
+{
+ char *page;
+ ssize_t ret;
+ unsigned int new_value;
+
+ ret = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
+ SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__SETSECPARAM,
+ NULL);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ if (count >= PAGE_SIZE)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ /* No partial writes. */
+ if (*ppos != 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ page = memdup_user_nul(buf, count);
+ if (IS_ERR(page))
+ return PTR_ERR(page);
+
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ if (sscanf(page, "%u", &new_value) != 1)
+ goto out;
+
+ avc_set_cache_threshold(new_value);
+
+ ret = count;
+out:
+ kfree(page);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static ssize_t sel_read_avc_hash_stats(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ char *page;
+ ssize_t length;
+
+ page = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!page)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ length = avc_get_hash_stats(page);
+ if (length >= 0)
+ length = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, page, length);
+ free_page((unsigned long)page);
+
+ return length;
+}
+
+static ssize_t sel_read_sidtab_hash_stats(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ char *page;
+ ssize_t length;
+
+ page = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!page)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ length = security_sidtab_hash_stats(page);
+ if (length >= 0)
+ length = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, page,
+ length);
+ free_page((unsigned long)page);
+
+ return length;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations sel_sidtab_hash_stats_ops = {
+ .read = sel_read_sidtab_hash_stats,
+ .llseek = generic_file_llseek,
+};
+
+static const struct file_operations sel_avc_cache_threshold_ops = {
+ .read = sel_read_avc_cache_threshold,
+ .write = sel_write_avc_cache_threshold,
+ .llseek = generic_file_llseek,
+};
+
+static const struct file_operations sel_avc_hash_stats_ops = {
+ .read = sel_read_avc_hash_stats,
+ .llseek = generic_file_llseek,
+};
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_AVC_STATS
+static struct avc_cache_stats *sel_avc_get_stat_idx(loff_t *idx)
+{
+ int cpu;
+
+ for (cpu = *idx; cpu < nr_cpu_ids; ++cpu) {
+ if (!cpu_possible(cpu))
+ continue;
+ *idx = cpu + 1;
+ return &per_cpu(avc_cache_stats, cpu);
+ }
+ (*idx)++;
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static void *sel_avc_stats_seq_start(struct seq_file *seq, loff_t *pos)
+{
+ loff_t n = *pos - 1;
+
+ if (*pos == 0)
+ return SEQ_START_TOKEN;
+
+ return sel_avc_get_stat_idx(&n);
+}
+
+static void *sel_avc_stats_seq_next(struct seq_file *seq, void *v, loff_t *pos)
+{
+ return sel_avc_get_stat_idx(pos);
+}
+
+static int sel_avc_stats_seq_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
+{
+ struct avc_cache_stats *st = v;
+
+ if (v == SEQ_START_TOKEN) {
+ seq_puts(seq,
+ "lookups hits misses allocations reclaims frees\n");
+ } else {
+ unsigned int lookups = st->lookups;
+ unsigned int misses = st->misses;
+ unsigned int hits = lookups - misses;
+ seq_printf(seq, "%u %u %u %u %u %u\n", lookups,
+ hits, misses, st->allocations,
+ st->reclaims, st->frees);
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void sel_avc_stats_seq_stop(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
+{ }
+
+static const struct seq_operations sel_avc_cache_stats_seq_ops = {
+ .start = sel_avc_stats_seq_start,
+ .next = sel_avc_stats_seq_next,
+ .show = sel_avc_stats_seq_show,
+ .stop = sel_avc_stats_seq_stop,
+};
+
+static int sel_open_avc_cache_stats(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+ return seq_open(file, &sel_avc_cache_stats_seq_ops);
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations sel_avc_cache_stats_ops = {
+ .open = sel_open_avc_cache_stats,
+ .read = seq_read,
+ .llseek = seq_lseek,
+ .release = seq_release,
+};
+#endif
+
+static int sel_make_avc_files(struct dentry *dir)
+{
+ struct super_block *sb = dir->d_sb;
+ struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = sb->s_fs_info;
+ unsigned int i;
+ static const struct tree_descr files[] = {
+ { "cache_threshold",
+ &sel_avc_cache_threshold_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR },
+ { "hash_stats", &sel_avc_hash_stats_ops, S_IRUGO },
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_AVC_STATS
+ { "cache_stats", &sel_avc_cache_stats_ops, S_IRUGO },
+#endif
+ };
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(files); i++) {
+ struct inode *inode;
+ struct dentry *dentry;
+
+ dentry = d_alloc_name(dir, files[i].name);
+ if (!dentry)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ inode = sel_make_inode(dir->d_sb, S_IFREG|files[i].mode);
+ if (!inode) {
+ dput(dentry);
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ inode->i_fop = files[i].ops;
+ inode->i_ino = ++fsi->last_ino;
+ d_add(dentry, inode);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int sel_make_ss_files(struct dentry *dir)
+{
+ struct super_block *sb = dir->d_sb;
+ struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = sb->s_fs_info;
+ unsigned int i;
+ static const struct tree_descr files[] = {
+ { "sidtab_hash_stats", &sel_sidtab_hash_stats_ops, S_IRUGO },
+ };
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(files); i++) {
+ struct inode *inode;
+ struct dentry *dentry;
+
+ dentry = d_alloc_name(dir, files[i].name);
+ if (!dentry)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ inode = sel_make_inode(dir->d_sb, S_IFREG|files[i].mode);
+ if (!inode) {
+ dput(dentry);
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ inode->i_fop = files[i].ops;
+ inode->i_ino = ++fsi->last_ino;
+ d_add(dentry, inode);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static ssize_t sel_read_initcon(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ char *con;
+ u32 sid, len;
+ ssize_t ret;
+
+ sid = file_inode(file)->i_ino&SEL_INO_MASK;
+ ret = security_sid_to_context(sid, &con, &len);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ ret = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, con, len);
+ kfree(con);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations sel_initcon_ops = {
+ .read = sel_read_initcon,
+ .llseek = generic_file_llseek,
+};
+
+static int sel_make_initcon_files(struct dentry *dir)
+{
+ unsigned int i;
+
+ for (i = 1; i <= SECINITSID_NUM; i++) {
+ struct inode *inode;
+ struct dentry *dentry;
+ const char *s = security_get_initial_sid_context(i);
+
+ if (!s)
+ continue;
+ dentry = d_alloc_name(dir, s);
+ if (!dentry)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ inode = sel_make_inode(dir->d_sb, S_IFREG|S_IRUGO);
+ if (!inode) {
+ dput(dentry);
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ inode->i_fop = &sel_initcon_ops;
+ inode->i_ino = i|SEL_INITCON_INO_OFFSET;
+ d_add(dentry, inode);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline unsigned long sel_class_to_ino(u16 class)
+{
+ return (class * (SEL_VEC_MAX + 1)) | SEL_CLASS_INO_OFFSET;
+}
+
+static inline u16 sel_ino_to_class(unsigned long ino)
+{
+ return (ino & SEL_INO_MASK) / (SEL_VEC_MAX + 1);
+}
+
+static inline unsigned long sel_perm_to_ino(u16 class, u32 perm)
+{
+ return (class * (SEL_VEC_MAX + 1) + perm) | SEL_CLASS_INO_OFFSET;
+}
+
+static inline u32 sel_ino_to_perm(unsigned long ino)
+{
+ return (ino & SEL_INO_MASK) % (SEL_VEC_MAX + 1);
+}
+
+static ssize_t sel_read_class(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ unsigned long ino = file_inode(file)->i_ino;
+ char res[TMPBUFLEN];
+ ssize_t len = scnprintf(res, sizeof(res), "%d", sel_ino_to_class(ino));
+ return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, res, len);
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations sel_class_ops = {
+ .read = sel_read_class,
+ .llseek = generic_file_llseek,
+};
+
+static ssize_t sel_read_perm(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ unsigned long ino = file_inode(file)->i_ino;
+ char res[TMPBUFLEN];
+ ssize_t len = scnprintf(res, sizeof(res), "%d", sel_ino_to_perm(ino));
+ return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, res, len);
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations sel_perm_ops = {
+ .read = sel_read_perm,
+ .llseek = generic_file_llseek,
+};
+
+static ssize_t sel_read_policycap(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ int value;
+ char tmpbuf[TMPBUFLEN];
+ ssize_t length;
+ unsigned long i_ino = file_inode(file)->i_ino;
+
+ value = security_policycap_supported(i_ino & SEL_INO_MASK);
+ length = scnprintf(tmpbuf, TMPBUFLEN, "%d", value);
+
+ return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, tmpbuf, length);
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations sel_policycap_ops = {
+ .read = sel_read_policycap,
+ .llseek = generic_file_llseek,
+};
+
+static int sel_make_perm_files(struct selinux_policy *newpolicy,
+ char *objclass, int classvalue,
+ struct dentry *dir)
+{
+ u32 i, nperms;
+ int rc;
+ char **perms;
+
+ rc = security_get_permissions(newpolicy, objclass, &perms, &nperms);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < nperms; i++) {
+ struct inode *inode;
+ struct dentry *dentry;
+
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ dentry = d_alloc_name(dir, perms[i]);
+ if (!dentry)
+ goto out;
+
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ inode = sel_make_inode(dir->d_sb, S_IFREG|S_IRUGO);
+ if (!inode) {
+ dput(dentry);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ inode->i_fop = &sel_perm_ops;
+ /* i+1 since perm values are 1-indexed */
+ inode->i_ino = sel_perm_to_ino(classvalue, i + 1);
+ d_add(dentry, inode);
+ }
+ rc = 0;
+out:
+ for (i = 0; i < nperms; i++)
+ kfree(perms[i]);
+ kfree(perms);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static int sel_make_class_dir_entries(struct selinux_policy *newpolicy,
+ char *classname, int index,
+ struct dentry *dir)
+{
+ struct super_block *sb = dir->d_sb;
+ struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = sb->s_fs_info;
+ struct dentry *dentry = NULL;
+ struct inode *inode = NULL;
+
+ dentry = d_alloc_name(dir, "index");
+ if (!dentry)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ inode = sel_make_inode(dir->d_sb, S_IFREG|S_IRUGO);
+ if (!inode) {
+ dput(dentry);
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ inode->i_fop = &sel_class_ops;
+ inode->i_ino = sel_class_to_ino(index);
+ d_add(dentry, inode);
+
+ dentry = sel_make_dir(dir, "perms", &fsi->last_class_ino);
+ if (IS_ERR(dentry))
+ return PTR_ERR(dentry);
+
+ return sel_make_perm_files(newpolicy, classname, index, dentry);
+}
+
+static int sel_make_classes(struct selinux_policy *newpolicy,
+ struct dentry *class_dir,
+ unsigned long *last_class_ino)
+{
+ u32 i, nclasses;
+ int rc;
+ char **classes;
+
+ rc = security_get_classes(newpolicy, &classes, &nclasses);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ /* +2 since classes are 1-indexed */
+ *last_class_ino = sel_class_to_ino(nclasses + 2);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < nclasses; i++) {
+ struct dentry *class_name_dir;
+
+ class_name_dir = sel_make_dir(class_dir, classes[i],
+ last_class_ino);
+ if (IS_ERR(class_name_dir)) {
+ rc = PTR_ERR(class_name_dir);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* i+1 since class values are 1-indexed */
+ rc = sel_make_class_dir_entries(newpolicy, classes[i], i + 1,
+ class_name_dir);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ }
+ rc = 0;
+out:
+ for (i = 0; i < nclasses; i++)
+ kfree(classes[i]);
+ kfree(classes);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static int sel_make_policycap(struct selinux_fs_info *fsi)
+{
+ unsigned int iter;
+ struct dentry *dentry = NULL;
+ struct inode *inode = NULL;
+
+ for (iter = 0; iter <= POLICYDB_CAP_MAX; iter++) {
+ if (iter < ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_policycap_names))
+ dentry = d_alloc_name(fsi->policycap_dir,
+ selinux_policycap_names[iter]);
+ else
+ dentry = d_alloc_name(fsi->policycap_dir, "unknown");
+
+ if (dentry == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ inode = sel_make_inode(fsi->sb, S_IFREG | 0444);
+ if (inode == NULL) {
+ dput(dentry);
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ inode->i_fop = &sel_policycap_ops;
+ inode->i_ino = iter | SEL_POLICYCAP_INO_OFFSET;
+ d_add(dentry, inode);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static struct dentry *sel_make_dir(struct dentry *dir, const char *name,
+ unsigned long *ino)
+{
+ struct dentry *dentry = d_alloc_name(dir, name);
+ struct inode *inode;
+
+ if (!dentry)
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+ inode = sel_make_inode(dir->d_sb, S_IFDIR | S_IRUGO | S_IXUGO);
+ if (!inode) {
+ dput(dentry);
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+ }
+
+ inode->i_op = &simple_dir_inode_operations;
+ inode->i_fop = &simple_dir_operations;
+ inode->i_ino = ++(*ino);
+ /* directory inodes start off with i_nlink == 2 (for "." entry) */
+ inc_nlink(inode);
+ d_add(dentry, inode);
+ /* bump link count on parent directory, too */
+ inc_nlink(d_inode(dir));
+
+ return dentry;
+}
+
+static struct dentry *sel_make_disconnected_dir(struct super_block *sb,
+ unsigned long *ino)
+{
+ struct inode *inode = sel_make_inode(sb, S_IFDIR | S_IRUGO | S_IXUGO);
+
+ if (!inode)
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+ inode->i_op = &simple_dir_inode_operations;
+ inode->i_fop = &simple_dir_operations;
+ inode->i_ino = ++(*ino);
+ /* directory inodes start off with i_nlink == 2 (for "." entry) */
+ inc_nlink(inode);
+ return d_obtain_alias(inode);
+}
+
+#define NULL_FILE_NAME "null"
+
+static int sel_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, struct fs_context *fc)
+{
+ struct selinux_fs_info *fsi;
+ int ret;
+ struct dentry *dentry;
+ struct inode *inode;
+ struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+
+ static const struct tree_descr selinux_files[] = {
+ [SEL_LOAD] = {"load", &sel_load_ops, S_IRUSR|S_IWUSR},
+ [SEL_ENFORCE] = {"enforce", &sel_enforce_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
+ [SEL_CONTEXT] = {"context", &transaction_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO},
+ [SEL_ACCESS] = {"access", &transaction_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO},
+ [SEL_CREATE] = {"create", &transaction_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO},
+ [SEL_RELABEL] = {"relabel", &transaction_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO},
+ [SEL_USER] = {"user", &transaction_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO},
+ [SEL_POLICYVERS] = {"policyvers", &sel_policyvers_ops, S_IRUGO},
+ [SEL_COMMIT_BOOLS] = {"commit_pending_bools", &sel_commit_bools_ops, S_IWUSR},
+ [SEL_MLS] = {"mls", &sel_mls_ops, S_IRUGO},
+ [SEL_DISABLE] = {"disable", &sel_disable_ops, S_IWUSR},
+ [SEL_MEMBER] = {"member", &transaction_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO},
+ [SEL_CHECKREQPROT] = {"checkreqprot", &sel_checkreqprot_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
+ [SEL_REJECT_UNKNOWN] = {"reject_unknown", &sel_handle_unknown_ops, S_IRUGO},
+ [SEL_DENY_UNKNOWN] = {"deny_unknown", &sel_handle_unknown_ops, S_IRUGO},
+ [SEL_STATUS] = {"status", &sel_handle_status_ops, S_IRUGO},
+ [SEL_POLICY] = {"policy", &sel_policy_ops, S_IRUGO},
+ [SEL_VALIDATE_TRANS] = {"validatetrans", &sel_transition_ops,
+ S_IWUGO},
+ /* last one */ {""}
+ };
+
+ ret = selinux_fs_info_create(sb);
+ if (ret)
+ goto err;
+
+ ret = simple_fill_super(sb, SELINUX_MAGIC, selinux_files);
+ if (ret)
+ goto err;
+
+ fsi = sb->s_fs_info;
+ fsi->bool_dir = sel_make_dir(sb->s_root, BOOL_DIR_NAME, &fsi->last_ino);
+ if (IS_ERR(fsi->bool_dir)) {
+ ret = PTR_ERR(fsi->bool_dir);
+ fsi->bool_dir = NULL;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ dentry = d_alloc_name(sb->s_root, NULL_FILE_NAME);
+ if (!dentry)
+ goto err;
+
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ inode = sel_make_inode(sb, S_IFCHR | S_IRUGO | S_IWUGO);
+ if (!inode) {
+ dput(dentry);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ inode->i_ino = ++fsi->last_ino;
+ isec = selinux_inode(inode);
+ isec->sid = SECINITSID_DEVNULL;
+ isec->sclass = SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
+ isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
+
+ init_special_inode(inode, S_IFCHR | S_IRUGO | S_IWUGO, MKDEV(MEM_MAJOR, 3));
+ d_add(dentry, inode);
+
+ dentry = sel_make_dir(sb->s_root, "avc", &fsi->last_ino);
+ if (IS_ERR(dentry)) {
+ ret = PTR_ERR(dentry);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ ret = sel_make_avc_files(dentry);
+ if (ret)
+ goto err;
+
+ dentry = sel_make_dir(sb->s_root, "ss", &fsi->last_ino);
+ if (IS_ERR(dentry)) {
+ ret = PTR_ERR(dentry);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ ret = sel_make_ss_files(dentry);
+ if (ret)
+ goto err;
+
+ dentry = sel_make_dir(sb->s_root, "initial_contexts", &fsi->last_ino);
+ if (IS_ERR(dentry)) {
+ ret = PTR_ERR(dentry);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ ret = sel_make_initcon_files(dentry);
+ if (ret)
+ goto err;
+
+ fsi->class_dir = sel_make_dir(sb->s_root, CLASS_DIR_NAME, &fsi->last_ino);
+ if (IS_ERR(fsi->class_dir)) {
+ ret = PTR_ERR(fsi->class_dir);
+ fsi->class_dir = NULL;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ fsi->policycap_dir = sel_make_dir(sb->s_root, POLICYCAP_DIR_NAME,
+ &fsi->last_ino);
+ if (IS_ERR(fsi->policycap_dir)) {
+ ret = PTR_ERR(fsi->policycap_dir);
+ fsi->policycap_dir = NULL;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ ret = sel_make_policycap(fsi);
+ if (ret) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: failed to load policy capabilities\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+err:
+ pr_err("SELinux: %s: failed while creating inodes\n",
+ __func__);
+
+ selinux_fs_info_free(sb);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int sel_get_tree(struct fs_context *fc)
+{
+ return get_tree_single(fc, sel_fill_super);
+}
+
+static const struct fs_context_operations sel_context_ops = {
+ .get_tree = sel_get_tree,
+};
+
+static int sel_init_fs_context(struct fs_context *fc)
+{
+ fc->ops = &sel_context_ops;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void sel_kill_sb(struct super_block *sb)
+{
+ selinux_fs_info_free(sb);
+ kill_litter_super(sb);
+}
+
+static struct file_system_type sel_fs_type = {
+ .name = "selinuxfs",
+ .init_fs_context = sel_init_fs_context,
+ .kill_sb = sel_kill_sb,
+};
+
+static struct vfsmount *selinuxfs_mount __ro_after_init;
+struct path selinux_null __ro_after_init;
+
+static int __init init_sel_fs(void)
+{
+ struct qstr null_name = QSTR_INIT(NULL_FILE_NAME,
+ sizeof(NULL_FILE_NAME)-1);
+ int err;
+
+ if (!selinux_enabled_boot)
+ return 0;
+
+ err = sysfs_create_mount_point(fs_kobj, "selinux");
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ err = register_filesystem(&sel_fs_type);
+ if (err) {
+ sysfs_remove_mount_point(fs_kobj, "selinux");
+ return err;
+ }
+
+ selinux_null.mnt = selinuxfs_mount = kern_mount(&sel_fs_type);
+ if (IS_ERR(selinuxfs_mount)) {
+ pr_err("selinuxfs: could not mount!\n");
+ err = PTR_ERR(selinuxfs_mount);
+ selinuxfs_mount = NULL;
+ }
+ selinux_null.dentry = d_hash_and_lookup(selinux_null.mnt->mnt_root,
+ &null_name);
+ if (IS_ERR(selinux_null.dentry)) {
+ pr_err("selinuxfs: could not lookup null!\n");
+ err = PTR_ERR(selinux_null.dentry);
+ selinux_null.dentry = NULL;
+ }
+
+ return err;
+}
+
+__initcall(init_sel_fs);
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..86d98a8e29
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
@@ -0,0 +1,649 @@
+/*
+ * Implementation of the access vector table type.
+ *
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
+ */
+
+/* Updated: Frank Mayer <mayerf@tresys.com> and Karl MacMillan <kmacmillan@tresys.com>
+ *
+ * Added conditional policy language extensions
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2003 Tresys Technology, LLC
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation, version 2.
+ *
+ * Updated: Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
+ * Tuned number of hash slots for avtab to reduce memory usage
+ */
+
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include "avtab.h"
+#include "policydb.h"
+
+static struct kmem_cache *avtab_node_cachep __ro_after_init;
+static struct kmem_cache *avtab_xperms_cachep __ro_after_init;
+
+/* Based on MurmurHash3, written by Austin Appleby and placed in the
+ * public domain.
+ */
+static inline u32 avtab_hash(const struct avtab_key *keyp, u32 mask)
+{
+ static const u32 c1 = 0xcc9e2d51;
+ static const u32 c2 = 0x1b873593;
+ static const u32 r1 = 15;
+ static const u32 r2 = 13;
+ static const u32 m = 5;
+ static const u32 n = 0xe6546b64;
+
+ u32 hash = 0;
+
+#define mix(input) do { \
+ u32 v = input; \
+ v *= c1; \
+ v = (v << r1) | (v >> (32 - r1)); \
+ v *= c2; \
+ hash ^= v; \
+ hash = (hash << r2) | (hash >> (32 - r2)); \
+ hash = hash * m + n; \
+ } while (0)
+
+ mix(keyp->target_class);
+ mix(keyp->target_type);
+ mix(keyp->source_type);
+
+#undef mix
+
+ hash ^= hash >> 16;
+ hash *= 0x85ebca6b;
+ hash ^= hash >> 13;
+ hash *= 0xc2b2ae35;
+ hash ^= hash >> 16;
+
+ return hash & mask;
+}
+
+static struct avtab_node*
+avtab_insert_node(struct avtab *h, u32 hvalue,
+ struct avtab_node *prev,
+ const struct avtab_key *key, const struct avtab_datum *datum)
+{
+ struct avtab_node *newnode;
+ struct avtab_extended_perms *xperms;
+ newnode = kmem_cache_zalloc(avtab_node_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (newnode == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ newnode->key = *key;
+
+ if (key->specified & AVTAB_XPERMS) {
+ xperms = kmem_cache_zalloc(avtab_xperms_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (xperms == NULL) {
+ kmem_cache_free(avtab_node_cachep, newnode);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ *xperms = *(datum->u.xperms);
+ newnode->datum.u.xperms = xperms;
+ } else {
+ newnode->datum.u.data = datum->u.data;
+ }
+
+ if (prev) {
+ newnode->next = prev->next;
+ prev->next = newnode;
+ } else {
+ struct avtab_node **n = &h->htable[hvalue];
+
+ newnode->next = *n;
+ *n = newnode;
+ }
+
+ h->nel++;
+ return newnode;
+}
+
+static int avtab_insert(struct avtab *h, const struct avtab_key *key,
+ const struct avtab_datum *datum)
+{
+ u32 hvalue;
+ struct avtab_node *prev, *cur, *newnode;
+ u16 specified = key->specified & ~(AVTAB_ENABLED|AVTAB_ENABLED_OLD);
+
+ if (!h || !h->nslot || h->nel == U32_MAX)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ hvalue = avtab_hash(key, h->mask);
+ for (prev = NULL, cur = h->htable[hvalue];
+ cur;
+ prev = cur, cur = cur->next) {
+ if (key->source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
+ key->target_type == cur->key.target_type &&
+ key->target_class == cur->key.target_class &&
+ (specified & cur->key.specified)) {
+ /* extended perms may not be unique */
+ if (specified & AVTAB_XPERMS)
+ break;
+ return -EEXIST;
+ }
+ if (key->source_type < cur->key.source_type)
+ break;
+ if (key->source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
+ key->target_type < cur->key.target_type)
+ break;
+ if (key->source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
+ key->target_type == cur->key.target_type &&
+ key->target_class < cur->key.target_class)
+ break;
+ }
+
+ newnode = avtab_insert_node(h, hvalue, prev, key, datum);
+ if (!newnode)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Unlike avtab_insert(), this function allow multiple insertions of the same
+ * key/specified mask into the table, as needed by the conditional avtab.
+ * It also returns a pointer to the node inserted.
+ */
+struct avtab_node *avtab_insert_nonunique(struct avtab *h,
+ const struct avtab_key *key,
+ const struct avtab_datum *datum)
+{
+ u32 hvalue;
+ struct avtab_node *prev, *cur;
+ u16 specified = key->specified & ~(AVTAB_ENABLED|AVTAB_ENABLED_OLD);
+
+ if (!h || !h->nslot || h->nel == U32_MAX)
+ return NULL;
+ hvalue = avtab_hash(key, h->mask);
+ for (prev = NULL, cur = h->htable[hvalue];
+ cur;
+ prev = cur, cur = cur->next) {
+ if (key->source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
+ key->target_type == cur->key.target_type &&
+ key->target_class == cur->key.target_class &&
+ (specified & cur->key.specified))
+ break;
+ if (key->source_type < cur->key.source_type)
+ break;
+ if (key->source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
+ key->target_type < cur->key.target_type)
+ break;
+ if (key->source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
+ key->target_type == cur->key.target_type &&
+ key->target_class < cur->key.target_class)
+ break;
+ }
+ return avtab_insert_node(h, hvalue, prev, key, datum);
+}
+
+/* This search function returns a node pointer, and can be used in
+ * conjunction with avtab_search_next_node()
+ */
+struct avtab_node *avtab_search_node(struct avtab *h,
+ const struct avtab_key *key)
+{
+ u32 hvalue;
+ struct avtab_node *cur;
+ u16 specified = key->specified & ~(AVTAB_ENABLED|AVTAB_ENABLED_OLD);
+
+ if (!h || !h->nslot)
+ return NULL;
+
+ hvalue = avtab_hash(key, h->mask);
+ for (cur = h->htable[hvalue]; cur;
+ cur = cur->next) {
+ if (key->source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
+ key->target_type == cur->key.target_type &&
+ key->target_class == cur->key.target_class &&
+ (specified & cur->key.specified))
+ return cur;
+
+ if (key->source_type < cur->key.source_type)
+ break;
+ if (key->source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
+ key->target_type < cur->key.target_type)
+ break;
+ if (key->source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
+ key->target_type == cur->key.target_type &&
+ key->target_class < cur->key.target_class)
+ break;
+ }
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+struct avtab_node*
+avtab_search_node_next(struct avtab_node *node, u16 specified)
+{
+ struct avtab_node *cur;
+
+ if (!node)
+ return NULL;
+
+ specified &= ~(AVTAB_ENABLED|AVTAB_ENABLED_OLD);
+ for (cur = node->next; cur; cur = cur->next) {
+ if (node->key.source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
+ node->key.target_type == cur->key.target_type &&
+ node->key.target_class == cur->key.target_class &&
+ (specified & cur->key.specified))
+ return cur;
+
+ if (node->key.source_type < cur->key.source_type)
+ break;
+ if (node->key.source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
+ node->key.target_type < cur->key.target_type)
+ break;
+ if (node->key.source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
+ node->key.target_type == cur->key.target_type &&
+ node->key.target_class < cur->key.target_class)
+ break;
+ }
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+void avtab_destroy(struct avtab *h)
+{
+ u32 i;
+ struct avtab_node *cur, *temp;
+
+ if (!h)
+ return;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < h->nslot; i++) {
+ cur = h->htable[i];
+ while (cur) {
+ temp = cur;
+ cur = cur->next;
+ if (temp->key.specified & AVTAB_XPERMS)
+ kmem_cache_free(avtab_xperms_cachep,
+ temp->datum.u.xperms);
+ kmem_cache_free(avtab_node_cachep, temp);
+ }
+ }
+ kvfree(h->htable);
+ h->htable = NULL;
+ h->nel = 0;
+ h->nslot = 0;
+ h->mask = 0;
+}
+
+void avtab_init(struct avtab *h)
+{
+ h->htable = NULL;
+ h->nel = 0;
+ h->nslot = 0;
+ h->mask = 0;
+}
+
+static int avtab_alloc_common(struct avtab *h, u32 nslot)
+{
+ if (!nslot)
+ return 0;
+
+ h->htable = kvcalloc(nslot, sizeof(void *), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!h->htable)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ h->nslot = nslot;
+ h->mask = nslot - 1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int avtab_alloc(struct avtab *h, u32 nrules)
+{
+ int rc;
+ u32 nslot = 0;
+
+ if (nrules != 0) {
+ u32 shift = 1;
+ u32 work = nrules >> 3;
+ while (work) {
+ work >>= 1;
+ shift++;
+ }
+ nslot = 1 << shift;
+ if (nslot > MAX_AVTAB_HASH_BUCKETS)
+ nslot = MAX_AVTAB_HASH_BUCKETS;
+
+ rc = avtab_alloc_common(h, nslot);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ pr_debug("SELinux: %d avtab hash slots, %d rules.\n", nslot, nrules);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int avtab_alloc_dup(struct avtab *new, const struct avtab *orig)
+{
+ return avtab_alloc_common(new, orig->nslot);
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEBUG
+void avtab_hash_eval(struct avtab *h, const char *tag)
+{
+ u32 i, chain_len, slots_used, max_chain_len;
+ unsigned long long chain2_len_sum;
+ struct avtab_node *cur;
+
+ slots_used = 0;
+ max_chain_len = 0;
+ chain2_len_sum = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < h->nslot; i++) {
+ cur = h->htable[i];
+ if (cur) {
+ slots_used++;
+ chain_len = 0;
+ while (cur) {
+ chain_len++;
+ cur = cur->next;
+ }
+
+ if (chain_len > max_chain_len)
+ max_chain_len = chain_len;
+ chain2_len_sum += (unsigned long long)chain_len * chain_len;
+ }
+ }
+
+ pr_debug("SELinux: %s: %d entries and %d/%d buckets used, "
+ "longest chain length %d sum of chain length^2 %llu\n",
+ tag, h->nel, slots_used, h->nslot, max_chain_len,
+ chain2_len_sum);
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEBUG */
+
+static const uint16_t spec_order[] = {
+ AVTAB_ALLOWED,
+ AVTAB_AUDITDENY,
+ AVTAB_AUDITALLOW,
+ AVTAB_TRANSITION,
+ AVTAB_CHANGE,
+ AVTAB_MEMBER,
+ AVTAB_XPERMS_ALLOWED,
+ AVTAB_XPERMS_AUDITALLOW,
+ AVTAB_XPERMS_DONTAUDIT
+};
+
+int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, void *fp, struct policydb *pol,
+ int (*insertf)(struct avtab *a, const struct avtab_key *k,
+ const struct avtab_datum *d, void *p),
+ void *p)
+{
+ __le16 buf16[4];
+ u16 enabled;
+ u32 items, items2, val, i;
+ struct avtab_key key;
+ struct avtab_datum datum;
+ struct avtab_extended_perms xperms;
+ __le32 buf32[ARRAY_SIZE(xperms.perms.p)];
+ int rc;
+ unsigned int set, vers = pol->policyvers;
+
+ memset(&key, 0, sizeof(struct avtab_key));
+ memset(&datum, 0, sizeof(struct avtab_datum));
+
+ if (vers < POLICYDB_VERSION_AVTAB) {
+ rc = next_entry(buf32, fp, sizeof(u32));
+ if (rc) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n");
+ return rc;
+ }
+ items2 = le32_to_cpu(buf32[0]);
+ if (items2 > ARRAY_SIZE(buf32)) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: avtab: entry overflow\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ }
+ rc = next_entry(buf32, fp, sizeof(u32)*items2);
+ if (rc) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n");
+ return rc;
+ }
+ items = 0;
+
+ val = le32_to_cpu(buf32[items++]);
+ key.source_type = (u16)val;
+ if (key.source_type != val) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: avtab: truncated source type\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ val = le32_to_cpu(buf32[items++]);
+ key.target_type = (u16)val;
+ if (key.target_type != val) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: avtab: truncated target type\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ val = le32_to_cpu(buf32[items++]);
+ key.target_class = (u16)val;
+ if (key.target_class != val) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: avtab: truncated target class\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ val = le32_to_cpu(buf32[items++]);
+ enabled = (val & AVTAB_ENABLED_OLD) ? AVTAB_ENABLED : 0;
+
+ if (!(val & (AVTAB_AV | AVTAB_TYPE))) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: avtab: null entry\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ if ((val & AVTAB_AV) &&
+ (val & AVTAB_TYPE)) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: avtab: entry has both access vectors and types\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ if (val & AVTAB_XPERMS) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: avtab: entry has extended permissions\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(spec_order); i++) {
+ if (val & spec_order[i]) {
+ key.specified = spec_order[i] | enabled;
+ datum.u.data = le32_to_cpu(buf32[items++]);
+ rc = insertf(a, &key, &datum, p);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (items != items2) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: avtab: entry only had %d items, expected %d\n",
+ items2, items);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ rc = next_entry(buf16, fp, sizeof(u16)*4);
+ if (rc) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n");
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ items = 0;
+ key.source_type = le16_to_cpu(buf16[items++]);
+ key.target_type = le16_to_cpu(buf16[items++]);
+ key.target_class = le16_to_cpu(buf16[items++]);
+ key.specified = le16_to_cpu(buf16[items++]);
+
+ if (!policydb_type_isvalid(pol, key.source_type) ||
+ !policydb_type_isvalid(pol, key.target_type) ||
+ !policydb_class_isvalid(pol, key.target_class)) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: avtab: invalid type or class\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ set = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(spec_order); i++) {
+ if (key.specified & spec_order[i])
+ set++;
+ }
+ if (!set || set > 1) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: avtab: more than one specifier\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if ((vers < POLICYDB_VERSION_XPERMS_IOCTL) &&
+ (key.specified & AVTAB_XPERMS)) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: avtab: policy version %u does not "
+ "support extended permissions rules and one "
+ "was specified\n", vers);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ } else if (key.specified & AVTAB_XPERMS) {
+ memset(&xperms, 0, sizeof(struct avtab_extended_perms));
+ rc = next_entry(&xperms.specified, fp, sizeof(u8));
+ if (rc) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n");
+ return rc;
+ }
+ rc = next_entry(&xperms.driver, fp, sizeof(u8));
+ if (rc) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n");
+ return rc;
+ }
+ rc = next_entry(buf32, fp, sizeof(u32)*ARRAY_SIZE(xperms.perms.p));
+ if (rc) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n");
+ return rc;
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(xperms.perms.p); i++)
+ xperms.perms.p[i] = le32_to_cpu(buf32[i]);
+ datum.u.xperms = &xperms;
+ } else {
+ rc = next_entry(buf32, fp, sizeof(u32));
+ if (rc) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n");
+ return rc;
+ }
+ datum.u.data = le32_to_cpu(*buf32);
+ }
+ if ((key.specified & AVTAB_TYPE) &&
+ !policydb_type_isvalid(pol, datum.u.data)) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: avtab: invalid type\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ return insertf(a, &key, &datum, p);
+}
+
+static int avtab_insertf(struct avtab *a, const struct avtab_key *k,
+ const struct avtab_datum *d, void *p)
+{
+ return avtab_insert(a, k, d);
+}
+
+int avtab_read(struct avtab *a, void *fp, struct policydb *pol)
+{
+ int rc;
+ __le32 buf[1];
+ u32 nel, i;
+
+
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+ if (rc < 0) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: avtab: truncated table\n");
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ if (!nel) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: avtab: table is empty\n");
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto bad;
+ }
+
+ rc = avtab_alloc(a, nel);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < nel; i++) {
+ rc = avtab_read_item(a, fp, pol, avtab_insertf, NULL);
+ if (rc) {
+ if (rc == -ENOMEM)
+ pr_err("SELinux: avtab: out of memory\n");
+ else if (rc == -EEXIST)
+ pr_err("SELinux: avtab: duplicate entry\n");
+
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ }
+
+ rc = 0;
+out:
+ return rc;
+
+bad:
+ avtab_destroy(a);
+ goto out;
+}
+
+int avtab_write_item(struct policydb *p, const struct avtab_node *cur, void *fp)
+{
+ __le16 buf16[4];
+ __le32 buf32[ARRAY_SIZE(cur->datum.u.xperms->perms.p)];
+ int rc;
+ unsigned int i;
+
+ buf16[0] = cpu_to_le16(cur->key.source_type);
+ buf16[1] = cpu_to_le16(cur->key.target_type);
+ buf16[2] = cpu_to_le16(cur->key.target_class);
+ buf16[3] = cpu_to_le16(cur->key.specified);
+ rc = put_entry(buf16, sizeof(u16), 4, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ if (cur->key.specified & AVTAB_XPERMS) {
+ rc = put_entry(&cur->datum.u.xperms->specified, sizeof(u8), 1, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ rc = put_entry(&cur->datum.u.xperms->driver, sizeof(u8), 1, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(cur->datum.u.xperms->perms.p); i++)
+ buf32[i] = cpu_to_le32(cur->datum.u.xperms->perms.p[i]);
+ rc = put_entry(buf32, sizeof(u32),
+ ARRAY_SIZE(cur->datum.u.xperms->perms.p), fp);
+ } else {
+ buf32[0] = cpu_to_le32(cur->datum.u.data);
+ rc = put_entry(buf32, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+ }
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int avtab_write(struct policydb *p, struct avtab *a, void *fp)
+{
+ u32 i;
+ int rc = 0;
+ struct avtab_node *cur;
+ __le32 buf[1];
+
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(a->nel);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < a->nslot; i++) {
+ for (cur = a->htable[i]; cur;
+ cur = cur->next) {
+ rc = avtab_write_item(p, cur, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+void __init avtab_cache_init(void)
+{
+ avtab_node_cachep = kmem_cache_create("avtab_node",
+ sizeof(struct avtab_node),
+ 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
+ avtab_xperms_cachep = kmem_cache_create("avtab_extended_perms",
+ sizeof(struct avtab_extended_perms),
+ 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
+}
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..3c3904bf02
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h
@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+/*
+ * An access vector table (avtab) is a hash table
+ * of access vectors and transition types indexed
+ * by a type pair and a class. An access vector
+ * table is used to represent the type enforcement
+ * tables.
+ *
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
+ */
+
+/* Updated: Frank Mayer <mayerf@tresys.com> and Karl MacMillan <kmacmillan@tresys.com>
+ *
+ * Added conditional policy language extensions
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2003 Tresys Technology, LLC
+ *
+ * Updated: Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
+ * Tuned number of hash slots for avtab to reduce memory usage
+ */
+#ifndef _SS_AVTAB_H_
+#define _SS_AVTAB_H_
+
+#include "security.h"
+
+struct avtab_key {
+ u16 source_type; /* source type */
+ u16 target_type; /* target type */
+ u16 target_class; /* target object class */
+#define AVTAB_ALLOWED 0x0001
+#define AVTAB_AUDITALLOW 0x0002
+#define AVTAB_AUDITDENY 0x0004
+#define AVTAB_AV (AVTAB_ALLOWED | AVTAB_AUDITALLOW | AVTAB_AUDITDENY)
+#define AVTAB_TRANSITION 0x0010
+#define AVTAB_MEMBER 0x0020
+#define AVTAB_CHANGE 0x0040
+#define AVTAB_TYPE (AVTAB_TRANSITION | AVTAB_MEMBER | AVTAB_CHANGE)
+/* extended permissions */
+#define AVTAB_XPERMS_ALLOWED 0x0100
+#define AVTAB_XPERMS_AUDITALLOW 0x0200
+#define AVTAB_XPERMS_DONTAUDIT 0x0400
+#define AVTAB_XPERMS (AVTAB_XPERMS_ALLOWED | \
+ AVTAB_XPERMS_AUDITALLOW | \
+ AVTAB_XPERMS_DONTAUDIT)
+#define AVTAB_ENABLED_OLD 0x80000000 /* reserved for used in cond_avtab */
+#define AVTAB_ENABLED 0x8000 /* reserved for used in cond_avtab */
+ u16 specified; /* what field is specified */
+};
+
+/*
+ * For operations that require more than the 32 permissions provided by the avc
+ * extended permissions may be used to provide 256 bits of permissions.
+ */
+struct avtab_extended_perms {
+/* These are not flags. All 256 values may be used */
+#define AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLFUNCTION 0x01
+#define AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLDRIVER 0x02
+ /* extension of the avtab_key specified */
+ u8 specified; /* ioctl, netfilter, ... */
+ /*
+ * if 256 bits is not adequate as is often the case with ioctls, then
+ * multiple extended perms may be used and the driver field
+ * specifies which permissions are included.
+ */
+ u8 driver;
+ /* 256 bits of permissions */
+ struct extended_perms_data perms;
+};
+
+struct avtab_datum {
+ union {
+ u32 data; /* access vector or type value */
+ struct avtab_extended_perms *xperms;
+ } u;
+};
+
+struct avtab_node {
+ struct avtab_key key;
+ struct avtab_datum datum;
+ struct avtab_node *next;
+};
+
+struct avtab {
+ struct avtab_node **htable;
+ u32 nel; /* number of elements */
+ u32 nslot; /* number of hash slots */
+ u32 mask; /* mask to compute hash func */
+};
+
+void avtab_init(struct avtab *h);
+int avtab_alloc(struct avtab *, u32);
+int avtab_alloc_dup(struct avtab *new, const struct avtab *orig);
+void avtab_destroy(struct avtab *h);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEBUG
+void avtab_hash_eval(struct avtab *h, const char *tag);
+#else
+static inline void avtab_hash_eval(struct avtab *h, const char *tag)
+{
+}
+#endif
+
+struct policydb;
+int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, void *fp, struct policydb *pol,
+ int (*insert)(struct avtab *a, const struct avtab_key *k,
+ const struct avtab_datum *d, void *p),
+ void *p);
+
+int avtab_read(struct avtab *a, void *fp, struct policydb *pol);
+int avtab_write_item(struct policydb *p, const struct avtab_node *cur, void *fp);
+int avtab_write(struct policydb *p, struct avtab *a, void *fp);
+
+struct avtab_node *avtab_insert_nonunique(struct avtab *h,
+ const struct avtab_key *key,
+ const struct avtab_datum *datum);
+
+struct avtab_node *avtab_search_node(struct avtab *h,
+ const struct avtab_key *key);
+
+struct avtab_node *avtab_search_node_next(struct avtab_node *node, u16 specified);
+
+#define MAX_AVTAB_HASH_BITS 16
+#define MAX_AVTAB_HASH_BUCKETS (1 << MAX_AVTAB_HASH_BITS)
+
+#endif /* _SS_AVTAB_H_ */
+
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c b/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..81ff676f20
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c
@@ -0,0 +1,758 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/* Authors: Karl MacMillan <kmacmillan@tresys.com>
+ * Frank Mayer <mayerf@tresys.com>
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2003 - 2004 Tresys Technology, LLC
+ */
+
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+
+#include "security.h"
+#include "conditional.h"
+#include "services.h"
+
+/*
+ * cond_evaluate_expr evaluates a conditional expr
+ * in reverse polish notation. It returns true (1), false (0),
+ * or undefined (-1). Undefined occurs when the expression
+ * exceeds the stack depth of COND_EXPR_MAXDEPTH.
+ */
+static int cond_evaluate_expr(struct policydb *p, struct cond_expr *expr)
+{
+ u32 i;
+ int s[COND_EXPR_MAXDEPTH];
+ int sp = -1;
+
+ if (expr->len == 0)
+ return -1;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < expr->len; i++) {
+ struct cond_expr_node *node = &expr->nodes[i];
+
+ switch (node->expr_type) {
+ case COND_BOOL:
+ if (sp == (COND_EXPR_MAXDEPTH - 1))
+ return -1;
+ sp++;
+ s[sp] = p->bool_val_to_struct[node->boolean - 1]->state;
+ break;
+ case COND_NOT:
+ if (sp < 0)
+ return -1;
+ s[sp] = !s[sp];
+ break;
+ case COND_OR:
+ if (sp < 1)
+ return -1;
+ sp--;
+ s[sp] |= s[sp + 1];
+ break;
+ case COND_AND:
+ if (sp < 1)
+ return -1;
+ sp--;
+ s[sp] &= s[sp + 1];
+ break;
+ case COND_XOR:
+ if (sp < 1)
+ return -1;
+ sp--;
+ s[sp] ^= s[sp + 1];
+ break;
+ case COND_EQ:
+ if (sp < 1)
+ return -1;
+ sp--;
+ s[sp] = (s[sp] == s[sp + 1]);
+ break;
+ case COND_NEQ:
+ if (sp < 1)
+ return -1;
+ sp--;
+ s[sp] = (s[sp] != s[sp + 1]);
+ break;
+ default:
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+ return s[0];
+}
+
+/*
+ * evaluate_cond_node evaluates the conditional stored in
+ * a struct cond_node and if the result is different than the
+ * current state of the node it sets the rules in the true/false
+ * list appropriately. If the result of the expression is undefined
+ * all of the rules are disabled for safety.
+ */
+static void evaluate_cond_node(struct policydb *p, struct cond_node *node)
+{
+ struct avtab_node *avnode;
+ int new_state;
+ u32 i;
+
+ new_state = cond_evaluate_expr(p, &node->expr);
+ if (new_state != node->cur_state) {
+ node->cur_state = new_state;
+ if (new_state == -1)
+ pr_err("SELinux: expression result was undefined - disabling all rules.\n");
+ /* turn the rules on or off */
+ for (i = 0; i < node->true_list.len; i++) {
+ avnode = node->true_list.nodes[i];
+ if (new_state <= 0)
+ avnode->key.specified &= ~AVTAB_ENABLED;
+ else
+ avnode->key.specified |= AVTAB_ENABLED;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < node->false_list.len; i++) {
+ avnode = node->false_list.nodes[i];
+ /* -1 or 1 */
+ if (new_state)
+ avnode->key.specified &= ~AVTAB_ENABLED;
+ else
+ avnode->key.specified |= AVTAB_ENABLED;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+void evaluate_cond_nodes(struct policydb *p)
+{
+ u32 i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < p->cond_list_len; i++)
+ evaluate_cond_node(p, &p->cond_list[i]);
+}
+
+void cond_policydb_init(struct policydb *p)
+{
+ p->bool_val_to_struct = NULL;
+ p->cond_list = NULL;
+ p->cond_list_len = 0;
+
+ avtab_init(&p->te_cond_avtab);
+}
+
+static void cond_node_destroy(struct cond_node *node)
+{
+ kfree(node->expr.nodes);
+ /* the avtab_ptr_t nodes are destroyed by the avtab */
+ kfree(node->true_list.nodes);
+ kfree(node->false_list.nodes);
+}
+
+static void cond_list_destroy(struct policydb *p)
+{
+ u32 i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < p->cond_list_len; i++)
+ cond_node_destroy(&p->cond_list[i]);
+ kfree(p->cond_list);
+ p->cond_list = NULL;
+ p->cond_list_len = 0;
+}
+
+void cond_policydb_destroy(struct policydb *p)
+{
+ kfree(p->bool_val_to_struct);
+ avtab_destroy(&p->te_cond_avtab);
+ cond_list_destroy(p);
+}
+
+int cond_init_bool_indexes(struct policydb *p)
+{
+ kfree(p->bool_val_to_struct);
+ p->bool_val_to_struct = kmalloc_array(p->p_bools.nprim,
+ sizeof(*p->bool_val_to_struct),
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!p->bool_val_to_struct)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int cond_destroy_bool(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
+{
+ kfree(key);
+ kfree(datum);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int cond_index_bool(void *key, void *datum, void *datap)
+{
+ struct policydb *p;
+ struct cond_bool_datum *booldatum;
+
+ booldatum = datum;
+ p = datap;
+
+ if (!booldatum->value || booldatum->value > p->p_bools.nprim)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ p->sym_val_to_name[SYM_BOOLS][booldatum->value - 1] = key;
+ p->bool_val_to_struct[booldatum->value - 1] = booldatum;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int bool_isvalid(struct cond_bool_datum *b)
+{
+ if (!(b->state == 0 || b->state == 1))
+ return 0;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int cond_read_bool(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, void *fp)
+{
+ char *key = NULL;
+ struct cond_bool_datum *booldatum;
+ __le32 buf[3];
+ u32 len;
+ int rc;
+
+ booldatum = kzalloc(sizeof(*booldatum), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!booldatum)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(buf));
+ if (rc)
+ goto err;
+
+ booldatum->value = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ booldatum->state = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ if (!bool_isvalid(booldatum))
+ goto err;
+
+ len = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+ if (((len == 0) || (len == (u32)-1)))
+ goto err;
+
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ key = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!key)
+ goto err;
+ rc = next_entry(key, fp, len);
+ if (rc)
+ goto err;
+ key[len] = '\0';
+ rc = symtab_insert(s, key, booldatum);
+ if (rc)
+ goto err;
+
+ return 0;
+err:
+ cond_destroy_bool(key, booldatum, NULL);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+struct cond_insertf_data {
+ struct policydb *p;
+ struct avtab_node **dst;
+ struct cond_av_list *other;
+};
+
+static int cond_insertf(struct avtab *a, const struct avtab_key *k,
+ const struct avtab_datum *d, void *ptr)
+{
+ struct cond_insertf_data *data = ptr;
+ struct policydb *p = data->p;
+ struct cond_av_list *other = data->other;
+ struct avtab_node *node_ptr;
+ u32 i;
+ bool found;
+
+ /*
+ * For type rules we have to make certain there aren't any
+ * conflicting rules by searching the te_avtab and the
+ * cond_te_avtab.
+ */
+ if (k->specified & AVTAB_TYPE) {
+ if (avtab_search_node(&p->te_avtab, k)) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: type rule already exists outside of a conditional.\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ /*
+ * If we are reading the false list other will be a pointer to
+ * the true list. We can have duplicate entries if there is only
+ * 1 other entry and it is in our true list.
+ *
+ * If we are reading the true list (other == NULL) there shouldn't
+ * be any other entries.
+ */
+ if (other) {
+ node_ptr = avtab_search_node(&p->te_cond_avtab, k);
+ if (node_ptr) {
+ if (avtab_search_node_next(node_ptr, k->specified)) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: too many conflicting type rules.\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ found = false;
+ for (i = 0; i < other->len; i++) {
+ if (other->nodes[i] == node_ptr) {
+ found = true;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (!found) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: conflicting type rules.\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (avtab_search_node(&p->te_cond_avtab, k)) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: conflicting type rules when adding type rule for true.\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ node_ptr = avtab_insert_nonunique(&p->te_cond_avtab, k, d);
+ if (!node_ptr) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: could not insert rule.\n");
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ *data->dst = node_ptr;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int cond_read_av_list(struct policydb *p, void *fp,
+ struct cond_av_list *list,
+ struct cond_av_list *other)
+{
+ int rc;
+ __le32 buf[1];
+ u32 i, len;
+ struct cond_insertf_data data;
+
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ if (len == 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ list->nodes = kcalloc(len, sizeof(*list->nodes), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!list->nodes)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ data.p = p;
+ data.other = other;
+ for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
+ data.dst = &list->nodes[i];
+ rc = avtab_read_item(&p->te_cond_avtab, fp, p, cond_insertf,
+ &data);
+ if (rc) {
+ kfree(list->nodes);
+ list->nodes = NULL;
+ return rc;
+ }
+ }
+
+ list->len = len;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int expr_node_isvalid(struct policydb *p, struct cond_expr_node *expr)
+{
+ if (expr->expr_type <= 0 || expr->expr_type > COND_LAST) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: conditional expressions uses unknown operator.\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (expr->boolean > p->p_bools.nprim) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: conditional expressions uses unknown bool.\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int cond_read_node(struct policydb *p, struct cond_node *node, void *fp)
+{
+ __le32 buf[2];
+ u32 i, len;
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 2);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ node->cur_state = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+
+ /* expr */
+ len = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+ node->expr.nodes = kcalloc(len, sizeof(*node->expr.nodes), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!node->expr.nodes)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ node->expr.len = len;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
+ struct cond_expr_node *expr = &node->expr.nodes[i];
+
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 2);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ expr->expr_type = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ expr->boolean = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+
+ if (!expr_node_isvalid(p, expr))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ rc = cond_read_av_list(p, fp, &node->true_list, NULL);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ return cond_read_av_list(p, fp, &node->false_list, &node->true_list);
+}
+
+int cond_read_list(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
+{
+ __le32 buf[1];
+ u32 i, len;
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(buf));
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+
+ p->cond_list = kcalloc(len, sizeof(*p->cond_list), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!p->cond_list)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ rc = avtab_alloc(&(p->te_cond_avtab), p->te_avtab.nel);
+ if (rc)
+ goto err;
+
+ p->cond_list_len = len;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
+ rc = cond_read_node(p, &p->cond_list[i], fp);
+ if (rc)
+ goto err;
+ }
+ return 0;
+err:
+ cond_list_destroy(p);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+int cond_write_bool(void *vkey, void *datum, void *ptr)
+{
+ char *key = vkey;
+ struct cond_bool_datum *booldatum = datum;
+ struct policy_data *pd = ptr;
+ void *fp = pd->fp;
+ __le32 buf[3];
+ u32 len;
+ int rc;
+
+ len = strlen(key);
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(booldatum->value);
+ buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(booldatum->state);
+ buf[2] = cpu_to_le32(len);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 3, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ rc = put_entry(key, 1, len, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * cond_write_cond_av_list doesn't write out the av_list nodes.
+ * Instead it writes out the key/value pairs from the avtab. This
+ * is necessary because there is no way to uniquely identifying rules
+ * in the avtab so it is not possible to associate individual rules
+ * in the avtab with a conditional without saving them as part of
+ * the conditional. This means that the avtab with the conditional
+ * rules will not be saved but will be rebuilt on policy load.
+ */
+static int cond_write_av_list(struct policydb *p,
+ struct cond_av_list *list, struct policy_file *fp)
+{
+ __le32 buf[1];
+ u32 i;
+ int rc;
+
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(list->len);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < list->len; i++) {
+ rc = avtab_write_item(p, list->nodes[i], fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int cond_write_node(struct policydb *p, struct cond_node *node,
+ struct policy_file *fp)
+{
+ __le32 buf[2];
+ int rc;
+ u32 i;
+
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(node->cur_state);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(node->expr.len);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < node->expr.len; i++) {
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(node->expr.nodes[i].expr_type);
+ buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(node->expr.nodes[i].boolean);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 2, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ rc = cond_write_av_list(p, &node->true_list, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ rc = cond_write_av_list(p, &node->false_list, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int cond_write_list(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
+{
+ u32 i;
+ __le32 buf[1];
+ int rc;
+
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(p->cond_list_len);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < p->cond_list_len; i++) {
+ rc = cond_write_node(p, &p->cond_list[i], fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void cond_compute_xperms(struct avtab *ctab, struct avtab_key *key,
+ struct extended_perms_decision *xpermd)
+{
+ struct avtab_node *node;
+
+ if (!ctab || !key || !xpermd)
+ return;
+
+ for (node = avtab_search_node(ctab, key); node;
+ node = avtab_search_node_next(node, key->specified)) {
+ if (node->key.specified & AVTAB_ENABLED)
+ services_compute_xperms_decision(xpermd, node);
+ }
+}
+/* Determine whether additional permissions are granted by the conditional
+ * av table, and if so, add them to the result
+ */
+void cond_compute_av(struct avtab *ctab, struct avtab_key *key,
+ struct av_decision *avd, struct extended_perms *xperms)
+{
+ struct avtab_node *node;
+
+ if (!ctab || !key || !avd)
+ return;
+
+ for (node = avtab_search_node(ctab, key); node;
+ node = avtab_search_node_next(node, key->specified)) {
+ if ((u16)(AVTAB_ALLOWED|AVTAB_ENABLED) ==
+ (node->key.specified & (AVTAB_ALLOWED|AVTAB_ENABLED)))
+ avd->allowed |= node->datum.u.data;
+ if ((u16)(AVTAB_AUDITDENY|AVTAB_ENABLED) ==
+ (node->key.specified & (AVTAB_AUDITDENY|AVTAB_ENABLED)))
+ /* Since a '0' in an auditdeny mask represents a
+ * permission we do NOT want to audit (dontaudit), we use
+ * the '&' operand to ensure that all '0's in the mask
+ * are retained (much unlike the allow and auditallow cases).
+ */
+ avd->auditdeny &= node->datum.u.data;
+ if ((u16)(AVTAB_AUDITALLOW|AVTAB_ENABLED) ==
+ (node->key.specified & (AVTAB_AUDITALLOW|AVTAB_ENABLED)))
+ avd->auditallow |= node->datum.u.data;
+ if (xperms && (node->key.specified & AVTAB_ENABLED) &&
+ (node->key.specified & AVTAB_XPERMS))
+ services_compute_xperms_drivers(xperms, node);
+ }
+}
+
+static int cond_dup_av_list(struct cond_av_list *new,
+ struct cond_av_list *orig,
+ struct avtab *avtab)
+{
+ u32 i;
+
+ memset(new, 0, sizeof(*new));
+
+ new->nodes = kcalloc(orig->len, sizeof(*new->nodes), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!new->nodes)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < orig->len; i++) {
+ new->nodes[i] = avtab_insert_nonunique(avtab,
+ &orig->nodes[i]->key,
+ &orig->nodes[i]->datum);
+ if (!new->nodes[i])
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ new->len++;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int duplicate_policydb_cond_list(struct policydb *newp,
+ struct policydb *origp)
+{
+ int rc;
+ u32 i;
+
+ rc = avtab_alloc_dup(&newp->te_cond_avtab, &origp->te_cond_avtab);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ newp->cond_list_len = 0;
+ newp->cond_list = kcalloc(origp->cond_list_len,
+ sizeof(*newp->cond_list),
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!newp->cond_list)
+ goto error;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < origp->cond_list_len; i++) {
+ struct cond_node *newn = &newp->cond_list[i];
+ struct cond_node *orign = &origp->cond_list[i];
+
+ newp->cond_list_len++;
+
+ newn->cur_state = orign->cur_state;
+ newn->expr.nodes = kmemdup(orign->expr.nodes,
+ orign->expr.len * sizeof(*orign->expr.nodes),
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!newn->expr.nodes)
+ goto error;
+
+ newn->expr.len = orign->expr.len;
+
+ rc = cond_dup_av_list(&newn->true_list, &orign->true_list,
+ &newp->te_cond_avtab);
+ if (rc)
+ goto error;
+
+ rc = cond_dup_av_list(&newn->false_list, &orign->false_list,
+ &newp->te_cond_avtab);
+ if (rc)
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+
+error:
+ avtab_destroy(&newp->te_cond_avtab);
+ cond_list_destroy(newp);
+ return -ENOMEM;
+}
+
+static int cond_bools_destroy(void *key, void *datum, void *args)
+{
+ /* key was not copied so no need to free here */
+ kfree(datum);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int cond_bools_copy(struct hashtab_node *new, struct hashtab_node *orig, void *args)
+{
+ struct cond_bool_datum *datum;
+
+ datum = kmemdup(orig->datum, sizeof(struct cond_bool_datum),
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!datum)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ new->key = orig->key; /* No need to copy, never modified */
+ new->datum = datum;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int cond_bools_index(void *key, void *datum, void *args)
+{
+ struct cond_bool_datum *booldatum, **cond_bool_array;
+
+ booldatum = datum;
+ cond_bool_array = args;
+ cond_bool_array[booldatum->value - 1] = booldatum;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int duplicate_policydb_bools(struct policydb *newdb,
+ struct policydb *orig)
+{
+ struct cond_bool_datum **cond_bool_array;
+ int rc;
+
+ cond_bool_array = kmalloc_array(orig->p_bools.nprim,
+ sizeof(*orig->bool_val_to_struct),
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!cond_bool_array)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ rc = hashtab_duplicate(&newdb->p_bools.table, &orig->p_bools.table,
+ cond_bools_copy, cond_bools_destroy, NULL);
+ if (rc) {
+ kfree(cond_bool_array);
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ hashtab_map(&newdb->p_bools.table, cond_bools_index, cond_bool_array);
+ newdb->bool_val_to_struct = cond_bool_array;
+
+ newdb->p_bools.nprim = orig->p_bools.nprim;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void cond_policydb_destroy_dup(struct policydb *p)
+{
+ hashtab_map(&p->p_bools.table, cond_bools_destroy, NULL);
+ hashtab_destroy(&p->p_bools.table);
+ cond_policydb_destroy(p);
+}
+
+int cond_policydb_dup(struct policydb *new, struct policydb *orig)
+{
+ cond_policydb_init(new);
+
+ if (duplicate_policydb_bools(new, orig))
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ if (duplicate_policydb_cond_list(new, orig)) {
+ cond_policydb_destroy_dup(new);
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/conditional.h b/security/selinux/ss/conditional.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..5a7b51278d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/conditional.h
@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+/* Authors: Karl MacMillan <kmacmillan@tresys.com>
+ * Frank Mayer <mayerf@tresys.com>
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2003 - 2004 Tresys Technology, LLC
+ */
+
+#ifndef _CONDITIONAL_H_
+#define _CONDITIONAL_H_
+
+#include "avtab.h"
+#include "symtab.h"
+#include "policydb.h"
+#include "../include/conditional.h"
+
+#define COND_EXPR_MAXDEPTH 10
+
+/*
+ * A conditional expression is a list of operators and operands
+ * in reverse polish notation.
+ */
+struct cond_expr_node {
+#define COND_BOOL 1 /* plain bool */
+#define COND_NOT 2 /* !bool */
+#define COND_OR 3 /* bool || bool */
+#define COND_AND 4 /* bool && bool */
+#define COND_XOR 5 /* bool ^ bool */
+#define COND_EQ 6 /* bool == bool */
+#define COND_NEQ 7 /* bool != bool */
+#define COND_LAST COND_NEQ
+ u32 expr_type;
+ u32 boolean;
+};
+
+struct cond_expr {
+ struct cond_expr_node *nodes;
+ u32 len;
+};
+
+/*
+ * Each cond_node contains a list of rules to be enabled/disabled
+ * depending on the current value of the conditional expression. This
+ * struct is for that list.
+ */
+struct cond_av_list {
+ struct avtab_node **nodes;
+ u32 len;
+};
+
+/*
+ * A cond node represents a conditional block in a policy. It
+ * contains a conditional expression, the current state of the expression,
+ * two lists of rules to enable/disable depending on the value of the
+ * expression (the true list corresponds to if and the false list corresponds
+ * to else)..
+ */
+struct cond_node {
+ int cur_state;
+ struct cond_expr expr;
+ struct cond_av_list true_list;
+ struct cond_av_list false_list;
+};
+
+void cond_policydb_init(struct policydb *p);
+void cond_policydb_destroy(struct policydb *p);
+
+int cond_init_bool_indexes(struct policydb *p);
+int cond_destroy_bool(void *key, void *datum, void *p);
+
+int cond_index_bool(void *key, void *datum, void *datap);
+
+int cond_read_bool(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, void *fp);
+int cond_read_list(struct policydb *p, void *fp);
+int cond_write_bool(void *key, void *datum, void *ptr);
+int cond_write_list(struct policydb *p, void *fp);
+
+void cond_compute_av(struct avtab *ctab, struct avtab_key *key,
+ struct av_decision *avd, struct extended_perms *xperms);
+void cond_compute_xperms(struct avtab *ctab, struct avtab_key *key,
+ struct extended_perms_decision *xpermd);
+void evaluate_cond_nodes(struct policydb *p);
+void cond_policydb_destroy_dup(struct policydb *p);
+int cond_policydb_dup(struct policydb *new, struct policydb *orig);
+
+#endif /* _CONDITIONAL_H_ */
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/constraint.h b/security/selinux/ss/constraint.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..f76eb3128a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/constraint.h
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * A constraint is a condition that must be satisfied in
+ * order for one or more permissions to be granted.
+ * Constraints are used to impose additional restrictions
+ * beyond the type-based rules in `te' or the role-based
+ * transition rules in `rbac'. Constraints are typically
+ * used to prevent a process from transitioning to a new user
+ * identity or role unless it is in a privileged type.
+ * Constraints are likewise typically used to prevent a
+ * process from labeling an object with a different user
+ * identity.
+ *
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
+ */
+#ifndef _SS_CONSTRAINT_H_
+#define _SS_CONSTRAINT_H_
+
+#include "ebitmap.h"
+
+#define CEXPR_MAXDEPTH 5
+
+struct constraint_expr {
+#define CEXPR_NOT 1 /* not expr */
+#define CEXPR_AND 2 /* expr and expr */
+#define CEXPR_OR 3 /* expr or expr */
+#define CEXPR_ATTR 4 /* attr op attr */
+#define CEXPR_NAMES 5 /* attr op names */
+ u32 expr_type; /* expression type */
+
+#define CEXPR_USER 1 /* user */
+#define CEXPR_ROLE 2 /* role */
+#define CEXPR_TYPE 4 /* type */
+#define CEXPR_TARGET 8 /* target if set, source otherwise */
+#define CEXPR_XTARGET 16 /* special 3rd target for validatetrans rule */
+#define CEXPR_L1L2 32 /* low level 1 vs. low level 2 */
+#define CEXPR_L1H2 64 /* low level 1 vs. high level 2 */
+#define CEXPR_H1L2 128 /* high level 1 vs. low level 2 */
+#define CEXPR_H1H2 256 /* high level 1 vs. high level 2 */
+#define CEXPR_L1H1 512 /* low level 1 vs. high level 1 */
+#define CEXPR_L2H2 1024 /* low level 2 vs. high level 2 */
+ u32 attr; /* attribute */
+
+#define CEXPR_EQ 1 /* == or eq */
+#define CEXPR_NEQ 2 /* != */
+#define CEXPR_DOM 3 /* dom */
+#define CEXPR_DOMBY 4 /* domby */
+#define CEXPR_INCOMP 5 /* incomp */
+ u32 op; /* operator */
+
+ struct ebitmap names; /* names */
+ struct type_set *type_names;
+
+ struct constraint_expr *next; /* next expression */
+};
+
+struct constraint_node {
+ u32 permissions; /* constrained permissions */
+ struct constraint_expr *expr; /* constraint on permissions */
+ struct constraint_node *next; /* next constraint */
+};
+
+#endif /* _SS_CONSTRAINT_H_ */
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/context.c b/security/selinux/ss/context.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..38bc0aa524
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/context.c
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Implementations of the security context functions.
+ *
+ * Author: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnacek@gmail.com>
+ * Copyright (C) 2020 Red Hat, Inc.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/jhash.h>
+
+#include "context.h"
+#include "mls.h"
+
+u32 context_compute_hash(const struct context *c)
+{
+ u32 hash = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * If a context is invalid, it will always be represented by a
+ * context struct with only the len & str set (and vice versa)
+ * under a given policy. Since context structs from different
+ * policies should never meet, it is safe to hash valid and
+ * invalid contexts differently. The context_cmp() function
+ * already operates under the same assumption.
+ */
+ if (c->len)
+ return full_name_hash(NULL, c->str, c->len);
+
+ hash = jhash_3words(c->user, c->role, c->type, hash);
+ hash = mls_range_hash(&c->range, hash);
+ return hash;
+}
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/context.h b/security/selinux/ss/context.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..1f59468c07
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/context.h
@@ -0,0 +1,201 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * A security context is a set of security attributes
+ * associated with each subject and object controlled
+ * by the security policy. Security contexts are
+ * externally represented as variable-length strings
+ * that can be interpreted by a user or application
+ * with an understanding of the security policy.
+ * Internally, the security server uses a simple
+ * structure. This structure is private to the
+ * security server and can be changed without affecting
+ * clients of the security server.
+ *
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
+ */
+#ifndef _SS_CONTEXT_H_
+#define _SS_CONTEXT_H_
+
+#include "ebitmap.h"
+#include "mls_types.h"
+#include "security.h"
+
+/*
+ * A security context consists of an authenticated user
+ * identity, a role, a type and a MLS range.
+ */
+struct context {
+ u32 user;
+ u32 role;
+ u32 type;
+ u32 len; /* length of string in bytes */
+ struct mls_range range;
+ char *str; /* string representation if context cannot be mapped. */
+};
+
+static inline void mls_context_init(struct context *c)
+{
+ memset(&c->range, 0, sizeof(c->range));
+}
+
+static inline int mls_context_cpy(struct context *dst, const struct context *src)
+{
+ int rc;
+
+ dst->range.level[0].sens = src->range.level[0].sens;
+ rc = ebitmap_cpy(&dst->range.level[0].cat, &src->range.level[0].cat);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ dst->range.level[1].sens = src->range.level[1].sens;
+ rc = ebitmap_cpy(&dst->range.level[1].cat, &src->range.level[1].cat);
+ if (rc)
+ ebitmap_destroy(&dst->range.level[0].cat);
+out:
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Sets both levels in the MLS range of 'dst' to the low level of 'src'.
+ */
+static inline int mls_context_cpy_low(struct context *dst, const struct context *src)
+{
+ int rc;
+
+ dst->range.level[0].sens = src->range.level[0].sens;
+ rc = ebitmap_cpy(&dst->range.level[0].cat, &src->range.level[0].cat);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ dst->range.level[1].sens = src->range.level[0].sens;
+ rc = ebitmap_cpy(&dst->range.level[1].cat, &src->range.level[0].cat);
+ if (rc)
+ ebitmap_destroy(&dst->range.level[0].cat);
+out:
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Sets both levels in the MLS range of 'dst' to the high level of 'src'.
+ */
+static inline int mls_context_cpy_high(struct context *dst, const struct context *src)
+{
+ int rc;
+
+ dst->range.level[0].sens = src->range.level[1].sens;
+ rc = ebitmap_cpy(&dst->range.level[0].cat, &src->range.level[1].cat);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ dst->range.level[1].sens = src->range.level[1].sens;
+ rc = ebitmap_cpy(&dst->range.level[1].cat, &src->range.level[1].cat);
+ if (rc)
+ ebitmap_destroy(&dst->range.level[0].cat);
+out:
+ return rc;
+}
+
+
+static inline int mls_context_glblub(struct context *dst,
+ const struct context *c1, const struct context *c2)
+{
+ struct mls_range *dr = &dst->range;
+ const struct mls_range *r1 = &c1->range, *r2 = &c2->range;
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ if (r1->level[1].sens < r2->level[0].sens ||
+ r2->level[1].sens < r1->level[0].sens)
+ /* These ranges have no common sensitivities */
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /* Take the greatest of the low */
+ dr->level[0].sens = max(r1->level[0].sens, r2->level[0].sens);
+
+ /* Take the least of the high */
+ dr->level[1].sens = min(r1->level[1].sens, r2->level[1].sens);
+
+ rc = ebitmap_and(&dr->level[0].cat,
+ &r1->level[0].cat, &r2->level[0].cat);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ rc = ebitmap_and(&dr->level[1].cat,
+ &r1->level[1].cat, &r2->level[1].cat);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+out:
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static inline int mls_context_cmp(const struct context *c1, const struct context *c2)
+{
+ return ((c1->range.level[0].sens == c2->range.level[0].sens) &&
+ ebitmap_cmp(&c1->range.level[0].cat, &c2->range.level[0].cat) &&
+ (c1->range.level[1].sens == c2->range.level[1].sens) &&
+ ebitmap_cmp(&c1->range.level[1].cat, &c2->range.level[1].cat));
+}
+
+static inline void mls_context_destroy(struct context *c)
+{
+ ebitmap_destroy(&c->range.level[0].cat);
+ ebitmap_destroy(&c->range.level[1].cat);
+ mls_context_init(c);
+}
+
+static inline void context_init(struct context *c)
+{
+ memset(c, 0, sizeof(*c));
+}
+
+static inline int context_cpy(struct context *dst, const struct context *src)
+{
+ int rc;
+
+ dst->user = src->user;
+ dst->role = src->role;
+ dst->type = src->type;
+ if (src->str) {
+ dst->str = kstrdup(src->str, GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!dst->str)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ dst->len = src->len;
+ } else {
+ dst->str = NULL;
+ dst->len = 0;
+ }
+ rc = mls_context_cpy(dst, src);
+ if (rc) {
+ kfree(dst->str);
+ dst->str = NULL;
+ dst->len = 0;
+ return rc;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline void context_destroy(struct context *c)
+{
+ c->user = c->role = c->type = 0;
+ kfree(c->str);
+ c->str = NULL;
+ c->len = 0;
+ mls_context_destroy(c);
+}
+
+static inline int context_cmp(const struct context *c1, const struct context *c2)
+{
+ if (c1->len && c2->len)
+ return (c1->len == c2->len && !strcmp(c1->str, c2->str));
+ if (c1->len || c2->len)
+ return 0;
+ return ((c1->user == c2->user) &&
+ (c1->role == c2->role) &&
+ (c1->type == c2->type) &&
+ mls_context_cmp(c1, c2));
+}
+
+u32 context_compute_hash(const struct context *c);
+
+#endif /* _SS_CONTEXT_H_ */
+
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..77875ad355
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c
@@ -0,0 +1,564 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Implementation of the extensible bitmap type.
+ *
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
+ */
+/*
+ * Updated: Hewlett-Packard <paul@paul-moore.com>
+ *
+ * Added support to import/export the NetLabel category bitmap
+ *
+ * (c) Copyright Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P., 2006
+ */
+/*
+ * Updated: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com>
+ * Applied standard bit operations to improve bitmap scanning.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/jhash.h>
+#include <net/netlabel.h>
+#include "ebitmap.h"
+#include "policydb.h"
+
+#define BITS_PER_U64 (sizeof(u64) * 8)
+
+static struct kmem_cache *ebitmap_node_cachep __ro_after_init;
+
+int ebitmap_cmp(const struct ebitmap *e1, const struct ebitmap *e2)
+{
+ const struct ebitmap_node *n1, *n2;
+
+ if (e1->highbit != e2->highbit)
+ return 0;
+
+ n1 = e1->node;
+ n2 = e2->node;
+ while (n1 && n2 &&
+ (n1->startbit == n2->startbit) &&
+ !memcmp(n1->maps, n2->maps, EBITMAP_SIZE / 8)) {
+ n1 = n1->next;
+ n2 = n2->next;
+ }
+
+ if (n1 || n2)
+ return 0;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int ebitmap_cpy(struct ebitmap *dst, const struct ebitmap *src)
+{
+ struct ebitmap_node *new, *prev;
+ const struct ebitmap_node *n;
+
+ ebitmap_init(dst);
+ n = src->node;
+ prev = NULL;
+ while (n) {
+ new = kmem_cache_zalloc(ebitmap_node_cachep, GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!new) {
+ ebitmap_destroy(dst);
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+ new->startbit = n->startbit;
+ memcpy(new->maps, n->maps, EBITMAP_SIZE / 8);
+ new->next = NULL;
+ if (prev)
+ prev->next = new;
+ else
+ dst->node = new;
+ prev = new;
+ n = n->next;
+ }
+
+ dst->highbit = src->highbit;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int ebitmap_and(struct ebitmap *dst, const struct ebitmap *e1, const struct ebitmap *e2)
+{
+ struct ebitmap_node *n;
+ int bit, rc;
+
+ ebitmap_init(dst);
+
+ ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(e1, n, bit) {
+ if (ebitmap_get_bit(e2, bit)) {
+ rc = ebitmap_set_bit(dst, bit, 1);
+ if (rc < 0)
+ return rc;
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_NETLABEL
+/**
+ * ebitmap_netlbl_export - Export an ebitmap into a NetLabel category bitmap
+ * @ebmap: the ebitmap to export
+ * @catmap: the NetLabel category bitmap
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Export a SELinux extensibile bitmap into a NetLabel category bitmap.
+ * Returns zero on success, negative values on error.
+ *
+ */
+int ebitmap_netlbl_export(struct ebitmap *ebmap,
+ struct netlbl_lsm_catmap **catmap)
+{
+ struct ebitmap_node *e_iter = ebmap->node;
+ unsigned long e_map;
+ u32 offset;
+ unsigned int iter;
+ int rc;
+
+ if (e_iter == NULL) {
+ *catmap = NULL;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (*catmap != NULL)
+ netlbl_catmap_free(*catmap);
+ *catmap = NULL;
+
+ while (e_iter) {
+ offset = e_iter->startbit;
+ for (iter = 0; iter < EBITMAP_UNIT_NUMS; iter++) {
+ e_map = e_iter->maps[iter];
+ if (e_map != 0) {
+ rc = netlbl_catmap_setlong(catmap,
+ offset,
+ e_map,
+ GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (rc != 0)
+ goto netlbl_export_failure;
+ }
+ offset += EBITMAP_UNIT_SIZE;
+ }
+ e_iter = e_iter->next;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+
+netlbl_export_failure:
+ netlbl_catmap_free(*catmap);
+ return -ENOMEM;
+}
+
+/**
+ * ebitmap_netlbl_import - Import a NetLabel category bitmap into an ebitmap
+ * @ebmap: the ebitmap to import
+ * @catmap: the NetLabel category bitmap
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Import a NetLabel category bitmap into a SELinux extensibile bitmap.
+ * Returns zero on success, negative values on error.
+ *
+ */
+int ebitmap_netlbl_import(struct ebitmap *ebmap,
+ struct netlbl_lsm_catmap *catmap)
+{
+ int rc;
+ struct ebitmap_node *e_iter = NULL;
+ struct ebitmap_node *e_prev = NULL;
+ u32 offset = 0, idx;
+ unsigned long bitmap;
+
+ for (;;) {
+ rc = netlbl_catmap_getlong(catmap, &offset, &bitmap);
+ if (rc < 0)
+ goto netlbl_import_failure;
+ if (offset == (u32)-1)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* don't waste ebitmap space if the netlabel bitmap is empty */
+ if (bitmap == 0) {
+ offset += EBITMAP_UNIT_SIZE;
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ if (e_iter == NULL ||
+ offset >= e_iter->startbit + EBITMAP_SIZE) {
+ e_prev = e_iter;
+ e_iter = kmem_cache_zalloc(ebitmap_node_cachep, GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (e_iter == NULL)
+ goto netlbl_import_failure;
+ e_iter->startbit = offset - (offset % EBITMAP_SIZE);
+ if (e_prev == NULL)
+ ebmap->node = e_iter;
+ else
+ e_prev->next = e_iter;
+ ebmap->highbit = e_iter->startbit + EBITMAP_SIZE;
+ }
+
+ /* offset will always be aligned to an unsigned long */
+ idx = EBITMAP_NODE_INDEX(e_iter, offset);
+ e_iter->maps[idx] = bitmap;
+
+ /* next */
+ offset += EBITMAP_UNIT_SIZE;
+ }
+
+ /* NOTE: we should never reach this return */
+ return 0;
+
+netlbl_import_failure:
+ ebitmap_destroy(ebmap);
+ return -ENOMEM;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_NETLABEL */
+
+/*
+ * Check to see if all the bits set in e2 are also set in e1. Optionally,
+ * if last_e2bit is non-zero, the highest set bit in e2 cannot exceed
+ * last_e2bit.
+ */
+int ebitmap_contains(const struct ebitmap *e1, const struct ebitmap *e2, u32 last_e2bit)
+{
+ const struct ebitmap_node *n1, *n2;
+ int i;
+
+ if (e1->highbit < e2->highbit)
+ return 0;
+
+ n1 = e1->node;
+ n2 = e2->node;
+
+ while (n1 && n2 && (n1->startbit <= n2->startbit)) {
+ if (n1->startbit < n2->startbit) {
+ n1 = n1->next;
+ continue;
+ }
+ for (i = EBITMAP_UNIT_NUMS - 1; (i >= 0) && !n2->maps[i]; )
+ i--; /* Skip trailing NULL map entries */
+ if (last_e2bit && (i >= 0)) {
+ u32 lastsetbit = n2->startbit + i * EBITMAP_UNIT_SIZE +
+ __fls(n2->maps[i]);
+ if (lastsetbit > last_e2bit)
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ while (i >= 0) {
+ if ((n1->maps[i] & n2->maps[i]) != n2->maps[i])
+ return 0;
+ i--;
+ }
+
+ n1 = n1->next;
+ n2 = n2->next;
+ }
+
+ if (n2)
+ return 0;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int ebitmap_get_bit(const struct ebitmap *e, unsigned long bit)
+{
+ const struct ebitmap_node *n;
+
+ if (e->highbit < bit)
+ return 0;
+
+ n = e->node;
+ while (n && (n->startbit <= bit)) {
+ if ((n->startbit + EBITMAP_SIZE) > bit)
+ return ebitmap_node_get_bit(n, bit);
+ n = n->next;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int ebitmap_set_bit(struct ebitmap *e, unsigned long bit, int value)
+{
+ struct ebitmap_node *n, *prev, *new;
+
+ prev = NULL;
+ n = e->node;
+ while (n && n->startbit <= bit) {
+ if ((n->startbit + EBITMAP_SIZE) > bit) {
+ if (value) {
+ ebitmap_node_set_bit(n, bit);
+ } else {
+ unsigned int s;
+
+ ebitmap_node_clr_bit(n, bit);
+
+ s = find_first_bit(n->maps, EBITMAP_SIZE);
+ if (s < EBITMAP_SIZE)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* drop this node from the bitmap */
+ if (!n->next) {
+ /*
+ * this was the highest map
+ * within the bitmap
+ */
+ if (prev)
+ e->highbit = prev->startbit
+ + EBITMAP_SIZE;
+ else
+ e->highbit = 0;
+ }
+ if (prev)
+ prev->next = n->next;
+ else
+ e->node = n->next;
+ kmem_cache_free(ebitmap_node_cachep, n);
+ }
+ return 0;
+ }
+ prev = n;
+ n = n->next;
+ }
+
+ if (!value)
+ return 0;
+
+ new = kmem_cache_zalloc(ebitmap_node_cachep, GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!new)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ new->startbit = bit - (bit % EBITMAP_SIZE);
+ ebitmap_node_set_bit(new, bit);
+
+ if (!n)
+ /* this node will be the highest map within the bitmap */
+ e->highbit = new->startbit + EBITMAP_SIZE;
+
+ if (prev) {
+ new->next = prev->next;
+ prev->next = new;
+ } else {
+ new->next = e->node;
+ e->node = new;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void ebitmap_destroy(struct ebitmap *e)
+{
+ struct ebitmap_node *n, *temp;
+
+ if (!e)
+ return;
+
+ n = e->node;
+ while (n) {
+ temp = n;
+ n = n->next;
+ kmem_cache_free(ebitmap_node_cachep, temp);
+ }
+
+ e->highbit = 0;
+ e->node = NULL;
+}
+
+int ebitmap_read(struct ebitmap *e, void *fp)
+{
+ struct ebitmap_node *n = NULL;
+ u32 mapunit, count, startbit, index;
+ __le32 ebitmap_start;
+ u64 map;
+ __le64 mapbits;
+ __le32 buf[3];
+ int rc, i;
+
+ ebitmap_init(e);
+
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof buf);
+ if (rc < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ mapunit = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ e->highbit = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+ count = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+
+ if (mapunit != BITS_PER_U64) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: ebitmap: map size %u does not "
+ "match my size %zd (high bit was %d)\n",
+ mapunit, BITS_PER_U64, e->highbit);
+ goto bad;
+ }
+
+ /* round up e->highbit */
+ e->highbit += EBITMAP_SIZE - 1;
+ e->highbit -= (e->highbit % EBITMAP_SIZE);
+
+ if (!e->highbit) {
+ e->node = NULL;
+ goto ok;
+ }
+
+ if (e->highbit && !count)
+ goto bad;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
+ rc = next_entry(&ebitmap_start, fp, sizeof(u32));
+ if (rc < 0) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: ebitmap: truncated map\n");
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ startbit = le32_to_cpu(ebitmap_start);
+
+ if (startbit & (mapunit - 1)) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: ebitmap start bit (%d) is "
+ "not a multiple of the map unit size (%u)\n",
+ startbit, mapunit);
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ if (startbit > e->highbit - mapunit) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: ebitmap start bit (%d) is "
+ "beyond the end of the bitmap (%u)\n",
+ startbit, (e->highbit - mapunit));
+ goto bad;
+ }
+
+ if (!n || startbit >= n->startbit + EBITMAP_SIZE) {
+ struct ebitmap_node *tmp;
+ tmp = kmem_cache_zalloc(ebitmap_node_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!tmp) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: ebitmap: out of memory\n");
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ /* round down */
+ tmp->startbit = startbit - (startbit % EBITMAP_SIZE);
+ if (n)
+ n->next = tmp;
+ else
+ e->node = tmp;
+ n = tmp;
+ } else if (startbit <= n->startbit) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: ebitmap: start bit %d"
+ " comes after start bit %d\n",
+ startbit, n->startbit);
+ goto bad;
+ }
+
+ rc = next_entry(&mapbits, fp, sizeof(u64));
+ if (rc < 0) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: ebitmap: truncated map\n");
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ map = le64_to_cpu(mapbits);
+
+ index = (startbit - n->startbit) / EBITMAP_UNIT_SIZE;
+ while (map) {
+ n->maps[index++] = map & (-1UL);
+ map = EBITMAP_SHIFT_UNIT_SIZE(map);
+ }
+ }
+ok:
+ rc = 0;
+out:
+ return rc;
+bad:
+ if (!rc)
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ ebitmap_destroy(e);
+ goto out;
+}
+
+int ebitmap_write(const struct ebitmap *e, void *fp)
+{
+ struct ebitmap_node *n;
+ u32 count;
+ __le32 buf[3];
+ u64 map;
+ int bit, last_bit, last_startbit, rc;
+
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(BITS_PER_U64);
+
+ count = 0;
+ last_bit = 0;
+ last_startbit = -1;
+ ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(e, n, bit) {
+ if (rounddown(bit, (int)BITS_PER_U64) > last_startbit) {
+ count++;
+ last_startbit = rounddown(bit, BITS_PER_U64);
+ }
+ last_bit = roundup(bit + 1, BITS_PER_U64);
+ }
+ buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(last_bit);
+ buf[2] = cpu_to_le32(count);
+
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 3, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ map = 0;
+ last_startbit = INT_MIN;
+ ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(e, n, bit) {
+ if (rounddown(bit, (int)BITS_PER_U64) > last_startbit) {
+ __le64 buf64[1];
+
+ /* this is the very first bit */
+ if (!map) {
+ last_startbit = rounddown(bit, BITS_PER_U64);
+ map = (u64)1 << (bit - last_startbit);
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /* write the last node */
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(last_startbit);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ buf64[0] = cpu_to_le64(map);
+ rc = put_entry(buf64, sizeof(u64), 1, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ /* set up for the next node */
+ map = 0;
+ last_startbit = rounddown(bit, BITS_PER_U64);
+ }
+ map |= (u64)1 << (bit - last_startbit);
+ }
+ /* write the last node */
+ if (map) {
+ __le64 buf64[1];
+
+ /* write the last node */
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(last_startbit);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ buf64[0] = cpu_to_le64(map);
+ rc = put_entry(buf64, sizeof(u64), 1, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+u32 ebitmap_hash(const struct ebitmap *e, u32 hash)
+{
+ struct ebitmap_node *node;
+
+ /* need to change hash even if ebitmap is empty */
+ hash = jhash_1word(e->highbit, hash);
+ for (node = e->node; node; node = node->next) {
+ hash = jhash_1word(node->startbit, hash);
+ hash = jhash(node->maps, sizeof(node->maps), hash);
+ }
+ return hash;
+}
+
+void __init ebitmap_cache_init(void)
+{
+ ebitmap_node_cachep = kmem_cache_create("ebitmap_node",
+ sizeof(struct ebitmap_node),
+ 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
+}
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e3c807cfad
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h
@@ -0,0 +1,154 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * An extensible bitmap is a bitmap that supports an
+ * arbitrary number of bits. Extensible bitmaps are
+ * used to represent sets of values, such as types,
+ * roles, categories, and classes.
+ *
+ * Each extensible bitmap is implemented as a linked
+ * list of bitmap nodes, where each bitmap node has
+ * an explicitly specified starting bit position within
+ * the total bitmap.
+ *
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
+ */
+#ifndef _SS_EBITMAP_H_
+#define _SS_EBITMAP_H_
+
+#include <net/netlabel.h>
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_64BIT
+#define EBITMAP_NODE_SIZE 64
+#else
+#define EBITMAP_NODE_SIZE 32
+#endif
+
+#define EBITMAP_UNIT_NUMS ((EBITMAP_NODE_SIZE-sizeof(void *)-sizeof(u32))\
+ / sizeof(unsigned long))
+#define EBITMAP_UNIT_SIZE BITS_PER_LONG
+#define EBITMAP_SIZE (EBITMAP_UNIT_NUMS * EBITMAP_UNIT_SIZE)
+#define EBITMAP_BIT 1ULL
+#define EBITMAP_SHIFT_UNIT_SIZE(x) \
+ (((x) >> EBITMAP_UNIT_SIZE / 2) >> EBITMAP_UNIT_SIZE / 2)
+
+struct ebitmap_node {
+ struct ebitmap_node *next;
+ unsigned long maps[EBITMAP_UNIT_NUMS];
+ u32 startbit;
+};
+
+struct ebitmap {
+ struct ebitmap_node *node; /* first node in the bitmap */
+ u32 highbit; /* highest position in the total bitmap */
+};
+
+#define ebitmap_length(e) ((e)->highbit)
+
+static inline unsigned int ebitmap_start_positive(const struct ebitmap *e,
+ struct ebitmap_node **n)
+{
+ unsigned int ofs;
+
+ for (*n = e->node; *n; *n = (*n)->next) {
+ ofs = find_first_bit((*n)->maps, EBITMAP_SIZE);
+ if (ofs < EBITMAP_SIZE)
+ return (*n)->startbit + ofs;
+ }
+ return ebitmap_length(e);
+}
+
+static inline void ebitmap_init(struct ebitmap *e)
+{
+ memset(e, 0, sizeof(*e));
+}
+
+static inline unsigned int ebitmap_next_positive(const struct ebitmap *e,
+ struct ebitmap_node **n,
+ unsigned int bit)
+{
+ unsigned int ofs;
+
+ ofs = find_next_bit((*n)->maps, EBITMAP_SIZE, bit - (*n)->startbit + 1);
+ if (ofs < EBITMAP_SIZE)
+ return ofs + (*n)->startbit;
+
+ for (*n = (*n)->next; *n; *n = (*n)->next) {
+ ofs = find_first_bit((*n)->maps, EBITMAP_SIZE);
+ if (ofs < EBITMAP_SIZE)
+ return ofs + (*n)->startbit;
+ }
+ return ebitmap_length(e);
+}
+
+#define EBITMAP_NODE_INDEX(node, bit) \
+ (((bit) - (node)->startbit) / EBITMAP_UNIT_SIZE)
+#define EBITMAP_NODE_OFFSET(node, bit) \
+ (((bit) - (node)->startbit) % EBITMAP_UNIT_SIZE)
+
+static inline int ebitmap_node_get_bit(const struct ebitmap_node *n,
+ unsigned int bit)
+{
+ unsigned int index = EBITMAP_NODE_INDEX(n, bit);
+ unsigned int ofs = EBITMAP_NODE_OFFSET(n, bit);
+
+ BUG_ON(index >= EBITMAP_UNIT_NUMS);
+ if ((n->maps[index] & (EBITMAP_BIT << ofs)))
+ return 1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline void ebitmap_node_set_bit(struct ebitmap_node *n,
+ unsigned int bit)
+{
+ unsigned int index = EBITMAP_NODE_INDEX(n, bit);
+ unsigned int ofs = EBITMAP_NODE_OFFSET(n, bit);
+
+ BUG_ON(index >= EBITMAP_UNIT_NUMS);
+ n->maps[index] |= (EBITMAP_BIT << ofs);
+}
+
+static inline void ebitmap_node_clr_bit(struct ebitmap_node *n,
+ unsigned int bit)
+{
+ unsigned int index = EBITMAP_NODE_INDEX(n, bit);
+ unsigned int ofs = EBITMAP_NODE_OFFSET(n, bit);
+
+ BUG_ON(index >= EBITMAP_UNIT_NUMS);
+ n->maps[index] &= ~(EBITMAP_BIT << ofs);
+}
+
+#define ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(e, n, bit) \
+ for ((bit) = ebitmap_start_positive(e, &(n)); \
+ (bit) < ebitmap_length(e); \
+ (bit) = ebitmap_next_positive(e, &(n), bit)) \
+
+int ebitmap_cmp(const struct ebitmap *e1, const struct ebitmap *e2);
+int ebitmap_cpy(struct ebitmap *dst, const struct ebitmap *src);
+int ebitmap_and(struct ebitmap *dst, const struct ebitmap *e1, const struct ebitmap *e2);
+int ebitmap_contains(const struct ebitmap *e1, const struct ebitmap *e2, u32 last_e2bit);
+int ebitmap_get_bit(const struct ebitmap *e, unsigned long bit);
+int ebitmap_set_bit(struct ebitmap *e, unsigned long bit, int value);
+void ebitmap_destroy(struct ebitmap *e);
+int ebitmap_read(struct ebitmap *e, void *fp);
+int ebitmap_write(const struct ebitmap *e, void *fp);
+u32 ebitmap_hash(const struct ebitmap *e, u32 hash);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_NETLABEL
+int ebitmap_netlbl_export(struct ebitmap *ebmap,
+ struct netlbl_lsm_catmap **catmap);
+int ebitmap_netlbl_import(struct ebitmap *ebmap,
+ struct netlbl_lsm_catmap *catmap);
+#else
+static inline int ebitmap_netlbl_export(struct ebitmap *ebmap,
+ struct netlbl_lsm_catmap **catmap)
+{
+ return -ENOMEM;
+}
+static inline int ebitmap_netlbl_import(struct ebitmap *ebmap,
+ struct netlbl_lsm_catmap *catmap)
+{
+ return -ENOMEM;
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* _SS_EBITMAP_H_ */
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..ac5cdddfbf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c
@@ -0,0 +1,194 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Implementation of the hash table type.
+ *
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
+ */
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include "hashtab.h"
+#include "security.h"
+
+static struct kmem_cache *hashtab_node_cachep __ro_after_init;
+
+/*
+ * Here we simply round the number of elements up to the nearest power of two.
+ * I tried also other options like rounding down or rounding to the closest
+ * power of two (up or down based on which is closer), but I was unable to
+ * find any significant difference in lookup/insert performance that would
+ * justify switching to a different (less intuitive) formula. It could be that
+ * a different formula is actually more optimal, but any future changes here
+ * should be supported with performance/memory usage data.
+ *
+ * The total memory used by the htable arrays (only) with Fedora policy loaded
+ * is approximately 163 KB at the time of writing.
+ */
+static u32 hashtab_compute_size(u32 nel)
+{
+ return nel == 0 ? 0 : roundup_pow_of_two(nel);
+}
+
+int hashtab_init(struct hashtab *h, u32 nel_hint)
+{
+ u32 size = hashtab_compute_size(nel_hint);
+
+ /* should already be zeroed, but better be safe */
+ h->nel = 0;
+ h->size = 0;
+ h->htable = NULL;
+
+ if (size) {
+ h->htable = kcalloc(size, sizeof(*h->htable), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!h->htable)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ h->size = size;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int __hashtab_insert(struct hashtab *h, struct hashtab_node **dst,
+ void *key, void *datum)
+{
+ struct hashtab_node *newnode;
+
+ newnode = kmem_cache_zalloc(hashtab_node_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!newnode)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ newnode->key = key;
+ newnode->datum = datum;
+ newnode->next = *dst;
+ *dst = newnode;
+
+ h->nel++;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void hashtab_destroy(struct hashtab *h)
+{
+ u32 i;
+ struct hashtab_node *cur, *temp;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < h->size; i++) {
+ cur = h->htable[i];
+ while (cur) {
+ temp = cur;
+ cur = cur->next;
+ kmem_cache_free(hashtab_node_cachep, temp);
+ }
+ h->htable[i] = NULL;
+ }
+
+ kfree(h->htable);
+ h->htable = NULL;
+}
+
+int hashtab_map(struct hashtab *h,
+ int (*apply)(void *k, void *d, void *args),
+ void *args)
+{
+ u32 i;
+ int ret;
+ struct hashtab_node *cur;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < h->size; i++) {
+ cur = h->htable[i];
+ while (cur) {
+ ret = apply(cur->key, cur->datum, args);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+ cur = cur->next;
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEBUG
+void hashtab_stat(struct hashtab *h, struct hashtab_info *info)
+{
+ u32 i, chain_len, slots_used, max_chain_len;
+ struct hashtab_node *cur;
+
+ slots_used = 0;
+ max_chain_len = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < h->size; i++) {
+ cur = h->htable[i];
+ if (cur) {
+ slots_used++;
+ chain_len = 0;
+ while (cur) {
+ chain_len++;
+ cur = cur->next;
+ }
+
+ if (chain_len > max_chain_len)
+ max_chain_len = chain_len;
+ }
+ }
+
+ info->slots_used = slots_used;
+ info->max_chain_len = max_chain_len;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEBUG */
+
+int hashtab_duplicate(struct hashtab *new, struct hashtab *orig,
+ int (*copy)(struct hashtab_node *new,
+ struct hashtab_node *orig, void *args),
+ int (*destroy)(void *k, void *d, void *args),
+ void *args)
+{
+ struct hashtab_node *cur, *tmp, *tail;
+ u32 i;
+ int rc;
+
+ memset(new, 0, sizeof(*new));
+
+ new->htable = kcalloc(orig->size, sizeof(*new->htable), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!new->htable)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ new->size = orig->size;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < orig->size; i++) {
+ tail = NULL;
+ for (cur = orig->htable[i]; cur; cur = cur->next) {
+ tmp = kmem_cache_zalloc(hashtab_node_cachep,
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!tmp)
+ goto error;
+ rc = copy(tmp, cur, args);
+ if (rc) {
+ kmem_cache_free(hashtab_node_cachep, tmp);
+ goto error;
+ }
+ tmp->next = NULL;
+ if (!tail)
+ new->htable[i] = tmp;
+ else
+ tail->next = tmp;
+ tail = tmp;
+ new->nel++;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+
+ error:
+ for (i = 0; i < new->size; i++) {
+ for (cur = new->htable[i]; cur; cur = tmp) {
+ tmp = cur->next;
+ destroy(cur->key, cur->datum, args);
+ kmem_cache_free(hashtab_node_cachep, cur);
+ }
+ }
+ kfree(new->htable);
+ memset(new, 0, sizeof(*new));
+ return -ENOMEM;
+}
+
+void __init hashtab_cache_init(void)
+{
+ hashtab_node_cachep = kmem_cache_create("hashtab_node",
+ sizeof(struct hashtab_node),
+ 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
+}
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.h b/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..f9713b56d3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.h
@@ -0,0 +1,154 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * A hash table (hashtab) maintains associations between
+ * key values and datum values. The type of the key values
+ * and the type of the datum values is arbitrary. The
+ * functions for hash computation and key comparison are
+ * provided by the creator of the table.
+ *
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
+ */
+#ifndef _SS_HASHTAB_H_
+#define _SS_HASHTAB_H_
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+
+#define HASHTAB_MAX_NODES U32_MAX
+
+struct hashtab_key_params {
+ u32 (*hash)(const void *key); /* hash function */
+ int (*cmp)(const void *key1, const void *key2);
+ /* key comparison function */
+};
+
+struct hashtab_node {
+ void *key;
+ void *datum;
+ struct hashtab_node *next;
+};
+
+struct hashtab {
+ struct hashtab_node **htable; /* hash table */
+ u32 size; /* number of slots in hash table */
+ u32 nel; /* number of elements in hash table */
+};
+
+struct hashtab_info {
+ u32 slots_used;
+ u32 max_chain_len;
+};
+
+/*
+ * Initializes a new hash table with the specified characteristics.
+ *
+ * Returns -ENOMEM if insufficient space is available or 0 otherwise.
+ */
+int hashtab_init(struct hashtab *h, u32 nel_hint);
+
+int __hashtab_insert(struct hashtab *h, struct hashtab_node **dst,
+ void *key, void *datum);
+
+/*
+ * Inserts the specified (key, datum) pair into the specified hash table.
+ *
+ * Returns -ENOMEM on memory allocation error,
+ * -EEXIST if there is already an entry with the same key,
+ * -EINVAL for general errors or
+ 0 otherwise.
+ */
+static inline int hashtab_insert(struct hashtab *h, void *key, void *datum,
+ struct hashtab_key_params key_params)
+{
+ u32 hvalue;
+ struct hashtab_node *prev, *cur;
+
+ cond_resched();
+
+ if (!h->size || h->nel == HASHTAB_MAX_NODES)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ hvalue = key_params.hash(key) & (h->size - 1);
+ prev = NULL;
+ cur = h->htable[hvalue];
+ while (cur) {
+ int cmp = key_params.cmp(key, cur->key);
+
+ if (cmp == 0)
+ return -EEXIST;
+ if (cmp < 0)
+ break;
+ prev = cur;
+ cur = cur->next;
+ }
+
+ return __hashtab_insert(h, prev ? &prev->next : &h->htable[hvalue],
+ key, datum);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Searches for the entry with the specified key in the hash table.
+ *
+ * Returns NULL if no entry has the specified key or
+ * the datum of the entry otherwise.
+ */
+static inline void *hashtab_search(struct hashtab *h, const void *key,
+ struct hashtab_key_params key_params)
+{
+ u32 hvalue;
+ struct hashtab_node *cur;
+
+ if (!h->size)
+ return NULL;
+
+ hvalue = key_params.hash(key) & (h->size - 1);
+ cur = h->htable[hvalue];
+ while (cur) {
+ int cmp = key_params.cmp(key, cur->key);
+
+ if (cmp == 0)
+ return cur->datum;
+ if (cmp < 0)
+ break;
+ cur = cur->next;
+ }
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Destroys the specified hash table.
+ */
+void hashtab_destroy(struct hashtab *h);
+
+/*
+ * Applies the specified apply function to (key,datum,args)
+ * for each entry in the specified hash table.
+ *
+ * The order in which the function is applied to the entries
+ * is dependent upon the internal structure of the hash table.
+ *
+ * If apply returns a non-zero status, then hashtab_map will cease
+ * iterating through the hash table and will propagate the error
+ * return to its caller.
+ */
+int hashtab_map(struct hashtab *h,
+ int (*apply)(void *k, void *d, void *args),
+ void *args);
+
+int hashtab_duplicate(struct hashtab *new, struct hashtab *orig,
+ int (*copy)(struct hashtab_node *new,
+ struct hashtab_node *orig, void *args),
+ int (*destroy)(void *k, void *d, void *args),
+ void *args);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEBUG
+/* Fill info with some hash table statistics */
+void hashtab_stat(struct hashtab *h, struct hashtab_info *info);
+#else
+static inline void hashtab_stat(struct hashtab *h, struct hashtab_info *info)
+{
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* _SS_HASHTAB_H */
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/mls.c b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..cd38f5913b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
@@ -0,0 +1,662 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Implementation of the multi-level security (MLS) policy.
+ *
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
+ */
+/*
+ * Updated: Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
+ *
+ * Support for enhanced MLS infrastructure.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2004-2006 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
+ */
+/*
+ * Updated: Hewlett-Packard <paul@paul-moore.com>
+ *
+ * Added support to import/export the MLS label from NetLabel
+ *
+ * (c) Copyright Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P., 2006
+ */
+
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <net/netlabel.h>
+#include "sidtab.h"
+#include "mls.h"
+#include "policydb.h"
+#include "services.h"
+
+/*
+ * Return the length in bytes for the MLS fields of the
+ * security context string representation of `context'.
+ */
+int mls_compute_context_len(struct policydb *p, struct context *context)
+{
+ int i, l, len, head, prev;
+ char *nm;
+ struct ebitmap *e;
+ struct ebitmap_node *node;
+
+ if (!p->mls_enabled)
+ return 0;
+
+ len = 1; /* for the beginning ":" */
+ for (l = 0; l < 2; l++) {
+ u32 index_sens = context->range.level[l].sens;
+ len += strlen(sym_name(p, SYM_LEVELS, index_sens - 1));
+
+ /* categories */
+ head = -2;
+ prev = -2;
+ e = &context->range.level[l].cat;
+ ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(e, node, i) {
+ if (i - prev > 1) {
+ /* one or more negative bits are skipped */
+ if (head != prev) {
+ nm = sym_name(p, SYM_CATS, prev);
+ len += strlen(nm) + 1;
+ }
+ nm = sym_name(p, SYM_CATS, i);
+ len += strlen(nm) + 1;
+ head = i;
+ }
+ prev = i;
+ }
+ if (prev != head) {
+ nm = sym_name(p, SYM_CATS, prev);
+ len += strlen(nm) + 1;
+ }
+ if (l == 0) {
+ if (mls_level_eq(&context->range.level[0],
+ &context->range.level[1]))
+ break;
+ else
+ len++;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return len;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Write the security context string representation of
+ * the MLS fields of `context' into the string `*scontext'.
+ * Update `*scontext' to point to the end of the MLS fields.
+ */
+void mls_sid_to_context(struct policydb *p,
+ struct context *context,
+ char **scontext)
+{
+ char *scontextp, *nm;
+ int i, l, head, prev;
+ struct ebitmap *e;
+ struct ebitmap_node *node;
+
+ if (!p->mls_enabled)
+ return;
+
+ scontextp = *scontext;
+
+ *scontextp = ':';
+ scontextp++;
+
+ for (l = 0; l < 2; l++) {
+ strcpy(scontextp, sym_name(p, SYM_LEVELS,
+ context->range.level[l].sens - 1));
+ scontextp += strlen(scontextp);
+
+ /* categories */
+ head = -2;
+ prev = -2;
+ e = &context->range.level[l].cat;
+ ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(e, node, i) {
+ if (i - prev > 1) {
+ /* one or more negative bits are skipped */
+ if (prev != head) {
+ if (prev - head > 1)
+ *scontextp++ = '.';
+ else
+ *scontextp++ = ',';
+ nm = sym_name(p, SYM_CATS, prev);
+ strcpy(scontextp, nm);
+ scontextp += strlen(nm);
+ }
+ if (prev < 0)
+ *scontextp++ = ':';
+ else
+ *scontextp++ = ',';
+ nm = sym_name(p, SYM_CATS, i);
+ strcpy(scontextp, nm);
+ scontextp += strlen(nm);
+ head = i;
+ }
+ prev = i;
+ }
+
+ if (prev != head) {
+ if (prev - head > 1)
+ *scontextp++ = '.';
+ else
+ *scontextp++ = ',';
+ nm = sym_name(p, SYM_CATS, prev);
+ strcpy(scontextp, nm);
+ scontextp += strlen(nm);
+ }
+
+ if (l == 0) {
+ if (mls_level_eq(&context->range.level[0],
+ &context->range.level[1]))
+ break;
+ else
+ *scontextp++ = '-';
+ }
+ }
+
+ *scontext = scontextp;
+}
+
+int mls_level_isvalid(struct policydb *p, struct mls_level *l)
+{
+ struct level_datum *levdatum;
+
+ if (!l->sens || l->sens > p->p_levels.nprim)
+ return 0;
+ levdatum = symtab_search(&p->p_levels,
+ sym_name(p, SYM_LEVELS, l->sens - 1));
+ if (!levdatum)
+ return 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Return 1 iff all the bits set in l->cat are also be set in
+ * levdatum->level->cat and no bit in l->cat is larger than
+ * p->p_cats.nprim.
+ */
+ return ebitmap_contains(&levdatum->level->cat, &l->cat,
+ p->p_cats.nprim);
+}
+
+int mls_range_isvalid(struct policydb *p, struct mls_range *r)
+{
+ return (mls_level_isvalid(p, &r->level[0]) &&
+ mls_level_isvalid(p, &r->level[1]) &&
+ mls_level_dom(&r->level[1], &r->level[0]));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return 1 if the MLS fields in the security context
+ * structure `c' are valid. Return 0 otherwise.
+ */
+int mls_context_isvalid(struct policydb *p, struct context *c)
+{
+ struct user_datum *usrdatum;
+
+ if (!p->mls_enabled)
+ return 1;
+
+ if (!mls_range_isvalid(p, &c->range))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (c->role == OBJECT_R_VAL)
+ return 1;
+
+ /*
+ * User must be authorized for the MLS range.
+ */
+ if (!c->user || c->user > p->p_users.nprim)
+ return 0;
+ usrdatum = p->user_val_to_struct[c->user - 1];
+ if (!mls_range_contains(usrdatum->range, c->range))
+ return 0; /* user may not be associated with range */
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Set the MLS fields in the security context structure
+ * `context' based on the string representation in
+ * the string `scontext'.
+ *
+ * This function modifies the string in place, inserting
+ * NULL characters to terminate the MLS fields.
+ *
+ * If a def_sid is provided and no MLS field is present,
+ * copy the MLS field of the associated default context.
+ * Used for upgraded to MLS systems where objects may lack
+ * MLS fields.
+ *
+ * Policy read-lock must be held for sidtab lookup.
+ *
+ */
+int mls_context_to_sid(struct policydb *pol,
+ char oldc,
+ char *scontext,
+ struct context *context,
+ struct sidtab *s,
+ u32 def_sid)
+{
+ char *sensitivity, *cur_cat, *next_cat, *rngptr;
+ struct level_datum *levdatum;
+ struct cat_datum *catdatum, *rngdatum;
+ u32 i;
+ int l, rc;
+ char *rangep[2];
+
+ if (!pol->mls_enabled) {
+ /*
+ * With no MLS, only return -EINVAL if there is a MLS field
+ * and it did not come from an xattr.
+ */
+ if (oldc && def_sid == SECSID_NULL)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * No MLS component to the security context, try and map to
+ * default if provided.
+ */
+ if (!oldc) {
+ struct context *defcon;
+
+ if (def_sid == SECSID_NULL)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ defcon = sidtab_search(s, def_sid);
+ if (!defcon)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ return mls_context_cpy(context, defcon);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If we're dealing with a range, figure out where the two parts
+ * of the range begin.
+ */
+ rangep[0] = scontext;
+ rangep[1] = strchr(scontext, '-');
+ if (rangep[1]) {
+ rangep[1][0] = '\0';
+ rangep[1]++;
+ }
+
+ /* For each part of the range: */
+ for (l = 0; l < 2; l++) {
+ /* Split sensitivity and category set. */
+ sensitivity = rangep[l];
+ if (sensitivity == NULL)
+ break;
+ next_cat = strchr(sensitivity, ':');
+ if (next_cat)
+ *(next_cat++) = '\0';
+
+ /* Parse sensitivity. */
+ levdatum = symtab_search(&pol->p_levels, sensitivity);
+ if (!levdatum)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ context->range.level[l].sens = levdatum->level->sens;
+
+ /* Extract category set. */
+ while (next_cat != NULL) {
+ cur_cat = next_cat;
+ next_cat = strchr(next_cat, ',');
+ if (next_cat != NULL)
+ *(next_cat++) = '\0';
+
+ /* Separate into range if exists */
+ rngptr = strchr(cur_cat, '.');
+ if (rngptr != NULL) {
+ /* Remove '.' */
+ *rngptr++ = '\0';
+ }
+
+ catdatum = symtab_search(&pol->p_cats, cur_cat);
+ if (!catdatum)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ rc = ebitmap_set_bit(&context->range.level[l].cat,
+ catdatum->value - 1, 1);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ /* If range, set all categories in range */
+ if (rngptr == NULL)
+ continue;
+
+ rngdatum = symtab_search(&pol->p_cats, rngptr);
+ if (!rngdatum)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (catdatum->value >= rngdatum->value)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ for (i = catdatum->value; i < rngdatum->value; i++) {
+ rc = ebitmap_set_bit(&context->range.level[l].cat, i, 1);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* If we didn't see a '-', the range start is also the range end. */
+ if (rangep[1] == NULL) {
+ context->range.level[1].sens = context->range.level[0].sens;
+ rc = ebitmap_cpy(&context->range.level[1].cat,
+ &context->range.level[0].cat);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Set the MLS fields in the security context structure
+ * `context' based on the string representation in
+ * the string `str'. This function will allocate temporary memory with the
+ * given constraints of gfp_mask.
+ */
+int mls_from_string(struct policydb *p, char *str, struct context *context,
+ gfp_t gfp_mask)
+{
+ char *tmpstr;
+ int rc;
+
+ if (!p->mls_enabled)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ tmpstr = kstrdup(str, gfp_mask);
+ if (!tmpstr) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ } else {
+ rc = mls_context_to_sid(p, ':', tmpstr, context,
+ NULL, SECSID_NULL);
+ kfree(tmpstr);
+ }
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Copies the MLS range `range' into `context'.
+ */
+int mls_range_set(struct context *context,
+ struct mls_range *range)
+{
+ int l, rc = 0;
+
+ /* Copy the MLS range into the context */
+ for (l = 0; l < 2; l++) {
+ context->range.level[l].sens = range->level[l].sens;
+ rc = ebitmap_cpy(&context->range.level[l].cat,
+ &range->level[l].cat);
+ if (rc)
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+int mls_setup_user_range(struct policydb *p,
+ struct context *fromcon, struct user_datum *user,
+ struct context *usercon)
+{
+ if (p->mls_enabled) {
+ struct mls_level *fromcon_sen = &(fromcon->range.level[0]);
+ struct mls_level *fromcon_clr = &(fromcon->range.level[1]);
+ struct mls_level *user_low = &(user->range.level[0]);
+ struct mls_level *user_clr = &(user->range.level[1]);
+ struct mls_level *user_def = &(user->dfltlevel);
+ struct mls_level *usercon_sen = &(usercon->range.level[0]);
+ struct mls_level *usercon_clr = &(usercon->range.level[1]);
+
+ /* Honor the user's default level if we can */
+ if (mls_level_between(user_def, fromcon_sen, fromcon_clr))
+ *usercon_sen = *user_def;
+ else if (mls_level_between(fromcon_sen, user_def, user_clr))
+ *usercon_sen = *fromcon_sen;
+ else if (mls_level_between(fromcon_clr, user_low, user_def))
+ *usercon_sen = *user_low;
+ else
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /* Lower the clearance of available contexts
+ if the clearance of "fromcon" is lower than
+ that of the user's default clearance (but
+ only if the "fromcon" clearance dominates
+ the user's computed sensitivity level) */
+ if (mls_level_dom(user_clr, fromcon_clr))
+ *usercon_clr = *fromcon_clr;
+ else if (mls_level_dom(fromcon_clr, user_clr))
+ *usercon_clr = *user_clr;
+ else
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Convert the MLS fields in the security context
+ * structure `oldc' from the values specified in the
+ * policy `oldp' to the values specified in the policy `newp',
+ * storing the resulting context in `newc'.
+ */
+int mls_convert_context(struct policydb *oldp,
+ struct policydb *newp,
+ struct context *oldc,
+ struct context *newc)
+{
+ struct level_datum *levdatum;
+ struct cat_datum *catdatum;
+ struct ebitmap_node *node;
+ u32 i;
+ int l;
+
+ if (!oldp->mls_enabled || !newp->mls_enabled)
+ return 0;
+
+ for (l = 0; l < 2; l++) {
+ char *name = sym_name(oldp, SYM_LEVELS,
+ oldc->range.level[l].sens - 1);
+
+ levdatum = symtab_search(&newp->p_levels, name);
+
+ if (!levdatum)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ newc->range.level[l].sens = levdatum->level->sens;
+
+ ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&oldc->range.level[l].cat,
+ node, i) {
+ int rc;
+
+ catdatum = symtab_search(&newp->p_cats,
+ sym_name(oldp, SYM_CATS, i));
+ if (!catdatum)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ rc = ebitmap_set_bit(&newc->range.level[l].cat,
+ catdatum->value - 1, 1);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int mls_compute_sid(struct policydb *p,
+ struct context *scontext,
+ struct context *tcontext,
+ u16 tclass,
+ u32 specified,
+ struct context *newcontext,
+ bool sock)
+{
+ struct range_trans rtr;
+ struct mls_range *r;
+ struct class_datum *cladatum;
+ char default_range = 0;
+
+ if (!p->mls_enabled)
+ return 0;
+
+ switch (specified) {
+ case AVTAB_TRANSITION:
+ /* Look for a range transition rule. */
+ rtr.source_type = scontext->type;
+ rtr.target_type = tcontext->type;
+ rtr.target_class = tclass;
+ r = policydb_rangetr_search(p, &rtr);
+ if (r)
+ return mls_range_set(newcontext, r);
+
+ if (tclass && tclass <= p->p_classes.nprim) {
+ cladatum = p->class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
+ if (cladatum)
+ default_range = cladatum->default_range;
+ }
+
+ switch (default_range) {
+ case DEFAULT_SOURCE_LOW:
+ return mls_context_cpy_low(newcontext, scontext);
+ case DEFAULT_SOURCE_HIGH:
+ return mls_context_cpy_high(newcontext, scontext);
+ case DEFAULT_SOURCE_LOW_HIGH:
+ return mls_context_cpy(newcontext, scontext);
+ case DEFAULT_TARGET_LOW:
+ return mls_context_cpy_low(newcontext, tcontext);
+ case DEFAULT_TARGET_HIGH:
+ return mls_context_cpy_high(newcontext, tcontext);
+ case DEFAULT_TARGET_LOW_HIGH:
+ return mls_context_cpy(newcontext, tcontext);
+ case DEFAULT_GLBLUB:
+ return mls_context_glblub(newcontext,
+ scontext, tcontext);
+ }
+
+ fallthrough;
+ case AVTAB_CHANGE:
+ if ((tclass == p->process_class) || sock)
+ /* Use the process MLS attributes. */
+ return mls_context_cpy(newcontext, scontext);
+ else
+ /* Use the process effective MLS attributes. */
+ return mls_context_cpy_low(newcontext, scontext);
+ case AVTAB_MEMBER:
+ /* Use the process effective MLS attributes. */
+ return mls_context_cpy_low(newcontext, scontext);
+ }
+ return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_NETLABEL
+/**
+ * mls_export_netlbl_lvl - Export the MLS sensitivity levels to NetLabel
+ * @p: the policy
+ * @context: the security context
+ * @secattr: the NetLabel security attributes
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Given the security context copy the low MLS sensitivity level into the
+ * NetLabel MLS sensitivity level field.
+ *
+ */
+void mls_export_netlbl_lvl(struct policydb *p,
+ struct context *context,
+ struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
+{
+ if (!p->mls_enabled)
+ return;
+
+ secattr->attr.mls.lvl = context->range.level[0].sens - 1;
+ secattr->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * mls_import_netlbl_lvl - Import the NetLabel MLS sensitivity levels
+ * @p: the policy
+ * @context: the security context
+ * @secattr: the NetLabel security attributes
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Given the security context and the NetLabel security attributes, copy the
+ * NetLabel MLS sensitivity level into the context.
+ *
+ */
+void mls_import_netlbl_lvl(struct policydb *p,
+ struct context *context,
+ struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
+{
+ if (!p->mls_enabled)
+ return;
+
+ context->range.level[0].sens = secattr->attr.mls.lvl + 1;
+ context->range.level[1].sens = context->range.level[0].sens;
+}
+
+/**
+ * mls_export_netlbl_cat - Export the MLS categories to NetLabel
+ * @p: the policy
+ * @context: the security context
+ * @secattr: the NetLabel security attributes
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Given the security context copy the low MLS categories into the NetLabel
+ * MLS category field. Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
+ *
+ */
+int mls_export_netlbl_cat(struct policydb *p,
+ struct context *context,
+ struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
+{
+ int rc;
+
+ if (!p->mls_enabled)
+ return 0;
+
+ rc = ebitmap_netlbl_export(&context->range.level[0].cat,
+ &secattr->attr.mls.cat);
+ if (rc == 0 && secattr->attr.mls.cat != NULL)
+ secattr->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT;
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * mls_import_netlbl_cat - Import the MLS categories from NetLabel
+ * @p: the policy
+ * @context: the security context
+ * @secattr: the NetLabel security attributes
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Copy the NetLabel security attributes into the SELinux context; since the
+ * NetLabel security attribute only contains a single MLS category use it for
+ * both the low and high categories of the context. Returns zero on success,
+ * negative values on failure.
+ *
+ */
+int mls_import_netlbl_cat(struct policydb *p,
+ struct context *context,
+ struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
+{
+ int rc;
+
+ if (!p->mls_enabled)
+ return 0;
+
+ rc = ebitmap_netlbl_import(&context->range.level[0].cat,
+ secattr->attr.mls.cat);
+ if (rc)
+ goto import_netlbl_cat_failure;
+ memcpy(&context->range.level[1].cat, &context->range.level[0].cat,
+ sizeof(context->range.level[0].cat));
+
+ return 0;
+
+import_netlbl_cat_failure:
+ ebitmap_destroy(&context->range.level[0].cat);
+ return rc;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_NETLABEL */
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/mls.h b/security/selinux/ss/mls.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..107681dd18
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/mls.h
@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * Multi-level security (MLS) policy operations.
+ *
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
+ */
+/*
+ * Updated: Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
+ *
+ * Support for enhanced MLS infrastructure.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2004-2006 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
+ */
+/*
+ * Updated: Hewlett-Packard <paul@paul-moore.com>
+ *
+ * Added support to import/export the MLS label from NetLabel
+ *
+ * (c) Copyright Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P., 2006
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SS_MLS_H_
+#define _SS_MLS_H_
+
+#include <linux/jhash.h>
+
+#include "context.h"
+#include "ebitmap.h"
+#include "policydb.h"
+
+int mls_compute_context_len(struct policydb *p, struct context *context);
+void mls_sid_to_context(struct policydb *p, struct context *context,
+ char **scontext);
+int mls_context_isvalid(struct policydb *p, struct context *c);
+int mls_range_isvalid(struct policydb *p, struct mls_range *r);
+int mls_level_isvalid(struct policydb *p, struct mls_level *l);
+
+int mls_context_to_sid(struct policydb *p,
+ char oldc,
+ char *scontext,
+ struct context *context,
+ struct sidtab *s,
+ u32 def_sid);
+
+int mls_from_string(struct policydb *p, char *str, struct context *context,
+ gfp_t gfp_mask);
+
+int mls_range_set(struct context *context, struct mls_range *range);
+
+int mls_convert_context(struct policydb *oldp,
+ struct policydb *newp,
+ struct context *oldc,
+ struct context *newc);
+
+int mls_compute_sid(struct policydb *p,
+ struct context *scontext,
+ struct context *tcontext,
+ u16 tclass,
+ u32 specified,
+ struct context *newcontext,
+ bool sock);
+
+int mls_setup_user_range(struct policydb *p,
+ struct context *fromcon, struct user_datum *user,
+ struct context *usercon);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_NETLABEL
+void mls_export_netlbl_lvl(struct policydb *p,
+ struct context *context,
+ struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr);
+void mls_import_netlbl_lvl(struct policydb *p,
+ struct context *context,
+ struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr);
+int mls_export_netlbl_cat(struct policydb *p,
+ struct context *context,
+ struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr);
+int mls_import_netlbl_cat(struct policydb *p,
+ struct context *context,
+ struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr);
+#else
+static inline void mls_export_netlbl_lvl(struct policydb *p,
+ struct context *context,
+ struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
+{
+ return;
+}
+static inline void mls_import_netlbl_lvl(struct policydb *p,
+ struct context *context,
+ struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
+{
+ return;
+}
+static inline int mls_export_netlbl_cat(struct policydb *p,
+ struct context *context,
+ struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
+{
+ return -ENOMEM;
+}
+static inline int mls_import_netlbl_cat(struct policydb *p,
+ struct context *context,
+ struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
+{
+ return -ENOMEM;
+}
+#endif
+
+static inline u32 mls_range_hash(const struct mls_range *r, u32 hash)
+{
+ hash = jhash_2words(r->level[0].sens, r->level[1].sens, hash);
+ hash = ebitmap_hash(&r->level[0].cat, hash);
+ hash = ebitmap_hash(&r->level[1].cat, hash);
+ return hash;
+}
+
+#endif /* _SS_MLS_H */
+
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/mls_types.h b/security/selinux/ss/mls_types.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..f492cf1488
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/mls_types.h
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * Type definitions for the multi-level security (MLS) policy.
+ *
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
+ */
+/*
+ * Updated: Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
+ *
+ * Support for enhanced MLS infrastructure.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SS_MLS_TYPES_H_
+#define _SS_MLS_TYPES_H_
+
+#include "security.h"
+#include "ebitmap.h"
+
+struct mls_level {
+ u32 sens; /* sensitivity */
+ struct ebitmap cat; /* category set */
+};
+
+struct mls_range {
+ struct mls_level level[2]; /* low == level[0], high == level[1] */
+};
+
+static inline int mls_level_eq(const struct mls_level *l1, const struct mls_level *l2)
+{
+ return ((l1->sens == l2->sens) &&
+ ebitmap_cmp(&l1->cat, &l2->cat));
+}
+
+static inline int mls_level_dom(const struct mls_level *l1, const struct mls_level *l2)
+{
+ return ((l1->sens >= l2->sens) &&
+ ebitmap_contains(&l1->cat, &l2->cat, 0));
+}
+
+#define mls_level_incomp(l1, l2) \
+(!mls_level_dom((l1), (l2)) && !mls_level_dom((l2), (l1)))
+
+#define mls_level_between(l1, l2, l3) \
+(mls_level_dom((l1), (l2)) && mls_level_dom((l3), (l1)))
+
+#define mls_range_contains(r1, r2) \
+(mls_level_dom(&(r2).level[0], &(r1).level[0]) && \
+ mls_level_dom(&(r1).level[1], &(r2).level[1]))
+
+#endif /* _SS_MLS_TYPES_H_ */
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..2d528f699a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
@@ -0,0 +1,3741 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Implementation of the policy database.
+ *
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Updated: Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
+ *
+ * Support for enhanced MLS infrastructure.
+ *
+ * Updated: Frank Mayer <mayerf@tresys.com> and Karl MacMillan <kmacmillan@tresys.com>
+ *
+ * Added conditional policy language extensions
+ *
+ * Updated: Hewlett-Packard <paul@paul-moore.com>
+ *
+ * Added support for the policy capability bitmap
+ *
+ * Update: Mellanox Techonologies
+ *
+ * Added Infiniband support
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2016 Mellanox Techonologies
+ * Copyright (C) 2007 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
+ * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
+ * Copyright (C) 2003 - 2004 Tresys Technology, LLC
+ */
+
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h>
+#include "security.h"
+
+#include "policydb.h"
+#include "conditional.h"
+#include "mls.h"
+#include "services.h"
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEBUG
+static const char *const symtab_name[SYM_NUM] = {
+ "common prefixes",
+ "classes",
+ "roles",
+ "types",
+ "users",
+ "bools",
+ "levels",
+ "categories",
+};
+#endif
+
+struct policydb_compat_info {
+ unsigned int version;
+ unsigned int sym_num;
+ unsigned int ocon_num;
+};
+
+/* These need to be updated if SYM_NUM or OCON_NUM changes */
+static const struct policydb_compat_info policydb_compat[] = {
+ {
+ .version = POLICYDB_VERSION_BASE,
+ .sym_num = SYM_NUM - 3,
+ .ocon_num = OCON_NUM - 3,
+ },
+ {
+ .version = POLICYDB_VERSION_BOOL,
+ .sym_num = SYM_NUM - 2,
+ .ocon_num = OCON_NUM - 3,
+ },
+ {
+ .version = POLICYDB_VERSION_IPV6,
+ .sym_num = SYM_NUM - 2,
+ .ocon_num = OCON_NUM - 2,
+ },
+ {
+ .version = POLICYDB_VERSION_NLCLASS,
+ .sym_num = SYM_NUM - 2,
+ .ocon_num = OCON_NUM - 2,
+ },
+ {
+ .version = POLICYDB_VERSION_MLS,
+ .sym_num = SYM_NUM,
+ .ocon_num = OCON_NUM - 2,
+ },
+ {
+ .version = POLICYDB_VERSION_AVTAB,
+ .sym_num = SYM_NUM,
+ .ocon_num = OCON_NUM - 2,
+ },
+ {
+ .version = POLICYDB_VERSION_RANGETRANS,
+ .sym_num = SYM_NUM,
+ .ocon_num = OCON_NUM - 2,
+ },
+ {
+ .version = POLICYDB_VERSION_POLCAP,
+ .sym_num = SYM_NUM,
+ .ocon_num = OCON_NUM - 2,
+ },
+ {
+ .version = POLICYDB_VERSION_PERMISSIVE,
+ .sym_num = SYM_NUM,
+ .ocon_num = OCON_NUM - 2,
+ },
+ {
+ .version = POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY,
+ .sym_num = SYM_NUM,
+ .ocon_num = OCON_NUM - 2,
+ },
+ {
+ .version = POLICYDB_VERSION_FILENAME_TRANS,
+ .sym_num = SYM_NUM,
+ .ocon_num = OCON_NUM - 2,
+ },
+ {
+ .version = POLICYDB_VERSION_ROLETRANS,
+ .sym_num = SYM_NUM,
+ .ocon_num = OCON_NUM - 2,
+ },
+ {
+ .version = POLICYDB_VERSION_NEW_OBJECT_DEFAULTS,
+ .sym_num = SYM_NUM,
+ .ocon_num = OCON_NUM - 2,
+ },
+ {
+ .version = POLICYDB_VERSION_DEFAULT_TYPE,
+ .sym_num = SYM_NUM,
+ .ocon_num = OCON_NUM - 2,
+ },
+ {
+ .version = POLICYDB_VERSION_CONSTRAINT_NAMES,
+ .sym_num = SYM_NUM,
+ .ocon_num = OCON_NUM - 2,
+ },
+ {
+ .version = POLICYDB_VERSION_XPERMS_IOCTL,
+ .sym_num = SYM_NUM,
+ .ocon_num = OCON_NUM - 2,
+ },
+ {
+ .version = POLICYDB_VERSION_INFINIBAND,
+ .sym_num = SYM_NUM,
+ .ocon_num = OCON_NUM,
+ },
+ {
+ .version = POLICYDB_VERSION_GLBLUB,
+ .sym_num = SYM_NUM,
+ .ocon_num = OCON_NUM,
+ },
+ {
+ .version = POLICYDB_VERSION_COMP_FTRANS,
+ .sym_num = SYM_NUM,
+ .ocon_num = OCON_NUM,
+ },
+};
+
+static const struct policydb_compat_info *policydb_lookup_compat(unsigned int version)
+{
+ unsigned int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(policydb_compat); i++) {
+ if (policydb_compat[i].version == version)
+ return &policydb_compat[i];
+ }
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * The following *_destroy functions are used to
+ * free any memory allocated for each kind of
+ * symbol data in the policy database.
+ */
+
+static int perm_destroy(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
+{
+ kfree(key);
+ kfree(datum);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int common_destroy(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
+{
+ struct common_datum *comdatum;
+
+ kfree(key);
+ if (datum) {
+ comdatum = datum;
+ hashtab_map(&comdatum->permissions.table, perm_destroy, NULL);
+ hashtab_destroy(&comdatum->permissions.table);
+ }
+ kfree(datum);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void constraint_expr_destroy(struct constraint_expr *expr)
+{
+ if (expr) {
+ ebitmap_destroy(&expr->names);
+ if (expr->type_names) {
+ ebitmap_destroy(&expr->type_names->types);
+ ebitmap_destroy(&expr->type_names->negset);
+ kfree(expr->type_names);
+ }
+ kfree(expr);
+ }
+}
+
+static int cls_destroy(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
+{
+ struct class_datum *cladatum;
+ struct constraint_node *constraint, *ctemp;
+ struct constraint_expr *e, *etmp;
+
+ kfree(key);
+ if (datum) {
+ cladatum = datum;
+ hashtab_map(&cladatum->permissions.table, perm_destroy, NULL);
+ hashtab_destroy(&cladatum->permissions.table);
+ constraint = cladatum->constraints;
+ while (constraint) {
+ e = constraint->expr;
+ while (e) {
+ etmp = e;
+ e = e->next;
+ constraint_expr_destroy(etmp);
+ }
+ ctemp = constraint;
+ constraint = constraint->next;
+ kfree(ctemp);
+ }
+
+ constraint = cladatum->validatetrans;
+ while (constraint) {
+ e = constraint->expr;
+ while (e) {
+ etmp = e;
+ e = e->next;
+ constraint_expr_destroy(etmp);
+ }
+ ctemp = constraint;
+ constraint = constraint->next;
+ kfree(ctemp);
+ }
+ kfree(cladatum->comkey);
+ }
+ kfree(datum);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int role_destroy(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
+{
+ struct role_datum *role;
+
+ kfree(key);
+ if (datum) {
+ role = datum;
+ ebitmap_destroy(&role->dominates);
+ ebitmap_destroy(&role->types);
+ }
+ kfree(datum);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int type_destroy(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
+{
+ kfree(key);
+ kfree(datum);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int user_destroy(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
+{
+ struct user_datum *usrdatum;
+
+ kfree(key);
+ if (datum) {
+ usrdatum = datum;
+ ebitmap_destroy(&usrdatum->roles);
+ ebitmap_destroy(&usrdatum->range.level[0].cat);
+ ebitmap_destroy(&usrdatum->range.level[1].cat);
+ ebitmap_destroy(&usrdatum->dfltlevel.cat);
+ }
+ kfree(datum);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int sens_destroy(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
+{
+ struct level_datum *levdatum;
+
+ kfree(key);
+ if (datum) {
+ levdatum = datum;
+ if (levdatum->level)
+ ebitmap_destroy(&levdatum->level->cat);
+ kfree(levdatum->level);
+ }
+ kfree(datum);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int cat_destroy(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
+{
+ kfree(key);
+ kfree(datum);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int (*const destroy_f[SYM_NUM]) (void *key, void *datum, void *datap) = {
+ common_destroy,
+ cls_destroy,
+ role_destroy,
+ type_destroy,
+ user_destroy,
+ cond_destroy_bool,
+ sens_destroy,
+ cat_destroy,
+};
+
+static int filenametr_destroy(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
+{
+ struct filename_trans_key *ft = key;
+ struct filename_trans_datum *next, *d = datum;
+
+ kfree(ft->name);
+ kfree(key);
+ do {
+ ebitmap_destroy(&d->stypes);
+ next = d->next;
+ kfree(d);
+ d = next;
+ } while (unlikely(d));
+ cond_resched();
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int range_tr_destroy(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
+{
+ struct mls_range *rt = datum;
+
+ kfree(key);
+ ebitmap_destroy(&rt->level[0].cat);
+ ebitmap_destroy(&rt->level[1].cat);
+ kfree(datum);
+ cond_resched();
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int role_tr_destroy(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
+{
+ kfree(key);
+ kfree(datum);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void ocontext_destroy(struct ocontext *c, unsigned int i)
+{
+ if (!c)
+ return;
+
+ context_destroy(&c->context[0]);
+ context_destroy(&c->context[1]);
+ if (i == OCON_ISID || i == OCON_FS ||
+ i == OCON_NETIF || i == OCON_FSUSE)
+ kfree(c->u.name);
+ kfree(c);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Initialize the role table.
+ */
+static int roles_init(struct policydb *p)
+{
+ char *key = NULL;
+ int rc;
+ struct role_datum *role;
+
+ role = kzalloc(sizeof(*role), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!role)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ role->value = ++p->p_roles.nprim;
+ if (role->value != OBJECT_R_VAL)
+ goto out;
+
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ key = kstrdup(OBJECT_R, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!key)
+ goto out;
+
+ rc = symtab_insert(&p->p_roles, key, role);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ return 0;
+out:
+ kfree(key);
+ kfree(role);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static u32 filenametr_hash(const void *k)
+{
+ const struct filename_trans_key *ft = k;
+ unsigned long hash;
+ unsigned int byte_num;
+ unsigned char focus;
+
+ hash = ft->ttype ^ ft->tclass;
+
+ byte_num = 0;
+ while ((focus = ft->name[byte_num++]))
+ hash = partial_name_hash(focus, hash);
+ return hash;
+}
+
+static int filenametr_cmp(const void *k1, const void *k2)
+{
+ const struct filename_trans_key *ft1 = k1;
+ const struct filename_trans_key *ft2 = k2;
+ int v;
+
+ v = ft1->ttype - ft2->ttype;
+ if (v)
+ return v;
+
+ v = ft1->tclass - ft2->tclass;
+ if (v)
+ return v;
+
+ return strcmp(ft1->name, ft2->name);
+
+}
+
+static const struct hashtab_key_params filenametr_key_params = {
+ .hash = filenametr_hash,
+ .cmp = filenametr_cmp,
+};
+
+struct filename_trans_datum *policydb_filenametr_search(
+ struct policydb *p, struct filename_trans_key *key)
+{
+ return hashtab_search(&p->filename_trans, key, filenametr_key_params);
+}
+
+static u32 rangetr_hash(const void *k)
+{
+ const struct range_trans *key = k;
+
+ return key->source_type + (key->target_type << 3) +
+ (key->target_class << 5);
+}
+
+static int rangetr_cmp(const void *k1, const void *k2)
+{
+ const struct range_trans *key1 = k1, *key2 = k2;
+ int v;
+
+ v = key1->source_type - key2->source_type;
+ if (v)
+ return v;
+
+ v = key1->target_type - key2->target_type;
+ if (v)
+ return v;
+
+ v = key1->target_class - key2->target_class;
+
+ return v;
+}
+
+static const struct hashtab_key_params rangetr_key_params = {
+ .hash = rangetr_hash,
+ .cmp = rangetr_cmp,
+};
+
+struct mls_range *policydb_rangetr_search(struct policydb *p,
+ struct range_trans *key)
+{
+ return hashtab_search(&p->range_tr, key, rangetr_key_params);
+}
+
+static u32 role_trans_hash(const void *k)
+{
+ const struct role_trans_key *key = k;
+
+ return key->role + (key->type << 3) + (key->tclass << 5);
+}
+
+static int role_trans_cmp(const void *k1, const void *k2)
+{
+ const struct role_trans_key *key1 = k1, *key2 = k2;
+ int v;
+
+ v = key1->role - key2->role;
+ if (v)
+ return v;
+
+ v = key1->type - key2->type;
+ if (v)
+ return v;
+
+ return key1->tclass - key2->tclass;
+}
+
+static const struct hashtab_key_params roletr_key_params = {
+ .hash = role_trans_hash,
+ .cmp = role_trans_cmp,
+};
+
+struct role_trans_datum *policydb_roletr_search(struct policydb *p,
+ struct role_trans_key *key)
+{
+ return hashtab_search(&p->role_tr, key, roletr_key_params);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Initialize a policy database structure.
+ */
+static void policydb_init(struct policydb *p)
+{
+ memset(p, 0, sizeof(*p));
+
+ avtab_init(&p->te_avtab);
+ cond_policydb_init(p);
+
+ ebitmap_init(&p->filename_trans_ttypes);
+ ebitmap_init(&p->policycaps);
+ ebitmap_init(&p->permissive_map);
+}
+
+/*
+ * The following *_index functions are used to
+ * define the val_to_name and val_to_struct arrays
+ * in a policy database structure. The val_to_name
+ * arrays are used when converting security context
+ * structures into string representations. The
+ * val_to_struct arrays are used when the attributes
+ * of a class, role, or user are needed.
+ */
+
+static int common_index(void *key, void *datum, void *datap)
+{
+ struct policydb *p;
+ struct common_datum *comdatum;
+
+ comdatum = datum;
+ p = datap;
+ if (!comdatum->value || comdatum->value > p->p_commons.nprim)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ p->sym_val_to_name[SYM_COMMONS][comdatum->value - 1] = key;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int class_index(void *key, void *datum, void *datap)
+{
+ struct policydb *p;
+ struct class_datum *cladatum;
+
+ cladatum = datum;
+ p = datap;
+ if (!cladatum->value || cladatum->value > p->p_classes.nprim)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ p->sym_val_to_name[SYM_CLASSES][cladatum->value - 1] = key;
+ p->class_val_to_struct[cladatum->value - 1] = cladatum;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int role_index(void *key, void *datum, void *datap)
+{
+ struct policydb *p;
+ struct role_datum *role;
+
+ role = datum;
+ p = datap;
+ if (!role->value
+ || role->value > p->p_roles.nprim
+ || role->bounds > p->p_roles.nprim)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ p->sym_val_to_name[SYM_ROLES][role->value - 1] = key;
+ p->role_val_to_struct[role->value - 1] = role;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int type_index(void *key, void *datum, void *datap)
+{
+ struct policydb *p;
+ struct type_datum *typdatum;
+
+ typdatum = datum;
+ p = datap;
+
+ if (typdatum->primary) {
+ if (!typdatum->value
+ || typdatum->value > p->p_types.nprim
+ || typdatum->bounds > p->p_types.nprim)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ p->sym_val_to_name[SYM_TYPES][typdatum->value - 1] = key;
+ p->type_val_to_struct[typdatum->value - 1] = typdatum;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int user_index(void *key, void *datum, void *datap)
+{
+ struct policydb *p;
+ struct user_datum *usrdatum;
+
+ usrdatum = datum;
+ p = datap;
+ if (!usrdatum->value
+ || usrdatum->value > p->p_users.nprim
+ || usrdatum->bounds > p->p_users.nprim)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ p->sym_val_to_name[SYM_USERS][usrdatum->value - 1] = key;
+ p->user_val_to_struct[usrdatum->value - 1] = usrdatum;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int sens_index(void *key, void *datum, void *datap)
+{
+ struct policydb *p;
+ struct level_datum *levdatum;
+
+ levdatum = datum;
+ p = datap;
+
+ if (!levdatum->isalias) {
+ if (!levdatum->level->sens ||
+ levdatum->level->sens > p->p_levels.nprim)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ p->sym_val_to_name[SYM_LEVELS][levdatum->level->sens - 1] = key;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int cat_index(void *key, void *datum, void *datap)
+{
+ struct policydb *p;
+ struct cat_datum *catdatum;
+
+ catdatum = datum;
+ p = datap;
+
+ if (!catdatum->isalias) {
+ if (!catdatum->value || catdatum->value > p->p_cats.nprim)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ p->sym_val_to_name[SYM_CATS][catdatum->value - 1] = key;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int (*const index_f[SYM_NUM]) (void *key, void *datum, void *datap) = {
+ common_index,
+ class_index,
+ role_index,
+ type_index,
+ user_index,
+ cond_index_bool,
+ sens_index,
+ cat_index,
+};
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEBUG
+static void hash_eval(struct hashtab *h, const char *hash_name)
+{
+ struct hashtab_info info;
+
+ hashtab_stat(h, &info);
+ pr_debug("SELinux: %s: %d entries and %d/%d buckets used, longest chain length %d\n",
+ hash_name, h->nel, info.slots_used, h->size,
+ info.max_chain_len);
+}
+
+static void symtab_hash_eval(struct symtab *s)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < SYM_NUM; i++)
+ hash_eval(&s[i].table, symtab_name[i]);
+}
+
+#else
+static inline void hash_eval(struct hashtab *h, const char *hash_name)
+{
+}
+static inline void symtab_hash_eval(struct symtab *s)
+{
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEBUG */
+
+/*
+ * Define the other val_to_name and val_to_struct arrays
+ * in a policy database structure.
+ *
+ * Caller must clean up on failure.
+ */
+static int policydb_index(struct policydb *p)
+{
+ int i, rc;
+
+ if (p->mls_enabled)
+ pr_debug("SELinux: %d users, %d roles, %d types, %d bools, %d sens, %d cats\n",
+ p->p_users.nprim, p->p_roles.nprim, p->p_types.nprim,
+ p->p_bools.nprim, p->p_levels.nprim, p->p_cats.nprim);
+ else
+ pr_debug("SELinux: %d users, %d roles, %d types, %d bools\n",
+ p->p_users.nprim, p->p_roles.nprim, p->p_types.nprim,
+ p->p_bools.nprim);
+
+ pr_debug("SELinux: %d classes, %d rules\n",
+ p->p_classes.nprim, p->te_avtab.nel);
+
+ avtab_hash_eval(&p->te_avtab, "rules");
+ symtab_hash_eval(p->symtab);
+
+ p->class_val_to_struct = kcalloc(p->p_classes.nprim,
+ sizeof(*p->class_val_to_struct),
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!p->class_val_to_struct)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ p->role_val_to_struct = kcalloc(p->p_roles.nprim,
+ sizeof(*p->role_val_to_struct),
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!p->role_val_to_struct)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ p->user_val_to_struct = kcalloc(p->p_users.nprim,
+ sizeof(*p->user_val_to_struct),
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!p->user_val_to_struct)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ p->type_val_to_struct = kvcalloc(p->p_types.nprim,
+ sizeof(*p->type_val_to_struct),
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!p->type_val_to_struct)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ rc = cond_init_bool_indexes(p);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < SYM_NUM; i++) {
+ p->sym_val_to_name[i] = kvcalloc(p->symtab[i].nprim,
+ sizeof(char *),
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!p->sym_val_to_name[i])
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ rc = hashtab_map(&p->symtab[i].table, index_f[i], p);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ }
+ rc = 0;
+out:
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Free any memory allocated by a policy database structure.
+ */
+void policydb_destroy(struct policydb *p)
+{
+ struct ocontext *c, *ctmp;
+ struct genfs *g, *gtmp;
+ u32 i;
+ struct role_allow *ra, *lra = NULL;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < SYM_NUM; i++) {
+ cond_resched();
+ hashtab_map(&p->symtab[i].table, destroy_f[i], NULL);
+ hashtab_destroy(&p->symtab[i].table);
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < SYM_NUM; i++)
+ kvfree(p->sym_val_to_name[i]);
+
+ kfree(p->class_val_to_struct);
+ kfree(p->role_val_to_struct);
+ kfree(p->user_val_to_struct);
+ kvfree(p->type_val_to_struct);
+
+ avtab_destroy(&p->te_avtab);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < OCON_NUM; i++) {
+ cond_resched();
+ c = p->ocontexts[i];
+ while (c) {
+ ctmp = c;
+ c = c->next;
+ ocontext_destroy(ctmp, i);
+ }
+ p->ocontexts[i] = NULL;
+ }
+
+ g = p->genfs;
+ while (g) {
+ cond_resched();
+ kfree(g->fstype);
+ c = g->head;
+ while (c) {
+ ctmp = c;
+ c = c->next;
+ ocontext_destroy(ctmp, OCON_FSUSE);
+ }
+ gtmp = g;
+ g = g->next;
+ kfree(gtmp);
+ }
+ p->genfs = NULL;
+
+ cond_policydb_destroy(p);
+
+ hashtab_map(&p->role_tr, role_tr_destroy, NULL);
+ hashtab_destroy(&p->role_tr);
+
+ for (ra = p->role_allow; ra; ra = ra->next) {
+ cond_resched();
+ kfree(lra);
+ lra = ra;
+ }
+ kfree(lra);
+
+ hashtab_map(&p->filename_trans, filenametr_destroy, NULL);
+ hashtab_destroy(&p->filename_trans);
+
+ hashtab_map(&p->range_tr, range_tr_destroy, NULL);
+ hashtab_destroy(&p->range_tr);
+
+ if (p->type_attr_map_array) {
+ for (i = 0; i < p->p_types.nprim; i++)
+ ebitmap_destroy(&p->type_attr_map_array[i]);
+ kvfree(p->type_attr_map_array);
+ }
+
+ ebitmap_destroy(&p->filename_trans_ttypes);
+ ebitmap_destroy(&p->policycaps);
+ ebitmap_destroy(&p->permissive_map);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Load the initial SIDs specified in a policy database
+ * structure into a SID table.
+ */
+int policydb_load_isids(struct policydb *p, struct sidtab *s)
+{
+ struct ocontext *head, *c;
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = sidtab_init(s);
+ if (rc) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: out of memory on SID table init\n");
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ head = p->ocontexts[OCON_ISID];
+ for (c = head; c; c = c->next) {
+ u32 sid = c->sid[0];
+ const char *name = security_get_initial_sid_context(sid);
+
+ if (sid == SECSID_NULL) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: SID 0 was assigned a context.\n");
+ sidtab_destroy(s);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ /* Ignore initial SIDs unused by this kernel. */
+ if (!name)
+ continue;
+
+ rc = sidtab_set_initial(s, sid, &c->context[0]);
+ if (rc) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: unable to load initial SID %s.\n",
+ name);
+ sidtab_destroy(s);
+ return rc;
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int policydb_class_isvalid(struct policydb *p, unsigned int class)
+{
+ if (!class || class > p->p_classes.nprim)
+ return 0;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int policydb_role_isvalid(struct policydb *p, unsigned int role)
+{
+ if (!role || role > p->p_roles.nprim)
+ return 0;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int policydb_type_isvalid(struct policydb *p, unsigned int type)
+{
+ if (!type || type > p->p_types.nprim)
+ return 0;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return 1 if the fields in the security context
+ * structure `c' are valid. Return 0 otherwise.
+ */
+int policydb_context_isvalid(struct policydb *p, struct context *c)
+{
+ struct role_datum *role;
+ struct user_datum *usrdatum;
+
+ if (!c->role || c->role > p->p_roles.nprim)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (!c->user || c->user > p->p_users.nprim)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (!c->type || c->type > p->p_types.nprim)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (c->role != OBJECT_R_VAL) {
+ /*
+ * Role must be authorized for the type.
+ */
+ role = p->role_val_to_struct[c->role - 1];
+ if (!role || !ebitmap_get_bit(&role->types, c->type - 1))
+ /* role may not be associated with type */
+ return 0;
+
+ /*
+ * User must be authorized for the role.
+ */
+ usrdatum = p->user_val_to_struct[c->user - 1];
+ if (!usrdatum)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (!ebitmap_get_bit(&usrdatum->roles, c->role - 1))
+ /* user may not be associated with role */
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!mls_context_isvalid(p, c))
+ return 0;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Read a MLS range structure from a policydb binary
+ * representation file.
+ */
+static int mls_read_range_helper(struct mls_range *r, void *fp)
+{
+ __le32 buf[2];
+ u32 items;
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ items = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ if (items > ARRAY_SIZE(buf)) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: mls: range overflow\n");
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32) * items);
+ if (rc) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: mls: truncated range\n");
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ r->level[0].sens = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ if (items > 1)
+ r->level[1].sens = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+ else
+ r->level[1].sens = r->level[0].sens;
+
+ rc = ebitmap_read(&r->level[0].cat, fp);
+ if (rc) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: mls: error reading low categories\n");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (items > 1) {
+ rc = ebitmap_read(&r->level[1].cat, fp);
+ if (rc) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: mls: error reading high categories\n");
+ goto bad_high;
+ }
+ } else {
+ rc = ebitmap_cpy(&r->level[1].cat, &r->level[0].cat);
+ if (rc) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: mls: out of memory\n");
+ goto bad_high;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+bad_high:
+ ebitmap_destroy(&r->level[0].cat);
+out:
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Read and validate a security context structure
+ * from a policydb binary representation file.
+ */
+static int context_read_and_validate(struct context *c,
+ struct policydb *p,
+ void *fp)
+{
+ __le32 buf[3];
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof buf);
+ if (rc) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: context truncated\n");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ c->user = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ c->role = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+ c->type = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+ if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_MLS) {
+ rc = mls_read_range_helper(&c->range, fp);
+ if (rc) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: error reading MLS range of context\n");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ if (!policydb_context_isvalid(p, c)) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: invalid security context\n");
+ context_destroy(c);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ rc = 0;
+out:
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * The following *_read functions are used to
+ * read the symbol data from a policy database
+ * binary representation file.
+ */
+
+static int str_read(char **strp, gfp_t flags, void *fp, u32 len)
+{
+ int rc;
+ char *str;
+
+ if ((len == 0) || (len == (u32)-1))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ str = kmalloc(len + 1, flags | __GFP_NOWARN);
+ if (!str)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ rc = next_entry(str, fp, len);
+ if (rc) {
+ kfree(str);
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ str[len] = '\0';
+ *strp = str;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int perm_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, void *fp)
+{
+ char *key = NULL;
+ struct perm_datum *perdatum;
+ int rc;
+ __le32 buf[2];
+ u32 len;
+
+ perdatum = kzalloc(sizeof(*perdatum), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!perdatum)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof buf);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+
+ len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ perdatum->value = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+
+ rc = str_read(&key, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+
+ rc = symtab_insert(s, key, perdatum);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+
+ return 0;
+bad:
+ perm_destroy(key, perdatum, NULL);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static int common_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, void *fp)
+{
+ char *key = NULL;
+ struct common_datum *comdatum;
+ __le32 buf[4];
+ u32 i, len, nel;
+ int rc;
+
+ comdatum = kzalloc(sizeof(*comdatum), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!comdatum)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof buf);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+
+ len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ comdatum->value = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+ nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[3]);
+
+ rc = symtab_init(&comdatum->permissions, nel);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+ comdatum->permissions.nprim = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+
+ rc = str_read(&key, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < nel; i++) {
+ rc = perm_read(p, &comdatum->permissions, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+ }
+
+ rc = symtab_insert(s, key, comdatum);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+ return 0;
+bad:
+ common_destroy(key, comdatum, NULL);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static void type_set_init(struct type_set *t)
+{
+ ebitmap_init(&t->types);
+ ebitmap_init(&t->negset);
+}
+
+static int type_set_read(struct type_set *t, void *fp)
+{
+ __le32 buf[1];
+ int rc;
+
+ if (ebitmap_read(&t->types, fp))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ if (ebitmap_read(&t->negset, fp))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+ if (rc < 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ t->flags = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
+static int read_cons_helper(struct policydb *p,
+ struct constraint_node **nodep,
+ u32 ncons, int allowxtarget, void *fp)
+{
+ struct constraint_node *c, *lc;
+ struct constraint_expr *e, *le;
+ __le32 buf[3];
+ u32 i, j, nexpr;
+ int rc, depth;
+
+ lc = NULL;
+ for (i = 0; i < ncons; i++) {
+ c = kzalloc(sizeof(*c), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!c)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ if (lc)
+ lc->next = c;
+ else
+ *nodep = c;
+
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, (sizeof(u32) * 2));
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ c->permissions = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ nexpr = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+ le = NULL;
+ depth = -1;
+ for (j = 0; j < nexpr; j++) {
+ e = kzalloc(sizeof(*e), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!e)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ if (le)
+ le->next = e;
+ else
+ c->expr = e;
+
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, (sizeof(u32) * 3));
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ e->expr_type = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ e->attr = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+ e->op = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+
+ switch (e->expr_type) {
+ case CEXPR_NOT:
+ if (depth < 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ case CEXPR_AND:
+ case CEXPR_OR:
+ if (depth < 1)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ depth--;
+ break;
+ case CEXPR_ATTR:
+ if (depth == (CEXPR_MAXDEPTH - 1))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ depth++;
+ break;
+ case CEXPR_NAMES:
+ if (!allowxtarget && (e->attr & CEXPR_XTARGET))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ if (depth == (CEXPR_MAXDEPTH - 1))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ depth++;
+ rc = ebitmap_read(&e->names, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ if (p->policyvers >=
+ POLICYDB_VERSION_CONSTRAINT_NAMES) {
+ e->type_names = kzalloc(sizeof
+ (*e->type_names), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!e->type_names)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ type_set_init(e->type_names);
+ rc = type_set_read(e->type_names, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ }
+ break;
+ default:
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ le = e;
+ }
+ if (depth != 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ lc = c;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int class_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, void *fp)
+{
+ char *key = NULL;
+ struct class_datum *cladatum;
+ __le32 buf[6];
+ u32 i, len, len2, ncons, nel;
+ int rc;
+
+ cladatum = kzalloc(sizeof(*cladatum), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!cladatum)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32)*6);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+
+ len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ len2 = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+ cladatum->value = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+ nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[4]);
+
+ rc = symtab_init(&cladatum->permissions, nel);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+ cladatum->permissions.nprim = le32_to_cpu(buf[3]);
+
+ ncons = le32_to_cpu(buf[5]);
+
+ rc = str_read(&key, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+
+ if (len2) {
+ rc = str_read(&cladatum->comkey, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len2);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ cladatum->comdatum = symtab_search(&p->p_commons,
+ cladatum->comkey);
+ if (!cladatum->comdatum) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: unknown common %s\n",
+ cladatum->comkey);
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < nel; i++) {
+ rc = perm_read(p, &cladatum->permissions, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+ }
+
+ rc = read_cons_helper(p, &cladatum->constraints, ncons, 0, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+
+ if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_VALIDATETRANS) {
+ /* grab the validatetrans rules */
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+ ncons = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ rc = read_cons_helper(p, &cladatum->validatetrans,
+ ncons, 1, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+ }
+
+ if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_NEW_OBJECT_DEFAULTS) {
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 3);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+
+ cladatum->default_user = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ cladatum->default_role = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+ cladatum->default_range = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+ }
+
+ if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_DEFAULT_TYPE) {
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 1);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+ cladatum->default_type = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ }
+
+ rc = symtab_insert(s, key, cladatum);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+
+ return 0;
+bad:
+ cls_destroy(key, cladatum, NULL);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static int role_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, void *fp)
+{
+ char *key = NULL;
+ struct role_datum *role;
+ int rc;
+ unsigned int to_read = 2;
+ __le32 buf[3];
+ u32 len;
+
+ role = kzalloc(sizeof(*role), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!role)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY)
+ to_read = 3;
+
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(buf[0]) * to_read);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+
+ len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ role->value = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+ if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY)
+ role->bounds = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+
+ rc = str_read(&key, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+
+ rc = ebitmap_read(&role->dominates, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+
+ rc = ebitmap_read(&role->types, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+
+ if (strcmp(key, OBJECT_R) == 0) {
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ if (role->value != OBJECT_R_VAL) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: Role %s has wrong value %d\n",
+ OBJECT_R, role->value);
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ rc = 0;
+ goto bad;
+ }
+
+ rc = symtab_insert(s, key, role);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+ return 0;
+bad:
+ role_destroy(key, role, NULL);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static int type_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, void *fp)
+{
+ char *key = NULL;
+ struct type_datum *typdatum;
+ int rc;
+ unsigned int to_read = 3;
+ __le32 buf[4];
+ u32 len;
+
+ typdatum = kzalloc(sizeof(*typdatum), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!typdatum)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY)
+ to_read = 4;
+
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(buf[0]) * to_read);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+
+ len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ typdatum->value = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+ if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY) {
+ u32 prop = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+
+ if (prop & TYPEDATUM_PROPERTY_PRIMARY)
+ typdatum->primary = 1;
+ if (prop & TYPEDATUM_PROPERTY_ATTRIBUTE)
+ typdatum->attribute = 1;
+
+ typdatum->bounds = le32_to_cpu(buf[3]);
+ } else {
+ typdatum->primary = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+ }
+
+ rc = str_read(&key, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+
+ rc = symtab_insert(s, key, typdatum);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+ return 0;
+bad:
+ type_destroy(key, typdatum, NULL);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Read a MLS level structure from a policydb binary
+ * representation file.
+ */
+static int mls_read_level(struct mls_level *lp, void *fp)
+{
+ __le32 buf[1];
+ int rc;
+
+ memset(lp, 0, sizeof(*lp));
+
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof buf);
+ if (rc) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: mls: truncated level\n");
+ return rc;
+ }
+ lp->sens = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+
+ rc = ebitmap_read(&lp->cat, fp);
+ if (rc) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: mls: error reading level categories\n");
+ return rc;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int user_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, void *fp)
+{
+ char *key = NULL;
+ struct user_datum *usrdatum;
+ int rc;
+ unsigned int to_read = 2;
+ __le32 buf[3];
+ u32 len;
+
+ usrdatum = kzalloc(sizeof(*usrdatum), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!usrdatum)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY)
+ to_read = 3;
+
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(buf[0]) * to_read);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+
+ len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ usrdatum->value = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+ if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY)
+ usrdatum->bounds = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+
+ rc = str_read(&key, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+
+ rc = ebitmap_read(&usrdatum->roles, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+
+ if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_MLS) {
+ rc = mls_read_range_helper(&usrdatum->range, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+ rc = mls_read_level(&usrdatum->dfltlevel, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+ }
+
+ rc = symtab_insert(s, key, usrdatum);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+ return 0;
+bad:
+ user_destroy(key, usrdatum, NULL);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static int sens_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, void *fp)
+{
+ char *key = NULL;
+ struct level_datum *levdatum;
+ int rc;
+ __le32 buf[2];
+ u32 len;
+
+ levdatum = kzalloc(sizeof(*levdatum), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!levdatum)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof buf);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+
+ len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ levdatum->isalias = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+
+ rc = str_read(&key, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ levdatum->level = kmalloc(sizeof(*levdatum->level), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!levdatum->level)
+ goto bad;
+
+ rc = mls_read_level(levdatum->level, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+
+ rc = symtab_insert(s, key, levdatum);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+ return 0;
+bad:
+ sens_destroy(key, levdatum, NULL);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static int cat_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, void *fp)
+{
+ char *key = NULL;
+ struct cat_datum *catdatum;
+ int rc;
+ __le32 buf[3];
+ u32 len;
+
+ catdatum = kzalloc(sizeof(*catdatum), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!catdatum)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof buf);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+
+ len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ catdatum->value = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+ catdatum->isalias = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+
+ rc = str_read(&key, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+
+ rc = symtab_insert(s, key, catdatum);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+ return 0;
+bad:
+ cat_destroy(key, catdatum, NULL);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static int (*const read_f[SYM_NUM]) (struct policydb *p,
+ struct symtab *s, void *fp) = {
+ common_read,
+ class_read,
+ role_read,
+ type_read,
+ user_read,
+ cond_read_bool,
+ sens_read,
+ cat_read,
+};
+
+static int user_bounds_sanity_check(void *key, void *datum, void *datap)
+{
+ struct user_datum *upper, *user;
+ struct policydb *p = datap;
+ int depth = 0;
+
+ upper = user = datum;
+ while (upper->bounds) {
+ struct ebitmap_node *node;
+ u32 bit;
+
+ if (++depth == POLICYDB_BOUNDS_MAXDEPTH) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: user %s: "
+ "too deep or looped boundary\n",
+ (char *) key);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ upper = p->user_val_to_struct[upper->bounds - 1];
+ ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&user->roles, node, bit) {
+ if (ebitmap_get_bit(&upper->roles, bit))
+ continue;
+
+ pr_err("SELinux: boundary violated policy: "
+ "user=%s role=%s bounds=%s\n",
+ sym_name(p, SYM_USERS, user->value - 1),
+ sym_name(p, SYM_ROLES, bit),
+ sym_name(p, SYM_USERS, upper->value - 1));
+
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int role_bounds_sanity_check(void *key, void *datum, void *datap)
+{
+ struct role_datum *upper, *role;
+ struct policydb *p = datap;
+ int depth = 0;
+
+ upper = role = datum;
+ while (upper->bounds) {
+ struct ebitmap_node *node;
+ u32 bit;
+
+ if (++depth == POLICYDB_BOUNDS_MAXDEPTH) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: role %s: "
+ "too deep or looped bounds\n",
+ (char *) key);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ upper = p->role_val_to_struct[upper->bounds - 1];
+ ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&role->types, node, bit) {
+ if (ebitmap_get_bit(&upper->types, bit))
+ continue;
+
+ pr_err("SELinux: boundary violated policy: "
+ "role=%s type=%s bounds=%s\n",
+ sym_name(p, SYM_ROLES, role->value - 1),
+ sym_name(p, SYM_TYPES, bit),
+ sym_name(p, SYM_ROLES, upper->value - 1));
+
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int type_bounds_sanity_check(void *key, void *datum, void *datap)
+{
+ struct type_datum *upper;
+ struct policydb *p = datap;
+ int depth = 0;
+
+ upper = datum;
+ while (upper->bounds) {
+ if (++depth == POLICYDB_BOUNDS_MAXDEPTH) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: type %s: "
+ "too deep or looped boundary\n",
+ (char *) key);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ upper = p->type_val_to_struct[upper->bounds - 1];
+ BUG_ON(!upper);
+
+ if (upper->attribute) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: type %s: "
+ "bounded by attribute %s\n",
+ (char *) key,
+ sym_name(p, SYM_TYPES, upper->value - 1));
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int policydb_bounds_sanity_check(struct policydb *p)
+{
+ int rc;
+
+ if (p->policyvers < POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY)
+ return 0;
+
+ rc = hashtab_map(&p->p_users.table, user_bounds_sanity_check, p);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = hashtab_map(&p->p_roles.table, role_bounds_sanity_check, p);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = hashtab_map(&p->p_types.table, type_bounds_sanity_check, p);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+u16 string_to_security_class(struct policydb *p, const char *name)
+{
+ struct class_datum *cladatum;
+
+ cladatum = symtab_search(&p->p_classes, name);
+ if (!cladatum)
+ return 0;
+
+ return cladatum->value;
+}
+
+u32 string_to_av_perm(struct policydb *p, u16 tclass, const char *name)
+{
+ struct class_datum *cladatum;
+ struct perm_datum *perdatum = NULL;
+ struct common_datum *comdatum;
+
+ if (!tclass || tclass > p->p_classes.nprim)
+ return 0;
+
+ cladatum = p->class_val_to_struct[tclass-1];
+ comdatum = cladatum->comdatum;
+ if (comdatum)
+ perdatum = symtab_search(&comdatum->permissions, name);
+ if (!perdatum)
+ perdatum = symtab_search(&cladatum->permissions, name);
+ if (!perdatum)
+ return 0;
+
+ return 1U << (perdatum->value-1);
+}
+
+static int range_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
+{
+ struct range_trans *rt = NULL;
+ struct mls_range *r = NULL;
+ int rc;
+ __le32 buf[2];
+ u32 i, nel;
+
+ if (p->policyvers < POLICYDB_VERSION_MLS)
+ return 0;
+
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+
+ rc = hashtab_init(&p->range_tr, nel);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < nel; i++) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ rt = kzalloc(sizeof(*rt), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!rt)
+ goto out;
+
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, (sizeof(u32) * 2));
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ rt->source_type = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ rt->target_type = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+ if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_RANGETRANS) {
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ rt->target_class = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ } else
+ rt->target_class = p->process_class;
+
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ if (!policydb_type_isvalid(p, rt->source_type) ||
+ !policydb_type_isvalid(p, rt->target_type) ||
+ !policydb_class_isvalid(p, rt->target_class))
+ goto out;
+
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ r = kzalloc(sizeof(*r), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!r)
+ goto out;
+
+ rc = mls_read_range_helper(r, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ if (!mls_range_isvalid(p, r)) {
+ pr_warn("SELinux: rangetrans: invalid range\n");
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ rc = hashtab_insert(&p->range_tr, rt, r, rangetr_key_params);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ rt = NULL;
+ r = NULL;
+ }
+ hash_eval(&p->range_tr, "rangetr");
+ rc = 0;
+out:
+ kfree(rt);
+ kfree(r);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static int filename_trans_read_helper_compat(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
+{
+ struct filename_trans_key key, *ft = NULL;
+ struct filename_trans_datum *last, *datum = NULL;
+ char *name = NULL;
+ u32 len, stype, otype;
+ __le32 buf[4];
+ int rc;
+
+ /* length of the path component string */
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+
+ /* path component string */
+ rc = str_read(&name, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 4);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ stype = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ key.ttype = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+ key.tclass = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+ key.name = name;
+
+ otype = le32_to_cpu(buf[3]);
+
+ last = NULL;
+ datum = policydb_filenametr_search(p, &key);
+ while (datum) {
+ if (unlikely(ebitmap_get_bit(&datum->stypes, stype - 1))) {
+ /* conflicting/duplicate rules are ignored */
+ datum = NULL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (likely(datum->otype == otype))
+ break;
+ last = datum;
+ datum = datum->next;
+ }
+ if (!datum) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ datum = kmalloc(sizeof(*datum), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!datum)
+ goto out;
+
+ ebitmap_init(&datum->stypes);
+ datum->otype = otype;
+ datum->next = NULL;
+
+ if (unlikely(last)) {
+ last->next = datum;
+ } else {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ ft = kmemdup(&key, sizeof(key), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!ft)
+ goto out;
+
+ rc = hashtab_insert(&p->filename_trans, ft, datum,
+ filenametr_key_params);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ name = NULL;
+
+ rc = ebitmap_set_bit(&p->filename_trans_ttypes,
+ key.ttype, 1);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ }
+ }
+ kfree(name);
+ return ebitmap_set_bit(&datum->stypes, stype - 1, 1);
+
+out:
+ kfree(ft);
+ kfree(name);
+ kfree(datum);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static int filename_trans_read_helper(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
+{
+ struct filename_trans_key *ft = NULL;
+ struct filename_trans_datum **dst, *datum, *first = NULL;
+ char *name = NULL;
+ u32 len, ttype, tclass, ndatum, i;
+ __le32 buf[3];
+ int rc;
+
+ /* length of the path component string */
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+
+ /* path component string */
+ rc = str_read(&name, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 3);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ ttype = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ tclass = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+
+ ndatum = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+ if (ndatum == 0) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: Filename transition key with no datum\n");
+ rc = -ENOENT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ dst = &first;
+ for (i = 0; i < ndatum; i++) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ datum = kmalloc(sizeof(*datum), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!datum)
+ goto out;
+
+ datum->next = NULL;
+ *dst = datum;
+
+ /* ebitmap_read() will at least init the bitmap */
+ rc = ebitmap_read(&datum->stypes, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ datum->otype = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+
+ dst = &datum->next;
+ }
+
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ ft = kmalloc(sizeof(*ft), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!ft)
+ goto out;
+
+ ft->ttype = ttype;
+ ft->tclass = tclass;
+ ft->name = name;
+
+ rc = hashtab_insert(&p->filename_trans, ft, first,
+ filenametr_key_params);
+ if (rc == -EEXIST)
+ pr_err("SELinux: Duplicate filename transition key\n");
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ return ebitmap_set_bit(&p->filename_trans_ttypes, ttype, 1);
+
+out:
+ kfree(ft);
+ kfree(name);
+ while (first) {
+ datum = first;
+ first = first->next;
+
+ ebitmap_destroy(&datum->stypes);
+ kfree(datum);
+ }
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static int filename_trans_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
+{
+ u32 nel, i;
+ __le32 buf[1];
+ int rc;
+
+ if (p->policyvers < POLICYDB_VERSION_FILENAME_TRANS)
+ return 0;
+
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+
+ if (p->policyvers < POLICYDB_VERSION_COMP_FTRANS) {
+ p->compat_filename_trans_count = nel;
+
+ rc = hashtab_init(&p->filename_trans, (1 << 11));
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < nel; i++) {
+ rc = filename_trans_read_helper_compat(p, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ }
+ } else {
+ rc = hashtab_init(&p->filename_trans, nel);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < nel; i++) {
+ rc = filename_trans_read_helper(p, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ }
+ }
+ hash_eval(&p->filename_trans, "filenametr");
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int genfs_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
+{
+ int rc;
+ u32 i, j, nel, nel2, len, len2;
+ __le32 buf[1];
+ struct ocontext *l, *c;
+ struct ocontext *newc = NULL;
+ struct genfs *genfs_p, *genfs;
+ struct genfs *newgenfs = NULL;
+
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < nel; i++) {
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ newgenfs = kzalloc(sizeof(*newgenfs), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!newgenfs)
+ goto out;
+
+ rc = str_read(&newgenfs->fstype, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ for (genfs_p = NULL, genfs = p->genfs; genfs;
+ genfs_p = genfs, genfs = genfs->next) {
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ if (strcmp(newgenfs->fstype, genfs->fstype) == 0) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: dup genfs fstype %s\n",
+ newgenfs->fstype);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (strcmp(newgenfs->fstype, genfs->fstype) < 0)
+ break;
+ }
+ newgenfs->next = genfs;
+ if (genfs_p)
+ genfs_p->next = newgenfs;
+ else
+ p->genfs = newgenfs;
+ genfs = newgenfs;
+ newgenfs = NULL;
+
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ nel2 = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ for (j = 0; j < nel2; j++) {
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ newc = kzalloc(sizeof(*newc), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!newc)
+ goto out;
+
+ rc = str_read(&newc->u.name, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ newc->v.sclass = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ rc = context_read_and_validate(&newc->context[0], p, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ for (l = NULL, c = genfs->head; c;
+ l = c, c = c->next) {
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ if (!strcmp(newc->u.name, c->u.name) &&
+ (!c->v.sclass || !newc->v.sclass ||
+ newc->v.sclass == c->v.sclass)) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: dup genfs entry (%s,%s)\n",
+ genfs->fstype, c->u.name);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ len = strlen(newc->u.name);
+ len2 = strlen(c->u.name);
+ if (len > len2)
+ break;
+ }
+
+ newc->next = c;
+ if (l)
+ l->next = newc;
+ else
+ genfs->head = newc;
+ newc = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+ rc = 0;
+out:
+ if (newgenfs) {
+ kfree(newgenfs->fstype);
+ kfree(newgenfs);
+ }
+ ocontext_destroy(newc, OCON_FSUSE);
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static int ocontext_read(struct policydb *p, const struct policydb_compat_info *info,
+ void *fp)
+{
+ int rc;
+ unsigned int i;
+ u32 j, nel, len;
+ __be64 prefixbuf[1];
+ __le32 buf[3];
+ struct ocontext *l, *c;
+ u32 nodebuf[8];
+
+ for (i = 0; i < info->ocon_num; i++) {
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+
+ l = NULL;
+ for (j = 0; j < nel; j++) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ c = kzalloc(sizeof(*c), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!c)
+ goto out;
+ if (l)
+ l->next = c;
+ else
+ p->ocontexts[i] = c;
+ l = c;
+
+ switch (i) {
+ case OCON_ISID:
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ c->sid[0] = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ rc = context_read_and_validate(&c->context[0], p, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ break;
+ case OCON_FS:
+ case OCON_NETIF:
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+
+ rc = str_read(&c->u.name, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (i == OCON_FS)
+ pr_warn("SELinux: void and deprecated fs ocon %s\n",
+ c->u.name);
+
+ rc = context_read_and_validate(&c->context[0], p, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ rc = context_read_and_validate(&c->context[1], p, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ break;
+ case OCON_PORT:
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32)*3);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ c->u.port.protocol = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ c->u.port.low_port = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+ c->u.port.high_port = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+ rc = context_read_and_validate(&c->context[0], p, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ break;
+ case OCON_NODE:
+ rc = next_entry(nodebuf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 2);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ c->u.node.addr = nodebuf[0]; /* network order */
+ c->u.node.mask = nodebuf[1]; /* network order */
+ rc = context_read_and_validate(&c->context[0], p, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ break;
+ case OCON_FSUSE:
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32)*2);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ c->v.behavior = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ /* Determined at runtime, not in policy DB. */
+ if (c->v.behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)
+ goto out;
+ if (c->v.behavior > SECURITY_FS_USE_MAX)
+ goto out;
+
+ len = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+ rc = str_read(&c->u.name, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ rc = context_read_and_validate(&c->context[0], p, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ break;
+ case OCON_NODE6: {
+ int k;
+
+ rc = next_entry(nodebuf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 8);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ for (k = 0; k < 4; k++)
+ c->u.node6.addr[k] = nodebuf[k];
+ for (k = 0; k < 4; k++)
+ c->u.node6.mask[k] = nodebuf[k+4];
+ rc = context_read_and_validate(&c->context[0], p, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ break;
+ }
+ case OCON_IBPKEY: {
+ u32 pkey_lo, pkey_hi;
+
+ rc = next_entry(prefixbuf, fp, sizeof(u64));
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* we need to have subnet_prefix in CPU order */
+ c->u.ibpkey.subnet_prefix = be64_to_cpu(prefixbuf[0]);
+
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 2);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ pkey_lo = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ pkey_hi = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+
+ if (pkey_lo > U16_MAX || pkey_hi > U16_MAX) {
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ c->u.ibpkey.low_pkey = pkey_lo;
+ c->u.ibpkey.high_pkey = pkey_hi;
+
+ rc = context_read_and_validate(&c->context[0],
+ p,
+ fp);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ break;
+ }
+ case OCON_IBENDPORT: {
+ u32 port;
+
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 2);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+
+ rc = str_read(&c->u.ibendport.dev_name, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ port = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+ if (port > U8_MAX || port == 0) {
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ c->u.ibendport.port = port;
+
+ rc = context_read_and_validate(&c->context[0],
+ p,
+ fp);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ break;
+ } /* end case */
+ } /* end switch */
+ }
+ }
+ rc = 0;
+out:
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Read the configuration data from a policy database binary
+ * representation file into a policy database structure.
+ */
+int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
+{
+ struct role_allow *ra, *lra;
+ struct role_trans_key *rtk = NULL;
+ struct role_trans_datum *rtd = NULL;
+ int rc;
+ __le32 buf[4];
+ u32 i, j, len, nprim, nel, perm;
+
+ char *policydb_str;
+ const struct policydb_compat_info *info;
+
+ policydb_init(p);
+
+ /* Read the magic number and string length. */
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 2);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ if (le32_to_cpu(buf[0]) != POLICYDB_MAGIC) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: policydb magic number 0x%x does "
+ "not match expected magic number 0x%x\n",
+ le32_to_cpu(buf[0]), POLICYDB_MAGIC);
+ goto bad;
+ }
+
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ len = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+ if (len != strlen(POLICYDB_STRING)) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: policydb string length %d does not "
+ "match expected length %zu\n",
+ len, strlen(POLICYDB_STRING));
+ goto bad;
+ }
+
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ policydb_str = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!policydb_str) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: unable to allocate memory for policydb "
+ "string of length %d\n", len);
+ goto bad;
+ }
+
+ rc = next_entry(policydb_str, fp, len);
+ if (rc) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: truncated policydb string identifier\n");
+ kfree(policydb_str);
+ goto bad;
+ }
+
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ policydb_str[len] = '\0';
+ if (strcmp(policydb_str, POLICYDB_STRING)) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: policydb string %s does not match "
+ "my string %s\n", policydb_str, POLICYDB_STRING);
+ kfree(policydb_str);
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ /* Done with policydb_str. */
+ kfree(policydb_str);
+ policydb_str = NULL;
+
+ /* Read the version and table sizes. */
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32)*4);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ p->policyvers = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ if (p->policyvers < POLICYDB_VERSION_MIN ||
+ p->policyvers > POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: policydb version %d does not match "
+ "my version range %d-%d\n",
+ le32_to_cpu(buf[0]), POLICYDB_VERSION_MIN, POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX);
+ goto bad;
+ }
+
+ if ((le32_to_cpu(buf[1]) & POLICYDB_CONFIG_MLS)) {
+ p->mls_enabled = 1;
+
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ if (p->policyvers < POLICYDB_VERSION_MLS) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: security policydb version %d "
+ "(MLS) not backwards compatible\n",
+ p->policyvers);
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ }
+ p->reject_unknown = !!(le32_to_cpu(buf[1]) & REJECT_UNKNOWN);
+ p->allow_unknown = !!(le32_to_cpu(buf[1]) & ALLOW_UNKNOWN);
+
+ if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_POLCAP) {
+ rc = ebitmap_read(&p->policycaps, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+ }
+
+ if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_PERMISSIVE) {
+ rc = ebitmap_read(&p->permissive_map, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+ }
+
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ info = policydb_lookup_compat(p->policyvers);
+ if (!info) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: unable to find policy compat info "
+ "for version %d\n", p->policyvers);
+ goto bad;
+ }
+
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ if (le32_to_cpu(buf[2]) != info->sym_num ||
+ le32_to_cpu(buf[3]) != info->ocon_num) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: policydb table sizes (%d,%d) do "
+ "not match mine (%d,%d)\n", le32_to_cpu(buf[2]),
+ le32_to_cpu(buf[3]),
+ info->sym_num, info->ocon_num);
+ goto bad;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < info->sym_num; i++) {
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32)*2);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+ nprim = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+
+ rc = symtab_init(&p->symtab[i], nel);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (i == SYM_ROLES) {
+ rc = roles_init(p);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ for (j = 0; j < nel; j++) {
+ rc = read_f[i](p, &p->symtab[i], fp);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+ }
+
+ p->symtab[i].nprim = nprim;
+ }
+
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ p->process_class = string_to_security_class(p, "process");
+ if (!p->process_class) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: process class is required, not defined in policy\n");
+ goto bad;
+ }
+
+ rc = avtab_read(&p->te_avtab, fp, p);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+
+ if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_BOOL) {
+ rc = cond_read_list(p, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+ }
+
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+ nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+
+ rc = hashtab_init(&p->role_tr, nel);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+ for (i = 0; i < nel; i++) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ rtk = kmalloc(sizeof(*rtk), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!rtk)
+ goto bad;
+
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ rtd = kmalloc(sizeof(*rtd), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!rtd)
+ goto bad;
+
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32)*3);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+
+ rtk->role = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ rtk->type = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+ rtd->new_role = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+ if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_ROLETRANS) {
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+ rtk->tclass = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ } else
+ rtk->tclass = p->process_class;
+
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ if (!policydb_role_isvalid(p, rtk->role) ||
+ !policydb_type_isvalid(p, rtk->type) ||
+ !policydb_class_isvalid(p, rtk->tclass) ||
+ !policydb_role_isvalid(p, rtd->new_role))
+ goto bad;
+
+ rc = hashtab_insert(&p->role_tr, rtk, rtd, roletr_key_params);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+
+ rtk = NULL;
+ rtd = NULL;
+ }
+
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+ nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ lra = NULL;
+ for (i = 0; i < nel; i++) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ ra = kzalloc(sizeof(*ra), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!ra)
+ goto bad;
+ if (lra)
+ lra->next = ra;
+ else
+ p->role_allow = ra;
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32)*2);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ ra->role = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ ra->new_role = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+ if (!policydb_role_isvalid(p, ra->role) ||
+ !policydb_role_isvalid(p, ra->new_role))
+ goto bad;
+ lra = ra;
+ }
+
+ rc = filename_trans_read(p, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+
+ rc = policydb_index(p);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ perm = string_to_av_perm(p, p->process_class, "transition");
+ if (!perm) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: process transition permission is required, not defined in policy\n");
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ p->process_trans_perms = perm;
+ perm = string_to_av_perm(p, p->process_class, "dyntransition");
+ if (!perm) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: process dyntransition permission is required, not defined in policy\n");
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ p->process_trans_perms |= perm;
+
+ rc = ocontext_read(p, info, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+
+ rc = genfs_read(p, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+
+ rc = range_read(p, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ p->type_attr_map_array = kvcalloc(p->p_types.nprim,
+ sizeof(*p->type_attr_map_array),
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!p->type_attr_map_array)
+ goto bad;
+
+ /* just in case ebitmap_init() becomes more than just a memset(0): */
+ for (i = 0; i < p->p_types.nprim; i++)
+ ebitmap_init(&p->type_attr_map_array[i]);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < p->p_types.nprim; i++) {
+ struct ebitmap *e = &p->type_attr_map_array[i];
+
+ if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_AVTAB) {
+ rc = ebitmap_read(e, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ /* add the type itself as the degenerate case */
+ rc = ebitmap_set_bit(e, i, 1);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+ }
+
+ rc = policydb_bounds_sanity_check(p);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+
+ rc = 0;
+out:
+ return rc;
+bad:
+ kfree(rtk);
+ kfree(rtd);
+ policydb_destroy(p);
+ goto out;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Write a MLS level structure to a policydb binary
+ * representation file.
+ */
+static int mls_write_level(struct mls_level *l, void *fp)
+{
+ __le32 buf[1];
+ int rc;
+
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(l->sens);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = ebitmap_write(&l->cat, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Write a MLS range structure to a policydb binary
+ * representation file.
+ */
+static int mls_write_range_helper(struct mls_range *r, void *fp)
+{
+ __le32 buf[3];
+ size_t items;
+ int rc, eq;
+
+ eq = mls_level_eq(&r->level[1], &r->level[0]);
+
+ if (eq)
+ items = 2;
+ else
+ items = 3;
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(items-1);
+ buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(r->level[0].sens);
+ if (!eq)
+ buf[2] = cpu_to_le32(r->level[1].sens);
+
+ BUG_ON(items > ARRAY_SIZE(buf));
+
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), items, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = ebitmap_write(&r->level[0].cat, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ if (!eq) {
+ rc = ebitmap_write(&r->level[1].cat, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int sens_write(void *vkey, void *datum, void *ptr)
+{
+ char *key = vkey;
+ struct level_datum *levdatum = datum;
+ struct policy_data *pd = ptr;
+ void *fp = pd->fp;
+ __le32 buf[2];
+ size_t len;
+ int rc;
+
+ len = strlen(key);
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(len);
+ buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(levdatum->isalias);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 2, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = put_entry(key, 1, len, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = mls_write_level(levdatum->level, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int cat_write(void *vkey, void *datum, void *ptr)
+{
+ char *key = vkey;
+ struct cat_datum *catdatum = datum;
+ struct policy_data *pd = ptr;
+ void *fp = pd->fp;
+ __le32 buf[3];
+ size_t len;
+ int rc;
+
+ len = strlen(key);
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(len);
+ buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(catdatum->value);
+ buf[2] = cpu_to_le32(catdatum->isalias);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 3, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = put_entry(key, 1, len, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int role_trans_write_one(void *key, void *datum, void *ptr)
+{
+ struct role_trans_key *rtk = key;
+ struct role_trans_datum *rtd = datum;
+ struct policy_data *pd = ptr;
+ void *fp = pd->fp;
+ struct policydb *p = pd->p;
+ __le32 buf[3];
+ int rc;
+
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(rtk->role);
+ buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(rtk->type);
+ buf[2] = cpu_to_le32(rtd->new_role);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 3, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_ROLETRANS) {
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(rtk->tclass);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int role_trans_write(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
+{
+ struct policy_data pd = { .p = p, .fp = fp };
+ __le32 buf[1];
+ int rc;
+
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(p->role_tr.nel);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ return hashtab_map(&p->role_tr, role_trans_write_one, &pd);
+}
+
+static int role_allow_write(struct role_allow *r, void *fp)
+{
+ struct role_allow *ra;
+ __le32 buf[2];
+ size_t nel;
+ int rc;
+
+ nel = 0;
+ for (ra = r; ra; ra = ra->next)
+ nel++;
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(nel);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ for (ra = r; ra; ra = ra->next) {
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(ra->role);
+ buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(ra->new_role);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 2, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Write a security context structure
+ * to a policydb binary representation file.
+ */
+static int context_write(struct policydb *p, struct context *c,
+ void *fp)
+{
+ int rc;
+ __le32 buf[3];
+
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(c->user);
+ buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(c->role);
+ buf[2] = cpu_to_le32(c->type);
+
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 3, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = mls_write_range_helper(&c->range, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * The following *_write functions are used to
+ * write the symbol data to a policy database
+ * binary representation file.
+ */
+
+static int perm_write(void *vkey, void *datum, void *fp)
+{
+ char *key = vkey;
+ struct perm_datum *perdatum = datum;
+ __le32 buf[2];
+ size_t len;
+ int rc;
+
+ len = strlen(key);
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(len);
+ buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(perdatum->value);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 2, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = put_entry(key, 1, len, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int common_write(void *vkey, void *datum, void *ptr)
+{
+ char *key = vkey;
+ struct common_datum *comdatum = datum;
+ struct policy_data *pd = ptr;
+ void *fp = pd->fp;
+ __le32 buf[4];
+ size_t len;
+ int rc;
+
+ len = strlen(key);
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(len);
+ buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(comdatum->value);
+ buf[2] = cpu_to_le32(comdatum->permissions.nprim);
+ buf[3] = cpu_to_le32(comdatum->permissions.table.nel);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 4, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = put_entry(key, 1, len, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = hashtab_map(&comdatum->permissions.table, perm_write, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int type_set_write(struct type_set *t, void *fp)
+{
+ int rc;
+ __le32 buf[1];
+
+ if (ebitmap_write(&t->types, fp))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ if (ebitmap_write(&t->negset, fp))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(t->flags);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int write_cons_helper(struct policydb *p, struct constraint_node *node,
+ void *fp)
+{
+ struct constraint_node *c;
+ struct constraint_expr *e;
+ __le32 buf[3];
+ u32 nel;
+ int rc;
+
+ for (c = node; c; c = c->next) {
+ nel = 0;
+ for (e = c->expr; e; e = e->next)
+ nel++;
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(c->permissions);
+ buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(nel);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 2, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ for (e = c->expr; e; e = e->next) {
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(e->expr_type);
+ buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(e->attr);
+ buf[2] = cpu_to_le32(e->op);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 3, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ switch (e->expr_type) {
+ case CEXPR_NAMES:
+ rc = ebitmap_write(&e->names, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ if (p->policyvers >=
+ POLICYDB_VERSION_CONSTRAINT_NAMES) {
+ rc = type_set_write(e->type_names, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ }
+ break;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int class_write(void *vkey, void *datum, void *ptr)
+{
+ char *key = vkey;
+ struct class_datum *cladatum = datum;
+ struct policy_data *pd = ptr;
+ void *fp = pd->fp;
+ struct policydb *p = pd->p;
+ struct constraint_node *c;
+ __le32 buf[6];
+ u32 ncons;
+ size_t len, len2;
+ int rc;
+
+ len = strlen(key);
+ if (cladatum->comkey)
+ len2 = strlen(cladatum->comkey);
+ else
+ len2 = 0;
+
+ ncons = 0;
+ for (c = cladatum->constraints; c; c = c->next)
+ ncons++;
+
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(len);
+ buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(len2);
+ buf[2] = cpu_to_le32(cladatum->value);
+ buf[3] = cpu_to_le32(cladatum->permissions.nprim);
+ buf[4] = cpu_to_le32(cladatum->permissions.table.nel);
+ buf[5] = cpu_to_le32(ncons);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 6, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = put_entry(key, 1, len, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ if (cladatum->comkey) {
+ rc = put_entry(cladatum->comkey, 1, len2, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ rc = hashtab_map(&cladatum->permissions.table, perm_write, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = write_cons_helper(p, cladatum->constraints, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ /* write out the validatetrans rule */
+ ncons = 0;
+ for (c = cladatum->validatetrans; c; c = c->next)
+ ncons++;
+
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(ncons);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = write_cons_helper(p, cladatum->validatetrans, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_NEW_OBJECT_DEFAULTS) {
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(cladatum->default_user);
+ buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(cladatum->default_role);
+ buf[2] = cpu_to_le32(cladatum->default_range);
+
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(uint32_t), 3, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_DEFAULT_TYPE) {
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(cladatum->default_type);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(uint32_t), 1, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int role_write(void *vkey, void *datum, void *ptr)
+{
+ char *key = vkey;
+ struct role_datum *role = datum;
+ struct policy_data *pd = ptr;
+ void *fp = pd->fp;
+ struct policydb *p = pd->p;
+ __le32 buf[3];
+ size_t items, len;
+ int rc;
+
+ len = strlen(key);
+ items = 0;
+ buf[items++] = cpu_to_le32(len);
+ buf[items++] = cpu_to_le32(role->value);
+ if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY)
+ buf[items++] = cpu_to_le32(role->bounds);
+
+ BUG_ON(items > ARRAY_SIZE(buf));
+
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), items, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = put_entry(key, 1, len, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = ebitmap_write(&role->dominates, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = ebitmap_write(&role->types, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int type_write(void *vkey, void *datum, void *ptr)
+{
+ char *key = vkey;
+ struct type_datum *typdatum = datum;
+ struct policy_data *pd = ptr;
+ struct policydb *p = pd->p;
+ void *fp = pd->fp;
+ __le32 buf[4];
+ int rc;
+ size_t items, len;
+
+ len = strlen(key);
+ items = 0;
+ buf[items++] = cpu_to_le32(len);
+ buf[items++] = cpu_to_le32(typdatum->value);
+ if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY) {
+ u32 properties = 0;
+
+ if (typdatum->primary)
+ properties |= TYPEDATUM_PROPERTY_PRIMARY;
+
+ if (typdatum->attribute)
+ properties |= TYPEDATUM_PROPERTY_ATTRIBUTE;
+
+ buf[items++] = cpu_to_le32(properties);
+ buf[items++] = cpu_to_le32(typdatum->bounds);
+ } else {
+ buf[items++] = cpu_to_le32(typdatum->primary);
+ }
+ BUG_ON(items > ARRAY_SIZE(buf));
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), items, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = put_entry(key, 1, len, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int user_write(void *vkey, void *datum, void *ptr)
+{
+ char *key = vkey;
+ struct user_datum *usrdatum = datum;
+ struct policy_data *pd = ptr;
+ struct policydb *p = pd->p;
+ void *fp = pd->fp;
+ __le32 buf[3];
+ size_t items, len;
+ int rc;
+
+ len = strlen(key);
+ items = 0;
+ buf[items++] = cpu_to_le32(len);
+ buf[items++] = cpu_to_le32(usrdatum->value);
+ if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY)
+ buf[items++] = cpu_to_le32(usrdatum->bounds);
+ BUG_ON(items > ARRAY_SIZE(buf));
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), items, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = put_entry(key, 1, len, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = ebitmap_write(&usrdatum->roles, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = mls_write_range_helper(&usrdatum->range, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = mls_write_level(&usrdatum->dfltlevel, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int (*const write_f[SYM_NUM]) (void *key, void *datum, void *datap) = {
+ common_write,
+ class_write,
+ role_write,
+ type_write,
+ user_write,
+ cond_write_bool,
+ sens_write,
+ cat_write,
+};
+
+static int ocontext_write(struct policydb *p, const struct policydb_compat_info *info,
+ void *fp)
+{
+ unsigned int i, j;
+ int rc;
+ size_t nel, len;
+ __be64 prefixbuf[1];
+ __le32 buf[3];
+ u32 nodebuf[8];
+ struct ocontext *c;
+ for (i = 0; i < info->ocon_num; i++) {
+ nel = 0;
+ for (c = p->ocontexts[i]; c; c = c->next)
+ nel++;
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(nel);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ for (c = p->ocontexts[i]; c; c = c->next) {
+ switch (i) {
+ case OCON_ISID:
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(c->sid[0]);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ rc = context_write(p, &c->context[0], fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ break;
+ case OCON_FS:
+ case OCON_NETIF:
+ len = strlen(c->u.name);
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(len);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ rc = put_entry(c->u.name, 1, len, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ rc = context_write(p, &c->context[0], fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ rc = context_write(p, &c->context[1], fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ break;
+ case OCON_PORT:
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(c->u.port.protocol);
+ buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(c->u.port.low_port);
+ buf[2] = cpu_to_le32(c->u.port.high_port);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 3, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ rc = context_write(p, &c->context[0], fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ break;
+ case OCON_NODE:
+ nodebuf[0] = c->u.node.addr; /* network order */
+ nodebuf[1] = c->u.node.mask; /* network order */
+ rc = put_entry(nodebuf, sizeof(u32), 2, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ rc = context_write(p, &c->context[0], fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ break;
+ case OCON_FSUSE:
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(c->v.behavior);
+ len = strlen(c->u.name);
+ buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(len);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 2, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ rc = put_entry(c->u.name, 1, len, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ rc = context_write(p, &c->context[0], fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ break;
+ case OCON_NODE6:
+ for (j = 0; j < 4; j++)
+ nodebuf[j] = c->u.node6.addr[j]; /* network order */
+ for (j = 0; j < 4; j++)
+ nodebuf[j + 4] = c->u.node6.mask[j]; /* network order */
+ rc = put_entry(nodebuf, sizeof(u32), 8, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ rc = context_write(p, &c->context[0], fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ break;
+ case OCON_IBPKEY:
+ /* subnet_prefix is in CPU order */
+ prefixbuf[0] = cpu_to_be64(c->u.ibpkey.subnet_prefix);
+
+ rc = put_entry(prefixbuf, sizeof(u64), 1, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(c->u.ibpkey.low_pkey);
+ buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(c->u.ibpkey.high_pkey);
+
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 2, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ rc = context_write(p, &c->context[0], fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ break;
+ case OCON_IBENDPORT:
+ len = strlen(c->u.ibendport.dev_name);
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(len);
+ buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(c->u.ibendport.port);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 2, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ rc = put_entry(c->u.ibendport.dev_name, 1, len, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ rc = context_write(p, &c->context[0], fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int genfs_write(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
+{
+ struct genfs *genfs;
+ struct ocontext *c;
+ size_t len;
+ __le32 buf[1];
+ int rc;
+
+ len = 0;
+ for (genfs = p->genfs; genfs; genfs = genfs->next)
+ len++;
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(len);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ for (genfs = p->genfs; genfs; genfs = genfs->next) {
+ len = strlen(genfs->fstype);
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(len);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ rc = put_entry(genfs->fstype, 1, len, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ len = 0;
+ for (c = genfs->head; c; c = c->next)
+ len++;
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(len);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ for (c = genfs->head; c; c = c->next) {
+ len = strlen(c->u.name);
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(len);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ rc = put_entry(c->u.name, 1, len, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(c->v.sclass);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ rc = context_write(p, &c->context[0], fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int range_write_helper(void *key, void *data, void *ptr)
+{
+ __le32 buf[2];
+ struct range_trans *rt = key;
+ struct mls_range *r = data;
+ struct policy_data *pd = ptr;
+ void *fp = pd->fp;
+ struct policydb *p = pd->p;
+ int rc;
+
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(rt->source_type);
+ buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(rt->target_type);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 2, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_RANGETRANS) {
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(rt->target_class);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ }
+ rc = mls_write_range_helper(r, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int range_write(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
+{
+ __le32 buf[1];
+ int rc;
+ struct policy_data pd;
+
+ pd.p = p;
+ pd.fp = fp;
+
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(p->range_tr.nel);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ /* actually write all of the entries */
+ rc = hashtab_map(&p->range_tr, range_write_helper, &pd);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int filename_write_helper_compat(void *key, void *data, void *ptr)
+{
+ struct filename_trans_key *ft = key;
+ struct filename_trans_datum *datum = data;
+ struct ebitmap_node *node;
+ void *fp = ptr;
+ __le32 buf[4];
+ int rc;
+ u32 bit, len = strlen(ft->name);
+
+ do {
+ ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&datum->stypes, node, bit) {
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(len);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = put_entry(ft->name, sizeof(char), len, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(bit + 1);
+ buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(ft->ttype);
+ buf[2] = cpu_to_le32(ft->tclass);
+ buf[3] = cpu_to_le32(datum->otype);
+
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 4, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ datum = datum->next;
+ } while (unlikely(datum));
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int filename_write_helper(void *key, void *data, void *ptr)
+{
+ struct filename_trans_key *ft = key;
+ struct filename_trans_datum *datum;
+ void *fp = ptr;
+ __le32 buf[3];
+ int rc;
+ u32 ndatum, len = strlen(ft->name);
+
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(len);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = put_entry(ft->name, sizeof(char), len, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ ndatum = 0;
+ datum = data;
+ do {
+ ndatum++;
+ datum = datum->next;
+ } while (unlikely(datum));
+
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(ft->ttype);
+ buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(ft->tclass);
+ buf[2] = cpu_to_le32(ndatum);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 3, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ datum = data;
+ do {
+ rc = ebitmap_write(&datum->stypes, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(datum->otype);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ datum = datum->next;
+ } while (unlikely(datum));
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int filename_trans_write(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
+{
+ __le32 buf[1];
+ int rc;
+
+ if (p->policyvers < POLICYDB_VERSION_FILENAME_TRANS)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (p->policyvers < POLICYDB_VERSION_COMP_FTRANS) {
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(p->compat_filename_trans_count);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = hashtab_map(&p->filename_trans,
+ filename_write_helper_compat, fp);
+ } else {
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(p->filename_trans.nel);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = hashtab_map(&p->filename_trans, filename_write_helper, fp);
+ }
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Write the configuration data in a policy database
+ * structure to a policy database binary representation
+ * file.
+ */
+int policydb_write(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
+{
+ unsigned int num_syms;
+ int rc;
+ __le32 buf[4];
+ u32 config, i;
+ size_t len;
+ const struct policydb_compat_info *info;
+
+ /*
+ * refuse to write policy older than compressed avtab
+ * to simplify the writer. There are other tests dropped
+ * since we assume this throughout the writer code. Be
+ * careful if you ever try to remove this restriction
+ */
+ if (p->policyvers < POLICYDB_VERSION_AVTAB) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: refusing to write policy version %d."
+ " Because it is less than version %d\n", p->policyvers,
+ POLICYDB_VERSION_AVTAB);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ config = 0;
+ if (p->mls_enabled)
+ config |= POLICYDB_CONFIG_MLS;
+
+ if (p->reject_unknown)
+ config |= REJECT_UNKNOWN;
+ if (p->allow_unknown)
+ config |= ALLOW_UNKNOWN;
+
+ /* Write the magic number and string identifiers. */
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(POLICYDB_MAGIC);
+ len = strlen(POLICYDB_STRING);
+ buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(len);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 2, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ rc = put_entry(POLICYDB_STRING, 1, len, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ /* Write the version, config, and table sizes. */
+ info = policydb_lookup_compat(p->policyvers);
+ if (!info) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: compatibility lookup failed for policy "
+ "version %d\n", p->policyvers);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(p->policyvers);
+ buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(config);
+ buf[2] = cpu_to_le32(info->sym_num);
+ buf[3] = cpu_to_le32(info->ocon_num);
+
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 4, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_POLCAP) {
+ rc = ebitmap_write(&p->policycaps, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_PERMISSIVE) {
+ rc = ebitmap_write(&p->permissive_map, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ num_syms = info->sym_num;
+ for (i = 0; i < num_syms; i++) {
+ struct policy_data pd;
+
+ pd.fp = fp;
+ pd.p = p;
+
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(p->symtab[i].nprim);
+ buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(p->symtab[i].table.nel);
+
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 2, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ rc = hashtab_map(&p->symtab[i].table, write_f[i], &pd);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ rc = avtab_write(p, &p->te_avtab, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = cond_write_list(p, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = role_trans_write(p, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = role_allow_write(p->role_allow, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = filename_trans_write(p, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = ocontext_write(p, info, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = genfs_write(p, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = range_write(p, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < p->p_types.nprim; i++) {
+ struct ebitmap *e = &p->type_attr_map_array[i];
+
+ rc = ebitmap_write(e, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b97cda4897
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h
@@ -0,0 +1,394 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+/*
+ * A policy database (policydb) specifies the
+ * configuration data for the security policy.
+ *
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Updated: Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
+ *
+ * Support for enhanced MLS infrastructure.
+ *
+ * Updated: Frank Mayer <mayerf@tresys.com> and Karl MacMillan <kmacmillan@tresys.com>
+ *
+ * Added conditional policy language extensions
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
+ * Copyright (C) 2003 - 2004 Tresys Technology, LLC
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SS_POLICYDB_H_
+#define _SS_POLICYDB_H_
+
+#include "symtab.h"
+#include "avtab.h"
+#include "sidtab.h"
+#include "ebitmap.h"
+#include "mls_types.h"
+#include "context.h"
+#include "constraint.h"
+
+/*
+ * A datum type is defined for each kind of symbol
+ * in the configuration data: individual permissions,
+ * common prefixes for access vectors, classes,
+ * users, roles, types, sensitivities, categories, etc.
+ */
+
+/* Permission attributes */
+struct perm_datum {
+ u32 value; /* permission bit + 1 */
+};
+
+/* Attributes of a common prefix for access vectors */
+struct common_datum {
+ u32 value; /* internal common value */
+ struct symtab permissions; /* common permissions */
+};
+
+/* Class attributes */
+struct class_datum {
+ u32 value; /* class value */
+ char *comkey; /* common name */
+ struct common_datum *comdatum; /* common datum */
+ struct symtab permissions; /* class-specific permission symbol table */
+ struct constraint_node *constraints; /* constraints on class permissions */
+ struct constraint_node *validatetrans; /* special transition rules */
+/* Options how a new object user, role, and type should be decided */
+#define DEFAULT_SOURCE 1
+#define DEFAULT_TARGET 2
+ char default_user;
+ char default_role;
+ char default_type;
+/* Options how a new object range should be decided */
+#define DEFAULT_SOURCE_LOW 1
+#define DEFAULT_SOURCE_HIGH 2
+#define DEFAULT_SOURCE_LOW_HIGH 3
+#define DEFAULT_TARGET_LOW 4
+#define DEFAULT_TARGET_HIGH 5
+#define DEFAULT_TARGET_LOW_HIGH 6
+#define DEFAULT_GLBLUB 7
+ char default_range;
+};
+
+/* Role attributes */
+struct role_datum {
+ u32 value; /* internal role value */
+ u32 bounds; /* boundary of role */
+ struct ebitmap dominates; /* set of roles dominated by this role */
+ struct ebitmap types; /* set of authorized types for role */
+};
+
+struct role_trans_key {
+ u32 role; /* current role */
+ u32 type; /* program executable type, or new object type */
+ u32 tclass; /* process class, or new object class */
+};
+
+struct role_trans_datum {
+ u32 new_role; /* new role */
+};
+
+struct filename_trans_key {
+ u32 ttype; /* parent dir context */
+ u16 tclass; /* class of new object */
+ const char *name; /* last path component */
+};
+
+struct filename_trans_datum {
+ struct ebitmap stypes; /* bitmap of source types for this otype */
+ u32 otype; /* resulting type of new object */
+ struct filename_trans_datum *next; /* record for next otype*/
+};
+
+struct role_allow {
+ u32 role; /* current role */
+ u32 new_role; /* new role */
+ struct role_allow *next;
+};
+
+/* Type attributes */
+struct type_datum {
+ u32 value; /* internal type value */
+ u32 bounds; /* boundary of type */
+ unsigned char primary; /* primary name? */
+ unsigned char attribute;/* attribute ?*/
+};
+
+/* User attributes */
+struct user_datum {
+ u32 value; /* internal user value */
+ u32 bounds; /* bounds of user */
+ struct ebitmap roles; /* set of authorized roles for user */
+ struct mls_range range; /* MLS range (min - max) for user */
+ struct mls_level dfltlevel; /* default login MLS level for user */
+};
+
+
+/* Sensitivity attributes */
+struct level_datum {
+ struct mls_level *level; /* sensitivity and associated categories */
+ unsigned char isalias; /* is this sensitivity an alias for another? */
+};
+
+/* Category attributes */
+struct cat_datum {
+ u32 value; /* internal category bit + 1 */
+ unsigned char isalias; /* is this category an alias for another? */
+};
+
+struct range_trans {
+ u32 source_type;
+ u32 target_type;
+ u32 target_class;
+};
+
+/* Boolean data type */
+struct cond_bool_datum {
+ __u32 value; /* internal type value */
+ int state;
+};
+
+struct cond_node;
+
+/*
+ * type set preserves data needed to determine constraint info from
+ * policy source. This is not used by the kernel policy but allows
+ * utilities such as audit2allow to determine constraint denials.
+ */
+struct type_set {
+ struct ebitmap types;
+ struct ebitmap negset;
+ u32 flags;
+};
+
+/*
+ * The configuration data includes security contexts for
+ * initial SIDs, unlabeled file systems, TCP and UDP port numbers,
+ * network interfaces, and nodes. This structure stores the
+ * relevant data for one such entry. Entries of the same kind
+ * (e.g. all initial SIDs) are linked together into a list.
+ */
+struct ocontext {
+ union {
+ char *name; /* name of initial SID, fs, netif, fstype, path */
+ struct {
+ u8 protocol;
+ u16 low_port;
+ u16 high_port;
+ } port; /* TCP or UDP port information */
+ struct {
+ u32 addr;
+ u32 mask;
+ } node; /* node information */
+ struct {
+ u32 addr[4];
+ u32 mask[4];
+ } node6; /* IPv6 node information */
+ struct {
+ u64 subnet_prefix;
+ u16 low_pkey;
+ u16 high_pkey;
+ } ibpkey;
+ struct {
+ char *dev_name;
+ u8 port;
+ } ibendport;
+ } u;
+ union {
+ u32 sclass; /* security class for genfs */
+ u32 behavior; /* labeling behavior for fs_use */
+ } v;
+ struct context context[2]; /* security context(s) */
+ u32 sid[2]; /* SID(s) */
+ struct ocontext *next;
+};
+
+struct genfs {
+ char *fstype;
+ struct ocontext *head;
+ struct genfs *next;
+};
+
+/* symbol table array indices */
+#define SYM_COMMONS 0
+#define SYM_CLASSES 1
+#define SYM_ROLES 2
+#define SYM_TYPES 3
+#define SYM_USERS 4
+#define SYM_BOOLS 5
+#define SYM_LEVELS 6
+#define SYM_CATS 7
+#define SYM_NUM 8
+
+/* object context array indices */
+#define OCON_ISID 0 /* initial SIDs */
+#define OCON_FS 1 /* unlabeled file systems (deprecated) */
+#define OCON_PORT 2 /* TCP and UDP port numbers */
+#define OCON_NETIF 3 /* network interfaces */
+#define OCON_NODE 4 /* nodes */
+#define OCON_FSUSE 5 /* fs_use */
+#define OCON_NODE6 6 /* IPv6 nodes */
+#define OCON_IBPKEY 7 /* Infiniband PKeys */
+#define OCON_IBENDPORT 8 /* Infiniband end ports */
+#define OCON_NUM 9
+
+/* The policy database */
+struct policydb {
+ int mls_enabled;
+
+ /* symbol tables */
+ struct symtab symtab[SYM_NUM];
+#define p_commons symtab[SYM_COMMONS]
+#define p_classes symtab[SYM_CLASSES]
+#define p_roles symtab[SYM_ROLES]
+#define p_types symtab[SYM_TYPES]
+#define p_users symtab[SYM_USERS]
+#define p_bools symtab[SYM_BOOLS]
+#define p_levels symtab[SYM_LEVELS]
+#define p_cats symtab[SYM_CATS]
+
+ /* symbol names indexed by (value - 1) */
+ char **sym_val_to_name[SYM_NUM];
+
+ /* class, role, and user attributes indexed by (value - 1) */
+ struct class_datum **class_val_to_struct;
+ struct role_datum **role_val_to_struct;
+ struct user_datum **user_val_to_struct;
+ struct type_datum **type_val_to_struct;
+
+ /* type enforcement access vectors and transitions */
+ struct avtab te_avtab;
+
+ /* role transitions */
+ struct hashtab role_tr;
+
+ /* file transitions with the last path component */
+ /* quickly exclude lookups when parent ttype has no rules */
+ struct ebitmap filename_trans_ttypes;
+ /* actual set of filename_trans rules */
+ struct hashtab filename_trans;
+ /* only used if policyvers < POLICYDB_VERSION_COMP_FTRANS */
+ u32 compat_filename_trans_count;
+
+ /* bools indexed by (value - 1) */
+ struct cond_bool_datum **bool_val_to_struct;
+ /* type enforcement conditional access vectors and transitions */
+ struct avtab te_cond_avtab;
+ /* array indexing te_cond_avtab by conditional */
+ struct cond_node *cond_list;
+ u32 cond_list_len;
+
+ /* role allows */
+ struct role_allow *role_allow;
+
+ /* security contexts of initial SIDs, unlabeled file systems,
+ TCP or UDP port numbers, network interfaces and nodes */
+ struct ocontext *ocontexts[OCON_NUM];
+
+ /* security contexts for files in filesystems that cannot support
+ a persistent label mapping or use another
+ fixed labeling behavior. */
+ struct genfs *genfs;
+
+ /* range transitions table (range_trans_key -> mls_range) */
+ struct hashtab range_tr;
+
+ /* type -> attribute reverse mapping */
+ struct ebitmap *type_attr_map_array;
+
+ struct ebitmap policycaps;
+
+ struct ebitmap permissive_map;
+
+ /* length of this policy when it was loaded */
+ size_t len;
+
+ unsigned int policyvers;
+
+ unsigned int reject_unknown : 1;
+ unsigned int allow_unknown : 1;
+
+ u16 process_class;
+ u32 process_trans_perms;
+} __randomize_layout;
+
+extern void policydb_destroy(struct policydb *p);
+extern int policydb_load_isids(struct policydb *p, struct sidtab *s);
+extern int policydb_context_isvalid(struct policydb *p, struct context *c);
+extern int policydb_class_isvalid(struct policydb *p, unsigned int class);
+extern int policydb_type_isvalid(struct policydb *p, unsigned int type);
+extern int policydb_role_isvalid(struct policydb *p, unsigned int role);
+extern int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp);
+extern int policydb_write(struct policydb *p, void *fp);
+
+extern struct filename_trans_datum *policydb_filenametr_search(
+ struct policydb *p, struct filename_trans_key *key);
+
+extern struct mls_range *policydb_rangetr_search(
+ struct policydb *p, struct range_trans *key);
+
+extern struct role_trans_datum *policydb_roletr_search(
+ struct policydb *p, struct role_trans_key *key);
+
+#define POLICYDB_CONFIG_MLS 1
+
+/* the config flags related to unknown classes/perms are bits 2 and 3 */
+#define REJECT_UNKNOWN 0x00000002
+#define ALLOW_UNKNOWN 0x00000004
+
+#define OBJECT_R "object_r"
+#define OBJECT_R_VAL 1
+
+#define POLICYDB_MAGIC SELINUX_MAGIC
+#define POLICYDB_STRING "SE Linux"
+
+struct policy_file {
+ char *data;
+ size_t len;
+};
+
+struct policy_data {
+ struct policydb *p;
+ void *fp;
+};
+
+static inline int next_entry(void *buf, struct policy_file *fp, size_t bytes)
+{
+ if (bytes > fp->len)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ memcpy(buf, fp->data, bytes);
+ fp->data += bytes;
+ fp->len -= bytes;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int put_entry(const void *buf, size_t bytes, size_t num, struct policy_file *fp)
+{
+ size_t len;
+
+ if (unlikely(check_mul_overflow(bytes, num, &len)))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (len > fp->len)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ memcpy(fp->data, buf, len);
+ fp->data += len;
+ fp->len -= len;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline char *sym_name(struct policydb *p, unsigned int sym_num, unsigned int element_nr)
+{
+ return p->sym_val_to_name[sym_num][element_nr];
+}
+
+extern u16 string_to_security_class(struct policydb *p, const char *name);
+extern u32 string_to_av_perm(struct policydb *p, u16 tclass, const char *name);
+
+#endif /* _SS_POLICYDB_H_ */
+
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..1eeffc66ea
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -0,0 +1,3998 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Implementation of the security services.
+ *
+ * Authors : Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
+ * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ *
+ * Updated: Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
+ *
+ * Support for enhanced MLS infrastructure.
+ * Support for context based audit filters.
+ *
+ * Updated: Frank Mayer <mayerf@tresys.com> and Karl MacMillan <kmacmillan@tresys.com>
+ *
+ * Added conditional policy language extensions
+ *
+ * Updated: Hewlett-Packard <paul@paul-moore.com>
+ *
+ * Added support for NetLabel
+ * Added support for the policy capability bitmap
+ *
+ * Updated: Chad Sellers <csellers@tresys.com>
+ *
+ * Added validation of kernel classes and permissions
+ *
+ * Updated: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com>
+ *
+ * Added support for bounds domain and audit messaged on masked permissions
+ *
+ * Updated: Guido Trentalancia <guido@trentalancia.com>
+ *
+ * Added support for runtime switching of the policy type
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2008, 2009 NEC Corporation
+ * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
+ * Copyright (C) 2004-2006 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
+ * Copyright (C) 2003 - 2004, 2006 Tresys Technology, LLC
+ * Copyright (C) 2003 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ */
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
+#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/in.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h>
+#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
+#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
+#include <net/netlabel.h>
+
+#include "flask.h"
+#include "avc.h"
+#include "avc_ss.h"
+#include "security.h"
+#include "context.h"
+#include "policydb.h"
+#include "sidtab.h"
+#include "services.h"
+#include "conditional.h"
+#include "mls.h"
+#include "objsec.h"
+#include "netlabel.h"
+#include "xfrm.h"
+#include "ebitmap.h"
+#include "audit.h"
+#include "policycap_names.h"
+#include "ima.h"
+
+struct selinux_policy_convert_data {
+ struct convert_context_args args;
+ struct sidtab_convert_params sidtab_params;
+};
+
+/* Forward declaration. */
+static int context_struct_to_string(struct policydb *policydb,
+ struct context *context,
+ char **scontext,
+ u32 *scontext_len);
+
+static int sidtab_entry_to_string(struct policydb *policydb,
+ struct sidtab *sidtab,
+ struct sidtab_entry *entry,
+ char **scontext,
+ u32 *scontext_len);
+
+static void context_struct_compute_av(struct policydb *policydb,
+ struct context *scontext,
+ struct context *tcontext,
+ u16 tclass,
+ struct av_decision *avd,
+ struct extended_perms *xperms);
+
+static int selinux_set_mapping(struct policydb *pol,
+ const struct security_class_mapping *map,
+ struct selinux_map *out_map)
+{
+ u16 i, j;
+ bool print_unknown_handle = false;
+
+ /* Find number of classes in the input mapping */
+ if (!map)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ i = 0;
+ while (map[i].name)
+ i++;
+
+ /* Allocate space for the class records, plus one for class zero */
+ out_map->mapping = kcalloc(++i, sizeof(*out_map->mapping), GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!out_map->mapping)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ /* Store the raw class and permission values */
+ j = 0;
+ while (map[j].name) {
+ const struct security_class_mapping *p_in = map + (j++);
+ struct selinux_mapping *p_out = out_map->mapping + j;
+ u16 k;
+
+ /* An empty class string skips ahead */
+ if (!strcmp(p_in->name, "")) {
+ p_out->num_perms = 0;
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ p_out->value = string_to_security_class(pol, p_in->name);
+ if (!p_out->value) {
+ pr_info("SELinux: Class %s not defined in policy.\n",
+ p_in->name);
+ if (pol->reject_unknown)
+ goto err;
+ p_out->num_perms = 0;
+ print_unknown_handle = true;
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ k = 0;
+ while (p_in->perms[k]) {
+ /* An empty permission string skips ahead */
+ if (!*p_in->perms[k]) {
+ k++;
+ continue;
+ }
+ p_out->perms[k] = string_to_av_perm(pol, p_out->value,
+ p_in->perms[k]);
+ if (!p_out->perms[k]) {
+ pr_info("SELinux: Permission %s in class %s not defined in policy.\n",
+ p_in->perms[k], p_in->name);
+ if (pol->reject_unknown)
+ goto err;
+ print_unknown_handle = true;
+ }
+
+ k++;
+ }
+ p_out->num_perms = k;
+ }
+
+ if (print_unknown_handle)
+ pr_info("SELinux: the above unknown classes and permissions will be %s\n",
+ pol->allow_unknown ? "allowed" : "denied");
+
+ out_map->size = i;
+ return 0;
+err:
+ kfree(out_map->mapping);
+ out_map->mapping = NULL;
+ return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Get real, policy values from mapped values
+ */
+
+static u16 unmap_class(struct selinux_map *map, u16 tclass)
+{
+ if (tclass < map->size)
+ return map->mapping[tclass].value;
+
+ return tclass;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Get kernel value for class from its policy value
+ */
+static u16 map_class(struct selinux_map *map, u16 pol_value)
+{
+ u16 i;
+
+ for (i = 1; i < map->size; i++) {
+ if (map->mapping[i].value == pol_value)
+ return i;
+ }
+
+ return SECCLASS_NULL;
+}
+
+static void map_decision(struct selinux_map *map,
+ u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd,
+ int allow_unknown)
+{
+ if (tclass < map->size) {
+ struct selinux_mapping *mapping = &map->mapping[tclass];
+ unsigned int i, n = mapping->num_perms;
+ u32 result;
+
+ for (i = 0, result = 0; i < n; i++) {
+ if (avd->allowed & mapping->perms[i])
+ result |= (u32)1<<i;
+ if (allow_unknown && !mapping->perms[i])
+ result |= (u32)1<<i;
+ }
+ avd->allowed = result;
+
+ for (i = 0, result = 0; i < n; i++)
+ if (avd->auditallow & mapping->perms[i])
+ result |= (u32)1<<i;
+ avd->auditallow = result;
+
+ for (i = 0, result = 0; i < n; i++) {
+ if (avd->auditdeny & mapping->perms[i])
+ result |= (u32)1<<i;
+ if (!allow_unknown && !mapping->perms[i])
+ result |= (u32)1<<i;
+ }
+ /*
+ * In case the kernel has a bug and requests a permission
+ * between num_perms and the maximum permission number, we
+ * should audit that denial
+ */
+ for (; i < (sizeof(u32)*8); i++)
+ result |= (u32)1<<i;
+ avd->auditdeny = result;
+ }
+}
+
+int security_mls_enabled(void)
+{
+ int mls_enabled;
+ struct selinux_policy *policy;
+
+ if (!selinux_initialized())
+ return 0;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ policy = rcu_dereference(selinux_state.policy);
+ mls_enabled = policy->policydb.mls_enabled;
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return mls_enabled;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return the boolean value of a constraint expression
+ * when it is applied to the specified source and target
+ * security contexts.
+ *
+ * xcontext is a special beast... It is used by the validatetrans rules
+ * only. For these rules, scontext is the context before the transition,
+ * tcontext is the context after the transition, and xcontext is the context
+ * of the process performing the transition. All other callers of
+ * constraint_expr_eval should pass in NULL for xcontext.
+ */
+static int constraint_expr_eval(struct policydb *policydb,
+ struct context *scontext,
+ struct context *tcontext,
+ struct context *xcontext,
+ struct constraint_expr *cexpr)
+{
+ u32 val1, val2;
+ struct context *c;
+ struct role_datum *r1, *r2;
+ struct mls_level *l1, *l2;
+ struct constraint_expr *e;
+ int s[CEXPR_MAXDEPTH];
+ int sp = -1;
+
+ for (e = cexpr; e; e = e->next) {
+ switch (e->expr_type) {
+ case CEXPR_NOT:
+ BUG_ON(sp < 0);
+ s[sp] = !s[sp];
+ break;
+ case CEXPR_AND:
+ BUG_ON(sp < 1);
+ sp--;
+ s[sp] &= s[sp + 1];
+ break;
+ case CEXPR_OR:
+ BUG_ON(sp < 1);
+ sp--;
+ s[sp] |= s[sp + 1];
+ break;
+ case CEXPR_ATTR:
+ if (sp == (CEXPR_MAXDEPTH - 1))
+ return 0;
+ switch (e->attr) {
+ case CEXPR_USER:
+ val1 = scontext->user;
+ val2 = tcontext->user;
+ break;
+ case CEXPR_TYPE:
+ val1 = scontext->type;
+ val2 = tcontext->type;
+ break;
+ case CEXPR_ROLE:
+ val1 = scontext->role;
+ val2 = tcontext->role;
+ r1 = policydb->role_val_to_struct[val1 - 1];
+ r2 = policydb->role_val_to_struct[val2 - 1];
+ switch (e->op) {
+ case CEXPR_DOM:
+ s[++sp] = ebitmap_get_bit(&r1->dominates,
+ val2 - 1);
+ continue;
+ case CEXPR_DOMBY:
+ s[++sp] = ebitmap_get_bit(&r2->dominates,
+ val1 - 1);
+ continue;
+ case CEXPR_INCOMP:
+ s[++sp] = (!ebitmap_get_bit(&r1->dominates,
+ val2 - 1) &&
+ !ebitmap_get_bit(&r2->dominates,
+ val1 - 1));
+ continue;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ break;
+ case CEXPR_L1L2:
+ l1 = &(scontext->range.level[0]);
+ l2 = &(tcontext->range.level[0]);
+ goto mls_ops;
+ case CEXPR_L1H2:
+ l1 = &(scontext->range.level[0]);
+ l2 = &(tcontext->range.level[1]);
+ goto mls_ops;
+ case CEXPR_H1L2:
+ l1 = &(scontext->range.level[1]);
+ l2 = &(tcontext->range.level[0]);
+ goto mls_ops;
+ case CEXPR_H1H2:
+ l1 = &(scontext->range.level[1]);
+ l2 = &(tcontext->range.level[1]);
+ goto mls_ops;
+ case CEXPR_L1H1:
+ l1 = &(scontext->range.level[0]);
+ l2 = &(scontext->range.level[1]);
+ goto mls_ops;
+ case CEXPR_L2H2:
+ l1 = &(tcontext->range.level[0]);
+ l2 = &(tcontext->range.level[1]);
+ goto mls_ops;
+mls_ops:
+ switch (e->op) {
+ case CEXPR_EQ:
+ s[++sp] = mls_level_eq(l1, l2);
+ continue;
+ case CEXPR_NEQ:
+ s[++sp] = !mls_level_eq(l1, l2);
+ continue;
+ case CEXPR_DOM:
+ s[++sp] = mls_level_dom(l1, l2);
+ continue;
+ case CEXPR_DOMBY:
+ s[++sp] = mls_level_dom(l2, l1);
+ continue;
+ case CEXPR_INCOMP:
+ s[++sp] = mls_level_incomp(l2, l1);
+ continue;
+ default:
+ BUG();
+ return 0;
+ }
+ break;
+ default:
+ BUG();
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ switch (e->op) {
+ case CEXPR_EQ:
+ s[++sp] = (val1 == val2);
+ break;
+ case CEXPR_NEQ:
+ s[++sp] = (val1 != val2);
+ break;
+ default:
+ BUG();
+ return 0;
+ }
+ break;
+ case CEXPR_NAMES:
+ if (sp == (CEXPR_MAXDEPTH-1))
+ return 0;
+ c = scontext;
+ if (e->attr & CEXPR_TARGET)
+ c = tcontext;
+ else if (e->attr & CEXPR_XTARGET) {
+ c = xcontext;
+ if (!c) {
+ BUG();
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ if (e->attr & CEXPR_USER)
+ val1 = c->user;
+ else if (e->attr & CEXPR_ROLE)
+ val1 = c->role;
+ else if (e->attr & CEXPR_TYPE)
+ val1 = c->type;
+ else {
+ BUG();
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ switch (e->op) {
+ case CEXPR_EQ:
+ s[++sp] = ebitmap_get_bit(&e->names, val1 - 1);
+ break;
+ case CEXPR_NEQ:
+ s[++sp] = !ebitmap_get_bit(&e->names, val1 - 1);
+ break;
+ default:
+ BUG();
+ return 0;
+ }
+ break;
+ default:
+ BUG();
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ BUG_ON(sp != 0);
+ return s[0];
+}
+
+/*
+ * security_dump_masked_av - dumps masked permissions during
+ * security_compute_av due to RBAC, MLS/Constraint and Type bounds.
+ */
+static int dump_masked_av_helper(void *k, void *d, void *args)
+{
+ struct perm_datum *pdatum = d;
+ char **permission_names = args;
+
+ BUG_ON(pdatum->value < 1 || pdatum->value > 32);
+
+ permission_names[pdatum->value - 1] = (char *)k;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void security_dump_masked_av(struct policydb *policydb,
+ struct context *scontext,
+ struct context *tcontext,
+ u16 tclass,
+ u32 permissions,
+ const char *reason)
+{
+ struct common_datum *common_dat;
+ struct class_datum *tclass_dat;
+ struct audit_buffer *ab;
+ char *tclass_name;
+ char *scontext_name = NULL;
+ char *tcontext_name = NULL;
+ char *permission_names[32];
+ int index;
+ u32 length;
+ bool need_comma = false;
+
+ if (!permissions)
+ return;
+
+ tclass_name = sym_name(policydb, SYM_CLASSES, tclass - 1);
+ tclass_dat = policydb->class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
+ common_dat = tclass_dat->comdatum;
+
+ /* init permission_names */
+ if (common_dat &&
+ hashtab_map(&common_dat->permissions.table,
+ dump_masked_av_helper, permission_names) < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (hashtab_map(&tclass_dat->permissions.table,
+ dump_masked_av_helper, permission_names) < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* get scontext/tcontext in text form */
+ if (context_struct_to_string(policydb, scontext,
+ &scontext_name, &length) < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (context_struct_to_string(policydb, tcontext,
+ &tcontext_name, &length) < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* audit a message */
+ ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(),
+ GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR);
+ if (!ab)
+ goto out;
+
+ audit_log_format(ab, "op=security_compute_av reason=%s "
+ "scontext=%s tcontext=%s tclass=%s perms=",
+ reason, scontext_name, tcontext_name, tclass_name);
+
+ for (index = 0; index < 32; index++) {
+ u32 mask = (1 << index);
+
+ if ((mask & permissions) == 0)
+ continue;
+
+ audit_log_format(ab, "%s%s",
+ need_comma ? "," : "",
+ permission_names[index]
+ ? permission_names[index] : "????");
+ need_comma = true;
+ }
+ audit_log_end(ab);
+out:
+ /* release scontext/tcontext */
+ kfree(tcontext_name);
+ kfree(scontext_name);
+}
+
+/*
+ * security_boundary_permission - drops violated permissions
+ * on boundary constraint.
+ */
+static void type_attribute_bounds_av(struct policydb *policydb,
+ struct context *scontext,
+ struct context *tcontext,
+ u16 tclass,
+ struct av_decision *avd)
+{
+ struct context lo_scontext;
+ struct context lo_tcontext, *tcontextp = tcontext;
+ struct av_decision lo_avd;
+ struct type_datum *source;
+ struct type_datum *target;
+ u32 masked = 0;
+
+ source = policydb->type_val_to_struct[scontext->type - 1];
+ BUG_ON(!source);
+
+ if (!source->bounds)
+ return;
+
+ target = policydb->type_val_to_struct[tcontext->type - 1];
+ BUG_ON(!target);
+
+ memset(&lo_avd, 0, sizeof(lo_avd));
+
+ memcpy(&lo_scontext, scontext, sizeof(lo_scontext));
+ lo_scontext.type = source->bounds;
+
+ if (target->bounds) {
+ memcpy(&lo_tcontext, tcontext, sizeof(lo_tcontext));
+ lo_tcontext.type = target->bounds;
+ tcontextp = &lo_tcontext;
+ }
+
+ context_struct_compute_av(policydb, &lo_scontext,
+ tcontextp,
+ tclass,
+ &lo_avd,
+ NULL);
+
+ masked = ~lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed;
+
+ if (likely(!masked))
+ return; /* no masked permission */
+
+ /* mask violated permissions */
+ avd->allowed &= ~masked;
+
+ /* audit masked permissions */
+ security_dump_masked_av(policydb, scontext, tcontext,
+ tclass, masked, "bounds");
+}
+
+/*
+ * flag which drivers have permissions
+ * only looking for ioctl based extended permissions
+ */
+void services_compute_xperms_drivers(
+ struct extended_perms *xperms,
+ struct avtab_node *node)
+{
+ unsigned int i;
+
+ if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLDRIVER) {
+ /* if one or more driver has all permissions allowed */
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(xperms->drivers.p); i++)
+ xperms->drivers.p[i] |= node->datum.u.xperms->perms.p[i];
+ } else if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLFUNCTION) {
+ /* if allowing permissions within a driver */
+ security_xperm_set(xperms->drivers.p,
+ node->datum.u.xperms->driver);
+ }
+
+ xperms->len = 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Compute access vectors and extended permissions based on a context
+ * structure pair for the permissions in a particular class.
+ */
+static void context_struct_compute_av(struct policydb *policydb,
+ struct context *scontext,
+ struct context *tcontext,
+ u16 tclass,
+ struct av_decision *avd,
+ struct extended_perms *xperms)
+{
+ struct constraint_node *constraint;
+ struct role_allow *ra;
+ struct avtab_key avkey;
+ struct avtab_node *node;
+ struct class_datum *tclass_datum;
+ struct ebitmap *sattr, *tattr;
+ struct ebitmap_node *snode, *tnode;
+ unsigned int i, j;
+
+ avd->allowed = 0;
+ avd->auditallow = 0;
+ avd->auditdeny = 0xffffffff;
+ if (xperms) {
+ memset(&xperms->drivers, 0, sizeof(xperms->drivers));
+ xperms->len = 0;
+ }
+
+ if (unlikely(!tclass || tclass > policydb->p_classes.nprim)) {
+ if (printk_ratelimit())
+ pr_warn("SELinux: Invalid class %hu\n", tclass);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ tclass_datum = policydb->class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
+
+ /*
+ * If a specific type enforcement rule was defined for
+ * this permission check, then use it.
+ */
+ avkey.target_class = tclass;
+ avkey.specified = AVTAB_AV | AVTAB_XPERMS;
+ sattr = &policydb->type_attr_map_array[scontext->type - 1];
+ tattr = &policydb->type_attr_map_array[tcontext->type - 1];
+ ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(sattr, snode, i) {
+ ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(tattr, tnode, j) {
+ avkey.source_type = i + 1;
+ avkey.target_type = j + 1;
+ for (node = avtab_search_node(&policydb->te_avtab,
+ &avkey);
+ node;
+ node = avtab_search_node_next(node, avkey.specified)) {
+ if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_ALLOWED)
+ avd->allowed |= node->datum.u.data;
+ else if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_AUDITALLOW)
+ avd->auditallow |= node->datum.u.data;
+ else if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_AUDITDENY)
+ avd->auditdeny &= node->datum.u.data;
+ else if (xperms && (node->key.specified & AVTAB_XPERMS))
+ services_compute_xperms_drivers(xperms, node);
+ }
+
+ /* Check conditional av table for additional permissions */
+ cond_compute_av(&policydb->te_cond_avtab, &avkey,
+ avd, xperms);
+
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Remove any permissions prohibited by a constraint (this includes
+ * the MLS policy).
+ */
+ constraint = tclass_datum->constraints;
+ while (constraint) {
+ if ((constraint->permissions & (avd->allowed)) &&
+ !constraint_expr_eval(policydb, scontext, tcontext, NULL,
+ constraint->expr)) {
+ avd->allowed &= ~(constraint->permissions);
+ }
+ constraint = constraint->next;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If checking process transition permission and the
+ * role is changing, then check the (current_role, new_role)
+ * pair.
+ */
+ if (tclass == policydb->process_class &&
+ (avd->allowed & policydb->process_trans_perms) &&
+ scontext->role != tcontext->role) {
+ for (ra = policydb->role_allow; ra; ra = ra->next) {
+ if (scontext->role == ra->role &&
+ tcontext->role == ra->new_role)
+ break;
+ }
+ if (!ra)
+ avd->allowed &= ~policydb->process_trans_perms;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If the given source and target types have boundary
+ * constraint, lazy checks have to mask any violated
+ * permission and notice it to userspace via audit.
+ */
+ type_attribute_bounds_av(policydb, scontext, tcontext,
+ tclass, avd);
+}
+
+static int security_validtrans_handle_fail(struct selinux_policy *policy,
+ struct sidtab_entry *oentry,
+ struct sidtab_entry *nentry,
+ struct sidtab_entry *tentry,
+ u16 tclass)
+{
+ struct policydb *p = &policy->policydb;
+ struct sidtab *sidtab = policy->sidtab;
+ char *o = NULL, *n = NULL, *t = NULL;
+ u32 olen, nlen, tlen;
+
+ if (sidtab_entry_to_string(p, sidtab, oentry, &o, &olen))
+ goto out;
+ if (sidtab_entry_to_string(p, sidtab, nentry, &n, &nlen))
+ goto out;
+ if (sidtab_entry_to_string(p, sidtab, tentry, &t, &tlen))
+ goto out;
+ audit_log(audit_context(), GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
+ "op=security_validate_transition seresult=denied"
+ " oldcontext=%s newcontext=%s taskcontext=%s tclass=%s",
+ o, n, t, sym_name(p, SYM_CLASSES, tclass-1));
+out:
+ kfree(o);
+ kfree(n);
+ kfree(t);
+
+ if (!enforcing_enabled())
+ return 0;
+ return -EPERM;
+}
+
+static int security_compute_validatetrans(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid,
+ u16 orig_tclass, bool user)
+{
+ struct selinux_policy *policy;
+ struct policydb *policydb;
+ struct sidtab *sidtab;
+ struct sidtab_entry *oentry;
+ struct sidtab_entry *nentry;
+ struct sidtab_entry *tentry;
+ struct class_datum *tclass_datum;
+ struct constraint_node *constraint;
+ u16 tclass;
+ int rc = 0;
+
+
+ if (!selinux_initialized())
+ return 0;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+
+ policy = rcu_dereference(selinux_state.policy);
+ policydb = &policy->policydb;
+ sidtab = policy->sidtab;
+
+ if (!user)
+ tclass = unmap_class(&policy->map, orig_tclass);
+ else
+ tclass = orig_tclass;
+
+ if (!tclass || tclass > policydb->p_classes.nprim) {
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ tclass_datum = policydb->class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
+
+ oentry = sidtab_search_entry(sidtab, oldsid);
+ if (!oentry) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
+ __func__, oldsid);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ nentry = sidtab_search_entry(sidtab, newsid);
+ if (!nentry) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
+ __func__, newsid);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ tentry = sidtab_search_entry(sidtab, tasksid);
+ if (!tentry) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
+ __func__, tasksid);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ constraint = tclass_datum->validatetrans;
+ while (constraint) {
+ if (!constraint_expr_eval(policydb, &oentry->context,
+ &nentry->context, &tentry->context,
+ constraint->expr)) {
+ if (user)
+ rc = -EPERM;
+ else
+ rc = security_validtrans_handle_fail(policy,
+ oentry,
+ nentry,
+ tentry,
+ tclass);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ constraint = constraint->next;
+ }
+
+out:
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return rc;
+}
+
+int security_validate_transition_user(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid,
+ u16 tclass)
+{
+ return security_compute_validatetrans(oldsid, newsid, tasksid,
+ tclass, true);
+}
+
+int security_validate_transition(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid,
+ u16 orig_tclass)
+{
+ return security_compute_validatetrans(oldsid, newsid, tasksid,
+ orig_tclass, false);
+}
+
+/*
+ * security_bounded_transition - check whether the given
+ * transition is directed to bounded, or not.
+ * It returns 0, if @newsid is bounded by @oldsid.
+ * Otherwise, it returns error code.
+ *
+ * @oldsid : current security identifier
+ * @newsid : destinated security identifier
+ */
+int security_bounded_transition(u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
+{
+ struct selinux_policy *policy;
+ struct policydb *policydb;
+ struct sidtab *sidtab;
+ struct sidtab_entry *old_entry, *new_entry;
+ struct type_datum *type;
+ u32 index;
+ int rc;
+
+ if (!selinux_initialized())
+ return 0;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ policy = rcu_dereference(selinux_state.policy);
+ policydb = &policy->policydb;
+ sidtab = policy->sidtab;
+
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ old_entry = sidtab_search_entry(sidtab, old_sid);
+ if (!old_entry) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %u\n",
+ __func__, old_sid);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ new_entry = sidtab_search_entry(sidtab, new_sid);
+ if (!new_entry) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %u\n",
+ __func__, new_sid);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ rc = 0;
+ /* type/domain unchanged */
+ if (old_entry->context.type == new_entry->context.type)
+ goto out;
+
+ index = new_entry->context.type;
+ while (true) {
+ type = policydb->type_val_to_struct[index - 1];
+ BUG_ON(!type);
+
+ /* not bounded anymore */
+ rc = -EPERM;
+ if (!type->bounds)
+ break;
+
+ /* @newsid is bounded by @oldsid */
+ rc = 0;
+ if (type->bounds == old_entry->context.type)
+ break;
+
+ index = type->bounds;
+ }
+
+ if (rc) {
+ char *old_name = NULL;
+ char *new_name = NULL;
+ u32 length;
+
+ if (!sidtab_entry_to_string(policydb, sidtab, old_entry,
+ &old_name, &length) &&
+ !sidtab_entry_to_string(policydb, sidtab, new_entry,
+ &new_name, &length)) {
+ audit_log(audit_context(),
+ GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
+ "op=security_bounded_transition "
+ "seresult=denied "
+ "oldcontext=%s newcontext=%s",
+ old_name, new_name);
+ }
+ kfree(new_name);
+ kfree(old_name);
+ }
+out:
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static void avd_init(struct selinux_policy *policy, struct av_decision *avd)
+{
+ avd->allowed = 0;
+ avd->auditallow = 0;
+ avd->auditdeny = 0xffffffff;
+ if (policy)
+ avd->seqno = policy->latest_granting;
+ else
+ avd->seqno = 0;
+ avd->flags = 0;
+}
+
+void services_compute_xperms_decision(struct extended_perms_decision *xpermd,
+ struct avtab_node *node)
+{
+ unsigned int i;
+
+ if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLFUNCTION) {
+ if (xpermd->driver != node->datum.u.xperms->driver)
+ return;
+ } else if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLDRIVER) {
+ if (!security_xperm_test(node->datum.u.xperms->perms.p,
+ xpermd->driver))
+ return;
+ } else {
+ BUG();
+ }
+
+ if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_ALLOWED) {
+ xpermd->used |= XPERMS_ALLOWED;
+ if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLDRIVER) {
+ memset(xpermd->allowed->p, 0xff,
+ sizeof(xpermd->allowed->p));
+ }
+ if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLFUNCTION) {
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(xpermd->allowed->p); i++)
+ xpermd->allowed->p[i] |=
+ node->datum.u.xperms->perms.p[i];
+ }
+ } else if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_AUDITALLOW) {
+ xpermd->used |= XPERMS_AUDITALLOW;
+ if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLDRIVER) {
+ memset(xpermd->auditallow->p, 0xff,
+ sizeof(xpermd->auditallow->p));
+ }
+ if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLFUNCTION) {
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(xpermd->auditallow->p); i++)
+ xpermd->auditallow->p[i] |=
+ node->datum.u.xperms->perms.p[i];
+ }
+ } else if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_DONTAUDIT) {
+ xpermd->used |= XPERMS_DONTAUDIT;
+ if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLDRIVER) {
+ memset(xpermd->dontaudit->p, 0xff,
+ sizeof(xpermd->dontaudit->p));
+ }
+ if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLFUNCTION) {
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(xpermd->dontaudit->p); i++)
+ xpermd->dontaudit->p[i] |=
+ node->datum.u.xperms->perms.p[i];
+ }
+ } else {
+ BUG();
+ }
+}
+
+void security_compute_xperms_decision(u32 ssid,
+ u32 tsid,
+ u16 orig_tclass,
+ u8 driver,
+ struct extended_perms_decision *xpermd)
+{
+ struct selinux_policy *policy;
+ struct policydb *policydb;
+ struct sidtab *sidtab;
+ u16 tclass;
+ struct context *scontext, *tcontext;
+ struct avtab_key avkey;
+ struct avtab_node *node;
+ struct ebitmap *sattr, *tattr;
+ struct ebitmap_node *snode, *tnode;
+ unsigned int i, j;
+
+ xpermd->driver = driver;
+ xpermd->used = 0;
+ memset(xpermd->allowed->p, 0, sizeof(xpermd->allowed->p));
+ memset(xpermd->auditallow->p, 0, sizeof(xpermd->auditallow->p));
+ memset(xpermd->dontaudit->p, 0, sizeof(xpermd->dontaudit->p));
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ if (!selinux_initialized())
+ goto allow;
+
+ policy = rcu_dereference(selinux_state.policy);
+ policydb = &policy->policydb;
+ sidtab = policy->sidtab;
+
+ scontext = sidtab_search(sidtab, ssid);
+ if (!scontext) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
+ __func__, ssid);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ tcontext = sidtab_search(sidtab, tsid);
+ if (!tcontext) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
+ __func__, tsid);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ tclass = unmap_class(&policy->map, orig_tclass);
+ if (unlikely(orig_tclass && !tclass)) {
+ if (policydb->allow_unknown)
+ goto allow;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+
+ if (unlikely(!tclass || tclass > policydb->p_classes.nprim)) {
+ pr_warn_ratelimited("SELinux: Invalid class %hu\n", tclass);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ avkey.target_class = tclass;
+ avkey.specified = AVTAB_XPERMS;
+ sattr = &policydb->type_attr_map_array[scontext->type - 1];
+ tattr = &policydb->type_attr_map_array[tcontext->type - 1];
+ ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(sattr, snode, i) {
+ ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(tattr, tnode, j) {
+ avkey.source_type = i + 1;
+ avkey.target_type = j + 1;
+ for (node = avtab_search_node(&policydb->te_avtab,
+ &avkey);
+ node;
+ node = avtab_search_node_next(node, avkey.specified))
+ services_compute_xperms_decision(xpermd, node);
+
+ cond_compute_xperms(&policydb->te_cond_avtab,
+ &avkey, xpermd);
+ }
+ }
+out:
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return;
+allow:
+ memset(xpermd->allowed->p, 0xff, sizeof(xpermd->allowed->p));
+ goto out;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_compute_av - Compute access vector decisions.
+ * @ssid: source security identifier
+ * @tsid: target security identifier
+ * @orig_tclass: target security class
+ * @avd: access vector decisions
+ * @xperms: extended permissions
+ *
+ * Compute a set of access vector decisions based on the
+ * SID pair (@ssid, @tsid) for the permissions in @tclass.
+ */
+void security_compute_av(u32 ssid,
+ u32 tsid,
+ u16 orig_tclass,
+ struct av_decision *avd,
+ struct extended_perms *xperms)
+{
+ struct selinux_policy *policy;
+ struct policydb *policydb;
+ struct sidtab *sidtab;
+ u16 tclass;
+ struct context *scontext = NULL, *tcontext = NULL;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ policy = rcu_dereference(selinux_state.policy);
+ avd_init(policy, avd);
+ xperms->len = 0;
+ if (!selinux_initialized())
+ goto allow;
+
+ policydb = &policy->policydb;
+ sidtab = policy->sidtab;
+
+ scontext = sidtab_search(sidtab, ssid);
+ if (!scontext) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
+ __func__, ssid);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* permissive domain? */
+ if (ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb->permissive_map, scontext->type))
+ avd->flags |= AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE;
+
+ tcontext = sidtab_search(sidtab, tsid);
+ if (!tcontext) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
+ __func__, tsid);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ tclass = unmap_class(&policy->map, orig_tclass);
+ if (unlikely(orig_tclass && !tclass)) {
+ if (policydb->allow_unknown)
+ goto allow;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ context_struct_compute_av(policydb, scontext, tcontext, tclass, avd,
+ xperms);
+ map_decision(&policy->map, orig_tclass, avd,
+ policydb->allow_unknown);
+out:
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return;
+allow:
+ avd->allowed = 0xffffffff;
+ goto out;
+}
+
+void security_compute_av_user(u32 ssid,
+ u32 tsid,
+ u16 tclass,
+ struct av_decision *avd)
+{
+ struct selinux_policy *policy;
+ struct policydb *policydb;
+ struct sidtab *sidtab;
+ struct context *scontext = NULL, *tcontext = NULL;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ policy = rcu_dereference(selinux_state.policy);
+ avd_init(policy, avd);
+ if (!selinux_initialized())
+ goto allow;
+
+ policydb = &policy->policydb;
+ sidtab = policy->sidtab;
+
+ scontext = sidtab_search(sidtab, ssid);
+ if (!scontext) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
+ __func__, ssid);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* permissive domain? */
+ if (ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb->permissive_map, scontext->type))
+ avd->flags |= AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE;
+
+ tcontext = sidtab_search(sidtab, tsid);
+ if (!tcontext) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
+ __func__, tsid);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (unlikely(!tclass)) {
+ if (policydb->allow_unknown)
+ goto allow;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ context_struct_compute_av(policydb, scontext, tcontext, tclass, avd,
+ NULL);
+ out:
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return;
+allow:
+ avd->allowed = 0xffffffff;
+ goto out;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Write the security context string representation of
+ * the context structure `context' into a dynamically
+ * allocated string of the correct size. Set `*scontext'
+ * to point to this string and set `*scontext_len' to
+ * the length of the string.
+ */
+static int context_struct_to_string(struct policydb *p,
+ struct context *context,
+ char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len)
+{
+ char *scontextp;
+
+ if (scontext)
+ *scontext = NULL;
+ *scontext_len = 0;
+
+ if (context->len) {
+ *scontext_len = context->len;
+ if (scontext) {
+ *scontext = kstrdup(context->str, GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!(*scontext))
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Compute the size of the context. */
+ *scontext_len += strlen(sym_name(p, SYM_USERS, context->user - 1)) + 1;
+ *scontext_len += strlen(sym_name(p, SYM_ROLES, context->role - 1)) + 1;
+ *scontext_len += strlen(sym_name(p, SYM_TYPES, context->type - 1)) + 1;
+ *scontext_len += mls_compute_context_len(p, context);
+
+ if (!scontext)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Allocate space for the context; caller must free this space. */
+ scontextp = kmalloc(*scontext_len, GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!scontextp)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ *scontext = scontextp;
+
+ /*
+ * Copy the user name, role name and type name into the context.
+ */
+ scontextp += sprintf(scontextp, "%s:%s:%s",
+ sym_name(p, SYM_USERS, context->user - 1),
+ sym_name(p, SYM_ROLES, context->role - 1),
+ sym_name(p, SYM_TYPES, context->type - 1));
+
+ mls_sid_to_context(p, context, &scontextp);
+
+ *scontextp = 0;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int sidtab_entry_to_string(struct policydb *p,
+ struct sidtab *sidtab,
+ struct sidtab_entry *entry,
+ char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len)
+{
+ int rc = sidtab_sid2str_get(sidtab, entry, scontext, scontext_len);
+
+ if (rc != -ENOENT)
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = context_struct_to_string(p, &entry->context, scontext,
+ scontext_len);
+ if (!rc && scontext)
+ sidtab_sid2str_put(sidtab, entry, *scontext, *scontext_len);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+#include "initial_sid_to_string.h"
+
+int security_sidtab_hash_stats(char *page)
+{
+ struct selinux_policy *policy;
+ int rc;
+
+ if (!selinux_initialized()) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: %s: called before initial load_policy\n",
+ __func__);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ policy = rcu_dereference(selinux_state.policy);
+ rc = sidtab_hash_stats(policy->sidtab, page);
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+const char *security_get_initial_sid_context(u32 sid)
+{
+ if (unlikely(sid > SECINITSID_NUM))
+ return NULL;
+ return initial_sid_to_string[sid];
+}
+
+static int security_sid_to_context_core(u32 sid, char **scontext,
+ u32 *scontext_len, int force,
+ int only_invalid)
+{
+ struct selinux_policy *policy;
+ struct policydb *policydb;
+ struct sidtab *sidtab;
+ struct sidtab_entry *entry;
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ if (scontext)
+ *scontext = NULL;
+ *scontext_len = 0;
+
+ if (!selinux_initialized()) {
+ if (sid <= SECINITSID_NUM) {
+ char *scontextp;
+ const char *s = initial_sid_to_string[sid];
+
+ if (!s)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ *scontext_len = strlen(s) + 1;
+ if (!scontext)
+ return 0;
+ scontextp = kmemdup(s, *scontext_len, GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!scontextp)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ *scontext = scontextp;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ pr_err("SELinux: %s: called before initial "
+ "load_policy on unknown SID %d\n", __func__, sid);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ policy = rcu_dereference(selinux_state.policy);
+ policydb = &policy->policydb;
+ sidtab = policy->sidtab;
+
+ if (force)
+ entry = sidtab_search_entry_force(sidtab, sid);
+ else
+ entry = sidtab_search_entry(sidtab, sid);
+ if (!entry) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
+ __func__, sid);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
+ if (only_invalid && !entry->context.len)
+ goto out_unlock;
+
+ rc = sidtab_entry_to_string(policydb, sidtab, entry, scontext,
+ scontext_len);
+
+out_unlock:
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return rc;
+
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_sid_to_context - Obtain a context for a given SID.
+ * @sid: security identifier, SID
+ * @scontext: security context
+ * @scontext_len: length in bytes
+ *
+ * Write the string representation of the context associated with @sid
+ * into a dynamically allocated string of the correct size. Set @scontext
+ * to point to this string and set @scontext_len to the length of the string.
+ */
+int security_sid_to_context(u32 sid, char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len)
+{
+ return security_sid_to_context_core(sid, scontext,
+ scontext_len, 0, 0);
+}
+
+int security_sid_to_context_force(u32 sid,
+ char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len)
+{
+ return security_sid_to_context_core(sid, scontext,
+ scontext_len, 1, 0);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_sid_to_context_inval - Obtain a context for a given SID if it
+ * is invalid.
+ * @sid: security identifier, SID
+ * @scontext: security context
+ * @scontext_len: length in bytes
+ *
+ * Write the string representation of the context associated with @sid
+ * into a dynamically allocated string of the correct size, but only if the
+ * context is invalid in the current policy. Set @scontext to point to
+ * this string (or NULL if the context is valid) and set @scontext_len to
+ * the length of the string (or 0 if the context is valid).
+ */
+int security_sid_to_context_inval(u32 sid,
+ char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len)
+{
+ return security_sid_to_context_core(sid, scontext,
+ scontext_len, 1, 1);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Caveat: Mutates scontext.
+ */
+static int string_to_context_struct(struct policydb *pol,
+ struct sidtab *sidtabp,
+ char *scontext,
+ struct context *ctx,
+ u32 def_sid)
+{
+ struct role_datum *role;
+ struct type_datum *typdatum;
+ struct user_datum *usrdatum;
+ char *scontextp, *p, oldc;
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ context_init(ctx);
+
+ /* Parse the security context. */
+
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ scontextp = scontext;
+
+ /* Extract the user. */
+ p = scontextp;
+ while (*p && *p != ':')
+ p++;
+
+ if (*p == 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ *p++ = 0;
+
+ usrdatum = symtab_search(&pol->p_users, scontextp);
+ if (!usrdatum)
+ goto out;
+
+ ctx->user = usrdatum->value;
+
+ /* Extract role. */
+ scontextp = p;
+ while (*p && *p != ':')
+ p++;
+
+ if (*p == 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ *p++ = 0;
+
+ role = symtab_search(&pol->p_roles, scontextp);
+ if (!role)
+ goto out;
+ ctx->role = role->value;
+
+ /* Extract type. */
+ scontextp = p;
+ while (*p && *p != ':')
+ p++;
+ oldc = *p;
+ *p++ = 0;
+
+ typdatum = symtab_search(&pol->p_types, scontextp);
+ if (!typdatum || typdatum->attribute)
+ goto out;
+
+ ctx->type = typdatum->value;
+
+ rc = mls_context_to_sid(pol, oldc, p, ctx, sidtabp, def_sid);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* Check the validity of the new context. */
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ if (!policydb_context_isvalid(pol, ctx))
+ goto out;
+ rc = 0;
+out:
+ if (rc)
+ context_destroy(ctx);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static int security_context_to_sid_core(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
+ u32 *sid, u32 def_sid, gfp_t gfp_flags,
+ int force)
+{
+ struct selinux_policy *policy;
+ struct policydb *policydb;
+ struct sidtab *sidtab;
+ char *scontext2, *str = NULL;
+ struct context context;
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ /* An empty security context is never valid. */
+ if (!scontext_len)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /* Copy the string to allow changes and ensure a NUL terminator */
+ scontext2 = kmemdup_nul(scontext, scontext_len, gfp_flags);
+ if (!scontext2)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ if (!selinux_initialized()) {
+ u32 i;
+
+ for (i = 1; i < SECINITSID_NUM; i++) {
+ const char *s = initial_sid_to_string[i];
+
+ if (s && !strcmp(s, scontext2)) {
+ *sid = i;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+ *sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ *sid = SECSID_NULL;
+
+ if (force) {
+ /* Save another copy for storing in uninterpreted form */
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ str = kstrdup(scontext2, gfp_flags);
+ if (!str)
+ goto out;
+ }
+retry:
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ policy = rcu_dereference(selinux_state.policy);
+ policydb = &policy->policydb;
+ sidtab = policy->sidtab;
+ rc = string_to_context_struct(policydb, sidtab, scontext2,
+ &context, def_sid);
+ if (rc == -EINVAL && force) {
+ context.str = str;
+ context.len = strlen(str) + 1;
+ str = NULL;
+ } else if (rc)
+ goto out_unlock;
+ rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab, &context, sid);
+ if (rc == -ESTALE) {
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ if (context.str) {
+ str = context.str;
+ context.str = NULL;
+ }
+ context_destroy(&context);
+ goto retry;
+ }
+ context_destroy(&context);
+out_unlock:
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+out:
+ kfree(scontext2);
+ kfree(str);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_context_to_sid - Obtain a SID for a given security context.
+ * @scontext: security context
+ * @scontext_len: length in bytes
+ * @sid: security identifier, SID
+ * @gfp: context for the allocation
+ *
+ * Obtains a SID associated with the security context that
+ * has the string representation specified by @scontext.
+ * Returns -%EINVAL if the context is invalid, -%ENOMEM if insufficient
+ * memory is available, or 0 on success.
+ */
+int security_context_to_sid(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len, u32 *sid,
+ gfp_t gfp)
+{
+ return security_context_to_sid_core(scontext, scontext_len,
+ sid, SECSID_NULL, gfp, 0);
+}
+
+int security_context_str_to_sid(const char *scontext, u32 *sid, gfp_t gfp)
+{
+ return security_context_to_sid(scontext, strlen(scontext),
+ sid, gfp);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_context_to_sid_default - Obtain a SID for a given security context,
+ * falling back to specified default if needed.
+ *
+ * @scontext: security context
+ * @scontext_len: length in bytes
+ * @sid: security identifier, SID
+ * @def_sid: default SID to assign on error
+ * @gfp_flags: the allocator get-free-page (GFP) flags
+ *
+ * Obtains a SID associated with the security context that
+ * has the string representation specified by @scontext.
+ * The default SID is passed to the MLS layer to be used to allow
+ * kernel labeling of the MLS field if the MLS field is not present
+ * (for upgrading to MLS without full relabel).
+ * Implicitly forces adding of the context even if it cannot be mapped yet.
+ * Returns -%EINVAL if the context is invalid, -%ENOMEM if insufficient
+ * memory is available, or 0 on success.
+ */
+int security_context_to_sid_default(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
+ u32 *sid, u32 def_sid, gfp_t gfp_flags)
+{
+ return security_context_to_sid_core(scontext, scontext_len,
+ sid, def_sid, gfp_flags, 1);
+}
+
+int security_context_to_sid_force(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
+ u32 *sid)
+{
+ return security_context_to_sid_core(scontext, scontext_len,
+ sid, SECSID_NULL, GFP_KERNEL, 1);
+}
+
+static int compute_sid_handle_invalid_context(
+ struct selinux_policy *policy,
+ struct sidtab_entry *sentry,
+ struct sidtab_entry *tentry,
+ u16 tclass,
+ struct context *newcontext)
+{
+ struct policydb *policydb = &policy->policydb;
+ struct sidtab *sidtab = policy->sidtab;
+ char *s = NULL, *t = NULL, *n = NULL;
+ u32 slen, tlen, nlen;
+ struct audit_buffer *ab;
+
+ if (sidtab_entry_to_string(policydb, sidtab, sentry, &s, &slen))
+ goto out;
+ if (sidtab_entry_to_string(policydb, sidtab, tentry, &t, &tlen))
+ goto out;
+ if (context_struct_to_string(policydb, newcontext, &n, &nlen))
+ goto out;
+ ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR);
+ if (!ab)
+ goto out;
+ audit_log_format(ab,
+ "op=security_compute_sid invalid_context=");
+ /* no need to record the NUL with untrusted strings */
+ audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, n, nlen - 1);
+ audit_log_format(ab, " scontext=%s tcontext=%s tclass=%s",
+ s, t, sym_name(policydb, SYM_CLASSES, tclass-1));
+ audit_log_end(ab);
+out:
+ kfree(s);
+ kfree(t);
+ kfree(n);
+ if (!enforcing_enabled())
+ return 0;
+ return -EACCES;
+}
+
+static void filename_compute_type(struct policydb *policydb,
+ struct context *newcontext,
+ u32 stype, u32 ttype, u16 tclass,
+ const char *objname)
+{
+ struct filename_trans_key ft;
+ struct filename_trans_datum *datum;
+
+ /*
+ * Most filename trans rules are going to live in specific directories
+ * like /dev or /var/run. This bitmap will quickly skip rule searches
+ * if the ttype does not contain any rules.
+ */
+ if (!ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb->filename_trans_ttypes, ttype))
+ return;
+
+ ft.ttype = ttype;
+ ft.tclass = tclass;
+ ft.name = objname;
+
+ datum = policydb_filenametr_search(policydb, &ft);
+ while (datum) {
+ if (ebitmap_get_bit(&datum->stypes, stype - 1)) {
+ newcontext->type = datum->otype;
+ return;
+ }
+ datum = datum->next;
+ }
+}
+
+static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid,
+ u32 tsid,
+ u16 orig_tclass,
+ u16 specified,
+ const char *objname,
+ u32 *out_sid,
+ bool kern)
+{
+ struct selinux_policy *policy;
+ struct policydb *policydb;
+ struct sidtab *sidtab;
+ struct class_datum *cladatum;
+ struct context *scontext, *tcontext, newcontext;
+ struct sidtab_entry *sentry, *tentry;
+ struct avtab_key avkey;
+ struct avtab_node *avnode, *node;
+ u16 tclass;
+ int rc = 0;
+ bool sock;
+
+ if (!selinux_initialized()) {
+ switch (orig_tclass) {
+ case SECCLASS_PROCESS: /* kernel value */
+ *out_sid = ssid;
+ break;
+ default:
+ *out_sid = tsid;
+ break;
+ }
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+retry:
+ cladatum = NULL;
+ context_init(&newcontext);
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+
+ policy = rcu_dereference(selinux_state.policy);
+
+ if (kern) {
+ tclass = unmap_class(&policy->map, orig_tclass);
+ sock = security_is_socket_class(orig_tclass);
+ } else {
+ tclass = orig_tclass;
+ sock = security_is_socket_class(map_class(&policy->map,
+ tclass));
+ }
+
+ policydb = &policy->policydb;
+ sidtab = policy->sidtab;
+
+ sentry = sidtab_search_entry(sidtab, ssid);
+ if (!sentry) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
+ __func__, ssid);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
+ tentry = sidtab_search_entry(sidtab, tsid);
+ if (!tentry) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
+ __func__, tsid);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
+
+ scontext = &sentry->context;
+ tcontext = &tentry->context;
+
+ if (tclass && tclass <= policydb->p_classes.nprim)
+ cladatum = policydb->class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
+
+ /* Set the user identity. */
+ switch (specified) {
+ case AVTAB_TRANSITION:
+ case AVTAB_CHANGE:
+ if (cladatum && cladatum->default_user == DEFAULT_TARGET) {
+ newcontext.user = tcontext->user;
+ } else {
+ /* notice this gets both DEFAULT_SOURCE and unset */
+ /* Use the process user identity. */
+ newcontext.user = scontext->user;
+ }
+ break;
+ case AVTAB_MEMBER:
+ /* Use the related object owner. */
+ newcontext.user = tcontext->user;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* Set the role to default values. */
+ if (cladatum && cladatum->default_role == DEFAULT_SOURCE) {
+ newcontext.role = scontext->role;
+ } else if (cladatum && cladatum->default_role == DEFAULT_TARGET) {
+ newcontext.role = tcontext->role;
+ } else {
+ if ((tclass == policydb->process_class) || sock)
+ newcontext.role = scontext->role;
+ else
+ newcontext.role = OBJECT_R_VAL;
+ }
+
+ /* Set the type to default values. */
+ if (cladatum && cladatum->default_type == DEFAULT_SOURCE) {
+ newcontext.type = scontext->type;
+ } else if (cladatum && cladatum->default_type == DEFAULT_TARGET) {
+ newcontext.type = tcontext->type;
+ } else {
+ if ((tclass == policydb->process_class) || sock) {
+ /* Use the type of process. */
+ newcontext.type = scontext->type;
+ } else {
+ /* Use the type of the related object. */
+ newcontext.type = tcontext->type;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Look for a type transition/member/change rule. */
+ avkey.source_type = scontext->type;
+ avkey.target_type = tcontext->type;
+ avkey.target_class = tclass;
+ avkey.specified = specified;
+ avnode = avtab_search_node(&policydb->te_avtab, &avkey);
+
+ /* If no permanent rule, also check for enabled conditional rules */
+ if (!avnode) {
+ node = avtab_search_node(&policydb->te_cond_avtab, &avkey);
+ for (; node; node = avtab_search_node_next(node, specified)) {
+ if (node->key.specified & AVTAB_ENABLED) {
+ avnode = node;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (avnode) {
+ /* Use the type from the type transition/member/change rule. */
+ newcontext.type = avnode->datum.u.data;
+ }
+
+ /* if we have a objname this is a file trans check so check those rules */
+ if (objname)
+ filename_compute_type(policydb, &newcontext, scontext->type,
+ tcontext->type, tclass, objname);
+
+ /* Check for class-specific changes. */
+ if (specified & AVTAB_TRANSITION) {
+ /* Look for a role transition rule. */
+ struct role_trans_datum *rtd;
+ struct role_trans_key rtk = {
+ .role = scontext->role,
+ .type = tcontext->type,
+ .tclass = tclass,
+ };
+
+ rtd = policydb_roletr_search(policydb, &rtk);
+ if (rtd)
+ newcontext.role = rtd->new_role;
+ }
+
+ /* Set the MLS attributes.
+ This is done last because it may allocate memory. */
+ rc = mls_compute_sid(policydb, scontext, tcontext, tclass, specified,
+ &newcontext, sock);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out_unlock;
+
+ /* Check the validity of the context. */
+ if (!policydb_context_isvalid(policydb, &newcontext)) {
+ rc = compute_sid_handle_invalid_context(policy, sentry,
+ tentry, tclass,
+ &newcontext);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
+ /* Obtain the sid for the context. */
+ rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab, &newcontext, out_sid);
+ if (rc == -ESTALE) {
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ context_destroy(&newcontext);
+ goto retry;
+ }
+out_unlock:
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ context_destroy(&newcontext);
+out:
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_transition_sid - Compute the SID for a new subject/object.
+ * @ssid: source security identifier
+ * @tsid: target security identifier
+ * @tclass: target security class
+ * @qstr: object name
+ * @out_sid: security identifier for new subject/object
+ *
+ * Compute a SID to use for labeling a new subject or object in the
+ * class @tclass based on a SID pair (@ssid, @tsid).
+ * Return -%EINVAL if any of the parameters are invalid, -%ENOMEM
+ * if insufficient memory is available, or %0 if the new SID was
+ * computed successfully.
+ */
+int security_transition_sid(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
+ const struct qstr *qstr, u32 *out_sid)
+{
+ return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass,
+ AVTAB_TRANSITION,
+ qstr ? qstr->name : NULL, out_sid, true);
+}
+
+int security_transition_sid_user(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
+ const char *objname, u32 *out_sid)
+{
+ return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass,
+ AVTAB_TRANSITION,
+ objname, out_sid, false);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_member_sid - Compute the SID for member selection.
+ * @ssid: source security identifier
+ * @tsid: target security identifier
+ * @tclass: target security class
+ * @out_sid: security identifier for selected member
+ *
+ * Compute a SID to use when selecting a member of a polyinstantiated
+ * object of class @tclass based on a SID pair (@ssid, @tsid).
+ * Return -%EINVAL if any of the parameters are invalid, -%ENOMEM
+ * if insufficient memory is available, or %0 if the SID was
+ * computed successfully.
+ */
+int security_member_sid(u32 ssid,
+ u32 tsid,
+ u16 tclass,
+ u32 *out_sid)
+{
+ return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass,
+ AVTAB_MEMBER, NULL,
+ out_sid, false);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_change_sid - Compute the SID for object relabeling.
+ * @ssid: source security identifier
+ * @tsid: target security identifier
+ * @tclass: target security class
+ * @out_sid: security identifier for selected member
+ *
+ * Compute a SID to use for relabeling an object of class @tclass
+ * based on a SID pair (@ssid, @tsid).
+ * Return -%EINVAL if any of the parameters are invalid, -%ENOMEM
+ * if insufficient memory is available, or %0 if the SID was
+ * computed successfully.
+ */
+int security_change_sid(u32 ssid,
+ u32 tsid,
+ u16 tclass,
+ u32 *out_sid)
+{
+ return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_CHANGE, NULL,
+ out_sid, false);
+}
+
+static inline int convert_context_handle_invalid_context(
+ struct policydb *policydb,
+ struct context *context)
+{
+ char *s;
+ u32 len;
+
+ if (enforcing_enabled())
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (!context_struct_to_string(policydb, context, &s, &len)) {
+ pr_warn("SELinux: Context %s would be invalid if enforcing\n",
+ s);
+ kfree(s);
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * services_convert_context - Convert a security context across policies.
+ * @args: populated convert_context_args struct
+ * @oldc: original context
+ * @newc: converted context
+ * @gfp_flags: allocation flags
+ *
+ * Convert the values in the security context structure @oldc from the values
+ * specified in the policy @args->oldp to the values specified in the policy
+ * @args->newp, storing the new context in @newc, and verifying that the
+ * context is valid under the new policy.
+ */
+int services_convert_context(struct convert_context_args *args,
+ struct context *oldc, struct context *newc,
+ gfp_t gfp_flags)
+{
+ struct ocontext *oc;
+ struct role_datum *role;
+ struct type_datum *typdatum;
+ struct user_datum *usrdatum;
+ char *s;
+ u32 len;
+ int rc;
+
+ if (oldc->str) {
+ s = kstrdup(oldc->str, gfp_flags);
+ if (!s)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ rc = string_to_context_struct(args->newp, NULL, s, newc, SECSID_NULL);
+ if (rc == -EINVAL) {
+ /*
+ * Retain string representation for later mapping.
+ *
+ * IMPORTANT: We need to copy the contents of oldc->str
+ * back into s again because string_to_context_struct()
+ * may have garbled it.
+ */
+ memcpy(s, oldc->str, oldc->len);
+ context_init(newc);
+ newc->str = s;
+ newc->len = oldc->len;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ kfree(s);
+ if (rc) {
+ /* Other error condition, e.g. ENOMEM. */
+ pr_err("SELinux: Unable to map context %s, rc = %d.\n",
+ oldc->str, -rc);
+ return rc;
+ }
+ pr_info("SELinux: Context %s became valid (mapped).\n",
+ oldc->str);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ context_init(newc);
+
+ /* Convert the user. */
+ usrdatum = symtab_search(&args->newp->p_users,
+ sym_name(args->oldp, SYM_USERS, oldc->user - 1));
+ if (!usrdatum)
+ goto bad;
+ newc->user = usrdatum->value;
+
+ /* Convert the role. */
+ role = symtab_search(&args->newp->p_roles,
+ sym_name(args->oldp, SYM_ROLES, oldc->role - 1));
+ if (!role)
+ goto bad;
+ newc->role = role->value;
+
+ /* Convert the type. */
+ typdatum = symtab_search(&args->newp->p_types,
+ sym_name(args->oldp, SYM_TYPES, oldc->type - 1));
+ if (!typdatum)
+ goto bad;
+ newc->type = typdatum->value;
+
+ /* Convert the MLS fields if dealing with MLS policies */
+ if (args->oldp->mls_enabled && args->newp->mls_enabled) {
+ rc = mls_convert_context(args->oldp, args->newp, oldc, newc);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+ } else if (!args->oldp->mls_enabled && args->newp->mls_enabled) {
+ /*
+ * Switching between non-MLS and MLS policy:
+ * ensure that the MLS fields of the context for all
+ * existing entries in the sidtab are filled in with a
+ * suitable default value, likely taken from one of the
+ * initial SIDs.
+ */
+ oc = args->newp->ocontexts[OCON_ISID];
+ while (oc && oc->sid[0] != SECINITSID_UNLABELED)
+ oc = oc->next;
+ if (!oc) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: unable to look up"
+ " the initial SIDs list\n");
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ rc = mls_range_set(newc, &oc->context[0].range);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+ }
+
+ /* Check the validity of the new context. */
+ if (!policydb_context_isvalid(args->newp, newc)) {
+ rc = convert_context_handle_invalid_context(args->oldp, oldc);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+bad:
+ /* Map old representation to string and save it. */
+ rc = context_struct_to_string(args->oldp, oldc, &s, &len);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ context_destroy(newc);
+ newc->str = s;
+ newc->len = len;
+ pr_info("SELinux: Context %s became invalid (unmapped).\n",
+ newc->str);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void security_load_policycaps(struct selinux_policy *policy)
+{
+ struct policydb *p;
+ unsigned int i;
+ struct ebitmap_node *node;
+
+ p = &policy->policydb;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_state.policycap); i++)
+ WRITE_ONCE(selinux_state.policycap[i],
+ ebitmap_get_bit(&p->policycaps, i));
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_policycap_names); i++)
+ pr_info("SELinux: policy capability %s=%d\n",
+ selinux_policycap_names[i],
+ ebitmap_get_bit(&p->policycaps, i));
+
+ ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&p->policycaps, node, i) {
+ if (i >= ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_policycap_names))
+ pr_info("SELinux: unknown policy capability %u\n",
+ i);
+ }
+}
+
+static int security_preserve_bools(struct selinux_policy *oldpolicy,
+ struct selinux_policy *newpolicy);
+
+static void selinux_policy_free(struct selinux_policy *policy)
+{
+ if (!policy)
+ return;
+
+ sidtab_destroy(policy->sidtab);
+ kfree(policy->map.mapping);
+ policydb_destroy(&policy->policydb);
+ kfree(policy->sidtab);
+ kfree(policy);
+}
+
+static void selinux_policy_cond_free(struct selinux_policy *policy)
+{
+ cond_policydb_destroy_dup(&policy->policydb);
+ kfree(policy);
+}
+
+void selinux_policy_cancel(struct selinux_load_state *load_state)
+{
+ struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state;
+ struct selinux_policy *oldpolicy;
+
+ oldpolicy = rcu_dereference_protected(state->policy,
+ lockdep_is_held(&state->policy_mutex));
+
+ sidtab_cancel_convert(oldpolicy->sidtab);
+ selinux_policy_free(load_state->policy);
+ kfree(load_state->convert_data);
+}
+
+static void selinux_notify_policy_change(u32 seqno)
+{
+ /* Flush external caches and notify userspace of policy load */
+ avc_ss_reset(seqno);
+ selnl_notify_policyload(seqno);
+ selinux_status_update_policyload(seqno);
+ selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate();
+ selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload();
+ selinux_ima_measure_state_locked();
+}
+
+void selinux_policy_commit(struct selinux_load_state *load_state)
+{
+ struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state;
+ struct selinux_policy *oldpolicy, *newpolicy = load_state->policy;
+ unsigned long flags;
+ u32 seqno;
+
+ oldpolicy = rcu_dereference_protected(state->policy,
+ lockdep_is_held(&state->policy_mutex));
+
+ /* If switching between different policy types, log MLS status */
+ if (oldpolicy) {
+ if (oldpolicy->policydb.mls_enabled && !newpolicy->policydb.mls_enabled)
+ pr_info("SELinux: Disabling MLS support...\n");
+ else if (!oldpolicy->policydb.mls_enabled && newpolicy->policydb.mls_enabled)
+ pr_info("SELinux: Enabling MLS support...\n");
+ }
+
+ /* Set latest granting seqno for new policy. */
+ if (oldpolicy)
+ newpolicy->latest_granting = oldpolicy->latest_granting + 1;
+ else
+ newpolicy->latest_granting = 1;
+ seqno = newpolicy->latest_granting;
+
+ /* Install the new policy. */
+ if (oldpolicy) {
+ sidtab_freeze_begin(oldpolicy->sidtab, &flags);
+ rcu_assign_pointer(state->policy, newpolicy);
+ sidtab_freeze_end(oldpolicy->sidtab, &flags);
+ } else {
+ rcu_assign_pointer(state->policy, newpolicy);
+ }
+
+ /* Load the policycaps from the new policy */
+ security_load_policycaps(newpolicy);
+
+ if (!selinux_initialized()) {
+ /*
+ * After first policy load, the security server is
+ * marked as initialized and ready to handle requests and
+ * any objects created prior to policy load are then labeled.
+ */
+ selinux_mark_initialized();
+ selinux_complete_init();
+ }
+
+ /* Free the old policy */
+ synchronize_rcu();
+ selinux_policy_free(oldpolicy);
+ kfree(load_state->convert_data);
+
+ /* Notify others of the policy change */
+ selinux_notify_policy_change(seqno);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_load_policy - Load a security policy configuration.
+ * @data: binary policy data
+ * @len: length of data in bytes
+ * @load_state: policy load state
+ *
+ * Load a new set of security policy configuration data,
+ * validate it and convert the SID table as necessary.
+ * This function will flush the access vector cache after
+ * loading the new policy.
+ */
+int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len,
+ struct selinux_load_state *load_state)
+{
+ struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state;
+ struct selinux_policy *newpolicy, *oldpolicy;
+ struct selinux_policy_convert_data *convert_data;
+ int rc = 0;
+ struct policy_file file = { data, len }, *fp = &file;
+
+ newpolicy = kzalloc(sizeof(*newpolicy), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!newpolicy)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ newpolicy->sidtab = kzalloc(sizeof(*newpolicy->sidtab), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!newpolicy->sidtab) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto err_policy;
+ }
+
+ rc = policydb_read(&newpolicy->policydb, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ goto err_sidtab;
+
+ newpolicy->policydb.len = len;
+ rc = selinux_set_mapping(&newpolicy->policydb, secclass_map,
+ &newpolicy->map);
+ if (rc)
+ goto err_policydb;
+
+ rc = policydb_load_isids(&newpolicy->policydb, newpolicy->sidtab);
+ if (rc) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: unable to load the initial SIDs\n");
+ goto err_mapping;
+ }
+
+ if (!selinux_initialized()) {
+ /* First policy load, so no need to preserve state from old policy */
+ load_state->policy = newpolicy;
+ load_state->convert_data = NULL;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ oldpolicy = rcu_dereference_protected(state->policy,
+ lockdep_is_held(&state->policy_mutex));
+
+ /* Preserve active boolean values from the old policy */
+ rc = security_preserve_bools(oldpolicy, newpolicy);
+ if (rc) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: unable to preserve booleans\n");
+ goto err_free_isids;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Convert the internal representations of contexts
+ * in the new SID table.
+ */
+
+ convert_data = kmalloc(sizeof(*convert_data), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!convert_data) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto err_free_isids;
+ }
+
+ convert_data->args.oldp = &oldpolicy->policydb;
+ convert_data->args.newp = &newpolicy->policydb;
+
+ convert_data->sidtab_params.args = &convert_data->args;
+ convert_data->sidtab_params.target = newpolicy->sidtab;
+
+ rc = sidtab_convert(oldpolicy->sidtab, &convert_data->sidtab_params);
+ if (rc) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: unable to convert the internal"
+ " representation of contexts in the new SID"
+ " table\n");
+ goto err_free_convert_data;
+ }
+
+ load_state->policy = newpolicy;
+ load_state->convert_data = convert_data;
+ return 0;
+
+err_free_convert_data:
+ kfree(convert_data);
+err_free_isids:
+ sidtab_destroy(newpolicy->sidtab);
+err_mapping:
+ kfree(newpolicy->map.mapping);
+err_policydb:
+ policydb_destroy(&newpolicy->policydb);
+err_sidtab:
+ kfree(newpolicy->sidtab);
+err_policy:
+ kfree(newpolicy);
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * ocontext_to_sid - Helper to safely get sid for an ocontext
+ * @sidtab: SID table
+ * @c: ocontext structure
+ * @index: index of the context entry (0 or 1)
+ * @out_sid: pointer to the resulting SID value
+ *
+ * For all ocontexts except OCON_ISID the SID fields are populated
+ * on-demand when needed. Since updating the SID value is an SMP-sensitive
+ * operation, this helper must be used to do that safely.
+ *
+ * WARNING: This function may return -ESTALE, indicating that the caller
+ * must retry the operation after re-acquiring the policy pointer!
+ */
+static int ocontext_to_sid(struct sidtab *sidtab, struct ocontext *c,
+ size_t index, u32 *out_sid)
+{
+ int rc;
+ u32 sid;
+
+ /* Ensure the associated sidtab entry is visible to this thread. */
+ sid = smp_load_acquire(&c->sid[index]);
+ if (!sid) {
+ rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab, &c->context[index], &sid);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ /*
+ * Ensure the new sidtab entry is visible to other threads
+ * when they see the SID.
+ */
+ smp_store_release(&c->sid[index], sid);
+ }
+ *out_sid = sid;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_port_sid - Obtain the SID for a port.
+ * @protocol: protocol number
+ * @port: port number
+ * @out_sid: security identifier
+ */
+int security_port_sid(u8 protocol, u16 port, u32 *out_sid)
+{
+ struct selinux_policy *policy;
+ struct policydb *policydb;
+ struct sidtab *sidtab;
+ struct ocontext *c;
+ int rc;
+
+ if (!selinux_initialized()) {
+ *out_sid = SECINITSID_PORT;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+retry:
+ rc = 0;
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ policy = rcu_dereference(selinux_state.policy);
+ policydb = &policy->policydb;
+ sidtab = policy->sidtab;
+
+ c = policydb->ocontexts[OCON_PORT];
+ while (c) {
+ if (c->u.port.protocol == protocol &&
+ c->u.port.low_port <= port &&
+ c->u.port.high_port >= port)
+ break;
+ c = c->next;
+ }
+
+ if (c) {
+ rc = ocontext_to_sid(sidtab, c, 0, out_sid);
+ if (rc == -ESTALE) {
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ goto retry;
+ }
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ } else {
+ *out_sid = SECINITSID_PORT;
+ }
+
+out:
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_ib_pkey_sid - Obtain the SID for a pkey.
+ * @subnet_prefix: Subnet Prefix
+ * @pkey_num: pkey number
+ * @out_sid: security identifier
+ */
+int security_ib_pkey_sid(u64 subnet_prefix, u16 pkey_num, u32 *out_sid)
+{
+ struct selinux_policy *policy;
+ struct policydb *policydb;
+ struct sidtab *sidtab;
+ struct ocontext *c;
+ int rc;
+
+ if (!selinux_initialized()) {
+ *out_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+retry:
+ rc = 0;
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ policy = rcu_dereference(selinux_state.policy);
+ policydb = &policy->policydb;
+ sidtab = policy->sidtab;
+
+ c = policydb->ocontexts[OCON_IBPKEY];
+ while (c) {
+ if (c->u.ibpkey.low_pkey <= pkey_num &&
+ c->u.ibpkey.high_pkey >= pkey_num &&
+ c->u.ibpkey.subnet_prefix == subnet_prefix)
+ break;
+
+ c = c->next;
+ }
+
+ if (c) {
+ rc = ocontext_to_sid(sidtab, c, 0, out_sid);
+ if (rc == -ESTALE) {
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ goto retry;
+ }
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ } else
+ *out_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+
+out:
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_ib_endport_sid - Obtain the SID for a subnet management interface.
+ * @dev_name: device name
+ * @port_num: port number
+ * @out_sid: security identifier
+ */
+int security_ib_endport_sid(const char *dev_name, u8 port_num, u32 *out_sid)
+{
+ struct selinux_policy *policy;
+ struct policydb *policydb;
+ struct sidtab *sidtab;
+ struct ocontext *c;
+ int rc;
+
+ if (!selinux_initialized()) {
+ *out_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+retry:
+ rc = 0;
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ policy = rcu_dereference(selinux_state.policy);
+ policydb = &policy->policydb;
+ sidtab = policy->sidtab;
+
+ c = policydb->ocontexts[OCON_IBENDPORT];
+ while (c) {
+ if (c->u.ibendport.port == port_num &&
+ !strncmp(c->u.ibendport.dev_name,
+ dev_name,
+ IB_DEVICE_NAME_MAX))
+ break;
+
+ c = c->next;
+ }
+
+ if (c) {
+ rc = ocontext_to_sid(sidtab, c, 0, out_sid);
+ if (rc == -ESTALE) {
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ goto retry;
+ }
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ } else
+ *out_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+
+out:
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_netif_sid - Obtain the SID for a network interface.
+ * @name: interface name
+ * @if_sid: interface SID
+ */
+int security_netif_sid(char *name, u32 *if_sid)
+{
+ struct selinux_policy *policy;
+ struct policydb *policydb;
+ struct sidtab *sidtab;
+ int rc;
+ struct ocontext *c;
+
+ if (!selinux_initialized()) {
+ *if_sid = SECINITSID_NETIF;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+retry:
+ rc = 0;
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ policy = rcu_dereference(selinux_state.policy);
+ policydb = &policy->policydb;
+ sidtab = policy->sidtab;
+
+ c = policydb->ocontexts[OCON_NETIF];
+ while (c) {
+ if (strcmp(name, c->u.name) == 0)
+ break;
+ c = c->next;
+ }
+
+ if (c) {
+ rc = ocontext_to_sid(sidtab, c, 0, if_sid);
+ if (rc == -ESTALE) {
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ goto retry;
+ }
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ } else
+ *if_sid = SECINITSID_NETIF;
+
+out:
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static int match_ipv6_addrmask(u32 *input, u32 *addr, u32 *mask)
+{
+ int i, fail = 0;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
+ if (addr[i] != (input[i] & mask[i])) {
+ fail = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return !fail;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_node_sid - Obtain the SID for a node (host).
+ * @domain: communication domain aka address family
+ * @addrp: address
+ * @addrlen: address length in bytes
+ * @out_sid: security identifier
+ */
+int security_node_sid(u16 domain,
+ void *addrp,
+ u32 addrlen,
+ u32 *out_sid)
+{
+ struct selinux_policy *policy;
+ struct policydb *policydb;
+ struct sidtab *sidtab;
+ int rc;
+ struct ocontext *c;
+
+ if (!selinux_initialized()) {
+ *out_sid = SECINITSID_NODE;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+retry:
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ policy = rcu_dereference(selinux_state.policy);
+ policydb = &policy->policydb;
+ sidtab = policy->sidtab;
+
+ switch (domain) {
+ case AF_INET: {
+ u32 addr;
+
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ if (addrlen != sizeof(u32))
+ goto out;
+
+ addr = *((u32 *)addrp);
+
+ c = policydb->ocontexts[OCON_NODE];
+ while (c) {
+ if (c->u.node.addr == (addr & c->u.node.mask))
+ break;
+ c = c->next;
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+
+ case AF_INET6:
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ if (addrlen != sizeof(u64) * 2)
+ goto out;
+ c = policydb->ocontexts[OCON_NODE6];
+ while (c) {
+ if (match_ipv6_addrmask(addrp, c->u.node6.addr,
+ c->u.node6.mask))
+ break;
+ c = c->next;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ rc = 0;
+ *out_sid = SECINITSID_NODE;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (c) {
+ rc = ocontext_to_sid(sidtab, c, 0, out_sid);
+ if (rc == -ESTALE) {
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ goto retry;
+ }
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ } else {
+ *out_sid = SECINITSID_NODE;
+ }
+
+ rc = 0;
+out:
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return rc;
+}
+
+#define SIDS_NEL 25
+
+/**
+ * security_get_user_sids - Obtain reachable SIDs for a user.
+ * @fromsid: starting SID
+ * @username: username
+ * @sids: array of reachable SIDs for user
+ * @nel: number of elements in @sids
+ *
+ * Generate the set of SIDs for legal security contexts
+ * for a given user that can be reached by @fromsid.
+ * Set *@sids to point to a dynamically allocated
+ * array containing the set of SIDs. Set *@nel to the
+ * number of elements in the array.
+ */
+
+int security_get_user_sids(u32 fromsid,
+ char *username,
+ u32 **sids,
+ u32 *nel)
+{
+ struct selinux_policy *policy;
+ struct policydb *policydb;
+ struct sidtab *sidtab;
+ struct context *fromcon, usercon;
+ u32 *mysids = NULL, *mysids2, sid;
+ u32 i, j, mynel, maxnel = SIDS_NEL;
+ struct user_datum *user;
+ struct role_datum *role;
+ struct ebitmap_node *rnode, *tnode;
+ int rc;
+
+ *sids = NULL;
+ *nel = 0;
+
+ if (!selinux_initialized())
+ return 0;
+
+ mysids = kcalloc(maxnel, sizeof(*mysids), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!mysids)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+retry:
+ mynel = 0;
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ policy = rcu_dereference(selinux_state.policy);
+ policydb = &policy->policydb;
+ sidtab = policy->sidtab;
+
+ context_init(&usercon);
+
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ fromcon = sidtab_search(sidtab, fromsid);
+ if (!fromcon)
+ goto out_unlock;
+
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ user = symtab_search(&policydb->p_users, username);
+ if (!user)
+ goto out_unlock;
+
+ usercon.user = user->value;
+
+ ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&user->roles, rnode, i) {
+ role = policydb->role_val_to_struct[i];
+ usercon.role = i + 1;
+ ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&role->types, tnode, j) {
+ usercon.type = j + 1;
+
+ if (mls_setup_user_range(policydb, fromcon, user,
+ &usercon))
+ continue;
+
+ rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab, &usercon, &sid);
+ if (rc == -ESTALE) {
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ goto retry;
+ }
+ if (rc)
+ goto out_unlock;
+ if (mynel < maxnel) {
+ mysids[mynel++] = sid;
+ } else {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ maxnel += SIDS_NEL;
+ mysids2 = kcalloc(maxnel, sizeof(*mysids2), GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!mysids2)
+ goto out_unlock;
+ memcpy(mysids2, mysids, mynel * sizeof(*mysids2));
+ kfree(mysids);
+ mysids = mysids2;
+ mysids[mynel++] = sid;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ rc = 0;
+out_unlock:
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ if (rc || !mynel) {
+ kfree(mysids);
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ mysids2 = kcalloc(mynel, sizeof(*mysids2), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!mysids2) {
+ kfree(mysids);
+ return rc;
+ }
+ for (i = 0, j = 0; i < mynel; i++) {
+ struct av_decision dummy_avd;
+ rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(fromsid, mysids[i],
+ SECCLASS_PROCESS, /* kernel value */
+ PROCESS__TRANSITION, AVC_STRICT,
+ &dummy_avd);
+ if (!rc)
+ mysids2[j++] = mysids[i];
+ cond_resched();
+ }
+ kfree(mysids);
+ *sids = mysids2;
+ *nel = j;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * __security_genfs_sid - Helper to obtain a SID for a file in a filesystem
+ * @policy: policy
+ * @fstype: filesystem type
+ * @path: path from root of mount
+ * @orig_sclass: file security class
+ * @sid: SID for path
+ *
+ * Obtain a SID to use for a file in a filesystem that
+ * cannot support xattr or use a fixed labeling behavior like
+ * transition SIDs or task SIDs.
+ *
+ * WARNING: This function may return -ESTALE, indicating that the caller
+ * must retry the operation after re-acquiring the policy pointer!
+ */
+static inline int __security_genfs_sid(struct selinux_policy *policy,
+ const char *fstype,
+ const char *path,
+ u16 orig_sclass,
+ u32 *sid)
+{
+ struct policydb *policydb = &policy->policydb;
+ struct sidtab *sidtab = policy->sidtab;
+ u16 sclass;
+ struct genfs *genfs;
+ struct ocontext *c;
+ int cmp = 0;
+
+ while (path[0] == '/' && path[1] == '/')
+ path++;
+
+ sclass = unmap_class(&policy->map, orig_sclass);
+ *sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+
+ for (genfs = policydb->genfs; genfs; genfs = genfs->next) {
+ cmp = strcmp(fstype, genfs->fstype);
+ if (cmp <= 0)
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (!genfs || cmp)
+ return -ENOENT;
+
+ for (c = genfs->head; c; c = c->next) {
+ size_t len = strlen(c->u.name);
+ if ((!c->v.sclass || sclass == c->v.sclass) &&
+ (strncmp(c->u.name, path, len) == 0))
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (!c)
+ return -ENOENT;
+
+ return ocontext_to_sid(sidtab, c, 0, sid);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_genfs_sid - Obtain a SID for a file in a filesystem
+ * @fstype: filesystem type
+ * @path: path from root of mount
+ * @orig_sclass: file security class
+ * @sid: SID for path
+ *
+ * Acquire policy_rwlock before calling __security_genfs_sid() and release
+ * it afterward.
+ */
+int security_genfs_sid(const char *fstype,
+ const char *path,
+ u16 orig_sclass,
+ u32 *sid)
+{
+ struct selinux_policy *policy;
+ int retval;
+
+ if (!selinux_initialized()) {
+ *sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ do {
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ policy = rcu_dereference(selinux_state.policy);
+ retval = __security_genfs_sid(policy, fstype, path,
+ orig_sclass, sid);
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ } while (retval == -ESTALE);
+ return retval;
+}
+
+int selinux_policy_genfs_sid(struct selinux_policy *policy,
+ const char *fstype,
+ const char *path,
+ u16 orig_sclass,
+ u32 *sid)
+{
+ /* no lock required, policy is not yet accessible by other threads */
+ return __security_genfs_sid(policy, fstype, path, orig_sclass, sid);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_fs_use - Determine how to handle labeling for a filesystem.
+ * @sb: superblock in question
+ */
+int security_fs_use(struct super_block *sb)
+{
+ struct selinux_policy *policy;
+ struct policydb *policydb;
+ struct sidtab *sidtab;
+ int rc;
+ struct ocontext *c;
+ struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
+ const char *fstype = sb->s_type->name;
+
+ if (!selinux_initialized()) {
+ sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE;
+ sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+retry:
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ policy = rcu_dereference(selinux_state.policy);
+ policydb = &policy->policydb;
+ sidtab = policy->sidtab;
+
+ c = policydb->ocontexts[OCON_FSUSE];
+ while (c) {
+ if (strcmp(fstype, c->u.name) == 0)
+ break;
+ c = c->next;
+ }
+
+ if (c) {
+ sbsec->behavior = c->v.behavior;
+ rc = ocontext_to_sid(sidtab, c, 0, &sbsec->sid);
+ if (rc == -ESTALE) {
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ goto retry;
+ }
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ } else {
+ rc = __security_genfs_sid(policy, fstype, "/",
+ SECCLASS_DIR, &sbsec->sid);
+ if (rc == -ESTALE) {
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ goto retry;
+ }
+ if (rc) {
+ sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE;
+ rc = 0;
+ } else {
+ sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS;
+ }
+ }
+
+out:
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return rc;
+}
+
+int security_get_bools(struct selinux_policy *policy,
+ u32 *len, char ***names, int **values)
+{
+ struct policydb *policydb;
+ u32 i;
+ int rc;
+
+ policydb = &policy->policydb;
+
+ *names = NULL;
+ *values = NULL;
+
+ rc = 0;
+ *len = policydb->p_bools.nprim;
+ if (!*len)
+ goto out;
+
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ *names = kcalloc(*len, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!*names)
+ goto err;
+
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ *values = kcalloc(*len, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!*values)
+ goto err;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < *len; i++) {
+ (*values)[i] = policydb->bool_val_to_struct[i]->state;
+
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ (*names)[i] = kstrdup(sym_name(policydb, SYM_BOOLS, i),
+ GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!(*names)[i])
+ goto err;
+ }
+ rc = 0;
+out:
+ return rc;
+err:
+ if (*names) {
+ for (i = 0; i < *len; i++)
+ kfree((*names)[i]);
+ kfree(*names);
+ }
+ kfree(*values);
+ *len = 0;
+ *names = NULL;
+ *values = NULL;
+ goto out;
+}
+
+
+int security_set_bools(u32 len, int *values)
+{
+ struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state;
+ struct selinux_policy *newpolicy, *oldpolicy;
+ int rc;
+ u32 i, seqno = 0;
+
+ if (!selinux_initialized())
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ oldpolicy = rcu_dereference_protected(state->policy,
+ lockdep_is_held(&state->policy_mutex));
+
+ /* Consistency check on number of booleans, should never fail */
+ if (WARN_ON(len != oldpolicy->policydb.p_bools.nprim))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ newpolicy = kmemdup(oldpolicy, sizeof(*newpolicy), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!newpolicy)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ /*
+ * Deep copy only the parts of the policydb that might be
+ * modified as a result of changing booleans.
+ */
+ rc = cond_policydb_dup(&newpolicy->policydb, &oldpolicy->policydb);
+ if (rc) {
+ kfree(newpolicy);
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ /* Update the boolean states in the copy */
+ for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
+ int new_state = !!values[i];
+ int old_state = newpolicy->policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state;
+
+ if (new_state != old_state) {
+ audit_log(audit_context(), GFP_ATOMIC,
+ AUDIT_MAC_CONFIG_CHANGE,
+ "bool=%s val=%d old_val=%d auid=%u ses=%u",
+ sym_name(&newpolicy->policydb, SYM_BOOLS, i),
+ new_state,
+ old_state,
+ from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current)),
+ audit_get_sessionid(current));
+ newpolicy->policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state = new_state;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Re-evaluate the conditional rules in the copy */
+ evaluate_cond_nodes(&newpolicy->policydb);
+
+ /* Set latest granting seqno for new policy */
+ newpolicy->latest_granting = oldpolicy->latest_granting + 1;
+ seqno = newpolicy->latest_granting;
+
+ /* Install the new policy */
+ rcu_assign_pointer(state->policy, newpolicy);
+
+ /*
+ * Free the conditional portions of the old policydb
+ * that were copied for the new policy, and the oldpolicy
+ * structure itself but not what it references.
+ */
+ synchronize_rcu();
+ selinux_policy_cond_free(oldpolicy);
+
+ /* Notify others of the policy change */
+ selinux_notify_policy_change(seqno);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int security_get_bool_value(u32 index)
+{
+ struct selinux_policy *policy;
+ struct policydb *policydb;
+ int rc;
+ u32 len;
+
+ if (!selinux_initialized())
+ return 0;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ policy = rcu_dereference(selinux_state.policy);
+ policydb = &policy->policydb;
+
+ rc = -EFAULT;
+ len = policydb->p_bools.nprim;
+ if (index >= len)
+ goto out;
+
+ rc = policydb->bool_val_to_struct[index]->state;
+out:
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static int security_preserve_bools(struct selinux_policy *oldpolicy,
+ struct selinux_policy *newpolicy)
+{
+ int rc, *bvalues = NULL;
+ char **bnames = NULL;
+ struct cond_bool_datum *booldatum;
+ u32 i, nbools = 0;
+
+ rc = security_get_bools(oldpolicy, &nbools, &bnames, &bvalues);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ for (i = 0; i < nbools; i++) {
+ booldatum = symtab_search(&newpolicy->policydb.p_bools,
+ bnames[i]);
+ if (booldatum)
+ booldatum->state = bvalues[i];
+ }
+ evaluate_cond_nodes(&newpolicy->policydb);
+
+out:
+ if (bnames) {
+ for (i = 0; i < nbools; i++)
+ kfree(bnames[i]);
+ }
+ kfree(bnames);
+ kfree(bvalues);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * security_sid_mls_copy() - computes a new sid based on the given
+ * sid and the mls portion of mls_sid.
+ */
+int security_sid_mls_copy(u32 sid, u32 mls_sid, u32 *new_sid)
+{
+ struct selinux_policy *policy;
+ struct policydb *policydb;
+ struct sidtab *sidtab;
+ struct context *context1;
+ struct context *context2;
+ struct context newcon;
+ char *s;
+ u32 len;
+ int rc;
+
+ if (!selinux_initialized()) {
+ *new_sid = sid;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+retry:
+ rc = 0;
+ context_init(&newcon);
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ policy = rcu_dereference(selinux_state.policy);
+ policydb = &policy->policydb;
+ sidtab = policy->sidtab;
+
+ if (!policydb->mls_enabled) {
+ *new_sid = sid;
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
+
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ context1 = sidtab_search(sidtab, sid);
+ if (!context1) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
+ __func__, sid);
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
+
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ context2 = sidtab_search(sidtab, mls_sid);
+ if (!context2) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
+ __func__, mls_sid);
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
+
+ newcon.user = context1->user;
+ newcon.role = context1->role;
+ newcon.type = context1->type;
+ rc = mls_context_cpy(&newcon, context2);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out_unlock;
+
+ /* Check the validity of the new context. */
+ if (!policydb_context_isvalid(policydb, &newcon)) {
+ rc = convert_context_handle_invalid_context(policydb,
+ &newcon);
+ if (rc) {
+ if (!context_struct_to_string(policydb, &newcon, &s,
+ &len)) {
+ struct audit_buffer *ab;
+
+ ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(),
+ GFP_ATOMIC,
+ AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR);
+ audit_log_format(ab,
+ "op=security_sid_mls_copy invalid_context=");
+ /* don't record NUL with untrusted strings */
+ audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, s, len - 1);
+ audit_log_end(ab);
+ kfree(s);
+ }
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
+ }
+ rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab, &newcon, new_sid);
+ if (rc == -ESTALE) {
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ context_destroy(&newcon);
+ goto retry;
+ }
+out_unlock:
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ context_destroy(&newcon);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_net_peersid_resolve - Compare and resolve two network peer SIDs
+ * @nlbl_sid: NetLabel SID
+ * @nlbl_type: NetLabel labeling protocol type
+ * @xfrm_sid: XFRM SID
+ * @peer_sid: network peer sid
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Compare the @nlbl_sid and @xfrm_sid values and if the two SIDs can be
+ * resolved into a single SID it is returned via @peer_sid and the function
+ * returns zero. Otherwise @peer_sid is set to SECSID_NULL and the function
+ * returns a negative value. A table summarizing the behavior is below:
+ *
+ * | function return | @sid
+ * ------------------------------+-----------------+-----------------
+ * no peer labels | 0 | SECSID_NULL
+ * single peer label | 0 | <peer_label>
+ * multiple, consistent labels | 0 | <peer_label>
+ * multiple, inconsistent labels | -<errno> | SECSID_NULL
+ *
+ */
+int security_net_peersid_resolve(u32 nlbl_sid, u32 nlbl_type,
+ u32 xfrm_sid,
+ u32 *peer_sid)
+{
+ struct selinux_policy *policy;
+ struct policydb *policydb;
+ struct sidtab *sidtab;
+ int rc;
+ struct context *nlbl_ctx;
+ struct context *xfrm_ctx;
+
+ *peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
+
+ /* handle the common (which also happens to be the set of easy) cases
+ * right away, these two if statements catch everything involving a
+ * single or absent peer SID/label */
+ if (xfrm_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
+ *peer_sid = nlbl_sid;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* NOTE: an nlbl_type == NETLBL_NLTYPE_UNLABELED is a "fallback" label
+ * and is treated as if nlbl_sid == SECSID_NULL when a XFRM SID/label
+ * is present */
+ if (nlbl_sid == SECSID_NULL || nlbl_type == NETLBL_NLTYPE_UNLABELED) {
+ *peer_sid = xfrm_sid;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!selinux_initialized())
+ return 0;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ policy = rcu_dereference(selinux_state.policy);
+ policydb = &policy->policydb;
+ sidtab = policy->sidtab;
+
+ /*
+ * We don't need to check initialized here since the only way both
+ * nlbl_sid and xfrm_sid are not equal to SECSID_NULL would be if the
+ * security server was initialized and state->initialized was true.
+ */
+ if (!policydb->mls_enabled) {
+ rc = 0;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ nlbl_ctx = sidtab_search(sidtab, nlbl_sid);
+ if (!nlbl_ctx) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
+ __func__, nlbl_sid);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ xfrm_ctx = sidtab_search(sidtab, xfrm_sid);
+ if (!xfrm_ctx) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
+ __func__, xfrm_sid);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ rc = (mls_context_cmp(nlbl_ctx, xfrm_ctx) ? 0 : -EACCES);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* at present NetLabel SIDs/labels really only carry MLS
+ * information so if the MLS portion of the NetLabel SID
+ * matches the MLS portion of the labeled XFRM SID/label
+ * then pass along the XFRM SID as it is the most
+ * expressive */
+ *peer_sid = xfrm_sid;
+out:
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static int get_classes_callback(void *k, void *d, void *args)
+{
+ struct class_datum *datum = d;
+ char *name = k, **classes = args;
+ u32 value = datum->value - 1;
+
+ classes[value] = kstrdup(name, GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!classes[value])
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int security_get_classes(struct selinux_policy *policy,
+ char ***classes, u32 *nclasses)
+{
+ struct policydb *policydb;
+ int rc;
+
+ policydb = &policy->policydb;
+
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ *nclasses = policydb->p_classes.nprim;
+ *classes = kcalloc(*nclasses, sizeof(**classes), GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!*classes)
+ goto out;
+
+ rc = hashtab_map(&policydb->p_classes.table, get_classes_callback,
+ *classes);
+ if (rc) {
+ u32 i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < *nclasses; i++)
+ kfree((*classes)[i]);
+ kfree(*classes);
+ }
+
+out:
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static int get_permissions_callback(void *k, void *d, void *args)
+{
+ struct perm_datum *datum = d;
+ char *name = k, **perms = args;
+ u32 value = datum->value - 1;
+
+ perms[value] = kstrdup(name, GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!perms[value])
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int security_get_permissions(struct selinux_policy *policy,
+ const char *class, char ***perms, u32 *nperms)
+{
+ struct policydb *policydb;
+ u32 i;
+ int rc;
+ struct class_datum *match;
+
+ policydb = &policy->policydb;
+
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ match = symtab_search(&policydb->p_classes, class);
+ if (!match) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: %s: unrecognized class %s\n",
+ __func__, class);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ *nperms = match->permissions.nprim;
+ *perms = kcalloc(*nperms, sizeof(**perms), GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!*perms)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (match->comdatum) {
+ rc = hashtab_map(&match->comdatum->permissions.table,
+ get_permissions_callback, *perms);
+ if (rc)
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ rc = hashtab_map(&match->permissions.table, get_permissions_callback,
+ *perms);
+ if (rc)
+ goto err;
+
+out:
+ return rc;
+
+err:
+ for (i = 0; i < *nperms; i++)
+ kfree((*perms)[i]);
+ kfree(*perms);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+int security_get_reject_unknown(void)
+{
+ struct selinux_policy *policy;
+ int value;
+
+ if (!selinux_initialized())
+ return 0;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ policy = rcu_dereference(selinux_state.policy);
+ value = policy->policydb.reject_unknown;
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return value;
+}
+
+int security_get_allow_unknown(void)
+{
+ struct selinux_policy *policy;
+ int value;
+
+ if (!selinux_initialized())
+ return 0;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ policy = rcu_dereference(selinux_state.policy);
+ value = policy->policydb.allow_unknown;
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return value;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_policycap_supported - Check for a specific policy capability
+ * @req_cap: capability
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * This function queries the currently loaded policy to see if it supports the
+ * capability specified by @req_cap. Returns true (1) if the capability is
+ * supported, false (0) if it isn't supported.
+ *
+ */
+int security_policycap_supported(unsigned int req_cap)
+{
+ struct selinux_policy *policy;
+ int rc;
+
+ if (!selinux_initialized())
+ return 0;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ policy = rcu_dereference(selinux_state.policy);
+ rc = ebitmap_get_bit(&policy->policydb.policycaps, req_cap);
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+struct selinux_audit_rule {
+ u32 au_seqno;
+ struct context au_ctxt;
+};
+
+void selinux_audit_rule_free(void *vrule)
+{
+ struct selinux_audit_rule *rule = vrule;
+
+ if (rule) {
+ context_destroy(&rule->au_ctxt);
+ kfree(rule);
+ }
+}
+
+int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule)
+{
+ struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state;
+ struct selinux_policy *policy;
+ struct policydb *policydb;
+ struct selinux_audit_rule *tmprule;
+ struct role_datum *roledatum;
+ struct type_datum *typedatum;
+ struct user_datum *userdatum;
+ struct selinux_audit_rule **rule = (struct selinux_audit_rule **)vrule;
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ *rule = NULL;
+
+ if (!selinux_initialized())
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+ switch (field) {
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
+ /* only 'equals' and 'not equals' fit user, role, and type */
+ if (op != Audit_equal && op != Audit_not_equal)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
+ /* we do not allow a range, indicated by the presence of '-' */
+ if (strchr(rulestr, '-'))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ default:
+ /* only the above fields are valid */
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ tmprule = kzalloc(sizeof(struct selinux_audit_rule), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!tmprule)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ context_init(&tmprule->au_ctxt);
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ policy = rcu_dereference(state->policy);
+ policydb = &policy->policydb;
+ tmprule->au_seqno = policy->latest_granting;
+ switch (field) {
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
+ userdatum = symtab_search(&policydb->p_users, rulestr);
+ if (!userdatum) {
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ tmprule->au_ctxt.user = userdatum->value;
+ break;
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
+ roledatum = symtab_search(&policydb->p_roles, rulestr);
+ if (!roledatum) {
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ tmprule->au_ctxt.role = roledatum->value;
+ break;
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
+ typedatum = symtab_search(&policydb->p_types, rulestr);
+ if (!typedatum) {
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ tmprule->au_ctxt.type = typedatum->value;
+ break;
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
+ rc = mls_from_string(policydb, rulestr, &tmprule->au_ctxt,
+ GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (rc)
+ goto err;
+ break;
+ }
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+
+ *rule = tmprule;
+ return 0;
+
+err:
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ selinux_audit_rule_free(tmprule);
+ *rule = NULL;
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/* Check to see if the rule contains any selinux fields */
+int selinux_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *rule)
+{
+ u32 i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
+ struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i];
+ switch (f->type) {
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule)
+{
+ struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state;
+ struct selinux_policy *policy;
+ struct context *ctxt;
+ struct mls_level *level;
+ struct selinux_audit_rule *rule = vrule;
+ int match = 0;
+
+ if (unlikely(!rule)) {
+ WARN_ONCE(1, "selinux_audit_rule_match: missing rule\n");
+ return -ENOENT;
+ }
+
+ if (!selinux_initialized())
+ return 0;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+
+ policy = rcu_dereference(state->policy);
+
+ if (rule->au_seqno < policy->latest_granting) {
+ match = -ESTALE;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ ctxt = sidtab_search(policy->sidtab, sid);
+ if (unlikely(!ctxt)) {
+ WARN_ONCE(1, "selinux_audit_rule_match: unrecognized SID %d\n",
+ sid);
+ match = -ENOENT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* a field/op pair that is not caught here will simply fall through
+ without a match */
+ switch (field) {
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
+ switch (op) {
+ case Audit_equal:
+ match = (ctxt->user == rule->au_ctxt.user);
+ break;
+ case Audit_not_equal:
+ match = (ctxt->user != rule->au_ctxt.user);
+ break;
+ }
+ break;
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
+ switch (op) {
+ case Audit_equal:
+ match = (ctxt->role == rule->au_ctxt.role);
+ break;
+ case Audit_not_equal:
+ match = (ctxt->role != rule->au_ctxt.role);
+ break;
+ }
+ break;
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
+ switch (op) {
+ case Audit_equal:
+ match = (ctxt->type == rule->au_ctxt.type);
+ break;
+ case Audit_not_equal:
+ match = (ctxt->type != rule->au_ctxt.type);
+ break;
+ }
+ break;
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
+ level = ((field == AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN ||
+ field == AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW) ?
+ &ctxt->range.level[0] : &ctxt->range.level[1]);
+ switch (op) {
+ case Audit_equal:
+ match = mls_level_eq(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0],
+ level);
+ break;
+ case Audit_not_equal:
+ match = !mls_level_eq(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0],
+ level);
+ break;
+ case Audit_lt:
+ match = (mls_level_dom(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0],
+ level) &&
+ !mls_level_eq(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0],
+ level));
+ break;
+ case Audit_le:
+ match = mls_level_dom(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0],
+ level);
+ break;
+ case Audit_gt:
+ match = (mls_level_dom(level,
+ &rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0]) &&
+ !mls_level_eq(level,
+ &rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0]));
+ break;
+ case Audit_ge:
+ match = mls_level_dom(level,
+ &rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0]);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+out:
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return match;
+}
+
+static int aurule_avc_callback(u32 event)
+{
+ if (event == AVC_CALLBACK_RESET)
+ return audit_update_lsm_rules();
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int __init aurule_init(void)
+{
+ int err;
+
+ err = avc_add_callback(aurule_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET);
+ if (err)
+ panic("avc_add_callback() failed, error %d\n", err);
+
+ return err;
+}
+__initcall(aurule_init);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_NETLABEL
+/**
+ * security_netlbl_cache_add - Add an entry to the NetLabel cache
+ * @secattr: the NetLabel packet security attributes
+ * @sid: the SELinux SID
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Attempt to cache the context in @ctx, which was derived from the packet in
+ * @skb, in the NetLabel subsystem cache. This function assumes @secattr has
+ * already been initialized.
+ *
+ */
+static void security_netlbl_cache_add(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr,
+ u32 sid)
+{
+ u32 *sid_cache;
+
+ sid_cache = kmalloc(sizeof(*sid_cache), GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (sid_cache == NULL)
+ return;
+ secattr->cache = netlbl_secattr_cache_alloc(GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (secattr->cache == NULL) {
+ kfree(sid_cache);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ *sid_cache = sid;
+ secattr->cache->free = kfree;
+ secattr->cache->data = sid_cache;
+ secattr->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHE;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid - Convert a NetLabel secattr to a SELinux SID
+ * @secattr: the NetLabel packet security attributes
+ * @sid: the SELinux SID
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Convert the given NetLabel security attributes in @secattr into a
+ * SELinux SID. If the @secattr field does not contain a full SELinux
+ * SID/context then use SECINITSID_NETMSG as the foundation. If possible the
+ * 'cache' field of @secattr is set and the CACHE flag is set; this is to
+ * allow the @secattr to be used by NetLabel to cache the secattr to SID
+ * conversion for future lookups. Returns zero on success, negative values on
+ * failure.
+ *
+ */
+int security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr,
+ u32 *sid)
+{
+ struct selinux_policy *policy;
+ struct policydb *policydb;
+ struct sidtab *sidtab;
+ int rc;
+ struct context *ctx;
+ struct context ctx_new;
+
+ if (!selinux_initialized()) {
+ *sid = SECSID_NULL;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+retry:
+ rc = 0;
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ policy = rcu_dereference(selinux_state.policy);
+ policydb = &policy->policydb;
+ sidtab = policy->sidtab;
+
+ if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHE)
+ *sid = *(u32 *)secattr->cache->data;
+ else if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID)
+ *sid = secattr->attr.secid;
+ else if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL) {
+ rc = -EIDRM;
+ ctx = sidtab_search(sidtab, SECINITSID_NETMSG);
+ if (ctx == NULL)
+ goto out;
+
+ context_init(&ctx_new);
+ ctx_new.user = ctx->user;
+ ctx_new.role = ctx->role;
+ ctx_new.type = ctx->type;
+ mls_import_netlbl_lvl(policydb, &ctx_new, secattr);
+ if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT) {
+ rc = mls_import_netlbl_cat(policydb, &ctx_new, secattr);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ }
+ rc = -EIDRM;
+ if (!mls_context_isvalid(policydb, &ctx_new)) {
+ ebitmap_destroy(&ctx_new.range.level[0].cat);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab, &ctx_new, sid);
+ ebitmap_destroy(&ctx_new.range.level[0].cat);
+ if (rc == -ESTALE) {
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ goto retry;
+ }
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ security_netlbl_cache_add(secattr, *sid);
+ } else
+ *sid = SECSID_NULL;
+
+out:
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr - Convert a SELinux SID to a NetLabel secattr
+ * @sid: the SELinux SID
+ * @secattr: the NetLabel packet security attributes
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Convert the given SELinux SID in @sid into a NetLabel security attribute.
+ * Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
+ *
+ */
+int security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(u32 sid, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
+{
+ struct selinux_policy *policy;
+ struct policydb *policydb;
+ int rc;
+ struct context *ctx;
+
+ if (!selinux_initialized())
+ return 0;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ policy = rcu_dereference(selinux_state.policy);
+ policydb = &policy->policydb;
+
+ rc = -ENOENT;
+ ctx = sidtab_search(policy->sidtab, sid);
+ if (ctx == NULL)
+ goto out;
+
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ secattr->domain = kstrdup(sym_name(policydb, SYM_TYPES, ctx->type - 1),
+ GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (secattr->domain == NULL)
+ goto out;
+
+ secattr->attr.secid = sid;
+ secattr->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_DOMAIN_CPY | NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID;
+ mls_export_netlbl_lvl(policydb, ctx, secattr);
+ rc = mls_export_netlbl_cat(policydb, ctx, secattr);
+out:
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return rc;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_NETLABEL */
+
+/**
+ * __security_read_policy - read the policy.
+ * @policy: SELinux policy
+ * @data: binary policy data
+ * @len: length of data in bytes
+ *
+ */
+static int __security_read_policy(struct selinux_policy *policy,
+ void *data, size_t *len)
+{
+ int rc;
+ struct policy_file fp;
+
+ fp.data = data;
+ fp.len = *len;
+
+ rc = policydb_write(&policy->policydb, &fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ *len = (unsigned long)fp.data - (unsigned long)data;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_read_policy - read the policy.
+ * @data: binary policy data
+ * @len: length of data in bytes
+ *
+ */
+int security_read_policy(void **data, size_t *len)
+{
+ struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state;
+ struct selinux_policy *policy;
+
+ policy = rcu_dereference_protected(
+ state->policy, lockdep_is_held(&state->policy_mutex));
+ if (!policy)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ *len = policy->policydb.len;
+ *data = vmalloc_user(*len);
+ if (!*data)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ return __security_read_policy(policy, *data, len);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_read_state_kernel - read the policy.
+ * @data: binary policy data
+ * @len: length of data in bytes
+ *
+ * Allocates kernel memory for reading SELinux policy.
+ * This function is for internal use only and should not
+ * be used for returning data to user space.
+ *
+ * This function must be called with policy_mutex held.
+ */
+int security_read_state_kernel(void **data, size_t *len)
+{
+ int err;
+ struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state;
+ struct selinux_policy *policy;
+
+ policy = rcu_dereference_protected(
+ state->policy, lockdep_is_held(&state->policy_mutex));
+ if (!policy)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ *len = policy->policydb.len;
+ *data = vmalloc(*len);
+ if (!*data)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ err = __security_read_policy(policy, *data, len);
+ if (err) {
+ vfree(*data);
+ *data = NULL;
+ *len = 0;
+ }
+ return err;
+}
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.h b/security/selinux/ss/services.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..d24b0a3d19
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.h
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * Implementation of the security services.
+ *
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
+ */
+#ifndef _SS_SERVICES_H_
+#define _SS_SERVICES_H_
+
+#include "policydb.h"
+
+/* Mapping for a single class */
+struct selinux_mapping {
+ u16 value; /* policy value for class */
+ u16 num_perms; /* number of permissions in class */
+ u32 perms[sizeof(u32) * 8]; /* policy values for permissions */
+};
+
+/* Map for all of the classes, with array size */
+struct selinux_map {
+ struct selinux_mapping *mapping; /* indexed by class */
+ u16 size; /* array size of mapping */
+};
+
+struct selinux_policy {
+ struct sidtab *sidtab;
+ struct policydb policydb;
+ struct selinux_map map;
+ u32 latest_granting;
+} __randomize_layout;
+
+struct convert_context_args {
+ struct policydb *oldp;
+ struct policydb *newp;
+};
+
+void services_compute_xperms_drivers(struct extended_perms *xperms,
+ struct avtab_node *node);
+void services_compute_xperms_decision(struct extended_perms_decision *xpermd,
+ struct avtab_node *node);
+
+int services_convert_context(struct convert_context_args *args,
+ struct context *oldc, struct context *newc,
+ gfp_t gfp_flags);
+
+#endif /* _SS_SERVICES_H_ */
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..d8ead463b8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c
@@ -0,0 +1,633 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Implementation of the SID table type.
+ *
+ * Original author: Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
+ * Author: Ondrej Mosnacek, <omosnacek@gmail.com>
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2018 Red Hat, Inc.
+ */
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/list.h>
+#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
+#include <asm/barrier.h>
+#include "flask.h"
+#include "security.h"
+#include "sidtab.h"
+#include "services.h"
+
+struct sidtab_str_cache {
+ struct rcu_head rcu_member;
+ struct list_head lru_member;
+ struct sidtab_entry *parent;
+ u32 len;
+ char str[];
+};
+
+#define index_to_sid(index) ((index) + SECINITSID_NUM + 1)
+#define sid_to_index(sid) ((sid) - (SECINITSID_NUM + 1))
+
+int sidtab_init(struct sidtab *s)
+{
+ u32 i;
+
+ memset(s->roots, 0, sizeof(s->roots));
+
+ for (i = 0; i < SECINITSID_NUM; i++)
+ s->isids[i].set = 0;
+
+ s->frozen = false;
+ s->count = 0;
+ s->convert = NULL;
+ hash_init(s->context_to_sid);
+
+ spin_lock_init(&s->lock);
+
+#if CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_SID2STR_CACHE_SIZE > 0
+ s->cache_free_slots = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_SID2STR_CACHE_SIZE;
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&s->cache_lru_list);
+ spin_lock_init(&s->cache_lock);
+#endif
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static u32 context_to_sid(struct sidtab *s, struct context *context, u32 hash)
+{
+ struct sidtab_entry *entry;
+ u32 sid = 0;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ hash_for_each_possible_rcu(s->context_to_sid, entry, list, hash) {
+ if (entry->hash != hash)
+ continue;
+ if (context_cmp(&entry->context, context)) {
+ sid = entry->sid;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return sid;
+}
+
+int sidtab_set_initial(struct sidtab *s, u32 sid, struct context *context)
+{
+ struct sidtab_isid_entry *isid;
+ u32 hash;
+ int rc;
+
+ if (sid == 0 || sid > SECINITSID_NUM)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ isid = &s->isids[sid - 1];
+
+ rc = context_cpy(&isid->entry.context, context);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+#if CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_SID2STR_CACHE_SIZE > 0
+ isid->entry.cache = NULL;
+#endif
+ isid->set = 1;
+
+ hash = context_compute_hash(context);
+
+ /*
+ * Multiple initial sids may map to the same context. Check that this
+ * context is not already represented in the context_to_sid hashtable
+ * to avoid duplicate entries and long linked lists upon hash
+ * collision.
+ */
+ if (!context_to_sid(s, context, hash)) {
+ isid->entry.sid = sid;
+ isid->entry.hash = hash;
+ hash_add(s->context_to_sid, &isid->entry.list, hash);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int sidtab_hash_stats(struct sidtab *sidtab, char *page)
+{
+ int i;
+ int chain_len = 0;
+ int slots_used = 0;
+ int entries = 0;
+ int max_chain_len = 0;
+ int cur_bucket = 0;
+ struct sidtab_entry *entry;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ hash_for_each_rcu(sidtab->context_to_sid, i, entry, list) {
+ entries++;
+ if (i == cur_bucket) {
+ chain_len++;
+ if (chain_len == 1)
+ slots_used++;
+ } else {
+ cur_bucket = i;
+ if (chain_len > max_chain_len)
+ max_chain_len = chain_len;
+ chain_len = 0;
+ }
+ }
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+
+ if (chain_len > max_chain_len)
+ max_chain_len = chain_len;
+
+ return scnprintf(page, PAGE_SIZE, "entries: %d\nbuckets used: %d/%d\n"
+ "longest chain: %d\n", entries,
+ slots_used, SIDTAB_HASH_BUCKETS, max_chain_len);
+}
+
+static u32 sidtab_level_from_count(u32 count)
+{
+ u32 capacity = SIDTAB_LEAF_ENTRIES;
+ u32 level = 0;
+
+ while (count > capacity) {
+ capacity <<= SIDTAB_INNER_SHIFT;
+ ++level;
+ }
+ return level;
+}
+
+static int sidtab_alloc_roots(struct sidtab *s, u32 level)
+{
+ u32 l;
+
+ if (!s->roots[0].ptr_leaf) {
+ s->roots[0].ptr_leaf = kzalloc(SIDTAB_NODE_ALLOC_SIZE,
+ GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!s->roots[0].ptr_leaf)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+ for (l = 1; l <= level; ++l)
+ if (!s->roots[l].ptr_inner) {
+ s->roots[l].ptr_inner = kzalloc(SIDTAB_NODE_ALLOC_SIZE,
+ GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!s->roots[l].ptr_inner)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ s->roots[l].ptr_inner->entries[0] = s->roots[l - 1];
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static struct sidtab_entry *sidtab_do_lookup(struct sidtab *s, u32 index,
+ int alloc)
+{
+ union sidtab_entry_inner *entry;
+ u32 level, capacity_shift, leaf_index = index / SIDTAB_LEAF_ENTRIES;
+
+ /* find the level of the subtree we need */
+ level = sidtab_level_from_count(index + 1);
+ capacity_shift = level * SIDTAB_INNER_SHIFT;
+
+ /* allocate roots if needed */
+ if (alloc && sidtab_alloc_roots(s, level) != 0)
+ return NULL;
+
+ /* lookup inside the subtree */
+ entry = &s->roots[level];
+ while (level != 0) {
+ capacity_shift -= SIDTAB_INNER_SHIFT;
+ --level;
+
+ entry = &entry->ptr_inner->entries[leaf_index >> capacity_shift];
+ leaf_index &= ((u32)1 << capacity_shift) - 1;
+
+ if (!entry->ptr_inner) {
+ if (alloc)
+ entry->ptr_inner = kzalloc(SIDTAB_NODE_ALLOC_SIZE,
+ GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!entry->ptr_inner)
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ }
+ if (!entry->ptr_leaf) {
+ if (alloc)
+ entry->ptr_leaf = kzalloc(SIDTAB_NODE_ALLOC_SIZE,
+ GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!entry->ptr_leaf)
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ return &entry->ptr_leaf->entries[index % SIDTAB_LEAF_ENTRIES];
+}
+
+static struct sidtab_entry *sidtab_lookup(struct sidtab *s, u32 index)
+{
+ /* read entries only after reading count */
+ u32 count = smp_load_acquire(&s->count);
+
+ if (index >= count)
+ return NULL;
+
+ return sidtab_do_lookup(s, index, 0);
+}
+
+static struct sidtab_entry *sidtab_lookup_initial(struct sidtab *s, u32 sid)
+{
+ return s->isids[sid - 1].set ? &s->isids[sid - 1].entry : NULL;
+}
+
+static struct sidtab_entry *sidtab_search_core(struct sidtab *s, u32 sid,
+ int force)
+{
+ if (sid != 0) {
+ struct sidtab_entry *entry;
+
+ if (sid > SECINITSID_NUM)
+ entry = sidtab_lookup(s, sid_to_index(sid));
+ else
+ entry = sidtab_lookup_initial(s, sid);
+ if (entry && (!entry->context.len || force))
+ return entry;
+ }
+
+ return sidtab_lookup_initial(s, SECINITSID_UNLABELED);
+}
+
+struct sidtab_entry *sidtab_search_entry(struct sidtab *s, u32 sid)
+{
+ return sidtab_search_core(s, sid, 0);
+}
+
+struct sidtab_entry *sidtab_search_entry_force(struct sidtab *s, u32 sid)
+{
+ return sidtab_search_core(s, sid, 1);
+}
+
+int sidtab_context_to_sid(struct sidtab *s, struct context *context,
+ u32 *sid)
+{
+ unsigned long flags;
+ u32 count, hash = context_compute_hash(context);
+ struct sidtab_convert_params *convert;
+ struct sidtab_entry *dst, *dst_convert;
+ int rc;
+
+ *sid = context_to_sid(s, context, hash);
+ if (*sid)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* lock-free search failed: lock, re-search, and insert if not found */
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&s->lock, flags);
+
+ rc = 0;
+ *sid = context_to_sid(s, context, hash);
+ if (*sid)
+ goto out_unlock;
+
+ if (unlikely(s->frozen)) {
+ /*
+ * This sidtab is now frozen - tell the caller to abort and
+ * get the new one.
+ */
+ rc = -ESTALE;
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
+
+ count = s->count;
+
+ /* bail out if we already reached max entries */
+ rc = -EOVERFLOW;
+ if (count >= SIDTAB_MAX)
+ goto out_unlock;
+
+ /* insert context into new entry */
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ dst = sidtab_do_lookup(s, count, 1);
+ if (!dst)
+ goto out_unlock;
+
+ dst->sid = index_to_sid(count);
+ dst->hash = hash;
+
+ rc = context_cpy(&dst->context, context);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out_unlock;
+
+ /*
+ * if we are building a new sidtab, we need to convert the context
+ * and insert it there as well
+ */
+ convert = s->convert;
+ if (convert) {
+ struct sidtab *target = convert->target;
+
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ dst_convert = sidtab_do_lookup(target, count, 1);
+ if (!dst_convert) {
+ context_destroy(&dst->context);
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
+
+ rc = services_convert_context(convert->args,
+ context, &dst_convert->context,
+ GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (rc) {
+ context_destroy(&dst->context);
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
+ dst_convert->sid = index_to_sid(count);
+ dst_convert->hash = context_compute_hash(&dst_convert->context);
+ target->count = count + 1;
+
+ hash_add_rcu(target->context_to_sid,
+ &dst_convert->list, dst_convert->hash);
+ }
+
+ if (context->len)
+ pr_info("SELinux: Context %s is not valid (left unmapped).\n",
+ context->str);
+
+ *sid = index_to_sid(count);
+
+ /* write entries before updating count */
+ smp_store_release(&s->count, count + 1);
+ hash_add_rcu(s->context_to_sid, &dst->list, dst->hash);
+
+ rc = 0;
+out_unlock:
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&s->lock, flags);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static void sidtab_convert_hashtable(struct sidtab *s, u32 count)
+{
+ struct sidtab_entry *entry;
+ u32 i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
+ entry = sidtab_do_lookup(s, i, 0);
+ entry->sid = index_to_sid(i);
+ entry->hash = context_compute_hash(&entry->context);
+
+ hash_add_rcu(s->context_to_sid, &entry->list, entry->hash);
+ }
+}
+
+static int sidtab_convert_tree(union sidtab_entry_inner *edst,
+ union sidtab_entry_inner *esrc,
+ u32 *pos, u32 count, u32 level,
+ struct sidtab_convert_params *convert)
+{
+ int rc;
+ u32 i;
+
+ if (level != 0) {
+ if (!edst->ptr_inner) {
+ edst->ptr_inner = kzalloc(SIDTAB_NODE_ALLOC_SIZE,
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!edst->ptr_inner)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+ i = 0;
+ while (i < SIDTAB_INNER_ENTRIES && *pos < count) {
+ rc = sidtab_convert_tree(&edst->ptr_inner->entries[i],
+ &esrc->ptr_inner->entries[i],
+ pos, count, level - 1,
+ convert);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ i++;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (!edst->ptr_leaf) {
+ edst->ptr_leaf = kzalloc(SIDTAB_NODE_ALLOC_SIZE,
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!edst->ptr_leaf)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+ i = 0;
+ while (i < SIDTAB_LEAF_ENTRIES && *pos < count) {
+ rc = services_convert_context(convert->args,
+ &esrc->ptr_leaf->entries[i].context,
+ &edst->ptr_leaf->entries[i].context,
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ (*pos)++;
+ i++;
+ }
+ cond_resched();
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int sidtab_convert(struct sidtab *s, struct sidtab_convert_params *params)
+{
+ unsigned long flags;
+ u32 count, level, pos;
+ int rc;
+
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&s->lock, flags);
+
+ /* concurrent policy loads are not allowed */
+ if (s->convert) {
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&s->lock, flags);
+ return -EBUSY;
+ }
+
+ count = s->count;
+ level = sidtab_level_from_count(count);
+
+ /* allocate last leaf in the new sidtab (to avoid race with
+ * live convert)
+ */
+ rc = sidtab_do_lookup(params->target, count - 1, 1) ? 0 : -ENOMEM;
+ if (rc) {
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&s->lock, flags);
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ /* set count in case no new entries are added during conversion */
+ params->target->count = count;
+
+ /* enable live convert of new entries */
+ s->convert = params;
+
+ /* we can safely convert the tree outside the lock */
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&s->lock, flags);
+
+ pr_info("SELinux: Converting %u SID table entries...\n", count);
+
+ /* convert all entries not covered by live convert */
+ pos = 0;
+ rc = sidtab_convert_tree(&params->target->roots[level],
+ &s->roots[level], &pos, count, level, params);
+ if (rc) {
+ /* we need to keep the old table - disable live convert */
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&s->lock, flags);
+ s->convert = NULL;
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&s->lock, flags);
+ return rc;
+ }
+ /*
+ * The hashtable can also be modified in sidtab_context_to_sid()
+ * so we must re-acquire the lock here.
+ */
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&s->lock, flags);
+ sidtab_convert_hashtable(params->target, count);
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&s->lock, flags);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void sidtab_cancel_convert(struct sidtab *s)
+{
+ unsigned long flags;
+
+ /* cancelling policy load - disable live convert of sidtab */
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&s->lock, flags);
+ s->convert = NULL;
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&s->lock, flags);
+}
+
+void sidtab_freeze_begin(struct sidtab *s, unsigned long *flags) __acquires(&s->lock)
+{
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&s->lock, *flags);
+ s->frozen = true;
+ s->convert = NULL;
+}
+void sidtab_freeze_end(struct sidtab *s, unsigned long *flags) __releases(&s->lock)
+{
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&s->lock, *flags);
+}
+
+static void sidtab_destroy_entry(struct sidtab_entry *entry)
+{
+ context_destroy(&entry->context);
+#if CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_SID2STR_CACHE_SIZE > 0
+ kfree(rcu_dereference_raw(entry->cache));
+#endif
+}
+
+static void sidtab_destroy_tree(union sidtab_entry_inner entry, u32 level)
+{
+ u32 i;
+
+ if (level != 0) {
+ struct sidtab_node_inner *node = entry.ptr_inner;
+
+ if (!node)
+ return;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < SIDTAB_INNER_ENTRIES; i++)
+ sidtab_destroy_tree(node->entries[i], level - 1);
+ kfree(node);
+ } else {
+ struct sidtab_node_leaf *node = entry.ptr_leaf;
+
+ if (!node)
+ return;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < SIDTAB_LEAF_ENTRIES; i++)
+ sidtab_destroy_entry(&node->entries[i]);
+ kfree(node);
+ }
+}
+
+void sidtab_destroy(struct sidtab *s)
+{
+ u32 i, level;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < SECINITSID_NUM; i++)
+ if (s->isids[i].set)
+ sidtab_destroy_entry(&s->isids[i].entry);
+
+ level = SIDTAB_MAX_LEVEL;
+ while (level && !s->roots[level].ptr_inner)
+ --level;
+
+ sidtab_destroy_tree(s->roots[level], level);
+ /*
+ * The context_to_sid hashtable's objects are all shared
+ * with the isids array and context tree, and so don't need
+ * to be cleaned up here.
+ */
+}
+
+#if CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_SID2STR_CACHE_SIZE > 0
+
+void sidtab_sid2str_put(struct sidtab *s, struct sidtab_entry *entry,
+ const char *str, u32 str_len)
+{
+ struct sidtab_str_cache *cache, *victim = NULL;
+ unsigned long flags;
+
+ /* do not cache invalid contexts */
+ if (entry->context.len)
+ return;
+
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&s->cache_lock, flags);
+
+ cache = rcu_dereference_protected(entry->cache,
+ lockdep_is_held(&s->cache_lock));
+ if (cache) {
+ /* entry in cache - just bump to the head of LRU list */
+ list_move(&cache->lru_member, &s->cache_lru_list);
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
+
+ cache = kmalloc(struct_size(cache, str, str_len), GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!cache)
+ goto out_unlock;
+
+ if (s->cache_free_slots == 0) {
+ /* pop a cache entry from the tail and free it */
+ victim = container_of(s->cache_lru_list.prev,
+ struct sidtab_str_cache, lru_member);
+ list_del(&victim->lru_member);
+ rcu_assign_pointer(victim->parent->cache, NULL);
+ } else {
+ s->cache_free_slots--;
+ }
+ cache->parent = entry;
+ cache->len = str_len;
+ memcpy(cache->str, str, str_len);
+ list_add(&cache->lru_member, &s->cache_lru_list);
+
+ rcu_assign_pointer(entry->cache, cache);
+
+out_unlock:
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&s->cache_lock, flags);
+ kfree_rcu(victim, rcu_member);
+}
+
+int sidtab_sid2str_get(struct sidtab *s, struct sidtab_entry *entry,
+ char **out, u32 *out_len)
+{
+ struct sidtab_str_cache *cache;
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ if (entry->context.len)
+ return -ENOENT; /* do not cache invalid contexts */
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+
+ cache = rcu_dereference(entry->cache);
+ if (!cache) {
+ rc = -ENOENT;
+ } else {
+ *out_len = cache->len;
+ if (out) {
+ *out = kmemdup(cache->str, cache->len, GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!*out)
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ }
+ }
+
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+
+ if (!rc && out)
+ sidtab_sid2str_put(s, entry, *out, *out_len);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_SID2STR_CACHE_SIZE > 0 */
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.h b/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..22258201cd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.h
@@ -0,0 +1,158 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * A security identifier table (sidtab) is a lookup table
+ * of security context structures indexed by SID value.
+ *
+ * Original author: Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
+ * Author: Ondrej Mosnacek, <omosnacek@gmail.com>
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2018 Red Hat, Inc.
+ */
+#ifndef _SS_SIDTAB_H_
+#define _SS_SIDTAB_H_
+
+#include <linux/spinlock_types.h>
+#include <linux/log2.h>
+#include <linux/hashtable.h>
+
+#include "context.h"
+
+struct sidtab_entry {
+ u32 sid;
+ u32 hash;
+ struct context context;
+#if CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_SID2STR_CACHE_SIZE > 0
+ struct sidtab_str_cache __rcu *cache;
+#endif
+ struct hlist_node list;
+};
+
+union sidtab_entry_inner {
+ struct sidtab_node_inner *ptr_inner;
+ struct sidtab_node_leaf *ptr_leaf;
+};
+
+/* align node size to page boundary */
+#define SIDTAB_NODE_ALLOC_SHIFT PAGE_SHIFT
+#define SIDTAB_NODE_ALLOC_SIZE PAGE_SIZE
+
+#define size_to_shift(size) ((size) == 1 ? 1 : (const_ilog2((size) - 1) + 1))
+
+#define SIDTAB_INNER_SHIFT \
+ (SIDTAB_NODE_ALLOC_SHIFT - size_to_shift(sizeof(union sidtab_entry_inner)))
+#define SIDTAB_INNER_ENTRIES ((size_t)1 << SIDTAB_INNER_SHIFT)
+#define SIDTAB_LEAF_ENTRIES \
+ (SIDTAB_NODE_ALLOC_SIZE / sizeof(struct sidtab_entry))
+
+#define SIDTAB_MAX_BITS 32
+#define SIDTAB_MAX U32_MAX
+/* ensure enough tree levels for SIDTAB_MAX entries */
+#define SIDTAB_MAX_LEVEL \
+ DIV_ROUND_UP(SIDTAB_MAX_BITS - size_to_shift(SIDTAB_LEAF_ENTRIES), \
+ SIDTAB_INNER_SHIFT)
+
+struct sidtab_node_leaf {
+ struct sidtab_entry entries[SIDTAB_LEAF_ENTRIES];
+};
+
+struct sidtab_node_inner {
+ union sidtab_entry_inner entries[SIDTAB_INNER_ENTRIES];
+};
+
+struct sidtab_isid_entry {
+ int set;
+ struct sidtab_entry entry;
+};
+
+struct sidtab_convert_params {
+ struct convert_context_args *args;
+ struct sidtab *target;
+};
+
+#define SIDTAB_HASH_BITS CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_SIDTAB_HASH_BITS
+#define SIDTAB_HASH_BUCKETS (1 << SIDTAB_HASH_BITS)
+
+struct sidtab {
+ /*
+ * lock-free read access only for as many items as a prior read of
+ * 'count'
+ */
+ union sidtab_entry_inner roots[SIDTAB_MAX_LEVEL + 1];
+ /*
+ * access atomically via {READ|WRITE}_ONCE(); only increment under
+ * spinlock
+ */
+ u32 count;
+ /* access only under spinlock */
+ struct sidtab_convert_params *convert;
+ bool frozen;
+ spinlock_t lock;
+
+#if CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_SID2STR_CACHE_SIZE > 0
+ /* SID -> context string cache */
+ u32 cache_free_slots;
+ struct list_head cache_lru_list;
+ spinlock_t cache_lock;
+#endif
+
+ /* index == SID - 1 (no entry for SECSID_NULL) */
+ struct sidtab_isid_entry isids[SECINITSID_NUM];
+
+ /* Hash table for fast reverse context-to-sid lookups. */
+ DECLARE_HASHTABLE(context_to_sid, SIDTAB_HASH_BITS);
+};
+
+int sidtab_init(struct sidtab *s);
+int sidtab_set_initial(struct sidtab *s, u32 sid, struct context *context);
+struct sidtab_entry *sidtab_search_entry(struct sidtab *s, u32 sid);
+struct sidtab_entry *sidtab_search_entry_force(struct sidtab *s, u32 sid);
+
+static inline struct context *sidtab_search(struct sidtab *s, u32 sid)
+{
+ struct sidtab_entry *entry = sidtab_search_entry(s, sid);
+
+ return entry ? &entry->context : NULL;
+}
+
+static inline struct context *sidtab_search_force(struct sidtab *s, u32 sid)
+{
+ struct sidtab_entry *entry = sidtab_search_entry_force(s, sid);
+
+ return entry ? &entry->context : NULL;
+}
+
+int sidtab_convert(struct sidtab *s, struct sidtab_convert_params *params);
+
+void sidtab_cancel_convert(struct sidtab *s);
+
+void sidtab_freeze_begin(struct sidtab *s, unsigned long *flags) __acquires(&s->lock);
+void sidtab_freeze_end(struct sidtab *s, unsigned long *flags) __releases(&s->lock);
+
+int sidtab_context_to_sid(struct sidtab *s, struct context *context, u32 *sid);
+
+void sidtab_destroy(struct sidtab *s);
+
+int sidtab_hash_stats(struct sidtab *sidtab, char *page);
+
+#if CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_SID2STR_CACHE_SIZE > 0
+void sidtab_sid2str_put(struct sidtab *s, struct sidtab_entry *entry,
+ const char *str, u32 str_len);
+int sidtab_sid2str_get(struct sidtab *s, struct sidtab_entry *entry,
+ char **out, u32 *out_len);
+#else
+static inline void sidtab_sid2str_put(struct sidtab *s,
+ struct sidtab_entry *entry,
+ const char *str, u32 str_len)
+{
+}
+static inline int sidtab_sid2str_get(struct sidtab *s,
+ struct sidtab_entry *entry,
+ char **out, u32 *out_len)
+{
+ return -ENOENT;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_SID2STR_CACHE_SIZE > 0 */
+
+#endif /* _SS_SIDTAB_H_ */
+
+
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/symtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/symtab.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..43d7f0319c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/symtab.c
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Implementation of the symbol table type.
+ *
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
+ */
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include "symtab.h"
+
+static unsigned int symhash(const void *key)
+{
+ const char *p, *keyp;
+ unsigned int size;
+ unsigned int val;
+
+ val = 0;
+ keyp = key;
+ size = strlen(keyp);
+ for (p = keyp; (p - keyp) < size; p++)
+ val = (val << 4 | (val >> (8*sizeof(unsigned int)-4))) ^ (*p);
+ return val;
+}
+
+static int symcmp(const void *key1, const void *key2)
+{
+ const char *keyp1, *keyp2;
+
+ keyp1 = key1;
+ keyp2 = key2;
+ return strcmp(keyp1, keyp2);
+}
+
+static const struct hashtab_key_params symtab_key_params = {
+ .hash = symhash,
+ .cmp = symcmp,
+};
+
+int symtab_init(struct symtab *s, u32 size)
+{
+ s->nprim = 0;
+ return hashtab_init(&s->table, size);
+}
+
+int symtab_insert(struct symtab *s, char *name, void *datum)
+{
+ return hashtab_insert(&s->table, name, datum, symtab_key_params);
+}
+
+void *symtab_search(struct symtab *s, const char *name)
+{
+ return hashtab_search(&s->table, name, symtab_key_params);
+}
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/symtab.h b/security/selinux/ss/symtab.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0a3b5de79a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/symtab.h
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * A symbol table (symtab) maintains associations between symbol
+ * strings and datum values. The type of the datum values
+ * is arbitrary. The symbol table type is implemented
+ * using the hash table type (hashtab).
+ *
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
+ */
+#ifndef _SS_SYMTAB_H_
+#define _SS_SYMTAB_H_
+
+#include "hashtab.h"
+
+struct symtab {
+ struct hashtab table; /* hash table (keyed on a string) */
+ u32 nprim; /* number of primary names in table */
+};
+
+int symtab_init(struct symtab *s, u32 size);
+
+int symtab_insert(struct symtab *s, char *name, void *datum);
+void *symtab_search(struct symtab *s, const char *name);
+
+#endif /* _SS_SYMTAB_H_ */
+
+
diff --git a/security/selinux/status.c b/security/selinux/status.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..dffca22ce6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/status.c
@@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * mmap based event notifications for SELinux
+ *
+ * Author: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com>
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2010 NEC corporation
+ */
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/gfp.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/mutex.h>
+#include "avc.h"
+#include "security.h"
+
+/*
+ * The selinux_status_page shall be exposed to userspace applications
+ * using mmap interface on /selinux/status.
+ * It enables to notify applications a few events that will cause reset
+ * of userspace access vector without context switching.
+ *
+ * The selinux_kernel_status structure on the head of status page is
+ * protected from concurrent accesses using seqlock logic, so userspace
+ * application should reference the status page according to the seqlock
+ * logic.
+ *
+ * Typically, application checks status->sequence at the head of access
+ * control routine. If it is odd-number, kernel is updating the status,
+ * so please wait for a moment. If it is changed from the last sequence
+ * number, it means something happen, so application will reset userspace
+ * avc, if needed.
+ * In most cases, application shall confirm the kernel status is not
+ * changed without any system call invocations.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * selinux_kernel_status_page
+ *
+ * It returns a reference to selinux_status_page. If the status page is
+ * not allocated yet, it also tries to allocate it at the first time.
+ */
+struct page *selinux_kernel_status_page(void)
+{
+ struct selinux_kernel_status *status;
+ struct page *result = NULL;
+
+ mutex_lock(&selinux_state.status_lock);
+ if (!selinux_state.status_page) {
+ selinux_state.status_page = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_ZERO);
+
+ if (selinux_state.status_page) {
+ status = page_address(selinux_state.status_page);
+
+ status->version = SELINUX_KERNEL_STATUS_VERSION;
+ status->sequence = 0;
+ status->enforcing = enforcing_enabled();
+ /*
+ * NOTE: the next policyload event shall set
+ * a positive value on the status->policyload,
+ * although it may not be 1, but never zero.
+ * So, application can know it was updated.
+ */
+ status->policyload = 0;
+ status->deny_unknown =
+ !security_get_allow_unknown();
+ }
+ }
+ result = selinux_state.status_page;
+ mutex_unlock(&selinux_state.status_lock);
+
+ return result;
+}
+
+/*
+ * selinux_status_update_setenforce
+ *
+ * It updates status of the current enforcing/permissive mode.
+ */
+void selinux_status_update_setenforce(bool enforcing)
+{
+ struct selinux_kernel_status *status;
+
+ mutex_lock(&selinux_state.status_lock);
+ if (selinux_state.status_page) {
+ status = page_address(selinux_state.status_page);
+
+ status->sequence++;
+ smp_wmb();
+
+ status->enforcing = enforcing ? 1 : 0;
+
+ smp_wmb();
+ status->sequence++;
+ }
+ mutex_unlock(&selinux_state.status_lock);
+}
+
+/*
+ * selinux_status_update_policyload
+ *
+ * It updates status of the times of policy reloaded, and current
+ * setting of deny_unknown.
+ */
+void selinux_status_update_policyload(u32 seqno)
+{
+ struct selinux_kernel_status *status;
+
+ mutex_lock(&selinux_state.status_lock);
+ if (selinux_state.status_page) {
+ status = page_address(selinux_state.status_page);
+
+ status->sequence++;
+ smp_wmb();
+
+ status->policyload = seqno;
+ status->deny_unknown = !security_get_allow_unknown();
+
+ smp_wmb();
+ status->sequence++;
+ }
+ mutex_unlock(&selinux_state.status_lock);
+}
diff --git a/security/selinux/xfrm.c b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..95fcd2d343
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
@@ -0,0 +1,469 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
+ *
+ * This file contains the SELinux XFRM hook function implementations.
+ *
+ * Authors: Serge Hallyn <sergeh@us.ibm.com>
+ * Trent Jaeger <jaegert@us.ibm.com>
+ *
+ * Updated: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
+ *
+ * Granular IPSec Associations for use in MLS environments.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2005 International Business Machines Corporation
+ * Copyright (C) 2006 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * USAGE:
+ * NOTES:
+ * 1. Make sure to enable the following options in your kernel config:
+ * CONFIG_SECURITY=y
+ * CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK=y
+ * CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM=y
+ * CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX=m/y
+ * ISSUES:
+ * 1. Caching packets, so they are not dropped during negotiation
+ * 2. Emulating a reasonable SO_PEERSEC across machines
+ * 3. Testing addition of sk_policy's with security context via setsockopt
+ */
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/ip.h>
+#include <linux/tcp.h>
+#include <linux/skbuff.h>
+#include <linux/xfrm.h>
+#include <net/xfrm.h>
+#include <net/checksum.h>
+#include <net/udp.h>
+#include <linux/atomic.h>
+
+#include "avc.h"
+#include "objsec.h"
+#include "xfrm.h"
+
+/* Labeled XFRM instance counter */
+atomic_t selinux_xfrm_refcount __read_mostly = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
+
+/*
+ * Returns true if the context is an LSM/SELinux context.
+ */
+static inline int selinux_authorizable_ctx(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx)
+{
+ return (ctx &&
+ (ctx->ctx_doi == XFRM_SC_DOI_LSM) &&
+ (ctx->ctx_alg == XFRM_SC_ALG_SELINUX));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns true if the xfrm contains a security blob for SELinux.
+ */
+static inline int selinux_authorizable_xfrm(struct xfrm_state *x)
+{
+ return selinux_authorizable_ctx(x->security);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Allocates a xfrm_sec_state and populates it using the supplied security
+ * xfrm_user_sec_ctx context.
+ */
+static int selinux_xfrm_alloc_user(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp,
+ struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx,
+ gfp_t gfp)
+{
+ int rc;
+ const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
+ struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = NULL;
+ u32 str_len;
+
+ if (ctxp == NULL || uctx == NULL ||
+ uctx->ctx_doi != XFRM_SC_DOI_LSM ||
+ uctx->ctx_alg != XFRM_SC_ALG_SELINUX)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ str_len = uctx->ctx_len;
+ if (str_len >= PAGE_SIZE)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ ctx = kmalloc(struct_size(ctx, ctx_str, str_len + 1), gfp);
+ if (!ctx)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ ctx->ctx_doi = XFRM_SC_DOI_LSM;
+ ctx->ctx_alg = XFRM_SC_ALG_SELINUX;
+ ctx->ctx_len = str_len;
+ memcpy(ctx->ctx_str, &uctx[1], str_len);
+ ctx->ctx_str[str_len] = '\0';
+ rc = security_context_to_sid(ctx->ctx_str, str_len,
+ &ctx->ctx_sid, gfp);
+ if (rc)
+ goto err;
+
+ rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ctx->ctx_sid,
+ SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__SETCONTEXT, NULL);
+ if (rc)
+ goto err;
+
+ *ctxp = ctx;
+ atomic_inc(&selinux_xfrm_refcount);
+ return 0;
+
+err:
+ kfree(ctx);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Free the xfrm_sec_ctx structure.
+ */
+static void selinux_xfrm_free(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx)
+{
+ if (!ctx)
+ return;
+
+ atomic_dec(&selinux_xfrm_refcount);
+ kfree(ctx);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Authorize the deletion of a labeled SA or policy rule.
+ */
+static int selinux_xfrm_delete(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx)
+{
+ const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
+
+ if (!ctx)
+ return 0;
+
+ return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ctx->ctx_sid,
+ SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__SETCONTEXT,
+ NULL);
+}
+
+/*
+ * LSM hook implementation that authorizes that a flow can use a xfrm policy
+ * rule.
+ */
+int selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx, u32 fl_secid)
+{
+ int rc;
+
+ /* All flows should be treated as polmatch'ing an otherwise applicable
+ * "non-labeled" policy. This would prevent inadvertent "leaks". */
+ if (!ctx)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Context sid is either set to label or ANY_ASSOC */
+ if (!selinux_authorizable_ctx(ctx))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ rc = avc_has_perm(fl_secid, ctx->ctx_sid,
+ SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__POLMATCH, NULL);
+ return (rc == -EACCES ? -ESRCH : rc);
+}
+
+/*
+ * LSM hook implementation that authorizes that a state matches
+ * the given policy, flow combo.
+ */
+int selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x,
+ struct xfrm_policy *xp,
+ const struct flowi_common *flic)
+{
+ u32 state_sid;
+ u32 flic_sid;
+
+ if (!xp->security)
+ if (x->security)
+ /* unlabeled policy and labeled SA can't match */
+ return 0;
+ else
+ /* unlabeled policy and unlabeled SA match all flows */
+ return 1;
+ else
+ if (!x->security)
+ /* unlabeled SA and labeled policy can't match */
+ return 0;
+ else
+ if (!selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x))
+ /* Not a SELinux-labeled SA */
+ return 0;
+
+ state_sid = x->security->ctx_sid;
+ flic_sid = flic->flowic_secid;
+
+ if (flic_sid != state_sid)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* We don't need a separate SA Vs. policy polmatch check since the SA
+ * is now of the same label as the flow and a flow Vs. policy polmatch
+ * check had already happened in selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup() above. */
+ return (avc_has_perm(flic_sid, state_sid,
+ SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__SENDTO,
+ NULL) ? 0 : 1);
+}
+
+static u32 selinux_xfrm_skb_sid_egress(struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ struct dst_entry *dst = skb_dst(skb);
+ struct xfrm_state *x;
+
+ if (dst == NULL)
+ return SECSID_NULL;
+ x = dst->xfrm;
+ if (x == NULL || !selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x))
+ return SECSID_NULL;
+
+ return x->security->ctx_sid;
+}
+
+static int selinux_xfrm_skb_sid_ingress(struct sk_buff *skb,
+ u32 *sid, int ckall)
+{
+ u32 sid_session = SECSID_NULL;
+ struct sec_path *sp = skb_sec_path(skb);
+
+ if (sp) {
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = sp->len - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
+ struct xfrm_state *x = sp->xvec[i];
+ if (selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x)) {
+ struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = x->security;
+
+ if (sid_session == SECSID_NULL) {
+ sid_session = ctx->ctx_sid;
+ if (!ckall)
+ goto out;
+ } else if (sid_session != ctx->ctx_sid) {
+ *sid = SECSID_NULL;
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+out:
+ *sid = sid_session;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * LSM hook implementation that checks and/or returns the xfrm sid for the
+ * incoming packet.
+ */
+int selinux_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid, int ckall)
+{
+ if (skb == NULL) {
+ *sid = SECSID_NULL;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return selinux_xfrm_skb_sid_ingress(skb, sid, ckall);
+}
+
+int selinux_xfrm_skb_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid)
+{
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = selinux_xfrm_skb_sid_ingress(skb, sid, 0);
+ if (rc == 0 && *sid == SECSID_NULL)
+ *sid = selinux_xfrm_skb_sid_egress(skb);
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * LSM hook implementation that allocs and transfers uctx spec to xfrm_policy.
+ */
+int selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp,
+ struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx,
+ gfp_t gfp)
+{
+ return selinux_xfrm_alloc_user(ctxp, uctx, gfp);
+}
+
+/*
+ * LSM hook implementation that copies security data structure from old to new
+ * for policy cloning.
+ */
+int selinux_xfrm_policy_clone(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *old_ctx,
+ struct xfrm_sec_ctx **new_ctxp)
+{
+ struct xfrm_sec_ctx *new_ctx;
+
+ if (!old_ctx)
+ return 0;
+
+ new_ctx = kmemdup(old_ctx, sizeof(*old_ctx) + old_ctx->ctx_len,
+ GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!new_ctx)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ atomic_inc(&selinux_xfrm_refcount);
+ *new_ctxp = new_ctx;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * LSM hook implementation that frees xfrm_sec_ctx security information.
+ */
+void selinux_xfrm_policy_free(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx)
+{
+ selinux_xfrm_free(ctx);
+}
+
+/*
+ * LSM hook implementation that authorizes deletion of labeled policies.
+ */
+int selinux_xfrm_policy_delete(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx)
+{
+ return selinux_xfrm_delete(ctx);
+}
+
+/*
+ * LSM hook implementation that allocates a xfrm_sec_state, populates it using
+ * the supplied security context, and assigns it to the xfrm_state.
+ */
+int selinux_xfrm_state_alloc(struct xfrm_state *x,
+ struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx)
+{
+ return selinux_xfrm_alloc_user(&x->security, uctx, GFP_KERNEL);
+}
+
+/*
+ * LSM hook implementation that allocates a xfrm_sec_state and populates based
+ * on a secid.
+ */
+int selinux_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire(struct xfrm_state *x,
+ struct xfrm_sec_ctx *polsec, u32 secid)
+{
+ int rc;
+ struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx;
+ char *ctx_str = NULL;
+ u32 str_len;
+
+ if (!polsec)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (secid == 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ rc = security_sid_to_context(secid, &ctx_str,
+ &str_len);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ ctx = kmalloc(struct_size(ctx, ctx_str, str_len), GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!ctx) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ ctx->ctx_doi = XFRM_SC_DOI_LSM;
+ ctx->ctx_alg = XFRM_SC_ALG_SELINUX;
+ ctx->ctx_sid = secid;
+ ctx->ctx_len = str_len;
+ memcpy(ctx->ctx_str, ctx_str, str_len);
+
+ x->security = ctx;
+ atomic_inc(&selinux_xfrm_refcount);
+out:
+ kfree(ctx_str);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * LSM hook implementation that frees xfrm_state security information.
+ */
+void selinux_xfrm_state_free(struct xfrm_state *x)
+{
+ selinux_xfrm_free(x->security);
+}
+
+/*
+ * LSM hook implementation that authorizes deletion of labeled SAs.
+ */
+int selinux_xfrm_state_delete(struct xfrm_state *x)
+{
+ return selinux_xfrm_delete(x->security);
+}
+
+/*
+ * LSM hook that controls access to unlabelled packets. If
+ * a xfrm_state is authorizable (defined by macro) then it was
+ * already authorized by the IPSec process. If not, then
+ * we need to check for unlabelled access since this may not have
+ * gone thru the IPSec process.
+ */
+int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 sk_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
+ struct common_audit_data *ad)
+{
+ int i;
+ struct sec_path *sp = skb_sec_path(skb);
+ u32 peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+
+ if (sp) {
+ for (i = 0; i < sp->len; i++) {
+ struct xfrm_state *x = sp->xvec[i];
+
+ if (x && selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x)) {
+ struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = x->security;
+ peer_sid = ctx->ctx_sid;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* This check even when there's no association involved is intended,
+ * according to Trent Jaeger, to make sure a process can't engage in
+ * non-IPsec communication unless explicitly allowed by policy. */
+ return avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid,
+ SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__RECVFROM, ad);
+}
+
+/*
+ * POSTROUTE_LAST hook's XFRM processing:
+ * If we have no security association, then we need to determine
+ * whether the socket is allowed to send to an unlabelled destination.
+ * If we do have a authorizable security association, then it has already been
+ * checked in the selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match hook above.
+ */
+int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 sk_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
+ struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 proto)
+{
+ struct dst_entry *dst;
+
+ switch (proto) {
+ case IPPROTO_AH:
+ case IPPROTO_ESP:
+ case IPPROTO_COMP:
+ /* We should have already seen this packet once before it
+ * underwent xfrm(s). No need to subject it to the unlabeled
+ * check. */
+ return 0;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ dst = skb_dst(skb);
+ if (dst) {
+ struct dst_entry *iter;
+
+ for (iter = dst; iter != NULL; iter = xfrm_dst_child(iter)) {
+ struct xfrm_state *x = iter->xfrm;
+
+ if (x && selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x))
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* This check even when there's no association involved is intended,
+ * according to Trent Jaeger, to make sure a process can't engage in
+ * non-IPsec communication unless explicitly allowed by policy. */
+ return avc_has_perm(sk_sid, SECINITSID_UNLABELED,
+ SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__SENDTO, ad);
+}