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-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c5381
1 files changed, 5381 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..77f1eeefcd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
@@ -0,0 +1,5381 @@
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
+
+#include <linux/kvm_host.h>
+
+#include "irq.h"
+#include "mmu.h"
+#include "kvm_cache_regs.h"
+#include "x86.h"
+#include "smm.h"
+#include "cpuid.h"
+#include "pmu.h"
+
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/mod_devicetable.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
+#include <linux/highmem.h>
+#include <linux/amd-iommu.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/trace_events.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/hashtable.h>
+#include <linux/objtool.h>
+#include <linux/psp-sev.h>
+#include <linux/file.h>
+#include <linux/pagemap.h>
+#include <linux/swap.h>
+#include <linux/rwsem.h>
+#include <linux/cc_platform.h>
+#include <linux/smp.h>
+
+#include <asm/apic.h>
+#include <asm/perf_event.h>
+#include <asm/tlbflush.h>
+#include <asm/desc.h>
+#include <asm/debugreg.h>
+#include <asm/kvm_para.h>
+#include <asm/irq_remapping.h>
+#include <asm/spec-ctrl.h>
+#include <asm/cpu_device_id.h>
+#include <asm/traps.h>
+#include <asm/reboot.h>
+#include <asm/fpu/api.h>
+
+#include <trace/events/ipi.h>
+
+#include "trace.h"
+
+#include "svm.h"
+#include "svm_ops.h"
+
+#include "kvm_onhyperv.h"
+#include "svm_onhyperv.h"
+
+MODULE_AUTHOR("Qumranet");
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
+
+#ifdef MODULE
+static const struct x86_cpu_id svm_cpu_id[] = {
+ X86_MATCH_FEATURE(X86_FEATURE_SVM, NULL),
+ {}
+};
+MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(x86cpu, svm_cpu_id);
+#endif
+
+#define SEG_TYPE_LDT 2
+#define SEG_TYPE_BUSY_TSS16 3
+
+static bool erratum_383_found __read_mostly;
+
+u32 msrpm_offsets[MSRPM_OFFSETS] __read_mostly;
+
+/*
+ * Set osvw_len to higher value when updated Revision Guides
+ * are published and we know what the new status bits are
+ */
+static uint64_t osvw_len = 4, osvw_status;
+
+static DEFINE_PER_CPU(u64, current_tsc_ratio);
+
+#define X2APIC_MSR(x) (APIC_BASE_MSR + (x >> 4))
+
+static const struct svm_direct_access_msrs {
+ u32 index; /* Index of the MSR */
+ bool always; /* True if intercept is initially cleared */
+} direct_access_msrs[MAX_DIRECT_ACCESS_MSRS] = {
+ { .index = MSR_STAR, .always = true },
+ { .index = MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS, .always = true },
+ { .index = MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, .always = false },
+ { .index = MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP, .always = false },
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+ { .index = MSR_GS_BASE, .always = true },
+ { .index = MSR_FS_BASE, .always = true },
+ { .index = MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE, .always = true },
+ { .index = MSR_LSTAR, .always = true },
+ { .index = MSR_CSTAR, .always = true },
+ { .index = MSR_SYSCALL_MASK, .always = true },
+#endif
+ { .index = MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, .always = false },
+ { .index = MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, .always = false },
+ { .index = MSR_IA32_FLUSH_CMD, .always = false },
+ { .index = MSR_IA32_LASTBRANCHFROMIP, .always = false },
+ { .index = MSR_IA32_LASTBRANCHTOIP, .always = false },
+ { .index = MSR_IA32_LASTINTFROMIP, .always = false },
+ { .index = MSR_IA32_LASTINTTOIP, .always = false },
+ { .index = MSR_EFER, .always = false },
+ { .index = MSR_IA32_CR_PAT, .always = false },
+ { .index = MSR_AMD64_SEV_ES_GHCB, .always = true },
+ { .index = MSR_TSC_AUX, .always = false },
+ { .index = X2APIC_MSR(APIC_ID), .always = false },
+ { .index = X2APIC_MSR(APIC_LVR), .always = false },
+ { .index = X2APIC_MSR(APIC_TASKPRI), .always = false },
+ { .index = X2APIC_MSR(APIC_ARBPRI), .always = false },
+ { .index = X2APIC_MSR(APIC_PROCPRI), .always = false },
+ { .index = X2APIC_MSR(APIC_EOI), .always = false },
+ { .index = X2APIC_MSR(APIC_RRR), .always = false },
+ { .index = X2APIC_MSR(APIC_LDR), .always = false },
+ { .index = X2APIC_MSR(APIC_DFR), .always = false },
+ { .index = X2APIC_MSR(APIC_SPIV), .always = false },
+ { .index = X2APIC_MSR(APIC_ISR), .always = false },
+ { .index = X2APIC_MSR(APIC_TMR), .always = false },
+ { .index = X2APIC_MSR(APIC_IRR), .always = false },
+ { .index = X2APIC_MSR(APIC_ESR), .always = false },
+ { .index = X2APIC_MSR(APIC_ICR), .always = false },
+ { .index = X2APIC_MSR(APIC_ICR2), .always = false },
+
+ /*
+ * Note:
+ * AMD does not virtualize APIC TSC-deadline timer mode, but it is
+ * emulated by KVM. When setting APIC LVTT (0x832) register bit 18,
+ * the AVIC hardware would generate GP fault. Therefore, always
+ * intercept the MSR 0x832, and do not setup direct_access_msr.
+ */
+ { .index = X2APIC_MSR(APIC_LVTTHMR), .always = false },
+ { .index = X2APIC_MSR(APIC_LVTPC), .always = false },
+ { .index = X2APIC_MSR(APIC_LVT0), .always = false },
+ { .index = X2APIC_MSR(APIC_LVT1), .always = false },
+ { .index = X2APIC_MSR(APIC_LVTERR), .always = false },
+ { .index = X2APIC_MSR(APIC_TMICT), .always = false },
+ { .index = X2APIC_MSR(APIC_TMCCT), .always = false },
+ { .index = X2APIC_MSR(APIC_TDCR), .always = false },
+ { .index = MSR_INVALID, .always = false },
+};
+
+/*
+ * These 2 parameters are used to config the controls for Pause-Loop Exiting:
+ * pause_filter_count: On processors that support Pause filtering(indicated
+ * by CPUID Fn8000_000A_EDX), the VMCB provides a 16 bit pause filter
+ * count value. On VMRUN this value is loaded into an internal counter.
+ * Each time a pause instruction is executed, this counter is decremented
+ * until it reaches zero at which time a #VMEXIT is generated if pause
+ * intercept is enabled. Refer to AMD APM Vol 2 Section 15.14.4 Pause
+ * Intercept Filtering for more details.
+ * This also indicate if ple logic enabled.
+ *
+ * pause_filter_thresh: In addition, some processor families support advanced
+ * pause filtering (indicated by CPUID Fn8000_000A_EDX) upper bound on
+ * the amount of time a guest is allowed to execute in a pause loop.
+ * In this mode, a 16-bit pause filter threshold field is added in the
+ * VMCB. The threshold value is a cycle count that is used to reset the
+ * pause counter. As with simple pause filtering, VMRUN loads the pause
+ * count value from VMCB into an internal counter. Then, on each pause
+ * instruction the hardware checks the elapsed number of cycles since
+ * the most recent pause instruction against the pause filter threshold.
+ * If the elapsed cycle count is greater than the pause filter threshold,
+ * then the internal pause count is reloaded from the VMCB and execution
+ * continues. If the elapsed cycle count is less than the pause filter
+ * threshold, then the internal pause count is decremented. If the count
+ * value is less than zero and PAUSE intercept is enabled, a #VMEXIT is
+ * triggered. If advanced pause filtering is supported and pause filter
+ * threshold field is set to zero, the filter will operate in the simpler,
+ * count only mode.
+ */
+
+static unsigned short pause_filter_thresh = KVM_DEFAULT_PLE_GAP;
+module_param(pause_filter_thresh, ushort, 0444);
+
+static unsigned short pause_filter_count = KVM_SVM_DEFAULT_PLE_WINDOW;
+module_param(pause_filter_count, ushort, 0444);
+
+/* Default doubles per-vcpu window every exit. */
+static unsigned short pause_filter_count_grow = KVM_DEFAULT_PLE_WINDOW_GROW;
+module_param(pause_filter_count_grow, ushort, 0444);
+
+/* Default resets per-vcpu window every exit to pause_filter_count. */
+static unsigned short pause_filter_count_shrink = KVM_DEFAULT_PLE_WINDOW_SHRINK;
+module_param(pause_filter_count_shrink, ushort, 0444);
+
+/* Default is to compute the maximum so we can never overflow. */
+static unsigned short pause_filter_count_max = KVM_SVM_DEFAULT_PLE_WINDOW_MAX;
+module_param(pause_filter_count_max, ushort, 0444);
+
+/*
+ * Use nested page tables by default. Note, NPT may get forced off by
+ * svm_hardware_setup() if it's unsupported by hardware or the host kernel.
+ */
+bool npt_enabled = true;
+module_param_named(npt, npt_enabled, bool, 0444);
+
+/* allow nested virtualization in KVM/SVM */
+static int nested = true;
+module_param(nested, int, S_IRUGO);
+
+/* enable/disable Next RIP Save */
+int nrips = true;
+module_param(nrips, int, 0444);
+
+/* enable/disable Virtual VMLOAD VMSAVE */
+static int vls = true;
+module_param(vls, int, 0444);
+
+/* enable/disable Virtual GIF */
+int vgif = true;
+module_param(vgif, int, 0444);
+
+/* enable/disable LBR virtualization */
+static int lbrv = true;
+module_param(lbrv, int, 0444);
+
+static int tsc_scaling = true;
+module_param(tsc_scaling, int, 0444);
+
+/*
+ * enable / disable AVIC. Because the defaults differ for APICv
+ * support between VMX and SVM we cannot use module_param_named.
+ */
+static bool avic;
+module_param(avic, bool, 0444);
+
+bool __read_mostly dump_invalid_vmcb;
+module_param(dump_invalid_vmcb, bool, 0644);
+
+
+bool intercept_smi = true;
+module_param(intercept_smi, bool, 0444);
+
+bool vnmi = true;
+module_param(vnmi, bool, 0444);
+
+static bool svm_gp_erratum_intercept = true;
+
+static u8 rsm_ins_bytes[] = "\x0f\xaa";
+
+static unsigned long iopm_base;
+
+DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct svm_cpu_data, svm_data);
+
+/*
+ * Only MSR_TSC_AUX is switched via the user return hook. EFER is switched via
+ * the VMCB, and the SYSCALL/SYSENTER MSRs are handled by VMLOAD/VMSAVE.
+ *
+ * RDTSCP and RDPID are not used in the kernel, specifically to allow KVM to
+ * defer the restoration of TSC_AUX until the CPU returns to userspace.
+ */
+static int tsc_aux_uret_slot __read_mostly = -1;
+
+static const u32 msrpm_ranges[] = {0, 0xc0000000, 0xc0010000};
+
+#define NUM_MSR_MAPS ARRAY_SIZE(msrpm_ranges)
+#define MSRS_RANGE_SIZE 2048
+#define MSRS_IN_RANGE (MSRS_RANGE_SIZE * 8 / 2)
+
+u32 svm_msrpm_offset(u32 msr)
+{
+ u32 offset;
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < NUM_MSR_MAPS; i++) {
+ if (msr < msrpm_ranges[i] ||
+ msr >= msrpm_ranges[i] + MSRS_IN_RANGE)
+ continue;
+
+ offset = (msr - msrpm_ranges[i]) / 4; /* 4 msrs per u8 */
+ offset += (i * MSRS_RANGE_SIZE); /* add range offset */
+
+ /* Now we have the u8 offset - but need the u32 offset */
+ return offset / 4;
+ }
+
+ /* MSR not in any range */
+ return MSR_INVALID;
+}
+
+static void svm_flush_tlb_current(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+
+static int get_npt_level(void)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+ return pgtable_l5_enabled() ? PT64_ROOT_5LEVEL : PT64_ROOT_4LEVEL;
+#else
+ return PT32E_ROOT_LEVEL;
+#endif
+}
+
+int svm_set_efer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 efer)
+{
+ struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+ u64 old_efer = vcpu->arch.efer;
+ vcpu->arch.efer = efer;
+
+ if (!npt_enabled) {
+ /* Shadow paging assumes NX to be available. */
+ efer |= EFER_NX;
+
+ if (!(efer & EFER_LMA))
+ efer &= ~EFER_LME;
+ }
+
+ if ((old_efer & EFER_SVME) != (efer & EFER_SVME)) {
+ if (!(efer & EFER_SVME)) {
+ svm_leave_nested(vcpu);
+ svm_set_gif(svm, true);
+ /* #GP intercept is still needed for vmware backdoor */
+ if (!enable_vmware_backdoor)
+ clr_exception_intercept(svm, GP_VECTOR);
+
+ /*
+ * Free the nested guest state, unless we are in SMM.
+ * In this case we will return to the nested guest
+ * as soon as we leave SMM.
+ */
+ if (!is_smm(vcpu))
+ svm_free_nested(svm);
+
+ } else {
+ int ret = svm_allocate_nested(svm);
+
+ if (ret) {
+ vcpu->arch.efer = old_efer;
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Never intercept #GP for SEV guests, KVM can't
+ * decrypt guest memory to workaround the erratum.
+ */
+ if (svm_gp_erratum_intercept && !sev_guest(vcpu->kvm))
+ set_exception_intercept(svm, GP_VECTOR);
+ }
+ }
+
+ svm->vmcb->save.efer = efer | EFER_SVME;
+ vmcb_mark_dirty(svm->vmcb, VMCB_CR);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static u32 svm_get_interrupt_shadow(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+ u32 ret = 0;
+
+ if (svm->vmcb->control.int_state & SVM_INTERRUPT_SHADOW_MASK)
+ ret = KVM_X86_SHADOW_INT_STI | KVM_X86_SHADOW_INT_MOV_SS;
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static void svm_set_interrupt_shadow(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int mask)
+{
+ struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+
+ if (mask == 0)
+ svm->vmcb->control.int_state &= ~SVM_INTERRUPT_SHADOW_MASK;
+ else
+ svm->vmcb->control.int_state |= SVM_INTERRUPT_SHADOW_MASK;
+
+}
+static bool svm_can_emulate_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int emul_type,
+ void *insn, int insn_len);
+
+static int __svm_skip_emulated_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+ bool commit_side_effects)
+{
+ struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+ unsigned long old_rflags;
+
+ /*
+ * SEV-ES does not expose the next RIP. The RIP update is controlled by
+ * the type of exit and the #VC handler in the guest.
+ */
+ if (sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm))
+ goto done;
+
+ if (nrips && svm->vmcb->control.next_rip != 0) {
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_NRIPS));
+ svm->next_rip = svm->vmcb->control.next_rip;
+ }
+
+ if (!svm->next_rip) {
+ /*
+ * FIXME: Drop this when kvm_emulate_instruction() does the
+ * right thing and treats "can't emulate" as outright failure
+ * for EMULTYPE_SKIP.
+ */
+ if (!svm_can_emulate_instruction(vcpu, EMULTYPE_SKIP, NULL, 0))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (unlikely(!commit_side_effects))
+ old_rflags = svm->vmcb->save.rflags;
+
+ if (!kvm_emulate_instruction(vcpu, EMULTYPE_SKIP))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (unlikely(!commit_side_effects))
+ svm->vmcb->save.rflags = old_rflags;
+ } else {
+ kvm_rip_write(vcpu, svm->next_rip);
+ }
+
+done:
+ if (likely(commit_side_effects))
+ svm_set_interrupt_shadow(vcpu, 0);
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int svm_skip_emulated_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ return __svm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu, true);
+}
+
+static int svm_update_soft_interrupt_rip(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ unsigned long rip, old_rip = kvm_rip_read(vcpu);
+ struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+
+ /*
+ * Due to architectural shortcomings, the CPU doesn't always provide
+ * NextRIP, e.g. if KVM intercepted an exception that occurred while
+ * the CPU was vectoring an INTO/INT3 in the guest. Temporarily skip
+ * the instruction even if NextRIP is supported to acquire the next
+ * RIP so that it can be shoved into the NextRIP field, otherwise
+ * hardware will fail to advance guest RIP during event injection.
+ * Drop the exception/interrupt if emulation fails and effectively
+ * retry the instruction, it's the least awful option. If NRIPS is
+ * in use, the skip must not commit any side effects such as clearing
+ * the interrupt shadow or RFLAGS.RF.
+ */
+ if (!__svm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu, !nrips))
+ return -EIO;
+
+ rip = kvm_rip_read(vcpu);
+
+ /*
+ * Save the injection information, even when using next_rip, as the
+ * VMCB's next_rip will be lost (cleared on VM-Exit) if the injection
+ * doesn't complete due to a VM-Exit occurring while the CPU is
+ * vectoring the event. Decoding the instruction isn't guaranteed to
+ * work as there may be no backing instruction, e.g. if the event is
+ * being injected by L1 for L2, or if the guest is patching INT3 into
+ * a different instruction.
+ */
+ svm->soft_int_injected = true;
+ svm->soft_int_csbase = svm->vmcb->save.cs.base;
+ svm->soft_int_old_rip = old_rip;
+ svm->soft_int_next_rip = rip;
+
+ if (nrips)
+ kvm_rip_write(vcpu, old_rip);
+
+ if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_NRIPS))
+ svm->vmcb->control.next_rip = rip;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void svm_inject_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ struct kvm_queued_exception *ex = &vcpu->arch.exception;
+ struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+
+ kvm_deliver_exception_payload(vcpu, ex);
+
+ if (kvm_exception_is_soft(ex->vector) &&
+ svm_update_soft_interrupt_rip(vcpu))
+ return;
+
+ svm->vmcb->control.event_inj = ex->vector
+ | SVM_EVTINJ_VALID
+ | (ex->has_error_code ? SVM_EVTINJ_VALID_ERR : 0)
+ | SVM_EVTINJ_TYPE_EXEPT;
+ svm->vmcb->control.event_inj_err = ex->error_code;
+}
+
+static void svm_init_erratum_383(void)
+{
+ u32 low, high;
+ int err;
+ u64 val;
+
+ if (!static_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_AMD_TLB_MMATCH))
+ return;
+
+ /* Use _safe variants to not break nested virtualization */
+ val = native_read_msr_safe(MSR_AMD64_DC_CFG, &err);
+ if (err)
+ return;
+
+ val |= (1ULL << 47);
+
+ low = lower_32_bits(val);
+ high = upper_32_bits(val);
+
+ native_write_msr_safe(MSR_AMD64_DC_CFG, low, high);
+
+ erratum_383_found = true;
+}
+
+static void svm_init_osvw(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ /*
+ * Guests should see errata 400 and 415 as fixed (assuming that
+ * HLT and IO instructions are intercepted).
+ */
+ vcpu->arch.osvw.length = (osvw_len >= 3) ? (osvw_len) : 3;
+ vcpu->arch.osvw.status = osvw_status & ~(6ULL);
+
+ /*
+ * By increasing VCPU's osvw.length to 3 we are telling the guest that
+ * all osvw.status bits inside that length, including bit 0 (which is
+ * reserved for erratum 298), are valid. However, if host processor's
+ * osvw_len is 0 then osvw_status[0] carries no information. We need to
+ * be conservative here and therefore we tell the guest that erratum 298
+ * is present (because we really don't know).
+ */
+ if (osvw_len == 0 && boot_cpu_data.x86 == 0x10)
+ vcpu->arch.osvw.status |= 1;
+}
+
+static bool __kvm_is_svm_supported(void)
+{
+ int cpu = smp_processor_id();
+ struct cpuinfo_x86 *c = &cpu_data(cpu);
+
+ u64 vm_cr;
+
+ if (c->x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_AMD &&
+ c->x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_HYGON) {
+ pr_err("CPU %d isn't AMD or Hygon\n", cpu);
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SVM)) {
+ pr_err("SVM not supported by CPU %d\n", cpu);
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) {
+ pr_info("KVM is unsupported when running as an SEV guest\n");
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ rdmsrl(MSR_VM_CR, vm_cr);
+ if (vm_cr & (1 << SVM_VM_CR_SVM_DISABLE)) {
+ pr_err("SVM disabled (by BIOS) in MSR_VM_CR on CPU %d\n", cpu);
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+static bool kvm_is_svm_supported(void)
+{
+ bool supported;
+
+ migrate_disable();
+ supported = __kvm_is_svm_supported();
+ migrate_enable();
+
+ return supported;
+}
+
+static int svm_check_processor_compat(void)
+{
+ if (!__kvm_is_svm_supported())
+ return -EIO;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void __svm_write_tsc_multiplier(u64 multiplier)
+{
+ if (multiplier == __this_cpu_read(current_tsc_ratio))
+ return;
+
+ wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_TSC_RATIO, multiplier);
+ __this_cpu_write(current_tsc_ratio, multiplier);
+}
+
+static inline void kvm_cpu_svm_disable(void)
+{
+ uint64_t efer;
+
+ wrmsrl(MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA, 0);
+ rdmsrl(MSR_EFER, efer);
+ if (efer & EFER_SVME) {
+ /*
+ * Force GIF=1 prior to disabling SVM, e.g. to ensure INIT and
+ * NMI aren't blocked.
+ */
+ stgi();
+ wrmsrl(MSR_EFER, efer & ~EFER_SVME);
+ }
+}
+
+static void svm_emergency_disable(void)
+{
+ kvm_rebooting = true;
+
+ kvm_cpu_svm_disable();
+}
+
+static void svm_hardware_disable(void)
+{
+ /* Make sure we clean up behind us */
+ if (tsc_scaling)
+ __svm_write_tsc_multiplier(SVM_TSC_RATIO_DEFAULT);
+
+ kvm_cpu_svm_disable();
+
+ amd_pmu_disable_virt();
+}
+
+static int svm_hardware_enable(void)
+{
+
+ struct svm_cpu_data *sd;
+ uint64_t efer;
+ int me = raw_smp_processor_id();
+
+ rdmsrl(MSR_EFER, efer);
+ if (efer & EFER_SVME)
+ return -EBUSY;
+
+ sd = per_cpu_ptr(&svm_data, me);
+ sd->asid_generation = 1;
+ sd->max_asid = cpuid_ebx(SVM_CPUID_FUNC) - 1;
+ sd->next_asid = sd->max_asid + 1;
+ sd->min_asid = max_sev_asid + 1;
+
+ wrmsrl(MSR_EFER, efer | EFER_SVME);
+
+ wrmsrl(MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA, sd->save_area_pa);
+
+ if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_TSCRATEMSR)) {
+ /*
+ * Set the default value, even if we don't use TSC scaling
+ * to avoid having stale value in the msr
+ */
+ __svm_write_tsc_multiplier(SVM_TSC_RATIO_DEFAULT);
+ }
+
+
+ /*
+ * Get OSVW bits.
+ *
+ * Note that it is possible to have a system with mixed processor
+ * revisions and therefore different OSVW bits. If bits are not the same
+ * on different processors then choose the worst case (i.e. if erratum
+ * is present on one processor and not on another then assume that the
+ * erratum is present everywhere).
+ */
+ if (cpu_has(&boot_cpu_data, X86_FEATURE_OSVW)) {
+ uint64_t len, status = 0;
+ int err;
+
+ len = native_read_msr_safe(MSR_AMD64_OSVW_ID_LENGTH, &err);
+ if (!err)
+ status = native_read_msr_safe(MSR_AMD64_OSVW_STATUS,
+ &err);
+
+ if (err)
+ osvw_status = osvw_len = 0;
+ else {
+ if (len < osvw_len)
+ osvw_len = len;
+ osvw_status |= status;
+ osvw_status &= (1ULL << osvw_len) - 1;
+ }
+ } else
+ osvw_status = osvw_len = 0;
+
+ svm_init_erratum_383();
+
+ amd_pmu_enable_virt();
+
+ /*
+ * If TSC_AUX virtualization is supported, TSC_AUX becomes a swap type
+ * "B" field (see sev_es_prepare_switch_to_guest()) for SEV-ES guests.
+ * Since Linux does not change the value of TSC_AUX once set, prime the
+ * TSC_AUX field now to avoid a RDMSR on every vCPU run.
+ */
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_V_TSC_AUX)) {
+ struct sev_es_save_area *hostsa;
+ u32 __maybe_unused msr_hi;
+
+ hostsa = (struct sev_es_save_area *)(page_address(sd->save_area) + 0x400);
+
+ rdmsr(MSR_TSC_AUX, hostsa->tsc_aux, msr_hi);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void svm_cpu_uninit(int cpu)
+{
+ struct svm_cpu_data *sd = per_cpu_ptr(&svm_data, cpu);
+
+ if (!sd->save_area)
+ return;
+
+ kfree(sd->sev_vmcbs);
+ __free_page(sd->save_area);
+ sd->save_area_pa = 0;
+ sd->save_area = NULL;
+}
+
+static int svm_cpu_init(int cpu)
+{
+ struct svm_cpu_data *sd = per_cpu_ptr(&svm_data, cpu);
+ int ret = -ENOMEM;
+
+ memset(sd, 0, sizeof(struct svm_cpu_data));
+ sd->save_area = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO);
+ if (!sd->save_area)
+ return ret;
+
+ ret = sev_cpu_init(sd);
+ if (ret)
+ goto free_save_area;
+
+ sd->save_area_pa = __sme_page_pa(sd->save_area);
+ return 0;
+
+free_save_area:
+ __free_page(sd->save_area);
+ sd->save_area = NULL;
+ return ret;
+
+}
+
+static void set_dr_intercepts(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
+{
+ struct vmcb *vmcb = svm->vmcb01.ptr;
+
+ vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR0_READ);
+ vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR1_READ);
+ vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR2_READ);
+ vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR3_READ);
+ vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR4_READ);
+ vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR5_READ);
+ vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR6_READ);
+ vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR0_WRITE);
+ vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR1_WRITE);
+ vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR2_WRITE);
+ vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR3_WRITE);
+ vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR4_WRITE);
+ vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR5_WRITE);
+ vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR6_WRITE);
+ vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR7_READ);
+ vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR7_WRITE);
+
+ recalc_intercepts(svm);
+}
+
+static void clr_dr_intercepts(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
+{
+ struct vmcb *vmcb = svm->vmcb01.ptr;
+
+ vmcb->control.intercepts[INTERCEPT_DR] = 0;
+
+ recalc_intercepts(svm);
+}
+
+static int direct_access_msr_slot(u32 msr)
+{
+ u32 i;
+
+ for (i = 0; direct_access_msrs[i].index != MSR_INVALID; i++)
+ if (direct_access_msrs[i].index == msr)
+ return i;
+
+ return -ENOENT;
+}
+
+static void set_shadow_msr_intercept(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr, int read,
+ int write)
+{
+ struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+ int slot = direct_access_msr_slot(msr);
+
+ if (slot == -ENOENT)
+ return;
+
+ /* Set the shadow bitmaps to the desired intercept states */
+ if (read)
+ set_bit(slot, svm->shadow_msr_intercept.read);
+ else
+ clear_bit(slot, svm->shadow_msr_intercept.read);
+
+ if (write)
+ set_bit(slot, svm->shadow_msr_intercept.write);
+ else
+ clear_bit(slot, svm->shadow_msr_intercept.write);
+}
+
+static bool valid_msr_intercept(u32 index)
+{
+ return direct_access_msr_slot(index) != -ENOENT;
+}
+
+static bool msr_write_intercepted(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr)
+{
+ u8 bit_write;
+ unsigned long tmp;
+ u32 offset;
+ u32 *msrpm;
+
+ /*
+ * For non-nested case:
+ * If the L01 MSR bitmap does not intercept the MSR, then we need to
+ * save it.
+ *
+ * For nested case:
+ * If the L02 MSR bitmap does not intercept the MSR, then we need to
+ * save it.
+ */
+ msrpm = is_guest_mode(vcpu) ? to_svm(vcpu)->nested.msrpm:
+ to_svm(vcpu)->msrpm;
+
+ offset = svm_msrpm_offset(msr);
+ bit_write = 2 * (msr & 0x0f) + 1;
+ tmp = msrpm[offset];
+
+ BUG_ON(offset == MSR_INVALID);
+
+ return test_bit(bit_write, &tmp);
+}
+
+static void set_msr_interception_bitmap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 *msrpm,
+ u32 msr, int read, int write)
+{
+ struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+ u8 bit_read, bit_write;
+ unsigned long tmp;
+ u32 offset;
+
+ /*
+ * If this warning triggers extend the direct_access_msrs list at the
+ * beginning of the file
+ */
+ WARN_ON(!valid_msr_intercept(msr));
+
+ /* Enforce non allowed MSRs to trap */
+ if (read && !kvm_msr_allowed(vcpu, msr, KVM_MSR_FILTER_READ))
+ read = 0;
+
+ if (write && !kvm_msr_allowed(vcpu, msr, KVM_MSR_FILTER_WRITE))
+ write = 0;
+
+ offset = svm_msrpm_offset(msr);
+ bit_read = 2 * (msr & 0x0f);
+ bit_write = 2 * (msr & 0x0f) + 1;
+ tmp = msrpm[offset];
+
+ BUG_ON(offset == MSR_INVALID);
+
+ read ? clear_bit(bit_read, &tmp) : set_bit(bit_read, &tmp);
+ write ? clear_bit(bit_write, &tmp) : set_bit(bit_write, &tmp);
+
+ msrpm[offset] = tmp;
+
+ svm_hv_vmcb_dirty_nested_enlightenments(vcpu);
+ svm->nested.force_msr_bitmap_recalc = true;
+}
+
+void set_msr_interception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 *msrpm, u32 msr,
+ int read, int write)
+{
+ set_shadow_msr_intercept(vcpu, msr, read, write);
+ set_msr_interception_bitmap(vcpu, msrpm, msr, read, write);
+}
+
+u32 *svm_vcpu_alloc_msrpm(void)
+{
+ unsigned int order = get_order(MSRPM_SIZE);
+ struct page *pages = alloc_pages(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT, order);
+ u32 *msrpm;
+
+ if (!pages)
+ return NULL;
+
+ msrpm = page_address(pages);
+ memset(msrpm, 0xff, PAGE_SIZE * (1 << order));
+
+ return msrpm;
+}
+
+void svm_vcpu_init_msrpm(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 *msrpm)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; direct_access_msrs[i].index != MSR_INVALID; i++) {
+ if (!direct_access_msrs[i].always)
+ continue;
+ set_msr_interception(vcpu, msrpm, direct_access_msrs[i].index, 1, 1);
+ }
+}
+
+void svm_set_x2apic_msr_interception(struct vcpu_svm *svm, bool intercept)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ if (intercept == svm->x2avic_msrs_intercepted)
+ return;
+
+ if (!x2avic_enabled)
+ return;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < MAX_DIRECT_ACCESS_MSRS; i++) {
+ int index = direct_access_msrs[i].index;
+
+ if ((index < APIC_BASE_MSR) ||
+ (index > APIC_BASE_MSR + 0xff))
+ continue;
+ set_msr_interception(&svm->vcpu, svm->msrpm, index,
+ !intercept, !intercept);
+ }
+
+ svm->x2avic_msrs_intercepted = intercept;
+}
+
+void svm_vcpu_free_msrpm(u32 *msrpm)
+{
+ __free_pages(virt_to_page(msrpm), get_order(MSRPM_SIZE));
+}
+
+static void svm_msr_filter_changed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+ u32 i;
+
+ /*
+ * Set intercept permissions for all direct access MSRs again. They
+ * will automatically get filtered through the MSR filter, so we are
+ * back in sync after this.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; direct_access_msrs[i].index != MSR_INVALID; i++) {
+ u32 msr = direct_access_msrs[i].index;
+ u32 read = test_bit(i, svm->shadow_msr_intercept.read);
+ u32 write = test_bit(i, svm->shadow_msr_intercept.write);
+
+ set_msr_interception_bitmap(vcpu, svm->msrpm, msr, read, write);
+ }
+}
+
+static void add_msr_offset(u32 offset)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < MSRPM_OFFSETS; ++i) {
+
+ /* Offset already in list? */
+ if (msrpm_offsets[i] == offset)
+ return;
+
+ /* Slot used by another offset? */
+ if (msrpm_offsets[i] != MSR_INVALID)
+ continue;
+
+ /* Add offset to list */
+ msrpm_offsets[i] = offset;
+
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If this BUG triggers the msrpm_offsets table has an overflow. Just
+ * increase MSRPM_OFFSETS in this case.
+ */
+ BUG();
+}
+
+static void init_msrpm_offsets(void)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ memset(msrpm_offsets, 0xff, sizeof(msrpm_offsets));
+
+ for (i = 0; direct_access_msrs[i].index != MSR_INVALID; i++) {
+ u32 offset;
+
+ offset = svm_msrpm_offset(direct_access_msrs[i].index);
+ BUG_ON(offset == MSR_INVALID);
+
+ add_msr_offset(offset);
+ }
+}
+
+void svm_copy_lbrs(struct vmcb *to_vmcb, struct vmcb *from_vmcb)
+{
+ to_vmcb->save.dbgctl = from_vmcb->save.dbgctl;
+ to_vmcb->save.br_from = from_vmcb->save.br_from;
+ to_vmcb->save.br_to = from_vmcb->save.br_to;
+ to_vmcb->save.last_excp_from = from_vmcb->save.last_excp_from;
+ to_vmcb->save.last_excp_to = from_vmcb->save.last_excp_to;
+
+ vmcb_mark_dirty(to_vmcb, VMCB_LBR);
+}
+
+static void svm_enable_lbrv(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+
+ svm->vmcb->control.virt_ext |= LBR_CTL_ENABLE_MASK;
+ set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_LASTBRANCHFROMIP, 1, 1);
+ set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_LASTBRANCHTOIP, 1, 1);
+ set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_LASTINTFROMIP, 1, 1);
+ set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_LASTINTTOIP, 1, 1);
+
+ /* Move the LBR msrs to the vmcb02 so that the guest can see them. */
+ if (is_guest_mode(vcpu))
+ svm_copy_lbrs(svm->vmcb, svm->vmcb01.ptr);
+}
+
+static void svm_disable_lbrv(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+
+ svm->vmcb->control.virt_ext &= ~LBR_CTL_ENABLE_MASK;
+ set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_LASTBRANCHFROMIP, 0, 0);
+ set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_LASTBRANCHTOIP, 0, 0);
+ set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_LASTINTFROMIP, 0, 0);
+ set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_LASTINTTOIP, 0, 0);
+
+ /*
+ * Move the LBR msrs back to the vmcb01 to avoid copying them
+ * on nested guest entries.
+ */
+ if (is_guest_mode(vcpu))
+ svm_copy_lbrs(svm->vmcb01.ptr, svm->vmcb);
+}
+
+static struct vmcb *svm_get_lbr_vmcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
+{
+ /*
+ * If LBR virtualization is disabled, the LBR MSRs are always kept in
+ * vmcb01. If LBR virtualization is enabled and L1 is running VMs of
+ * its own, the MSRs are moved between vmcb01 and vmcb02 as needed.
+ */
+ return svm->vmcb->control.virt_ext & LBR_CTL_ENABLE_MASK ? svm->vmcb :
+ svm->vmcb01.ptr;
+}
+
+void svm_update_lbrv(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+ bool current_enable_lbrv = svm->vmcb->control.virt_ext & LBR_CTL_ENABLE_MASK;
+ bool enable_lbrv = (svm_get_lbr_vmcb(svm)->save.dbgctl & DEBUGCTLMSR_LBR) ||
+ (is_guest_mode(vcpu) && guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_LBRV) &&
+ (svm->nested.ctl.virt_ext & LBR_CTL_ENABLE_MASK));
+
+ if (enable_lbrv == current_enable_lbrv)
+ return;
+
+ if (enable_lbrv)
+ svm_enable_lbrv(vcpu);
+ else
+ svm_disable_lbrv(vcpu);
+}
+
+void disable_nmi_singlestep(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
+{
+ svm->nmi_singlestep = false;
+
+ if (!(svm->vcpu.guest_debug & KVM_GUESTDBG_SINGLESTEP)) {
+ /* Clear our flags if they were not set by the guest */
+ if (!(svm->nmi_singlestep_guest_rflags & X86_EFLAGS_TF))
+ svm->vmcb->save.rflags &= ~X86_EFLAGS_TF;
+ if (!(svm->nmi_singlestep_guest_rflags & X86_EFLAGS_RF))
+ svm->vmcb->save.rflags &= ~X86_EFLAGS_RF;
+ }
+}
+
+static void grow_ple_window(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+ struct vmcb_control_area *control = &svm->vmcb->control;
+ int old = control->pause_filter_count;
+
+ if (kvm_pause_in_guest(vcpu->kvm))
+ return;
+
+ control->pause_filter_count = __grow_ple_window(old,
+ pause_filter_count,
+ pause_filter_count_grow,
+ pause_filter_count_max);
+
+ if (control->pause_filter_count != old) {
+ vmcb_mark_dirty(svm->vmcb, VMCB_INTERCEPTS);
+ trace_kvm_ple_window_update(vcpu->vcpu_id,
+ control->pause_filter_count, old);
+ }
+}
+
+static void shrink_ple_window(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+ struct vmcb_control_area *control = &svm->vmcb->control;
+ int old = control->pause_filter_count;
+
+ if (kvm_pause_in_guest(vcpu->kvm))
+ return;
+
+ control->pause_filter_count =
+ __shrink_ple_window(old,
+ pause_filter_count,
+ pause_filter_count_shrink,
+ pause_filter_count);
+ if (control->pause_filter_count != old) {
+ vmcb_mark_dirty(svm->vmcb, VMCB_INTERCEPTS);
+ trace_kvm_ple_window_update(vcpu->vcpu_id,
+ control->pause_filter_count, old);
+ }
+}
+
+static void svm_hardware_unsetup(void)
+{
+ int cpu;
+
+ sev_hardware_unsetup();
+
+ for_each_possible_cpu(cpu)
+ svm_cpu_uninit(cpu);
+
+ __free_pages(pfn_to_page(iopm_base >> PAGE_SHIFT),
+ get_order(IOPM_SIZE));
+ iopm_base = 0;
+}
+
+static void init_seg(struct vmcb_seg *seg)
+{
+ seg->selector = 0;
+ seg->attrib = SVM_SELECTOR_P_MASK | SVM_SELECTOR_S_MASK |
+ SVM_SELECTOR_WRITE_MASK; /* Read/Write Data Segment */
+ seg->limit = 0xffff;
+ seg->base = 0;
+}
+
+static void init_sys_seg(struct vmcb_seg *seg, uint32_t type)
+{
+ seg->selector = 0;
+ seg->attrib = SVM_SELECTOR_P_MASK | type;
+ seg->limit = 0xffff;
+ seg->base = 0;
+}
+
+static u64 svm_get_l2_tsc_offset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+
+ return svm->nested.ctl.tsc_offset;
+}
+
+static u64 svm_get_l2_tsc_multiplier(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+
+ return svm->tsc_ratio_msr;
+}
+
+static void svm_write_tsc_offset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+
+ svm->vmcb01.ptr->control.tsc_offset = vcpu->arch.l1_tsc_offset;
+ svm->vmcb->control.tsc_offset = vcpu->arch.tsc_offset;
+ vmcb_mark_dirty(svm->vmcb, VMCB_INTERCEPTS);
+}
+
+void svm_write_tsc_multiplier(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ preempt_disable();
+ if (to_svm(vcpu)->guest_state_loaded)
+ __svm_write_tsc_multiplier(vcpu->arch.tsc_scaling_ratio);
+ preempt_enable();
+}
+
+/* Evaluate instruction intercepts that depend on guest CPUID features. */
+static void svm_recalc_instruction_intercepts(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+ struct vcpu_svm *svm)
+{
+ /*
+ * Intercept INVPCID if shadow paging is enabled to sync/free shadow
+ * roots, or if INVPCID is disabled in the guest to inject #UD.
+ */
+ if (kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_INVPCID)) {
+ if (!npt_enabled ||
+ !guest_cpuid_has(&svm->vcpu, X86_FEATURE_INVPCID))
+ svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_INVPCID);
+ else
+ svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_INVPCID);
+ }
+
+ if (kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_RDTSCP)) {
+ if (guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_RDTSCP))
+ svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_RDTSCP);
+ else
+ svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_RDTSCP);
+ }
+}
+
+static inline void init_vmcb_after_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+
+ if (guest_cpuid_is_intel(vcpu)) {
+ /*
+ * We must intercept SYSENTER_EIP and SYSENTER_ESP
+ * accesses because the processor only stores 32 bits.
+ * For the same reason we cannot use virtual VMLOAD/VMSAVE.
+ */
+ svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_VMLOAD);
+ svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_VMSAVE);
+ svm->vmcb->control.virt_ext &= ~VIRTUAL_VMLOAD_VMSAVE_ENABLE_MASK;
+
+ set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, 0, 0);
+ set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP, 0, 0);
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * If hardware supports Virtual VMLOAD VMSAVE then enable it
+ * in VMCB and clear intercepts to avoid #VMEXIT.
+ */
+ if (vls) {
+ svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_VMLOAD);
+ svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_VMSAVE);
+ svm->vmcb->control.virt_ext |= VIRTUAL_VMLOAD_VMSAVE_ENABLE_MASK;
+ }
+ /* No need to intercept these MSRs */
+ set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, 1, 1);
+ set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP, 1, 1);
+ }
+}
+
+static void init_vmcb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+ struct vmcb *vmcb = svm->vmcb01.ptr;
+ struct vmcb_control_area *control = &vmcb->control;
+ struct vmcb_save_area *save = &vmcb->save;
+
+ svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR0_READ);
+ svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR3_READ);
+ svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR4_READ);
+ svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR0_WRITE);
+ svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR3_WRITE);
+ svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR4_WRITE);
+ if (!kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu))
+ svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR8_WRITE);
+
+ set_dr_intercepts(svm);
+
+ set_exception_intercept(svm, PF_VECTOR);
+ set_exception_intercept(svm, UD_VECTOR);
+ set_exception_intercept(svm, MC_VECTOR);
+ set_exception_intercept(svm, AC_VECTOR);
+ set_exception_intercept(svm, DB_VECTOR);
+ /*
+ * Guest access to VMware backdoor ports could legitimately
+ * trigger #GP because of TSS I/O permission bitmap.
+ * We intercept those #GP and allow access to them anyway
+ * as VMware does.
+ */
+ if (enable_vmware_backdoor)
+ set_exception_intercept(svm, GP_VECTOR);
+
+ svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_INTR);
+ svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_NMI);
+
+ if (intercept_smi)
+ svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_SMI);
+
+ svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_SELECTIVE_CR0);
+ svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_RDPMC);
+ svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CPUID);
+ svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_INVD);
+ svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_INVLPG);
+ svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_INVLPGA);
+ svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_IOIO_PROT);
+ svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_MSR_PROT);
+ svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_TASK_SWITCH);
+ svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_SHUTDOWN);
+ svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_VMRUN);
+ svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_VMMCALL);
+ svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_VMLOAD);
+ svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_VMSAVE);
+ svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_STGI);
+ svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CLGI);
+ svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_SKINIT);
+ svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_WBINVD);
+ svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_XSETBV);
+ svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_RDPRU);
+ svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_RSM);
+
+ if (!kvm_mwait_in_guest(vcpu->kvm)) {
+ svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_MONITOR);
+ svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_MWAIT);
+ }
+
+ if (!kvm_hlt_in_guest(vcpu->kvm))
+ svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_HLT);
+
+ control->iopm_base_pa = __sme_set(iopm_base);
+ control->msrpm_base_pa = __sme_set(__pa(svm->msrpm));
+ control->int_ctl = V_INTR_MASKING_MASK;
+
+ init_seg(&save->es);
+ init_seg(&save->ss);
+ init_seg(&save->ds);
+ init_seg(&save->fs);
+ init_seg(&save->gs);
+
+ save->cs.selector = 0xf000;
+ save->cs.base = 0xffff0000;
+ /* Executable/Readable Code Segment */
+ save->cs.attrib = SVM_SELECTOR_READ_MASK | SVM_SELECTOR_P_MASK |
+ SVM_SELECTOR_S_MASK | SVM_SELECTOR_CODE_MASK;
+ save->cs.limit = 0xffff;
+
+ save->gdtr.base = 0;
+ save->gdtr.limit = 0xffff;
+ save->idtr.base = 0;
+ save->idtr.limit = 0xffff;
+
+ init_sys_seg(&save->ldtr, SEG_TYPE_LDT);
+ init_sys_seg(&save->tr, SEG_TYPE_BUSY_TSS16);
+
+ if (npt_enabled) {
+ /* Setup VMCB for Nested Paging */
+ control->nested_ctl |= SVM_NESTED_CTL_NP_ENABLE;
+ svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_INVLPG);
+ clr_exception_intercept(svm, PF_VECTOR);
+ svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR3_READ);
+ svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR3_WRITE);
+ save->g_pat = vcpu->arch.pat;
+ save->cr3 = 0;
+ }
+ svm->current_vmcb->asid_generation = 0;
+ svm->asid = 0;
+
+ svm->nested.vmcb12_gpa = INVALID_GPA;
+ svm->nested.last_vmcb12_gpa = INVALID_GPA;
+
+ if (!kvm_pause_in_guest(vcpu->kvm)) {
+ control->pause_filter_count = pause_filter_count;
+ if (pause_filter_thresh)
+ control->pause_filter_thresh = pause_filter_thresh;
+ svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_PAUSE);
+ } else {
+ svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_PAUSE);
+ }
+
+ svm_recalc_instruction_intercepts(vcpu, svm);
+
+ /*
+ * If the host supports V_SPEC_CTRL then disable the interception
+ * of MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL.
+ */
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_V_SPEC_CTRL))
+ set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, 1, 1);
+
+ if (kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu))
+ avic_init_vmcb(svm, vmcb);
+
+ if (vnmi)
+ svm->vmcb->control.int_ctl |= V_NMI_ENABLE_MASK;
+
+ if (vgif) {
+ svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_STGI);
+ svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CLGI);
+ svm->vmcb->control.int_ctl |= V_GIF_ENABLE_MASK;
+ }
+
+ if (sev_guest(vcpu->kvm))
+ sev_init_vmcb(svm);
+
+ svm_hv_init_vmcb(vmcb);
+ init_vmcb_after_set_cpuid(vcpu);
+
+ vmcb_mark_all_dirty(vmcb);
+
+ enable_gif(svm);
+}
+
+static void __svm_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+
+ svm_vcpu_init_msrpm(vcpu, svm->msrpm);
+
+ svm_init_osvw(vcpu);
+ vcpu->arch.microcode_version = 0x01000065;
+ svm->tsc_ratio_msr = kvm_caps.default_tsc_scaling_ratio;
+
+ svm->nmi_masked = false;
+ svm->awaiting_iret_completion = false;
+
+ if (sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm))
+ sev_es_vcpu_reset(svm);
+}
+
+static void svm_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event)
+{
+ struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+
+ svm->spec_ctrl = 0;
+ svm->virt_spec_ctrl = 0;
+
+ init_vmcb(vcpu);
+
+ if (!init_event)
+ __svm_vcpu_reset(vcpu);
+}
+
+void svm_switch_vmcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm, struct kvm_vmcb_info *target_vmcb)
+{
+ svm->current_vmcb = target_vmcb;
+ svm->vmcb = target_vmcb->ptr;
+}
+
+static int svm_vcpu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ struct vcpu_svm *svm;
+ struct page *vmcb01_page;
+ struct page *vmsa_page = NULL;
+ int err;
+
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct vcpu_svm, vcpu) != 0);
+ svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+
+ err = -ENOMEM;
+ vmcb01_page = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT | __GFP_ZERO);
+ if (!vmcb01_page)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm)) {
+ /*
+ * SEV-ES guests require a separate VMSA page used to contain
+ * the encrypted register state of the guest.
+ */
+ vmsa_page = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT | __GFP_ZERO);
+ if (!vmsa_page)
+ goto error_free_vmcb_page;
+
+ /*
+ * SEV-ES guests maintain an encrypted version of their FPU
+ * state which is restored and saved on VMRUN and VMEXIT.
+ * Mark vcpu->arch.guest_fpu->fpstate as scratch so it won't
+ * do xsave/xrstor on it.
+ */
+ fpstate_set_confidential(&vcpu->arch.guest_fpu);
+ }
+
+ err = avic_init_vcpu(svm);
+ if (err)
+ goto error_free_vmsa_page;
+
+ svm->msrpm = svm_vcpu_alloc_msrpm();
+ if (!svm->msrpm) {
+ err = -ENOMEM;
+ goto error_free_vmsa_page;
+ }
+
+ svm->x2avic_msrs_intercepted = true;
+
+ svm->vmcb01.ptr = page_address(vmcb01_page);
+ svm->vmcb01.pa = __sme_set(page_to_pfn(vmcb01_page) << PAGE_SHIFT);
+ svm_switch_vmcb(svm, &svm->vmcb01);
+
+ if (vmsa_page)
+ svm->sev_es.vmsa = page_address(vmsa_page);
+
+ svm->guest_state_loaded = false;
+
+ return 0;
+
+error_free_vmsa_page:
+ if (vmsa_page)
+ __free_page(vmsa_page);
+error_free_vmcb_page:
+ __free_page(vmcb01_page);
+out:
+ return err;
+}
+
+static void svm_clear_current_vmcb(struct vmcb *vmcb)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for_each_online_cpu(i)
+ cmpxchg(per_cpu_ptr(&svm_data.current_vmcb, i), vmcb, NULL);
+}
+
+static void svm_vcpu_free(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+
+ /*
+ * The vmcb page can be recycled, causing a false negative in
+ * svm_vcpu_load(). So, ensure that no logical CPU has this
+ * vmcb page recorded as its current vmcb.
+ */
+ svm_clear_current_vmcb(svm->vmcb);
+
+ svm_leave_nested(vcpu);
+ svm_free_nested(svm);
+
+ sev_free_vcpu(vcpu);
+
+ __free_page(pfn_to_page(__sme_clr(svm->vmcb01.pa) >> PAGE_SHIFT));
+ __free_pages(virt_to_page(svm->msrpm), get_order(MSRPM_SIZE));
+}
+
+static void svm_prepare_switch_to_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+ struct svm_cpu_data *sd = per_cpu_ptr(&svm_data, vcpu->cpu);
+
+ if (sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm))
+ sev_es_unmap_ghcb(svm);
+
+ if (svm->guest_state_loaded)
+ return;
+
+ /*
+ * Save additional host state that will be restored on VMEXIT (sev-es)
+ * or subsequent vmload of host save area.
+ */
+ vmsave(sd->save_area_pa);
+ if (sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm)) {
+ struct sev_es_save_area *hostsa;
+ hostsa = (struct sev_es_save_area *)(page_address(sd->save_area) + 0x400);
+
+ sev_es_prepare_switch_to_guest(hostsa);
+ }
+
+ if (tsc_scaling)
+ __svm_write_tsc_multiplier(vcpu->arch.tsc_scaling_ratio);
+
+ /*
+ * TSC_AUX is always virtualized for SEV-ES guests when the feature is
+ * available. The user return MSR support is not required in this case
+ * because TSC_AUX is restored on #VMEXIT from the host save area
+ * (which has been initialized in svm_hardware_enable()).
+ */
+ if (likely(tsc_aux_uret_slot >= 0) &&
+ (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_V_TSC_AUX) || !sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm)))
+ kvm_set_user_return_msr(tsc_aux_uret_slot, svm->tsc_aux, -1ull);
+
+ svm->guest_state_loaded = true;
+}
+
+static void svm_prepare_host_switch(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ to_svm(vcpu)->guest_state_loaded = false;
+}
+
+static void svm_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu)
+{
+ struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+ struct svm_cpu_data *sd = per_cpu_ptr(&svm_data, cpu);
+
+ if (sd->current_vmcb != svm->vmcb) {
+ sd->current_vmcb = svm->vmcb;
+
+ if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT))
+ indirect_branch_prediction_barrier();
+ }
+ if (kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu))
+ avic_vcpu_load(vcpu, cpu);
+}
+
+static void svm_vcpu_put(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ if (kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu))
+ avic_vcpu_put(vcpu);
+
+ svm_prepare_host_switch(vcpu);
+
+ ++vcpu->stat.host_state_reload;
+}
+
+static unsigned long svm_get_rflags(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+ unsigned long rflags = svm->vmcb->save.rflags;
+
+ if (svm->nmi_singlestep) {
+ /* Hide our flags if they were not set by the guest */
+ if (!(svm->nmi_singlestep_guest_rflags & X86_EFLAGS_TF))
+ rflags &= ~X86_EFLAGS_TF;
+ if (!(svm->nmi_singlestep_guest_rflags & X86_EFLAGS_RF))
+ rflags &= ~X86_EFLAGS_RF;
+ }
+ return rflags;
+}
+
+static void svm_set_rflags(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long rflags)
+{
+ if (to_svm(vcpu)->nmi_singlestep)
+ rflags |= (X86_EFLAGS_TF | X86_EFLAGS_RF);
+
+ /*
+ * Any change of EFLAGS.VM is accompanied by a reload of SS
+ * (caused by either a task switch or an inter-privilege IRET),
+ * so we do not need to update the CPL here.
+ */
+ to_svm(vcpu)->vmcb->save.rflags = rflags;
+}
+
+static bool svm_get_if_flag(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ struct vmcb *vmcb = to_svm(vcpu)->vmcb;
+
+ return sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm)
+ ? vmcb->control.int_state & SVM_GUEST_INTERRUPT_MASK
+ : kvm_get_rflags(vcpu) & X86_EFLAGS_IF;
+}
+
+static void svm_cache_reg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, enum kvm_reg reg)
+{
+ kvm_register_mark_available(vcpu, reg);
+
+ switch (reg) {
+ case VCPU_EXREG_PDPTR:
+ /*
+ * When !npt_enabled, mmu->pdptrs[] is already available since
+ * it is always updated per SDM when moving to CRs.
+ */
+ if (npt_enabled)
+ load_pdptrs(vcpu, kvm_read_cr3(vcpu));
+ break;
+ default:
+ KVM_BUG_ON(1, vcpu->kvm);
+ }
+}
+
+static void svm_set_vintr(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
+{
+ struct vmcb_control_area *control;
+
+ /*
+ * The following fields are ignored when AVIC is enabled
+ */
+ WARN_ON(kvm_vcpu_apicv_activated(&svm->vcpu));
+
+ svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_VINTR);
+
+ /*
+ * Recalculating intercepts may have cleared the VINTR intercept. If
+ * V_INTR_MASKING is enabled in vmcb12, then the effective RFLAGS.IF
+ * for L1 physical interrupts is L1's RFLAGS.IF at the time of VMRUN.
+ * Requesting an interrupt window if save.RFLAGS.IF=0 is pointless as
+ * interrupts will never be unblocked while L2 is running.
+ */
+ if (!svm_is_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_VINTR))
+ return;
+
+ /*
+ * This is just a dummy VINTR to actually cause a vmexit to happen.
+ * Actual injection of virtual interrupts happens through EVENTINJ.
+ */
+ control = &svm->vmcb->control;
+ control->int_vector = 0x0;
+ control->int_ctl &= ~V_INTR_PRIO_MASK;
+ control->int_ctl |= V_IRQ_MASK |
+ ((/*control->int_vector >> 4*/ 0xf) << V_INTR_PRIO_SHIFT);
+ vmcb_mark_dirty(svm->vmcb, VMCB_INTR);
+}
+
+static void svm_clear_vintr(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
+{
+ svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_VINTR);
+
+ /* Drop int_ctl fields related to VINTR injection. */
+ svm->vmcb->control.int_ctl &= ~V_IRQ_INJECTION_BITS_MASK;
+ if (is_guest_mode(&svm->vcpu)) {
+ svm->vmcb01.ptr->control.int_ctl &= ~V_IRQ_INJECTION_BITS_MASK;
+
+ WARN_ON((svm->vmcb->control.int_ctl & V_TPR_MASK) !=
+ (svm->nested.ctl.int_ctl & V_TPR_MASK));
+
+ svm->vmcb->control.int_ctl |= svm->nested.ctl.int_ctl &
+ V_IRQ_INJECTION_BITS_MASK;
+
+ svm->vmcb->control.int_vector = svm->nested.ctl.int_vector;
+ }
+
+ vmcb_mark_dirty(svm->vmcb, VMCB_INTR);
+}
+
+static struct vmcb_seg *svm_seg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int seg)
+{
+ struct vmcb_save_area *save = &to_svm(vcpu)->vmcb->save;
+ struct vmcb_save_area *save01 = &to_svm(vcpu)->vmcb01.ptr->save;
+
+ switch (seg) {
+ case VCPU_SREG_CS: return &save->cs;
+ case VCPU_SREG_DS: return &save->ds;
+ case VCPU_SREG_ES: return &save->es;
+ case VCPU_SREG_FS: return &save01->fs;
+ case VCPU_SREG_GS: return &save01->gs;
+ case VCPU_SREG_SS: return &save->ss;
+ case VCPU_SREG_TR: return &save01->tr;
+ case VCPU_SREG_LDTR: return &save01->ldtr;
+ }
+ BUG();
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static u64 svm_get_segment_base(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int seg)
+{
+ struct vmcb_seg *s = svm_seg(vcpu, seg);
+
+ return s->base;
+}
+
+static void svm_get_segment(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+ struct kvm_segment *var, int seg)
+{
+ struct vmcb_seg *s = svm_seg(vcpu, seg);
+
+ var->base = s->base;
+ var->limit = s->limit;
+ var->selector = s->selector;
+ var->type = s->attrib & SVM_SELECTOR_TYPE_MASK;
+ var->s = (s->attrib >> SVM_SELECTOR_S_SHIFT) & 1;
+ var->dpl = (s->attrib >> SVM_SELECTOR_DPL_SHIFT) & 3;
+ var->present = (s->attrib >> SVM_SELECTOR_P_SHIFT) & 1;
+ var->avl = (s->attrib >> SVM_SELECTOR_AVL_SHIFT) & 1;
+ var->l = (s->attrib >> SVM_SELECTOR_L_SHIFT) & 1;
+ var->db = (s->attrib >> SVM_SELECTOR_DB_SHIFT) & 1;
+
+ /*
+ * AMD CPUs circa 2014 track the G bit for all segments except CS.
+ * However, the SVM spec states that the G bit is not observed by the
+ * CPU, and some VMware virtual CPUs drop the G bit for all segments.
+ * So let's synthesize a legal G bit for all segments, this helps
+ * running KVM nested. It also helps cross-vendor migration, because
+ * Intel's vmentry has a check on the 'G' bit.
+ */
+ var->g = s->limit > 0xfffff;
+
+ /*
+ * AMD's VMCB does not have an explicit unusable field, so emulate it
+ * for cross vendor migration purposes by "not present"
+ */
+ var->unusable = !var->present;
+
+ switch (seg) {
+ case VCPU_SREG_TR:
+ /*
+ * Work around a bug where the busy flag in the tr selector
+ * isn't exposed
+ */
+ var->type |= 0x2;
+ break;
+ case VCPU_SREG_DS:
+ case VCPU_SREG_ES:
+ case VCPU_SREG_FS:
+ case VCPU_SREG_GS:
+ /*
+ * The accessed bit must always be set in the segment
+ * descriptor cache, although it can be cleared in the
+ * descriptor, the cached bit always remains at 1. Since
+ * Intel has a check on this, set it here to support
+ * cross-vendor migration.
+ */
+ if (!var->unusable)
+ var->type |= 0x1;
+ break;
+ case VCPU_SREG_SS:
+ /*
+ * On AMD CPUs sometimes the DB bit in the segment
+ * descriptor is left as 1, although the whole segment has
+ * been made unusable. Clear it here to pass an Intel VMX
+ * entry check when cross vendor migrating.
+ */
+ if (var->unusable)
+ var->db = 0;
+ /* This is symmetric with svm_set_segment() */
+ var->dpl = to_svm(vcpu)->vmcb->save.cpl;
+ break;
+ }
+}
+
+static int svm_get_cpl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ struct vmcb_save_area *save = &to_svm(vcpu)->vmcb->save;
+
+ return save->cpl;
+}
+
+static void svm_get_cs_db_l_bits(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int *db, int *l)
+{
+ struct kvm_segment cs;
+
+ svm_get_segment(vcpu, &cs, VCPU_SREG_CS);
+ *db = cs.db;
+ *l = cs.l;
+}
+
+static void svm_get_idt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct desc_ptr *dt)
+{
+ struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+
+ dt->size = svm->vmcb->save.idtr.limit;
+ dt->address = svm->vmcb->save.idtr.base;
+}
+
+static void svm_set_idt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct desc_ptr *dt)
+{
+ struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+
+ svm->vmcb->save.idtr.limit = dt->size;
+ svm->vmcb->save.idtr.base = dt->address ;
+ vmcb_mark_dirty(svm->vmcb, VMCB_DT);
+}
+
+static void svm_get_gdt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct desc_ptr *dt)
+{
+ struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+
+ dt->size = svm->vmcb->save.gdtr.limit;
+ dt->address = svm->vmcb->save.gdtr.base;
+}
+
+static void svm_set_gdt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct desc_ptr *dt)
+{
+ struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+
+ svm->vmcb->save.gdtr.limit = dt->size;
+ svm->vmcb->save.gdtr.base = dt->address ;
+ vmcb_mark_dirty(svm->vmcb, VMCB_DT);
+}
+
+static void sev_post_set_cr3(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr3)
+{
+ struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+
+ /*
+ * For guests that don't set guest_state_protected, the cr3 update is
+ * handled via kvm_mmu_load() while entering the guest. For guests
+ * that do (SEV-ES/SEV-SNP), the cr3 update needs to be written to
+ * VMCB save area now, since the save area will become the initial
+ * contents of the VMSA, and future VMCB save area updates won't be
+ * seen.
+ */
+ if (sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm)) {
+ svm->vmcb->save.cr3 = cr3;
+ vmcb_mark_dirty(svm->vmcb, VMCB_CR);
+ }
+}
+
+static bool svm_is_valid_cr0(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr0)
+{
+ return true;
+}
+
+void svm_set_cr0(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr0)
+{
+ struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+ u64 hcr0 = cr0;
+ bool old_paging = is_paging(vcpu);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+ if (vcpu->arch.efer & EFER_LME) {
+ if (!is_paging(vcpu) && (cr0 & X86_CR0_PG)) {
+ vcpu->arch.efer |= EFER_LMA;
+ if (!vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected)
+ svm->vmcb->save.efer |= EFER_LMA | EFER_LME;
+ }
+
+ if (is_paging(vcpu) && !(cr0 & X86_CR0_PG)) {
+ vcpu->arch.efer &= ~EFER_LMA;
+ if (!vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected)
+ svm->vmcb->save.efer &= ~(EFER_LMA | EFER_LME);
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+ vcpu->arch.cr0 = cr0;
+
+ if (!npt_enabled) {
+ hcr0 |= X86_CR0_PG | X86_CR0_WP;
+ if (old_paging != is_paging(vcpu))
+ svm_set_cr4(vcpu, kvm_read_cr4(vcpu));
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * re-enable caching here because the QEMU bios
+ * does not do it - this results in some delay at
+ * reboot
+ */
+ if (kvm_check_has_quirk(vcpu->kvm, KVM_X86_QUIRK_CD_NW_CLEARED))
+ hcr0 &= ~(X86_CR0_CD | X86_CR0_NW);
+
+ svm->vmcb->save.cr0 = hcr0;
+ vmcb_mark_dirty(svm->vmcb, VMCB_CR);
+
+ /*
+ * SEV-ES guests must always keep the CR intercepts cleared. CR
+ * tracking is done using the CR write traps.
+ */
+ if (sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm))
+ return;
+
+ if (hcr0 == cr0) {
+ /* Selective CR0 write remains on. */
+ svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR0_READ);
+ svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR0_WRITE);
+ } else {
+ svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR0_READ);
+ svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR0_WRITE);
+ }
+}
+
+static bool svm_is_valid_cr4(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr4)
+{
+ return true;
+}
+
+void svm_set_cr4(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr4)
+{
+ unsigned long host_cr4_mce = cr4_read_shadow() & X86_CR4_MCE;
+ unsigned long old_cr4 = vcpu->arch.cr4;
+
+ if (npt_enabled && ((old_cr4 ^ cr4) & X86_CR4_PGE))
+ svm_flush_tlb_current(vcpu);
+
+ vcpu->arch.cr4 = cr4;
+ if (!npt_enabled) {
+ cr4 |= X86_CR4_PAE;
+
+ if (!is_paging(vcpu))
+ cr4 &= ~(X86_CR4_SMEP | X86_CR4_SMAP | X86_CR4_PKE);
+ }
+ cr4 |= host_cr4_mce;
+ to_svm(vcpu)->vmcb->save.cr4 = cr4;
+ vmcb_mark_dirty(to_svm(vcpu)->vmcb, VMCB_CR);
+
+ if ((cr4 ^ old_cr4) & (X86_CR4_OSXSAVE | X86_CR4_PKE))
+ kvm_update_cpuid_runtime(vcpu);
+}
+
+static void svm_set_segment(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+ struct kvm_segment *var, int seg)
+{
+ struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+ struct vmcb_seg *s = svm_seg(vcpu, seg);
+
+ s->base = var->base;
+ s->limit = var->limit;
+ s->selector = var->selector;
+ s->attrib = (var->type & SVM_SELECTOR_TYPE_MASK);
+ s->attrib |= (var->s & 1) << SVM_SELECTOR_S_SHIFT;
+ s->attrib |= (var->dpl & 3) << SVM_SELECTOR_DPL_SHIFT;
+ s->attrib |= ((var->present & 1) && !var->unusable) << SVM_SELECTOR_P_SHIFT;
+ s->attrib |= (var->avl & 1) << SVM_SELECTOR_AVL_SHIFT;
+ s->attrib |= (var->l & 1) << SVM_SELECTOR_L_SHIFT;
+ s->attrib |= (var->db & 1) << SVM_SELECTOR_DB_SHIFT;
+ s->attrib |= (var->g & 1) << SVM_SELECTOR_G_SHIFT;
+
+ /*
+ * This is always accurate, except if SYSRET returned to a segment
+ * with SS.DPL != 3. Intel does not have this quirk, and always
+ * forces SS.DPL to 3 on sysret, so we ignore that case; fixing it
+ * would entail passing the CPL to userspace and back.
+ */
+ if (seg == VCPU_SREG_SS)
+ /* This is symmetric with svm_get_segment() */
+ svm->vmcb->save.cpl = (var->dpl & 3);
+
+ vmcb_mark_dirty(svm->vmcb, VMCB_SEG);
+}
+
+static void svm_update_exception_bitmap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+
+ clr_exception_intercept(svm, BP_VECTOR);
+
+ if (vcpu->guest_debug & KVM_GUESTDBG_ENABLE) {
+ if (vcpu->guest_debug & KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_SW_BP)
+ set_exception_intercept(svm, BP_VECTOR);
+ }
+}
+
+static void new_asid(struct vcpu_svm *svm, struct svm_cpu_data *sd)
+{
+ if (sd->next_asid > sd->max_asid) {
+ ++sd->asid_generation;
+ sd->next_asid = sd->min_asid;
+ svm->vmcb->control.tlb_ctl = TLB_CONTROL_FLUSH_ALL_ASID;
+ vmcb_mark_dirty(svm->vmcb, VMCB_ASID);
+ }
+
+ svm->current_vmcb->asid_generation = sd->asid_generation;
+ svm->asid = sd->next_asid++;
+}
+
+static void svm_set_dr6(struct vcpu_svm *svm, unsigned long value)
+{
+ struct vmcb *vmcb = svm->vmcb;
+
+ if (svm->vcpu.arch.guest_state_protected)
+ return;
+
+ if (unlikely(value != vmcb->save.dr6)) {
+ vmcb->save.dr6 = value;
+ vmcb_mark_dirty(vmcb, VMCB_DR);
+ }
+}
+
+static void svm_sync_dirty_debug_regs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm)))
+ return;
+
+ get_debugreg(vcpu->arch.db[0], 0);
+ get_debugreg(vcpu->arch.db[1], 1);
+ get_debugreg(vcpu->arch.db[2], 2);
+ get_debugreg(vcpu->arch.db[3], 3);
+ /*
+ * We cannot reset svm->vmcb->save.dr6 to DR6_ACTIVE_LOW here,
+ * because db_interception might need it. We can do it before vmentry.
+ */
+ vcpu->arch.dr6 = svm->vmcb->save.dr6;
+ vcpu->arch.dr7 = svm->vmcb->save.dr7;
+ vcpu->arch.switch_db_regs &= ~KVM_DEBUGREG_WONT_EXIT;
+ set_dr_intercepts(svm);
+}
+
+static void svm_set_dr7(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long value)
+{
+ struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+
+ if (vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected)
+ return;
+
+ svm->vmcb->save.dr7 = value;
+ vmcb_mark_dirty(svm->vmcb, VMCB_DR);
+}
+
+static int pf_interception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+
+ u64 fault_address = svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_2;
+ u64 error_code = svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_1;
+
+ return kvm_handle_page_fault(vcpu, error_code, fault_address,
+ static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_DECODEASSISTS) ?
+ svm->vmcb->control.insn_bytes : NULL,
+ svm->vmcb->control.insn_len);
+}
+
+static int npf_interception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+
+ u64 fault_address = svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_2;
+ u64 error_code = svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_1;
+
+ trace_kvm_page_fault(vcpu, fault_address, error_code);
+ return kvm_mmu_page_fault(vcpu, fault_address, error_code,
+ static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_DECODEASSISTS) ?
+ svm->vmcb->control.insn_bytes : NULL,
+ svm->vmcb->control.insn_len);
+}
+
+static int db_interception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ struct kvm_run *kvm_run = vcpu->run;
+ struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+
+ if (!(vcpu->guest_debug &
+ (KVM_GUESTDBG_SINGLESTEP | KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_HW_BP)) &&
+ !svm->nmi_singlestep) {
+ u32 payload = svm->vmcb->save.dr6 ^ DR6_ACTIVE_LOW;
+ kvm_queue_exception_p(vcpu, DB_VECTOR, payload);
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ if (svm->nmi_singlestep) {
+ disable_nmi_singlestep(svm);
+ /* Make sure we check for pending NMIs upon entry */
+ kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu);
+ }
+
+ if (vcpu->guest_debug &
+ (KVM_GUESTDBG_SINGLESTEP | KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_HW_BP)) {
+ kvm_run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_DEBUG;
+ kvm_run->debug.arch.dr6 = svm->vmcb->save.dr6;
+ kvm_run->debug.arch.dr7 = svm->vmcb->save.dr7;
+ kvm_run->debug.arch.pc =
+ svm->vmcb->save.cs.base + svm->vmcb->save.rip;
+ kvm_run->debug.arch.exception = DB_VECTOR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int bp_interception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+ struct kvm_run *kvm_run = vcpu->run;
+
+ kvm_run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_DEBUG;
+ kvm_run->debug.arch.pc = svm->vmcb->save.cs.base + svm->vmcb->save.rip;
+ kvm_run->debug.arch.exception = BP_VECTOR;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int ud_interception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ return handle_ud(vcpu);
+}
+
+static int ac_interception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ kvm_queue_exception_e(vcpu, AC_VECTOR, 0);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static bool is_erratum_383(void)
+{
+ int err, i;
+ u64 value;
+
+ if (!erratum_383_found)
+ return false;
+
+ value = native_read_msr_safe(MSR_IA32_MC0_STATUS, &err);
+ if (err)
+ return false;
+
+ /* Bit 62 may or may not be set for this mce */
+ value &= ~(1ULL << 62);
+
+ if (value != 0xb600000000010015ULL)
+ return false;
+
+ /* Clear MCi_STATUS registers */
+ for (i = 0; i < 6; ++i)
+ native_write_msr_safe(MSR_IA32_MCx_STATUS(i), 0, 0);
+
+ value = native_read_msr_safe(MSR_IA32_MCG_STATUS, &err);
+ if (!err) {
+ u32 low, high;
+
+ value &= ~(1ULL << 2);
+ low = lower_32_bits(value);
+ high = upper_32_bits(value);
+
+ native_write_msr_safe(MSR_IA32_MCG_STATUS, low, high);
+ }
+
+ /* Flush tlb to evict multi-match entries */
+ __flush_tlb_all();
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+static void svm_handle_mce(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ if (is_erratum_383()) {
+ /*
+ * Erratum 383 triggered. Guest state is corrupt so kill the
+ * guest.
+ */
+ pr_err("Guest triggered AMD Erratum 383\n");
+
+ kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_TRIPLE_FAULT, vcpu);
+
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * On an #MC intercept the MCE handler is not called automatically in
+ * the host. So do it by hand here.
+ */
+ kvm_machine_check();
+}
+
+static int mc_interception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int shutdown_interception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ struct kvm_run *kvm_run = vcpu->run;
+ struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+
+ /*
+ * The VM save area has already been encrypted so it
+ * cannot be reinitialized - just terminate.
+ */
+ if (sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /*
+ * VMCB is undefined after a SHUTDOWN intercept. INIT the vCPU to put
+ * the VMCB in a known good state. Unfortuately, KVM doesn't have
+ * KVM_MP_STATE_SHUTDOWN and can't add it without potentially breaking
+ * userspace. At a platform view, INIT is acceptable behavior as
+ * there exist bare metal platforms that automatically INIT the CPU
+ * in response to shutdown.
+ */
+ clear_page(svm->vmcb);
+ kvm_vcpu_reset(vcpu, true);
+
+ kvm_run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_SHUTDOWN;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int io_interception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+ u32 io_info = svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_1; /* address size bug? */
+ int size, in, string;
+ unsigned port;
+
+ ++vcpu->stat.io_exits;
+ string = (io_info & SVM_IOIO_STR_MASK) != 0;
+ in = (io_info & SVM_IOIO_TYPE_MASK) != 0;
+ port = io_info >> 16;
+ size = (io_info & SVM_IOIO_SIZE_MASK) >> SVM_IOIO_SIZE_SHIFT;
+
+ if (string) {
+ if (sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm))
+ return sev_es_string_io(svm, size, port, in);
+ else
+ return kvm_emulate_instruction(vcpu, 0);
+ }
+
+ svm->next_rip = svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_2;
+
+ return kvm_fast_pio(vcpu, size, port, in);
+}
+
+static int nmi_interception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int smi_interception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int intr_interception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ ++vcpu->stat.irq_exits;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int vmload_vmsave_interception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool vmload)
+{
+ struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+ struct vmcb *vmcb12;
+ struct kvm_host_map map;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (nested_svm_check_permissions(vcpu))
+ return 1;
+
+ ret = kvm_vcpu_map(vcpu, gpa_to_gfn(svm->vmcb->save.rax), &map);
+ if (ret) {
+ if (ret == -EINVAL)
+ kvm_inject_gp(vcpu, 0);
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ vmcb12 = map.hva;
+
+ ret = kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
+
+ if (vmload) {
+ svm_copy_vmloadsave_state(svm->vmcb, vmcb12);
+ svm->sysenter_eip_hi = 0;
+ svm->sysenter_esp_hi = 0;
+ } else {
+ svm_copy_vmloadsave_state(vmcb12, svm->vmcb);
+ }
+
+ kvm_vcpu_unmap(vcpu, &map, true);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int vmload_interception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ return vmload_vmsave_interception(vcpu, true);
+}
+
+static int vmsave_interception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ return vmload_vmsave_interception(vcpu, false);
+}
+
+static int vmrun_interception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ if (nested_svm_check_permissions(vcpu))
+ return 1;
+
+ return nested_svm_vmrun(vcpu);
+}
+
+enum {
+ NONE_SVM_INSTR,
+ SVM_INSTR_VMRUN,
+ SVM_INSTR_VMLOAD,
+ SVM_INSTR_VMSAVE,
+};
+
+/* Return NONE_SVM_INSTR if not SVM instrs, otherwise return decode result */
+static int svm_instr_opcode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt = vcpu->arch.emulate_ctxt;
+
+ if (ctxt->b != 0x1 || ctxt->opcode_len != 2)
+ return NONE_SVM_INSTR;
+
+ switch (ctxt->modrm) {
+ case 0xd8: /* VMRUN */
+ return SVM_INSTR_VMRUN;
+ case 0xda: /* VMLOAD */
+ return SVM_INSTR_VMLOAD;
+ case 0xdb: /* VMSAVE */
+ return SVM_INSTR_VMSAVE;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return NONE_SVM_INSTR;
+}
+
+static int emulate_svm_instr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int opcode)
+{
+ const int guest_mode_exit_codes[] = {
+ [SVM_INSTR_VMRUN] = SVM_EXIT_VMRUN,
+ [SVM_INSTR_VMLOAD] = SVM_EXIT_VMLOAD,
+ [SVM_INSTR_VMSAVE] = SVM_EXIT_VMSAVE,
+ };
+ int (*const svm_instr_handlers[])(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) = {
+ [SVM_INSTR_VMRUN] = vmrun_interception,
+ [SVM_INSTR_VMLOAD] = vmload_interception,
+ [SVM_INSTR_VMSAVE] = vmsave_interception,
+ };
+ struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+ int ret;
+
+ if (is_guest_mode(vcpu)) {
+ /* Returns '1' or -errno on failure, '0' on success. */
+ ret = nested_svm_simple_vmexit(svm, guest_mode_exit_codes[opcode]);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ return svm_instr_handlers[opcode](vcpu);
+}
+
+/*
+ * #GP handling code. Note that #GP can be triggered under the following two
+ * cases:
+ * 1) SVM VM-related instructions (VMRUN/VMSAVE/VMLOAD) that trigger #GP on
+ * some AMD CPUs when EAX of these instructions are in the reserved memory
+ * regions (e.g. SMM memory on host).
+ * 2) VMware backdoor
+ */
+static int gp_interception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+ u32 error_code = svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_1;
+ int opcode;
+
+ /* Both #GP cases have zero error_code */
+ if (error_code)
+ goto reinject;
+
+ /* Decode the instruction for usage later */
+ if (x86_decode_emulated_instruction(vcpu, 0, NULL, 0) != EMULATION_OK)
+ goto reinject;
+
+ opcode = svm_instr_opcode(vcpu);
+
+ if (opcode == NONE_SVM_INSTR) {
+ if (!enable_vmware_backdoor)
+ goto reinject;
+
+ /*
+ * VMware backdoor emulation on #GP interception only handles
+ * IN{S}, OUT{S}, and RDPMC.
+ */
+ if (!is_guest_mode(vcpu))
+ return kvm_emulate_instruction(vcpu,
+ EMULTYPE_VMWARE_GP | EMULTYPE_NO_DECODE);
+ } else {
+ /* All SVM instructions expect page aligned RAX */
+ if (svm->vmcb->save.rax & ~PAGE_MASK)
+ goto reinject;
+
+ return emulate_svm_instr(vcpu, opcode);
+ }
+
+reinject:
+ kvm_queue_exception_e(vcpu, GP_VECTOR, error_code);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+void svm_set_gif(struct vcpu_svm *svm, bool value)
+{
+ if (value) {
+ /*
+ * If VGIF is enabled, the STGI intercept is only added to
+ * detect the opening of the SMI/NMI window; remove it now.
+ * Likewise, clear the VINTR intercept, we will set it
+ * again while processing KVM_REQ_EVENT if needed.
+ */
+ if (vgif)
+ svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_STGI);
+ if (svm_is_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_VINTR))
+ svm_clear_vintr(svm);
+
+ enable_gif(svm);
+ if (svm->vcpu.arch.smi_pending ||
+ svm->vcpu.arch.nmi_pending ||
+ kvm_cpu_has_injectable_intr(&svm->vcpu) ||
+ kvm_apic_has_pending_init_or_sipi(&svm->vcpu))
+ kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, &svm->vcpu);
+ } else {
+ disable_gif(svm);
+
+ /*
+ * After a CLGI no interrupts should come. But if vGIF is
+ * in use, we still rely on the VINTR intercept (rather than
+ * STGI) to detect an open interrupt window.
+ */
+ if (!vgif)
+ svm_clear_vintr(svm);
+ }
+}
+
+static int stgi_interception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ if (nested_svm_check_permissions(vcpu))
+ return 1;
+
+ ret = kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
+ svm_set_gif(to_svm(vcpu), true);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int clgi_interception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ if (nested_svm_check_permissions(vcpu))
+ return 1;
+
+ ret = kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
+ svm_set_gif(to_svm(vcpu), false);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int invlpga_interception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ gva_t gva = kvm_rax_read(vcpu);
+ u32 asid = kvm_rcx_read(vcpu);
+
+ /* FIXME: Handle an address size prefix. */
+ if (!is_long_mode(vcpu))
+ gva = (u32)gva;
+
+ trace_kvm_invlpga(to_svm(vcpu)->vmcb->save.rip, asid, gva);
+
+ /* Let's treat INVLPGA the same as INVLPG (can be optimized!) */
+ kvm_mmu_invlpg(vcpu, gva);
+
+ return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
+}
+
+static int skinit_interception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ trace_kvm_skinit(to_svm(vcpu)->vmcb->save.rip, kvm_rax_read(vcpu));
+
+ kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, UD_VECTOR);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int task_switch_interception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+ u16 tss_selector;
+ int reason;
+ int int_type = svm->vmcb->control.exit_int_info &
+ SVM_EXITINTINFO_TYPE_MASK;
+ int int_vec = svm->vmcb->control.exit_int_info & SVM_EVTINJ_VEC_MASK;
+ uint32_t type =
+ svm->vmcb->control.exit_int_info & SVM_EXITINTINFO_TYPE_MASK;
+ uint32_t idt_v =
+ svm->vmcb->control.exit_int_info & SVM_EXITINTINFO_VALID;
+ bool has_error_code = false;
+ u32 error_code = 0;
+
+ tss_selector = (u16)svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_1;
+
+ if (svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_2 &
+ (1ULL << SVM_EXITINFOSHIFT_TS_REASON_IRET))
+ reason = TASK_SWITCH_IRET;
+ else if (svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_2 &
+ (1ULL << SVM_EXITINFOSHIFT_TS_REASON_JMP))
+ reason = TASK_SWITCH_JMP;
+ else if (idt_v)
+ reason = TASK_SWITCH_GATE;
+ else
+ reason = TASK_SWITCH_CALL;
+
+ if (reason == TASK_SWITCH_GATE) {
+ switch (type) {
+ case SVM_EXITINTINFO_TYPE_NMI:
+ vcpu->arch.nmi_injected = false;
+ break;
+ case SVM_EXITINTINFO_TYPE_EXEPT:
+ if (svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_2 &
+ (1ULL << SVM_EXITINFOSHIFT_TS_HAS_ERROR_CODE)) {
+ has_error_code = true;
+ error_code =
+ (u32)svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_2;
+ }
+ kvm_clear_exception_queue(vcpu);
+ break;
+ case SVM_EXITINTINFO_TYPE_INTR:
+ case SVM_EXITINTINFO_TYPE_SOFT:
+ kvm_clear_interrupt_queue(vcpu);
+ break;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (reason != TASK_SWITCH_GATE ||
+ int_type == SVM_EXITINTINFO_TYPE_SOFT ||
+ (int_type == SVM_EXITINTINFO_TYPE_EXEPT &&
+ (int_vec == OF_VECTOR || int_vec == BP_VECTOR))) {
+ if (!svm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu))
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (int_type != SVM_EXITINTINFO_TYPE_SOFT)
+ int_vec = -1;
+
+ return kvm_task_switch(vcpu, tss_selector, int_vec, reason,
+ has_error_code, error_code);
+}
+
+static void svm_clr_iret_intercept(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
+{
+ if (!sev_es_guest(svm->vcpu.kvm))
+ svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_IRET);
+}
+
+static void svm_set_iret_intercept(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
+{
+ if (!sev_es_guest(svm->vcpu.kvm))
+ svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_IRET);
+}
+
+static int iret_interception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm));
+
+ ++vcpu->stat.nmi_window_exits;
+ svm->awaiting_iret_completion = true;
+
+ svm_clr_iret_intercept(svm);
+ svm->nmi_iret_rip = kvm_rip_read(vcpu);
+
+ kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int invlpg_interception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_DECODEASSISTS))
+ return kvm_emulate_instruction(vcpu, 0);
+
+ kvm_mmu_invlpg(vcpu, to_svm(vcpu)->vmcb->control.exit_info_1);
+ return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
+}
+
+static int emulate_on_interception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ return kvm_emulate_instruction(vcpu, 0);
+}
+
+static int rsm_interception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ return kvm_emulate_instruction_from_buffer(vcpu, rsm_ins_bytes, 2);
+}
+
+static bool check_selective_cr0_intercepted(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+ unsigned long val)
+{
+ struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+ unsigned long cr0 = vcpu->arch.cr0;
+ bool ret = false;
+
+ if (!is_guest_mode(vcpu) ||
+ (!(vmcb12_is_intercept(&svm->nested.ctl, INTERCEPT_SELECTIVE_CR0))))
+ return false;
+
+ cr0 &= ~SVM_CR0_SELECTIVE_MASK;
+ val &= ~SVM_CR0_SELECTIVE_MASK;
+
+ if (cr0 ^ val) {
+ svm->vmcb->control.exit_code = SVM_EXIT_CR0_SEL_WRITE;
+ ret = (nested_svm_exit_handled(svm) == NESTED_EXIT_DONE);
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+#define CR_VALID (1ULL << 63)
+
+static int cr_interception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+ int reg, cr;
+ unsigned long val;
+ int err;
+
+ if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_DECODEASSISTS))
+ return emulate_on_interception(vcpu);
+
+ if (unlikely((svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_1 & CR_VALID) == 0))
+ return emulate_on_interception(vcpu);
+
+ reg = svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_1 & SVM_EXITINFO_REG_MASK;
+ if (svm->vmcb->control.exit_code == SVM_EXIT_CR0_SEL_WRITE)
+ cr = SVM_EXIT_WRITE_CR0 - SVM_EXIT_READ_CR0;
+ else
+ cr = svm->vmcb->control.exit_code - SVM_EXIT_READ_CR0;
+
+ err = 0;
+ if (cr >= 16) { /* mov to cr */
+ cr -= 16;
+ val = kvm_register_read(vcpu, reg);
+ trace_kvm_cr_write(cr, val);
+ switch (cr) {
+ case 0:
+ if (!check_selective_cr0_intercepted(vcpu, val))
+ err = kvm_set_cr0(vcpu, val);
+ else
+ return 1;
+
+ break;
+ case 3:
+ err = kvm_set_cr3(vcpu, val);
+ break;
+ case 4:
+ err = kvm_set_cr4(vcpu, val);
+ break;
+ case 8:
+ err = kvm_set_cr8(vcpu, val);
+ break;
+ default:
+ WARN(1, "unhandled write to CR%d", cr);
+ kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, UD_VECTOR);
+ return 1;
+ }
+ } else { /* mov from cr */
+ switch (cr) {
+ case 0:
+ val = kvm_read_cr0(vcpu);
+ break;
+ case 2:
+ val = vcpu->arch.cr2;
+ break;
+ case 3:
+ val = kvm_read_cr3(vcpu);
+ break;
+ case 4:
+ val = kvm_read_cr4(vcpu);
+ break;
+ case 8:
+ val = kvm_get_cr8(vcpu);
+ break;
+ default:
+ WARN(1, "unhandled read from CR%d", cr);
+ kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, UD_VECTOR);
+ return 1;
+ }
+ kvm_register_write(vcpu, reg, val);
+ trace_kvm_cr_read(cr, val);
+ }
+ return kvm_complete_insn_gp(vcpu, err);
+}
+
+static int cr_trap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+ unsigned long old_value, new_value;
+ unsigned int cr;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ new_value = (unsigned long)svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_1;
+
+ cr = svm->vmcb->control.exit_code - SVM_EXIT_CR0_WRITE_TRAP;
+ switch (cr) {
+ case 0:
+ old_value = kvm_read_cr0(vcpu);
+ svm_set_cr0(vcpu, new_value);
+
+ kvm_post_set_cr0(vcpu, old_value, new_value);
+ break;
+ case 4:
+ old_value = kvm_read_cr4(vcpu);
+ svm_set_cr4(vcpu, new_value);
+
+ kvm_post_set_cr4(vcpu, old_value, new_value);
+ break;
+ case 8:
+ ret = kvm_set_cr8(vcpu, new_value);
+ break;
+ default:
+ WARN(1, "unhandled CR%d write trap", cr);
+ kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, UD_VECTOR);
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ return kvm_complete_insn_gp(vcpu, ret);
+}
+
+static int dr_interception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+ int reg, dr;
+ unsigned long val;
+ int err = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * SEV-ES intercepts DR7 only to disable guest debugging and the guest issues a VMGEXIT
+ * for DR7 write only. KVM cannot change DR7 (always swapped as type 'A') so return early.
+ */
+ if (sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm))
+ return 1;
+
+ if (vcpu->guest_debug == 0) {
+ /*
+ * No more DR vmexits; force a reload of the debug registers
+ * and reenter on this instruction. The next vmexit will
+ * retrieve the full state of the debug registers.
+ */
+ clr_dr_intercepts(svm);
+ vcpu->arch.switch_db_regs |= KVM_DEBUGREG_WONT_EXIT;
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_DECODEASSISTS))
+ return emulate_on_interception(vcpu);
+
+ reg = svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_1 & SVM_EXITINFO_REG_MASK;
+ dr = svm->vmcb->control.exit_code - SVM_EXIT_READ_DR0;
+ if (dr >= 16) { /* mov to DRn */
+ dr -= 16;
+ val = kvm_register_read(vcpu, reg);
+ err = kvm_set_dr(vcpu, dr, val);
+ } else {
+ kvm_get_dr(vcpu, dr, &val);
+ kvm_register_write(vcpu, reg, val);
+ }
+
+ return kvm_complete_insn_gp(vcpu, err);
+}
+
+static int cr8_write_interception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ int r;
+
+ u8 cr8_prev = kvm_get_cr8(vcpu);
+ /* instruction emulation calls kvm_set_cr8() */
+ r = cr_interception(vcpu);
+ if (lapic_in_kernel(vcpu))
+ return r;
+ if (cr8_prev <= kvm_get_cr8(vcpu))
+ return r;
+ vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_SET_TPR;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int efer_trap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ struct msr_data msr_info;
+ int ret;
+
+ /*
+ * Clear the EFER_SVME bit from EFER. The SVM code always sets this
+ * bit in svm_set_efer(), but __kvm_valid_efer() checks it against
+ * whether the guest has X86_FEATURE_SVM - this avoids a failure if
+ * the guest doesn't have X86_FEATURE_SVM.
+ */
+ msr_info.host_initiated = false;
+ msr_info.index = MSR_EFER;
+ msr_info.data = to_svm(vcpu)->vmcb->control.exit_info_1 & ~EFER_SVME;
+ ret = kvm_set_msr_common(vcpu, &msr_info);
+
+ return kvm_complete_insn_gp(vcpu, ret);
+}
+
+static int svm_get_msr_feature(struct kvm_msr_entry *msr)
+{
+ msr->data = 0;
+
+ switch (msr->index) {
+ case MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG:
+ if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC))
+ msr->data |= MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG_LFENCE_SERIALIZE;
+ break;
+ default:
+ return KVM_MSR_RET_INVALID;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int svm_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
+{
+ struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+
+ switch (msr_info->index) {
+ case MSR_AMD64_TSC_RATIO:
+ if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
+ !guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_TSCRATEMSR))
+ return 1;
+ msr_info->data = svm->tsc_ratio_msr;
+ break;
+ case MSR_STAR:
+ msr_info->data = svm->vmcb01.ptr->save.star;
+ break;
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+ case MSR_LSTAR:
+ msr_info->data = svm->vmcb01.ptr->save.lstar;
+ break;
+ case MSR_CSTAR:
+ msr_info->data = svm->vmcb01.ptr->save.cstar;
+ break;
+ case MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE:
+ msr_info->data = svm->vmcb01.ptr->save.kernel_gs_base;
+ break;
+ case MSR_SYSCALL_MASK:
+ msr_info->data = svm->vmcb01.ptr->save.sfmask;
+ break;
+#endif
+ case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS:
+ msr_info->data = svm->vmcb01.ptr->save.sysenter_cs;
+ break;
+ case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP:
+ msr_info->data = (u32)svm->vmcb01.ptr->save.sysenter_eip;
+ if (guest_cpuid_is_intel(vcpu))
+ msr_info->data |= (u64)svm->sysenter_eip_hi << 32;
+ break;
+ case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP:
+ msr_info->data = svm->vmcb01.ptr->save.sysenter_esp;
+ if (guest_cpuid_is_intel(vcpu))
+ msr_info->data |= (u64)svm->sysenter_esp_hi << 32;
+ break;
+ case MSR_TSC_AUX:
+ msr_info->data = svm->tsc_aux;
+ break;
+ case MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR:
+ msr_info->data = svm_get_lbr_vmcb(svm)->save.dbgctl;
+ break;
+ case MSR_IA32_LASTBRANCHFROMIP:
+ msr_info->data = svm_get_lbr_vmcb(svm)->save.br_from;
+ break;
+ case MSR_IA32_LASTBRANCHTOIP:
+ msr_info->data = svm_get_lbr_vmcb(svm)->save.br_to;
+ break;
+ case MSR_IA32_LASTINTFROMIP:
+ msr_info->data = svm_get_lbr_vmcb(svm)->save.last_excp_from;
+ break;
+ case MSR_IA32_LASTINTTOIP:
+ msr_info->data = svm_get_lbr_vmcb(svm)->save.last_excp_to;
+ break;
+ case MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA:
+ msr_info->data = svm->nested.hsave_msr;
+ break;
+ case MSR_VM_CR:
+ msr_info->data = svm->nested.vm_cr_msr;
+ break;
+ case MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL:
+ if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
+ !guest_has_spec_ctrl_msr(vcpu))
+ return 1;
+
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_V_SPEC_CTRL))
+ msr_info->data = svm->vmcb->save.spec_ctrl;
+ else
+ msr_info->data = svm->spec_ctrl;
+ break;
+ case MSR_AMD64_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL:
+ if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
+ !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD))
+ return 1;
+
+ msr_info->data = svm->virt_spec_ctrl;
+ break;
+ case MSR_F15H_IC_CFG: {
+
+ int family, model;
+
+ family = guest_cpuid_family(vcpu);
+ model = guest_cpuid_model(vcpu);
+
+ if (family < 0 || model < 0)
+ return kvm_get_msr_common(vcpu, msr_info);
+
+ msr_info->data = 0;
+
+ if (family == 0x15 &&
+ (model >= 0x2 && model < 0x20))
+ msr_info->data = 0x1E;
+ }
+ break;
+ case MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG:
+ msr_info->data = svm->msr_decfg;
+ break;
+ default:
+ return kvm_get_msr_common(vcpu, msr_info);
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int svm_complete_emulated_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int err)
+{
+ struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+ if (!err || !sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm) || WARN_ON_ONCE(!svm->sev_es.ghcb))
+ return kvm_complete_insn_gp(vcpu, err);
+
+ ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_1(svm->sev_es.ghcb, 1);
+ ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_2(svm->sev_es.ghcb,
+ X86_TRAP_GP |
+ SVM_EVTINJ_TYPE_EXEPT |
+ SVM_EVTINJ_VALID);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int svm_set_vm_cr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 data)
+{
+ struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+ int svm_dis, chg_mask;
+
+ if (data & ~SVM_VM_CR_VALID_MASK)
+ return 1;
+
+ chg_mask = SVM_VM_CR_VALID_MASK;
+
+ if (svm->nested.vm_cr_msr & SVM_VM_CR_SVM_DIS_MASK)
+ chg_mask &= ~(SVM_VM_CR_SVM_LOCK_MASK | SVM_VM_CR_SVM_DIS_MASK);
+
+ svm->nested.vm_cr_msr &= ~chg_mask;
+ svm->nested.vm_cr_msr |= (data & chg_mask);
+
+ svm_dis = svm->nested.vm_cr_msr & SVM_VM_CR_SVM_DIS_MASK;
+
+ /* check for svm_disable while efer.svme is set */
+ if (svm_dis && (vcpu->arch.efer & EFER_SVME))
+ return 1;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int svm_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr)
+{
+ struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ u32 ecx = msr->index;
+ u64 data = msr->data;
+ switch (ecx) {
+ case MSR_AMD64_TSC_RATIO:
+
+ if (!guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_TSCRATEMSR)) {
+
+ if (!msr->host_initiated)
+ return 1;
+ /*
+ * In case TSC scaling is not enabled, always
+ * leave this MSR at the default value.
+ *
+ * Due to bug in qemu 6.2.0, it would try to set
+ * this msr to 0 if tsc scaling is not enabled.
+ * Ignore this value as well.
+ */
+ if (data != 0 && data != svm->tsc_ratio_msr)
+ return 1;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (data & SVM_TSC_RATIO_RSVD)
+ return 1;
+
+ svm->tsc_ratio_msr = data;
+
+ if (guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_TSCRATEMSR) &&
+ is_guest_mode(vcpu))
+ nested_svm_update_tsc_ratio_msr(vcpu);
+
+ break;
+ case MSR_IA32_CR_PAT:
+ ret = kvm_set_msr_common(vcpu, msr);
+ if (ret)
+ break;
+
+ svm->vmcb01.ptr->save.g_pat = data;
+ if (is_guest_mode(vcpu))
+ nested_vmcb02_compute_g_pat(svm);
+ vmcb_mark_dirty(svm->vmcb, VMCB_NPT);
+ break;
+ case MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL:
+ if (!msr->host_initiated &&
+ !guest_has_spec_ctrl_msr(vcpu))
+ return 1;
+
+ if (kvm_spec_ctrl_test_value(data))
+ return 1;
+
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_V_SPEC_CTRL))
+ svm->vmcb->save.spec_ctrl = data;
+ else
+ svm->spec_ctrl = data;
+ if (!data)
+ break;
+
+ /*
+ * For non-nested:
+ * When it's written (to non-zero) for the first time, pass
+ * it through.
+ *
+ * For nested:
+ * The handling of the MSR bitmap for L2 guests is done in
+ * nested_svm_vmrun_msrpm.
+ * We update the L1 MSR bit as well since it will end up
+ * touching the MSR anyway now.
+ */
+ set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, 1, 1);
+ break;
+ case MSR_AMD64_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL:
+ if (!msr->host_initiated &&
+ !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD))
+ return 1;
+
+ if (data & ~SPEC_CTRL_SSBD)
+ return 1;
+
+ svm->virt_spec_ctrl = data;
+ break;
+ case MSR_STAR:
+ svm->vmcb01.ptr->save.star = data;
+ break;
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+ case MSR_LSTAR:
+ svm->vmcb01.ptr->save.lstar = data;
+ break;
+ case MSR_CSTAR:
+ svm->vmcb01.ptr->save.cstar = data;
+ break;
+ case MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE:
+ svm->vmcb01.ptr->save.kernel_gs_base = data;
+ break;
+ case MSR_SYSCALL_MASK:
+ svm->vmcb01.ptr->save.sfmask = data;
+ break;
+#endif
+ case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS:
+ svm->vmcb01.ptr->save.sysenter_cs = data;
+ break;
+ case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP:
+ svm->vmcb01.ptr->save.sysenter_eip = (u32)data;
+ /*
+ * We only intercept the MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_{EIP|ESP} msrs
+ * when we spoof an Intel vendor ID (for cross vendor migration).
+ * In this case we use this intercept to track the high
+ * 32 bit part of these msrs to support Intel's
+ * implementation of SYSENTER/SYSEXIT.
+ */
+ svm->sysenter_eip_hi = guest_cpuid_is_intel(vcpu) ? (data >> 32) : 0;
+ break;
+ case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP:
+ svm->vmcb01.ptr->save.sysenter_esp = (u32)data;
+ svm->sysenter_esp_hi = guest_cpuid_is_intel(vcpu) ? (data >> 32) : 0;
+ break;
+ case MSR_TSC_AUX:
+ /*
+ * TSC_AUX is always virtualized for SEV-ES guests when the
+ * feature is available. The user return MSR support is not
+ * required in this case because TSC_AUX is restored on #VMEXIT
+ * from the host save area (which has been initialized in
+ * svm_hardware_enable()).
+ */
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_V_TSC_AUX) && sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm))
+ break;
+
+ /*
+ * TSC_AUX is usually changed only during boot and never read
+ * directly. Intercept TSC_AUX instead of exposing it to the
+ * guest via direct_access_msrs, and switch it via user return.
+ */
+ preempt_disable();
+ ret = kvm_set_user_return_msr(tsc_aux_uret_slot, data, -1ull);
+ preempt_enable();
+ if (ret)
+ break;
+
+ svm->tsc_aux = data;
+ break;
+ case MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR:
+ if (!lbrv) {
+ kvm_pr_unimpl_wrmsr(vcpu, ecx, data);
+ break;
+ }
+ if (data & DEBUGCTL_RESERVED_BITS)
+ return 1;
+
+ svm_get_lbr_vmcb(svm)->save.dbgctl = data;
+ svm_update_lbrv(vcpu);
+ break;
+ case MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA:
+ /*
+ * Old kernels did not validate the value written to
+ * MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA. Allow KVM_SET_MSR to set an invalid
+ * value to allow live migrating buggy or malicious guests
+ * originating from those kernels.
+ */
+ if (!msr->host_initiated && !page_address_valid(vcpu, data))
+ return 1;
+
+ svm->nested.hsave_msr = data & PAGE_MASK;
+ break;
+ case MSR_VM_CR:
+ return svm_set_vm_cr(vcpu, data);
+ case MSR_VM_IGNNE:
+ kvm_pr_unimpl_wrmsr(vcpu, ecx, data);
+ break;
+ case MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG: {
+ struct kvm_msr_entry msr_entry;
+
+ msr_entry.index = msr->index;
+ if (svm_get_msr_feature(&msr_entry))
+ return 1;
+
+ /* Check the supported bits */
+ if (data & ~msr_entry.data)
+ return 1;
+
+ /* Don't allow the guest to change a bit, #GP */
+ if (!msr->host_initiated && (data ^ msr_entry.data))
+ return 1;
+
+ svm->msr_decfg = data;
+ break;
+ }
+ default:
+ return kvm_set_msr_common(vcpu, msr);
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int msr_interception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ if (to_svm(vcpu)->vmcb->control.exit_info_1)
+ return kvm_emulate_wrmsr(vcpu);
+ else
+ return kvm_emulate_rdmsr(vcpu);
+}
+
+static int interrupt_window_interception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu);
+ svm_clear_vintr(to_svm(vcpu));
+
+ /*
+ * If not running nested, for AVIC, the only reason to end up here is ExtINTs.
+ * In this case AVIC was temporarily disabled for
+ * requesting the IRQ window and we have to re-enable it.
+ *
+ * If running nested, still remove the VM wide AVIC inhibit to
+ * support case in which the interrupt window was requested when the
+ * vCPU was not running nested.
+
+ * All vCPUs which run still run nested, will remain to have their
+ * AVIC still inhibited due to per-cpu AVIC inhibition.
+ */
+ kvm_clear_apicv_inhibit(vcpu->kvm, APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_IRQWIN);
+
+ ++vcpu->stat.irq_window_exits;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int pause_interception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ bool in_kernel;
+ /*
+ * CPL is not made available for an SEV-ES guest, therefore
+ * vcpu->arch.preempted_in_kernel can never be true. Just
+ * set in_kernel to false as well.
+ */
+ in_kernel = !sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm) && svm_get_cpl(vcpu) == 0;
+
+ grow_ple_window(vcpu);
+
+ kvm_vcpu_on_spin(vcpu, in_kernel);
+ return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
+}
+
+static int invpcid_interception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+ unsigned long type;
+ gva_t gva;
+
+ if (!guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_INVPCID)) {
+ kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, UD_VECTOR);
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * For an INVPCID intercept:
+ * EXITINFO1 provides the linear address of the memory operand.
+ * EXITINFO2 provides the contents of the register operand.
+ */
+ type = svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_2;
+ gva = svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_1;
+
+ return kvm_handle_invpcid(vcpu, type, gva);
+}
+
+static int (*const svm_exit_handlers[])(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) = {
+ [SVM_EXIT_READ_CR0] = cr_interception,
+ [SVM_EXIT_READ_CR3] = cr_interception,
+ [SVM_EXIT_READ_CR4] = cr_interception,
+ [SVM_EXIT_READ_CR8] = cr_interception,
+ [SVM_EXIT_CR0_SEL_WRITE] = cr_interception,
+ [SVM_EXIT_WRITE_CR0] = cr_interception,
+ [SVM_EXIT_WRITE_CR3] = cr_interception,
+ [SVM_EXIT_WRITE_CR4] = cr_interception,
+ [SVM_EXIT_WRITE_CR8] = cr8_write_interception,
+ [SVM_EXIT_READ_DR0] = dr_interception,
+ [SVM_EXIT_READ_DR1] = dr_interception,
+ [SVM_EXIT_READ_DR2] = dr_interception,
+ [SVM_EXIT_READ_DR3] = dr_interception,
+ [SVM_EXIT_READ_DR4] = dr_interception,
+ [SVM_EXIT_READ_DR5] = dr_interception,
+ [SVM_EXIT_READ_DR6] = dr_interception,
+ [SVM_EXIT_READ_DR7] = dr_interception,
+ [SVM_EXIT_WRITE_DR0] = dr_interception,
+ [SVM_EXIT_WRITE_DR1] = dr_interception,
+ [SVM_EXIT_WRITE_DR2] = dr_interception,
+ [SVM_EXIT_WRITE_DR3] = dr_interception,
+ [SVM_EXIT_WRITE_DR4] = dr_interception,
+ [SVM_EXIT_WRITE_DR5] = dr_interception,
+ [SVM_EXIT_WRITE_DR6] = dr_interception,
+ [SVM_EXIT_WRITE_DR7] = dr_interception,
+ [SVM_EXIT_EXCP_BASE + DB_VECTOR] = db_interception,
+ [SVM_EXIT_EXCP_BASE + BP_VECTOR] = bp_interception,
+ [SVM_EXIT_EXCP_BASE + UD_VECTOR] = ud_interception,
+ [SVM_EXIT_EXCP_BASE + PF_VECTOR] = pf_interception,
+ [SVM_EXIT_EXCP_BASE + MC_VECTOR] = mc_interception,
+ [SVM_EXIT_EXCP_BASE + AC_VECTOR] = ac_interception,
+ [SVM_EXIT_EXCP_BASE + GP_VECTOR] = gp_interception,
+ [SVM_EXIT_INTR] = intr_interception,
+ [SVM_EXIT_NMI] = nmi_interception,
+ [SVM_EXIT_SMI] = smi_interception,
+ [SVM_EXIT_VINTR] = interrupt_window_interception,
+ [SVM_EXIT_RDPMC] = kvm_emulate_rdpmc,
+ [SVM_EXIT_CPUID] = kvm_emulate_cpuid,
+ [SVM_EXIT_IRET] = iret_interception,
+ [SVM_EXIT_INVD] = kvm_emulate_invd,
+ [SVM_EXIT_PAUSE] = pause_interception,
+ [SVM_EXIT_HLT] = kvm_emulate_halt,
+ [SVM_EXIT_INVLPG] = invlpg_interception,
+ [SVM_EXIT_INVLPGA] = invlpga_interception,
+ [SVM_EXIT_IOIO] = io_interception,
+ [SVM_EXIT_MSR] = msr_interception,
+ [SVM_EXIT_TASK_SWITCH] = task_switch_interception,
+ [SVM_EXIT_SHUTDOWN] = shutdown_interception,
+ [SVM_EXIT_VMRUN] = vmrun_interception,
+ [SVM_EXIT_VMMCALL] = kvm_emulate_hypercall,
+ [SVM_EXIT_VMLOAD] = vmload_interception,
+ [SVM_EXIT_VMSAVE] = vmsave_interception,
+ [SVM_EXIT_STGI] = stgi_interception,
+ [SVM_EXIT_CLGI] = clgi_interception,
+ [SVM_EXIT_SKINIT] = skinit_interception,
+ [SVM_EXIT_RDTSCP] = kvm_handle_invalid_op,
+ [SVM_EXIT_WBINVD] = kvm_emulate_wbinvd,
+ [SVM_EXIT_MONITOR] = kvm_emulate_monitor,
+ [SVM_EXIT_MWAIT] = kvm_emulate_mwait,
+ [SVM_EXIT_XSETBV] = kvm_emulate_xsetbv,
+ [SVM_EXIT_RDPRU] = kvm_handle_invalid_op,
+ [SVM_EXIT_EFER_WRITE_TRAP] = efer_trap,
+ [SVM_EXIT_CR0_WRITE_TRAP] = cr_trap,
+ [SVM_EXIT_CR4_WRITE_TRAP] = cr_trap,
+ [SVM_EXIT_CR8_WRITE_TRAP] = cr_trap,
+ [SVM_EXIT_INVPCID] = invpcid_interception,
+ [SVM_EXIT_NPF] = npf_interception,
+ [SVM_EXIT_RSM] = rsm_interception,
+ [SVM_EXIT_AVIC_INCOMPLETE_IPI] = avic_incomplete_ipi_interception,
+ [SVM_EXIT_AVIC_UNACCELERATED_ACCESS] = avic_unaccelerated_access_interception,
+ [SVM_EXIT_VMGEXIT] = sev_handle_vmgexit,
+};
+
+static void dump_vmcb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+ struct vmcb_control_area *control = &svm->vmcb->control;
+ struct vmcb_save_area *save = &svm->vmcb->save;
+ struct vmcb_save_area *save01 = &svm->vmcb01.ptr->save;
+
+ if (!dump_invalid_vmcb) {
+ pr_warn_ratelimited("set kvm_amd.dump_invalid_vmcb=1 to dump internal KVM state.\n");
+ return;
+ }
+
+ pr_err("VMCB %p, last attempted VMRUN on CPU %d\n",
+ svm->current_vmcb->ptr, vcpu->arch.last_vmentry_cpu);
+ pr_err("VMCB Control Area:\n");
+ pr_err("%-20s%04x\n", "cr_read:", control->intercepts[INTERCEPT_CR] & 0xffff);
+ pr_err("%-20s%04x\n", "cr_write:", control->intercepts[INTERCEPT_CR] >> 16);
+ pr_err("%-20s%04x\n", "dr_read:", control->intercepts[INTERCEPT_DR] & 0xffff);
+ pr_err("%-20s%04x\n", "dr_write:", control->intercepts[INTERCEPT_DR] >> 16);
+ pr_err("%-20s%08x\n", "exceptions:", control->intercepts[INTERCEPT_EXCEPTION]);
+ pr_err("%-20s%08x %08x\n", "intercepts:",
+ control->intercepts[INTERCEPT_WORD3],
+ control->intercepts[INTERCEPT_WORD4]);
+ pr_err("%-20s%d\n", "pause filter count:", control->pause_filter_count);
+ pr_err("%-20s%d\n", "pause filter threshold:",
+ control->pause_filter_thresh);
+ pr_err("%-20s%016llx\n", "iopm_base_pa:", control->iopm_base_pa);
+ pr_err("%-20s%016llx\n", "msrpm_base_pa:", control->msrpm_base_pa);
+ pr_err("%-20s%016llx\n", "tsc_offset:", control->tsc_offset);
+ pr_err("%-20s%d\n", "asid:", control->asid);
+ pr_err("%-20s%d\n", "tlb_ctl:", control->tlb_ctl);
+ pr_err("%-20s%08x\n", "int_ctl:", control->int_ctl);
+ pr_err("%-20s%08x\n", "int_vector:", control->int_vector);
+ pr_err("%-20s%08x\n", "int_state:", control->int_state);
+ pr_err("%-20s%08x\n", "exit_code:", control->exit_code);
+ pr_err("%-20s%016llx\n", "exit_info1:", control->exit_info_1);
+ pr_err("%-20s%016llx\n", "exit_info2:", control->exit_info_2);
+ pr_err("%-20s%08x\n", "exit_int_info:", control->exit_int_info);
+ pr_err("%-20s%08x\n", "exit_int_info_err:", control->exit_int_info_err);
+ pr_err("%-20s%lld\n", "nested_ctl:", control->nested_ctl);
+ pr_err("%-20s%016llx\n", "nested_cr3:", control->nested_cr3);
+ pr_err("%-20s%016llx\n", "avic_vapic_bar:", control->avic_vapic_bar);
+ pr_err("%-20s%016llx\n", "ghcb:", control->ghcb_gpa);
+ pr_err("%-20s%08x\n", "event_inj:", control->event_inj);
+ pr_err("%-20s%08x\n", "event_inj_err:", control->event_inj_err);
+ pr_err("%-20s%lld\n", "virt_ext:", control->virt_ext);
+ pr_err("%-20s%016llx\n", "next_rip:", control->next_rip);
+ pr_err("%-20s%016llx\n", "avic_backing_page:", control->avic_backing_page);
+ pr_err("%-20s%016llx\n", "avic_logical_id:", control->avic_logical_id);
+ pr_err("%-20s%016llx\n", "avic_physical_id:", control->avic_physical_id);
+ pr_err("%-20s%016llx\n", "vmsa_pa:", control->vmsa_pa);
+ pr_err("VMCB State Save Area:\n");
+ pr_err("%-5s s: %04x a: %04x l: %08x b: %016llx\n",
+ "es:",
+ save->es.selector, save->es.attrib,
+ save->es.limit, save->es.base);
+ pr_err("%-5s s: %04x a: %04x l: %08x b: %016llx\n",
+ "cs:",
+ save->cs.selector, save->cs.attrib,
+ save->cs.limit, save->cs.base);
+ pr_err("%-5s s: %04x a: %04x l: %08x b: %016llx\n",
+ "ss:",
+ save->ss.selector, save->ss.attrib,
+ save->ss.limit, save->ss.base);
+ pr_err("%-5s s: %04x a: %04x l: %08x b: %016llx\n",
+ "ds:",
+ save->ds.selector, save->ds.attrib,
+ save->ds.limit, save->ds.base);
+ pr_err("%-5s s: %04x a: %04x l: %08x b: %016llx\n",
+ "fs:",
+ save01->fs.selector, save01->fs.attrib,
+ save01->fs.limit, save01->fs.base);
+ pr_err("%-5s s: %04x a: %04x l: %08x b: %016llx\n",
+ "gs:",
+ save01->gs.selector, save01->gs.attrib,
+ save01->gs.limit, save01->gs.base);
+ pr_err("%-5s s: %04x a: %04x l: %08x b: %016llx\n",
+ "gdtr:",
+ save->gdtr.selector, save->gdtr.attrib,
+ save->gdtr.limit, save->gdtr.base);
+ pr_err("%-5s s: %04x a: %04x l: %08x b: %016llx\n",
+ "ldtr:",
+ save01->ldtr.selector, save01->ldtr.attrib,
+ save01->ldtr.limit, save01->ldtr.base);
+ pr_err("%-5s s: %04x a: %04x l: %08x b: %016llx\n",
+ "idtr:",
+ save->idtr.selector, save->idtr.attrib,
+ save->idtr.limit, save->idtr.base);
+ pr_err("%-5s s: %04x a: %04x l: %08x b: %016llx\n",
+ "tr:",
+ save01->tr.selector, save01->tr.attrib,
+ save01->tr.limit, save01->tr.base);
+ pr_err("vmpl: %d cpl: %d efer: %016llx\n",
+ save->vmpl, save->cpl, save->efer);
+ pr_err("%-15s %016llx %-13s %016llx\n",
+ "cr0:", save->cr0, "cr2:", save->cr2);
+ pr_err("%-15s %016llx %-13s %016llx\n",
+ "cr3:", save->cr3, "cr4:", save->cr4);
+ pr_err("%-15s %016llx %-13s %016llx\n",
+ "dr6:", save->dr6, "dr7:", save->dr7);
+ pr_err("%-15s %016llx %-13s %016llx\n",
+ "rip:", save->rip, "rflags:", save->rflags);
+ pr_err("%-15s %016llx %-13s %016llx\n",
+ "rsp:", save->rsp, "rax:", save->rax);
+ pr_err("%-15s %016llx %-13s %016llx\n",
+ "star:", save01->star, "lstar:", save01->lstar);
+ pr_err("%-15s %016llx %-13s %016llx\n",
+ "cstar:", save01->cstar, "sfmask:", save01->sfmask);
+ pr_err("%-15s %016llx %-13s %016llx\n",
+ "kernel_gs_base:", save01->kernel_gs_base,
+ "sysenter_cs:", save01->sysenter_cs);
+ pr_err("%-15s %016llx %-13s %016llx\n",
+ "sysenter_esp:", save01->sysenter_esp,
+ "sysenter_eip:", save01->sysenter_eip);
+ pr_err("%-15s %016llx %-13s %016llx\n",
+ "gpat:", save->g_pat, "dbgctl:", save->dbgctl);
+ pr_err("%-15s %016llx %-13s %016llx\n",
+ "br_from:", save->br_from, "br_to:", save->br_to);
+ pr_err("%-15s %016llx %-13s %016llx\n",
+ "excp_from:", save->last_excp_from,
+ "excp_to:", save->last_excp_to);
+}
+
+static bool svm_check_exit_valid(u64 exit_code)
+{
+ return (exit_code < ARRAY_SIZE(svm_exit_handlers) &&
+ svm_exit_handlers[exit_code]);
+}
+
+static int svm_handle_invalid_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 exit_code)
+{
+ vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "svm: unexpected exit reason 0x%llx\n", exit_code);
+ dump_vmcb(vcpu);
+ vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ vcpu->run->internal.suberror = KVM_INTERNAL_ERROR_UNEXPECTED_EXIT_REASON;
+ vcpu->run->internal.ndata = 2;
+ vcpu->run->internal.data[0] = exit_code;
+ vcpu->run->internal.data[1] = vcpu->arch.last_vmentry_cpu;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int svm_invoke_exit_handler(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 exit_code)
+{
+ if (!svm_check_exit_valid(exit_code))
+ return svm_handle_invalid_exit(vcpu, exit_code);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+ if (exit_code == SVM_EXIT_MSR)
+ return msr_interception(vcpu);
+ else if (exit_code == SVM_EXIT_VINTR)
+ return interrupt_window_interception(vcpu);
+ else if (exit_code == SVM_EXIT_INTR)
+ return intr_interception(vcpu);
+ else if (exit_code == SVM_EXIT_HLT)
+ return kvm_emulate_halt(vcpu);
+ else if (exit_code == SVM_EXIT_NPF)
+ return npf_interception(vcpu);
+#endif
+ return svm_exit_handlers[exit_code](vcpu);
+}
+
+static void svm_get_exit_info(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 *reason,
+ u64 *info1, u64 *info2,
+ u32 *intr_info, u32 *error_code)
+{
+ struct vmcb_control_area *control = &to_svm(vcpu)->vmcb->control;
+
+ *reason = control->exit_code;
+ *info1 = control->exit_info_1;
+ *info2 = control->exit_info_2;
+ *intr_info = control->exit_int_info;
+ if ((*intr_info & SVM_EXITINTINFO_VALID) &&
+ (*intr_info & SVM_EXITINTINFO_VALID_ERR))
+ *error_code = control->exit_int_info_err;
+ else
+ *error_code = 0;
+}
+
+static int svm_handle_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, fastpath_t exit_fastpath)
+{
+ struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+ struct kvm_run *kvm_run = vcpu->run;
+ u32 exit_code = svm->vmcb->control.exit_code;
+
+ /* SEV-ES guests must use the CR write traps to track CR registers. */
+ if (!sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm)) {
+ if (!svm_is_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR0_WRITE))
+ vcpu->arch.cr0 = svm->vmcb->save.cr0;
+ if (npt_enabled)
+ vcpu->arch.cr3 = svm->vmcb->save.cr3;
+ }
+
+ if (is_guest_mode(vcpu)) {
+ int vmexit;
+
+ trace_kvm_nested_vmexit(vcpu, KVM_ISA_SVM);
+
+ vmexit = nested_svm_exit_special(svm);
+
+ if (vmexit == NESTED_EXIT_CONTINUE)
+ vmexit = nested_svm_exit_handled(svm);
+
+ if (vmexit == NESTED_EXIT_DONE)
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ if (svm->vmcb->control.exit_code == SVM_EXIT_ERR) {
+ kvm_run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_FAIL_ENTRY;
+ kvm_run->fail_entry.hardware_entry_failure_reason
+ = svm->vmcb->control.exit_code;
+ kvm_run->fail_entry.cpu = vcpu->arch.last_vmentry_cpu;
+ dump_vmcb(vcpu);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (exit_fastpath != EXIT_FASTPATH_NONE)
+ return 1;
+
+ return svm_invoke_exit_handler(vcpu, exit_code);
+}
+
+static void pre_svm_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ struct svm_cpu_data *sd = per_cpu_ptr(&svm_data, vcpu->cpu);
+ struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+
+ /*
+ * If the previous vmrun of the vmcb occurred on a different physical
+ * cpu, then mark the vmcb dirty and assign a new asid. Hardware's
+ * vmcb clean bits are per logical CPU, as are KVM's asid assignments.
+ */
+ if (unlikely(svm->current_vmcb->cpu != vcpu->cpu)) {
+ svm->current_vmcb->asid_generation = 0;
+ vmcb_mark_all_dirty(svm->vmcb);
+ svm->current_vmcb->cpu = vcpu->cpu;
+ }
+
+ if (sev_guest(vcpu->kvm))
+ return pre_sev_run(svm, vcpu->cpu);
+
+ /* FIXME: handle wraparound of asid_generation */
+ if (svm->current_vmcb->asid_generation != sd->asid_generation)
+ new_asid(svm, sd);
+}
+
+static void svm_inject_nmi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+
+ svm->vmcb->control.event_inj = SVM_EVTINJ_VALID | SVM_EVTINJ_TYPE_NMI;
+
+ if (svm->nmi_l1_to_l2)
+ return;
+
+ svm->nmi_masked = true;
+ svm_set_iret_intercept(svm);
+ ++vcpu->stat.nmi_injections;
+}
+
+static bool svm_is_vnmi_pending(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+
+ if (!is_vnmi_enabled(svm))
+ return false;
+
+ return !!(svm->vmcb->control.int_ctl & V_NMI_PENDING_MASK);
+}
+
+static bool svm_set_vnmi_pending(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+
+ if (!is_vnmi_enabled(svm))
+ return false;
+
+ if (svm->vmcb->control.int_ctl & V_NMI_PENDING_MASK)
+ return false;
+
+ svm->vmcb->control.int_ctl |= V_NMI_PENDING_MASK;
+ vmcb_mark_dirty(svm->vmcb, VMCB_INTR);
+
+ /*
+ * Because the pending NMI is serviced by hardware, KVM can't know when
+ * the NMI is "injected", but for all intents and purposes, passing the
+ * NMI off to hardware counts as injection.
+ */
+ ++vcpu->stat.nmi_injections;
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+static void svm_inject_irq(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool reinjected)
+{
+ struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+ u32 type;
+
+ if (vcpu->arch.interrupt.soft) {
+ if (svm_update_soft_interrupt_rip(vcpu))
+ return;
+
+ type = SVM_EVTINJ_TYPE_SOFT;
+ } else {
+ type = SVM_EVTINJ_TYPE_INTR;
+ }
+
+ trace_kvm_inj_virq(vcpu->arch.interrupt.nr,
+ vcpu->arch.interrupt.soft, reinjected);
+ ++vcpu->stat.irq_injections;
+
+ svm->vmcb->control.event_inj = vcpu->arch.interrupt.nr |
+ SVM_EVTINJ_VALID | type;
+}
+
+void svm_complete_interrupt_delivery(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int delivery_mode,
+ int trig_mode, int vector)
+{
+ /*
+ * apic->apicv_active must be read after vcpu->mode.
+ * Pairs with smp_store_release in vcpu_enter_guest.
+ */
+ bool in_guest_mode = (smp_load_acquire(&vcpu->mode) == IN_GUEST_MODE);
+
+ /* Note, this is called iff the local APIC is in-kernel. */
+ if (!READ_ONCE(vcpu->arch.apic->apicv_active)) {
+ /* Process the interrupt via kvm_check_and_inject_events(). */
+ kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu);
+ kvm_vcpu_kick(vcpu);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ trace_kvm_apicv_accept_irq(vcpu->vcpu_id, delivery_mode, trig_mode, vector);
+ if (in_guest_mode) {
+ /*
+ * Signal the doorbell to tell hardware to inject the IRQ. If
+ * the vCPU exits the guest before the doorbell chimes, hardware
+ * will automatically process AVIC interrupts at the next VMRUN.
+ */
+ avic_ring_doorbell(vcpu);
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * Wake the vCPU if it was blocking. KVM will then detect the
+ * pending IRQ when checking if the vCPU has a wake event.
+ */
+ kvm_vcpu_wake_up(vcpu);
+ }
+}
+
+static void svm_deliver_interrupt(struct kvm_lapic *apic, int delivery_mode,
+ int trig_mode, int vector)
+{
+ kvm_lapic_set_irr(vector, apic);
+
+ /*
+ * Pairs with the smp_mb_*() after setting vcpu->guest_mode in
+ * vcpu_enter_guest() to ensure the write to the vIRR is ordered before
+ * the read of guest_mode. This guarantees that either VMRUN will see
+ * and process the new vIRR entry, or that svm_complete_interrupt_delivery
+ * will signal the doorbell if the CPU has already entered the guest.
+ */
+ smp_mb__after_atomic();
+ svm_complete_interrupt_delivery(apic->vcpu, delivery_mode, trig_mode, vector);
+}
+
+static void svm_update_cr8_intercept(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int tpr, int irr)
+{
+ struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+
+ /*
+ * SEV-ES guests must always keep the CR intercepts cleared. CR
+ * tracking is done using the CR write traps.
+ */
+ if (sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm))
+ return;
+
+ if (nested_svm_virtualize_tpr(vcpu))
+ return;
+
+ svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR8_WRITE);
+
+ if (irr == -1)
+ return;
+
+ if (tpr >= irr)
+ svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR8_WRITE);
+}
+
+static bool svm_get_nmi_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+
+ if (is_vnmi_enabled(svm))
+ return svm->vmcb->control.int_ctl & V_NMI_BLOCKING_MASK;
+ else
+ return svm->nmi_masked;
+}
+
+static void svm_set_nmi_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool masked)
+{
+ struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+
+ if (is_vnmi_enabled(svm)) {
+ if (masked)
+ svm->vmcb->control.int_ctl |= V_NMI_BLOCKING_MASK;
+ else
+ svm->vmcb->control.int_ctl &= ~V_NMI_BLOCKING_MASK;
+
+ } else {
+ svm->nmi_masked = masked;
+ if (masked)
+ svm_set_iret_intercept(svm);
+ else
+ svm_clr_iret_intercept(svm);
+ }
+}
+
+bool svm_nmi_blocked(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+ struct vmcb *vmcb = svm->vmcb;
+
+ if (!gif_set(svm))
+ return true;
+
+ if (is_guest_mode(vcpu) && nested_exit_on_nmi(svm))
+ return false;
+
+ if (svm_get_nmi_mask(vcpu))
+ return true;
+
+ return vmcb->control.int_state & SVM_INTERRUPT_SHADOW_MASK;
+}
+
+static int svm_nmi_allowed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool for_injection)
+{
+ struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+ if (svm->nested.nested_run_pending)
+ return -EBUSY;
+
+ if (svm_nmi_blocked(vcpu))
+ return 0;
+
+ /* An NMI must not be injected into L2 if it's supposed to VM-Exit. */
+ if (for_injection && is_guest_mode(vcpu) && nested_exit_on_nmi(svm))
+ return -EBUSY;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+bool svm_interrupt_blocked(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+ struct vmcb *vmcb = svm->vmcb;
+
+ if (!gif_set(svm))
+ return true;
+
+ if (is_guest_mode(vcpu)) {
+ /* As long as interrupts are being delivered... */
+ if ((svm->nested.ctl.int_ctl & V_INTR_MASKING_MASK)
+ ? !(svm->vmcb01.ptr->save.rflags & X86_EFLAGS_IF)
+ : !(kvm_get_rflags(vcpu) & X86_EFLAGS_IF))
+ return true;
+
+ /* ... vmexits aren't blocked by the interrupt shadow */
+ if (nested_exit_on_intr(svm))
+ return false;
+ } else {
+ if (!svm_get_if_flag(vcpu))
+ return true;
+ }
+
+ return (vmcb->control.int_state & SVM_INTERRUPT_SHADOW_MASK);
+}
+
+static int svm_interrupt_allowed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool for_injection)
+{
+ struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+
+ if (svm->nested.nested_run_pending)
+ return -EBUSY;
+
+ if (svm_interrupt_blocked(vcpu))
+ return 0;
+
+ /*
+ * An IRQ must not be injected into L2 if it's supposed to VM-Exit,
+ * e.g. if the IRQ arrived asynchronously after checking nested events.
+ */
+ if (for_injection && is_guest_mode(vcpu) && nested_exit_on_intr(svm))
+ return -EBUSY;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static void svm_enable_irq_window(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+
+ /*
+ * In case GIF=0 we can't rely on the CPU to tell us when GIF becomes
+ * 1, because that's a separate STGI/VMRUN intercept. The next time we
+ * get that intercept, this function will be called again though and
+ * we'll get the vintr intercept. However, if the vGIF feature is
+ * enabled, the STGI interception will not occur. Enable the irq
+ * window under the assumption that the hardware will set the GIF.
+ */
+ if (vgif || gif_set(svm)) {
+ /*
+ * IRQ window is not needed when AVIC is enabled,
+ * unless we have pending ExtINT since it cannot be injected
+ * via AVIC. In such case, KVM needs to temporarily disable AVIC,
+ * and fallback to injecting IRQ via V_IRQ.
+ *
+ * If running nested, AVIC is already locally inhibited
+ * on this vCPU, therefore there is no need to request
+ * the VM wide AVIC inhibition.
+ */
+ if (!is_guest_mode(vcpu))
+ kvm_set_apicv_inhibit(vcpu->kvm, APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_IRQWIN);
+
+ svm_set_vintr(svm);
+ }
+}
+
+static void svm_enable_nmi_window(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+
+ /*
+ * KVM should never request an NMI window when vNMI is enabled, as KVM
+ * allows at most one to-be-injected NMI and one pending NMI, i.e. if
+ * two NMIs arrive simultaneously, KVM will inject one and set
+ * V_NMI_PENDING for the other. WARN, but continue with the standard
+ * single-step approach to try and salvage the pending NMI.
+ */
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(is_vnmi_enabled(svm));
+
+ if (svm_get_nmi_mask(vcpu) && !svm->awaiting_iret_completion)
+ return; /* IRET will cause a vm exit */
+
+ /*
+ * SEV-ES guests are responsible for signaling when a vCPU is ready to
+ * receive a new NMI, as SEV-ES guests can't be single-stepped, i.e.
+ * KVM can't intercept and single-step IRET to detect when NMIs are
+ * unblocked (architecturally speaking). See SVM_VMGEXIT_NMI_COMPLETE.
+ *
+ * Note, GIF is guaranteed to be '1' for SEV-ES guests as hardware
+ * ignores SEV-ES guest writes to EFER.SVME *and* CLGI/STGI are not
+ * supported NAEs in the GHCB protocol.
+ */
+ if (sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm))
+ return;
+
+ if (!gif_set(svm)) {
+ if (vgif)
+ svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_STGI);
+ return; /* STGI will cause a vm exit */
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Something prevents NMI from been injected. Single step over possible
+ * problem (IRET or exception injection or interrupt shadow)
+ */
+ svm->nmi_singlestep_guest_rflags = svm_get_rflags(vcpu);
+ svm->nmi_singlestep = true;
+ svm->vmcb->save.rflags |= (X86_EFLAGS_TF | X86_EFLAGS_RF);
+}
+
+static void svm_flush_tlb_asid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+
+ /*
+ * Unlike VMX, SVM doesn't provide a way to flush only NPT TLB entries.
+ * A TLB flush for the current ASID flushes both "host" and "guest" TLB
+ * entries, and thus is a superset of Hyper-V's fine grained flushing.
+ */
+ kvm_hv_vcpu_purge_flush_tlb(vcpu);
+
+ /*
+ * Flush only the current ASID even if the TLB flush was invoked via
+ * kvm_flush_remote_tlbs(). Although flushing remote TLBs requires all
+ * ASIDs to be flushed, KVM uses a single ASID for L1 and L2, and
+ * unconditionally does a TLB flush on both nested VM-Enter and nested
+ * VM-Exit (via kvm_mmu_reset_context()).
+ */
+ if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_FLUSHBYASID))
+ svm->vmcb->control.tlb_ctl = TLB_CONTROL_FLUSH_ASID;
+ else
+ svm->current_vmcb->asid_generation--;
+}
+
+static void svm_flush_tlb_current(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ hpa_t root_tdp = vcpu->arch.mmu->root.hpa;
+
+ /*
+ * When running on Hyper-V with EnlightenedNptTlb enabled, explicitly
+ * flush the NPT mappings via hypercall as flushing the ASID only
+ * affects virtual to physical mappings, it does not invalidate guest
+ * physical to host physical mappings.
+ */
+ if (svm_hv_is_enlightened_tlb_enabled(vcpu) && VALID_PAGE(root_tdp))
+ hyperv_flush_guest_mapping(root_tdp);
+
+ svm_flush_tlb_asid(vcpu);
+}
+
+static void svm_flush_tlb_all(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ /*
+ * When running on Hyper-V with EnlightenedNptTlb enabled, remote TLB
+ * flushes should be routed to hv_flush_remote_tlbs() without requesting
+ * a "regular" remote flush. Reaching this point means either there's
+ * a KVM bug or a prior hv_flush_remote_tlbs() call failed, both of
+ * which might be fatal to the guest. Yell, but try to recover.
+ */
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(svm_hv_is_enlightened_tlb_enabled(vcpu)))
+ hv_flush_remote_tlbs(vcpu->kvm);
+
+ svm_flush_tlb_asid(vcpu);
+}
+
+static void svm_flush_tlb_gva(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gva_t gva)
+{
+ struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+
+ invlpga(gva, svm->vmcb->control.asid);
+}
+
+static inline void sync_cr8_to_lapic(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+
+ if (nested_svm_virtualize_tpr(vcpu))
+ return;
+
+ if (!svm_is_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR8_WRITE)) {
+ int cr8 = svm->vmcb->control.int_ctl & V_TPR_MASK;
+ kvm_set_cr8(vcpu, cr8);
+ }
+}
+
+static inline void sync_lapic_to_cr8(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+ u64 cr8;
+
+ if (nested_svm_virtualize_tpr(vcpu) ||
+ kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu))
+ return;
+
+ cr8 = kvm_get_cr8(vcpu);
+ svm->vmcb->control.int_ctl &= ~V_TPR_MASK;
+ svm->vmcb->control.int_ctl |= cr8 & V_TPR_MASK;
+}
+
+static void svm_complete_soft_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u8 vector,
+ int type)
+{
+ bool is_exception = (type == SVM_EXITINTINFO_TYPE_EXEPT);
+ bool is_soft = (type == SVM_EXITINTINFO_TYPE_SOFT);
+ struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+
+ /*
+ * If NRIPS is enabled, KVM must snapshot the pre-VMRUN next_rip that's
+ * associated with the original soft exception/interrupt. next_rip is
+ * cleared on all exits that can occur while vectoring an event, so KVM
+ * needs to manually set next_rip for re-injection. Unlike the !nrips
+ * case below, this needs to be done if and only if KVM is re-injecting
+ * the same event, i.e. if the event is a soft exception/interrupt,
+ * otherwise next_rip is unused on VMRUN.
+ */
+ if (nrips && (is_soft || (is_exception && kvm_exception_is_soft(vector))) &&
+ kvm_is_linear_rip(vcpu, svm->soft_int_old_rip + svm->soft_int_csbase))
+ svm->vmcb->control.next_rip = svm->soft_int_next_rip;
+ /*
+ * If NRIPS isn't enabled, KVM must manually advance RIP prior to
+ * injecting the soft exception/interrupt. That advancement needs to
+ * be unwound if vectoring didn't complete. Note, the new event may
+ * not be the injected event, e.g. if KVM injected an INTn, the INTn
+ * hit a #NP in the guest, and the #NP encountered a #PF, the #NP will
+ * be the reported vectored event, but RIP still needs to be unwound.
+ */
+ else if (!nrips && (is_soft || is_exception) &&
+ kvm_is_linear_rip(vcpu, svm->soft_int_next_rip + svm->soft_int_csbase))
+ kvm_rip_write(vcpu, svm->soft_int_old_rip);
+}
+
+static void svm_complete_interrupts(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+ u8 vector;
+ int type;
+ u32 exitintinfo = svm->vmcb->control.exit_int_info;
+ bool nmi_l1_to_l2 = svm->nmi_l1_to_l2;
+ bool soft_int_injected = svm->soft_int_injected;
+
+ svm->nmi_l1_to_l2 = false;
+ svm->soft_int_injected = false;
+
+ /*
+ * If we've made progress since setting awaiting_iret_completion, we've
+ * executed an IRET and can allow NMI injection.
+ */
+ if (svm->awaiting_iret_completion &&
+ kvm_rip_read(vcpu) != svm->nmi_iret_rip) {
+ svm->awaiting_iret_completion = false;
+ svm->nmi_masked = false;
+ kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu);
+ }
+
+ vcpu->arch.nmi_injected = false;
+ kvm_clear_exception_queue(vcpu);
+ kvm_clear_interrupt_queue(vcpu);
+
+ if (!(exitintinfo & SVM_EXITINTINFO_VALID))
+ return;
+
+ kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu);
+
+ vector = exitintinfo & SVM_EXITINTINFO_VEC_MASK;
+ type = exitintinfo & SVM_EXITINTINFO_TYPE_MASK;
+
+ if (soft_int_injected)
+ svm_complete_soft_interrupt(vcpu, vector, type);
+
+ switch (type) {
+ case SVM_EXITINTINFO_TYPE_NMI:
+ vcpu->arch.nmi_injected = true;
+ svm->nmi_l1_to_l2 = nmi_l1_to_l2;
+ break;
+ case SVM_EXITINTINFO_TYPE_EXEPT:
+ /*
+ * Never re-inject a #VC exception.
+ */
+ if (vector == X86_TRAP_VC)
+ break;
+
+ if (exitintinfo & SVM_EXITINTINFO_VALID_ERR) {
+ u32 err = svm->vmcb->control.exit_int_info_err;
+ kvm_requeue_exception_e(vcpu, vector, err);
+
+ } else
+ kvm_requeue_exception(vcpu, vector);
+ break;
+ case SVM_EXITINTINFO_TYPE_INTR:
+ kvm_queue_interrupt(vcpu, vector, false);
+ break;
+ case SVM_EXITINTINFO_TYPE_SOFT:
+ kvm_queue_interrupt(vcpu, vector, true);
+ break;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+}
+
+static void svm_cancel_injection(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+ struct vmcb_control_area *control = &svm->vmcb->control;
+
+ control->exit_int_info = control->event_inj;
+ control->exit_int_info_err = control->event_inj_err;
+ control->event_inj = 0;
+ svm_complete_interrupts(vcpu);
+}
+
+static int svm_vcpu_pre_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static fastpath_t svm_exit_handlers_fastpath(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ if (to_svm(vcpu)->vmcb->control.exit_code == SVM_EXIT_MSR &&
+ to_svm(vcpu)->vmcb->control.exit_info_1)
+ return handle_fastpath_set_msr_irqoff(vcpu);
+
+ return EXIT_FASTPATH_NONE;
+}
+
+static noinstr void svm_vcpu_enter_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool spec_ctrl_intercepted)
+{
+ struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+
+ guest_state_enter_irqoff();
+
+ amd_clear_divider();
+
+ if (sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm))
+ __svm_sev_es_vcpu_run(svm, spec_ctrl_intercepted);
+ else
+ __svm_vcpu_run(svm, spec_ctrl_intercepted);
+
+ guest_state_exit_irqoff();
+}
+
+static __no_kcsan fastpath_t svm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+ bool spec_ctrl_intercepted = msr_write_intercepted(vcpu, MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL);
+
+ trace_kvm_entry(vcpu);
+
+ svm->vmcb->save.rax = vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RAX];
+ svm->vmcb->save.rsp = vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RSP];
+ svm->vmcb->save.rip = vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RIP];
+
+ /*
+ * Disable singlestep if we're injecting an interrupt/exception.
+ * We don't want our modified rflags to be pushed on the stack where
+ * we might not be able to easily reset them if we disabled NMI
+ * singlestep later.
+ */
+ if (svm->nmi_singlestep && svm->vmcb->control.event_inj) {
+ /*
+ * Event injection happens before external interrupts cause a
+ * vmexit and interrupts are disabled here, so smp_send_reschedule
+ * is enough to force an immediate vmexit.
+ */
+ disable_nmi_singlestep(svm);
+ smp_send_reschedule(vcpu->cpu);
+ }
+
+ pre_svm_run(vcpu);
+
+ sync_lapic_to_cr8(vcpu);
+
+ if (unlikely(svm->asid != svm->vmcb->control.asid)) {
+ svm->vmcb->control.asid = svm->asid;
+ vmcb_mark_dirty(svm->vmcb, VMCB_ASID);
+ }
+ svm->vmcb->save.cr2 = vcpu->arch.cr2;
+
+ svm_hv_update_vp_id(svm->vmcb, vcpu);
+
+ /*
+ * Run with all-zero DR6 unless needed, so that we can get the exact cause
+ * of a #DB.
+ */
+ if (unlikely(vcpu->arch.switch_db_regs & KVM_DEBUGREG_WONT_EXIT))
+ svm_set_dr6(svm, vcpu->arch.dr6);
+ else
+ svm_set_dr6(svm, DR6_ACTIVE_LOW);
+
+ clgi();
+ kvm_load_guest_xsave_state(vcpu);
+
+ kvm_wait_lapic_expire(vcpu);
+
+ /*
+ * If this vCPU has touched SPEC_CTRL, restore the guest's value if
+ * it's non-zero. Since vmentry is serialising on affected CPUs, there
+ * is no need to worry about the conditional branch over the wrmsr
+ * being speculatively taken.
+ */
+ if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_V_SPEC_CTRL))
+ x86_spec_ctrl_set_guest(svm->virt_spec_ctrl);
+
+ svm_vcpu_enter_exit(vcpu, spec_ctrl_intercepted);
+
+ if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_V_SPEC_CTRL))
+ x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host(svm->virt_spec_ctrl);
+
+ if (!sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm)) {
+ vcpu->arch.cr2 = svm->vmcb->save.cr2;
+ vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RAX] = svm->vmcb->save.rax;
+ vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RSP] = svm->vmcb->save.rsp;
+ vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RIP] = svm->vmcb->save.rip;
+ }
+ vcpu->arch.regs_dirty = 0;
+
+ if (unlikely(svm->vmcb->control.exit_code == SVM_EXIT_NMI))
+ kvm_before_interrupt(vcpu, KVM_HANDLING_NMI);
+
+ kvm_load_host_xsave_state(vcpu);
+ stgi();
+
+ /* Any pending NMI will happen here */
+
+ if (unlikely(svm->vmcb->control.exit_code == SVM_EXIT_NMI))
+ kvm_after_interrupt(vcpu);
+
+ sync_cr8_to_lapic(vcpu);
+
+ svm->next_rip = 0;
+ if (is_guest_mode(vcpu)) {
+ nested_sync_control_from_vmcb02(svm);
+
+ /* Track VMRUNs that have made past consistency checking */
+ if (svm->nested.nested_run_pending &&
+ svm->vmcb->control.exit_code != SVM_EXIT_ERR)
+ ++vcpu->stat.nested_run;
+
+ svm->nested.nested_run_pending = 0;
+ }
+
+ svm->vmcb->control.tlb_ctl = TLB_CONTROL_DO_NOTHING;
+ vmcb_mark_all_clean(svm->vmcb);
+
+ /* if exit due to PF check for async PF */
+ if (svm->vmcb->control.exit_code == SVM_EXIT_EXCP_BASE + PF_VECTOR)
+ vcpu->arch.apf.host_apf_flags =
+ kvm_read_and_reset_apf_flags();
+
+ vcpu->arch.regs_avail &= ~SVM_REGS_LAZY_LOAD_SET;
+
+ /*
+ * We need to handle MC intercepts here before the vcpu has a chance to
+ * change the physical cpu
+ */
+ if (unlikely(svm->vmcb->control.exit_code ==
+ SVM_EXIT_EXCP_BASE + MC_VECTOR))
+ svm_handle_mce(vcpu);
+
+ trace_kvm_exit(vcpu, KVM_ISA_SVM);
+
+ svm_complete_interrupts(vcpu);
+
+ if (is_guest_mode(vcpu))
+ return EXIT_FASTPATH_NONE;
+
+ return svm_exit_handlers_fastpath(vcpu);
+}
+
+static void svm_load_mmu_pgd(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, hpa_t root_hpa,
+ int root_level)
+{
+ struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+ unsigned long cr3;
+
+ if (npt_enabled) {
+ svm->vmcb->control.nested_cr3 = __sme_set(root_hpa);
+ vmcb_mark_dirty(svm->vmcb, VMCB_NPT);
+
+ hv_track_root_tdp(vcpu, root_hpa);
+
+ cr3 = vcpu->arch.cr3;
+ } else if (root_level >= PT64_ROOT_4LEVEL) {
+ cr3 = __sme_set(root_hpa) | kvm_get_active_pcid(vcpu);
+ } else {
+ /* PCID in the guest should be impossible with a 32-bit MMU. */
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(kvm_get_active_pcid(vcpu));
+ cr3 = root_hpa;
+ }
+
+ svm->vmcb->save.cr3 = cr3;
+ vmcb_mark_dirty(svm->vmcb, VMCB_CR);
+}
+
+static void
+svm_patch_hypercall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned char *hypercall)
+{
+ /*
+ * Patch in the VMMCALL instruction:
+ */
+ hypercall[0] = 0x0f;
+ hypercall[1] = 0x01;
+ hypercall[2] = 0xd9;
+}
+
+/*
+ * The kvm parameter can be NULL (module initialization, or invocation before
+ * VM creation). Be sure to check the kvm parameter before using it.
+ */
+static bool svm_has_emulated_msr(struct kvm *kvm, u32 index)
+{
+ switch (index) {
+ case MSR_IA32_MCG_EXT_CTL:
+ case KVM_FIRST_EMULATED_VMX_MSR ... KVM_LAST_EMULATED_VMX_MSR:
+ return false;
+ case MSR_IA32_SMBASE:
+ if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_SMM))
+ return false;
+ /* SEV-ES guests do not support SMM, so report false */
+ if (kvm && sev_es_guest(kvm))
+ return false;
+ break;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+static void svm_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+
+ /*
+ * SVM doesn't provide a way to disable just XSAVES in the guest, KVM
+ * can only disable all variants of by disallowing CR4.OSXSAVE from
+ * being set. As a result, if the host has XSAVE and XSAVES, and the
+ * guest has XSAVE enabled, the guest can execute XSAVES without
+ * faulting. Treat XSAVES as enabled in this case regardless of
+ * whether it's advertised to the guest so that KVM context switches
+ * XSS on VM-Enter/VM-Exit. Failure to do so would effectively give
+ * the guest read/write access to the host's XSS.
+ */
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XSAVE) &&
+ boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XSAVES) &&
+ guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XSAVE))
+ kvm_governed_feature_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XSAVES);
+
+ kvm_governed_feature_check_and_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_NRIPS);
+ kvm_governed_feature_check_and_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_TSCRATEMSR);
+ kvm_governed_feature_check_and_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_LBRV);
+
+ /*
+ * Intercept VMLOAD if the vCPU mode is Intel in order to emulate that
+ * VMLOAD drops bits 63:32 of SYSENTER (ignoring the fact that exposing
+ * SVM on Intel is bonkers and extremely unlikely to work).
+ */
+ if (!guest_cpuid_is_intel(vcpu))
+ kvm_governed_feature_check_and_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_V_VMSAVE_VMLOAD);
+
+ kvm_governed_feature_check_and_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_PAUSEFILTER);
+ kvm_governed_feature_check_and_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_PFTHRESHOLD);
+ kvm_governed_feature_check_and_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VGIF);
+ kvm_governed_feature_check_and_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VNMI);
+
+ svm_recalc_instruction_intercepts(vcpu, svm);
+
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB))
+ set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, 0,
+ !!guest_has_pred_cmd_msr(vcpu));
+
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_FLUSH_L1D))
+ set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_FLUSH_CMD, 0,
+ !!guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_FLUSH_L1D));
+
+ if (sev_guest(vcpu->kvm))
+ sev_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(svm);
+
+ init_vmcb_after_set_cpuid(vcpu);
+}
+
+static bool svm_has_wbinvd_exit(void)
+{
+ return true;
+}
+
+#define PRE_EX(exit) { .exit_code = (exit), \
+ .stage = X86_ICPT_PRE_EXCEPT, }
+#define POST_EX(exit) { .exit_code = (exit), \
+ .stage = X86_ICPT_POST_EXCEPT, }
+#define POST_MEM(exit) { .exit_code = (exit), \
+ .stage = X86_ICPT_POST_MEMACCESS, }
+
+static const struct __x86_intercept {
+ u32 exit_code;
+ enum x86_intercept_stage stage;
+} x86_intercept_map[] = {
+ [x86_intercept_cr_read] = POST_EX(SVM_EXIT_READ_CR0),
+ [x86_intercept_cr_write] = POST_EX(SVM_EXIT_WRITE_CR0),
+ [x86_intercept_clts] = POST_EX(SVM_EXIT_WRITE_CR0),
+ [x86_intercept_lmsw] = POST_EX(SVM_EXIT_WRITE_CR0),
+ [x86_intercept_smsw] = POST_EX(SVM_EXIT_READ_CR0),
+ [x86_intercept_dr_read] = POST_EX(SVM_EXIT_READ_DR0),
+ [x86_intercept_dr_write] = POST_EX(SVM_EXIT_WRITE_DR0),
+ [x86_intercept_sldt] = POST_EX(SVM_EXIT_LDTR_READ),
+ [x86_intercept_str] = POST_EX(SVM_EXIT_TR_READ),
+ [x86_intercept_lldt] = POST_EX(SVM_EXIT_LDTR_WRITE),
+ [x86_intercept_ltr] = POST_EX(SVM_EXIT_TR_WRITE),
+ [x86_intercept_sgdt] = POST_EX(SVM_EXIT_GDTR_READ),
+ [x86_intercept_sidt] = POST_EX(SVM_EXIT_IDTR_READ),
+ [x86_intercept_lgdt] = POST_EX(SVM_EXIT_GDTR_WRITE),
+ [x86_intercept_lidt] = POST_EX(SVM_EXIT_IDTR_WRITE),
+ [x86_intercept_vmrun] = POST_EX(SVM_EXIT_VMRUN),
+ [x86_intercept_vmmcall] = POST_EX(SVM_EXIT_VMMCALL),
+ [x86_intercept_vmload] = POST_EX(SVM_EXIT_VMLOAD),
+ [x86_intercept_vmsave] = POST_EX(SVM_EXIT_VMSAVE),
+ [x86_intercept_stgi] = POST_EX(SVM_EXIT_STGI),
+ [x86_intercept_clgi] = POST_EX(SVM_EXIT_CLGI),
+ [x86_intercept_skinit] = POST_EX(SVM_EXIT_SKINIT),
+ [x86_intercept_invlpga] = POST_EX(SVM_EXIT_INVLPGA),
+ [x86_intercept_rdtscp] = POST_EX(SVM_EXIT_RDTSCP),
+ [x86_intercept_monitor] = POST_MEM(SVM_EXIT_MONITOR),
+ [x86_intercept_mwait] = POST_EX(SVM_EXIT_MWAIT),
+ [x86_intercept_invlpg] = POST_EX(SVM_EXIT_INVLPG),
+ [x86_intercept_invd] = POST_EX(SVM_EXIT_INVD),
+ [x86_intercept_wbinvd] = POST_EX(SVM_EXIT_WBINVD),
+ [x86_intercept_wrmsr] = POST_EX(SVM_EXIT_MSR),
+ [x86_intercept_rdtsc] = POST_EX(SVM_EXIT_RDTSC),
+ [x86_intercept_rdmsr] = POST_EX(SVM_EXIT_MSR),
+ [x86_intercept_rdpmc] = POST_EX(SVM_EXIT_RDPMC),
+ [x86_intercept_cpuid] = PRE_EX(SVM_EXIT_CPUID),
+ [x86_intercept_rsm] = PRE_EX(SVM_EXIT_RSM),
+ [x86_intercept_pause] = PRE_EX(SVM_EXIT_PAUSE),
+ [x86_intercept_pushf] = PRE_EX(SVM_EXIT_PUSHF),
+ [x86_intercept_popf] = PRE_EX(SVM_EXIT_POPF),
+ [x86_intercept_intn] = PRE_EX(SVM_EXIT_SWINT),
+ [x86_intercept_iret] = PRE_EX(SVM_EXIT_IRET),
+ [x86_intercept_icebp] = PRE_EX(SVM_EXIT_ICEBP),
+ [x86_intercept_hlt] = POST_EX(SVM_EXIT_HLT),
+ [x86_intercept_in] = POST_EX(SVM_EXIT_IOIO),
+ [x86_intercept_ins] = POST_EX(SVM_EXIT_IOIO),
+ [x86_intercept_out] = POST_EX(SVM_EXIT_IOIO),
+ [x86_intercept_outs] = POST_EX(SVM_EXIT_IOIO),
+ [x86_intercept_xsetbv] = PRE_EX(SVM_EXIT_XSETBV),
+};
+
+#undef PRE_EX
+#undef POST_EX
+#undef POST_MEM
+
+static int svm_check_intercept(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+ struct x86_instruction_info *info,
+ enum x86_intercept_stage stage,
+ struct x86_exception *exception)
+{
+ struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+ int vmexit, ret = X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
+ struct __x86_intercept icpt_info;
+ struct vmcb *vmcb = svm->vmcb;
+
+ if (info->intercept >= ARRAY_SIZE(x86_intercept_map))
+ goto out;
+
+ icpt_info = x86_intercept_map[info->intercept];
+
+ if (stage != icpt_info.stage)
+ goto out;
+
+ switch (icpt_info.exit_code) {
+ case SVM_EXIT_READ_CR0:
+ if (info->intercept == x86_intercept_cr_read)
+ icpt_info.exit_code += info->modrm_reg;
+ break;
+ case SVM_EXIT_WRITE_CR0: {
+ unsigned long cr0, val;
+
+ if (info->intercept == x86_intercept_cr_write)
+ icpt_info.exit_code += info->modrm_reg;
+
+ if (icpt_info.exit_code != SVM_EXIT_WRITE_CR0 ||
+ info->intercept == x86_intercept_clts)
+ break;
+
+ if (!(vmcb12_is_intercept(&svm->nested.ctl,
+ INTERCEPT_SELECTIVE_CR0)))
+ break;
+
+ cr0 = vcpu->arch.cr0 & ~SVM_CR0_SELECTIVE_MASK;
+ val = info->src_val & ~SVM_CR0_SELECTIVE_MASK;
+
+ if (info->intercept == x86_intercept_lmsw) {
+ cr0 &= 0xfUL;
+ val &= 0xfUL;
+ /* lmsw can't clear PE - catch this here */
+ if (cr0 & X86_CR0_PE)
+ val |= X86_CR0_PE;
+ }
+
+ if (cr0 ^ val)
+ icpt_info.exit_code = SVM_EXIT_CR0_SEL_WRITE;
+
+ break;
+ }
+ case SVM_EXIT_READ_DR0:
+ case SVM_EXIT_WRITE_DR0:
+ icpt_info.exit_code += info->modrm_reg;
+ break;
+ case SVM_EXIT_MSR:
+ if (info->intercept == x86_intercept_wrmsr)
+ vmcb->control.exit_info_1 = 1;
+ else
+ vmcb->control.exit_info_1 = 0;
+ break;
+ case SVM_EXIT_PAUSE:
+ /*
+ * We get this for NOP only, but pause
+ * is rep not, check this here
+ */
+ if (info->rep_prefix != REPE_PREFIX)
+ goto out;
+ break;
+ case SVM_EXIT_IOIO: {
+ u64 exit_info;
+ u32 bytes;
+
+ if (info->intercept == x86_intercept_in ||
+ info->intercept == x86_intercept_ins) {
+ exit_info = ((info->src_val & 0xffff) << 16) |
+ SVM_IOIO_TYPE_MASK;
+ bytes = info->dst_bytes;
+ } else {
+ exit_info = (info->dst_val & 0xffff) << 16;
+ bytes = info->src_bytes;
+ }
+
+ if (info->intercept == x86_intercept_outs ||
+ info->intercept == x86_intercept_ins)
+ exit_info |= SVM_IOIO_STR_MASK;
+
+ if (info->rep_prefix)
+ exit_info |= SVM_IOIO_REP_MASK;
+
+ bytes = min(bytes, 4u);
+
+ exit_info |= bytes << SVM_IOIO_SIZE_SHIFT;
+
+ exit_info |= (u32)info->ad_bytes << (SVM_IOIO_ASIZE_SHIFT - 1);
+
+ vmcb->control.exit_info_1 = exit_info;
+ vmcb->control.exit_info_2 = info->next_rip;
+
+ break;
+ }
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* TODO: Advertise NRIPS to guest hypervisor unconditionally */
+ if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_NRIPS))
+ vmcb->control.next_rip = info->next_rip;
+ vmcb->control.exit_code = icpt_info.exit_code;
+ vmexit = nested_svm_exit_handled(svm);
+
+ ret = (vmexit == NESTED_EXIT_DONE) ? X86EMUL_INTERCEPTED
+ : X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
+
+out:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static void svm_handle_exit_irqoff(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ if (to_svm(vcpu)->vmcb->control.exit_code == SVM_EXIT_INTR)
+ vcpu->arch.at_instruction_boundary = true;
+}
+
+static void svm_sched_in(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu)
+{
+ if (!kvm_pause_in_guest(vcpu->kvm))
+ shrink_ple_window(vcpu);
+}
+
+static void svm_setup_mce(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ /* [63:9] are reserved. */
+ vcpu->arch.mcg_cap &= 0x1ff;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_SMM
+bool svm_smi_blocked(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+
+ /* Per APM Vol.2 15.22.2 "Response to SMI" */
+ if (!gif_set(svm))
+ return true;
+
+ return is_smm(vcpu);
+}
+
+static int svm_smi_allowed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool for_injection)
+{
+ struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+ if (svm->nested.nested_run_pending)
+ return -EBUSY;
+
+ if (svm_smi_blocked(vcpu))
+ return 0;
+
+ /* An SMI must not be injected into L2 if it's supposed to VM-Exit. */
+ if (for_injection && is_guest_mode(vcpu) && nested_exit_on_smi(svm))
+ return -EBUSY;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int svm_enter_smm(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, union kvm_smram *smram)
+{
+ struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+ struct kvm_host_map map_save;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (!is_guest_mode(vcpu))
+ return 0;
+
+ /*
+ * 32-bit SMRAM format doesn't preserve EFER and SVM state. Userspace is
+ * responsible for ensuring nested SVM and SMIs are mutually exclusive.
+ */
+
+ if (!guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_LM))
+ return 1;
+
+ smram->smram64.svm_guest_flag = 1;
+ smram->smram64.svm_guest_vmcb_gpa = svm->nested.vmcb12_gpa;
+
+ svm->vmcb->save.rax = vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RAX];
+ svm->vmcb->save.rsp = vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RSP];
+ svm->vmcb->save.rip = vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RIP];
+
+ ret = nested_svm_simple_vmexit(svm, SVM_EXIT_SW);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ /*
+ * KVM uses VMCB01 to store L1 host state while L2 runs but
+ * VMCB01 is going to be used during SMM and thus the state will
+ * be lost. Temporary save non-VMLOAD/VMSAVE state to the host save
+ * area pointed to by MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA. APM guarantees that the
+ * format of the area is identical to guest save area offsetted
+ * by 0x400 (matches the offset of 'struct vmcb_save_area'
+ * within 'struct vmcb'). Note: HSAVE area may also be used by
+ * L1 hypervisor to save additional host context (e.g. KVM does
+ * that, see svm_prepare_switch_to_guest()) which must be
+ * preserved.
+ */
+ if (kvm_vcpu_map(vcpu, gpa_to_gfn(svm->nested.hsave_msr), &map_save))
+ return 1;
+
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct vmcb, save) != 0x400);
+
+ svm_copy_vmrun_state(map_save.hva + 0x400,
+ &svm->vmcb01.ptr->save);
+
+ kvm_vcpu_unmap(vcpu, &map_save, true);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int svm_leave_smm(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, const union kvm_smram *smram)
+{
+ struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+ struct kvm_host_map map, map_save;
+ struct vmcb *vmcb12;
+ int ret;
+
+ const struct kvm_smram_state_64 *smram64 = &smram->smram64;
+
+ if (!guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_LM))
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Non-zero if SMI arrived while vCPU was in guest mode. */
+ if (!smram64->svm_guest_flag)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (!guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SVM))
+ return 1;
+
+ if (!(smram64->efer & EFER_SVME))
+ return 1;
+
+ if (kvm_vcpu_map(vcpu, gpa_to_gfn(smram64->svm_guest_vmcb_gpa), &map))
+ return 1;
+
+ ret = 1;
+ if (kvm_vcpu_map(vcpu, gpa_to_gfn(svm->nested.hsave_msr), &map_save))
+ goto unmap_map;
+
+ if (svm_allocate_nested(svm))
+ goto unmap_save;
+
+ /*
+ * Restore L1 host state from L1 HSAVE area as VMCB01 was
+ * used during SMM (see svm_enter_smm())
+ */
+
+ svm_copy_vmrun_state(&svm->vmcb01.ptr->save, map_save.hva + 0x400);
+
+ /*
+ * Enter the nested guest now
+ */
+
+ vmcb_mark_all_dirty(svm->vmcb01.ptr);
+
+ vmcb12 = map.hva;
+ nested_copy_vmcb_control_to_cache(svm, &vmcb12->control);
+ nested_copy_vmcb_save_to_cache(svm, &vmcb12->save);
+ ret = enter_svm_guest_mode(vcpu, smram64->svm_guest_vmcb_gpa, vmcb12, false);
+
+ if (ret)
+ goto unmap_save;
+
+ svm->nested.nested_run_pending = 1;
+
+unmap_save:
+ kvm_vcpu_unmap(vcpu, &map_save, true);
+unmap_map:
+ kvm_vcpu_unmap(vcpu, &map, true);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static void svm_enable_smi_window(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+
+ if (!gif_set(svm)) {
+ if (vgif)
+ svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_STGI);
+ /* STGI will cause a vm exit */
+ } else {
+ /* We must be in SMM; RSM will cause a vmexit anyway. */
+ }
+}
+#endif
+
+static bool svm_can_emulate_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int emul_type,
+ void *insn, int insn_len)
+{
+ bool smep, smap, is_user;
+ u64 error_code;
+
+ /* Emulation is always possible when KVM has access to all guest state. */
+ if (!sev_guest(vcpu->kvm))
+ return true;
+
+ /* #UD and #GP should never be intercepted for SEV guests. */
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(emul_type & (EMULTYPE_TRAP_UD |
+ EMULTYPE_TRAP_UD_FORCED |
+ EMULTYPE_VMWARE_GP));
+
+ /*
+ * Emulation is impossible for SEV-ES guests as KVM doesn't have access
+ * to guest register state.
+ */
+ if (sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm))
+ return false;
+
+ /*
+ * Emulation is possible if the instruction is already decoded, e.g.
+ * when completing I/O after returning from userspace.
+ */
+ if (emul_type & EMULTYPE_NO_DECODE)
+ return true;
+
+ /*
+ * Emulation is possible for SEV guests if and only if a prefilled
+ * buffer containing the bytes of the intercepted instruction is
+ * available. SEV guest memory is encrypted with a guest specific key
+ * and cannot be decrypted by KVM, i.e. KVM would read cyphertext and
+ * decode garbage.
+ *
+ * If KVM is NOT trying to simply skip an instruction, inject #UD if
+ * KVM reached this point without an instruction buffer. In practice,
+ * this path should never be hit by a well-behaved guest, e.g. KVM
+ * doesn't intercept #UD or #GP for SEV guests, but this path is still
+ * theoretically reachable, e.g. via unaccelerated fault-like AVIC
+ * access, and needs to be handled by KVM to avoid putting the guest
+ * into an infinite loop. Injecting #UD is somewhat arbitrary, but
+ * its the least awful option given lack of insight into the guest.
+ *
+ * If KVM is trying to skip an instruction, simply resume the guest.
+ * If a #NPF occurs while the guest is vectoring an INT3/INTO, then KVM
+ * will attempt to re-inject the INT3/INTO and skip the instruction.
+ * In that scenario, retrying the INT3/INTO and hoping the guest will
+ * make forward progress is the only option that has a chance of
+ * success (and in practice it will work the vast majority of the time).
+ */
+ if (unlikely(!insn)) {
+ if (!(emul_type & EMULTYPE_SKIP))
+ kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, UD_VECTOR);
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Emulate for SEV guests if the insn buffer is not empty. The buffer
+ * will be empty if the DecodeAssist microcode cannot fetch bytes for
+ * the faulting instruction because the code fetch itself faulted, e.g.
+ * the guest attempted to fetch from emulated MMIO or a guest page
+ * table used to translate CS:RIP resides in emulated MMIO.
+ */
+ if (likely(insn_len))
+ return true;
+
+ /*
+ * Detect and workaround Errata 1096 Fam_17h_00_0Fh.
+ *
+ * Errata:
+ * When CPU raises #NPF on guest data access and vCPU CR4.SMAP=1, it is
+ * possible that CPU microcode implementing DecodeAssist will fail to
+ * read guest memory at CS:RIP and vmcb.GuestIntrBytes will incorrectly
+ * be '0'. This happens because microcode reads CS:RIP using a _data_
+ * loap uop with CPL=0 privileges. If the load hits a SMAP #PF, ucode
+ * gives up and does not fill the instruction bytes buffer.
+ *
+ * As above, KVM reaches this point iff the VM is an SEV guest, the CPU
+ * supports DecodeAssist, a #NPF was raised, KVM's page fault handler
+ * triggered emulation (e.g. for MMIO), and the CPU returned 0 in the
+ * GuestIntrBytes field of the VMCB.
+ *
+ * This does _not_ mean that the erratum has been encountered, as the
+ * DecodeAssist will also fail if the load for CS:RIP hits a legitimate
+ * #PF, e.g. if the guest attempt to execute from emulated MMIO and
+ * encountered a reserved/not-present #PF.
+ *
+ * To hit the erratum, the following conditions must be true:
+ * 1. CR4.SMAP=1 (obviously).
+ * 2. CR4.SMEP=0 || CPL=3. If SMEP=1 and CPL<3, the erratum cannot
+ * have been hit as the guest would have encountered a SMEP
+ * violation #PF, not a #NPF.
+ * 3. The #NPF is not due to a code fetch, in which case failure to
+ * retrieve the instruction bytes is legitimate (see abvoe).
+ *
+ * In addition, don't apply the erratum workaround if the #NPF occurred
+ * while translating guest page tables (see below).
+ */
+ error_code = to_svm(vcpu)->vmcb->control.exit_info_1;
+ if (error_code & (PFERR_GUEST_PAGE_MASK | PFERR_FETCH_MASK))
+ goto resume_guest;
+
+ smep = kvm_is_cr4_bit_set(vcpu, X86_CR4_SMEP);
+ smap = kvm_is_cr4_bit_set(vcpu, X86_CR4_SMAP);
+ is_user = svm_get_cpl(vcpu) == 3;
+ if (smap && (!smep || is_user)) {
+ pr_err_ratelimited("SEV Guest triggered AMD Erratum 1096\n");
+
+ /*
+ * If the fault occurred in userspace, arbitrarily inject #GP
+ * to avoid killing the guest and to hopefully avoid confusing
+ * the guest kernel too much, e.g. injecting #PF would not be
+ * coherent with respect to the guest's page tables. Request
+ * triple fault if the fault occurred in the kernel as there's
+ * no fault that KVM can inject without confusing the guest.
+ * In practice, the triple fault is moot as no sane SEV kernel
+ * will execute from user memory while also running with SMAP=1.
+ */
+ if (is_user)
+ kvm_inject_gp(vcpu, 0);
+ else
+ kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_TRIPLE_FAULT, vcpu);
+ }
+
+resume_guest:
+ /*
+ * If the erratum was not hit, simply resume the guest and let it fault
+ * again. While awful, e.g. the vCPU may get stuck in an infinite loop
+ * if the fault is at CPL=0, it's the lesser of all evils. Exiting to
+ * userspace will kill the guest, and letting the emulator read garbage
+ * will yield random behavior and potentially corrupt the guest.
+ *
+ * Simply resuming the guest is technically not a violation of the SEV
+ * architecture. AMD's APM states that all code fetches and page table
+ * accesses for SEV guest are encrypted, regardless of the C-Bit. The
+ * APM also states that encrypted accesses to MMIO are "ignored", but
+ * doesn't explicitly define "ignored", i.e. doing nothing and letting
+ * the guest spin is technically "ignoring" the access.
+ */
+ return false;
+}
+
+static bool svm_apic_init_signal_blocked(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+
+ return !gif_set(svm);
+}
+
+static void svm_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u8 vector)
+{
+ if (!sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm))
+ return kvm_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector(vcpu, vector);
+
+ sev_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector(vcpu, vector);
+}
+
+static void svm_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+ avic_vm_destroy(kvm);
+ sev_vm_destroy(kvm);
+}
+
+static int svm_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+ if (!pause_filter_count || !pause_filter_thresh)
+ kvm->arch.pause_in_guest = true;
+
+ if (enable_apicv) {
+ int ret = avic_vm_init(kvm);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static struct kvm_x86_ops svm_x86_ops __initdata = {
+ .name = KBUILD_MODNAME,
+
+ .check_processor_compatibility = svm_check_processor_compat,
+
+ .hardware_unsetup = svm_hardware_unsetup,
+ .hardware_enable = svm_hardware_enable,
+ .hardware_disable = svm_hardware_disable,
+ .has_emulated_msr = svm_has_emulated_msr,
+
+ .vcpu_create = svm_vcpu_create,
+ .vcpu_free = svm_vcpu_free,
+ .vcpu_reset = svm_vcpu_reset,
+
+ .vm_size = sizeof(struct kvm_svm),
+ .vm_init = svm_vm_init,
+ .vm_destroy = svm_vm_destroy,
+
+ .prepare_switch_to_guest = svm_prepare_switch_to_guest,
+ .vcpu_load = svm_vcpu_load,
+ .vcpu_put = svm_vcpu_put,
+ .vcpu_blocking = avic_vcpu_blocking,
+ .vcpu_unblocking = avic_vcpu_unblocking,
+
+ .update_exception_bitmap = svm_update_exception_bitmap,
+ .get_msr_feature = svm_get_msr_feature,
+ .get_msr = svm_get_msr,
+ .set_msr = svm_set_msr,
+ .get_segment_base = svm_get_segment_base,
+ .get_segment = svm_get_segment,
+ .set_segment = svm_set_segment,
+ .get_cpl = svm_get_cpl,
+ .get_cs_db_l_bits = svm_get_cs_db_l_bits,
+ .is_valid_cr0 = svm_is_valid_cr0,
+ .set_cr0 = svm_set_cr0,
+ .post_set_cr3 = sev_post_set_cr3,
+ .is_valid_cr4 = svm_is_valid_cr4,
+ .set_cr4 = svm_set_cr4,
+ .set_efer = svm_set_efer,
+ .get_idt = svm_get_idt,
+ .set_idt = svm_set_idt,
+ .get_gdt = svm_get_gdt,
+ .set_gdt = svm_set_gdt,
+ .set_dr7 = svm_set_dr7,
+ .sync_dirty_debug_regs = svm_sync_dirty_debug_regs,
+ .cache_reg = svm_cache_reg,
+ .get_rflags = svm_get_rflags,
+ .set_rflags = svm_set_rflags,
+ .get_if_flag = svm_get_if_flag,
+
+ .flush_tlb_all = svm_flush_tlb_all,
+ .flush_tlb_current = svm_flush_tlb_current,
+ .flush_tlb_gva = svm_flush_tlb_gva,
+ .flush_tlb_guest = svm_flush_tlb_asid,
+
+ .vcpu_pre_run = svm_vcpu_pre_run,
+ .vcpu_run = svm_vcpu_run,
+ .handle_exit = svm_handle_exit,
+ .skip_emulated_instruction = svm_skip_emulated_instruction,
+ .update_emulated_instruction = NULL,
+ .set_interrupt_shadow = svm_set_interrupt_shadow,
+ .get_interrupt_shadow = svm_get_interrupt_shadow,
+ .patch_hypercall = svm_patch_hypercall,
+ .inject_irq = svm_inject_irq,
+ .inject_nmi = svm_inject_nmi,
+ .is_vnmi_pending = svm_is_vnmi_pending,
+ .set_vnmi_pending = svm_set_vnmi_pending,
+ .inject_exception = svm_inject_exception,
+ .cancel_injection = svm_cancel_injection,
+ .interrupt_allowed = svm_interrupt_allowed,
+ .nmi_allowed = svm_nmi_allowed,
+ .get_nmi_mask = svm_get_nmi_mask,
+ .set_nmi_mask = svm_set_nmi_mask,
+ .enable_nmi_window = svm_enable_nmi_window,
+ .enable_irq_window = svm_enable_irq_window,
+ .update_cr8_intercept = svm_update_cr8_intercept,
+ .set_virtual_apic_mode = avic_refresh_virtual_apic_mode,
+ .refresh_apicv_exec_ctrl = avic_refresh_apicv_exec_ctrl,
+ .apicv_post_state_restore = avic_apicv_post_state_restore,
+ .required_apicv_inhibits = AVIC_REQUIRED_APICV_INHIBITS,
+
+ .get_exit_info = svm_get_exit_info,
+
+ .vcpu_after_set_cpuid = svm_vcpu_after_set_cpuid,
+
+ .has_wbinvd_exit = svm_has_wbinvd_exit,
+
+ .get_l2_tsc_offset = svm_get_l2_tsc_offset,
+ .get_l2_tsc_multiplier = svm_get_l2_tsc_multiplier,
+ .write_tsc_offset = svm_write_tsc_offset,
+ .write_tsc_multiplier = svm_write_tsc_multiplier,
+
+ .load_mmu_pgd = svm_load_mmu_pgd,
+
+ .check_intercept = svm_check_intercept,
+ .handle_exit_irqoff = svm_handle_exit_irqoff,
+
+ .request_immediate_exit = __kvm_request_immediate_exit,
+
+ .sched_in = svm_sched_in,
+
+ .nested_ops = &svm_nested_ops,
+
+ .deliver_interrupt = svm_deliver_interrupt,
+ .pi_update_irte = avic_pi_update_irte,
+ .setup_mce = svm_setup_mce,
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_SMM
+ .smi_allowed = svm_smi_allowed,
+ .enter_smm = svm_enter_smm,
+ .leave_smm = svm_leave_smm,
+ .enable_smi_window = svm_enable_smi_window,
+#endif
+
+ .mem_enc_ioctl = sev_mem_enc_ioctl,
+ .mem_enc_register_region = sev_mem_enc_register_region,
+ .mem_enc_unregister_region = sev_mem_enc_unregister_region,
+ .guest_memory_reclaimed = sev_guest_memory_reclaimed,
+
+ .vm_copy_enc_context_from = sev_vm_copy_enc_context_from,
+ .vm_move_enc_context_from = sev_vm_move_enc_context_from,
+
+ .can_emulate_instruction = svm_can_emulate_instruction,
+
+ .apic_init_signal_blocked = svm_apic_init_signal_blocked,
+
+ .msr_filter_changed = svm_msr_filter_changed,
+ .complete_emulated_msr = svm_complete_emulated_msr,
+
+ .vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector = svm_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector,
+ .vcpu_get_apicv_inhibit_reasons = avic_vcpu_get_apicv_inhibit_reasons,
+};
+
+/*
+ * The default MMIO mask is a single bit (excluding the present bit),
+ * which could conflict with the memory encryption bit. Check for
+ * memory encryption support and override the default MMIO mask if
+ * memory encryption is enabled.
+ */
+static __init void svm_adjust_mmio_mask(void)
+{
+ unsigned int enc_bit, mask_bit;
+ u64 msr, mask;
+
+ /* If there is no memory encryption support, use existing mask */
+ if (cpuid_eax(0x80000000) < 0x8000001f)
+ return;
+
+ /* If memory encryption is not enabled, use existing mask */
+ rdmsrl(MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG, msr);
+ if (!(msr & MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPT))
+ return;
+
+ enc_bit = cpuid_ebx(0x8000001f) & 0x3f;
+ mask_bit = boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits;
+
+ /* Increment the mask bit if it is the same as the encryption bit */
+ if (enc_bit == mask_bit)
+ mask_bit++;
+
+ /*
+ * If the mask bit location is below 52, then some bits above the
+ * physical addressing limit will always be reserved, so use the
+ * rsvd_bits() function to generate the mask. This mask, along with
+ * the present bit, will be used to generate a page fault with
+ * PFER.RSV = 1.
+ *
+ * If the mask bit location is 52 (or above), then clear the mask.
+ */
+ mask = (mask_bit < 52) ? rsvd_bits(mask_bit, 51) | PT_PRESENT_MASK : 0;
+
+ kvm_mmu_set_mmio_spte_mask(mask, mask, PT_WRITABLE_MASK | PT_USER_MASK);
+}
+
+static __init void svm_set_cpu_caps(void)
+{
+ kvm_set_cpu_caps();
+
+ kvm_caps.supported_perf_cap = 0;
+ kvm_caps.supported_xss = 0;
+
+ /* CPUID 0x80000001 and 0x8000000A (SVM features) */
+ if (nested) {
+ kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_SVM);
+ kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_VMCBCLEAN);
+
+ if (nrips)
+ kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_NRIPS);
+
+ if (npt_enabled)
+ kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_NPT);
+
+ if (tsc_scaling)
+ kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_TSCRATEMSR);
+
+ if (vls)
+ kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_V_VMSAVE_VMLOAD);
+ if (lbrv)
+ kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_LBRV);
+
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PAUSEFILTER))
+ kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_PAUSEFILTER);
+
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PFTHRESHOLD))
+ kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_PFTHRESHOLD);
+
+ if (vgif)
+ kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_VGIF);
+
+ if (vnmi)
+ kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_VNMI);
+
+ /* Nested VM can receive #VMEXIT instead of triggering #GP */
+ kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_SVME_ADDR_CHK);
+ }
+
+ /* CPUID 0x80000008 */
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LS_CFG_SSBD) ||
+ boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD))
+ kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD);
+
+ if (enable_pmu) {
+ /*
+ * Enumerate support for PERFCTR_CORE if and only if KVM has
+ * access to enough counters to virtualize "core" support,
+ * otherwise limit vPMU support to the legacy number of counters.
+ */
+ if (kvm_pmu_cap.num_counters_gp < AMD64_NUM_COUNTERS_CORE)
+ kvm_pmu_cap.num_counters_gp = min(AMD64_NUM_COUNTERS,
+ kvm_pmu_cap.num_counters_gp);
+ else
+ kvm_cpu_cap_check_and_set(X86_FEATURE_PERFCTR_CORE);
+
+ if (kvm_pmu_cap.version != 2 ||
+ !kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_PERFCTR_CORE))
+ kvm_cpu_cap_clear(X86_FEATURE_PERFMON_V2);
+ }
+
+ /* CPUID 0x8000001F (SME/SEV features) */
+ sev_set_cpu_caps();
+}
+
+static __init int svm_hardware_setup(void)
+{
+ int cpu;
+ struct page *iopm_pages;
+ void *iopm_va;
+ int r;
+ unsigned int order = get_order(IOPM_SIZE);
+
+ /*
+ * NX is required for shadow paging and for NPT if the NX huge pages
+ * mitigation is enabled.
+ */
+ if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_NX)) {
+ pr_err_ratelimited("NX (Execute Disable) not supported\n");
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ }
+ kvm_enable_efer_bits(EFER_NX);
+
+ iopm_pages = alloc_pages(GFP_KERNEL, order);
+
+ if (!iopm_pages)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ iopm_va = page_address(iopm_pages);
+ memset(iopm_va, 0xff, PAGE_SIZE * (1 << order));
+ iopm_base = page_to_pfn(iopm_pages) << PAGE_SHIFT;
+
+ init_msrpm_offsets();
+
+ kvm_caps.supported_xcr0 &= ~(XFEATURE_MASK_BNDREGS |
+ XFEATURE_MASK_BNDCSR);
+
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_FXSR_OPT))
+ kvm_enable_efer_bits(EFER_FFXSR);
+
+ if (tsc_scaling) {
+ if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_TSCRATEMSR)) {
+ tsc_scaling = false;
+ } else {
+ pr_info("TSC scaling supported\n");
+ kvm_caps.has_tsc_control = true;
+ }
+ }
+ kvm_caps.max_tsc_scaling_ratio = SVM_TSC_RATIO_MAX;
+ kvm_caps.tsc_scaling_ratio_frac_bits = 32;
+
+ tsc_aux_uret_slot = kvm_add_user_return_msr(MSR_TSC_AUX);
+
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AUTOIBRS))
+ kvm_enable_efer_bits(EFER_AUTOIBRS);
+
+ /* Check for pause filtering support */
+ if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PAUSEFILTER)) {
+ pause_filter_count = 0;
+ pause_filter_thresh = 0;
+ } else if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PFTHRESHOLD)) {
+ pause_filter_thresh = 0;
+ }
+
+ if (nested) {
+ pr_info("Nested Virtualization enabled\n");
+ kvm_enable_efer_bits(EFER_SVME | EFER_LMSLE);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * KVM's MMU doesn't support using 2-level paging for itself, and thus
+ * NPT isn't supported if the host is using 2-level paging since host
+ * CR4 is unchanged on VMRUN.
+ */
+ if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_64) && !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_PAE))
+ npt_enabled = false;
+
+ if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_NPT))
+ npt_enabled = false;
+
+ /* Force VM NPT level equal to the host's paging level */
+ kvm_configure_mmu(npt_enabled, get_npt_level(),
+ get_npt_level(), PG_LEVEL_1G);
+ pr_info("Nested Paging %sabled\n", npt_enabled ? "en" : "dis");
+
+ /* Setup shadow_me_value and shadow_me_mask */
+ kvm_mmu_set_me_spte_mask(sme_me_mask, sme_me_mask);
+
+ svm_adjust_mmio_mask();
+
+ nrips = nrips && boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_NRIPS);
+
+ /*
+ * Note, SEV setup consumes npt_enabled and enable_mmio_caching (which
+ * may be modified by svm_adjust_mmio_mask()), as well as nrips.
+ */
+ sev_hardware_setup();
+
+ svm_hv_hardware_setup();
+
+ for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
+ r = svm_cpu_init(cpu);
+ if (r)
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ enable_apicv = avic = avic && avic_hardware_setup();
+
+ if (!enable_apicv) {
+ svm_x86_ops.vcpu_blocking = NULL;
+ svm_x86_ops.vcpu_unblocking = NULL;
+ svm_x86_ops.vcpu_get_apicv_inhibit_reasons = NULL;
+ } else if (!x2avic_enabled) {
+ svm_x86_ops.allow_apicv_in_x2apic_without_x2apic_virtualization = true;
+ }
+
+ if (vls) {
+ if (!npt_enabled ||
+ !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_V_VMSAVE_VMLOAD) ||
+ !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_64)) {
+ vls = false;
+ } else {
+ pr_info("Virtual VMLOAD VMSAVE supported\n");
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SVME_ADDR_CHK))
+ svm_gp_erratum_intercept = false;
+
+ if (vgif) {
+ if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_VGIF))
+ vgif = false;
+ else
+ pr_info("Virtual GIF supported\n");
+ }
+
+ vnmi = vgif && vnmi && boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_VNMI);
+ if (vnmi)
+ pr_info("Virtual NMI enabled\n");
+
+ if (!vnmi) {
+ svm_x86_ops.is_vnmi_pending = NULL;
+ svm_x86_ops.set_vnmi_pending = NULL;
+ }
+
+
+ if (lbrv) {
+ if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LBRV))
+ lbrv = false;
+ else
+ pr_info("LBR virtualization supported\n");
+ }
+
+ if (!enable_pmu)
+ pr_info("PMU virtualization is disabled\n");
+
+ svm_set_cpu_caps();
+
+ /*
+ * It seems that on AMD processors PTE's accessed bit is
+ * being set by the CPU hardware before the NPF vmexit.
+ * This is not expected behaviour and our tests fail because
+ * of it.
+ * A workaround here is to disable support for
+ * GUEST_MAXPHYADDR < HOST_MAXPHYADDR if NPT is enabled.
+ * In this case userspace can know if there is support using
+ * KVM_CAP_SMALLER_MAXPHYADDR extension and decide how to handle
+ * it
+ * If future AMD CPU models change the behaviour described above,
+ * this variable can be changed accordingly
+ */
+ allow_smaller_maxphyaddr = !npt_enabled;
+
+ return 0;
+
+err:
+ svm_hardware_unsetup();
+ return r;
+}
+
+
+static struct kvm_x86_init_ops svm_init_ops __initdata = {
+ .hardware_setup = svm_hardware_setup,
+
+ .runtime_ops = &svm_x86_ops,
+ .pmu_ops = &amd_pmu_ops,
+};
+
+static void __svm_exit(void)
+{
+ kvm_x86_vendor_exit();
+
+ cpu_emergency_unregister_virt_callback(svm_emergency_disable);
+}
+
+static int __init svm_init(void)
+{
+ int r;
+
+ __unused_size_checks();
+
+ if (!kvm_is_svm_supported())
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+ r = kvm_x86_vendor_init(&svm_init_ops);
+ if (r)
+ return r;
+
+ cpu_emergency_register_virt_callback(svm_emergency_disable);
+
+ /*
+ * Common KVM initialization _must_ come last, after this, /dev/kvm is
+ * exposed to userspace!
+ */
+ r = kvm_init(sizeof(struct vcpu_svm), __alignof__(struct vcpu_svm),
+ THIS_MODULE);
+ if (r)
+ goto err_kvm_init;
+
+ return 0;
+
+err_kvm_init:
+ __svm_exit();
+ return r;
+}
+
+static void __exit svm_exit(void)
+{
+ kvm_exit();
+ __svm_exit();
+}
+
+module_init(svm_init)
+module_exit(svm_exit)