diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86/boot')
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/boot/Makefile | 18 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile | 11 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c | 197 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/boot/printf.c | 3 |
4 files changed, 100 insertions, 129 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/Makefile b/arch/x86/boot/Makefile index 3cece19b74..9cc0ff6e90 100644 --- a/arch/x86/boot/Makefile +++ b/arch/x86/boot/Makefile @@ -9,19 +9,6 @@ # Changed by many, many contributors over the years. # -# Sanitizer runtimes are unavailable and cannot be linked for early boot code. -KASAN_SANITIZE := n -KCSAN_SANITIZE := n -KMSAN_SANITIZE := n -OBJECT_FILES_NON_STANDARD := y - -# Kernel does not boot with kcov instrumentation here. -# One of the problems observed was insertion of __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc() -# callback into middle of per-cpu data enabling code. Thus the callback observed -# inconsistent state and crashed. We are interested mostly in syscall coverage, -# so boot code is not interesting anyway. -KCOV_INSTRUMENT := n - # If you want to preset the SVGA mode, uncomment the next line and # set SVGA_MODE to whatever number you want. # Set it to -DSVGA_MODE=NORMAL_VGA if you just want the EGA/VGA mode. @@ -69,8 +56,7 @@ KBUILD_CFLAGS := $(REALMODE_CFLAGS) -D_SETUP KBUILD_AFLAGS := $(KBUILD_CFLAGS) -D__ASSEMBLY__ KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-option,-fmacro-prefix-map=$(srctree)/=) KBUILD_CFLAGS += -fno-asynchronous-unwind-tables -GCOV_PROFILE := n -UBSAN_SANITIZE := n +KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(CONFIG_CC_IMPLICIT_FALLTHROUGH) $(obj)/bzImage: asflags-y := $(SVGA_MODE) @@ -129,7 +115,7 @@ targets += mtools.conf # genimage.sh requires bash, but it also has a bunch of other # external dependencies. quiet_cmd_genimage = GENIMAGE $3 -cmd_genimage = $(BASH) $(srctree)/$(src)/genimage.sh $2 $3 $(obj)/bzImage \ + cmd_genimage = $(BASH) $(src)/genimage.sh $2 $3 $(obj)/bzImage \ $(obj)/mtools.conf '$(FDARGS)' $(FDINITRD) PHONY += bzdisk fdimage fdimage144 fdimage288 hdimage isoimage diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile index 8da3466775..f2051644de 100644 --- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile +++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile @@ -17,15 +17,6 @@ # (see scripts/Makefile.lib size_append) # compressed vmlinux.bin.all + u32 size of vmlinux.bin.all -# Sanitizer runtimes are unavailable and cannot be linked for early boot code. -KASAN_SANITIZE := n -KCSAN_SANITIZE := n -KMSAN_SANITIZE := n -OBJECT_FILES_NON_STANDARD := y - -# Prevents link failures: __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc() is not linked in. -KCOV_INSTRUMENT := n - targets := vmlinux vmlinux.bin vmlinux.bin.gz vmlinux.bin.bz2 vmlinux.bin.lzma \ vmlinux.bin.xz vmlinux.bin.lzo vmlinux.bin.lz4 vmlinux.bin.zst @@ -59,8 +50,6 @@ KBUILD_CFLAGS += -include $(srctree)/include/linux/hidden.h CFLAGS_sev.o += -I$(objtree)/arch/x86/lib/ KBUILD_AFLAGS := $(KBUILD_CFLAGS) -D__ASSEMBLY__ -GCOV_PROFILE := n -UBSAN_SANITIZE :=n KBUILD_LDFLAGS := -m elf_$(UTS_MACHINE) KBUILD_LDFLAGS += $(call ld-option,--no-ld-generated-unwind-info) diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c index ec71846d28..0457a9d7e5 100644 --- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c +++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c @@ -335,26 +335,6 @@ finish: sev_es_terminate(SEV_TERM_SET_GEN, GHCB_SEV_ES_GEN_REQ); } -static void enforce_vmpl0(void) -{ - u64 attrs; - int err; - - /* - * RMPADJUST modifies RMP permissions of a lesser-privileged (numerically - * higher) privilege level. Here, clear the VMPL1 permission mask of the - * GHCB page. If the guest is not running at VMPL0, this will fail. - * - * If the guest is running at VMPL0, it will succeed. Even if that operation - * modifies permission bits, it is still ok to do so currently because Linux - * SNP guests are supported only on VMPL0 so VMPL1 or higher permission masks - * changing is a don't-care. - */ - attrs = 1; - if (rmpadjust((unsigned long)&boot_ghcb_page, RMP_PG_SIZE_4K, attrs)) - sev_es_terminate(SEV_TERM_SET_LINUX, GHCB_TERM_NOT_VMPL0); -} - /* * SNP_FEATURES_IMPL_REQ is the mask of SNP features that will need * guest side implementation for proper functioning of the guest. If any @@ -413,6 +393,85 @@ void snp_check_features(void) } } +/* Search for Confidential Computing blob in the EFI config table. */ +static struct cc_blob_sev_info *find_cc_blob_efi(struct boot_params *bp) +{ + unsigned long cfg_table_pa; + unsigned int cfg_table_len; + int ret; + + ret = efi_get_conf_table(bp, &cfg_table_pa, &cfg_table_len); + if (ret) + return NULL; + + return (struct cc_blob_sev_info *)efi_find_vendor_table(bp, cfg_table_pa, + cfg_table_len, + EFI_CC_BLOB_GUID); +} + +/* + * Initial set up of SNP relies on information provided by the + * Confidential Computing blob, which can be passed to the boot kernel + * by firmware/bootloader in the following ways: + * + * - via an entry in the EFI config table + * - via a setup_data structure, as defined by the Linux Boot Protocol + * + * Scan for the blob in that order. + */ +static struct cc_blob_sev_info *find_cc_blob(struct boot_params *bp) +{ + struct cc_blob_sev_info *cc_info; + + cc_info = find_cc_blob_efi(bp); + if (cc_info) + goto found_cc_info; + + cc_info = find_cc_blob_setup_data(bp); + if (!cc_info) + return NULL; + +found_cc_info: + if (cc_info->magic != CC_BLOB_SEV_HDR_MAGIC) + sev_es_terminate(SEV_TERM_SET_GEN, GHCB_SNP_UNSUPPORTED); + + return cc_info; +} + +/* + * Indicate SNP based on presence of SNP-specific CC blob. Subsequent checks + * will verify the SNP CPUID/MSR bits. + */ +static bool early_snp_init(struct boot_params *bp) +{ + struct cc_blob_sev_info *cc_info; + + if (!bp) + return false; + + cc_info = find_cc_blob(bp); + if (!cc_info) + return false; + + /* + * If a SNP-specific Confidential Computing blob is present, then + * firmware/bootloader have indicated SNP support. Verifying this + * involves CPUID checks which will be more reliable if the SNP + * CPUID table is used. See comments over snp_setup_cpuid_table() for + * more details. + */ + setup_cpuid_table(cc_info); + + /* + * Pass run-time kernel a pointer to CC info via boot_params so EFI + * config table doesn't need to be searched again during early startup + * phase. + */ + bp->cc_blob_address = (u32)(unsigned long)cc_info; + + return true; +} + /* * sev_check_cpu_support - Check for SEV support in the CPU capabilities * @@ -463,7 +522,7 @@ void sev_enable(struct boot_params *bp) bp->cc_blob_address = 0; /* - * Do an initial SEV capability check before snp_init() which + * Do an initial SEV capability check before early_snp_init() which * loads the CPUID page and the same checks afterwards are done * without the hypervisor and are trustworthy. * @@ -478,7 +537,7 @@ void sev_enable(struct boot_params *bp) * Setup/preliminary detection of SNP. This will be sanity-checked * against CPUID/MSR values later. */ - snp = snp_init(bp); + snp = early_snp_init(bp); /* Now repeat the checks with the SNP CPUID table. */ @@ -509,7 +568,20 @@ void sev_enable(struct boot_params *bp) if (!(get_hv_features() & GHCB_HV_FT_SNP)) sev_es_terminate(SEV_TERM_SET_GEN, GHCB_SNP_UNSUPPORTED); - enforce_vmpl0(); + /* + * Enforce running at VMPL0. + * + * RMPADJUST modifies RMP permissions of a lesser-privileged (numerically + * higher) privilege level. Here, clear the VMPL1 permission mask of the + * GHCB page. If the guest is not running at VMPL0, this will fail. + * + * If the guest is running at VMPL0, it will succeed. Even if that operation + * modifies permission bits, it is still ok to do so currently because Linux + * SNP guests running at VMPL0 only run at VMPL0, so VMPL1 or higher + * permission mask changes are a don't-care. + */ + if (rmpadjust((unsigned long)&boot_ghcb_page, RMP_PG_SIZE_4K, 1)) + sev_es_terminate(SEV_TERM_SET_LINUX, GHCB_TERM_NOT_VMPL0); } if (snp && !(sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_SNP_ENABLED)) @@ -535,85 +607,6 @@ u64 sev_get_status(void) return m.q; } -/* Search for Confidential Computing blob in the EFI config table. */ -static struct cc_blob_sev_info *find_cc_blob_efi(struct boot_params *bp) -{ - unsigned long cfg_table_pa; - unsigned int cfg_table_len; - int ret; - - ret = efi_get_conf_table(bp, &cfg_table_pa, &cfg_table_len); - if (ret) - return NULL; - - return (struct cc_blob_sev_info *)efi_find_vendor_table(bp, cfg_table_pa, - cfg_table_len, - EFI_CC_BLOB_GUID); -} - -/* - * Initial set up of SNP relies on information provided by the - * Confidential Computing blob, which can be passed to the boot kernel - * by firmware/bootloader in the following ways: - * - * - via an entry in the EFI config table - * - via a setup_data structure, as defined by the Linux Boot Protocol - * - * Scan for the blob in that order. - */ -static struct cc_blob_sev_info *find_cc_blob(struct boot_params *bp) -{ - struct cc_blob_sev_info *cc_info; - - cc_info = find_cc_blob_efi(bp); - if (cc_info) - goto found_cc_info; - - cc_info = find_cc_blob_setup_data(bp); - if (!cc_info) - return NULL; - -found_cc_info: - if (cc_info->magic != CC_BLOB_SEV_HDR_MAGIC) - sev_es_terminate(SEV_TERM_SET_GEN, GHCB_SNP_UNSUPPORTED); - - return cc_info; -} - -/* - * Indicate SNP based on presence of SNP-specific CC blob. Subsequent checks - * will verify the SNP CPUID/MSR bits. - */ -bool snp_init(struct boot_params *bp) -{ - struct cc_blob_sev_info *cc_info; - - if (!bp) - return false; - - cc_info = find_cc_blob(bp); - if (!cc_info) - return false; - - /* - * If a SNP-specific Confidential Computing blob is present, then - * firmware/bootloader have indicated SNP support. Verifying this - * involves CPUID checks which will be more reliable if the SNP - * CPUID table is used. See comments over snp_setup_cpuid_table() for - * more details. - */ - setup_cpuid_table(cc_info); - - /* - * Pass run-time kernel a pointer to CC info via boot_params so EFI - * config table doesn't need to be searched again during early startup - * phase. - */ - bp->cc_blob_address = (u32)(unsigned long)cc_info; - - return true; -} - void sev_prep_identity_maps(unsigned long top_level_pgt) { /* diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/printf.c b/arch/x86/boot/printf.c index 1237beeb95..51dc14b714 100644 --- a/arch/x86/boot/printf.c +++ b/arch/x86/boot/printf.c @@ -246,6 +246,7 @@ int vsprintf(char *buf, const char *fmt, va_list args) case 'x': flags |= SMALL; + fallthrough; case 'X': base = 16; break; @@ -253,6 +254,8 @@ int vsprintf(char *buf, const char *fmt, va_list args) case 'd': case 'i': flags |= SIGN; + break; + case 'u': break; |